
The Position of the Arab League on the Algerian Liberation Revolution And Official Arab Reactions between 1954 -1962

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ABSTRACT: This exploratory paper aims to shed light on the position of the Arab League to the Algerian Revolution and legitimate Arab responses in 1954 and 1962. During this time, the Algerian Liberation Revolution found rare Arab consensus, the Arab League and its member states serving as the center of international affairs.

This study concludes by emphasizing that the Arab League and its member states play an active role in helping the Algerian cause. They targeted the main elements that made Algeria difficult all over the world, regarded as purely internal French, which required through French colonial authorities mainly political, military, media and diplomatic help, because the backbone on which the revolution rested was war abroad.

Keywords: Arab League; the Algerian liberation revolution; reliable Arabic responses; The National Liberation Front (FLN).

ملخص باللغة العربية: تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية إلى إبراز موقف الجامعة العربية من الثورة الجزائرية ، وردود الفعل العربية الرسمية ما بين سنتي (1954-1962م)، حيث شكّلت الثورة التحريرية الجزائرية إجماعاً عربياً نادراً، كما تبنت جامعة الدول العربية، والدول العربية الأعضاء القضية الجزائرية كقضية مركزية، مقدّمين دعماً شاملاً ومتعدد الأبعاد لجبهة التحرير الوطني.

وخلصت هذه الدراسة إلى التأكيد بأن الجامعة العربية ومن ورائها الدول العربية ساهموا مساهمة فعالة اتجاه القضية الجزائرية، إلى جانب تركيزهم على أهم الأسباب التي تجعل من القضية الجزائرية قضية دولية، وأنها ليست

مسألة داخلية فرنسية كما ادعى الاستعمار الفرنسي، فكان الدعم السياسي والعسكري والإعلامي والدبلوماسي بمثابة السند الذي تعتمد عليه الثورة في كفاحها في الخارج.

كلمات دالة: جامعة الدول العربية؛ الثورة التحريرية الجزائرية، وردود الفعل العربية الرسمية؛ جبهة التحرير الوطني.

1. Introduction:

The Algerian Revolution received unequivocal support from all Arab states, which were not spared from French counter-propaganda. France mobilized its forces to undermine the Arab world, and it portrayed the Arab League as rushing to aid Algeria in the name of religion, nationalism, and freedom. In the early years of the Algerian Revolution, Arab states lacked detailed information about it. However, after the establishment of the National Liberation Front's (FLN) external mission, the Arab League, and subsequently other Arab countries, gained access to the details of the revolution's events. Both entities readily provided material and moral support to the revolution, mobilizing Arab diplomacy in international, continental, and regional forums to raise awareness of the revolution and defend the legitimacy of its demands.

However, to examine the relationship between the Algerian Revolution and the Arab League, and the official Arab reactions to it, we should focus on two influential positions:

- a) The Arab League's stance on the Algerian Revolution.
- b) The role of Arab states in supporting the Algerian cause and the successive recognitions of the Provisional Government by Arab states

2. The Arab League's Position on the Algerian Revolution:

The Arab League ⁽¹⁾is one of the regional and international bodies that played a significant role in supporting the Algerian cause from its inception, providing material, political, and diplomatic assistance. Tracing the Arab League's stance on the Algerian issue reveals that its origins predate the Algerian Revolution of 1945. At the end of May 1946, the kings and presidents of the Arab states issued a statement entrusting the League with striving to fulfill the aspirations of the people of the Levant and North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco, and Algeria). ⁽²⁾

On April 19, 1951, the League Council issued the Six-Party Committee's resolution on North African issues.

Regarding Algeria, the Committee recommended raising the issue before the United Nations and tasked the Secretariat with preparing comprehensive studies on various aspects of Algerian affairs. It also instructed the Secretariat to exert its efforts with the Human Rights Committee to examine the issue so that it could be raised before the Third Committee of the United Nations .⁽³⁾

After the outbreak of the Algerian revolution, representatives of Arab states in the Arab League supported the Algerians, using the French authorities' methods towards the Algerian people as justification for responding to any French propaganda aimed at isolating Algeria from its Arab surroundings.⁽⁴⁾ However, the negativity of international public opinion towards the Algerian issue did not enable some Arab parties to achieve any tangible results. Rather, some parties expressed reservations due to French pressure. Before the official outbreak of the Algerian revolution, the Council of the League of Arab States decided in its meeting held on 11/19/1953 to establish a fund for North African issues to support the people of this part of the Arab homeland. The Arab League also allocated a sub-committee to set spending rules and established alongside it a body that included representatives of all the Maghreb bodies, in order to achieve the objectives of this fund.

