

The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic: Efforts Toward the Transition from Armed Struggle to International Diplomacy

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ABSTRACT:

The announcement of the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on September 19, 1958, is considered a landmark event that allowed the liberation revolution to move into a new phase to complete the establishment of state institutions and affirmed the people's rallying around the revolution and its leaders.

This research paper seeks to demonstrate that the declaration of the establishment of the Provisional Government carried with it multiple objectives, which allowed the Algerian revolution to move into a new phase by completing the establishment of the institutions of the fledgling Algerian state.

Key words: Algerian Liberation Revolution; Algerian diplomacy; negotiations; Provisional Government; Algerian Republic.

ملخص باللغة العربية:

يعتبر الإعلان عن تأسيس الحكومة المؤقتة للجمهورية الجزائرية بتاريخ 19 سبتمبر 1958م، حدثاً بارزاً، سمح للثورة التحريرية بالانتقال إلى مرحلة جديدة لاستكمال استحداث مؤسسات الدولة، وأكد التفاف الشعب حول الثورة وقادتها.

وتسعى هذه الورقة البحثية إلى التأكيد بأن إعلان تأسيس الحكومة المؤقتة حمل في طياته أهدافاً متعددة، سمحت للثورة الجزائرية بالانتقال إلى مرحلة جديدة من خلال استكمال استحداث مؤسسات الدولة الجزائرية الفتية.

كلمات دالة: الثورة التحريرية الجزائرية؛ الدبلوماسية الجزائرية؛ المفاوضات؛ الحكومة المؤقتة، الجمهورية الجزائرية.

1. Introduction:

The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was established on September 19, 1958, as a strategic necessity aimed at transitioning the Algerian Revolution from a purely armed struggle to formal diplomacy, and at granting political legitimacy to the National Liberation Front (FLN) as the sole representative of the Algerian people.

This marked a pivotal moment in the liberation revolution and was, consequently, the most significant political event in the history of the Algerian people's struggle.

Perhaps the question that comes to mind for the researcher is: What were the most prominent efforts of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in moving from a liberation movement to diplomacy?

1. Circumstances surrounding the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic:

From its outbreak on the night of November 1, 1954, until the restoration of national sovereignty in July 1962, the Algerian Revolution witnessed significant events and developments on various levels, both political and military, internal and external, which had a major impact on its course and continuation.⁽¹⁾

The establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on September 19, 1958, is considered one of these important events, as we can consider this event to be the result of conditions and factors experienced by the revolution internally and externally. Accordingly, we can distinguish between internal and external conditions that contributed to the emergence of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

– First: Internal Circumstances:

- These circumstances and factors are of paramount importance due to their direct impact on the course of the revolution. The most important of these can be summarized as follows:

-Political circumstances:

In accordance with the decisions of the Soummam Conference ⁽²⁾On August 20, 1956, the first official executive body of the Algerian Revolution was formed, namely the Coordination and Implementation Committee, which included five members ⁽³⁾.They divided among themselves the tasks assigned to this committee.

The Coordination and Implementation Committee strove with all its available resources to organize and lead the revolution. However, difficulties forced it to leave Algeria after the failure of the Battle of Algiers in 1957 and the violent reaction of the French military authorities. The committee attempted to address the internal problems of the revolution from abroad (Tunisia) before returning to the homeland, but events took a turn for the worse ⁽⁴⁾.

This led to an internal crisis in 1957, represented by the conflict between Krim Belkacem ⁽⁵⁾And Abane Ramadan, ⁽⁶⁾However, thanks to the mediation of Mr. Abbas Farhat, the crisis was temporarily resolved by agreeing to expand the Coordination and Implementation Committee and the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, at the conference of August 20, 1957 in Cairo. ⁽⁷⁾.

However, the Coordination and Implementation Committee remained stuck in a vicious cycle, suffering from a lack of trust and disharmony among its members, which led to its failure to solve the problems that the revolution was facing internally, especially those related to the issue of weapons and ammunition. ⁽⁸⁾.

In this atmosphere, the assassination of Abane Ramdane will take place ⁽⁹⁾.This assassination had a negative impact on the morale of the remaining members of the Coordination and Implementation Committee. Abbas Farhat stated that he considered withdrawing from the external mission at that time, but he changed his mind, justifying this by saying: "My place is among the officials and alongside them, at least to avoid something worse ⁽¹⁰⁾""..

Furthermore, incidents within the revolutionary ranks indicated a decline in confidence, especially after the conflict dynamics shifted with the return of General de Gaulle ⁽¹¹⁾.To the pyramid of power in France following the

events of May 13, 1958, led by extremist settlers and leaders of the colonial army in Algeria, as this is an important factor added to the previous factors.

