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The General Staff during the Algerian War of Liberation between Military Structuring and Political Aspirations (1960–1962)

هيئة الأركان العامة أثناء ثورة التحرير الجزائرية بين الهيكلة العسكرية والتطلعات السياسية (1960-1962)

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Abstract:

This article examines the General Staff of the National Liberation Army (ALN) between 1960 and 1962, focusing on the conditions of its emergence, its military structuring, and its interaction with the political leadership represented by the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic and the National Council of the Algerian Revolution. It highlights the central place of the General Staff within the revolutionary apparatus and its role in the transition from the logic of armed struggle to the logic of state-building on the eve of independence. The study underlines how the rising weight of the military institution reshaped political decision-making and contributed to redefining the balance between civilian and military actors. By analysing this experience, the article sheds light on the historical roots of the complex relationship

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between politics and the army in independent Algeria and on the way military power and revolutionary legitimacy converged in the hands of the General Staff during the crucial final phase of the war of liberation

Keywords: Independence; Algerian War of Liberation; Provisional Government; Iinternal conflicts; General Staff.

الملخص:

يتناول المقال موضـــوع هيئة الأركان العامة لجيش التحرير الوطني خلال المرحلة 1960-1962، من حيث ظروف نشـــأتها، هيكلتها العســكرية، وتفاعلها مع القيادة الســياســية ممثلة في الحكومة المؤقتة والمجلس الوطني للثورة الجزائرية، ويركّز على موقع هذه الهيئة داخل الجهاز الثوري ودورها في الانتقال من منطق الثورة إلى منطق الدولة عشية الاستقلال.

تنبع أهمية الموضوع من كونه يسلّط الضوء على لحظة مفصلية في تاريخ الثورة، حيث تزايد وزن المؤسسة العسكرية وتأثيرها في صنع القرار السياسي، ويساعد تحليل تجربة هيئة الأركان على فهم جذور العلاقة المعقّدة بين السياسي والعسكري في الجزائر المستقلة، وما نتج عنها من أزمات كأزمة صيف 1962.

نهدف من خلال هاته الورقة البحثية إلى تحليل الســياق الذي أدى إلى بروز هيئة الأركان العامة بصـــيغتها التنظيمية المتقدمة على الحدود الشرقية والغربية، ودراسة أثر تشكيلها على الأداء العسكري: التجنيد، التسليح، الانضـــباط، وتوحيد القيادة، مع تفكيك طبيعة العلاقة بين هيئة الأركان والحكومة المؤقتة والمجلس الوطني، وحدود التكامل أو التنافس بينهما.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الاستقلال؛ الثورة التحريرية؛ الحكومة المؤقتة؛ الخلافات الداخلية؛ هيئة الأركان.

Introduction:

The General Staff occupied a pivotal position during the Algerian War of Liberation, as it was responsible for organizing and directing military action in support of the Revolution’s objectives. As the conflict developed, it evolved from a military structure into an influential actor with a role that extended into the political sphere. The importance of this topic lies in its ability to highlight the impact of this institution on the internal balance of the National Liberation Front and on the shaping of independent Algeria’s future.

This study aims to analyze the role of the General Staff by highlighting its military functions, clarifying its relationship with the political leadership, and determining its influence on the course of the Revolution. It also seeks to show the conditions that enabled its emergence in its advanced organizational form. In addition, it examines its role in managing military operations and in shaping internal balances on the eve of independence. The study raises the following general question: to what extent did the General Staff play a decisive role in organizing military action and influencing the political course of the Algerian Revolution during its final phase?

To answer this question, the study adopts the historical-analytical method. It traces the evolution of the General Staff, analyzes its organizational structure and functions, and examines the interaction between military and political factors during the final phase of the Algerian Revolution.

1. The Military Strategy of the National Liberation Army from the Outbreak Phase to the Post-Soummam Congress Period 1954–1958

Despite the difficult conditions surrounding the outbreak of the Algerian War of Liberation, the cohesion of the revolutionary ranks and the commitment of the National Liberation Army enabled the Revolution to overcome its initial challenges. The mujahideen demonstrated remarkable combat effectiveness, disproving French claims that the events of 1 November 1954 were merely temporary disturbances. Instead, the Revolution clearly aimed at achieving national independence and restoring Algerian sovereignty.

Following the outbreak of the Revolution, a close relationship developed between the National Liberation Front and the National Liberation Army, based on discipline, collective responsibility, and organizational coordination. The Front assumed a leading role through its institutions, promoting collective decision-making and overseeing the revolutionary process in accordance with evolving circumstances.