On January 27, 1954, the Council of the League of Arab States informed Arab governments of their obligation to contribute to this project. At its meetings of December 1-2, 1954, the Political Committee of the League of Arab States endorsed the Algerian cause.⁽⁵⁾

Following the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, the League of Arab States sent a telegram to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on June 13, 1955, requesting his intervention—in response to the French reaction to the activities of the Algerian revolutionaries—to halt French methods of repression. The Arab League also explained to the United Nations the dire consequences of France's policies in North Africa. Furthermore, it sent memoranda to the embassies and missions of the countries that participated in the Bandung Conference, alerting them to the gravity of the situation in Algeria and outlining the stages the Algerian cause had gone through.⁽⁶⁾ Which has embassies in Cairo and to the embassies of NATO countries in Cairo. The Arab League also tasked its representatives at the United Nations with coordinating between African and Asian countries to carry out joint action for Algeria. The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States also studied the report of the French parliamentary mission sent

by the French government to study the conditions in Algeria. This report had been submitted to the French National Assembly on 30/07/1955.

This report indicated that the European elite benefited from social and economic reforms, while the national population received so little that they lived in poverty and ignorance. This was confirmed by a report from a senior French administration official who described the national population as ghosts in their own land, where the French enjoyed a life of luxury and false security. Following coordination of Arab states' positions by the Arab League, Arab delegates championed the Algerian cause during their discussions in the United Nations Political Committee on February 2, 1957.⁽⁷⁾

3. Material Aid to Algeria from the Arab League:

At the session of the Political Affairs Committee of the Arab League on November 3, 1957, the Algerian delegate requested the Committee to allocate an annual budget for Algeria, to be decided by the member governments of the League. In this regard, the General Secretariat received a memorandum from Egypt dated December 9, 1957, stating its readiness to be included in any plan adopted by the Arab states; a memorandum from the Iraqi Embassy in Cairo dated January 13, 1958, stating that the Iraqi government had allocated 250,000 Iraqi dinars for this purpose; a memorandum from the Saudi Embassy in Cairo dated February 12, 1958, stating that the government of King Saud had agreed to allocate 250,000 British pounds to aid Algeria; a memorandum from the Lebanese Embassy in Cairo dated February 18, 1958, stating that aid should be distributed among the member states of the Arab League in proportion to their respective obligations; and a memorandum from the Sudanese Embassy in Cairo dated March 9, 1958, stating that the Council of Ministers had approved the payment of 20,000 Pounds for Algeria, and the Arab League also used its offices abroad, and donations were collected from Latin American and European countries.

The General Secretariat of the League of Arab States also provided data, statistics, and reports on Algerian refugees in Tunisia and Morocco to Arab countries, requesting that they meet the refugees' needs for food, clothing, and shelter, and assist them in accordance with national and humanitarian principles. Arab states responded to the League's request..⁽⁸⁾

Arab support was not limited to diplomatic missions at the United Nations, but extended to Arab communities residing in Latin America, who were asked to lobby their governments and demonstrate so that their governments would support the Algerian cause. However, the fruits of this contact began to appear in the following year, 1958, during the months of September and October, when the Arab League office in Buenos Aires presented a project aimed at increasing the interest of the Argentine people in the Algerian cause.

4. The Role of Arab States in Supporting the Algerian Cause:

Given the importance of the political struggle for the Algerian Revolution, the National Liberation Front (FLN) saw the necessity of focusing on this aspect, relying on the sister Arab states in the Maghreb and the Mashreq, considering the Algerian cause to be primarily an Arab cause. The countries of the Mashreq and Maghreb thus adopted positive stances, supporting the Algerian cause without hesitation, politically, materially, and militarily.

