

Public Policy in Libya: A Story of Missed Development Opportunities

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Abstract

Libya obtained its independence in December 24, 1951 as the Kingdom of Libya. Before the discovery of oil in 1958, Libya was a poor country that relied on agriculture and leasing military bases to the United Kingdom and the United States. Furthermore, the majority of the lands estimated at 1,759, 000 is a desert. These challenges hindered poverty eradication and development strategies in Libya. This soon changed with the export of oil by the end of 1960 that, in turn, unshared in effective implementation of development policies with renaissance of rural- urban migration, the establishment of Libyan University and related modernization policies like in areas of medicine and public administration programs.

Every modernization clashed with a traditional society that led to the acceptance of the political change that brought Colonel Gaddafi to power, which in turn emptied the state of its institutions in the system of overwhelming chaos and led to the revolution that occurred on 02/17/2011 AD and brought the country back into chaos.

Key Words: Libya, development, public policy, modernization.

Introduction

ملخص

حصلت ليبيا على استقلالها في 24 ديسمبر 1951 م باسم المملكة الليبية. قبل اكتشاف النفط عام 1958، كانت دولة ليبيا فقيرة تعتمد على الزراعة وتأجير القواعد العسكرية للمملكة المتحدة والولايات المتحدة. علاوة على ذلك، فإن غالبية الأراضي المقدرة بـ 1759000 هي صحراء، وقد أعاقَت

هذه التحديات القضاء على الفقر واستراتيجيات التنمية في ليبيا، وسرعان ما تغير هذا مع تصدير النفط بحلول نهاية عام 1960 م، والذي بدوره لم يشارك في التنفيذ الفعال لسياسات التنمية مع نهضة الهجرة من الريف إلى المدينة، وإنشاء الجامعة الليبية وسياسات التحديث ذات الصلة مثل مجالات الطب والإدارة العامة والبرامج.

كل برامج التحديث هذه اصطدمت بمجتمع تقليدي أفضى في المحصلة أن يقبل بالتغيير السياسي الذي أوصل العقيد القذافي للحكم والذي بدوره أفرغ الدولة من مؤسساتها من خلال تبني نظام من الفوضى العارمة قادت إلى الثورة التي حدثت في 17/02/2011 مواد جعلت البلاد من جديد في فوضى أخرى.

الكلمات المفتاحية: ليبيا، التنمية، السياسة العامة، التحديث.

Introduction

Libyan society acquires a peculiarity that may distinguish it from its Arab and African surroundings; in spite of the apparent homogeneity, that we lack that Libya is 100% Muslim in it. Not to mention that the minorities present within society and that constitute the Libyan demographic did not create the social sensitivities that affected the social, political and economic conditions, especially in the first and second stages of the life of the Libyan state to the period 1951-1969 and the period from 1969-2011. Nevertheless, the ruling authority in the two phases was not able to benefit from the important basis that directly contributes to drawing effective and successful public policies. However, every political phase that the Libyan state lived through has its own peculiarities. In addition, unable to achieve development. Which targets the social, political and economic structure, and achieve stability and prosperity in a society that has always lived on the hopes and aspirations of achieving comprehensive development.

In fact, the age of the Libyan state is now seventy, and it is supposed to have mature and conscious institutions. It helps in drawing real public policies that move the country from a state of backwardness and traditionalism to modernity and modernity. The public policies after independence, i.e. from the period (1951 - 1969AD), was his ambition in the importance of modernizing a traditional society living in a state of poverty in resources and capabilities. Consequently, the policies aimed at building the material basis for building policies, which is the production of a human being who can think, analyze and predict what plans can be drawn And programs that help development events.

