Rawafid for Research and Studies Review
Available online at : https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/PresentationRevue/806
ISSN : 2543-3563 EISSN: 2588-1787 Volume(11)/Issue (01) (2026) :104-119

Arab support for the Algerian liberation revolution through conferences: The Tangier Conference and Maghreb rapprochement, April 27-30, 1958, as a model

Zenati Aumeur [1]
Ziane Achour University, Djelfa, Algeria

Ameur.zenati@yahoo.fr

Reçu le:03/06/2026 Accepté le:16/06/2026 Publié le : 20/06/2026

ABSTRACT: This research paper aims to highlight Arab support for the Algerian War of Independence (1954-1962) through the Maghreb conferences held during the revolution. This is a significant and prevalent topic in the contemporary history of the Maghreb, given the profound impact of the Algerian Revolution on the Maghreb and the crucial developments that characterized relations, sometimes marked by cooperation and solidarity, and at other times by tension and instability.

Furthermore, the Maghreb countries, through the Tangier Maghreb Conference held from April 27 to 30, 1958, in Tangier, Morocco, affirmed their commitment to unity, considering the Algerian Revolution as a single cause. They hoped for a comprehensive solution that would achieve their complete independence and unity, emphasizing that this aspiration could only be realized through the unity of the liberation movements in the Maghreb countries against the common enemy.

الملخص: تهدف هذه الورقة البحثية إلى إبراز الدعم العربي للثورة التحريرية الجزائرية (1954–1962م) من خلال المؤتمرات المغاربية إبان الثورة التحريرية، وهو من الموضوعات المهمة والشائعة في تاريخ المغرب العربي المعاصر، وذلك بحكم تأثير الثورة الجزائرية العميق على المغرب العربي وأهم التطورات الحاسمة التي عرفتها العلاقات المتسمة أحيانا بالتعاون والتضامن والتوتر والاضطراب أحيانا أخرى .

كما أكّدت الأقطار المغربية من خلال مؤتمر طنجة المغاربي، المنعقد في الفترة من 27 إلى 30 أفريل 1958م بمدينة طنجة المغربية، على بعدها الوحدوي، واعتبرت الثورة الجزائرية قضية واحدة، وأملت في

Auteur correspondant : Ameur.zenati

حـل شـامل يحقـق اسـتقلالها التـام ووحـدتها، وأكّـدت أن هـذا المطمـح لا يتحقـق إلا بوحـدة حركـات التحرر بالأقطار المغربية في مواجهة العدو المشترك.

كلمات دالة: الثورة الجزائرية 1954-1962م؛ الدعم العربي للثورة؛ مؤتمر طنجة ؛ التقارب المغاربي؛ المغرب العربي المعاصر .

1. Introduction:

Nearly sixty years have passed since the Algerian War of Independence, yet it continues to shape events on numerous occasions. It provides rich material for political discourse across the spectrum of ideological and intellectual orientations, and it also serves as inspiration for creative works—artistic and literary—as well as for the national and French press in all its forms, whether written, audio, or visual. Furthermore, it has remained a fertile subject for numerous historical and intellectual conferences and seminars, sparking diverse perspectives for discussion. Indeed, many societies and research centers have been established in Algeria and France, all dedicated to the issues of the revolution.

This continued interest in the Algerian revolution as a subject of research and intellectual and political creativity demonstrates the depth of its dimensions and the loftiness of its human values on the one hand, and the richness of its topics, which are still wide open to the pens of researchers from all disciplines, orientations, and nationalities.

The outbreak of the Algerian revolution, amidst the development of the Tunisian and Moroccan problems, revived the project of Maghreb unity, a comprehensive revolutionary project that had been so daunting that France circumvented it with a new policy that entailed granting Tunisia and Morocco their independence while maintaining Algeria as French territory. Thus, the Maghreb national movements faced a difficult test: balancing the pursuit of their national ambitions with the project of Maghreb unity. With the independence of the Maghreb countries, the Algerian revolution developed unexpectedly and withstood French policy, leading to the creation of far-reaching extensions and major repercussions on the internal and external conditions of these countries, especially in their relationship with France. This made them coexist with the Algerian revolution and affirm their solidarity with the Algerian cause, and made it more clear to the French authorities that it was impossible to maintain Algeria as a colony between two independent sister nations.