5. Egyptian Support for the Algerian Cause:

Egypt was a beacon for Arabs and a stronghold for North African revolutionaries, opening its arms to Algerians and supporting their cause, giving them a platform to raise their voices loudly, starting with advocating for Moroccan and Algerian issues, in addition to holding meetings and seminars and supporting them materially and morally. Likewise, conferences were held to raise awareness of this issue and support it.⁽⁹⁾.

- Media support:

Revolutionary Egypt continued its struggle and did everything in its power to support Arab causes, including the Algerian cause, which reached all Arabs from the Atlantic to the Gulf through the Voice of the Arabs radio station in Cairo. Egypt provided unparalleled media support to the Algerian revolution from its very first days. It was from this platform that the November 1st Declaration was broadcast, announcing the first shot fired in the revolution. The station continued to explain the cause, the revolution, and its true dimensions, and to counter biased French propaganda. As broadcaster Ahmed Saeed stated, "Gamal Abdel Nasser personally monitored the radio broadcasts and gave instructions and directives from the very first moments of the revolution. Nasser was keen to provide all available resources to the fighters on Algerian soil."⁽¹⁰⁾

The newspaper (le journal d’Egypte) was another source of Egyptian media support for Algeria. It published many articles about the situation in Algeria and the victories of the revolution, and it also published the appeals of the Algerian delegation in Cairo, one of which stated: “Yesterday you declared a sweeping revolution against French colonialism, which claimed for a hundred years of occupation that it was French.”⁽¹¹⁾

The newspaper explained that the colonialists had ruled the country for over a hundred years and that the French considered Algeria, legally and politically, part of France. The newspaper also predicted that the revolution was an organized act, as seen in articles titled "A Wave of Unrest in Algeria," which highlighted that a group of Algerians had carried out approximately 30 operations in different parts of Algeria..⁽¹²⁾

Thus, Egyptian media support was provided through its platform, the Voice of the Arabs radio station, to raise awareness, inform, and introduce the goals of the National Liberation Front, and to denounce the atrocities of colonial crimes. The Voice of the Arabs radio station was a parallel and supportive force for listening to the Algerian armed action, and Algerian students found in this radio station a source for broadcasting statements and poems that encouraged the Arab peoples. There were special programs for the Maghreb as a whole, in which officials of the national movements, including the National Liberation Front, participated.

- Military and financial support:

With the fate of the Egyptian army returned to the hands of its own people after the end of British occupation in 1947, the late President Gamal Abdel Nasser decided to support the Algerian revolution with weapons and ammunition. He opened the Egyptian army's depots to supply the Algerian revolutionaries with what they needed to continue their revolution against the French occupation authorities. Initially, the Egyptian government used one of the Egyptian fleet's vessels, the "Intisar" (Victory), which departed the port of Alexandria on the night of December 5-6, 1954, under the guise of a training voyage. The ship unloaded its cargo using small boats at a deserted port east of Tripoli, where the freedom fighter Ahmed Ben Bella and his companions transported it to Algeria. The Algerian revolution continued to receive successive shipments of weapons, equipment, and ammunition, and this Egyptian aid had a major impact on the success of the Algerian struggle..⁽¹³⁾

This is what Dr. Raafat El-Sheikh mentions in his book, *Contemporary Arab History*: “Supplying Egyptian weapons to the

Algerian revolutionaries was Egypt's primary mission in supporting the Algerian revolution. This was achieved either through smuggling across Libyan territory, purchasing weapons from international smugglers, or relying directly on Egyptian army depots and risking the use of the sea to transport supplies secretly. Egypt also placed several bases at the disposal of the Algerian National Liberation Front in Asyut, Inshas, and MarsaMatrouh to train Algerian revolutionaries in bomb-making, night attacks, and signal operations at the Egyptian Signals School in Heliopolis""..⁽¹⁴⁾ The first shipment transported by Egypt aboard the Egyptian fleet vessel Intisar consisted of:

- 100 -Lee-Enfield .303 rifles - 10 Bren .303 machine guns
- 25 -Tommy .45 machine guns - 5 firing cups
- 80,000 -rounds of .303 ammunition - 18,000 rounds of .303 ammunition for the Bren machine gun
- 24,650 -rounds of .45 ammunition for the Tommy machine gun - 1,000 rounds of .303 armor-piercing ammunition

