

The strategy of simulating historical memory in forming international alliances: the administration of US President Donald Trump as a model

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Abstract:

The research focusses on the strategy of simulating historical memory in the formation of international alliances: the administration of US President Donald Trump as a model, which is more important to study the impact of American memory, specifically for US President Donald Trump in building international relations, and the problem appeared in the fact that there are variables that affected the construction of the historical memory of President Trump, is to change the political positions between the two states that were punctuated by any Joe Biden, who carries a memory different from his memory and an approach to the memory of Obama, and the main question is "Was Trump affected in his international dealings with historical memory? What does it hold about states in the international system? This prompted the adoption of the hypothesis that "US President Donald Trump was influenced in his policy by the historical memory of building and structuring international alliances", and this required the use of the descriptive approach to describe its policies, statements and sayings and a comparison to compare his behavior in the first term and the second term, and the research process dealt with three axes: the first: the strategy of employing memory and building international relations, the second axis: the strategy of using the historical memory of China and the path towards universality. The third axis: The strategy of employing historical memory in the behavior of US President Donald Trump, so that the main conclusion is that historical memory affects international relations negatively and positively, according to the nature of historical relations.

Keywords: Historical Memory, International Alliances, Foreign Policy Strategy, Collective Memory, Ontological Security, Political Simulation, Diplomatic Behavior

Introduction:

I. The research of memory policies is related to how to remember the past or represent it in the present, and political memory has always affected the behavior of state politicians, but the field of knowledge and political literature did not care about the dimension of memories in the study of global political dynamics, the collective memory of any country may manifest itself in the form of a policy or strategy for a state in international relations, it is an intellectual memory and systematic behavior; many politicians translate collective memory and even individuality into a strategy for their country, including US President Donald Trump. The memory that carries is the basis of his international behavior, even national, his political behavior in international relations between the first and second terms is only a simulation of the memory that translates into political behavior towards countries negatively and positively.

II. The present study adopts a Qualitative Research Design rooted in the theoretical framework of Constructivist International Relations (IR). Given the research question—which explores the influence of historical memory on foreign policy and alliance formation—a positivist approach focused solely on material factors would be insufficient. The methodology is primarily Interpretivist, seeking to understand the subjective meanings, shared understandings, and discursive practices through which memory is constructed and subsequently translated into state behavior.

1.1 Methodology

The core methodological approach is a Comparative Case Study Analysis, structured around two main levels:

- Theoretical Case Studies (Germany/Israel, Turkey/Armenia): Used to establish the theoretical mechanism linking collective memory, narrative identity, and state practices (apology vs. denial), thereby grounding the analysis in established Memory Politics literature.
- Critical Case Study (Donald Trump Administration): Used to test the application of this theoretical mechanism in a contemporary context, focusing on how a leader's personalized historical memory shapes a state's foreign policy towards specific actors (Iran, China, NATO, etc.).

This dual-level approach allows for both theoretical synthesis and empirical application, moving beyond mere description to offer an interpretation of the causal role of memory in international politics.

1.1. Data Collection and Analytical Framework

The study relies on a triangulation of data sources, primarily qualitative in nature:

- Primary Discourse Data: Public statements, speeches, official tweets, and executive orders issued by President Donald Trump, which serve as direct evidence of the leader's expressed political memory and its operationalization in policy.
- Secondary Academic Literature: Scholarly articles and monographs (as evidenced in the References section) pertaining to collective memory, ontological security, and the specific historical cases (Holocaust, Armenian displacement, Belt and Road Initiative).
- Policy and Media Reports: News analysis and policy documents that contextualize the political environment and the reactions to Trump's foreign policy decisions.

The primary analytical tool employed is Discourse Analysis, specifically focusing on the construction and deployment of Strategic Narratives. This framework allows the researcher to:

- Identify the core components of the "historical memory" carried by the political actor (e.g., Trump's memory of past U.S. foreign policy failures, or China's memory of the Silk Road).
- Analyze how these components are framed, articulated, and mobilized to justify specific foreign policy actions (e.g., withdrawal from the Iran deal, trade wars with China, or criticism of NATO).
- Connect the discursive construction of the "Other" (e.g., Iran as a terrorist sponsor, China as an economic exploiter) to the underlying memory narratives, thereby establishing the link between memory and policy outcome.

1.2. Case Study Selection and Theoretical Synthesis

The selection of the Trump Administration as the Critical Case is justified by the high visibility and explicit nature of the leader's reliance on historical and personal narratives to drive foreign policy. Trump's rhetoric provides a unique opportunity to observe the direct translation of a leader's memory into state strategy, often bypassing traditional bureaucratic filters. The inclusion of the Germany/Israel and Turkey/Armenia cases serves as a Comparative Anchor, illustrating the established theoretical concepts of memory politics (apology, denial, ontological security) against which the Trump case can be measured. The China/Belt and Road Initiative case provides a crucial non-Western example of memory being employed as a tool of soft power and strategic narrative.

The study achieves a theoretical synthesis by bridging two distinct but related sub-fields of IR:

- Social Constructivism: Providing the foundational concepts of Narrative Identity and Ontological Security (the state's need for a stable sense of self). The study argues that foreign policy decisions, particularly those related to alliances and historical disputes, are driven not just by physical security but by the need to maintain a coherent and heroic national narrative.
- Memory Politics: Integrating the analysis of how collective and political memory acts as a powerful, non-material variable that constrains or enables foreign policy choices. The synthesis posits that a leader's memory acts as a filter, interpreting current events through the lens of past perceived glories or injustices, which in turn dictates the state's strategic behavior.

