

A Reading of the Three Forms of Decadence (Nihilism) in Friedrich Nietzsche (Religion-Morality-Philosophy)

قراءة في أشكال الانحطاط (العدمية) الثلاث لدى فريدريك نيتشه (الدين-الأخلاق-الفلسفة)

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Article abstract:

The researcher and scholar engaged in philosophical critical studies is well aware of the significance of the Nietzschean project and his critical theory, which he endeavored to apply to the triad of religion/morality/philosophy, given that these forms represent the epicenter of the slide into dogmatic thought; for every philosophy that reduces the critical structure in presenting its problems, based on being a self-subsistent philosophy, opens up multiple avenues for self-critique. By way of investigating the cause of the decadence and nihilism that marked Western consciousness beginning with Greek society, we shall attempt to present the Nietzschean vision and pinpoint highly significant points leading us to conclude that everything which has reached us necessitates a critical reading; consequently, we pose the following problematic: Was the philosopher Nietzsche able to formulate a critical theory for studying the three forms of nihilism (decadence) embodied in religion, morality, and philosophy?

Key words: religion; morality ; and philosophy; Decadence; Nihilism.

ملخص المقال:

إن الباحث والمشتغل في الدراسات النقدية الفلسفية يدرك أهمية الطرح النيتشوي لنظريته النقدية التي حاول جرها على ثلاثية الدين/الأخلاق/الفلسفة من خلال أن هذه الأشكال تمثل بؤرة الانزلاق نحو الفكر الدوغمائي فكل فلسفة تختزل البنية النقدية في طرح مشكلاتها على أساس أنها فلسفة قائمة بذاتها تفتح على ذاتها أوجه متعددة من النقد وعلى سبيل البحث عن علة الانحطاط والعدمية التي عرفها الوعي الغربي بداية مع المجتمع اليوناني سنحاول عرض الرؤية النيتشوية وتحديد نقاط جد مهمة تصل بنا أن كل ما وصل إلينا بحاجة إلى قراءة نقدية وعليه نطرح الإشكالية التالية: هل تمكن الفيلسوف نيتشه من صياغة نظرية نقدية لدراسة أشكال العدمية (الانحطاط) الثلاث التي تمثلت في كل من الدين-الأخلاق-الفلسفة؟.

كلمات مفتاحية: الدين؛ الأخلاق؛ الفلسفة؛ الانحطاط؛ العدمية.

Introduction

Since the dawn of philosophical thought, we find that many philosophical endeavors have focused on activating the mechanism of critique, not merely to object to philosophical theories but rather to attempt to grasp the truth of ideas and all that has been transmitted to us, for these theories represent an epistemic and intellectual burden invoked by multiple contexts, be they historical, social, or even psychological. Nietzsche's fundamental project was defined by diagnosing the pathological maladies that had afflicted Western consciousness, being the source of values and awareness, which everything else follows.

The roots of nihilism began the moment we started thinking beyond our existence, transcending ourselves and instincts, and migrating towards metaphysical presuppositions, which rationalist and moralist philosophers worked to embody and activate as issues necessary for comprehending the real world through this false world; thus, the equation was reversed, and with this reversal, our concept of truth was altered, or truth was obscured in favor of affirming concepts suspended in mid-air, devoid of existential validity.

Therefore, the form of decadence is any thought that recoils from recognizing reality as actual existence, establishing instead a doctrine or tendency that deviates towards denying reality on one hand, and denying the ability to grasp truths on the other, repudiating the body while glorifying the mind and rationality.

Accordingly, we pose the following question: What did the forms of nihilism consist of? And was Nietzsche able to address the roots of decadence and instill a new spirit in Western consciousness?