Since 1958, the Maghreb region has found itself facing major risks and challenges. French forces refused to evacuate Tunisia and Morocco on the one hand, and continued their oppressive policies in Algeria on the other. These challenges reminded the Maghreb of the necessity of their unity, so the national movement parties took the initiative to hold the Tangier Conference to coordinate their policies, declare their unity, and emphasize that colonialism would henceforth face a single, united bloc. Thus, the Tangier resolutions directed Maghreb relations towards unity and solidarity and support for the Algerian revolution militarily, politically, and at both the popular and official levels.

The Algerian revolution adopted the Maghreb unity project according to a new strategy that does not rely on unifying the battle as much as it focuses on solidarity to support this battle, and thus it gained the cooperation of the political elites and the support of the popular masses for its project and proposals.

Many observers of Moroccan politics mistakenly believe that the French aggression against Sakiet Sidi Youssef was the most prominent event on the Moroccan scene in the second half of the 1950s (after the independence of the two protectorates, Tunisia and Marrakesh, in 1956).

Since February 1958, official bodies, media outlets, and the general public have consistently praised Tunisian-Algerian rapprochement and highlighted the bonds of unity uniting all the countries of the Maghreb region. However, we believe that the most significant political event of that period was the convening of the Tangier Conference, given its serious political consequences.

The previous conclusion leads us to talk about the Tangier Conference held in April 1958, as an important political turning point in the history of the Moroccan idea. The decisions of the political parties gathered at this conference, namely the Marrakesh Istiqlal Party, the new Tunisian Constitution, and the Algerian Liberation Front, were divided into three sections: a section related to the Algerian revolution, which is the most important of the three sections due to its timing, content, and effects on the future of Algeria and the region in general; a section related to eliminating the effects of imperialist hegemony in the Maghreb; and a section related to Moroccan unity.

2. The Tangier Conference and the Prospects for Solidarity and Unity:

The Tangier Conference, held in April 1958, represented a significant event in the history of the Algerian Revolution and a crucial milestone in the project of Maghreb unity. During the conference, the main Maghreb parties adopted a joint plan for solidarity with Algeria and for building Maghreb unity. What changed that led the Maghreb parties to consider linking their destinies in a unified stance؟[(1)] Was the design firm towards establishing a true unity, and why did the government fail to implement what the political parties had pledged, and what was the impact of the project and its failure on the Algerian revolution and on Maghreb relations؟

It can be said that the Tangier Conference was one of the most important conferences held after the Algerian Revolution achieved a series of victories both domestically and internationally. The idea of Maghreb unity had also reached a point of maturity, coinciding with the peak of public agitation in Europe, both in Algeria and Paris. This was the prevailing climate in the Maghreb region, particularly in Algeria.

In this climate, many believed the conference had to be a response to the colonial challenge and an attempt to formulate a Maghreb-Arab strategy that offered solutions and alternatives to confront the challenges on various fronts, including the challenge facing the Algerian Revolution, which was beset by European powers, represented by NATO.

Despite the limited resources and armament of the Algerian revolution in its early years, and despite being besieged by military force, diplomatic pressure, and internal politics, it managed to topple four French governments, including the Fourth Republic. This enabled General de Gaulle to return to power after a mutiny on May 13, 1958, following the fragility of the Fourth Republic's governments, their secret contact with the enemy, the collapse of their international standing, and their deliberate disregard for the revolution. This also allowed them to erase the diplomatic losses inherited from their predecessors due to their excessive reliance on the revolution؛[(2)].The internationalization of the Algerian issue was due to:

1. The hijacking of the plane carrying the external delegation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) on October 22, 1956. The reaction to this heinous crime was fierce, both officially and among the people. King Mohammed V and President Bourguiba were deeply affected, and their governments condemned the act. The people of the Maghreb region denounced it in strikes and demonstrations. The FLN, in a statement, expressed its

condemnation of the crime and denounced its perpetrators. This incident hardened the course of the Algerian conflict, fostering distrust of French intentions and validating the FLN's rejection of cooperation with France and its negotiating proposals. It also underscored the fact that the fate of Morocco and Tunisia was more closely tied to that of Algeria than to any agreements signed with France[3]..

2. Settlement of France's overseas colonies
3. The Suez Canal Campaign, participating in the Tripartite Aggression against Egypt on November 5, 1956.
4. Bombing of the village of "Saqia Sidi Youssef" in February 1958 ،(4) Robert Lacoste goes on to say (5)" He goes even further, describing this diplomatic defeat as a "diplomatic Dien Bien Phu.[6]"."

In addition to the political changes in France, the year 1958 witnessed several local and international events that contributed to the development of the Algerian issue towards calling for the condemnation of France once again, and embarrassing it once again in front of world public opinion:

The first of these events was the bombing of the Tunisian village of Sidi Youssef on February 8, 1958, for a full hour ،[7].Under the pretext that they were centers harboring Algerian revolutionaries located two and a half kilometers away, the international press and the Red Cross refuted this claim because they were present on the ground and confirmed that they were merely clusters of modest shops and a market crowded with villagers.[8].

Following this incident, US Secretary of State Foster Dulles told French Ambassador Hervé Alphand that this policy was leading the world to disaster, saying, "...France is asking for a privileged role in Africa, but it seems unable to do so... and will soon find itself at war with all of North Africa, which is supported by Egypt and the Soviet Union.[9]"...

The second event was on the Maghreb level, which was the convening of the Tangier Conference between April 27 and 29, 1958 AD. This conference embodied the unity work of the Maghreb countries that suffered from a common colonial past, because the convening of this Maghreb Arab Conference was chaired by "Allal al-Fassi[10]."Who was also the head of the Moroccan delegation.[11]

3. Reasons for convening the conference:

It can be said that the interactions resulting from Arab and regional circumstances, including the Egyptian-Syrian union, the Sakiet Sidi Youssef incident, and the French-Spanish cooperation to strike at the Moroccan national movement in its own heartland, hastened the convening of the

conference and paved the way for it. Among the outcomes of this conference will be the charting of the future of Maghreb relations on firm, clear, and solid foundations, which will undoubtedly represent a qualitative leap towards a common goal aimed at the complete liberation of the Maghreb region and the building of a unity that fulfills the aspirations of the Maghreb project.

The events in Sakiet Sidi Youssef, Tunisia, strengthened Maghreb solidarity, which France had sought to undermine. The search for ways to bolster this solidarity and translate it into reality became more urgent than ever. Following this attack, the National Liberation Front (FLN) reaffirmed its strong commitment to cooperating with Tunisia and Morocco in building Maghreb unity[(12)]..

Furthermore, the importance of Tunisia and Morocco increased from 1957 onwards due to the political and military developments of the revolution, particularly as they provided crucial support to the activities of the National Liberation Front and its army. They served as supply and staging bases close to the front lines, and as arenas for popular solidarity due to their proximity and shared support. Even the declared media campaign against the West was effectively waged from Tunisia and Morocco, countries with ties to Western Europe and Africa.

Thus, the National Liberation Front (FLN) strove to extract the greatest possible benefits from this conference, according to a well-thought-out and targeted plan formulated by Abdelhamid Mehri, an expert on Maghreb affairs. He convinced the Coordination and Implementation Committee of the necessity of seizing this historical moment and taking advantage of the absence of a formal agenda for the conference to steer it towards the struggle against colonialism in Algeria and its remnants and military bases in Tunisia and Morocco. The FLN adopted a sound plan aimed at mobilizing the Maghreb in solidarity with the Algerian revolution and moving beyond the option of joint military action that had been proposed in 1955, as it was no longer compatible with the realities of the two independent countries, nor could their political systems implement it. However, the issue of providing aid and unifying positions with the Algerian revolution on common issues could be addressed, especially since the FLN was negotiating with political parties, not executive governments with decision-making power, and needed practical coordination to respond to its demands, as well as popular support.