1.3. Limitations and Contributions

The study acknowledges several inherent limitations:

- Causality Challenge: While the study demonstrates a strong correlation between expressed memory and policy outcomes, definitively isolating memory as the sole causal variable from other factors (e.g., domestic politics, economic interests, geopolitical shifts) remains a challenge inherent to qualitative IR research.
- Focus on Elite Discourse: The reliance on the leader's public statements may overemphasize the role of individual memory and understate the influence of deeper, institutionalized collective memory within the state bureaucracy.

- Temporal Scope: The analysis is heavily focused on the Trump administration's tenure, which may limit the generalizability of findings to political systems where the leader's personal influence on foreign policy is less pronounced.

Despite these limitations, the study offers significant contributions to the field of Political Science and International Relations:

- Conceptual Bridge: It successfully bridges the theoretical gap between Constructivism and Memory Studies, offering a refined framework for analyzing the non-material determinants of foreign policy.
- Empirical Application: It provides a detailed empirical analysis of a contemporary, high-stakes case (the Trump administration), demonstrating the practical utility of memory politics concepts in explaining seemingly erratic or non-rational foreign policy shifts.
- Comparative Insight: By contrasting the Trump case with the German, Turkish, and Chinese examples, the study illuminates the diverse ways in which memory can be mobilized—from apology and reconciliation to denial and strategic narrative projection—thereby enriching the understanding of state identity and behavior in the international system.

2. The strategy of employing memory and building international relations: historical models

The consideration of the relationship between memory and political behavior leads to the interpretation of the manifestations of interaction between countries passes through apology, reparations and compensation and rewriting the history of international relations again in the tone of peace not in the tone of conflict and aggression or revenge and revenge for the past, so that the history of relations is written in the tone of conflict and aggression, not peace, so that political memory is the source of starting points that bridge or widen the gap between countries. Considering the interaction of the theoretical dimensions of concepts such as narrative identity, ontological security, and rhetorical representations can bridge the gap between the two fields of knowledge, through two versions of social constructivism that can be included in the discussion to understand the motives for Germany's apology to Israel and Turkey's resistance to international pressure to apologies for the issue of Armenian displacement. He explained Germany's apology by looking at the role of foreign policy in recreating national identity through the transformation of the Jewish and then Israeli counterparts from a different enemy to a similar one, and how this became part of its moral responsibility (Lu, 2017, p. 445).

Some of them are eager to deny their connection and responsibility to the past and cherish the historical view of the 'practice' community that explains Turkey's reluctance to apologize to Armenia as an ontological need linked to Turkey's insistence on maintaining its routine narrative identity and protecting its heroic memory.

Since memory diplomacy is a pattern of diplomacy in which decision-makers use historical images built for foreign policy purposes, it is described as an approach of diplomatic practice that employs some of the past events of a society and is transformed into a political project that spreads "guilt and innocence" internationally to achieve strategic goals, including mobilizing international sympathy, as it is an unconventional diplomatic resource.

This concept converges with the concept of diplomatic sympathy and temperament management that Todd Hall devised to project emotion on the international stage; a strategic

tool used in foreign policy to gain from emotion. This is what Israel has applied in its foreign policy to commemorate and fallacy "anti-Semitism."

Some work to fabricate the image of the other E to demonize him. This is what the United States of America has done towards the Iranian nuclear file, reaching a long-term escalation that reaches a selective-preemptive strike to paralyze Iran's negotiating capabilities after the protracted crisis of 2003-225, as it did with Russia in the era of former President Joe Biden.

Using the narrative of national victims to strengthen foreign policy discourse, establishing places of memory for community support and arousing sympathy for world public opinion, combating defamation of anyone who denies its successor or exposes its memory and exposes its falsity, marginalizing or procrastinating historical events that contradict arguments to create a sympathetic historical narrative that spread after the Second Scientific War to compensate for the damage done by the losers (the Axis powers), imposed on them by the politicians of the victorious countries (the countries of the Holy Alliance). Some of them are due to the tragedies of the Second World War, as well as colonial apologies and the practice of apologies related to human rights violations.

In addition, the denial of compensation for the damage is despite the American recognition of the destruction of Iraq after 2003 and the American recognition that there is no justification for the occupation because there are no weapons of mass destruction and there is no evidence of the relationship of the "former Iraqi regime" with the Taliban movement "and the killing of thousands of civilians effectively scorched earth system in some areas of Iraq where militants are fighting the US forces.

Diplomatic relations are affected by "the content of memory" (Bachleitner, 2021), if the content is positive, the relations between the countries concerned are positive, cooperative-peaceful, and if the content is negative, the relations between the countries concerned are conflictual crisis, for example, the US-Iranian relations since the American hostage crisis in 1979, amounting to (52) diplomats until 2025, are a crisis that has been very clear in the eras of US President Donald Trump, effective despite the rounds of negotiations, but the use of force exists and is expected at any moment.

Whenever the degree of memory is negative (Johnson, 2019, pp. 96-140), the conflict is as clear as the European memory of Russian President Putin after the war in Ukraine; there is something undeniable is the motives of bias for historical memory in the relations and policies of countries (Langenbacher and Shain, 2012, p. 253). The state is the bearer of collective memory, for example, the American and European memory of "apartheid memory" about South Africa (Note: It is the systematic segregation between whites and blacks in South Africa in 1991, but Trump in his second term raised this memory, accusing the African president of discriminating against whites in a televised interview in April 2025), which the US President frankly showed when he met with South African President Cyril Ramaphosa, "An issue from memory, "genocide against whites, on 21-5-2025.