This aspiration was the goals of planning policies and at the same time the establishment of institutions to ensure this. However, the scarcity of resources and capabilities has always been an obstacle to achieving clear development visions, so the programs are ambiguous. Not to mention that adhering to loyalty to the tribe, the region and the region, acting as obstacles in the way of modernizing Libyan society, all of this led to the political change that took place in 1969 through the coup of military leaders headed by Colonel Gaddafi. All hopes were high that the country would enter an important stage in development and modernization. However, it soon became clear that the military wanted the revolutionary state to remain, which lives without clear institutions that shape policies. It was replaced by a state that is in a state of continuous and permanent change that does not naturally help in formulating public policies and achieving the desired development. This change and exaggeration was not in the administrative

structures of the institutions, but rather to the behaviors in foreign policy. Commander who made Libya a country involved in international conflicts. It made the international community impose state sanctions on it and prohibit dealing. Consequently, the internal situation was reflected in the state's inability to adopt general policies that achieve development and create priority in planning and organization. The state lived in a state of overwhelming chaos. It led to a floundering in development plans despite the financial abundance achieved by oil revenues. However, the absence of management and good planning required this stage, not to mention that Colonel Gaddafi employed the tribes' social structure to establish wisdom. The regime fell into a crisis of legitimacy, which was entrenched in the spread of the phenomenon of corruption that ravages all institutions and made them unable and unwilling to draw up development policies.

All these circumstances were an important basis for the eruption of the revolution on 02-17-2011. This revolution came in a country that lacks real institutionalization that is made, implemented and evaluated, and lacks a culture of dialogue that establishes a democratic society capable of producing an appropriate environment for development.

For all this, this chapter starts from a specific problem based on the following question: - How were public policies the cause of the loss of development in Libya?

In accordance with the above question, we consider the basic assumption as follows:

((Public policies in Libya have lived through different scenes between the three authorities that took turns ruling the country. They ranged between enthusiasm, ambiguity of vision, ambition, lack of priority, and finally, the absence of the institution and the absence of authority, which created a failure in drawing up public policies and thus the loss of real opportunities for the country. In achieving development)).

Based on that, we develop a systematic approach that compares public policies in the three policy stages in order to understand and analyze the reasons behind the state of failure that accompanied development in Libya by setting three stations that include understanding and analysis within the following context:

- The problematic of enthusiasm and the ambiguity of the vision 1951-1969.
- The problem of ambition and lack of prioritization, 1969-2011.
- The problem of the absence of the institution and the absence of authority 2011-2020.

First: the problem of enthusiasm and ambiguity of vision.

Libya's independence came in 1951 AD after the throes of the recession, because of international political quarrels. In response to the struggle and aspirations of the Libyans for the independence of their country from the Italian occupation in 1911 until 1951 AD. The state gained its independence in very difficult circumstances. The state did not have any resources, neither natural nor human, as its per capita income reached 35 dollars annually. During those days, there were only sixteen graduates from the university, There were no secondary schools and the illiteracy rate was 90%.¹

Thus, in order to confront this difficult situation, the state turned towards leasing military bases to the United States and the United Kingdom through insurance, and it was with Britain on July 29, 1951 AD for a period of twenty years in exchange for economic aid and service programs. With regard to the United States, Wheeliuss airbase was established near Tripoli in exchange for economic knowledge that was signed on this agreement September 9, 1951 AD.²

The geographical reality of Libya in its geographical and demographic dimensions gives a scene of scenery with which it is difficult to talk about the existence of policies that achieve development. In addition, 60 thousand in the Fezzan region.³

Not to mention the social reality that bears political differences that existed between the regions of the country regarding how to organize independence. The fears of the control of the Tripoli region, which represents two-thirds of the population. The differences over the federal system of the Kingdom were between supporters and non-supporters, and the same was true with regard to the country's capital. That is why King Idris proposed to overcome the dispute by establishing two capitals, with the government rotating annually over the two capitals.⁴

In front of this realistic scene in the external and internal environments, which were very complex and difficult. The birth of the Libyan state came. To

(1) A, Hamida, Libya That We Do Not Know 1830-2011, First Class, Press Encouragement and Support Authority, 2013, P.177.

(2) M, khadouri, modern: Asutdy IN POLITFCAN, Development Baltimore, the john Hopkins, press, 1963, P.220.