With his return, De Gaulle restored power to the French regime, which relied primarily on the army and a military solution to suppress the Algerian revolution and fulfill the ambitions of the settlers.⁽¹²⁾

In addition to political maneuvering ⁽¹³⁾The deceptive economic projects that would be embodied in the Constantine project, the beginnings of which were talking about a policy of reforms with the aim of “improving the living conditions of the Algerian population,” since De Gaulle’s arrival in June 1958. ⁽¹⁴⁾

Since the summer of 1958, De Gaulle had begun preparing for a referendum on a fifth constitution for the French Republic, scheduled to take place on September 26, 1958. ⁽¹⁵⁾Under these circumstances, the Coordination and Implementation Committee began studying the file of its transformation into a provisional government of the Algerian Republic, in order to confront De Gaulle's policies internally, both militarily and politically. ⁽¹⁶⁾And to establish a legitimate political body that can contribute to accelerating the negotiation process and finding a peaceful settlement ⁽¹⁷⁾

2. Objectives of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic:

What we can point out here is that the Provisional Government was established to achieve specific objectives, which we will discuss later, based on what is contained in the archives of this revolutionary political body, whether through the official declaration of its establishment or through the reports of the members of the Coordination and Implementation Committee, and the reports of the committee tasked with studying the possibility of establishing a provisional government.

3. First: On the internal level:

An attempt to resolve the leadership problem by achieving a kind of harmony and unity that the Coordination and Implementation Committee had long lacked, thus erasing the negatives of the past. The opinions of the Coordination Committee members almost unanimously agree that the fundamental problem the revolution suffered from at that time was primarily the leadership problem ⁽¹⁸⁾.

From a military standpoint, the issue of weapons was considered the most serious military problem that the revolution suffered during 1958. After the French authorities established the Morice Line on the Algerian-Tunisian and Algerian-Moroccan borders, it became extremely difficult to bring weapons into the country ⁽¹⁹⁾. Therefore, the first military objective programmed for the provisional government was to find a solution to the problem of armament and to strengthen the military capabilities of the National Liberation Army. ⁽²⁰⁾.

The establishment of the GSG government falls within a general framework for countering the policies of the Fifth Republic under General de Gaulle, which operate in two parallel directions on both the political and military levels, and on both the domestic and foreign levels. ⁽²¹⁾.

It also sought to restore a spirit of optimism and hope among segments of the Algerian people aspiring to the declaration of a legitimate national government, and to continue the revolution to gain effective support internationally. ⁽²²⁾.

Through all of the above, this move by the National Liberation Front aimed to give a second breath to the liberation revolution in circumstances where the dynamics of the Algerian-French conflict had changed, especially with the arrival of General de Gaulle at the helm of power in France ⁽²³⁾. It also worked to revive the official Algerian presence, embodied in the Algerian state usurped since July 5, 1830, which embodies its loyalty to the past. ⁽²⁴⁾.

4. Secondly: On the external front:

The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was established in unique and critical international circumstances for the Algerian Revolution. Therefore, diplomatic and international dimensions in general occupied a significant portion of its stated objectives, which can be summarized in the following points:

-To counter the foreign policy of Charles de Gaulle, regain the initiative from him, and overcome the difficulties it was facing as an offensive diplomatic move ⁽²⁵⁾.

The establishment of the Algerian Provisional Government falls within the framework of the National Liberation Front's endeavor to dismantle existing

colonial institutions by creating alternative revolutionary institutions, in order to gradually extend its influence on the international stage ⁽²⁶⁾.

The declaration of the birth of the Provisional Government of Algeria in 1958 is considered a revival of the Algerian state as a subject of international law, since this personality was not completely eliminated by the French colonial control over Algeria and its crushing of the resistance of Emir Abdelkader and the numerous popular uprisings, which placed the capitals of countries before the challenge of recognizing it sooner or later ⁽²⁷⁾.

-In order to provide a legitimate and official instrument for negotiating with France, and to refute De Gaulle's claims that there was no government representing the Algerian people with which to negotiate, as expressed by Ferhat Abbas in his letter to Gamal Abdel Nasser before the announcement of the establishment of the provisional government, that "this government will be a contributing factor in finding a peaceful solution."⁽²⁸⁾

-The National Liberation Front attempted to take advantage of the international situation at the time, characterized by the ideological conflict between the communist camp led by the Soviet Union and the capitalist camp led by the United States of America, without this resulting in Algeria becoming subservient to either camp, i.e., benefiting from the material and diplomatic support of the socialist countries while maintaining the independence of Algerian political decision-making ⁽²⁹⁾.

5. The Development of Diplomatic Action for the Algerian Revolution (1954-1958):

The Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties established a foreign mission in Cairo, Egypt, in 1945. This mission was responsible for establishing contacts with the then newly formed League of Arab States (March 1945) and coordinating with the Maghreb Liberation Bureau.⁽³⁰⁾ From 1951 onwards, the composition of this mission consisted of the following gentlemen:

-Mohamed Khider: Former member of the Political Bureau of the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties.

