

The Arab State and Military Society

الدولة العربية وعسكرة المجتمع

Issam Iyrot*

Nablus University for Vocational and Technical Education Palestine

iiyrot@gmail.com

The date of Submission: 18/11/2022

The date of revision: 18/02/2023

The date of acceptance: 19/02/2023

Abstract:

The study aimed to examine a problem centered on the structural challenges that the Arab countries suffer from by tracking the structural problems that resulted in a group of structural crises that led to the formation of countries of different natures.

It is clear that a group of intertwined internal and external factors led to the emergence of abnormal forms of Arab states, which led to more fragmentation until the Arab community began to suffer from the multiplicity of national currents, which led to its association with global powers. and international powers. It facilitated the interference of external powers in its affairs.

The Arab countries were unable to create authentic sources of legitimacy and relied on charisma and populist rhetoric, and effective political participation was absent from the political environment, which led to the growth of the phenomenon of tyranny and the consolidation of authoritarianism, and the security nature prevailed over the administration.

Keywords: military, behavior, Arab country, Hybrid State, Failed State.

الملخص:

يبحث موضوع الدراسة في إشكالية تتمحور حول التحديات البنيوية التي تُعاني منها الدول العربية وذلك من خلال تتبع الإشكالات البنيوية والتي أفرزت مجموعة من الأزمات البنائية والتي أدت إلى تكون الدول ذات الطوائف المختلفة، ويهدف الوصول إلى أهداف الدراسة تم استخدام المنهج التحليلي حيث تم توظيفه في محاولة تحليل علي لهذه المشكلات وجذورها وانعكاساتها عبر خمسة مطالب.

تبين لنا في متن البحث أن مجموعة من العوامل الداخلية والخارجية المتداخلة أدت إلى ظهور أشكال غير طبيعية من الدول في العالم العربي مما جره إلى المزيد من التجزئة فأصبح المجتمع العربي يعاني من تعدد التيارات القومية مما أدى إلى ارتباطه بقوى عالمية وسهل تدخل القوى الخارجية بشؤونه، كما لم تستطع الدول العربية خلق مصادر أصيلة للشرعية واستندت إلى الكاريزما والخطابات الشعبوية، كما غابت المشاركة السياسية الفاعلة عن البيئة السياسية مما أدى إلى تنامي ظاهرة الاستبداد وتكريس السلطوية، وغلب الطابع الأمني على إدارة الدول العربية. الكلمات المفتاحية: العسكر، السلوك، الدولة العربية، الدولة الهجينة، الدولة الفاشلة.

* Corresponding Author.

Introduction:

The role of the military in the Arab republics goes beyond the structural and functional role of the military institution, whether in hegemony and control or re-engineering the societal culture towards militarism. This reality has shifted the attention of the army and the military establishment to control the public space, whether in the political, economic, or media fields, given that security institutions organize and influence the collective organizational behavior in the Arab world.⁽¹⁾

In addition, the military institutions in the Arab republics enjoy great financial privileges, which make them able to employ and empower their members and affiliates in a way that distinguishes them from the rest of the community, whether in their functional, health or educational care. This leads to a shift in society's view of the military, and society becomes feeling a sense of ambition, entering into the future and enhancing confidence. Therefore, we find that the general culture in the Arab world, especially if it is combined with other factors such as the centralization of the leader and the paternalism of the relationship, makes the society able to migrate towards the militaristic culture and accept its prevalence in society⁽²⁾.

This led to the term “military” spread in Arab societal culture.

Therefore, this study gains its importance in being an attempt to examine the factors which led to the production of abnormal states in the Arab region through secretions that formed new types of conditions such as the (barrack) state, the (police) state, the (Neopatrimonial) state, the (hybrid) state, and the rentier state, which led to the creation of the failed state. This will be dealt with each type of these countries separately in the following five paragraphs

Problem statement:

Over the past decades, Arab countries have been suffering from the crisis of building a modern national state. It is a structural crisis with historical roots that extend back to the colonial era, which escalated in the post-independence phase as a result of the failure of the ruling elites in many cases to build an effective and legitimate state-nation which can carry out its main functions effectively and efficiently and accommodate societal pluralism (religious, ethnic, sectarian, and tribal) within the framework of a comprehensive national identity embodied by the state.