(3) I,R, Khalidi, Constitutional Development in Libya, Beirut, Lebanon, khoyyats, college Books, 1970. PP 62 – 63

(4) A, Zarm, Memoirs of the Libyan people's struggle with colonial ambitions, first edition, Arab Book House ,1988, PP. 80 - 82.

express the Libyan community's passion for being the state that brings together the three geographical regions of Libya (Tripoli - Cyrenaica - Fezzan) under the name

and economic constraints that have always been present in the Libyan self, and the state was formed with its legal, political requirements, and the Libyan identity, and personality, which establish for real development did not exist. In addition, the values of loyalty to the tribe, the region remained higher than loyalty to the state. Not to mention the deteriorating and difficult economic situation of making the state a hostage in its behavior to the major countries. Therefore, agreements were concluded to lease military bases. Simply because it does not have the financial resources that would enable it to build the infrastructure of the state that was destroyed during World War II.⁵

A miracle was achieved with the discovery of petroleum in 1958 in a country that is considered the poorest country in the world, where per capita income did not exceed 35 dollars in 1951. The first shipment of Libyan petroleum began in 1961. Thus, the country became the fourth largest oil exporter in the world.⁶

Afterwards, the government began implementing development programs that included the sectors of education, health, transportation, and housing. So the Libyan University was founded and two branches

were established for it in Tripoli and Benghazi. Indeed, the new educational policies of the government in the late 1960s resulted in the emergence of the middle class, which relied on the events of constructive social movement, which created a student movement, trade unions, and modernist intellectuals. All this contributed to a tangible and noticeable development in society. Student numbers jumped from 33 thousand in 1952. To 300 thousand in 1970 and the Libyan Women's Union was established in 1965 AD. The rates of those who know how to write and read have increased significantly, and aspects of development and modernity are noticeable.

The population increased dramatically because of free health programs and policies that made the population of the capital Tripoli jump from 130,000 in 1951 to 213,000 in 1964 and to 400,000 in 1970, and the population of Benghazi in the same years increased from 70,000 to 137,000. To 300 thousand.⁷

(5) M, Bin Halim, Libya, Resurgence of a Nation and Fall of a State, First Class, Al-Jamal Publications, 2003, P.170.

(6) D, vadewelle, A History of Modern Libya, Cambridge: the university press, 2006, PP: 53 – 61.

(7) Yassin, Al-Kabeer, Al-Muhajiroun in Western Tripoli, First Class, Arab Development Institute, 1982, PP:125 - 168.

Indeed, many development indicators have been achieved, which included an increase in the incomes of individuals. Health policies have also contributed to an increase in the life expectancy of Libyans, as well as for educational policies that have produced elites that have become in the leadership of the state. However, educational policies did not serve the monarchy and the continuity of its rule, which is why it resulted in many nationalist currents and movements found in Libya a fertile ground to spread their ideas. The realism that King Idris Al-Senussi was shaping politically and thus the legitimacy crisis that led to the 1969 coup by Colonel Muammar Gaddafi began.

Simultaneously, important indicators have been achieved in transforming the production of an agricultural policy that achieves self-sufficiency in agricultural products and provides for the development of water resources. Moreover, the implementation of plans for owning agricultural lands and reclaiming them.⁸

At the same time, the policy of the industry produced by the government was to encourage the Libyan industry in both the public and private

sectors, by establishing small industrial start-ups and taking special measures to protect local industries through tax exemptions and other incentives.⁹

However, the reality is being exerted and changed after the discovery of oil. Therefore, the movement took place from the countryside to the cities and the agricultural sector suffered from neglect, and then the trend towards service activity that flourished and was generating financial returns that motivated many workers to migrate from the countryside to the cities.

The attempts to build development policies in the monarchy of Libya actually collided with the fragility of the social structure of Libyan society, in that it was difficult to define the Libyan identity and personality, and there were difficulties in creating loyalties for the state, which were replaced by tribal and regional loyalties. Despite the achievement of many developmental achievements and the building of structuring state institutions.