-Hocine Aït Ahmed: Former head of the Special Organization (OS) from 1948 to 1949.

-Ahmed Ben Bella: Head of the Special Organization from the end of 1949 until his arrest in May 1950.

The instigators of the revolution realized that the success of the armed struggle at home depended on a broad diplomatic movement abroad, providing material and moral support for the continuation and success of the liberation revolution at home. This can be inferred from the first document issued by the leadership of the revolution – the National Liberation Front and Army – which analyzed the international situation and outlined the diplomatic movement of a young and ambitious revolution. .⁽³¹⁾

Therefore, in July 1954, the revolutionary leadership traveled to Switzerland to meet with the officials of the external mission, Mohamed Khider and Ahmed Ben Bella, who were there to discuss the two opposing factions within the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD): the Messalians and the Centralists. In this context, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, Didouche Mourad, and Mohamed Larbi Ben M'hidi met with Ahmed Ben Bella and Mohamed Khider and informed them of the decisions made by the Committee of Twenty-Two. Ahmed Ben Bella agreed to the decisions and declared his allegiance to the revolutionary project for which he had long struggled. He promised to persuade his two colleagues on the external mission, Mohamed Khider (who had returned to Cairo) and Hocine Aït Ahmed, and also pledged to contact the Egyptian authorities to secure their support .⁽³²⁾.

The appointment of Messrs. Mohamed Khider, Ahmed Ben Bella, and Hocine Aït Ahmed to head the external delegation – or the external mission – of the National Liberation Front, is a translation of the revolution's conviction of the need to work on internationalizing the Algerian-French conflict, and to mobilize the sister Arab states to support the revolution in confronting the colonial army and the adversaries – especially the Algerian national movement led by Messali Hadj. The first action taken by the external mission of the Front was to contact the Egyptian authorities in order to inform them of the new entity that sparked the revolution in Algeria on the night of November 1, 1954, which enabled it to broadcast the November 1, 1954 statement on the waves of the Egyptian radio station "Voice of the Arabs."

Subsequently, members of the external mission sought to establish an office for themselves in the Egyptian capital, Cairo, to serve as a base for

their activities and movements inside and outside Egypt, especially those related to the communications that the mission was conducting with Mr. Mohamed Boudiaf, who was considered the coordinator between the internal leadership, represented by the Committee of Six ⁽³³⁾. The members of the foreign mission, and those contacts were taking place in Europe, especially in Switzerland ⁽³⁴⁾.

The National Liberation Front's (FLN) foreign mission benefited in its activities from the experiences of the Algerian People's Party (PPA) and the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD), which had representatives in Cairo who advocated for the Algerian cause in international forums, notably at the Bandung Conference in April 1955. This garnered the revolution the support of the Afro-Asian bloc countries, which would raise the Algerian question at the tenth session of the United Nations General Assembly at the end of 1955.

The Soummam Conference, for its part, emphasized the importance of diplomatic efforts aimed at refuting the misconceptions propagated by the French government, its diplomacy, and its mainstream press. It sought to lay the foundations for the revolution's diplomatic campaign, asserting, "It is our duty to consistently ensure the complete independence of the Algerian revolution. We must also eradicate the falsehoods spread by the French government, its diplomacy, and its mainstream press to portray the revolution as an artificial, fabricated revolution orchestrated from abroad".

6. Foundations and Objectives of the Diplomatic Activity of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic 1958-1959

The Provisional Government inherited the features and foundations of its diplomatic activity from the National Liberation Front, which in turn inherited the most important of them from the National Independence Movement, represented by the North African Star, then the Algerian People's Party, and finally the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties, and sought to adapt them to international realities and develop them accordingly.

We can summarize the most important foundations and pillars of the diplomatic activity of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic in the following points:

The Soummam Conference Charter affirmed that it was the duty of the revolution's leadership to regularly ensure the complete independence of the Algerian revolution. Accordingly, the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic sought to maintain the independence of its decisions and to avoid anything that would make it vulnerable to any pressure or influence that would deprive it of its freedom to take positions that served the interests of the revolution and the Algerian people before any other consideration, even from the closest sisterly and friendly countries. Despite its keenness to consult with them constantly, it preferred to take its fateful positions with complete authority, which is what we discussed in its position on De Gaulle's initiative within the framework of "the right to self-determination⁽³⁵⁾".

-The endeavor to invalidate and refute French claims and rumors regarding the nature of the Algerian revolution, whether in terms of its affiliation (global communism, or fanatical nationalism...), or the nature of its leaders (moderates, extremists, politicians or military...) and its objectives, which is an objective set out by the Soummam Conference in its charter, which stressed the need to eliminate the falsehood spread by the French government, its diplomacy and its major press to portray the revolution as an artificial, false revolution orchestrated from abroad.