1. The Concept of Nihilism (Decadence):

1.1 Nihilism:

"The nihil in the word nihilism does not signify non-being but rather the value of nothingness, first and foremost" (Deleuze, 1993, p. 189); It is a theory/tendency/doctrine insofar as it is based on negation and denial, i.e., objection to existence and life as a whole; as the philosopher Nietzsche presents it in his work *The Will to Power*, it is a psychological condition that revolves around the denial of life: "The logic of nihilism, as a will of a psyche inclined to consider life worthless and meaningless, even going so far as to divest life of its value and meaning—indeed, it is a call for total withdrawal from life and a longing for the other world" (Ben Mansour, 2022, p. 197). This concept establishes nihilism as a metaphysical blow because it renders reality merely a false world and denies its existential truth, affirming instead the transcendent world which philosophers attempted to apprehend and sought to prove through their rational philosophical theories; hence, the concept acquires a character of negation and denial, constituting a denial of truths. Nietzsche identified three forms embodying the concept of nihilism: religion, morality, and philosophy.

Nietzsche juxtaposes the concept of nihilism with the concept of decadence, and he attempts to employ the latter as an acknowledgment of the negative condition to which Western consciousness has succumbed, considering that the forms of nihilism establish a decadence manifested as a negating tendency that desires nothingness; thus, we find him stating in his work *Twilight of the Idols*: "The division of the world into a 'true' world and an 'apparent' world, whether in the manner of Christianity or in the manner of Kant... can only be prompted by decadence" (Nietzsche, 1996, p. 32).

2. The Tripartite Theory of European Decadence:

2.1 The Theory of Religious Decadence:

For Nietzsche, Christian doctrine represented one of the primary causes—if not the greatest—of nihilism, as it fostered submission, domination, and complacency without instigating change or striving for liberation from oppressive ideologies, as his critical framework was directed against Christianity and its adherents, those who embraced its rituals and dogmas. A rebel in pursuit of truth, he regarded it as one of the veils that obscured thought, confining it within itself and relinquishing agency to an external force that frames human existence and dictates its destiny; hence, his impetus for establishing the "will to power" and autonomous decision-making: to restore humanity's sovereignty, free from religious or legislative constraints—a direct rebuttal to the notion of free will, which Nietzsche viewed as a justification for submissiveness and weakness, an idea Kant sought to entrench as a cornerstone of human morality.

Nietzsche rejected Christianity for opening the floodgates to unrealistic doctrines and sects, expanding under the guise of a religion that glorifies the mind, denies the body, and restricts pleasure, where he argued, such a faith institutionalized the renunciation of life's joys, while modernity abandoned what remained under the banner of rationalism, widening the chasm further. As he asserts in *The Antichrist*: "My objection to the means employed by Christianity is that they lack any sacred ends—only wretched ones: poisoning, slander, denial of life, contempt for the body, degradation, and self-abasement of the soul through the concept of sin, as to the extent that these ends are vile, its means are likewise vile and corrupt" (Nietzsche, 1888/ n.d, p. 162).

From this passage, we grasp Nietzsche's view that true religion does not lie in transcending life or denying its value, as the principle of sin, which Christianity adopted and which church authorities propagated as a foundational tenet of existence, nullified the value of life itself, where the individual became obsessed with the afterlife, abandoning their original reality, especially with the involvement of the intellectual elite—particularly philosophers—in constructing theological philosophies that reinforced Christian dogma, structuring its theories and doctrines under its dictates; thus, spread of Christianity enabled submission and the establishment of civil institutions structured to uphold it, molding individuals conditioned for obedience and deterring them from conflict or revolt against the system—so long as Western consciousness remained rooted in perceiving the sacred as an unquestionable idea, beyond doubt or inquiry regarding its ends.

"The equality of souls before God—this falsehood, this pretext for the rancor of all the base-minded, this explosive concept that ultimately became revolution, the modern idea, and the principle of decay for the whole social order—is Christian dynamite" (Nietzsche, 1888/n.d., pp. 185-186).

Nietzsche's critique of Christian methods stems from his fundamental rejection of liberation and progress toward superiority and mastery; for him, Christianity is a tool for producing the weak and the defeated, a religion that upholds the sick, the poor, and the abnormal—those who seek equality instead of revolution and self-actualization, thus, Nietzsche initiated his critique as a foundational framework for revolting against Christianity and all its manifestations, which he saw as sowing the seeds of weakness (reactiveness and non-resistance). "Since Christianity advocates an ethics of pity, it is, for Nietzsche, the source of the weak human's formation and wages a perpetual war against the emergence of the higher man whose advent Nietzsche prophesied in history" (Batwa & Mansouri, 2023, p. 79).