With the development of the state, the elements of this crisis have also developed instead of overcoming it and created many crises that the Arab countries have suffered from, the most important of which is the crisis of emergence that is accompanied by the absence of political and societal awareness regarding state-building. In addition, the problems of emergence have direct repercussions on important issues such as identity and citizenship. The second level of crises is what emerged in the post-state stage, including the institutional building of the state (social contract, separation of powers, rule of law, economic development) and its reliance on repression in addressing its shortcomings through the use of the army and security services. The state in the Arab world is facing a crisis in itself and its performance and actions.

⁽¹⁾Florence Gaub, *Arabe Armies: Agents Of Change Before And After 2011*, EU Institutuy Studies, Lissone, p.29

⁽²⁾Shams al-Ayari, *The Military Institution's Privileges A Red Line Before Any Political Force in Egypt*, DW Arabia, 2011, see the website :<https://bit.ly/2YyJPC>



Despite the diversity and multiplicity of the challenges and requirements facing countries, the structural challenges are at the forefront because they form the basis for creating the rest of the challenges. Therefore, standing on these challenges and analyzing them is important for understanding them and their roots, which works to try to confront and solve them.

Accordingly, this study attempts to determine the forms of the Arab state and its repercussions on the future of the national state.

To answer the main question that forms the heart of the research problem, the following question is presented :**What are the forms of the Arab countries that emerged as a result of the structural challenges they suffered?**

The barracks state:

The role that the army plays in some Arab countries has shifted from building a modern institution that produces the national identity to a modern institution that perpetuates and consolidates traditional sectarian and tribal structures and transforms them into the ruling and the ruled classes. The army in some Arab countries has returned to power as a result of the inability of civil forces and state institutions to formulate rules that govern the relationship between them and define the principles of democracy and their strong desires to preserve and maximize their privileges and to rule the country directly¹.

In this context, Harold Lasswell referred to the possibility of resorting to the militarization of the state and society for a security elite to gain power and control the decision-making process, due to the weakness of the political system as a result of long, continuous wars or a state of constant readiness for war. These ideas of Lasswell came after The militarization of Japan, and the conflict with China, and then moved on to applying them to the fascist and Nazi regimes in the Second World War, as well as the communist regime, and all of these experiences closely approached the complex of the barracks state, a country in which the army and police (violence specialists) pursue a comprehensive mobilization process in the service of the battle against the enemy so that freedoms are restricted and all institutions of scientific, media, educational and other authority are directed to the service of the war effort and military force, as well as certain read concepts such as: (discipline, sharing information, blind obedience, imposing work by force and subjugating individuals). It is worth noting that democratic countries and socialist countries can be subjected to the militarization of society, according to Lasswell., so states become barracks because the concept of the barracks is a theoretical compound that is not fully realized, but it can be approached even though the prevailing system in the barracks state contradicts the values of democracy and socialism².

That the barracks state is not a military dictatorship but rather developed through violent specialists and their actual dominance over decision-making, policies, and principles that raise the status and value of the military without direct control, but the army becomes in it the main crucible in which everything related to the interests of the nation appears, and in this, the state absorbs the military men from the political parties after they finish their military services, as the vast majority of the economic and political leaders are from the sons and men of the army. In our contemporary world, we see that the country that came close to the model of the

⁽¹⁾ Azmi Bishara, YouTube, 10/2/2016, The Military and Politics Conference in the Stage of Democratic Transition in the Arab World in Doha, video file, see website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O5E1IQ67C9k&t=208>

⁽²⁾ Harold D. Lasswell, essay on the garrison state, USA, Routledge; 1st edition, 1997, P 96.



barracks state is the Israeli state. Horey Vitt's classified Israel as one of the strongest democracies in the Middle East, but at the same time, it is called the barracks state¹.

while developed democratic and socialist countries are not excluded from the possibility of militarizing society, the danger in countries with fragile structures is doubled. This appears in the weakness of some institutions and the inability of society to create its unity through the dialectical interaction between the institutions of one state, which leads to the imposition of order on the society from the outside. Besides, the state is embodied by the army not only because it is a military institution, but also because it is the strongest national institution.²

Furthermore, what helps the army to gain additional strength is the weakness of modern political institutions, such as parties, parliaments, and civil society forces, while the army is trying to gain more power to fill the void of legitimacy and maintain the cohesion of society and huge budgets, despite not achieving great victories and successes. On the other hand, the army is subject to the civilian government in countries that have achieved great victories, such as Germany, Britain, and other countries³.