-To give a comprehensive character to the diplomatic activity of the Algerian revolution, so that it aims to obtain the greatest possible support from the countries of the world to benefit from their solidarity with the just cause of the Algerian people, and to obtain their material support (medicines, clothing, food, weapons...) or moral support, by winning their votes in favor of Algeria in the United Nations General Assembly, which will enable it to obtain the majority when voting on the resolutions proposed by sister and friendly countries within the Afro-Asian bloc.

-Relying on the support of Arab states, especially the United Arab Republic, Iraq, Tunisia, and Morocco, to gain new positions on the international stage, whether at the level of blocs and organizations, within the framework of the League of Arab States or the Afro-Asian bloc, the United Nations and its affiliated organizations, or at the level of individual states.⁽³⁶⁾ This is something we will analyze further through the activities of overseas offices in Asia and Europe, for example ⁽³⁷⁾.

-Relying on the weight represented by the support of Afro-Asian countries in international forums, which contributed to moving the Algerian problem from the French sphere to the level of internationalization. This was due to the ties that bind them to their respective countries, including national, religious, cultural, and geographical ties (Arab and Islamic countries), and the struggle against Western colonialism and imperialism (all Third World countries). The FLN had previously benefited, and later the diplomacy of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, from the convergence of Third World forces opposed to Western colonialism, from the Bandung Conference to the Belgrade Conference of 1961, which led to the establishment of the Non-Aligned Movement.⁽³⁸⁾

- The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic consistently demanded a peaceful, negotiated solution to end the Algerian War, demonstrating that it was not waging war for its own sake, as the French government and media claimed. This is evident in the Provisional Government's founding statement of September 18, 1958, as well as in subsequent government statements, such as those of September 28, 1959, and November 12, 1959, and in press interviews conducted by the Prime Minister⁽³⁹⁾. And its ministers, or through their articles in the newspaper "Al-Mujahid",⁽⁴⁰⁾ "In parallel, the war continued internally as a means of forcing the enemy to the negotiating table, and thus negotiating from a position of strength, not weakness."⁽⁴¹⁾

-The aim is to isolate France internationally and then negotiate with it from a position of strength, by pressuring it through supportive countries within the Afro-Asian bloc and stripping it of the support of its allies – particularly Western countries.⁽⁴²⁾

- Adopting the principle of neutrality, which is considered a legacy of the national movement's strategy, is a consequence of the changes that occurred on the international stage after World War II, with the emergence of two dominant powers with different ideological orientations, and the renewed conflict between the capitalist West, led by the United States, and the communist East, led by the Soviet Union. Any inclination towards one camp or the other is considered a risk that could result in the loss of diplomatic and material support on the international level. However, this neutrality is characterized by its positive nature through contributing to the defense of the

just causes of colonized peoples, and forming blocs to defend the economic interests of Third World countries ⁽⁴³⁾.

-Non-interference in the internal affairs of states and respect for their territorial sovereignty, which is particularly evident in its relations with the two neighboring countries. Despite the large military presence of the National Liberation Army in Tunisia and Morocco, which exceeded the number of troops.

7. Mechanisms for Internationalizing the Algerian Cause:

-The Algerian Cause at the United Nations:

Since the outbreak of the liberation revolution, the diplomacy of the National Liberation Front (FLN) has aimed to internationalize the Algerian cause. This was achieved by working to gain the support of the international community, both bilaterally (between states) and collectively (in international bodies). This objective constituted the work program of the FLN's foreign offices, which sought to internationalize the Algerian cause by raising awareness of it and garnering the attention and sympathy of global public opinion. This was accomplished by presenting the cause at the highest international body, the United Nations.

The United Nations is considered the most important mechanism on which the National Liberation Front and later the Provisional Government relied in their relentless pursuit of internationalizing the Algerian issue. Up until 1957, the Algerian issue was raised six times on the agenda of the United Nations in its regular and extraordinary sessions.⁽⁴⁴⁾

It is well known that since 1957, the Algerian question would be seriously addressed thanks to the support of the Afro-Asian Group, despite French efforts to prevent its inclusion. This serious consideration of the Algerian issue culminated in the issuance of a resolution by the UN Secretariat at its twelfth session in 1957, which called for a peaceful political solution to the Algerian question. This implicitly recognized the Algerian people's right to self-determination. This was further confirmed during the special session of the UN General Assembly in December 1957, which called for negotiations to resolve the Algerian question peacefully. The same position was adopted by the UN General Assembly at its thirteenth session

in 1958, despite French maneuvers, particularly the Constantine reform plan and de Gaulle's initiative known as the "Peace of the Brave"⁽⁴⁵⁾."