Finally, enthusiasm dominated this stage, but there is ambiguity in the development vision. Simultaneously, the difficulty of achieving real development aimed at the person in his affiliation and degree of loyalty to the nascent state not to mention the spread of the phenomenon of corruption among members of the

(8) M, Qashqash, *The Journey of Modernizing Libyan Society During the Monarchy (1960-1969)*, Journal of Historical Studies, Issues (115-116), 2016, pp. 424-425

(9) (REPORT, *The Economic Development Plan, 1963-1969*, p. 44).

ruling elite despite the growing oil revenues that led to the fall of the state and the 1969 coup occurred.

- **The problem of ambition and lack of priority, 1969-2011**

This station brought hopes that the Libyans had made of the military leaders who carried out the coup, led by Colonel Gaddafi. In creating real development, that meets their aspirations for a decent life.

In fact, the military inherited a developing country that has already begun to establish its institutions and build itself in spite of the negatives that we referred to previously.

The military regime began its political stage with a struggle between its various wings in order to define a path for the new state. It led to Colonel Gaddafi singling out the ruling and excluding his opponents in

various ways, including killing, exclusion or containment. He became the sole leader, the only thinker, which was reflected in the overall political, economic and social life in Libya. Libya lived under the colonel, a unique system that was not previously known. He relied on the ideology that dominated the aspects of life through his three books that he wrote in succession to discuss the problematic of democracy in his first book, and analyze the economic problem in his second book and find social solutions in his third book. For all this Libya remained captive to the colonel's vision.

On the political level, independent political parties and trade unions were banned in 1970, the constitution was suspended, all constitutional institutions were abolished, all powers were collected in Colonel Gaddafi, and military courts were established.¹⁰ The train of the revolutionary state wanted by the colonel was launched through stations that changed the course of political, economic and social life. Zuwara's speech on April 15, 1973 was an event that brought the country into chaos, as the laws in force under the slogans of the popular revolution, popular power and the Cultural Revolution were canceled as well as control and supervision of all media outlets. Campaigns targeting freedoms and restricting the press began; all of this coinciding with the prevention of private sector activity, and considering it as a sector run by the traditional bourgeoisie, which is hostile to the revolution. In addition, it ideologically differs with the views of the commanding colonel, which led to the state controlling all economic activity and becoming the sponsor and provider taking advantage of the growing oil income to play this role.

(10) M, Al-Maqrif, *Libya From Constitutional Legitimacy to Revolutionary Legitimacy*, Second Class, AD, Libyan Studies Center, 2011, P.172.

The other stage was in March 1977, when Colonel Gaddafi issued a charter declaring the authority of the people, where he changed the name of Libya to

the Jamahiriya, and the colonel claimed that according to this charter, he had handed

over power to the people and the Libyans collectively became possessing power, wealth and weapons. These changes have affected the reality of development in Libya in several aspects, including:

-Development during the Gaddafi era depended on what is known as meta development, which refers to the pattern of development that comes from the ruler as a gift to the people.

- There was no fairness in the distribution of development between the various regions and cities of Libya.

- Large economic and social gaps occur between the people, and this is due to cooperation in the distribution of wealth among the various spectrums of the people, as the phenomenon of corruption has grown. The clientelism, in parallel with the high unemployment rates, reached 30% in a country whose population does not exceed 6 million people.¹¹ and the percentage of the population who are below the poverty line reached 15% to 22%.¹²

- Despite the openness to the West and the influx of investment projects since 2003, there has not been a major change in the power equation, wealth and corruption, but rather an exacerbation of the situation.

- The deterioration of the level of services provided by the state in all areas, especially in education and health, which led to Libyans leaving to travel outside Libya to obtain these services.

- The colonel's political aspirations for leadership in his African surroundings made him carry out many political adventures, such as interfering in Uganda, Chad, and many African countries, as well as his many failed attempts at unity in the Arab field. All of this cost Libya, the small country, billions of dollars, which would have been more appropriate for the development needed by the country.