According to Nietzsche, religious institutions mobilized all resources under their dominion—social structures, economic systems, intellectual movements, and the like—to align with doctrinal dictates, as this persisted despite the Enlightenment's project of "fashioning man" and its declaration of the "death of God," which heralded a new epoch marking the limits of medieval Western thought, where this shift sought to reorient humanity toward life's immanent manifestations, dismantling the multifaceted edifice of metaphysics; Yet the pressing question remains: Has modernity fulfilled Nietzsche's vision of human self-creation? Regrettably, while modernity rejected traditional metaphysics, it erected a new metaphysical

framework—one neither coherent nor universally accepted, as even attempts to cultivate the *Übermensch* or prioritize human agency faltered; having been conditioned by religion into docility and submission, modern man was now ensnared by a scientific metaphysics; and far from securing happiness or investing in human potential, this paradigm excluded him through novel means, with techno-scientific dominance epitomizing the European subject's existential crisis.

After this systematic marginalization by technocratic hegemony, humanity retreated to its primal fears and customary solace, with Christianity re-emerging as a profound instrument to pacify disenfranchised masses yearning for salvific promises and a happier hereafter; thus, Christianity's capacity to attract psychologically colonized and vulnerable populations remains formidable; here Nietzsche's revolutionary critique of Christianity, initially perceived as the ravings of a madman targeting a historically entrenched institution, began as a radical rupture, where his genealogical method emptied religious structures of their sacrosanct status, gradually fostering a renaissance that re-examined reality and interrogated Christianity's teleological claims, as Nietzsche stands as the first critic to destabilize the foundational axioms of Western civilization, asserting in *The Antichrist*: "A religion like Christianity, which turns its back on reality at every point, cannot be touched by reality at any point" (Nietzsche, 1888/n.d., p. 162).

2.2 Theory of Moral Decadence

Nietzsche's intellectual revolution championed free thought, propelling a radical skepticism toward prevailing and inherited values that had endured for decades; through his critique, he sought to overturn these values and question their foundations, consistently attributing the moral decline of Western society to Christian doctrine, while simultaneously exposing its profound influence on thought and the instinct for superiority—redirecting it toward submission and obedience, a tendency embedded within philosophical movements that reinforced this stance.

Though Nietzsche rejected uncritical adherence to any ideology, he adopted the Sophists' framework as a cornerstone for his philosophy, finding in their approach the ideal tool to declare—or at least signal—a transformative shift toward the future by reevaluating established norms; their maxim, "Man is the measure of all things," served as an explicit prelude to revitalizing the spirit of change within Greek thought, establishing it as a turning point that redefined human worth and introduced a degree of intellectual autonomy, thereby influencing subsequent domains—this is precisely what compelled Nietzsche to embrace their ideas, as a scholar of philosophy may interpret Nietzsche's position through two lenses: the first aligns with his rejection of rationalist tendencies, as exemplified by the Sophists, while the second underscores his insistence on intellectual individualism within a highly sensitive field like morality—where the core issue lies not in the field itself but in its underlying premises, which formed the primary focus of Nietzsche's work.

Returning to the Western tradition embodied by Greek heritage, we find support for Nietzsche's stance, which sought to highlight the immaturity or lack of philosophical foresight in this lineage regarding change; indeed, the movements we will examine predominantly endorsed the Socratic-Platonic position, advocating conformity to prevailing norms and discouraging deviation from convention—thus, the Greek societal response to Sophistic thought paralleled contemporary reactions to Nietzschean ideas; naturally, this was deemed unacceptable from the perspective of traditional reverence, yet in terms of progress and truth-seeking, it articulated profoundly significant insights; indeed, revisiting the study of values in Western heritage will lead us to grasp the critical framework of Nietzsche's thought through movements that fiercely defended and promoted value systems dictated by reason—or rather, by the status quo.

