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The Proportional Representation System in Algerian Electoral Legislation: An Analytical Study of Advantages and Disadvantages in Light of Order No. 21-01 and Organic Law No. 26-05

نظام التمثيل النسبي في التشريع الانتخابي الجزائري: دراسة تحليلية لمزايا وعيوبه في ضوء الأمر رقم 21-01 والقانون الأساسي رقم 26-05

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Abstract:

This research examines the proportional representation system within Algerian electoral legislation, from Order No. 21-01 of March 10, 2021 comprising the Organic Law on the Electoral System, to its latest amendments under Organic Law No. 26-05 of April 4, 2026. The study reveals the structural advantages of this system - particularly in ensuring fair political representation for parties, minorities, women, and youth through the open list with preferential voting and binding quota mechanisms - while uncovering its structural disadvantages, including parliamentary fragmentation, mathematical complexity, and accountability diffusion. The research adopts an analytical methodology grounded in the exact operative texts of Algerian law, coupled with a comparative approach. The study concludes that proportional representation remains fundamentally a technical instrument for converting votes into seats, and that its genuine effectiveness depends on the maturity of party culture and the existence of responsible political elites.

Keywords : Electoral system, proportional representation, elections, political parties, parliament, Algerian organic law, Independent National Electoral Authority.

الملخص:

يتناول هذا البحث نظام التمثيل النسبي في التشريع الانتخابي الجزائري، انطلاقاً من الأمر رقم 21-01 المؤرخ في 10 مارس 2021 المتضمن القانون العضوي المتعلق بنظام الانتخابات، وصولاً إلى آخر تعديلاته بموجب القانون العضوي رقم 26-05 المؤرخ في 4 أبريل 2026. تسعى الدراسة إلى الكشف عن الإيجابيات البنيوية لهذا النظام، لا سيما ضمان التمثيل السياسي العادل للأحزاب والأقليات والمرأة والشباب من خلال القائمة المفتوحة بالتصويت التفضيلي وآليات الكوتا الملزمة، كما تكشف عن سلبياته المتمثلة في تشتت البرلمان وتعقيد الحسابات الانتخابية وإشكالية المساءلة في ظل الحكومات الائتلافية. اعتمد البحث على المنهج التحليلي في دراسة النصوص القانونية الجزائرية النافذة بصياغتها الحرفية، مقروناً بالمنهج المقارن. خلص البحث إلى أن التمثيل النسبي يبقى أداةً تقنية حسابية لتحويل الأصوات إلى مقاعد، وأن النجاعة الحقيقية رهينة بنضج الممارسة الحزبية ووجود نخب سياسية مسؤولة تُعلي المصلحة الوطنية فوق الحسابات الضيقة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: النظام الانتخابي. التمثيل النسبي. الانتخابات. الأحزاب السياسية. البرلمان. القانون العضوي الجزائري. الهيئة الوطنية المستقلة للانتخابات.

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Introduction:

Elections constitute the fundamental democratic mechanism for accessing political power and assuming public office within representative political institutions. They confer upon elected officials the democratic legitimacy necessary for the exercise of political authority, and most scholarly definitions of democracy identify free, fair, and periodic elections as among its indispensable constitutive elements. The procedural definition of democracy advanced by political economist Joseph Schumpeter affirms that it is that institutional arrangement whereby "individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote." (Diamond, 2014, p41-42)

Electoral systems occupy a central position in contemporary constitutional law and political science, functioning simultaneously as legal and technical instruments governing the mechanisms for converting votes into parliamentary seats, shaping the composition of legislative assemblies, and influencing the stability and effectiveness of government. Among the various systems that political science has classified - majoritarian, proportional, and mixed - proportional representation (PR) stands as the most globally prevalent, particularly in pluralist societies that prioritize representational equity and the reflection of social diversity within parliament.

Algeria has adopted the proportional representation system for elections to the National People's Assembly and local councils, anchoring it in Order No. 21-01 of March 10, 2021, published in the Official Gazette of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Issue No. 17, dated March 11, 2021. This legislation introduced transformative innovations - most notably the open list with preferential voting - that legal scholars regard as a qualitative advance in Algerian electoral engineering. (Hamdoud & Rayess, 2025, p522) The system was supplemented by Order No. 21-10 of August 25, 2021, and most recently comprehensively amended by Organic Law No. 26-05 of April 4, 2026, published in the Official Gazette, Issue No. 24.