Actually, the Libyan problem in the era of the colonel lies in the political system and its ideological references that Gaddafi outlined in the Green Book,

(11) Ali Khudair, Mazraa, Libya Missed Opportunities and Renewed Hopes, First Class, Arab Foundation for Studies for Publishing, 2012 , P: 129.

(12) R, El- Ghonemy, Anti- poverty land reform issues never die: collected essays on Development economies, Routledge Studies Development, 2009, P: 181.

which relies on theoretical assumptions that lack real implementation and activation mechanisms.¹³ The continuity of the behaviors decided by the colonel over four Decades of missed real opportunities for development were possible in a country characterized by financial abundance and demographic scarcity. Which created large economic and social gaps, due to the personal judgment that relied on the

Qadhafi family and a narrow circle of close associates and followers deprived the people of the returns to wealth. Not to mention that the openness to the West and the influx of foreign investments and companies since 2003 to participate in infrastructure projects did not bring about a major change in the power, wealth and corruption equation, but rather exacerbated the situation.¹⁴

At the same time, the social and cultural blockage deepened due to stereotyping and cultural unilateralism, as the colonel imposed the inflexibility of Libyan society and created a state of improvisation, emotionality, volatility and instability for the institutions. Therefore, all of this created a failed state that was unable to achieve development at various levels and thus Libya transformed this reality has resulted in a vast geography of hostilities and postponed revenge projects.¹⁵ Consequently, Libya became waiting for the unknown until the political change came in 2011 AD. In a country in which institutions are absent and depend on the individual, who was absent from death on 10-23 2011 AD; to start a new phase in which he aspires to build the foundations for a country suffering from many serious problems that threaten the demise of this state's entity.

- **The problem of the absence of institutions and the absence of authority 2011-2020**

The failure and decline of economic and human development indicators in Libya, the weakness of the infrastructure of a country whose income exceeds \$ 180 billion, the widespread phenomenon of corruption and bribery, and the increase in class inequality, which in turn deepened the phenomenon of poverty in a country that lives on an oil lake.

This atmosphere made the issue of political change in Libya only a matter of time, which will be longer or shorter, but it will happen. This coincided with the Libyans' conviction that the political structure of the system no longer met the Libyans'

(13) Z, Aql, Internal Failure and External Intervention in the Libyan Jamahiriya, Al-Ahram, 2011, Issue (2), p.18.

(14) Khaled, Bin Amor, Problems of Spatial Development in Libya, Journal of Applied and Human Sciences, Asmaria University, 2015, Issue (25), P34.

(15) al-Munsif, Wannas: The Libyan Personality: The Triad of Tribe, The Booty, and the Triumph, First Class, Mediterranean Publishing House, 2014, P:47

aspirations for reform and change. Even the attempts that the colonel claimed to undertake in the interest of reform were nothing but political tactics aimed at passing on power to the children and continuing in power whatever the results. Not to mention

that the international community became convinced of the difficulty and continuity of dealing with a system that did not meet the orientations of democratic values and promote human rights. In addition, it did not abide by the changes and undertakings at the internal and external levels. Therefore, its unacceptable and unfamiliar behaviors continued, for example, Colonel Gaddafi's speech at the 64th session of the United Nations General Assembly on September 23, 2001. His act of tearing up and throwing of the United Nations Charter indicates the absurdity and the underestimation of the Colonel's regime with the rules of international law and its lack of seriousness in changing its behavior). ¹⁶

In fact, the internal and external environments were driving change in a society suffering from a lack of institutions and a basic social defect that lies in the fact that modernization programs over the past years have not been able to bring about real and sustainable development. Furthermore, they failed to create a societal balance, conducive to achieving stability, which stems from trust between the social forces rather than out of fear of authority, which is what embodied In Libya during the seventy years of the political life of the state.