The Stoics, for their part, focused on ethics, asserting that moral conduct must adhere strictly to reason while avoiding passions and desires that enslave humanity; for them, pleasure was merely incidental—neither essential nor a prerequisite for ethical life—whereas the supreme necessity for moral existence was virtue, manifested in wisdom; as they maintained, "Virtue is founded upon two things: reason and knowledge; hence, logic, physics, and related sciences possess no intrinsic value—their worth lies solely in

being the foundation of virtue, and of all virtues, wisdom is paramount, and from wisdom arise four cardinal virtues: prudence, courage, temperance, and justice"(Mahfouz, 1935, p. 291).

The Stoics' point of departure was not far removed from the Socratic proposition, which linked virtue with knowledge and vice with ignorance, elevating reason above desires—an intellectual endeavor that, when viewed through Nietzsche's critical lens, represents the very corruption of tradition and the deepening of the rift in the search for authentic foundations of value. How could a movement impose the same standards while simultaneously attempting to clarify and revive them as a legacy inherited across generations? Moreover, how could it insist on acting solely according to reason, given that its equation of value was built upon virtue as embodied by wisdom, with reason as its sovereign? The distortion of value as a philosophical inquiry began precisely when reason was adopted as the sole arbiter of behavior, imposing standardized criteria to regulate conduct—thereby diverting attention from the true values that constitute the essence of existence.

Furthermore, we find thinkers who, despite their overt materialism, still privilege reason—"Indeed, Epicurus, for all his apparent materialism and reliance on sensation in explaining knowledge, reveals in his ethical doctrine a preference for the pleasures of the mind over those of the senses; for him, the ultimate aim of ethics is attaining mental tranquility (ataraxia), that is, the enjoyment of serenity, detached from life's troubles and burdens" (Abu Al-Rayyan, n.d., p. 280).

Epicurus recognized that sensory pleasures are transient, and that the wise man pursues intellectual pleasures to attain virtue and reach the supreme good—the essential condition of these pleasures being the achievement of ultimate happiness; indeed, Epicurus linked pleasure to pain, asserting that pleasure can only be realized by overcoming pain to reach happiness. Thus, the Epicurean ethical stance was founded on the pursuit of enduring pleasures (intellectual ones) and balance in practical life, for the wise man is he who can establish equilibrium in his lived experience; here, Nietzsche fully grasps the difficulty of his task: like Epicurus, who ostensibly upheld materialism in epistemology yet equivocated in ethics, imposing upon morality the dictate of reason—revealing, through all this, the calculated programming employed in the realm of values, a premeditated scheme to isolate the body as the domain of desires and impulses while exalting reason as their sovereign.

The criterion through which Nietzsche attempted to construct his critical philosophy was the question of the fate of weak peoples. Yet, he does not consider these peoples as inherently valuable, since the prevailing values were themselves crafted by them as a means to anesthetize their weakness and legitimize their dependence on the rule of civil and religious authorities—a rule predicated on reverence for the status quo and abstention from defying it, as for Nietzsche, power begins with the destabilization of what is dominant and the demolition of all norms and intellectual premises, whose becoming has been shaped by generations of moral philosophers since the dawn of history. Nietzsche reached the apex of his critical edifice with the principle of the "will to power," which he posited as a counterforce to divine authority, then he initiated a process of excluding—or abolishing—the authority of God over existence, to replace it with the principle of the will to power, viewing it as the ultimate end toward which humanity must strive (Lamouri, 2023, p. 643).

Nietzsche's approach to the issue of moral decline is embodied in the following points:

- The inversion of all values — culminating in the "death of God;"
- A critique of Western centrality, particularly its foundations in reason, authority, religion, and all other forms of centralization;
- The proposition of an alternative morality—namely, a morality of strength—that neither depends upon nor acknowledges any form of authority beyond the human being himself;
- A thorough critique of all moral theories that have constructed ethics upon the dichotomy of good and evil as absolute values;
- A rejection of the principle of equality in rights, coupled with the erasure of all traditional forms that cultivate subservient individuals, from the herd mentality to the ideal of superiority;

- The construction of a master morality in opposition to slave morality, and the call for a revolution against every claim to authority external to the individual;
- A re-examination of educational institutions, particularly the criteria of excellence, to forge the “Übermensch”.