Research Problem: The central question of this study is: In what specific ways do the advantages and disadvantages of the proportional representation system manifest within Algerian electoral legislation, and to what extent has the Algerian legislator succeeded in capitalizing on its strengths while remedying its structural weaknesses through successive reforms?

Significance and Objectives: This research engages a foundational pillar of Algerian electoral architecture at a critical reform moment. It aims to: (1) establish the conceptual and legislative framework of proportional representation through exact legal text analysis; (2) conduct a rigorous legal evaluation of the system's advantages and disadvantages; and (3) formulate realistic and actionable legal recommendations.

Methodology: The study employs the analytical method examining operative Algerian legal texts in their exact formulations, the descriptive method presenting legislative content systematically, and the comparative method engaging relevant European democratic experiences.

Plan: The research is structured in two principal sections: Section I examines the conceptual and legislative framework; Section II undertakes the evaluative analysis of advantages, disadvantages, and remedial mechanisms.

1. The Conceptual and Legislative Framework of Proportional Representation in Algeria

Subsection 1: The Concept of Electoral System and the Place of Proportional Representation

A. Defining the Electoral System

The concept of the electoral system operates across two complementary dimensions. From the legal-legislative dimension, it denotes the ensemble of rules governing the electoral process: constituency delimitation, candidacy conditions, voting procedures, vote counting, seat allocation, and dispute resolution. In Algeria, this framework is explicitly grounded in Article 1 of Order No. 21-01, which establishes that the Organic Law aims to:

"define the basic principles and rules relating to the electoral system; embody the constitutional principles relating to the independence, neutrality, and non-partisanship of the authority responsible for managing, organizing, and supervising electoral and referendum operations; embody and consolidate democracy, the rotation of power, and the moralization of political life; guarantee the participation of citizens and civil society, especially youth and women, in political life, and guarantee a free choice free from all material influence." (Ordre No. 21-01)

From the technical-political dimension, the electoral system refers to the method of "translating votes into seats" - in Arend Lijphart's formulation. (Moshri, 2017, p95) Article 2 of Order No. 21-01 provides the official legal definitions of key technical concepts:

"The largest remainder: a method for distributing remaining seats in list-based voting after the initial distribution of seats on the basis of the electoral quotient. The electoral quotient: the result of dividing the number of expressed votes by the number of seats to be filled." (Ordre No. 21-01)

This legislative definitional framework anchors the technical vocabulary of proportional representation directly in positive law, eliminating interpretive ambiguity and supplying the judicial and administrative apparatus with clear operational benchmarks.

B. Theoretical Effects of Proportional Representation

The eminent French political scientist Maurice Duverger formulated the canonical empirical proposition that "proportional representation tends to lead to the formation of many independent, and stable parties," elaborating that "every minority, however small, is guaranteed representation, and therefore nothing impedes the splitting of political families into several opinions differing only on details." (Duverger, 1992, p105) Although Duverger's broader propositions have attracted scholarly revision (Dolez & Laurent, 2017, p55-69), the hypothesis linking proportional representation to multipartyism has demonstrated substantial empirical robustness. The democratic justification for proportional representation rests on the principle articulated by Mény and Sadoun: "if voting comes to be viewed as an expression of interests, and certain small minorities find it difficult to overcome the majority system, proportional representation can be the remedy for the representation of minorities." (Mény & Sadoun, 1985, p11)

Subsection 2: The Legislative Architecture of Proportional Representation in Order No. 21-01

A. Parliamentary Elections: The Core Provisions (Articles 191–198)

B.

The foundational provision organizing proportional representation for elections to the National People's Assembly is Article 191 of Order No. 21-01, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05:

Article 191 of Order No. 21-01, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05:

"The National People's Assembly is elected for a term of five (5) years by proportional representation on an open list, with preferential voting without mixing. Lists submitted for elections, under penalty of rejection, must include one third (1/3) of female candidates, and must allocate at least half (1/2) of the candidacies to candidates whose age does not exceed forty (40) years on the day of the vote, and at least one third (1/3) of the list's candidates must hold a university-level qualification." (Ordre No. 21-01, Ordre No. 21-01, Article 191, paragraphs 1 and 3 (as amended by Organic Law No 26-05)

Article 192 specifies the voting mechanics:

"In every polling station, the voter, upon entering the voting booth, selects a single list and votes in favor of one or more candidates from the same list within the limit of the seats allocated to the electoral constituency." (Ordre No. 21-01, Article 192.)