1,000 -rounds of .303 ammunition - 120 Mills hand grenades
The Egyptian yacht Dina was also loaded with a quantity of weapons and ammunition on March 24, 1955, as follows:

- 303. 204 -rifles - 20 Bren machine guns 0.303
- 240 -Bren machine gun magazines - 34 firing pins
- 38 -Tommy .45 machine guns - 33,000 rounds of 0.303 ammunition
- 166,500 -rounds of 0.303 ammunition for the Bren machine gun - 356 Mills 36 hand grenades
- 136,000 -rounds of 0.45 ammunition for the Tommy gun - 4,000 impact pellets
- 50 boxes of air matches..⁽¹⁵⁾

The Egyptian authorities also contracted to purchase 1,000 weapons (machine guns and rifles) from Spain and acquired additional weapons through international smugglers (via representatives of the Algerian resistance in Europe). Furthermore, a deal was arranged for 350 machine guns from the Italian "Buta" factory, and 1,500 weapons belonging to the Arab League, stored in Syrian army depots, were brought to Egypt for repair in Egyptian maintenance workshops and then transported to the eastern front in Algeria's Aurès Mountains.

In the autumn of 1955, the Egyptian authorities purchased a 600-ton vessel specifically designated for transporting arms shipments to the

Algerian resistance fighters. This vessel transported large quantities of rifles, machine guns, ammunition, hand grenades, binoculars, and prismatic compasses. This prompted the Algerian revolutionary leadership to designate the night of October 1-2, 1955, as the starting point for the fighting on the Oran and Marrakesh fronts. Following the arrival of this shipment, attacks continued for three consecutive nights, inflicting heavy casualties on French forces in Oran and the Rif and Middle Atlas regions of Marrakesh. French resistance in Manouba ceased after the major battle that erupted on the evening of Wednesday, October 4, 1955, despite the intervention of French aircraft.

French resistance in Manouba ceased after the major battle that took place on the evening of Wednesday, October 4, 1955. The results of this clash crystallized into losses on the French side, amounting to 240 dead, including officers and soldiers, 330 wounded, 300 rifles, 50 heavy machine guns, and 20 light machine guns, compared to 12 dead and 15 wounded in the Algerian National Liberation Army..⁽¹⁶⁾

-Political and Diplomatic Support:

Egyptian support for the Algerian cause was not limited to the material and military aspects, but also extended to the political aspect, considering the Algerian cause an Arab cause that needed to be supported, especially since France was waging a dual military and political war against the Arabs in the Maghreb region.⁽¹⁷⁾

Cairo was the center of political activity for the Algerian Revolution. Exploratory talks were held there between representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and representatives of the French government during March and April 1956. In August 1957, Cairo hosted the second conference of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution. On September 19, 1958, the first provisional government of the Algerian Revolution was announced in Cairo and Tunis, with its headquarters in Cairo. The Algerian Revolution received unwavering support from Egypt, both in official government statements and in statements by Egyptian representatives at the United Nations, who called for Algeria's independence and its Arab identity. Egyptian-French relations deteriorated due to Egypt's absolute support for the Algerian Revolution, culminating in the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt.⁽¹⁸⁾

Egypt also played a crucial role in supporting Algeria's participation and representation at the Bandung Conference in support of the Algerian people. This gave the Algerian cause international momentum, as it garnered

solidarity from the peoples of Asia, Africa, and Europe. All of these factors contributed to the continuation of the armed struggle to regain national sovereignty. Egypt also played a significant and effective role in enabling Algerians to exert influence within the Afro-Asian Peoples' Organization from its inception in Cairo in December 1957.

What distinguished the Bandung Conference was not only the internationalization of the Algerian cause and its material and moral support, but also a deeper commitment. Its members pledged to provide material assistance to the Algerian War of Independence and to endorse Algerian demands and the legitimacy of the means used (armed struggle) for freedom. This was among the commitments of the participating states at Bandung, which affirmed their intention to "provide tangible assistance to peoples for their independence."⁽¹⁹⁾

Thus, Egypt was always behind the efforts to support the Algerian cause and obtain a resolution to support it and condemn French actions, and this role remained without wavering or weakening throughout the Algerian people's struggle until they achieved their independence.