The Algerian delegation was realistic in its ambitions and skillful in its diplomacy and strategy. It worked diligently to include important issues on the conference agenda and explored ways to implement the resolutions.

.**Participating Delegations:**

Regarding the representation of the delegations, Tunisia was represented by the Neo-Destour Party led by Habib Bourguiba, Morocco by the Istiqlal Party led by Allal al-Fassi, and Algeria by [unspecified entity][(13)].The National Liberation Front delegation included Ferhat Abbas as head, Abdelhafid Boussouf, Dr. Ahmed Francis, Mouloud Gaid, Ahmed Boumendjel, and Abdelhamid Mehri. A delegation from Mauritania attended as an observer, while the Libyan delegation was absent [(14)].The number of participants in the conference reached 19 members.[(15)].

In any case, on the twenty-sixth day of April 1958, delegations from the three parties formed by the Algerian National Liberation Front, the Tunisian Neo-Destour Party, and the Moroccan Independence Party had arrived in the Moroccan city of Tangier. These parties were represented by prominent historical figures known for their struggle for Maghreb unity and resistance against French colonialism.

4. -1Conference Resolutions and Their Importance:

Over four full days, the participants discussed issues related to completing the liberation and unification of the Maghreb. The opening speeches of the heads of delegations focused on the imperative of solidarity with Algeria in its liberation struggle and praised the unity of the Maghreb. The head of the National Liberation Front delegation emphasized that "the liberation of the Maghreb and the achievement of its unity are our highest ideals[(16)]".That conference was a resounding and decisive event, and it was called the “Unity Conference” because it approved a clear concept of the idea of the Arab Maghreb, which no longer meant mere joint coordination, but rather working towards the establishment of a federal union between the Maghreb countries. The conference agenda reflected the axes of interest of the Maghreb leaders, as the conference attendees, after two preliminary sessions in Rabat, identified the following axes:

-The ongoing independence revolution in Algeria.

- Eliminating the vestiges of colonialism in the Maghreb.
- Maghreb unity: its form, principles, and the transitional phase of this unity.

- Establishing a permanent organization to implement the conference resolutions.

The responsiveness of official regimes and the presence of a large number of officials helped enrich the discussion and lead to courageous stances. The conference participants announced historic resolutions that can be summarized in three main points: supporting the Algerian revolution, eliminating the remnants of colonialism, the position on Western support for France, and Maghreb unity.

5. The Tangier Conference and the Resolution to Support the Revolution by All Means:

This issue received the lion's share of discussions as it was the central issue of the Maghreb. The National Liberation Front (FLN) was able to garner support for its struggle, and the conference declared the principle of "the sacred right of the Algerian people to sovereignty and independence as the sole condition for resolving the Franco-Algerian conflict." This reaffirmed the FLN's position on the principle of complete sovereignty and independence. After analyzing the nature of the colonial war, the conference resolved that "political parties should offer the Algerian people, struggling for their independence, the full support of their peoples and the backing of their governments." Given the international support for the Algerian cause and the legitimacy of the FLN's representation of the Algerian people's struggle, "the conference recommends the formation of an Algerian government after consulting with the governments of Morocco and Tunisia." This last point was the subject of extensive debate, with some expressing concerns about the government's direction and structure. They stipulated prior approval from Tunisia and Morocco for its formation. However, the FLN insisted on its sovereignty and ultimately agreed to consult only with Tunisia and Morocco on the matter.