3. The Theory of Philosophical Decadence:

Nietzsche constructed his philosophy as a challenge to absolutes and fixity—those very notions that have eroded the history of philosophical thought for decades, as these ideas elevated reason as the sole gateway to knowledge while neglecting the role of the body, glorifying the self and abstract reflection at the expense of the real world, they gave rise to paradigms suspended in the air, as witnessed in idealist philosophies, therefore, Nietzsche’s endeavor was to restore man to himself—by affirming that the self is intrinsically linked to the body, and not estranged from it in the way that Christianity had instituted, further reinforced by philosophical doctrines that entrenched this alienation.

Thus, the main thrust toward the awakening of a new consciousness was the substitution of unreason in place of reason, and chaos in place of order; as a result, prevailing norms fractured, and a multitude of questions and axes emerged to interrogate the current human condition and liberate modern man from the absurdity he inhabits; As we know, the advancement of nations is contingent upon their intellectual progress, which constitutes the foundation for any forward-looking vision, hence, the starting point lay in revisiting the Western legacy, whose efforts were long dedicated to constructing reason-based philosophies that gained enduring credibility without much scrutiny of the foundations upon which they were built, and which later became established doctrines forming what is now referred to as the Western philosophical heritage, where Nietzsche explicitly states in *Twilight of the Idols*: “When one is forced to make reason into a tyrant—as Socrates did—did-the danger is not insignificant that something else will also become a tyrant; at that moment, the rational path was regarded as the only way out” (Nietzsche, 2010, p. 31).

The philosopher Nietzsche succeeded in portraying the foundational reference upon which Western reason was constructed, beginning with the figure of Socrates, who sought to transform the notion of reason into a fully-fledged philosophical system, as Socrates managed to regulate Athenian behavior by elevating reason above the senses—an approach Nietzsche vehemently rejected. For Nietzsche, the followers of Socrates, such as Plato and the Socratic schools, glorified reason as the essence of all knowledge and ethics, while casting doubt upon the senses instead of recognizing them as instruments of transformation, where their unwavering adherence to rationalism, to permanence, and their refusal to embrace change ultimately rendered reason a central authority—one that underpins all unrealistic orientations.

The principal reason that drove Nietzsche to repudiate reason lies in its construction around a deep-seated belief in permanence and in the failure to compel the self to change and to confront reality; in contrast to reason, which resists transformation, the senses are a source of renewal and vitality, as Nietzsche’s fundamental critique of rationalist doctrines—those which reject change and cast suspicion on sensory experience—does not take the form of questioning these doctrines from within; rather, he destabilizes them through his genealogical method, which stands among the most significant contemporary approaches, and through this method, Nietzsche was able to expose the Western intellectual heritage as a form of ideological construct—dangerous, institutionalized, and preserved as a kind of intellectual patrimony protected by rationalist schools of thought that sought to reinstate reason as an unassailable authority.

In the same context, the philosopher Immanuel Kant was not spared Nietzsche’s critique, particularly about the rationalism and critical framework Kant laid out in his renowned trilogy: *Critique of Pure Reason*, *Critique of Practical Reason*, and *Critique of the Faculty of Judgment*; here, Nietzsche questions the very notion of critique that, in his view, proves impotent when it justifies the limitations of reason on the one hand, yet attempts to critique it through reason itself on the other, while simultaneously evaluating it. On this basis, Nietzsche does not regard Kantian critique as genuine critique, nor does he consider Kant’s progress

as true philosophical advancement; for Nietzsche, Kant sought to attain a transcendental truth through non-philosophical means; ultimately, Nietzsche reveals that Kantian skepticism merely serves to uphold Christian values, as he stated, Kant's success was nothing but a theological triumph (Ammamri, 2023, p. 463).