- Iraqi Support for the Algerian Revolution:

This support dates back to the Bandung Conference, which addressed issues concerning the Maghreb. At this conference, Iraq affirmed its unconditional support for the Algerian cause. This was evident in the interventions of its representative, Mr. Fadhil al-Jamali, head of the Iraqi delegation, who focused on the criminal acts perpetrated by France against the Arab people and Algeria. He stated, among other things, that "this country, which France considers part of its territory, is witnessing daily bullets and bombs being dropped on unarmed civilians... If Algeria is considered by these French to be part of France, then why do the Arab Muslim population suffer humiliation and discrimination?"⁽²⁰⁾ The head of the Iraqi delegation also emphasized, through his interventions, the necessity of implementing the principles upon which the conference is based, especially resisting colonialism in all its forms, liberating peoples and determining their own destiny, especially the peoples of the Maghreb, including Algeria in particular. After the overthrow of the monarchy on July 14, 1958, came the second phase of Iraqi support for the Algerian liberation war. The Iraqi revolution of July 14, 1958, which overthrew the monarchy and established a progressive republican system led by Mr. Abdul Karim Qasim, the Prime Minister, distinguished this phase. Thus, the Iraqi position, government and

people, became consistent and more effective alongside the Algerian revolution⁽²¹⁾.

Iraq was the first Arab country to recognize the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic. Mr. Tawfiq al-Madani, Minister of Cultural Affairs in the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, confirmed the following: "I had barely finished reading the Arabic text of the Provisional Government's declaration and its programs when the Iraqi ambassador, the lawyer Faiq al-Samarrai, a fervent revolutionary, stepped forward and announced Iraq's recognition of the new government and Iraq's promise of full support and absolute backing for the Algerian revolution. Iraq was also at the forefront of Arab countries, politically and diplomatically, in working to internationalize the Algerian cause.".⁽²²⁾

Iraqi diplomatic support was characterized by its connection to military reinforcement and its insistence on its continuation as an inevitable choice and a guarantee of victory in the war of liberation. It was also used as a means of diplomatic pressure to mobilize international public opinion in favor of the Algerian cause. This support extended to the details of the war and colonial crimes, raising global awareness of them. The Iraqi government also mobilized its political and diplomatic resources, including instructing its embassy to contact the International Committee of the Red Cross. Furthermore, Iraqi public protests intensified on Iraqi soil, condemning the French massacres in Algeria.

At the level of official bilateral relations, the Iraqi position reached the point of criticizing and attacking any action that affected or influenced the course of the Algerian war of liberation, even if it involved a country like the Soviet Union, with which Iraq's vital national interests were concerned. Here, we find Iraqi President Abdul Karim Qasim unequivocally warning Soviet leader Khrushchev against visiting Hassi Messaoud.⁽²³⁾

Through the delegations that flocked to Baghdad, the Algerian cause succeeded in attracting the support of the Iraqi Arab people, who backed the Algerian people in their struggle for independence and freedom. They emphasized, through petitions from then-Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, the necessity of boycotting the French government politically, economically, and culturally, and of pressing for the Algerian issue to be forcefully raised at the United Nations.

Following the abduction of the five Algerian leaders, Iraq, through its Prime Minister, swiftly condemned this heinous act perpetrated by France and demanded their release. The situation worsened with the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt in 1956, leading the Council of Ministers to officially sever diplomatic relations between Iraq and France. This decision was communicated by the French Ambassador in Baghdad on November 9, 1956. On November 30, 1959, Iraq sent a memorandum to the Arab League regarding the economic boycott of France, which was a practical and constructive stance towards the Algerian people and their just cause. When France conducted its nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara, the Iraqi government condemned this barbaric act against independent Algeria. The statement issued by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that it strongly condemns France's despicable act and its attempt to manipulate Arab and African public opinion by conducting its nuclear tests in the Algerian Sahara..⁽²⁴⁾

In addition to the moral support that Iraq provided to the Algerian cause, the Iraqi government did not fall short in providing material and military assistance, which reflects the extent of Iraq's interaction with the Algerian cause in the darkest and most difficult circumstances.