The absence of a constitution that regulates relations within society, the absence of a true professional institutionalization, and the emergence of an armed revolution in Libya. He created a chaotic reality that made it impossible to move from the state of revolution to the state of the state in Libya, and from the state of ambition to the state of reality and practice. Not to mention external interference that does not want stability for Libya. All this constitutes a political challenge in a country that is not familiar with the culture of dialogue, and is living in a special state of economic misery that has been perpetuated for decades by the failure of development events despite the presence of data that, if employed in professional ways, would produce a more developed country more lively.

In fact, the difficulty of democratic transformation and building a state in which there is a peaceful transfer of power, respect for human rights, and social justice. Creating a conscious developmental reality that targets the human being and the place establishes a developmental relationship with the future that is

(16) A, Elhar. les relations franco – libyenns: Entre permanence et instabilité (1969– 2011), presses Académiques francophones, 2016, pp 280 - 290.

planned with an open mind that is not captive to the painful past. I ran into the reality of a socially disrupted, administratively and economically unstable society, and therefore unable to produce positivity that creates a favorable climate for development.

The transformation of the Libyan revolution in February 2011 from a revolution calling for peaceful change to an armed one was a result of the brutal mechanisms that the Colonel Gaddafi's regime dealt with against those who departed from its regime, which allowed major and regional powers to intervene in the Libyan affairs. Moreover, it deepened the structural disagreements about the Libyan factions and created a political blockage. With Qaddafi, there will be no opportunities for development and modernization and the ability to produce policies, which contribute to raising the standard of living for Libyans today and in the future.

Realistically, political and security instability and division in the post-revolution period greatly affected the existence of effective policies and plans for spatial development, especially with groups without the state controlling resources and capabilities and employing them in order to obtain personal interests, regional interests, or tribal interests.

Libya was ranked 55 out of 58 countries in the Resource Management Index (RGI) in 2013 from the (Revenue Watch) Institute, which measures the performance of these countries in facilitating their resources in the oil, gas and mining sectors.¹⁷ The report emphasized the failure of the Libyan state to manage its resources, the reason being the lack of vision, the lack of effective government policies, the lack of transparency in dealing with the oil sector, in addition to the absence of legal frameworks for the processes of extracting resources from the state. Therefore, multi-affiliated groups controlled the resources. This explains the existence of the informal or parallel economy at a rate of not less than two-thirds of almost all government economic activities.¹⁸

This poses a major challenge facing comprehensive national development policies. It disrupts it and creates an irresponsible private sector that is

(17) The Libyan Organization for Policies and Strategies, *Spatial Development Investigation Report in Libya*, September 2016.

(18) R, Mafrags, Libya, the Dinar and the Dollar, the first layer, fields of press, publishing and training ,2018, P:27.

not concerned with development. Every effort is limited to making the most of the chaos that the country is experiencing through the weakness and fragility of the government. Rather, the conversation in Libya today reached a primitive idea that aims to distribute wealth to the population directly instead of distributing spatial development throughout the country and social justice events and working to correct differences to an acceptable extent.

In light of this deteriorating reality in Libya, there are real problems that are reflected in the lives of individuals in the constant shortage of cash coffers, and therefore commercial banks. Not to mention the problems of high prices, inflation, the collapse of the Libyan dinar against other currencies, and the flight of Libyan funds from Libyan banks, as 70% of the cash withdrawn does not return to the banks.

The economy and development have become dependent on the end of the inter-war between the parties, as well as the end of the war on terror and the restoration of stability. The situation directly and profoundly contributes to facilitating the democratic transition and then providing climates that are appropriate for the approval of development policies.

As the Libyan scene gives us examples of this when Ibrahim Jadhra tribal and regional militia seized the oil facilities in the Oil Crescent; He was able to paralyze the will of the state to the point that it went to negotiate with him in order to raise his hand over state facilities, which cost the state an amount of \$ 140 billion over three years.

In the same context, General Haftar used the disruption of oil production in order to force his opponents to submit to his aspirations to restore military rule again, using the support of tribal, regional and religious forces at the local level. Furthermore, some countries at the international level such as (Russia, France, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). All this created this overwhelming chaos and the country was involved in polarization policies that created real restrictions on thinking about the reality of development and adopting policies that alleviate the suffering of the people and achieve stability and prosperity for them.