The FLN and ALN brought together national forces committed to directing the struggle against French colonialism. Their strategy focused on mobilizing the country's human and material resources, strengthening national organization, and consolidating revolutionary authority in liberated and controlled areas to ensure the success of the liberation movement[(1)].

The early operations of the National Liberation Army developed in successive stages despite various obstacles that affected the course of armed struggle. Nevertheless, the Revolution achieved notable success in several regions of Algeria, confirming its growing presence on the ground. In its initial phase, the historic Group of Six relied on mobilizing the popular base, particularly tribes and local communities influenced by traditional notables, which required direct contact between the leadership and the population to ensure effective engagement and protection from risks.

The strategy of the National Liberation Army succeeded in destabilizing French forces during the early years of the Revolution, despite limited resources. It was based on guerrilla warfare, economic sabotage, popular support, and

external assistance. With the intensification of French repression, revolutionary tactics gradually evolved, paving the way for more organized phases of armed struggle [(2)].Initial reactions to the Algerian Revolution were diverse, ranging between support, rejection, neutrality, and hesitant positions. This variation reflected the ambiguity of the Algerian political class, which was unable to adopt a unified and explicit stance in favor of the revolutionary choice at its outbreak.

This divergence was also evident within the Association of Muslim Ulama, which split into two currents. The first opposed armed action, considering the internal crisis of the national movement, French pressure, and strict surveillance as factors making military engagement premature and risky. The second current adopted a more cautious position, advocating postponement until clearer conditions allowed for more precise and informed decisions regarding armed struggle[(3)]. A third opinion also appears to have existed, indicating that al-Bashir al-Ibrahimi, from Cairo, declared his support for the Revolution through his famous speech dated 15 November 1954 [(4)].

During the period 1954–1958, the National Liberation Army adopted diverse strategies, combining guerrilla warfare in rural areas with urban fedayeen actions, alongside the organization and division of regions. Following the Soummam Congress of 20 August 1956, military tasks were structured into three categories: the mujahid, the musabbil, and the fida'i. Efforts of unification also included the organization of units, ranks, insignia, and allowances, which contributed to the establishment of a more coherent military apparatus. The leadership closely monitored this development to address weaknesses and reinforce achievements, ensuring operational effectiveness and organizational continuity.

According to Abane Ramdane, the Soummam Congress transformed the National Liberation Army into an integrated military institution with unified command and a clear organizational structure, including units, ranks, insignia, and soldiers' privileges, as well as specialized services in communications, intelligence, and supply, thereby strengthening its identity and efficiency throughout the Revolution[(5)].

Since the outbreak of the Revolution, there was no separation between the National Liberation Army and the National Liberation Front, as both operated under the same laws and regulations, with fighters kept in permanent readiness to respond to any emergency. The revolutionaries endured difficult conditions and

used the mountains as operational bases, which contributed to achieving military advantages on several levels.

They also demonstrated creativity in planning and adapting to combat conditions, relying on force to attain political objectives that could not be achieved otherwise. Rapid mastery and effective use of weapons enabled them to inflict significant losses on the enemy, following guerrilla warfare principles such as hit-and-run tactics, and the reliance on the ratio of one mujahid against multiple regular soldiers supported by local assistance [6].

2. The Establishment of the Provisional Government: Challenges and Difficulties

On 19 September 1958, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was formed in order to overcome the state of paralysis that had affected the political and military leadership after the Soummam Congress. This proclamation constituted a clear and explicit challenge to all French maneuvers and claims, which had alleged that no clear party existed with whom negotiations could be conducted to find a solution capable of ending the war. Thus, the proclamation represented the revival of the entity of the Algerian state and conveyed to public opinion the message that a negotiating authority did exist, possessing both the capacity and the willingness to communicate with the French government within the framework of official maneuvers and according to conditions officially announced by the political leadership of the Algerian Revolution[7].

Although the announcement of establishing the Provisional Government dealt a severe blow to the enemy, internal problems hindered the overcoming of certain crises, particularly after Mohamed Lamouri case and the divergent reactions concerning his arrest together with some leaders in the First Wilaya and the Eastern Base. The failure of the corrective attempt he had undertaken led to the paralysis of the Provisional Government's work, especially after the resignation of Amin Debaghine in the wake of the "Amira Alaoua" incident. Internal disagreements also erupted as a result of the tragic condition of Algerians in Tunisia, especially the refugees, in addition to the negative effects on their morale caused by the enemy's active propaganda campaigns, as it had made the Tunisian city of Bizerte one of its bases[8].