6. Syrian Support for the Algerian Revolution:

With the outbreak of the November 1st, 1954 revolution, Syrian interest in it became clearly evident, similar to that of some other Arab countries, especially among the general public. This stemmed from the National Liberation Front's goal of internationalizing the Algerian cause and working to gain moral support for it within its natural context, the Arab and Islamic world. Naturally, Syrian poets were influenced by the liberation revolution from its very beginning, and thus they contributed their poignant poems to support the Algerian people's cause. They succeeded in mobilizing Arab and Syrian public opinion with a spirit of hatred for French colonialism and a belief in the justice of the Algerian cause, as this revolution reminded them of past Arab glories and the bright history of the Arab nation..⁽²⁵⁾

As a member of the League of Arab States, Syria, through this Arab body, expressed its unlimited support for the cause of the Algerian people. This led the United Nations General Assembly, under Arab and international pressure, to include it on its agenda for the 1955 session, where the Syrian delegate asserted that France's aim was to isolate Algeria from its Arab

sisters.⁽²⁶⁾

The Syrian people's position was also characterized by absolute support for the Algerian revolution and criticism of any position of their government that did not live up to the goals and means of the Algerian liberation war, demanding, whether through the media, demonstrations or in the parliament, a boycott of France and pressure on the League of Arab States to take an effective, clear and unequivocal supportive position for the liberation of all occupied Arab lands.

7. Saudi Support for the Algerian Revolution:

Contacts between the FLN's external mission and the Saudi Arabian government, and subsequent deliberations with Asian and African members, resulted in an appeal by the Saudi Arabian delegation to the Security Council, requesting a discussion of the situation in Algeria as a threat to international peace and security.⁽²⁷⁾

Perhaps the Saudi government's adoption of the Algerian issue in the Security Council is an indication of its blessing of the Arab and Islamic trend that led the Algerian revolution. Hence, its approach was positive towards the Algerian revolution, and among these approaches was the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's recognition of the first provisional Algerian government on the second day after its declaration on September 20, 1958.⁽²⁸⁾

This groundwork and the support provided by Saudi Arabia to the Algerian cause helped to bring the Algerian cause out of the narrow framework that French colonialism tried to put it in, and it also helped to extend it at the external level in internationalizing the Algerian cause and making it an Arab cause with a national dimension that flows into the depths of the conscience of the Arab people, who began to support it, assist it, and stand up for it with all the material, moral, and political capabilities they possess.

8. Moroccan Support for the Algerian Revolution:

Despite the border disputes between Algeria and Morocco, which were linked to the Moroccan monarchy's expansionist ambitions, this does not negate the fact that Morocco continued to support the Algerian cause politically, militarily, and diplomatically..⁽²⁹⁾

First: Political support: The Kingdom of Morocco worked to support the Algerian revolution from its inception and worked within the United Nations to internationalize the issue, and historical evidence proves this. The Tangier

Conference of April 27-30 was a decisive step in supporting the inalienable rights of the Algerian people, and one of its most important recommendations was the establishment of a government representing the Algerian people.⁽³⁰⁾

This was the provisional government, established on September 19, 1958, and recognized by Morocco just one day later.

Among the manifestations of Moroccan support and a positive stance was allowing the National Liberation Front (FLN) to conduct political and diplomatic activities within Moroccan territory and coordinating with it. Then came Prince Hassan's statement at the fifteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly in 1960, when he said, "The General Assembly cannot allow the continuation of the war in Algeria... and the provisional government is the sole representative of the Algerian people."⁽³¹⁾

- Secondly: Military Support:

Morocco served as a rear base for the Algerian Revolution, where revolutionary leaders established training camps such as those in Khemisset, Larache, Moulouya, and Oujda. Members of the National Army received training in combat techniques, weapons, and bombs. Fedayeen were also trained and carried out operations against vital installations in Marseille and elsewhere, taking the revolution into the heart of France. These operations led France to impose a blockade on the Algerian-Moroccan border and thwart several arms smuggling operations, such as the seizure of the ship Atos on October 6, 1956, and the German ship Belliac on November 2, 1959, among others. This prompted the revolutionary leadership to establish weapons factories and workshops in cooperation with Moroccans, using equipment that often arrived under the auspices of the Moroccan government and its king, Mohammed V..⁽³²⁾

- Third: Media Support:

In addition to political and military support, Moroccan newspapers contributed media support, which manifested in mobilizing local and international public opinion to stand with the Algerian cause and achieve independence, which would inevitably contribute to the unification of the Maghreb. The newspaper "Al-Alam," the mouthpiece of the Marrakesh Istiqlal Party, stated on April 23, 1956: "If Algeria is not liberated, we will

find ourselves completely isolated from Tunisia and the Arab world. This means that we will live in a barren desert bordered by Algeria on one side, the Sahara on another, and the Atlantic Ocean on a third. This is something we can never accept." ⁽³³⁾

9. Tunisian Support for the Algerian Revolution:

The Tunisian government's stance towards the Algerian War of Independence during the first two years after Tunisian independence (1956-1958) was characterized by leniency towards France. This was primarily due to the experience of the Tunisian independence movement, led by President Bourguiba, which was distinguished by its approach of negotiation and flexibility. This approach, while considered acceptable for achieving Tunisian independence, was not conducive to the goals set by the National Liberation Front (FLN). This was particularly evident in Tunisia's signing of an agreement with France in June 1958 to transport Algerian oil via a pipeline from the Ighil oil fields (southern Algeria), through Tunisian territory, and for export via the port of Skhira in Gabes, Tunisia.

Tunisia's behavior constituted a breach of its commitments at the Tangier Conference on Maghreb Unity, a conference that emphasized the shared destiny of the Maghreb countries. The National Liberation Front (FLN) did not hesitate to consider the Tunisian-French agreement a violation of the pledges made by the Tunisian regime and President Habib Bourguiba. Among the negative consequences of the French-Tunisian agreement on the Algerian War of Independence were the following:

This agreement provided indirect political and material support to the French government.

- From a media perspective, France exploited this agreement to mislead international public opinion into believing that the Algerian revolution was rejected even by its neighbors and that the governments of the Maghreb countries were dealing normally with France at the expense of the goals of the National Liberation Front.

- Strategically and geographically, it served to reinforce France's project of separating the Sahara from Algeria.

- Militarily, it provided France with a pretext to increase its troop presence on the Algerian-Tunisian border, and this pipeline represents a new source of revenue for France to finance its military operations to suppress the revolution. ⁽³⁴⁾.

The Tunisian government initially dealt with the Algerian revolution negatively, especially after Mr. Habib Bourguiba's visit to Washington in 1956 in the United States of America, where he discussed the Algerian issue with President Eisenhower. These discussions ended with President Habib Bourguiba pledging to try to convince the Algerian revolutionaries to stop fighting against France. When he returned to Tunisia, he stated, "I agreed with President Eisenhower that we would mediate to resolve the Algerian issue." He also announced his opposition to discussing the issue at the United Nations in 1957 and his support for De Gaulle's project in 1959

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In the final two years (1960-1962) of the Algerian War of Independence, the Tunisian government's stance shifted more positively, particularly regarding support for the Algerian armed struggle. This shift wasn't driven by conviction on the part of the Tunisian government, but rather by the Algerian War's impact on mobilizing the Tunisian people to support the Algerian revolution. Labor and peasant unions, in coordination with various social and professional organizations, also played a significant role, bolstered by the influence of political leaders within the Tunisian national movement, such as Salah Ben Youssef, Secretary-General of the Neo-Destour Party. Thus, the Tunisian government's position became a balancing act between two factors: popular pressure on the one hand, and the influence of President Bourguiba, who was conciliatory towards French colonialism, on the other. Ultimately, the popular sentiment prevailed, especially after the French attack on the Tunisian naval base in Bizerte in 1961. Thus, Tunisia and the Tunisian people once again became direct victims of French colonialism. Following these historical changes, the official Tunisian position evolved to align with Tunisian public opinion, including agreeing to the transfer of the Algerian Provisional Government's intensive activities from Cairo to Tunis in the final stage (1960-1962). Tunisia was expected to provide unwavering support to the Algerian War of Independence and to pressure France to respond to the demands of the National Liberation Front (FLN), given its geographical location, proximity, strategic presence on the Mediterranean, and the Arab identity of the Tunisian political system. Consequently, these circumstances influenced the Tunisian government to adopt positive stances, particularly political and diplomatic ones, towards the Algerian cause⁽³⁶⁾.