This complex reality of Libya has made the last 10 years a continuation of violence and futility and made the ambition of Libyans in the welfare state deferred. In addition, creating a state of confusion and improvisation, therefore, government policies, which made them useless in the events of positive change, and rebuilding society on two basic dimensions:

The first is fast and superficial, targeting the requirements of the infrastructure and the necessary equipment, while the second is concerned with profound change that

targets the mental, cultural, social, economic and political structures, which did not happen in Libya after 2011 CE.¹⁹

Libya is living today in a complex state of conflict between its social components. As there is a state of mistrust, the absence of a culture of dialogue, and the absence of a caring civil society that is aware of the seriousness of the stage. All this coincides with great difficulties in determining the national identity and the political and economic personality of the state. Not to mention that it is difficult to define religious identity despite the fact that Muslims represent about 100% of the population. However, the difference between the religious schools of thought in the curriculum and the reference made there are intersections that deepened the differences very deeply and affected the stability of society, especially in light of the wide spread of weapons of all kinds.

In fact, after the February 2011 revolution, Libya had many bilateral conflicts, not all of which were about power and access to financial resources. Rather, it went beyond the struggles between binaries, Arabs and Berbers, urbanites and Bedouins, central and decentralization, East and West, all of these conflicts heralded the demise of the sovereignty and prestige of the state. Moreover, even the fading out of the independence state. Not to mention, external interference has become employing national parties to serve its own agenda.

The national interest was lost and a comprehensive national program to rebuild society first, then the trend to build a state of institutions that can achieve economic reforms and achieve stability that provide a suitable ground and climate for development events that the Libyan community needs.

The future of public policy-making that achieves promising development in Libya depends on the ability and will of Libyans to overcome their differences, In addition, agreement on the constitution organizes the country and achieves a democratic system that guarantees a peaceful transfer of power and prevents the encroachment of one spectrum over another within society and achieves an integrated system that guarantees rights, sets duties and professionally defines the priorities for construction and establishment.

(19) al-Munsif, Wannas: The Libyan Personality: The Triad of Tribe, The Booty, and the Triumph, First Class, Mediterranean Publishing House, 2014, P:84.

Conclusion

During this chapter, we tried to reach conclusions and recommendations about public policy in Libya and its impact on the loss of development opportunities, based on tracking, analysis and interpretation of three stations from the life of the Libyan state, which is about seventy years. In conclusion, we reach the following conclusions:

- The continued dominance of the oil sector, as the oil and gas sector still represents more than **96%** of Libyan exports and represents the main source of foreign exchange. Inefficiency and effectiveness of the investments implemented in the industrial and agricultural sectors, and the low levels of production in all non-oil sectors.
- The low level and quality of health and educational services, the persistence of housing, transportation and infrastructure problems, and the failure of these services to keep pace with the rapid population and urban growth.
- The defect in the financing and administrative structures of the public sector institutions, the failure and faltering of the privatization programs, and the suspension of many industrial, agricultural and service projects, which caused an increase in the waste of resources, accumulation of losses and increased costs.
- The ongoing structural change, which was coupled with the nature of the system, especially during the colonel's time, led to the spread of the phenomenon of administrative laxity, instability and mismanagement in most public institutions.
- The inflation of the administrative and service apparatus and the emergence of the unemployment problem among many groups of Libyan society.
- The rise in poverty rates in the community and showed an escalation, as the percentage of the population below the poverty rate from 15% to 22% between 1993 and 2003 AD. Libya suffered from the absence of an impartial and independent judiciary, which has directly affected the spread of corruption, clientelism and nepotism. As there is no development, no modernization, no development, no reform, and no exit from crises, except by law, order and institutions.
- The choice of leaders and administrative positions in the Libyan state is based on the reasons for political loyalty and tribal affiliations, and this matter formed one of the dilemmas that faced development policies.
- Development issues and experiences are by their nature cumulative matters in which to benefit from previous experiences, whether locally or internationally. This was not achieved in Libya, as the country did not open up to the outside and benefit

from international experiences and adapt them to suit the Libyan environment.