Article 194 establishes the electoral threshold and general distribution principle:

"As a result of the voting method defined in Article 191 above, the distribution of seats shall be based on the proportion of votes obtained by each list, with application of the largest remainder rule. Lists that have not obtained at least five percent (5%) of the expressed votes shall not be taken into account when distributing seats." (Order No. 21-01, Article 194)

Article 195 defines the electoral quotient with mathematical precision:

"The electoral quotient to be taken into account in distributing the seats to be filled in each electoral constituency shall be the result of dividing the number of expressed votes - reduced, where applicable, by the votes obtained by lists that have not reached the threshold mentioned in paragraph 2 of Article 194 above - by the number of seats to be filled." (Order No. 21-01, Article 195)

This provision contains a technically important detail: the votes of below-threshold lists are subtracted from the total before the quotient is calculated, further concentrating representation around parties with genuine popular support.

Article 196 sets out the complete seat distribution procedure:

"The distribution of the seats to be filled for each list shall be carried out according to the following modalities: (1) The electoral quotient is determined in each electoral constituency according to the conditions set out in Article 195; (2) Each list obtains a number of seats equal to the number of times it has obtained the electoral quotient; (3) After distributing seats to lists that have obtained the electoral quotient, the remaining votes obtained by winning lists and the votes obtained by non-winning lists shall be ranked according to the importance of the number of votes, and the remaining seats shall be distributed according to this ranking. When

two or more lists have obtained an equal number of votes, the last seat shall be awarded to the youngest candidate." (Order No. 21-01, Article 196)

Article 197 governs intra-list seat distribution:

"The distribution of the seats obtained by each list among its candidates shall be carried out according to the number of votes obtained by each candidate. The last seat obtained by the list shall be won, in the event of equal votes between candidates of the list, by the youngest candidate. However, in the event of equal votes between a male candidate and a female candidate, the female candidate shall win the last seat obtained by the list." (Order No. 21-01, Article 197)

This final clause - awarding the contested seat to the female candidate when she ties with a male candidate - establishes a concrete, actionable gender-affirmative tie-breaking rule going beyond declaratory commitment to gender equality.

Article 198 provides the safety net for extreme fragmentation scenarios:

"In the event that no list of candidates obtains at least five percent (5%) of the expressed votes, all lists of candidates shall be taken into account for distributing seats." (Order No. 21-01, Article 198)

B. Local Elections: Articles 169–176

For municipal and provincial elections, Article 169 establishes the same proportional basis:

"Members of the Municipal People's Assembly and the Provincial People's Assembly are elected for a term of five (5) years by proportional representation on an open list, with preferential voting without mixing." (Order No. 21-01, Article 169)

Article 171 stipulates that seats shall be distributed among the lists in proportion to the number of votes obtained by each list, with application of the largest remainder rule. Article 176, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05, imposes on local election lists a gender representation requirement of at least one third (1/3) of female candidates - with the specification that this gender requirement applies only in municipalities whose population exceeds twenty thousand (20,000) inhabitants. (Order No. 21-01, Article 176)

C. The Independent National Electoral Authority

The institutional framework within which the proportional representation system operates is constituted by the Independent National Electoral Authority. Article 7, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05, establishes its mandate:

"In accordance with the provisions of Article 202 of the Constitution, the Independent National Electoral Authority shall be responsible for the preparation, organization, management, supervision, and oversight of electoral and referendum operations. The competent administration shall be obliged to provide the material resources necessary for electoral and referendum operations and place them at the disposal of the Independent Authority." (Order No. 21-01, Article 7)

Article 10 enumerates its competencies, including maintaining voter registries, overseeing all electoral operations, accrediting candidates' representatives, coordinating international observation missions, and disseminating electoral culture. (Order No. 21-01, Article 10)

Article 19, as amended, mandates that the Independent Authority in Algeria comprises three distinct institutional bodies:

a deliberative Council, an executive Bureau, and the President . Omitting the "executive Bureau" from the legal composition is a significant structural error, as it acts as a mandatory collective coordinating body alongside the Council and the President." (Order No. 21-01, Article 19)

Article 21, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05, provides that the Council shall consist of ten (10) members appointed by the President of the Republic from among independent personalities, including one (1) member from the Algerian national community residing abroad, for a non-renewable term of six (6) years. (Order No. 21-01, Article 21) The independence of members is reinforced by Article 40, requiring that members must not have been affiliated with any political party within the five years preceding their appointment, (Order No. 21-01, Article 40) and by the personal oath prescribed in Article 43:

'I swear by God, the Most High, the Almighty, to perform my duties with full integrity, impartiality, and independence, and I undertake to work to ensure the integrity and transparency of electoral and referendum operations, and to respect the Constitution and the laws of the Republic, and God is witness to what I say." (Order No. 21-01, Article 43)

2. III. Evaluation - Advantages, Disadvantages, and Remedial Mechanisms

Subsection 1: Advantages of the Proportional Representation System

A. Representational Fairness and the Open List Innovation

The foremost advantage of proportional representation is representational fairness: the structural capacity to ensure that every political party obtains a share of parliamentary seats commensurate with its share of the popular vote. This contrasts fundamentally with majoritarian systems' zero-sum logic - where the winning party gains all and others gain nothing - embedding instead the principle that legislative composition should mirror the actual distribution of political support. As Mény and Sadoun observed, proportional representation serves as "the remedy for the representation of minorities" in systems where small parties cannot overcome majoritarian barriers. (Mény & Sadoun, 1985, p 11)

In the Algerian context, this advantage is qualitatively transformed - and one of the system's classical weaknesses simultaneously neutralized - by the open list with preferential voting under Article 191. Under the closed-list systems that dominated previous Algerian electoral practice, party leaderships enjoyed absolute authority over candidate ranking, historically enabling the notorious practice of "purchasing list positions" whereby financial power rather than democratic merit determined parliamentary access. The open list fundamentally restructures this dynamic: Article 192 enables voters to select preferred candidates within their chosen list, and Article 197 mandates that the final seat distribution within winning lists follows "the number of votes obtained by each candidate." This transfers the determinative ranking power from party hierarchies to the sovereign voter - a genuinely democratic innovation of considerable practical significance.

Scholar Bel'abdi Moustafa confirmed empirically that this choice "produced a National People's Assembly different from that in previous elections [...] as election results produced a broad representation of national competencies, and an improvement in parliamentary performance." (Bal'abdi, 2003, p272) The proportional formula further ensures that minority parties, emerging political movements, and independent candidacies retain realistic prospects

of parliamentary representation, making the legislature a genuine reflection of ideological plurality - an outcome structurally unavailable under majoritarian constituency systems.

B. Social Inclusion Through Binding Quotas: Article 191, Paragraph 3

A second major advantage is the capacity of list-based proportional systems to embed binding social composition requirements structurally guaranteeing the representation of groups systematically disadvantaged by unregulated political markets. Article 191, paragraph 3 of Order No. 21-01, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05, constitutes the most comprehensive list composition mandate in Algerian electoral history:

"'Lists submitted for elections, under penalty of rejection, must include one third (1/3) of female candidates, and must allocate at least half (1/2) of the candidacies to candidates whose age does not exceed forty (40) years on the day of the vote, and at least one third (1/3) of the list's candidates must hold a university-level qualification." (Order No. 21-01, Article 191)

Three aspects of this provision deserve emphasis. First, the sanction for non-compliance is list rejection - not a fine or warning - making these quotas genuinely binding. Second, the three requirements are cumulative: a list must simultaneously satisfy the women's quota (1/3), the youth requirement (1/2), and the university-level qualification requirement (1/3). Third, the rounding-up rule prevents arithmetical minimization of the quotas.

Without this legally binding obligation - made structurally feasible precisely because of the list-based proportional formula - financially powerful networks would systematically exclude women, youth, and academically qualified candidates from the legislative sphere. The gender-affirmative tie-breaking rule of Article 197 - awarding the contested seat to the female candidate in case of a tie with a male candidate - further operationalizes gender equality at the margin where outcomes are most closely decided. Researchers Hamdoud Ibtissam and Rayess Amina confirmed that these reforms represent "a series of fundamental reforms that had a direct impact on evaluating the electoral process, aiming to effectively embody integrity." (Hamdoud & Rayess, 2025, p522)

C. Coalition Governance and Democratic Deliberation

Proportional representation tends structurally to generate coalition governments by preventing any single party from monopolizing an absolute parliamentary majority. Coalition governments necessitate inter-party negotiation and compromise, fostering deliberative democratic culture that single-party majoritarian governments do not incentivize. The Scandinavian applications of proportional representation - Norway, Sweden, Denmark - demonstrate that this system can produce both genuine pluralism and governmental stability when supported by mature party culture and strong democratic institutions. (Troper & Tusseau, 2014, p506) Furthermore, when citizens across the political spectrum see their views represented in parliament, democratic legitimacy is reinforced, reducing political alienation.