The internal wilayas felt that the external leadership had abandoned them, and conflicts intensified between politicians and military leaders on the one hand, and between the "three Bs" (Krim, Ben Tobbal, and Boussouf) on the other,

regarding the extension of influence over the army, since they were regarded as the strongest figures in the Provisional Government(9).

The National Council of the Algerian Revolution also faced the same problems and the same situation, which constituted for the first time a clear intervention and overlap of military authority in political affairs. In order to address these disagreements, recourse was made to the ten colonels in Tunisia during the month of April 1959 to contain the crises that had arisen. The meeting continued for about four months, from 11 August to 16 December 1959, and was marked by numerous interruptions and crises. It ended with several decisions, the most prominent of which were the formation of a new National Council and the issuing of invitations to hold a third session in the Libyan city of Tripoli beginning in mid-December 1959, with the aim of definitively resolving the internal crisis(10).

The agenda of the Tripoli session included many points, the most important of which was the preparation of a program of action for the coming phase, including the establishment of the basic laws of the National Liberation Front and the formation of a new Provisional Government. The meeting ended with a call for the restructuring of the Provisional Government and the creation of a joint ministerial committee for war affairs within the government, directly linked to a General Staff composed of Ben Tobbal and Boussouf(11).

Krim Belkacem was the figure most affected by this restructuring, as he was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, while Ferhat Abbas retained his position as President of the Provisional Government. The Ministry of the Armed Forces was also abolished, a measure considered a necessary though limited partial reform(12). Among the most significant decisions resulting from the meeting was also the unification of the army staff, with Colonel Mohamed Boukharouba, known as Houari Boumediene, appointed at the head of the command, assisted by Kaid Ahmed, Ali Mendjeli, and Rabah Zerari, known as Azzedine. The headquarters of the body was located in Ghardimaou, Tunisia, on the eastern border between Algeria and Tunisia (13).

3. The General Staff as a Military Leadership Body in the Final Phase of the Algerian Revolution

During the session of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution held in the Libyan city of Tripoli between 16 December 1959 and 18 January 1960, the assembled leaders of the Revolution called for the need to overcome all

disagreements that might threaten the internal stability of the Revolution and to strive to preserve all the gains already achieved, including the political and military institutions. In addition to the many points discussed and adopted during the session, unanimous agreement was reached on the unification of the army under a single authority, especially after the failure of the Military Operations Committee to carry out its tasks.

The urgent need for the establishment of a General Staff emerged in order to ensure the overcoming of any influence that might obstruct the military course of the Algerian Revolution, particularly after the period of stagnation and the negative events that had affected the condition of the National Liberation Army during the years 1958–1959, which were accompanied by a decline in morale as a result of the dispute among the leaders in what became known as the Colonels' Affair or the Colonels' Conspiracy, followed by the failure of Krim Belkacem on the border after the project presented by Major Idir [(14)].

The internal situation also deteriorated with the use by the French forces of their airborne units to eliminate any movement by the mujahideen and to thwart attempts to support them, which led to an increase in the number of displaced persons heading to Tunisia and Morocco compared with those returning to Algeria. The French also applied systematic plans aimed at destroying the Revolution by maintaining the quadrillage centers, issuing orders to military units to remain in constant movement, and monitoring every suspicious movement within Algerian territory [(15)].

The session of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution held in Tripoli highlighted the deep differences concerning the conduct of the War of Liberation, the problems of organization, and issues of a military and organizational nature. During this session, agreement was reached on the establishment of the General Staff command in order to unify the army and continue its missions, thus becoming an official institution entrusted with reorganization and with raising the declining morale, especially after Charles de Gaulle had taken the initiative in the French Fifth Republic[(16)].

The governmental decree was issued on January 31st, 1960 defining the powers of the Commander of the General Staff after he had assumed his duties on January 23rd, 1960. Houari Boumediene then joined his base in the city of Ghardimaou in an attempt to remedy the situation and to bring under control all the previous problems and disorder[(17)], while securing the interior with military

equipment and the funds necessary to intensify military operations. He was also entrusted with the responsibility of supporting qualified cadres and military training, preparing rest camps, and activating the tasks of the military police and the health service, so that they would operate in specific locations according to precise plans.