1.4. *Germany and the memory of the Jews*

"There is no German identity without Auschwitz. The memory of the Holocaust will remain a matter for all German citizens; it is part of the country's history!" Former German President Joachim Gauck (Engert, 2016, pp. 30-34).

Based on this quote, we present the importance of apology and non-apology in international politics, to understand the motives behind Germany's hostage to the ghosts of its past and its apologetic policies in favor of Israel on the one hand, and to consider on the other hand the symmetrical representations between the representatives of the parties (Messari,

2002, pp. 227-228). The apology for the past went through two stages; the first represented German policy the Jews inside and outside as the other (enemy), and the second represented the Israeli foreign policy as the other (similar), and an integral part of the German self, in the issue of "Holocaust" and the ambiguities surrounding it exaggeration and exaggeration. How was Germany's pro-Israel foreign policy (Engert, 2016, p. 31)? And how that apologetic policy about Hitler and his counterparts' past reflected on the German national identity, which was reproduced to conform to the apologetic German position.

In his book "How Norman Finkelstein Confirms the Jews the Holocaust?" The Holocaust is an ideological industry. Like many ideologies, although they are relevant, they are based on supporting the political and social interests of a group. In the aftermath of the events of 1967, Israel's first exploitation of the Holocaust was manifested in the portrayal of itself as a victim State;

This enabled it to extort European money and maintain unjustified immunity that kept it steadfast in the face of criticism, which included its unfair practices against the Palestinian people, and led to the fabrication of the Holocaust.

Nazi propaganda refined German identity, at the hands of Nazi propaganda Minister Paul Joseph Goebbels in a way that enables the Nazi discourse to paint a positive image of Nazi soldiers, and what they commit in concentration camps, which paralyzed the people's ability to form any rhetorical resistance or even guilt about what is committed (Berger, 2012).

Not only did the German people blame for these practices, but they also went so far as to obscure the suffering of non-Jewish victims and exaggerate Jewish suffering. Looking at the circumstances of the Holocaust in which the systematic genocide of European Jews and German minorities took place during the six years from 1933 to 1939, Yitzhak Farhadian argues, emphasizing the suffering of Jews, 1945-1933 (since the rise of Adolf Hitler Germany began to pursue a domestic policy based on a set of racial laws that separated German Jews from social, economic and political life under the pretext that their blood and race were different from that of superior German-Aryan blood (Farhadian, 2009, pp. 1-2). And ended with attempts to push German Jews to leave Germany. But during World War II, the pace intensified, as the Nazi German regime committed crimes, killing nearly eighty percent of European Jews (Engert, 2016, p. 31).

After the Cold War, Germany suffered heavy losses (Wittlinger and Larose, 2007, p. 483), through which for the first time Germany assumed full political and legal responsibility for its crimes. The fourth stage is the apology of German President Johannes in 2000 in the Knesset (Engert, 2016, pp. 30-34).

This speech was followed by tepid attempts by Adenauer to test the pulse of the German people regarding the provision of material compensation to Israel, but this did not find popularity among the Germans, most of whom saw such assistance as unjustified.

Or extravagant, or even unnecessary. Although the two sides signed the Luxembourg Agreement in 1952, under which Israel received nearly three billion Deutsche Marks (DM – to be paid over twelve years), Considering it an attempt to make reparations, the Israeli memory remained fraught with the past of the Holocaust, which prevented it from fully accepting the German reconciliation (1955-1954) (Engert, 2016, pp. 37-38).

German rhetoric was still confused by the economic and social disasters of World War II, and showed no interest in Germany's international reputation, the restoration of a divided homeland, its crumbling defense, and its refugee and unemployed people (Engert, 2016, pp. 30-34). Which, according to Ingert, explains the nature with which Germans dealt with the

memory of their past at the time, through which they threw off moral responsibility and political guilt that the Allies insisted on provoking (Weyeneth, 2001, p. 9). On the shoulders of the Nazi power, because they saw that they were deceived and abused by Hitler.

This societal culture soon faded after the Nuremberg trials (Stolper and Roskamp, 1979, p. 376). German-Israeli reconciliation to redress the Jews and build reconciliation with the Germans (Engert, 2016, pp. 44-45).

We conclude from the above that Michael Maros' sincere apology criteria, although they have stressed the need to take responsibility for the mistakes of the past, do not mean blaming the German people or perpetuating the recall of past mistakes as a vehicle that reproduces the specificity of Jewish suffering, and opens the way for Israel to continue its unjust practices against the Palestinian people (Engert, 2016, p. 45).

1.5. *Turkey and the memory of Armenia*

"We will be ready to face our history if there is something to face in the first place, and everyone should know that Turkey's history is not related to the 2005 genocide." Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan (2014), and Turkey overcame the memories of the Armenian displacement and adopted a foreign policy that resists international pressure to apologize (Langenbacher, 2003, p. 58). The dilemma of the Turkish case arises in the following question: If Turkey's dream of joining the European Union to collect the material and moral benefits derived from it requires an apology to Armenia as a rational and expected behavior, understanding why Turkey refuses to apologize for the displacement of Armenians requires raising the normative dimensions of the international architecture to understand how the interaction affected Symbolism with the West in the narrative identity and the "concept of intersubjectivity" of Turkish society, and this is a first step that precedes placing all of this within the framework of Turkish ontological security linked to memory and apology.