Subsection 2: Disadvantages and Legislative Remedies

A. Parliamentary Fragmentation and the Threshold Remedy

The most significant structural disadvantage of proportional representation is its tendency toward parliamentary fragmentation: the production of a fractionalized legislature making it difficult to construct cohesive and durable governing majorities. The historical record provides compelling illustrations: the French Fourth Republic (1946–1958) witnessed no

fewer than 24 governments in twelve years; Italy between 1945 and 1991 saw approximately fifty governments, accompanied by systemic corruption that analysts attributed directly to the accountability vacuum created by unstable coalition arrangements. (Hamon & Troper, 2014, p 222) Scholar Jabali Ben Oumar described this as producing "a mosaic of parties under the proportional representation system that affects the work of the parliamentary chamber, whether in terms of legislation or the difficulty of obtaining the required majority to pass legislative texts, or the oversight process over the government." (Ben OUmar, 2025, p 467)

Legislative remedy - the 5% threshold (Article 194): The Algerian legislator directly confronts this risk through Article 194, paragraph 2: "Lists that have not obtained at least five percent (5%) of the expressed votes shall not be taken into account when distributing seats." This threshold performs a dual function: filtering out micro-parties lacking genuine popular roots, and concentrating representation around organizations with demonstrated electoral support. The technical sophistication of the provision is noteworthy: Article 195 mandates that the votes of below-threshold lists be subtracted from the total before the quotient is calculated. Article 198 ensures the system remains functional in highly fragmented scenarios by admitting all lists when none reaches 5%.

B. Accountability Diffusion and the Institutional Remedy

A related disadvantage is the weakening of political accountability under coalition governments. When several parties share governmental responsibility, voters face systematic difficulty identifying which party bears responsibility for policy failures. The Italian case is instructive: both Socialist and Communist parties routinely attributed governmental failures to the Christian Democratic Party whose coalitions they had sustained, contributing to the systemic erosion of democratic legitimacy that culminated in the "Tangentopoli" corruption scandals. (Troper & Tusseau, 2014, p506)

"Legislative remedy - the Independent National Electoral Authority: The Algerian legislature addresses institutional preconditions through the Authority's structural independence. The non-renewable six-year terms of Article 21, the mandatory requirement of proven experience in the electoral field alongside the strict incompatibility requirements of Article 40, and the personal oath of Article 43 collectively insulate electoral administration from political capture. The Authority's exclusive competence over result announcement ensures that the conversion of votes into seats occurs under impartial institutional supervision. Scholar Haydour Djeloul confirmed that these reforms 'aim to moralize political life and combat electoral corruption by imparting transparency and integrity to the process." (Haydour, 2022, p 2422)

C. Mathematical Complexity and the Comprehension Deficit

A practical disadvantage is the considerable complexity of seat allocation calculations, creating a gap between technical mechanics and citizens' capacity to understand outcomes. The system requires a two-stage process: first, distribution among lists through electoral quotient calculation (Article 195), initial allocation based on multiples of the quotient (Article 196, paragraph 2), largest-remainder distribution of residual seats (Article 196, paragraph 3), and age-based tie-breaking; second, intra-list distribution based on individual preferential vote counts under Article 197, with gender-based tie-breaking at the margin. This compound mathematical procedure delays result announcement and renders the process effectively

opaque to ordinary citizens. The Article 10 mandate for the Authority to undertake "awareness-raising in the field of elections and the dissemination of electoral culture" represents a partial institutional remedy.

D. Risk of Social Division Entrenchment

In highly diverse societies, proportional representation can paradoxically entrench rather than bridge social divisions, creating structural incentives for parties to organize along communal lines. Arend Lijphart's consociational democracy model acknowledges this dynamic while arguing that power-sharing can transform it into democratic stability. (Lijphart, 2007, p 19-20) However, the Lebanese experience - where sectarian proportional arrangements have repeatedly paralyzed governmental formation - demonstrates how consociational PR can, under adverse conditions, institutionalize communal identities. The Algerian legislative framework addresses this risk indirectly through the list composition requirements of Article 191, which require parties to include candidates across gender, age, and educational dimensions, incentivizing cross-sectional coalitions within lists.