In the era of the emergence of modernization theories, we found Western politics and its theorists supporting the military's control of power in third-world countries as new modernizing forces that can be bet on. They attributed to them a historical renaissance role in terms of presenting the values of integrity, diligence, and national loyalty in the early stages of building the national state. Such military officers played a major role in the renaissance and modernization in Brazil and Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century to serve the West. For this reason, Huntington called them (Western European Protestants) as these officers played a modernizing role represented in a process of social and economic reform and a process of national integration in addition to expanding political participation, not on a democratic basis, but through political mobilization processes for the public. This was what happened at the beginning of the officer's rule in Egypt, Iraq, Algeria, and Syria⁴.

However, as Huntington imagines, politics and the military have never been completely separated. The matter ranged between civilizing military life and introducing the values of citizenship to the military and the army, based on the concepts of struggle and the rule of law and legislation, and between introducing the military into civilian life through the police state and the use of technology in control and oversight through national values that raise the status of the military and equate it with patriotism, especially in times of crises. The effect has become in two directions: the first is that the military has become more of a citizen, and the second is that the citizen is greatly influenced by the army and its values. It is worth noting that non-democratic countries and a large number of democratic countries maintained the army's loyalty to the political regimes, and the army continued to take orders from these regimes while being generally subject to the law, despite maintaining its police and courts. In

(1) Azmi Bishara, previous reference, pp. 48-49.

(2) my determination good tidings The Army and Politics: Theoretical Problems and Arab Models, The Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 2017, see the website: <https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/BooksAndJournals/Pages/artDFE25642.aspx>

(3) Edward Shils, the military In the political development of the new States Cambridge University 2009, p 8-9.

(4) Samuel P. Huntington, political order in changing societies, new haven: Yale University, 47 press, 1996, p 203.



non-democratic countries, its budget remains unknown and is not subject to any oversight as it is in some Arab countries. Such a budget is called the (black box)¹.

With technological progress, the development of communication technology and control, and the emergence of the term terrorism, the security character has prevailed over states, and societies have become more vulnerable to state control, with the growing security power of the state and the increase in the participation of security experts in the decision-making process in the state, who have been absorbed by the state after they retired from the military. For researchers, consultants, government officials, and elected politicians, the main challenges for the civil society forces were to devise mechanisms to defend human rights and protect the privacy of individuals and thus mitigate the power of the state. There are some monarchies in Arab countries². As for Morocco had a different policy from the other Arab countries in the wake of the Arab Spring. It turned the popular rush into a driving force toward political modernization and democratic transformation. At the initiative of the King of the country (Mohammed VI), the Moroccan people adopted a new constitution that allowed Moroccans to run for free democratic elections that produced the 2012 parliament issued by the Justice and Development Party with an Islamic reference. Then the experiment, devoted to this basis, was held in subsequent regional and municipal elections, and later in parliamentary elections. More recently, in the year 2021, legislative elections were held that brought the party National Rally of Independents. The AKP singled out Islamic reference, and Morocco also had a positive role in supporting other experiences of the Arab Spring to succeed and overcome obstacles to the transition. Moroccan diplomacy adopted support for peaceful paths and solutions to overcome the crises that afflicted the Arab world, as happened in the Libyan crisis

The police state:

The police state tightens control over the societal trends of strong security and intelligence services, granting them huge budgets and keen to train them at the highest level. This was evident in the Arab Republic of Egypt. Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956 AD - 1970 AD) transformed the Egyptian state into a police state. He began to exclude political and military opponents and impose his vision and policies by force. He controlled the joints of the state, controlled the religious, political, and economic trends of society, weakened civil society, and extended its control through the army over public projects and the vital factories and institutions in the country, and thus possessed great economic power, the result of which the society turned into classes, and the dominant class remained the class of the influential, the military, and the owners of capital. This resulted in extremism among citizens, especially young people who were stranded, so they refused to marry and sought to emigrate. Individuals were also affected psychologically due to media and social mobilization, economic pressures, and religious concepts directed at the media. The voice of the state and the man of the economy existed to support it, and religion used it to serve its ends³.