- The unbalanced development plans caused them to concentrate in certain areas. The leader who created his presence 80% of the Libyans over an area that does not exceed a quarter of the size of Libya. At the same time, the centrally design of the plans led to the centralization of services in major cities.
- The lack of a clear policy defining the relationship between the public and private sectors in Libya has significantly affected the contribution of the private sector to development, but the matter came to abolish the private sector at the time of the colonel that led to the accumulation of employees in the government apparatus.

- The weak political participation has led to the fact that the established policies do not gain legitimacy, and consequently there is a wide gap between policy makers and those who implement it, which has negatively affected many policies.
- Paying attention to quantitative rather than qualitative products for public policies in Libya. For example, the education policies that led to the spread of education horizontally and thus the quality of education decreased compared to neighboring countries.
- The ideology's control over the course of drawing up public policies, thus it has been emptied of its professional, objective and logical content and has become captive to desires, whims and tendencies, especially at the time of the colonel.
- The sovereignty of security and informal institutions at the expense of official institutions, and the absence of a national constitution and personal cult led to the spread of the phenomenon of corruption and favoritism, which directly affected the development of reform plans.
- The limited contribution of the elite technocrats in setting public policies. Consequently, politics was characterized by improvisation, lack of objectivity, and ability to achieve.
- The absence of public policies concerned with the smelting of tribal loyalties and the independent determination of the Libyan political identity and personality.
- The lack of priorities in the policy-making process of the successive governments 'work paths, which has negatively affected the effectiveness and efficiency of development plans.
- The lack of transparency in the management of economic reform and the complexity of administrative procedures contributed directly to the existence of an inappropriate structure for the development process.
- Development plans in Libya in the 1990s, were negatively affected by the international sanctions that prevailed for nearly ten years.
- The reality of the development process has become captive to the state of instability, security, and political and institutional division of Libya after the 2-17 revolution 2011.
- The lack of civil society institutions to participate, monitor and evaluate development plans. This matter continued in the three stages of the state.

Recommendations

- Establishing centers for studies, research and consultations concerned with public policies.
- Focusing on education issues in its various stages, as it is the tool that prepares leaders for tomorrow. This matter requires attention to pre-university education as it represents the main rule.
- Activating the role of the private (private) sector and making it an important tributary of the national economy.
- Adopting a frankness and disclosure approach in all levels and institutions of administration, economics and politics.
- Adopting the principle of transparency and accountability and creating a national project that fights corruption and informs citizens of facts and information.
- Spreading the philosophy of enabling civil society institutions to exercise their role in participating in setting and evaluating public policies.
- Realizing the concept of spreading and distributing development instead of the concept of distributing wealth between various Libyan cities and regions.
- Adopting a comprehensive cultural project that defines the dimensions of the Libyan personality and specifies the options and development priorities. Because the contribution of culture to development is a very important outcome, and it is not of societal feasibility without the support of a strategic, civilizational, cultural, socio-economic and political project that leads to balanced plans that complement some of them. It responds to a comprehensive and sustainable demand.
- Work to create sectorial pluralism that would contribute to removing the domination of the oil and gas sector over the country's national product. This plurality lies in the field of investments and foreign trade, as well as in tourism and support for small and medium industries, all of which are supposed to be priorities for public policies in Libya in the future.
- Supporting democratic transformation, which of course will lead to the provision of political and social stability in a sustainable manner by building knowledge, skills, developing expertise, and capabilities.
- To stop haphazard planning for the state's development policies and meta plans, and to rely on flexible plans that meet the needs of citizens.
- Moving towards effective administrative and financial decentralization that guarantees participation in administration and implementation in formulating public policies.
- The trend towards institutional stability and an end to the continuous structural changes in the administrative system.

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