Modern Kemalist Turkey tried to get rid of the old Ottoman narrative, which was associated with Europe and the West, with its stigmatization of traditionalism, backwardness, and violence associated with the displacement of Armenians, by creating a Turkish national identity in line with the "advanced" norms and values formulated by the modernist Western vision, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took it upon himself to formulate internal strategies that convey the societal structure and narrative identity from the old "Ottoman" logic. Related to the inherited norms and values that placed the Ottoman Empire in an inferior hierarchical relationship with the West, the modern "Turkish" logic aimed at renewal and identification with the West. This coincided with an intensification of symbolic interaction with the West with the aim of adopting representations and then producing and reproducing them, and these representations adapt to its new national identity and image as a civilized state that rejects violence in all its forms, which is manifested in the words of the Turkish Minister of Justice Mustafa Necati in 1924, "The Turkish nation, committed to following the path of catching up with modern civilization, cannot modify that civilization according to its own needs, but must adapt to the requirements of this civilization at all costs." Avoiding apologizing for past mistakes was one way of adapting which will keep Turkey in the club of "civilized". Turkey had to withstand the wave of criticism and questioning the credibility of the "peaceful" and "civilized" image it was trying to portray, and it had to withstand the constant pressure of temptation from the European Union, which culminated in 2006 when MEPs passed a clause urging Turkey to recognize the Armenian Genocide, a condition for its accession to the European Union. This requirement was later dropped, but it remains one of the most prominent obstacles to its accession today (Zarakol, 2010, pp. 5-14).

Despite growing international challenges and pressures, Turkey has maintained a foreign political stance that refuses to link its past to the practice of genocide towards an ethnic community, which was reflected in the majority of its responses, which ranged between a complete denial of the genocide and a historical questioning of its credibility, to remove it from the circle of politics and law to the circle of historical research, which will later confirm its denial.

Regarding the historical skepticism of the alleged systematic Armenian genocide, the Turkish president in 1989, Turgut Özal, was the first to assert that "the study of such events should be left in the hands of historians (Engert, 2016, p. 227). The same approach that lasted for nearly three decades, and was recently manifested on April 24, 2021, in statements that came in the context of the complexity of Turkish-American relations, and were made by Ibrahim Kalin, spokesman for the Turkish presidency, following the statement of US President Joe Biden in which he pointed out that "what happened to the Armenians is genocide in the Ottoman era", to be his response that President Erdogan "previously called for the formation of a joint committee to investigate the events of 1915, to save a historical issue from the shadows of politics and malicious circles", stressing that "those who fear that historical facts will be revealed with the support of documents and evidence, did not respond to President Erdogan's invitation."

As for the denying position of genocide in official Turkish discourse, and in particular that of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in his premiership in 2005 Erdogan stated that Turkey is ready "to face its history if there is something to face in the first place, and that everyone should know that Turkey's history is not related to genocide." Even if their parliament passes otherwise!" (Edam, 2015). In 2009, Erdogan blamed President Barack Obama for using the word genocide, stating that "its use will not become appropriate just because it was used by the President of the United States" (Engert, 2016, p. 225).

First, a domestic narrative dominance that contradicts marginal narratives that differ from Turks' perceptions of the glories of their heroic past. In 2015, the Center for Economic and Foreign Policy Studies in Turkey found that only 9% of the Turkish population wanted the Turkish government to accept the allegations of the Armenian Genocide (Edam, 2015), a position that manifested itself several times in the form of gross anger among local groups, as President Erdoğan took softer steps on the part of Armenia.

However, the Turkish position remained consistent on the fact that the displacement of Armenians is a geopolitical consequence understood within a complex context of the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and second: the association of the local or national narrative with a reverse response to international pressure aimed at Turkey's recognition of the genocide, as some of them believe that these pressures have a pivotal role in feeding Turkish nationalism, thus hindering dialogue between the two parties (Açar and Rüma, 2007, pp. 449-465). So why does Turkey not apologize to Armenia? This question can be answered at three levels: International, local, and ontological. At the outset, we pointed out that the emergence of modern Kemalist Turkey and its symbolic involvement in the international arena came in the form of a social upbringing of society based on modern Western values and standards, which was represented in the transformation of the Turkish narrative identity from a conservative traditional Ottoman identity dominated by negative symbolism symbolized by "traditionalism" and "violence", to a narrative identity understood within the framework of the modern nation-state that shares the values of peaceful modernity, rationality and restraint with its European peers. After that identity was established Reproduced locally by forgetting the old identity and memories of its past, apologizing has become a worrying idea for Turkey, as its contentious relationship with Armenia meets an existential security need and maintains the

stability of its narrative, and by violating it, Turkey's international representations will return to the square that it fears, which is the square before the beginning of the socialization process, which will inevitably lead to its entry into a state of ontological disharmony (Lupovici, 2011, p. 810). Resulting from the difference between the symbolism of the international environment towards Turkey and its perceptions of itself. In other words, Turkey believes in the apology.

It means the return of traditional barbarian symbolism, violence, and backwardness. It means that the psychological costs of Turkey's apology are high, as when it decides to apologize, a societal identity shock will occur that will tear its routine narrative through which it understands itself, which will create a self full of cognitive uncertainty, lacking its temporal, teleological, and ontological coherence.

3. The strategy of employing China's historical memory and the path towards universality

The employment of memory policies is one of the elements of soft power (Ohnesorge and Owen, 2023, p. 288) and the drawing and shaping of memory (Ohnesorge and Owen, 2023, p. 293), and narratives of political existence (Ohnesorge and Owen, 2023, p. 294). For example, the use of Chinese memory in the revival of the historic Silk Road by the administration of Chinese President "Xi" (Mayer and Pawlik, 2023, p. 142). Chinese memory was a political breakthrough towards Chinese universality (Poozi, 2022, p. 142).

What traces the historical context of building Chinese policy with historically friendly countries that have made it a global power is due to positive memories (Yang, 2021, p. 4), as Chinese politics under President Xi deliberately deliberated China's strategic narratives and reformed the world government (Wang, 2021, p. 9).