10. Libyan Support for the Algerian Revolution:

Libya held a special position for the Algerian Revolution. Its territory was a battleground for the Allied and Axis armies, leaving behind a surplus of weapons that were later exploited by the national liberation movements that arose in North Africa. Coordination between the Algerian resistance and the Egyptian military attaché in Libya enabled Ben Bella to successfully send shipments of weapons from the British Eighth Army, which had been stored in Libya, to Souk Ahras via southern Algeria. Similarly, Egyptian supply routes to the Algerian Revolution passed through Libyan territory..⁽³⁷⁾

Compared to other political systems in the Maghreb, the Libyan monarchy held a distinct and positive stance towards the Algerian War of Independence. The Libyan public played a crucial role in bolstering the Libyan government's support for the Algerian revolution, serving as the political and military base for the National Liberation Army (ALN). This is evident in the absolute support for the policies of the National Liberation Front (FLN), stemming from its lack of direct ties to French colonialism (it was under Italian colonial rule before World War II and under British and American influence after World War II). This allowed the Libyan regime greater independence from France. Furthermore, Algerian representatives in Libya successfully convinced the King that the FLN possessed complete autonomy and freedom of political decision-making, with no allegiance to any entity other than the liberation of Algeria. The King's conviction and positive stance were rooted in his Arab nationalist sentiments.

Its territory also served as the venue for the National Council of the Revolution's conferences, notably the first and second Tripoli conferences, held from December 6, 1960, to January 18, 1961, and from August 9 to 27, 1961, respectively. These two conferences laid the foundations and structures that organized the revolution politically, militarily, and organizationally. Given the importance of these conferences to the liberation revolution, this reflects the trust that the National Liberation Front placed in Libya.

Libya also served as a transit point for military aid coming from the Arab East, particularly Egypt. The border regions embraced the Algerian revolution by supporting the revolutionaries and workers. They are also considered one of the most important training centers for the Algerian army, which benefited from the expertise of its Libyan brothers. Libyan support was not limited to political and military support only, but extended to the media aspect. The latter was one of the most important means that Libya

used to support the Algerian cause. Libyan radio, starting from 1958, hastened to make the voice of the revolution heard on its local radio, in order to provide the Libyan people with the latest field developments of the Algerian revolution, diplomatically and militarily, and to reveal the massacres of the French..⁽³⁸⁾

11. Arab States' Recognition of the Algerian Provisional Government:

When the National Council of the Algerian Revolution announced the formation of the first provisional government of the Algerian Revolution, headed by Ferhat Abbas, during its session in Cairo on September 19, 1958, the Arab states were quick to recognize it. Iraq, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia recognized it on the same day as the announcement. On September 20, 1958, the day after the announcement, the governments of Saudi Arabia and Jordan recognized it. Then, on the third day, September 21, 1958, the United Arab Republic and Yemen recognized it. On the fourth day, September 22, 1958, Sudan recognized it, and on January 15, 1959, the Lebanese government recognized it..⁽³⁹⁾

12. Conclusion:

From what has been mentioned above, we can say that the Arab League and the Arab states behind it contributed effectively to the Algerian cause, in addition to their focus on the most important reasons that make the Algerian cause an international issue and not a French internal matter as the French colonialism claimed. Thus, the political, military, media and diplomatic support was the support on which the revolution depended in its struggle abroad.

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²SalehLamiche, *Egypt and the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962)*, Master's Thesis, 1988, p. 144.

³Mohamed Ali Al-Rifai, *The Arab League and Issues of Liberation*, 1st ed., Egyptian Printing and Publishing Company, Egypt, 1971, p. 93.

⁴Saleh Lamiche, op. cit, p 146.

⁵Belassi Nabil, *The Arab and Islamic Trend and Its Role in the Liberation of Algeria*, Egyptian General Book Organization Press, Cairo, Egypt, 1999, p. 181.

⁶The Bandung Conference was held from 18 to 24 April 1955. The conference issued a resolution supporting the rights of the peoples of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia to self-determination and independence. The participating states also committed themselves to providing assistance to peoples struggling for their independence. For more details, see:Arthur Cont; **Bandoung" Tournant de l'Histoire"** , Robert laffont, Paris, 1965

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