- Given the support France receives from NATO and Western countries, the conference condemned this stance and demanded an end to all political and material aid aimed at fueling the colonial war in the Maghreb. Furthermore, considering the violations of sovereignty perpetrated by foreign forces stationed in Tunisia and Morocco, and their participation in the Algerian war, the communiqué recorded the following resolutions:

- It condemns the continued presence of foreign forces on its territory, which is incompatible with the sovereignty of an independent nation.

- It urgently demands that French forces immediately cease using Moroccan and Tunisian territory as a base for aggression against the Algerian people**.**

-It recommends that governments and political parties coordinate their efforts to take the necessary measures to eliminate all vestiges of colonial control [(17)]**..**

These crucial decisions were proposed by the National Liberation Front (FLN) to embarrass the Western position, and the French in particular. The FLN presented the conference attendees with detailed maps of the locations of French bases operating in Tunisia and Morocco, illustrating their coordinated activities with the French army in Algeria and the negative impact this had on the activities of the Algerian resistance fighters. The FLN's demands were met with a positive response, as it enjoyed widespread popular support and significant public mobilization. This emphasis on the FLN's demands was also intended to further mobilize this broad public behind the conference's position،[(18)].The decision to condemn Western support for France was an Algerian decision, which was adopted even though the Istiqlal Party and the Constitutional Party proposed formulating this condemnation on behalf of the peoples of the Maghreb. As for the demand to support the struggle of the Mauritanian people, the conference expressed its solidarity with this demand. However, the Istiqlal Party called for linking this struggle within the framework of the unity of the Moroccan territory, while the Tunisian and Algerian sides insisted on placing it within the framework of the Maghreb liberation struggle, and emphasized that this liberation resistance "is part of the battle being waged by the countries of the Maghreb for their liberation and unity".

Among the important decisions that emerged from the Tangier Conference was the necessity of embodying the will of the Maghreb peoples to establish unity among the three Maghreb countries. This unity was expressed through the establishment of joint institutions, such as the formation of a Maghreb Consultative Council emanating from the local councils in Morocco and Tunisia and from the National Council of the Algerian Liberation Revolution. This council was tasked with studying common issues and submitting recommendations to the executive authorities for implementation. The conference also approved the formation of a permanent secretariat for the conference, consisting of six members, two from each country, whose mission was to monitor the implementation of the conference's decisions[(19)]..

The National Liberation Front (FLN) emerged victorious from this conference, thanks to the ability of its representatives to steer the

proceedings in favor of the Algerian cause, particularly the withdrawal of French military forces from both Tunisia and Morocco. Indeed, following the Tangier Conference, both Morocco and Tunisia initiated procedures to demand the withdrawal of the French army, in accordance with the conference's resolutions.

However, the most important resolution of the conference was not public but rather secret, as it was not published. This resolution outlined the practical measures that the Destour Party and the Istiqlal Party would take to support the liberation revolution. In the context of this support and the pursuit of unity, we recall what Allal al-Fassi said in his closing address: "...Morocco is indivisible, and the independence of the two countries, however great an achievement, remains empty if Algeria is not also independent.[(20)]"...

As was the outcome of the conference[(21)]Ratification of the draft project to establish a federal union consisting of a national council in which the Moroccan Consultative Council, the Tunisian Constituent Assembly, and the Algerian Revolutionary Council would participate, with the task of reviving common issues.[(22)].

6. The Colonial Authorities' Stance on the Conference:

The Tangier Conference is considered a crucial stage in the Algerian liberation revolution. Over the years, France tried to employ all its means to isolate Algeria completely from its surroundings and the world, in order to stifle the revolution in its infancy. The occupying authorities were always apprehensive about the National Liberation Front uniting with the Maghreb countries, because they were well aware that this would inevitably pose a serious challenge to them and the Western bloc. Hence, they worked with all their might to thwart the conference, resorting to an old, yet ever-renewing, policy of "divide and rule".

After assuming power in France following the events of May 13, 1958 – the events that brought down the Fourth French Republic – General de Gaulle made it a priority to avoid the mistakes made by French policy during the Indochina War, from which it gained nothing but successive military defeats[(23)].