It is noteworthy that the French government, which had been exerting considerable pressure to prevent the Algerian issue from being placed on the General Assembly's agenda at the request of the Afro-Asian Group, was now forced by international pressure to move beyond the issue of inclusion and instead focus on preventing any resolution condemning its colonial policies in Algeria⁽⁴⁶⁾.

Since the formation of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, it has been recognized by many sister and friendly countries, which enabled the Algerian delegation in New York to achieve the goals set by the Provisional Government. The United Nations General Assembly, in its twelfth session (1958), recalled its resolution issued in the eleventh session (1957), and discussed the Algerian question again, and issued its recommendations on the same issue, which stipulated the necessity of a peaceful solution to the Algerian question, which can only be achieved through negotiations between the two parties to the conflict. The positive thing that the Provisional Government recorded in its general policy report was "the abstention of the United States of America from the vote, which is considered an indisputable success."⁽⁴⁷⁾...

The new data on the Algerian question, following the profound transformations that emerged before the convening of the thirteenth session in 1958, had a significant impact on changing the atmosphere and prospects within the United Nations. For the first time, the discussion on the "Algerian question" witnessed the dominance of the negotiating current. At the same time, France's traditional allies found themselves in a predicament due to the general situation in Algeria, and they began to distance themselves somewhat from the French proposals. In this context, the thirteenth session would also mark a new stage in addressing the Algerian question, represented by "deep concern and the endeavor to open negotiations between the two conflicting parties"⁽⁴⁸⁾."

This diplomatic victory was achieved despite the cunning Gaullist projects and maneuvers, particularly the "Peace of the Brave" project, and made France face the pressure of the international community. This explains why De Gaulle, in the next session - the fourteenth - in 1959, recognized the

right of the Algerian people to self-determination on September 16, 1959, in order to win over world public opinion in the United Nations and embarrass the diplomacy of the Provisional Government. However, the latter's response on September 28, 1959, restored things to their proper order, as it turned the initiative on De Gaulle, and the Provisional Government won the bet by renewing its call for official negotiations with it - as the representative of the revolution and the Algerian people - in order to establish the conditions for implementing the principle of self-determination and the political and military guarantees and conditions.

The fourteenth session of the United Nations General Assembly was of paramount importance in internationalizing the Algerian issue, given the international circumstances in which it was held:

- De Gaulle's declaration on the principle of the Algerian people's right to self-determination on September 16, 1959.
- The statement of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on September 28, 1959, followed by De Gaulle's invitation to the leaders of the revolution to come to Paris for negotiations on November 10, 1959, and the Provisional Government's response to De Gaulle's initiative to "negotiate with the prisoners" on November 12, 1959⁽⁴⁹⁾."
- Therefore, despite the difficult situation the provisional Algerian government was experiencing at the time, it did everything in its power to ensure the Algerian issue was raised more seriously and to achieve greater results, starting with:
 - The members of the mission to New York were determined during the meeting of November 6, 1959. The mission consisted of Messrs. Mohamed Yazid, Mohamed Ben Yahia, Ahmed Boumendjel, Abdelhamid Mehri, and Ahmed Francis, in addition to Mr. Abdelkader Chanderli, who was tasked with managing the affairs of the New York office. The delegation was given the freedom to adjust its tactics and maneuvers behind the scenes and in the corridors of the United Nations according to the circumstances and developments⁽⁵⁰⁾ ..
 - To promote the position of the Provisional Government, as adopted in its statement of September 28, 1959, in response to General de Gaulle's "right to self-determination," by distributing and explaining its implications, and emphasizing the Algerian government's desire and pursuit of a peaceful, negotiated solution, in accordance with UN resolutions on this matter.

- The fourteenth session of the UN General Assembly reiterated its recognition of the Algerian people's right to self-determination and renewed its call for both sides in the war to resort to negotiations to achieve a peaceful solution to the Algerian question and put an end to the fighting.

Despite this significant gain for the diplomacy of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic on the international stage, achieved thanks to the support of sister Arab states and Afro-Asian countries, the resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly remained lacking in binding and enforceable force, due to France's influence within the UN body, thanks to its permanent seat on the Security Council and the support of allied countries, particularly the United States and Britain⁵¹.

All of this will not deter the revolution's resolve, as the diplomacy of the provisional government will continue its struggle to achieve further victories in the battle to internationalize the Algerian cause, especially after the demonstrations of December 11, 1960, and the great resonance they generated internationally, which was effectively invested in to obtain official recognition from the United Nations of the Algerian people's right to self-determination in the same month of 1960.