Here, Nietzsche unequivocally rejects the trajectory followed by Kant in his critique, directing his most rigorous reproach toward the critique of practical reason; for Kant, in his treatment of the postulates—those principles that, according to him, can be neither known nor examined outside the domain of practical reason—offers nothing but a hollow and empty metaphysics, one that seeks merely to transcend the objective world. Such a form of knowledge, Nietzsche contends, does not contribute to the advancement of thought or critical reflection; rather, it reinforces alternative structures that glorify Christianity, insofar as it concentrates its entire concern on the thing-in-itself, thereby compelling human reason to think from the vantage point of a force superior to itself. This, in turn, reveals its philosophical impotence, for it remains imprisoned within the boundaries of theological inquiry.

According to Nietzsche, Kant's philosophy demands a critique of critique; for it leads, first, to the production of human beings who are equal in rights and duties; second, to the creation of opportunities that generate weakness—that is, a herd-like mentality—while resisting strength and excellence; and third, to a life governed by the imperatives of reason or law; these three foundations, constitute a modest and timid contribution from a philosopher of Kant's stature; indeed, in his writings, Kant repeatedly promotes obedience to the moral law, submission to its precepts, and unwavering commitment to its prescriptions as a moral duty that defines human dignity; as Kant declares in his *Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*: “Act only according to that maxim whereby you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law; act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your person or the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means” (Kant, 1785/2022, p. 11).

The philosophical lesson we derive from Nietzsche is that philosophy, from its inception up to the present moment, has consistently sought to unveil, to expose, and to refrain from recognizing any authority, inclination, or doctrine unless it arose through the very principle of contradiction; for without contradiction, what we now call philosophy would never have taken shape; true philosophy, Nietzsche insists, generates its subjects apart from the biases that claim objectivity, transparency, sanctity, and often present themselves as universal philosophies, as philosophy, in its essence, does not behave like religion—it does not require adherence, nor obedience to particular schools, individuals, or doctrines; rather, the only true function of critique lies in reinforcing the foundations of questioning—of interrogating every issue, problem, or question that purports to be central or absolute.

The modern era constructed its project of supremacy upon the foundation of modern science, proclaiming objectivity and scientific rigor as the new standards of legitimacy; this project was soon endorsed by the majority of philosophical trends, which began to construct paradigms grounded in the presumed neutrality and authority of scientific knowledge, then modern science, became a new center—one no longer subject to doubt—due to its unparalleled contributions to both intellectual discourse and the global stage, as a result, philosophy began to anchor its inquiries in scientific investigation, treating it as the ultimate foundation of objectivity, and as a response to the claims of metaphysical thinking and pre-modern modes of speculation.

Consequently, philosophical attention turned toward epistemology, rather than other traditional fields such as ontology or axiology; the justification lay in the belief that the progress of nations depends primarily on knowledge systems capable of advancing development and human welfare. In this context, the relevance of questions posed by other branches was gradually diminished, because they no longer suited the technological age; for modern man no longer carries the burden of essence, nor does he concern himself with how he ought to be moral, so much as he strives to attain happiness—a happiness made attainable, it is believed, through science.

Nietzsche, however, extended his critique to all models of the modern age, particularly those claiming rigor and objectivity; for he was fully conscious of the foundations of modernity and the consequences it



would eventually yield, as his rejection was decisive, especially concerning the shift from conceiving man as the center of the universe, to transferring that authority toward technology and instrumental reason, as he states in his major work *On the Genealogy of Morality*: “Science is still far from possessing the independence that would allow it to carry out this task; it too still requires its highest values... All sciences, including those of nature and those I like to call ‘anti-nature’—such as the critique of reason itself—are today working to destroy the old human being’s self-reverence (Nietzsche, 1887/2023, pp. 148-149).

Indeed, science did, at a certain point, succeed in subjugating nature—as the philosopher Francis Bacon had proclaimed; yet it did not serve humanity by making man the master of the universe; rather, it contributed to diminishing his worth and undermining his capacities; this compels us to ask: has science truly succeeded in formulating a scientific mind detached from metaphysical frameworks? The very autonomy of science remains, for Nietzsche, a questionable matter, for scientific disciplines cannot lay claim to the validity and precision of their subject matter merely by adhering to their methods in isolation.