In fact, General de Gaulle wanted to adopt a policy of integration in Algeria, believing that he would thereby achieve political gains, including cutting off the hopes of Morocco and Tunisia for the possibility of Algeria’s independence, at least in the near term, as this policy would create a kind of

frustration in the two regimes that would help implement his future plan to eliminate all the Algerians' hopes for independence.

Keen to obstruct the implementation of the Tangier Conference resolutions by all possible means, General de Gaulle worked to win over the regimes in both Morocco and Tunisia by explicitly declaring his respect for the independence of Tunisia and Morocco. Indeed, both countries responded positively to General de Gaulle's statements, considering them a gain that must be preserved(24)..

In light of this old-new policy introduced by General de Gaulle, the leaders of the Maghreb quickly convened national meetings in Lausanne and Geneva to discuss the events following the Tangier Conference. As a result, a tripartite conference was agreed upon for June 17, 1958, in Tunis. The aim was to reach a unified position among the three countries regarding the events unfolding in the Maghreb region, as well as to implement the recommendations of the Tangier Conference at the governmental level. Naturally, the French government sought to exclude the National Liberation Front (FLN) from this conference, and thus attempted to convince French and international public opinion that the Tangier Conference was limited to the Moroccan and Tunisian governments, excluding the FLN(25)..

7. Conclusion:

In short, the Algerian revolution capitalized on popular and official Maghreb solidarity to serve its strategic direction of struggle, rather than focusing on Maghreb unity, which was not even on the agenda as it entered its fourth year. It mobilized various forces and resources to provide political and military support. The Tangier Conference, a crucial opportunity to outline its Maghreb aspirations and objectives, truly marked a significant milestone in the history of Maghreb relations, given the historic resolutions it adopted in support of the Algerian revolution and the achievement of Maghreb unity.

Today, we need the same revolutionary fervor that characterized the Tangier Maghreb Conference, along with the same level of genuine solidarity, to address the numerous challenges facing our region. These challenges range from addressing the legitimate concerns of our youth and achieving sustainable development and food security, to combating transnational crime and fighting extremism, which is alien to our Maghreb societies, with their moderation, openness, and pursuit of progress.

8. References:

1 National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1st Revolution. Arab Support for the Algerian Revolution. Publications of the Center, Algeria, 2007.
2 Al-Kilani, Abdelwahab et al. Encyclopedia of Politics, Vols. 3 and 4. Arab Institution for Studies and Publishing, 2007.
3 El Moudjahid Newspaper. "The Story of Secret Communications, 1956–1960." Issue No. 92, March 27, 1961.
4 Chrit Lahdar et al. The Strategy of the French Enemy in Eliminating the Algerian Revolution. National Research Projects Series, National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1st Revolution of 1954, Algeria, 2007.
5 National Liberation Front (FLN). The Algerian Resistance Newspaper, Issue No. 11, November 1956.
6 Cheikh Slimane. "The Algerian Revolution on the International Scene." Majallat al-Dirasat al-Tarikhiyya (Review of Historical Studies), No. 9, Institute of History, University of Algiers, Algiers, 1995.
7 El Moudjahid Newspaper. "The Martyred Village of Sakiet Sidi Youssef." Issue No. 15, February 15, 1958.
8 Tablit, Ali. "French-American Relations and the Algerian War, 1956–1960." Al-Dhakira Journal, National Museum of the Mujahid, Issue No. 8, March 2007, Algeria.
9 El Moudjahid Newspaper. "From the Opening Speeches Expressing Hope." Issue No. 23, March 7, 1958.
10 El Moudjahid Newspaper. "Communiqué from the National Liberation Front." Issue No. 18, February 15, 1958.
11 Ghilani, Sebti. The Relationship Between the Algerian National Liberation Front and the Kingdom of Morocco During the Algerian War of Independence, 1954–1962. Doctoral Dissertation in History, University of Constantine, Algeria, 2010.
12 Allal El Fassi. So That We Do Not Forget. Al-Risala Press, Rabat, 1973.
13 Hamdani, Mohamed Ali El Amin. The Pan-African Movement, 1900–1963: Pioneers and Conferences.