8. Conclusion:

In conclusion, this research paper has yielded a number of results, which we summarize as follows:

- The decision of the Coordination and Implementation Committee to establish the Provisional Government was a product of internal and international circumstances. Internally, the revolution suffered from a shortage of weapons due to the cessation of supply and logistics operations across the borders. Internationally, French pressure on the Tunisian and Moroccan regimes created pressure on the National Liberation Front (FLN), making it necessary to elevate the representation of the Algerian revolution from a political party to a provisional government capable of confronting the diplomatic offensive of the Fifth French Republic under General de Gaulle.
- The diplomatic movement of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was based on foundations and principles inherited from the national independence movement (the People's Party and the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties), and then from the foreign mission of the National Liberation Front, and was supplemented according to the requirements of regional and international developments. The most important of these foundations and principles are:

- Maintaining the independence of the Algerian revolution and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.
- Minimizing its disputes with the two neighboring countries, particularly Tunisia and Morocco, to avoid diverting the revolution's efforts and to ensure the continued support of these countries for the Algerian revolution.
- Adopting a policy of neutrality in the conflict between the communist and capitalist blocs within the context of the Cold War, which demonstrates the Algerian diplomacy's understanding of the game of international relations at that time and its skillful use of it to internationalize the Algerian cause.
- The foreign offices played a crucial role in the diplomatic efforts of the Provisional Government during the period from September 19, 1958, to December 1959, thanks to the activity of their officials who succeeded in obtaining considerable material and moral support from the governments of the countries in which they operated.
- The establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic contributed to the internationalization of the Algerian cause, thanks to its recognition by numerous countries. This garnered it greater international support, as the French claim that the Algerian revolution lacked a leadership qualified to negotiate with it was rendered invalid in the eyes of world public opinion.
- In short, the establishment of the Provisional Government marked the advancement of the National Liberation Revolution from a liberation movement to a governing body, significantly strengthening its executive institutions. This elevated the National Liberation Front's international representation of the Algerian revolution. Despite its shortcomings and missteps, the first Provisional Government (1958-1960) laid the initial formal groundwork for Algerian diplomacy and paved the way for subsequent governments in their efforts to internationalize the Algerian cause and for the diplomacy of independent Algeria, which built upon the legacy of the national movement, the FLN's external delegation, and the Provisional Government.

¹ According to the author Omar Boudarba, he stated: "This chapter was published in full in a work prepared by the team of The Reference Book of the Algerian Revolution without my knowledge. When I contacted some members of this team (Ahmed Massoud, Said Ali, and Bedida Lazhar), I was told that the matter was a mistake that would be corrected, but nothing of the sort happened".

² The Soummam Conference was held on 20 August 1956 in the village of Ifri Ouzellaguen, in the Akfadou forest on the eastern slopes of the Djurdjura Mountains, overlooking the western bank of the Soummam Valley. One of the major outcomes of the conference was that it met the aspirations and expectations of the Algerian people, as it succeeded in organizing the

revolution through the creation of a regular army comparable to other national armies. It also divided the country into wilayas, regions, districts, and sectors, each supervised by a leadership responsible for managing its affairs. Furthermore, the conference established a unified national leadership represented by the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) and an executive body known as the Coordination and Execution Committee (CCE). For further details, see:

- Mohamed Lahcen Azghedi, *The Soummam Conference and the Development of the Algerian Revolution*, National Publishing Institution, Algiers, 1986, p. 137.

- Ahsan Boumali, *The Strategy of the Algerian Revolution in Its First Phase (1954–1956)*, Publications of the National Museum of the Mujahid and the National Institution for Communication and Publishing, Algiers, 1995, p. 38.

³ (They were: Abane Ramdane; Benyoucef Benkhedda, who was born on 23 February 1920 in Berrouaghia and was one of the leaders of the Algerian People's Party (PPA). He joined the Revolution after his release from prison in April 1955 and assumed major responsibilities during the Revolution, most notably serving as president of the third Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA). After 1962, he withdrew from political life except on a few occasions. See: Mohamed Harbi, *The Algerian Revolution: Years of Gestation*, translated by Najib Abad and Salah Al-Mathlouthi, Algeria, Mofem Publishing, 1994, previously cited, p. 183. Also included were Larbi Ben M'hidi, Krim Belkacem, and Saad Dahlab.

⁴ (According to the author Omar Boudarba: National Center for Archives, Minutes of the Meeting of the Provisional Government, 02/F Benkhedda, Microfilm Box No. G001 and G004. See Appendix No. 01.

⁵ (Krim Belkacem was born on 22 December 1922 in Draâ El Mizan. He joined the Algerian People's Party (PPA) in 1945 and later became the party's representative in the Kabylia region. He was among the five leaders who prepared for the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution and was appointed commander of Zone III. Subsequently, he became one of the most prominent leaders of the Revolution, assuming several high-ranking positions, notably serving as Minister of Foreign Affairs in the second Provisional Government and Minister of the Interior in the government formed after 1962. He later joined an opposition front against the ruling regime and was accused of attempting to overthrow the government of President Houari Boumediene. He was assassinated in October 1970 in Frankfurt, Germany. Reference: Mohamed Harbi, *The Algerian Revolution: Years of Gestation*, previously cited reference, p. 8.