Modern science has meticulously engineered a strategy based on the separation of subject and object, under the banner of rationality and the pursuit of objectivity; and Nietzsche’s response to this systematic division was not isolated, but echoed by various epistemological currents that likewise rejected the scientific paradigm and endeavored to develop alternative modes of inquiry—ones more attuned to their specific subject matter, and fundamentally distinct from those addressed by modern science, which falsely claims universal objectivity.

Accordingly, objectivity itself became the target of Nietzsche’s most scathing criticism; he dismantled every scientific pretense that hides behind the illusion of neutrality, as for Nietzsche, value judgments are nothing other than expressions of inner, lived experience, and the separation between subject and object is, in essence, a rejection of the body and the instincts; it is the subject who chooses, and this division, therefore, is no more than the expression of a negating will—a will that seeks to devalue corporeal life and suppress instinctual drives, for this reason, Nietzsche resolutely rejected the dichotomy between subject and object (Rabia, 2022, pp. 954-955).

Through these models, entire populations were conditioned to submit and conform, and the fabrication of weak peoples—docile, unquestioning, and deferential—was no trivial matter, particularly as long as they failed to reject such systematic absurdity or to revolt against the foundations upon which this structure of domination was built, as Nietzsche writes in *The Will to Power*: “It pleases me, after having spent thousands of years in error and confusion, to have found the path that leads to affirmation; I teach you to say No to all that enfeebles, and Yes to all that strengthens—to all that accumulates power, to all that evokes the feeling of strength”(Nietzsche, 1901/2011, p. 68).

For Nietzsche, these three forms representing nihilism have contributed to the creation of illusion and the formation of a herd-like populace lacking confrontation and rebellion against the status quo; where criticism marks the beginning of revolution, awareness represents its highest stage, and every systematic invocation of confrontation and accountability fosters a revolutionary mindset that champions strength and resists weakness in all its forms, where the forging of the strong begins precisely at this point—critiquing all knowledge that evades criticism and every doctrine or philosophy that promotes a fixed orientation, for philosophy’s role is to dispel the illusions that have long shaped Western consciousness, serving as the tool through which all sciences seek to correct their course, as each act of destabilization does not mean rejecting heritage, but rather comprehending the meaning behind what is taken for granted.

Conclusion:

To think with Nietzsche fundamentally necessitates unconstrained thought, unconditioned by any authority—be it dogma, religion, or law; for he held that Western deviations accepted the adoption of centrality as an impetus toward progress through a rationality serving only its interests, without justifying the true motivations behind its projects that entrenched authority’s role in leading societies. The forms

Nietzsche critiqued—religion, morality, and philosophy—demonstrated the depth of the crisis by failing to activate mechanisms of change and critique; instead, they glorified heritage, entrenched its dominance, and attempted its intergenerational perpetuation—thereby rendering change impossible or improbable; Christianity represents the greatest propaganda campaign in human history, securing the largest following for religious institutions; even Darwin's declaration of human origins diminished theological authority on one hand and rational authority on the other—with the adoption of rational authority from Socrates and Plato to the modern era under Kant's guardianship epitomizing Western reason's setback when attempting to critique reason through reason; for the genealogical method acknowledges neither heritage, nor religion, nor authority, nor universalist thought, nor objectivity—it is a thought-system dedicated to subverting all concepts and fracturing every facet of trends, tendencies, and doctrines asserting validity and objectivity.

The Nietzschean project fundamentally aims to restore humanity's image to the world—yet humanity as psychologically powerful, superior, and distinct from others—while displacing the rule of the weak who dominate the global arena; the principle of equality is the grandest deception entrenched by the Western mentality to exclude the superior from the scene; hence, instating the power struggle primarily targets the law of equality—for change begins here; power, according to Nietzsche, is fabricated; the will to life as portrayed by Schopenhauer serves not power, and free will as conceived by Kant reinforces slavery—for its premise is law-abidance under ethical rules; there exists but one will that effects change in the world: the will to power.

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