Unpublished Master's Thesis, University of Algiers, Academic Year 2010–2011.
14 El Moudjahid Newspaper, Issue No. 23, May 1958.
15 El Mili, Mohamed. Algerian Positions. 1st ed., National Book Institution, Algeria, 1984.
16 Al-Assali, Bassam. The Algerian National Liberation Front. 3rd ed., Dar Al-Nafais for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, Lebanon, 1990.
17 Bouaziz, Yahia. Algerian Revolutions in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 2nd ed., Vol. 2, Publications of the National Museum of the Mujahid, Algeria, 1996.
18 El Moudjahid Newspaper. "The Tunis Conference: How It Began and How It Ended." Issue No. 26.

[1]Within the framework of solidarity with the Algerian Liberation Revolution, the trade unions of the three countries (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) organized a union conference in the Moroccan city of Tangier from 20 to 22 October 1957. This Maghreb trade union conference focused on the central issue for which it was held, namely the Algerian cause, which received significant attention.
It was decided, on the sidelines of this conference, to establish a unified Maghreb front that would correspond to the aspirations of the working class in the Maghreb countries. Among the most important resolutions adopted by the participants was the commitment to stand by the Algerian people in their struggle against French occupation by all available means until they achieved independence, and to enable the Maghreb region to build its political, economic, and cultural unity in order to free the Maghreb countries from foreign monopoly..
The participants also called on international trade unions to organize a worldwide day of solidarity with the Algerian people and to stand against the arrogant French policy practiced against a peaceful people struggling against one of the most powerful forces in the world for their freedom and independence.

See: National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1st Revolution. *Arab Support for the Algerian Revolution*, Publications of the Center, Algeria, 2007, pp. 102–103.

[2]Lakhdar Cherait et al. The French Enemy's Strategy in Liquidating the Algerian Revolution. National Research Projects Series, National Center for Studies and Research on the National Movement and the November 1st Revolution of 1954, Algeria, 2007, pp. 17–18.

[3]See the position of the National Liberation Front in Algerian Resistance, Issue No. 11 (November 1956).

[4]Slimane Cheikh, **La Révulotion Algerienne sur La Scene Internationale**, Majalat Ed'dirasat Tarikhia," Reveu d'Etudes Historique, N09, Université d'Alger, Institut d'Histoir, Alger, 1995, p30.

[5]Robert Lacoste: A law graduate of the University of Paris, he participated in the French resistance against the Nazis. He later became Minister of Industry until 1950. In February 1956, he was appointed Minister and Governor-General of Algeria, a position he held until the coup of 13 May 1958. He became known for his repression of Algerians and for defending the use of torture by the French police and army. He is considered responsible for the terror carried out by the L.O.S. organization.

[6]Lakhdar Cherait et al., ibid., p. 17.

([7]) **جريدة المجاهد**، قرية ساقية سيدي يوسف الشهيدة، العدد 15، 15 فيفري 1958م، ص4.

[8]Ibid., p. 4.

[9] Tablit, Ali. "French-American Relations and the Algerian War, 1956–1960." Al-Dhakira (Memory) Journal, National Museum of the Mujahid, Issue No. 8, March 2007, Algeria, p. 84.

[10]Allal El Fassi (1906–1974): Leader of the Moroccan Istiqlal Party, which he founded in 1943. He was exiled by the French authorities to Gabon in 1938, then placed under house arrest in Tangier in 1946. He later took refuge in Cairo in 1948, where he continued his struggle through the Maghreb Bureau. After independence, he returned to Morocco and supported King Mohammed V. He died in Bucharest on 17 May 1974, following a meeting with the Romanian head of state.