In order to implement his program effectively, Colonel Boumediene released the cadres imprisoned in Tunisia in order to benefit from their experience, including those accused and sentenced in the Mohamed Lamouri case. Among the most prominent of them were Major Belhouchet, Ahmed Draaia, and Mohamed Cherif Messaadia. They were sent to the southern front under the command of Captain Abdelaziz Bouteflika to begin revolutionary activity among the inhabitants of the Hoggar, Gourara, Touat, and Tidikelt across the vast Sahara regions [(18)].

3.1. The Military Tasks of the General Staff

The period that witnessed the establishment of the General Staff was marked by a notable development in the structure of the Algerian army and in the increase in its personnel, especially along the eastern and western borders. According to available statistics, the number of recruits reached approximately 23,000 mujahideen, including about 8,000 on the western border and 15,000 on the eastern border. This phase was characterized by intensive activity in the fields of recruitment and training, and the army was also supplied with large quantities of weapons estimated at nearly 8,000 tons, obtained through support provided by friendly countries, including the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the Czechoslovak Republic [(19)].

Within a very short period, the General Staff succeeded in transforming its units stationed in the east and west into a strong nucleus in terms of organization and armament, which gave it clear political weight and military influence. This rigorous organization enabled it to impose discipline within its ranks, unify its administration, and exercise full control over the general situation. This cohesion was soon reflected on the ground, where Houari Boumediene achieved important military gains, as documented in the report prepared by the General Staff in July 1960[(20)].

In this context, the following phase witnessed major battles marked by firmness and revolutionary steadfastness, while the General Staff established an effective system of supervision that enabled it to monitor continuously the

military situation of its units in all respects. Weekly meetings involving the most important officials at the level of regiments and battalions were made compulsory, which enabled Houari Boumediene to impose discipline and overcome the previous disagreements resulting from regional and tribal rivalries. This was achieved through the reintegration of soldiers and officers and their redistribution across different and new geographical areas, which strengthened their interaction with one another and consolidated among them shared values centered on fighting France alone and fully believing in the cause of the country(21).

3.2. The Political Tasks of the General Staff

Although the tasks of the General Staff were fundamentally military, it constituted the principal political arm of the National Liberation Front, as it played a pivotal role in linking the political activity of the struggle with the military activity of the National Liberation Army. The General Staff was keen to ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Provisional Government and to contribute to regulating the relationship between politicians and military leaders, especially after the tensions that had arisen between the two leaderships. In addition to organizing military operations, the General Staff followed the divisions and disputes within the ranks of the Revolution and sought to prevent their aggravation. It also played a decisive role in supporting the negotiations with France by imposing a strong military reality on the ground, securing channels of communication with the states supporting the Revolution, and coordinating with the Front's representatives abroad in order to direct political and military discourse in a manner that reinforced international recognition of the Revolution.

Redha Malek indicates in his book Algeria at Evian that the head of government during the negotiation period, Benyoucef Benkhedda, requested the opinion of the General Staff concerning the continuation of negotiations with France in November 1961. The General Staff then affirmed its firm position regarding national responsibility, supporting the continuation of political action with a mature and clear outlook. The General Staff also responded to the telegram of the Vice-President of the Provisional Government, Krim Belkacem, concerning support for the government in the negotiations with France, and it participated in several stages of the Franco-Algerian negotiations by sending its own representatives. Moreover, the General Staff used its military weight to support national positions, while adopting a strict and firm policy toward the concessions and privileges that French diplomacy sought to obtain, thereby confirming its

commitment to national principles and its support for the government's efforts to defend Algeria's rights[22].

4. The Intertwinement of the Political and the Military in the Work of the General Staff

Many political factors affected the work and decisions of the General Staff, especially with the divergence of views between politicians and military leaders regarding the methods of managing the Revolution. After the establishment of the Provisional Government in 1958, and as time passed, the power of the General Staff increased, particularly with the decline of the role of some traditional politicians such as Ferhat Abbas. During the final months of the Revolution, the General Staff emerged as a force seeking to control the course of the Revolution and the future of the Algerian state after independence.

It is well known that the General Staff was formed against the background of a crisis. In parallel with the political crisis experienced by the Provisional Government and the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, the National Liberation Army on the eastern border witnessed a movement of insubordination and disorder, which led to the acceleration of its establishment in order to put an end to all serious excesses obstructing the Algerian Revolution. From the moment of its creation, the leadership of the General Staff became a point of convergence between opposing forces, and it sought to unify them by relying on members of the Revolution's mujahideen who feared that what had happened to the Tunisian fighters, who had been sacrificed by the regime of Habib Bourguiba, might also happen in Algeria. Accordingly, these cadres feared that the Revolution might deviate from its proper course and that they might be pursued and eliminated. Since Boumediene was aware of their importance and of what they represented, he repeatedly told them that he would never allow, under any circumstances, the sacrifice of the Algerian mujahideen after independence as had happened in Tunisia[23].