The Chinese embody its historical perception in the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, embodying that "a community with a shared future" (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, 2013, p. 5). Chinese politicians simulate the past (Silk Roads) to revive memory to build their strategic project One Belt and Road (Parepa, 2020, p. 176), the historical heritage of the Chinese has become justified to restore its glories "Middle Kingdom", memory simulates a path (Costa, 2020, p. 28) in which peoples coexisted for a long time (Winter, 2021, p. 12), recalling the four historical Chinese values (peace, cooperation, mutual education, mutual benefit) (Galleli and Heinrich, 2020, p. 27). And Rima Shared Historical Memory establishes the "Chinese Club" (Jing, 2020, p. 24).

China is a responsible country for providing aid and support to its historical partners (Bunskoek and Shih, 2021, p. 11), and the South-South cooperation policy to export China's development model is effective (Arežina, 2021, p. 82), and through it attacked U.S. pragmatism based on the "principle of solidarity based on interests" (Arežina, 2021, p. 82), and built China's new vision of global governance (Cheng and Liu, 2021, p. 3), guaranteeing China's position as the leader of the world of the South (Kallio, 2023, p. 232). Chinese behavior and how to interpret it from the perspective of historical memory depend on the Chinese narrative and the power of creating the emotion of spiritual bonding in the need to complete the Silk Road (Edeh and Han, 2023, p. 9).

This explains the US behavior in the administration of US President Donald Trump to reduce China's role globally by imposing taxes and sanctions on Chinese trade and investment, as well as warning his allies and friends against building partnerships with China (Garlick, 2020, p. 13).

4. the strategy of employing historical memory in the behavior of US President Donald Trump

The one who controls the past controls the future, and whoever controls the present controls the past (Orwell, 1949, p. 32), and the sincere apology may touch the human heart in a way that material compensation or the policy of power cannot touch it (Ikegami, n.d.). Collective memory is an effective political ball, as it serves as a frame of reference for the proposed policies to justify them at the public level.

It should also be noted that there is an inherent tension between the desire for a more impartial view of history based primarily on critical examination of evidence and utilitarian interpretations of events selected for political purposes. Collective memory is a tool for mobilization, and this is important in obtaining policy support to build the quality of international relations (Tóth, 2015, p. 37).

There is ample evidence that collective memory, part of which is political memory, influences international relations (Klotz and Lynch, 2007, p. 65). Although an apology was considered a face-saving means in the international arena, it was also linked to the intention and determination of the perpetrators (Weyeneth, 2001, pp. 9-38) to reconcile (Coicaud, 2009, p. 100).

There is an intellectual synthesis that feeds the memory of politicians based on an audience to build an interactive system outward (Finney, 2014, p. 451). The lessons of history teach us how Germany, Japan, and Austria dealt with their past during the Second World War and beyond to adapt their political situation to the international situation formed on their wreckage: "Instead of fading with time, the memory of World War II was a subject of revival and political pressure (Berger, 2012).

Apart from the victim-centric among politicians, they must focus on how the perpetrator confronts the ghosts of his past by remembering his wrong actions that have been lost, and holding him responsible for committing them, not as, therefore, enabling us to deal with the phrase: "I apologize" is a political phrase that reflects diplomatic tact among politicians, but rather it is an expressive practice or expression of practice that appears at the international level as a customary rule that entails practices that maintain security, and at the deepest level it is a practice that reveals The offender expresses an attitude towards his history, a position based on his "perceived" desire for a better future for his relationship with the victim, or his attempt to bury the sins of his past and his eagerness not to dig up (Amstutz, 2005, p. 7).

First of all, Michael Maros lists a set of requirements that clarify the meaning of a genuine, "sincere" apology and its criteria for what states issue towards their victims, as follows: acknowledging that a mistake has been committed; taking responsibility for it; expressing regret and remorse for the damage caused; the obligation to make reparations; pledging not to repeat the mistake. The practice of apologizing mostly concerns gross human rights violations that have not been overcome by the peoples of the victim States, or mistakes committed in the past that have not been punished (Marrus, 2007, p. 79). An apology, no matter how sincere or implicit, cannot cancel what happened, nor does it give the "wrongdoer" the possibility to undo his act, yet with vague wisdom, this is exactly what he does.

Considering the justifiable or inhibitory motives for the practice of apologizing states, as most of the practices of memory inevitably require raising the issue of political apology, is the product of wrong actions committed by perpetrators in the past, such as the Tokyo and Nuremberg courts (Tavuchis, 2002, p. 5). Because memory circles affect international

cooperation and exacerbate international conflicts, being a conflicting political memory (Gustafsson and Hall, 2021, p. 497). The collective memory of historical injustices (Dian, 2017, p. 1).

On the question of memory, and in particular collective memory, Pierre Nora distinguished between memory and history: memory is sacred, alive, evolutionary, negotiable, and emotional, while history is profane, analytical, cold, and detached from the present (Nora, 1989, pp. 2-3).

The problem of the "final contrast" between memory and history is that it distinguishes between two types of history: written history and lived history, while the first explicitly contradicts collective memory, the second tends to constitute a vital reference on which the memory of society is based from time to time to recall the events of the past (Bachleitner, 2021, p. 18).

When considering the interplay of the concepts of memory and apology, we find two main contributions, one in the field of international relations and the other in the field of foreign policy analysis. About the first contribution, the regretful States apologize to the States that have been harmed by their foreign policy, by the use of force (Lind, 2010, pp. 14-16).