There are many forms of the police state. It may work for the benefit of the police state system or serve the ruling party. It is under the control of the ruling elites from families and

(1) Azmi Bishara, previous reference, p. 48.

(2) Azmi Bishara, previous reference, pp. 47-52.

(3) Sohaib Al-Zubaidi, The Impact of the Police State on Society, Al Jazeera Net, 2018, see the website: <https://bit.ly/3v0aXpB>



tribes, or it is based on nationalist ideas such as the regime of Gamal Abdel Nasser. It can carry religious ideas and premises using religion as a tool to impose control and confiscate freedoms, claiming in this case that it derives its legitimacy from God. One of the clearest examples of these countries is Iran, especially after the Iranian Islamic Revolution of 1979 AD and the control of the Wali al-Faqih regime over power, which used the repressive police regime to control society and suppress its opponents. The countries implementing the death penalty, especially for minorities represented by Arabs, Kurds, and Ahwazis, led society to distance itself from religion and alienate it and to extremism in its concepts¹.

The state patrimonial-neo⁽²⁾ (Patrimonialism) in the Arab world in the sectarian logic:

The (neo-patrimonial) state is characterized by the concentration of power in the hands of the president, who looks after the independence of state agencies while maintaining a group of loyalists who support his rule. This state is also characterized by the lack of separation between the private and public spheres in the bureaucratic and military apparatus, and positions are distributed as rewards. Based on interest needs and even during the process of rotating elites within the joints of the state, the president is careful not to form or develop an alternative rule of thumb through some dissidents. Neopatrimonialism also strikingly intersects with corruption, so the political environment is conducive to the growth and development of corruption, as happening in traditional societies where a group of individuals are often above the law, competing for positions that enable them to control state resources where a weak legal environment encourages illegal behavior³.

Access to the institution of the state in the state model (neopatrimonialism) depends largely on ethnic and sectarian identity, where rewards and wealth are distributed usually permanently throughout the system. As for those who are excluded by the system, their exclusion is continuous. The sectarian logic of the state (neopatrimonialism) is on the opposite side of the modern state⁴.

As for the military state, it has built its model based on strong centralization, economic planning, and cultural and ideological guidance. This model has taken over civil society and emptied it of its content. Life will not be written for any institution outside the political community, where the Arab model of governance that the military state built in the Arab world intersects with the Soviet model, but there is a difference between them, which is that the Soviet model revolves around a party that has a state and an army. As for the Arab model, the army is reduced to the personality of the leader who has a state. In this model, mass mobilization is carried out through conferences, rallies, and propaganda campaigns, to support the decisions and directions of the regime and not as a means to enhance political

⁽¹⁾ see The Impact of the Police State on Society *ibid*.

⁽²⁾ It is called in English: patrimonialism) is a form of government in which all forms of power flow through the ruler. These regimes are often autocratic oligarchic, Max Weber defines patrimonialism as a form of traditional domination, beginning with family structures and particularly from the authority of the fathers. and system of hereditary monarchy and similar forms of government, a reflection of patriarchy over a wider range of social relations, and thus patrimonialism, mean treating the state as a natural extension of the family.

⁽³⁾ Ashraf Othman, The Sectarian Issue and Minority Industry in the Greater Arab Mashreq: The Neopatrimonial State in the Arab Mashreq in Sectarian Logic and the Reproduction of Sectarianism, *Omran Journal of Social Sciences*, Vol. 3, No. 11, 2015, pg. 49.

⁽⁴⁾ YouTube, Conference on Sectarianism and Minority Industry, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies 4-1-2015, video file, see the website: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dloQha-MTCY>



participation. Thus, the system works to thwart any competition by controlling it, directing it, or spoiling it¹.