5. The Conflict between the General Staff and the Provisional Government

During the meeting of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution and the agreement on the establishment of the General Staff, a ministerial committee for war was also appointed, composed of the trio Krim Belkacem, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, and Abdelhafid Boussouf. Immediately after his definitive confirmation at the head of the General Staff command, Houari Boumediene gradually began to distance himself from his superior, Boussouf, taking control of affairs within

the General Staff. His aim was to reorganize the army without constraints and to make it a powerful military force capable of confronting the French army, as well as a political force that could be relied upon directly after independence. After the formation of detachments, platoons, battalions, and regiments, the members of the General Staff command moved along the borders according to a new organization composed of mujahideen and of integrated soldiers and officers who had deserted from the French army and were promoted by the General Staff command in 1960 in order to instill and strengthen confidence in them and thereby reinforce their positions over time(24).

The spark of conflict between the Provisional Government and the General Staff began after the capture of a French pilot by units of the Border Army near Oued Melleg on June21st, 1961 following the shooting down of his aircraft. After the intervention of the French ambassador to Tunisia demanding his release, the members of the General Staff adopted an intransigent position. President of the Government Ferhat Abbas then went to the headquarters of the command and met Houari Boumediene, who decided to release the prisoner despite the opposition of Ali Mendjeli and Kaid Ahmed. This gave rise to many problems within the ranks of the National Liberation Army, as the mujahideen felt that the Provisional Government was yielding to the orders of Tunisian President Habib Bourguiba and to French demands without taking into account the feelings of the soldiers and officers of the National Liberation Army(25).

The units of the National Liberation Army recorded multiple military victories, as attested by the official French report addressed to the Senate in 1960. At the beginning of 1961, the heavy battalions were reinforced by independent detachments equipped with advanced artillery that proved effective, in addition to other combat units on the western border, training centers, communications services, military security services, and other arrangements that strengthened the army's capabilities on various fronts.

At a time when the General Staff command was strengthening its forces on the borders and expanding its authority in the interior, it came up against the obstinacy of the joint ministerial committee for war, which sought to remain the principal controller of the political situation, benefiting from the support of the Provisional Government, and also of the military sphere, since Krim Belkacem, Boussouf, and Ben Tobbal still controlled most of the internal wilayas(26).

What further complicated matters was that the same committee began to feel a certain embarrassment and realized that the progress and rigorous organization achieved by the General Staff represented a blow to its own management of the army. It therefore sought, by all available means, to diminish the General Staff and restrict its powers. It began to slow down the supply of military provisions to it. The matter did not stop there, for it also demanded that the General Staff issue orders to the army and its commanders to enter Algeria before 31 March 1961. This meant that the General Staff was confronted with two choices: either to carry out the orders, which would mean imposing the authority of the committee over the Border Army, or to refuse them and accept the reality of the situation in view of the difficulty of crossing the Morice Line and the possible loss of credibility that might follow. The matter did not stop there either, as the ministerial committee for war issued orders prohibiting the General Staff command from recruiting soldiers and suspending all communications with it [(27)].The disagreements came into the open and extended to the Tripoli meeting held from August 2nd to August 27th, 1961, after the General Staff command had submitted its resignation to the Provisional Government following the July 1961 meeting at its headquarters in Ghardimaou, in a maneuver on its part aimed at weakening the position of the Provisional Government and imposing itself as an interlocutor that could not be ignored. This position continued to threaten the fate of the Provisional Government and destabilize the Revolution during its initial phase after its outbreak, outbreak [(28)].

In its final session, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution found itself compelled to deal with a complex crisis on three interrelated levels. The first level concerned the negotiations with the French side, which had remained frozen since late July because of the crisis over the separation of the Sahara, without any clear timetable for their resumption. The second level concerned the tension within the Provisional Government itself, after Krim Belkacem once again put himself forward as an alternative to Ferhat Abbas. The third level concerned the situation of the resigned General Staff, which, through this step, sought to make its voice heard forcefully within the equation of revolutionary decision-making[(29)].