-BENJAMIN STORA : DICTIONNAIRE BIOGRAPHIQUE DE MILITANTS NATIONALISTES ALGERIENS 1926-1954, PARIS, ED. L'HARMATTAN, 1985, P 329/330.

⁶ Abane Ramdane was born on 10 June 1920 in Larbaâ Nath Irathen. He was an activist in the ranks of the Algerian People's Party (PPA). After his release from prison in January 1955, he joined the Algerian Revolution and became one of its most prominent leaders. He was the principal driving force behind the Soummam Conference of 20 August 1956 and served as a member of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution (CNRA) as well as of the first and second Coordination and Execution Committees (CCE) established in 1956. He was assassinated in Morocco on 27 December 1957. See: Mohamed Harbi, *The Algerian Revolution: Years of Gestation*, p. 185. -ACHOUR CHEURFI : LA CLASSE POLITIQUE ALGERIENNE – DE 1900 A NOS JOURS – DICTIONNAIRE BIOGRAPHIQUE, ALGER, ED CASBAH, 2001, P : 13/14

⁷ National Archives Center, previously cited source, intervention of the President of the Provisional Government, Ferhat Abbas, G004.

⁸ National Archives Center: interventions of Krim Belkacem, Ferhat Abbas, Benyoucef Benkhedda, and Abdelhafid Boussouf, same reference, G004.

⁹ Professor Mohamed Larbi Zoubiri considers this incident to be the first political assassination in the Algerian Revolution, as well as an ideological deviation and a violation of the principle of collective leadership by the most influential members of the Coordination and Execution Committee, namely Krim Belkacem, Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, and Abdelhafid Boussouf.

See: Mohamed Larbi Zoubiri, *Contemporary History of Algeria (1942–1962)*, Vol. 2, Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research, University of Algiers, Institute of History, 1996/1997, pp. 182–183.

¹⁰ BENJAMIN STORA, ZAKIA DAOUD, FERHAT ABBAS, CASBAH EDITIONS, 1995, P 284.

¹¹ Charles de Gaulle was one of the most prominent French figures of the twentieth century. He was born in 1890 and joined the French army from a young age. He participated in both World War I (1914–1918) and World War II (1939–1945). He rose through the military ranks and led the Free France movement from London after France fell under German occupation in June 1940.

He later played a key political role in post-war France and was associated with the establishment of the Fourth Republic. After January 1946, he withdrew from political life. Following the outbreak of the Algerian Revolution, he was brought back to power after the events of 13 May 1958, leading to the establishment of the Fifth Republic after the fall of the Fourth Republic. He governed France until 1969 and died in 1970.

Reference: *Le Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse*, Vol. 5, Paris, 1982, p. 4700.

¹² According to the author Omar Boudarba: National Archives Center, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (M.A.E), Box 05, File 14, Document 02.

¹³ Ahmed Tawfik El-Madani, *Life of Struggle*, Part 3, "With the Caravan of the Revolution," Algeria, National Company for Publishing and Distribution, 1982, p. 400.

¹⁴ For further reading, see: Nassereddine Saïdouni, "The Constantine Plan 1958," *El Chaâb* newspaper, issue No. 8299, p. 7.

¹⁵ JACQUES CHAPSAL, *LA VIE POLITIQUE EN FRANCE DEPUIS 1940*, France PRESSE UNIVERSITAIRE 1969, P 113, LA COLLECTION THEMIS SCIENCES POLITIQUES.

¹⁶ According to the author Omar Boudarba: National Archives Center, Box 05, File 14, Document 02.

¹⁷ (Ferhat Abbas, in his book *Anatomy of a War*, argues that Charles de Gaulle's return to power placed him in a position that enabled him to address and potentially resolve the Algerian question.

Reference: Ferhat Abbas, *Anatomy of a War*.

-FARHAT ABAS, *AUTOPSIE D'UNE GUERRE, L'AUROPE, PARIS, FRANCE EDITION, GARNIER, 1980, P 241*

¹⁸ One may also refer to the internal political conditions.

¹⁹ According to the author Omar Boudarba: National Archives Center, Minutes of the meetings of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), interventions of the ministers Lakhdar Ben Tobbal, Krim Belkacem, Abdelhafid Boussouf, Benyoucef Benkhedda, and Ferhat Abbas, meeting of 1 July 1959, G004.

²⁰ According to the author Omar Boudarba: National Archives Center, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, Report on the military situation, Box 05, File 14, Document 02.

²¹ Return to the circumstances of the establishment of the M.J.J. government, internally and externally.

²² *Al-Mujahid* newspaper, interview with President Ferhat Abbas, previous source, and:

Ahmed Benflis, *The International Policy of the Government of the Algerian Republic, 1958/1962*, University of Algiers, Institute of Political Science, 1985, p. 77.