IV. Conclusion: Findings and Recommendations:

A. Research Findings

Finding 1: The proportional representation system in Order No. 21-01, as amended by Organic Law No. 26-05, rests upon a carefully engineered formula combining four interlocking elements: open lists (Article 191); preferential voting without mixing (Article 192); the 5% electoral threshold (Article 194); and binding social composition quotas - one third (1/3) women, half (1/2) youth under 40, and one third (1/3) university graduates (Article 191, paragraph 3 as amended). This combination reflects a deliberate legislative strategy to capture the democratic advantages of proportional representation while structurally neutralizing its principal disadvantages.

Finding 2: The principal advantages are threefold: (a) representational fairness - ensuring parliamentary composition mirrors actual electoral support, with the open list of Article 191 and intra-list ranking of Article 197 transferring ranking power from party elites to voters; (b) social inclusion - through the binding quotas of Article 191, paragraph 3, mandating 1/3 women, 50% youth, and 1/3 university-level qualification, with the female tie-breaking rule of Article 197 operationalizing gender equity at the margin; and (c) democratic deliberation - compelling inter-party negotiation and coalition governance.

Finding 3: The principal structural disadvantages are: (a) parliamentary fragmentation - mitigated by the 5% threshold of Article 194 and the below-threshold vote subtraction mechanism of Article 195; (b) accountability diffusion - the structural difficulty of assigning governmental responsibility under coalition arrangements; and (c) mathematical opacity - the two-stage calculation process under Articles 195–197 creates a comprehension deficit potentially undermining popular trust in outcomes.

Finding 4: The Algerian legislature has implemented four categories of structural remedy: the electoral threshold (Article 194), the open list and preferential voting (Article 191), the Independent National Electoral Authority composed of ten (10) independent members serving non-renewable six-year terms (Articles 19 and 21 as amended), and the judicial review architecture (Articles 206, 209–211).

Finding 5: The establishment of the Independent National Electoral Authority with its ten (10) members serving non-renewable six-year terms under the amended Article 21 constitutes the most significant institutional innovation, providing structural administrative impartiality essential to the legitimacy of any electoral system.

Finding 6: Proportional representation is fundamentally a technical instrument whose democratic quality depends on the broader constitutional and cultural ecosystem within which it operates. The aspiration should be a self-reinforcing system in which proportional representation, an independent electoral authority, robust judicial oversight, and a mature party culture function together to produce a legislature that is simultaneously representative, effective, and accountable.

B. Legal Recommendations

Recommendation 1 (Legislative): The 5% electoral threshold of Article 194 should be subjected to periodic empirical review - recommended every decade - measuring the actual distribution of electoral support. A threshold calibrated for one stage of party system development may become exclusionary as the system matures, undermining the representational fairness that justifies the proportional choice.

Recommendation 2 (Legislative): The legislature should develop and publish an official simplified explanatory guide to the electoral calculation procedures under Articles 195–197 - the electoral quotient, the largest remainder method, and the preferential vote ranking - distributed before every electoral event. The mathematical complexity creates a democratic comprehension deficit; plain-language explanation is a low-cost, high-impact remedy.

Recommendation 3 (Institutional): The Independent National Electoral Authority should develop, under its Article 10 mandate for "awareness-raising in the field of elections and the dissemination of electoral culture," a dedicated civic education program specifically focused on explaining the open list and preferential voting mechanics. The democratic potential of these instruments cannot be fully realized without a well-informed electorate.

Recommendation 4 (Party-Institutional): Public policy should encourage the consolidation of small political parties sharing compatible ideological orientations into more organizationally robust entities, with the objective of progressively achieving a party system of between three and five major active parties. This structural consolidation would maximize proportional representation's democratic effectiveness without the dysfunctions of extreme fragmentation.

Recommendation 5 (Judicial): The professional training of administrative judges should be strengthened in electoral mathematics and proportional calculation methodology, enabling adjudication of disputes related to the electoral quotient and the largest remainder method under Articles 195–196 within tight judicial timeframes, as the review architecture of Articles 206 and 209–211 demands.

Recommendation 6 (General): The proportional representation system should be assessed neither as absolute good nor absolute evil, but as a technical instrument whose democratic quality depends on the supporting ecosystem of institutions, political culture, and party practice. Electoral law is a necessary but not sufficient condition for democratic governance.

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