Memorials and memorials such as the Warsaw Monument to the Victims of Nazism and the Memorial to the Murdered Jews in Europe – are one of the least costly symbols of apology, and even the least able to advance reconciliation (Jones, 2011, pp. 20-21).

For example, when addressing the question of identity and interests, the "I" of memory was one of the most important components of the subjects' identity, which later turns into an institutional identity or state identity through a sense of what requires the construction of a narrative, "we", shrouded in speech in the plural pronoun "common to the collective self, based on what the actors carry in the collective memory (Wendt, 1999, pp. 224-225).

The conceptual synonym between history and memory increases when "memory is sacred" and "history is profane"; memory is a living, evolutionary, and negotiating process that belongs to the past and present of certain groups, while history is a reconstruction of the past (Nora, 1989, pp. 7-24).

In an analytical style (written by the victors), history is cold and dry facts, and memory is emotional lived and present" Therefore, memory is a concept closer to the national, identity and narrative dimensions compared to history, in which the myths, glories and shocks of nations live, becoming an integral part of their political culture that is being produced, and even constantly reproduced (Langenbacher, 2010, p. 23).

But before that, it is inevitable to mention quickly one of the most important contributions that came somewhat close to the bridging combination of the study of memory and apology (Jash, 2016), in light of the narrative identity in shaping the practice of states to apologize, which allowed to reconcile of the linguistic and psychological dimensions of apology practices, which are centered on "preserving self-image", "saving face", "recovering from national shocks", "moral renewal" and "reconciliation".

The collective memory is part of the political memory (political mentality) literature of memory politics and political pragmatism, and political memory how to be a source of profit. Politics is restricted to political memory framing through the structure of the past, and many narratives indicate that politicians are provoked by the conflicts of the past, so it remains dialectical.

Excuse countries, virgin states, and mortgage to the past as an ideological identity and a national biography, The dialectic of temporal security is the perception of the behavior of the state in the form of a self-reflective struggle over memory, meaning the record of similarities between the past and the present of the state and trying to revive it, by linking memory with mental emotion and performance behavior, generates the problem of shame from separation from the "self-listed in the past", narrated identity affects the behavior of politicians by establishing the temporal continuity of the past, "and this is integrated with physical security and existential security. Israel and the United States are working on it.

As well as the problem of provoking the symbolism of the past, at the level of bilateral relations, disputes may occur along the broad conflict of issues that may be specific and concrete or more abstract and symbolic, the official memorial ceremony that was in the Chinese city of "Nanjing" on December 13, 2017, showed echoes of the Japanese massacre. The collective memory of "Japan the aggressor" is a picture in the memory of the Chinese past and a disturbance of Sino-Japanese relations.

1.6. *Iran's place in Trump's memory*

During his first term as president of the United States of America (2017-2021), he had a clear and tough stance towards Iran, due to the negative memory that the American decision-maker carries about Iran and its behavior that portrays it as aggressive, and the most important decision is to withdraw from the Iranian nuclear agreement in May 2018, signed in 2015 under President Barack Obama, and he said, "This agreement was disastrous and one of the worst deals I have ever seen... It has allowed Iran to continue enriching uranium, and has increased its aggression in the region." He reimposed and tightened sanctions on Iran in an unprecedented manner under the policy of "maximum pressure," and said: "We will continue to impose maximum economic pressure on the Iranian regime... We will never allow him to have a nuclear weapon," and the assassination of Qassem Soleimani (January 2020): Trump ordered an airstrike that killed Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani, commander of the IRGC-QF. He described Soleimani as "the number one terrorist in the world." Public discourse toward Iran: He described the Iranian regime as "the world's number one sponsor of terrorism." "We will never allow Iran to have a nuclear weapon. Never" (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Beyond the first term (2021-2024): Trump was not in power during this period, but made statements about Iran as part of his campaign to return to the White House in 2024, criticizing the Biden administration: "Biden refunded Iran. He gave her billions of dollars... On Israel's attack on Iran (or military tensions): "If I were president, Iran would not dare to approach Israel or support terrorism in this way." His election promise: "I will restore the policy of maximum pressure, and I will force Iran to sign a better deal in less than a week of taking office."

1.7. *The place of Saudi Arabia in Trump's memory*

Donald Trump maintained a very close relationship with Saudi Arabia in his first term (2017–2021), and continued to praise it and pledge to protect it during his campaign to return to the presidency (2021–2024), in his first term (2017–2021) he emphasized the strategic relationship and alliance Trump has repeatedly said: "Saudi Arabia is a very important strategic ally in the Middle East." He considered Saudi Arabia a key partner in the fight against Iran and terrorism. His first foreign visit as president to Saudi Arabia in May 2017 was: "Choosing Saudi Arabia as my first stop is a clear message... We want to build a strong strategic partnership." Economic and military deals, Trump boasted of his economic agreements with Saudi Arabia: "We made deals worth \$450 billion, including \$110 billion for weapons purchases." He further said, "These deals will create thousands of jobs for

Americans." And his position on the case of the murder of Jamal Khashoggi (2018). After Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was accused of involvement in the murder of journalist Khashoggi, Trump refused to punish Saudi Arabia, saying: "Maybe he did, maybe he didn't... But the kingdom has invested hundreds of billions in us, and America comes first." "The world is a dangerous place. We cannot abandon Saudi Arabia" (Trump, 2017).