²³ MOHAMED HARBI, *LES ARCHIVES, OP.CIT, P181/182*.

²⁴ The political program of the interim government, J.J., *Al-Mujahid* newspaper, previous reference.

²⁵ MOHAMED HARBI, *LES ARCHIVES, OP.CIT, RAPPORT DE AMAR OUAMRANE, P 189/193..*

²⁶ Mohammed Al-Bajawi, *The Algerian Revolution and the Law*, translated by Ali Al-Khash, Beirut, Dar Al-Yaqza Al-Arabiya, p. 118 and: -PHILIPPE TRIPIER, *AUTOPSIE DE LA GUERRE D'ALGERIE, PARIS, EDITION France EMPIRE, 1972, P 263*.

²⁷ Muhammad Al-Bajawi, previous reference, pp. 119/120.

²⁸ Ahmed Tawfiq Al-Madani, the previous reference, text of the letter, pp. 402/404.

W: Mustafa Boutoura, The relationship of the National Liberation Front with the Egyptian government 1954/1962, University of Algiers, Institute of Political Science 1983/1984, p. 110.

²⁹ MOHAMED HARBI, LES ARCHIVES, OP.CIT, RAPPORT DE AMAR OUAMRANE, P 189/193.

³⁰ M'HAMED YOUSFI, L'ALGERIE EN MARCHE, T II, ALGER, ENAL, 1985, P 58/59.

³¹ Declaration of November 1, 1954.

³² MABROUK BELHOCINE, LE COURRIER, ALGER –LE CAIRE-, 1954/1956, ALGER, EDITION CASBAH, 2000, P 35/36.

³³ The members of the Committee of Six are: Mohamed Boudiaf, Mostefa Ben Boulaïd, Mohamed Larbi Ben M'hidi, Didouche Mourad, Rabah Bitat, and Krim Belkacem.

³⁴ Muhammad Yazid and Reza Malek, two personal interviews, the previous references.

³⁵ About the author Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, M.H.M.J.J., Meetings 27/28 September 1959, G007.

³⁶ Muhammad Yazid, the previous reference.

³⁷ About the author Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, M.H.M.J.J., Ahmed Francis intervened on July 3, 1959, p., G004, and the Public Policy Report, Abbas Farhat, June 20, 1959, G004.

³⁸ About the author Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, H.M.J.J., W.S.Kh. Report of Mohamed Lamine Debaghine to the Head of Government, its members and military leaders, October 2, 1959, No. 5, No. 4, and 10, and Redha Malek, personal interview, previous reference.

³⁹ Such as the interview he gave to the newspaper El Moudjahid on October 10, 1958, El Moudjahid, previous source.

⁴⁰ " The Ministers of Defense and Interior say about the revolution," Al-Mujahid, No. 31, November 1, 1958.

⁴¹ About the author, Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, M.H.M.J.J., Public Policy Report, Abbas Farhat, June 20, 1959, G004 .

⁴² About the author Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, M.H.M.J.J., Karim Belkacem's intervention, July 1, 1959, G004, and the report of Mohamed Lamine Debaghine, previous source.

⁴³ Ben Youssef Ben Khedda, Mohamed Yazid, Reda Malek, personal interviews, previous sources.

⁴⁴ About the author Omar Boudarba: M.W. for Archives, M.H.M.J.J., W.S.Kh., Report on the Algerian Question at the United Nations 1960, No. 23, No. 08, and No. 02.

⁴⁵ "France's policy is defeated at the United Nations despite its allies," Al-Mujahid, No. 14, December 15, 1957.

⁴⁶ KHALFA MAMERI, LES NATIONS UNIES, OP.CIT, P 131.

⁴⁷ About the author Omar Boudarba: M.M.W. for Archives, H.M.J.J., Public Policy Report, Abbas Farhat, June 20, 1959, G004.

⁴⁸ KHALFA MAMERI, OP.CIT, P 121.

⁴⁹ Refer to these Gaullist initiatives in "The International Dimension of French Projects and the Provisional Government's Response to Them".

⁵⁰ The author Omar Boudarba said: A lengthy discussion took place among the members of the provisional government on the matter, and two trends emerged: The first trend saw the necessity of going to the United Nations with a pre-drawn (rigid) tactic and plan, and the second trend saw the necessity of taking the government's statement of September 28, 1959 as a basis, then drawing up the tactic according to the circumstances and developments in the international body. Thanks to Mohamed Yazid, the decision was made in favor of the second approach. See: M.W. for the archives, H.M.J.J., Mohamed Yazid, and Abdelhamid Mehri, Social 06 and 07 November 1959, A.M., G008.

⁵¹ "At the United Nations, the camp of freedom and the camp of colonialism face to face," Al-Mujahid, No. 57, December 15, 1959.