Al-Kilani, Abdelwahab et al. Encyclopedia of Politics, Vol. 4, previously cited source, p. 158.

[11]Al-Mujahid Newspaper, from the opening speeches expressing hope, issue 23, March 7, 1958, p. 8.

[12]El Moudjahid Newspaper: "Statement from the National Liberation Front," Issue No. 18, dated February 15, 1958, p. 4

[13]The invitation extended to the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN) to participate in the Tangier Conference sparked two opposing viewpoints within the Front's leadership. The first viewpoint opposed attending the conference, arguing that it would further distance Morocco from the Arab

world and thus anger Gamal Abdel Nasser's Egypt. The second viewpoint saw no harm in accepting the invitation to the Tangier Conference, in order to maintain the support provided by Morocco and Tunisia to the Algerian revolution and to leverage the conference for the benefit of the Algerian cause. This second viewpoint represented the majority opinion, and the conference also received the approval of the imprisoned leaders, most notably Ahmed Ben Bella, known for his leanings towards Gamal Abdel Nasser's ideology and his pan-Arabist leanings. Based on this, the FLN, by a majority, accepted the invitation from the Istiqlal Party and the Tunisian Destour Party to participate in the Tangier Conference. See: Ghilani Sabti, The Relationship of the Algerian National Liberation Front with the Kingdom of Morocco during the Algerian War of Independence 1954-1962, PhD dissertation in History, University of Constantine, Algeria, 2010, p. 184.

[14]Libya was not invited to the Tangier Conference for several reasons, primarily due to the lack of genuine rapprochement between Maghreb and Libyan political parties, and their disagreement on whether Libya should be considered part of the Maghreb Union, especially given Libya's alignment with Nasser's Egypt (1504). However, the justification offered by the conference attendees to the Libyan officials was based on technical reasons, emphasizing that time constraints prevented extending an invitation to Libya. The National Liberation Front (FLN) stressed the necessity of Libya's participation in this union and tasked the conference delegation (Abbas al-Adgham ibn Baraka) with visiting Libya to inform the King and the government of the conference resolutions and to ascertain their readiness to endorse them. The King confirmed his approval of the Tangier resolutions and stated that he would refer them to the government for the necessary action (1505). The Libyan Parliament called for endorsing the Tangier Conference and implementing its resolutions, and the Libyan government affirmed that these resolutions aligned with its policies, particularly those concerning support for Algerian independence, and declared its readiness to participate in the federal institutions of the Maghreb Union. See: See the text of King Idris's letter to the President The conference, Allal al-Fassi, and his commentary on the Libyan position, Allal al-Fassi: Lest We Forget, previous source, pp. 262-268.

[15]Mohamed Ali El Amine Hamdani, Pan-African Movement between 1900-1963 AD “Pioneers and Conferences”, Unpublished Master’s Thesis, University of Algiers, 2010, 2011, p. 46.

[16]See: Al-Mujahid, issue 23, May 1958.

[17]See the text of the communiqué in El Moudjahid, Issue No. 23, May 1958.

[18]El Mili, Mohamed. Algerian Positions. 1st ed., National Book Institution, Algeria, 1984, pp. 72–81.

[19]Al-Assali, Bassam. The Algerian National Liberation Front. 3rd ed., Dar Al-Nafais for Printing and Publishing, Beirut, Lebanon, 1990, pp. 143–144.
[20]Ibid., p. 9.
[21]See the appendix at the end of the article concerning the conference resolutions, as cited from El Moudjahid Newspaper.
[22]El Moudjahid Newspaper, "From the Opening Speeches Expressing Hope," previously cited source, p. 8.
[23]Bouaziz, Yahia. Algerian Revolutions in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 2nd ed., Vol. 2, Publications of the National Museum of the Mujahid, Algeria, 1996, p. 228..
[24]El Moudjahid Newspaper, "The Tunis Conference: How It Began and How It Ended," Issue No. 26, previously cited source, p. 8.
[25]ibid