6. The Political Aspirations of the General Staff

Beginning in 1961, Colonel Houari Boumediene embarked on a search for an alliance with the leaders imprisoned in France, and he sent Abdelaziz Bouteflika under the name Idriss Boukharouba to the Château de Turquant. In his

first contact, Boumediene intended to rely on Mohamed Boudiaf, but after the return of his envoy, he decided to abandon that option and to form an alliance with Ahmed Ben Bella, who carried less political weight than Boudiaf, the strong man who did not easily renounce his convictions and who was strict in his principles. After the failure of the French government to bring forward what was called the "third force," the General Staff criticized the government's signing of the Evian Accords, and these criticisms concerned several essential points related to the content of the agreements and the nature of the commitments they had approved (30). The criticisms directed by the General Staff leadership at the government concerning the Evian Accords related to several fundamental points, including:

- The creation of an army called the "Local Force," composed of 40,000 soldiers, supervised by Algerian officers from the French army in 1962 and by French officers working within the framework of technical cooperation
- The retention of the Mers El-Kébir base under the control of the French army for fifteen years and the preservation of In Ekker for the continuation of nuclear tests
- The maintenance of the administrative apparatus composed of 80,000 employees who had benefited from social promotion since Lacoste in 1956 and the preservation of economic liberalism and respect for French interests and privileges

This point concerned three interrelated issues: first, the continuation of the predominance of the French language over Arabic in the administrative and cultural spheres; second, the guarantee of the rights of European minorities with regard to their ethnic and religious particularities, while granting their members until 1965 to choose between retaining French nationality or transferring to Algerian nationality; and third, the creation of a "Provisional Executive" entrusted with managing public affairs during the period of political transition (31).

The participation of the General Staff in the Algerian-French negotiations took the form of sending its own representatives, who had clear views and orientations regarding the condition of independence, as the General Staff employed its military weight to support national positions during the negotiations. It adopted a strict and firm policy toward the concessions and privileges that French diplomacy sought to obtain in order to keep Algeria dependent on France and to leave it with the least possible losses. For this reason, the General Staff

opposed the "Les Rousses" agreements, and its leadership voted before the National Council of the Algerian Revolution on February 22nd, 1962 against these agreements. Its commander, Houari Boumediene, explained the position of the General Staff by stating that his confidence could only be granted to a written and clear text, because the results of the long war had not yet been translated into the proposed texts, and what was being offered to them achieved only a formal independence. He affirmed that the continuation of the Revolution required clarity and complete facts, and that he welcomed any questions that members of the Council might raise, while stressing the importance of a future meeting to discuss all the facts transparently(32) .

The General Staff began to effectively impose its authority on the interior through its forces, which led to a reduction in the influence of the Provisional Government. After the signing of the Evian Accords, the disagreement between the two sides escalated, leading to an actual confrontation. This division weakened the unified leadership and reinforced the role of the army as a principal actor. Consequently, the disagreement was not merely a conflict between individuals as much as it was an expression of a deeper problem in the management of the Revolution between politicians and military leaders.. This conflict could have been avoided if the relationship between the two parties had been defined from the beginning. During the final and sixth session of the National Council of the Revolution, held in June 1962, issues emerged that intensified the conflict among the leaders of the Revolution and ended in a crisis known as the Summer 1962 Crisis, which nearly brought to an end the efforts of many years of struggle and sacrifice. Without the policy of prudence adopted by some political leaders who gave precedence to the voice of wisdom in order to preserve lives and the gains that had been achieved and to overcome all disagreements in the service of national unity and the interest of the Algerian people (33).

Conclusion:

This study concludes that the General Staff played a central role during the final phase of the Algerian War of Liberation (1960–1962), emerging as a response to military disorganization, border pressures, and internal tensions within the revolutionary leadership. At the military level, it contributed significantly to restructuring the National Liberation Army by improving coordination, strengthening discipline, expanding recruitment, and enhancing training and armament, which in turn increased the effectiveness of the

revolutionary struggle and reinforced Algeria's position during negotiations with France.

The findings also show that the General Staff's role extended beyond the military sphere into the political domain, particularly in issues related to negotiations, authority, and post-independence power. This growing overlap between military and political functions generated tensions with the Provisional Government and revealed an underlying conflict over legitimacy and decision-making within the Revolution.

Accordingly, the study finds that the General Staff represented both a factor of military consolidation and a source of political tension in the final years of the Revolution. The crisis of 1962 is therefore understood not as a sudden rupture, but as the outcome of accumulated disputes over leadership, authority, and the relationship between armed force and political legitimacy.

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