On his way to the second term (2021-2024), criticizing Biden's policy towards Saudi Arabia, Trump accused the Biden administration of having "destroyed the relationship with Saudi Arabia," and said: "Biden neglected Saudi Arabia... During the war between Israel and Hamas (2023-2024), he said, "If I were president, Saudi Arabia would have signed a peace agreement with Israel... But Biden missed the opportunity." His stance on Saudi Arabia in the oil market and OPEC+ has repeatedly praised Saudi Arabia's role in lowering oil prices when he was in power: "I called King Salman and asked him to reduce production... During his campaign, he promised to restore strong ties to ensure the stability of the energy market. Saudi Arabia and the normalization agreements. He stressed that if he had continued in the presidency, "Saudi Arabia would have joined the Abraham Accords within months.

1.8. *Qatar in Trump's Memory*

During his first term (2017–2021), Donald Trump's statements about Qatar sparked controversy, especially in the context of the Gulf crisis. Here are his most prominent positions: In his first term (2017–2021) / supporting the blockade on Qatar (2017) In June 2017, after the outbreak of the Gulf crisis, Trump publicly supported the blockade imposed by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt on Qatar, saying: "During my recent visit to the Middle East, I said that radical ideologies can no longer be funded. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!" he added in another tweet: "It's good to see a visit to Saudi Arabia with the King and 50 countries already paying off. They said they would take a hard line on funding extremism, and all reference was pointing to Qatar. Perhaps this will be the beginning of the end to the horror of terrorism!" (Al Jazeera, 2019).

1.9. *NATO in Trump's memory*

Trump has repeatedly criticized NATO allies for not spending enough on defense, saying: "NATO is outdated... Many countries are not paying their fair share, and this is unfair to the United States." He threatened to withdraw from the alliance if other countries did not increase their spending: "If they don't pay, we're not going to protect them. It's that simple."

February 2024: "If NATO countries do not pay what they owe, I will not protect them. I will encourage Russia to do what it wants with it!" (A statement that caused an international uproar.) "Biden is ready for a world war for an alliance that pays us nothing." He vowed that in his second term, "I will renegotiate the structure of NATO or get out of it."

5.5. *The memory of Trump and African heads of state*

He carries a negative memory about Africa and its countries in his first term (2017-2021) / he has a statement describing "dirty countries in January 2018, the most famous and controversial statements related to Africa. In a closed-door meeting at the White House, Trump reportedly said, "Why do all these people come to us from scum countries, and he was referring to countries like: Haiti, Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia, and other African countries (BBC, 2018). In Nigeria and sub-Saharan Africa, Trump said that "all Nigerians will stay in America if they get a visa," hinting that he did not want to take in immigrants from Africa. He described some African governments as "corrupt and incompetent."

In the second term (2021–2024), in the election speech, Relative disregard for Africa Trump has not focused much on Africa in his election campaign; there are no clear positions towards certain heads of state, but he continues to attack immigration from African countries. Demand that "immigrants come only from developed countries." Corona and China in Africa: In separate statements, he accused China of "exploiting Africa economically," but expressed no clear desire to compete with this influence. He once said, "China buys Africa, and we're just looking."

5.6. *Gaza and the two-state solution*

During his first term (2017-2021), former US President Donald Trump did not issue specific public statements regarding the population of the Gaza Strip. But in February 2025, during his campaign to return to the presidency, he announced a controversial plan that included the deportation of Gazans to neighboring countries, which sparked widespread regional and international reactions (France 24, 2025).

Trump's plan to repatriate Gazans: In February 2025, Trump stated that he intended to "take over the Gaza Strip," noting the possibility of sending U.S. troops if necessary. He said he planned to force all of Gaza's roughly two million residents to leave the Strip and turn it into a "Middle East Riviera." He noted that the measure could be "temporary or long-term" and said he would prefer countries such as Egypt and Jordan to receive these populations, despite their refusal the categorize this idea.

In press statements, Trump said: "I don't think people should go back to Gaza. It was a bad place for them. They live as if they are in hell," he said, adding that he would prefer that Palestinians be moved to "new lands" where they can live in peace, noting that Gaza has become a "devastated site."

5.7. *Trump's memory of Iraq*

A comprehensive analysis of Trump's positions and statements towards Iraq during his first term (2017-2021), and what he later expressed on his way to the second term (2024-2021). In the first term (2017–2021): War in Iraq: Trump harshly criticized the invasion of Iraq in 2003, even before he took office, repeating this repeatedly: "Invasion of Iraq was the worst decision in American history... "We spent trillions there, we lost thousands of lives, and in the end, what did we get? Nothing." On the US military presence in Iraq, he expressed reluctance to withdraw US forces completely: "We have troops there, and we will keep them to protect our interests and monitor Iran." He stated in 2019: "We keep troops in Iraq to monitor Iran... This is very important." The statement angered the Iraqi government at the time, which refused to use Iraq to attack or monitor its neighbors. His stance on the Iraqi government: He did not attack the Iraqi prime minister by name, but described the Iraqi political system as "corrupt and ineffective." He tried to reduce financial aid to Iraq under the pretext that it did not lead to tangible results. Iranian Major General Qassem Soleimani and Popular Mobilization Forces commander Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis were assassinated in January 2020, and Trump ordered the assassination of Iranian Quds Force commander Qassem Soleimani through a drone strike at Baghdad airport. He described the operation as: "a defensive strike to prevent a war, not to start a war" (YouTube, 2023). Following that, an arrest warrant was issued for him by the Supreme Judicial Council / Court of Excellence in Rosana / Baghdad by Article 406 of the Iraqi Penal Code (premeditated murder and surveillance) in January 2021 on his way to a second term (2024–2021): His campaign speech: He didn't focus much on Iraq, but referred to it as part of the "endless wars" he wants to end. "We must stop fighting for people who don't love us... We spent trillions in Iraq and Afghanistan, and that was strategically stupid."

5.8. *Trump's memory of Afghanistan*

A comprehensive analysis of Trump's statements and positions during his first term (2017–2021), and his vision on his way to the second term (2021–2025). In his first term (2017–2021), he criticized the war in Afghanistan and considered that the stay of US troops in Afghanistan was a "big mistake": "We should have left Afghanistan years ago... It's an endless war." He has repeatedly said that, "The United States is spending billions on a country that doesn't even want to fight for itself" (CNN, 2017). And the withdrawal agreement with the Taliban: In February 2020, the Trump administration signed the Doha agreement with the Taliban, and one of its most important decisions was to withdraw all US troops by May 2021. The Taliban's commitment is not to attack U.S. forces and not to support terrorist groups. "We are bringing our soldiers home... We don't want to be the cops of the world."

In one speech, he said, "We could have completely crushed the Taliban, but that means we would be there for another twenty years."

On his way to the second term (2021–2025): Criticizing the way Biden withdrew even though he signed the withdrawal agreement, he stated, "I could have withdrawn in an orderly manner, with dignity and prestige... Biden turned the withdrawal into a disaster" (The Diplomat, 2024). "We left billions of dollars in equipment, and Biden killed our soldiers." Taliban: He said the Taliban "don't respect Biden," but they "respected him," adding, "If I were president, the Taliban wouldn't have dared to enter Kabul." He sometimes described Taliban leaders as "smart but savages" and asserted that he would have imposed harsher conditions on them.

On his Inauguration Day, January 20, Trump signed a record 26 presidential decrees (Holland & Knight, 2025). The first day's decisions charted the course of his policy, withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization and pardoning the rioters who stormed the Capitol in early 2021. Among other decisions that marked Trump's tenure was his announcement of the U.S. withdrawal from the Paris climate agreement.

The US president has also approved massive cuts to the foreign aid budget, ostensibly to combat waste and programs that promote diversity, equality, and inclusion. He also implemented a policy of deporting irregular migrants from the United States, sending some of them to a maximum-security prison in El Salvador, and waging war against Mexican drug cartels that he described as foreign terrorist organizations.

Elon Musk, the world's richest man, joined the Trump government, where the president entrusted him with overseeing a new body tasked with reducing federal costs and reducing the size of the government sector. But 100 days later, Musk left the White House and a dispute broke out with him to reflect a real US internal crisis, and the Trump administration entered into a dispute with some major universities such as Harvard University, accusing it of tolerating "anti-Semitism" for allowing demonstrations on campuses, criticizing Israel over the Gaza war. Federal support for some of these universities has been reduced. Trump said that "Harvard is just a farce that teaches hate and stupidity and should no longer receive federal funding."

Trump considered that the reason for the creation of the European Union was to "exploit" the United States. He has repeatedly attacked the Europeans with the phrase, accusing them of being "opportunists". But Europe was not alone in the crosshairs of his criticism, with Trump also saying Chinese President Xi Jinping's visit to Vietnam was aimed at "harming" the United States.

Trump has repeatedly declared his desire to make Canada "the fifty-first U.S. state," describing the border with the northern neighbor of the United States as an "artificial line." The US president did not stop there, but also said "we need" Greenland and "we will recover" the Panama Canal.

Conclusion:

The end US President Donald Trump carries a memory of the form of his political doctrine and drawing his foreign policies on it, as he is in the stages of the first before the presidency (January 20, 2017), which looked at science from the perspective of a highly profitable businessman, and then the first stage of the mandate (January 20, 2017 - January 20, 2021) and the stage of Joe Biden's crisis, which was subjected to political pressure on me that reached urban and governance, punctuated by a sharp criticism of Joe Biden's policy, describing him as wasting his efforts in the first term (January 20, 2021 - January 20, 2024) and from Then the second term (January 20, 2025).

Overall, the study has arrived at the following conclusions:

- 1 A negative memory of Iran's politicians has made U.S.-Iranian relations tense in the first and second terms.
- 2 A positive memory of Saudi politicians in both eras, he visited Saudi Arabia and invested billions of dollars, a strategically important country for the United States.
- 3 Trump's memory of Qatar's politicians differed between the two eras, the first describing Qatar as a maker of radicalism and imposing sanctions on it for not supporting and investing, and on the one hand making it the headquarters of US-Taliban spending in Afghanistan, and in the second era, Qatar's politicians increased acceptable after support and high investment with the United States of America.
- 4 The Gulf countries, the UAE, Kuwait, and Oman, described them as important and wonderful.
- 5 He described Yemen as containing the Houthi terrorists who must be turned into hell because they are exposed to American interests.
- 6 He described Iraq as a country that the US estimates made mistakes in dealing with and occupying it, and that its existing politicians are not qualified, and the situation worsened after the killing of Qassem Soleimani and Abu Mahdi Al-Mahdi, and the second era of the mandate in 2025, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the Iraqi policy, which did not succeed in changing Iraq for the better.
- 7 He described China as a country whose ambition towards universality must be defined and customs duties imposed.
- 8 He described Russia as a strong country with a wonderful president, and the Russian-Ukrainian war must be stopped and he pressured Ukrainian President Zelensky to stop the war.
- 9 The historical experiences of memory in building international relations, including the experience of Germany, Turkey, Japan, and the countries that lost the war in World War I and II, have affected international relations for long periods.
- 10 The United States of America did not compensate any country despite the recognition of the Donald Trump administration that they are unjust wars such as the war on Iraq, in which he tempted the absence of a nuclear weapon and the existence of the former political regime to terrorism, and after 2003 did not compensate for the losses and

destruction caused to Iraq as a result of the scorched earth system that his forces followed in the face of the Iraqi resistance against the US occupying forces.

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