We find that there is a clear intersection between the military state and the (neo-patrimonial) style. The Arab republics are distinguished by Pal nervous. For example, the leadership of the Syrian army and the Iraqi army before 2003 AD and thereafter was a client leadership managed by an elite of officers who described themselves as a group working to modernize the state and modify the political map, but this modification and modernization were in their interest and was considered a link between an important state structure the army and the sectarian entities supporting it. Military governments facilitate the transition to the (neo-patrimonial) pattern more than any other system, and one of the elements that push the military state to this pattern is central control. We find that in the cases of Syria and Iraq where the country is managed by the military through personal systems that derive their legitimacy from the support of loyalists who receive rewards and grants. Governance remains in this category through succession while maintaining the survival of the republican system at the level of official media statements. The state is privatized so that the line between the public and the private disappears and the state apparatus becomes a hotbed of corruption and looting of wealth competition is rising between client groups to offer more loyalty in order to obtain the largest amount of gains. The regime works to monopolize the sources of power by eliminating civil society institutions such as unions, parties, and organizations and gives way to organizations that rely on the dynasty, sect, and tribe as alternative organizations. It works to abolish social interests and narrow the political space, which leads to the continuation of old fanaticism and the emergence of new ones².

The Arab country -especially republics- has developed after independence. The reason for this development was the growth of the bureaucratic apparatus, the army, the police, and the state's tendency to maximize mega projects and activate economic development programs to form within these countries' bureaucratic empires. In the year 1954 AD, the process of strengthening and re-arming the Egyptian armed forces began, and these actions continued during the Anglo-French-Israeli war on Egypt in 1956 AD. The state began to intervene directly in the productive fields that were owned by the private sector, by nationalizing foreign companies and transferring their ownership to the state, and expanding the services provided by the public sector, so it began to employ university graduates, impose its dominance on the economic sector, and work on implementing huge projects such as the construction of the High Dam and the project of the Helwan Iron and Steel Complex in 1954 AD. It also established a public agricultural sector and owned (970) thousand feddans and thus dominated this sector³.

The number of workers in the Egyptian government sector increased to 350 thousand between the years (1951 AD - 1952 AD) This number continued to rise between (1965 AD - 1966) until it reached one million, and the number of ministers doubled from (15 to 29) during the same period. The period indicates that the government employed a third of the workforce in Egypt, and the number of workers in the military sector increased from (100) to

⁽¹⁾Yazid Sayegh, Owners of the Republic: An Anatomy of the Egyptian Military Economy, Carnegie Middle East Center, Beirut, 2019, see website: https://carnegieendowment.org/files/_Ar_Sayegh_04_web.pdf

⁽²⁾Ashraf Othman, previous reference, p. 53.

⁽³⁾Ashraf Othman, previous reference, pp. 54-53.



180,000, i.e. an increase of (100) thousand between the years (1955-1956) in addition to (90) thousand in the police. Government spending on the national product also increased from (18%) to (55.7%) in 1970. The Syrian case started in the sixties in the administrative expansion due to the export of the Egyptian systems of economic and political management during the Egyptian-Syrian union. One of the direct causes of this expansion was the policies of the Baath Party, which began to establish its feet in power since 1963 AD. In 1982 there were (440) Thousand workers in the government who were not employed in the army and police, and this represented (20%) of the total workforce in Syria. In Jordan, despite the ideological differences and the difference in its ruling regime as a monarchy, the ruling family used foreign aid to strengthen the army and expand the administration, where the number of employees in the government sector in the year 1982 AD was 59 thousand, which represented (15%) of the workforce and nearly (100) thousands working in the Jordanian Armed Forces¹.

This shows us that the role of the state in the economic life of the fifties and sixties intensified and grew remarkably at the expense of the private sector and the traditional forces in society, whose role began to dwindle and lost much of its influence in economic life. The word was in the political and economic life of the government and the army, which led to the inauguration of a state of nature (Neopatrimonialism) and the latter began by establishing new client networks, accommodating new loyalists, and controlling - note that they are not necessarily oil-exporting countries - over the sources of national wealth. One of its main functions became the distribution of rewards to members of society².

The hybrid state and the patriarchal rentier state:

Hybrid political systems usually spread in countries classified by Freedom House (Freedom House) in its annual report on (Freedom in the World) as partly free countries compared to the two groups of free and non-free countries, based on a scale that shows the availability of civil rights and political freedoms for citizens. According to the 2019 report issued by Freedom House, the percentage of countries reached Free was (39%) of the total (195) countries covered by the report, while the percentage of partially free countries was (24%) and the percentage of non-free countries was (37%) which means that about (61%) of the countries of the world fall into the two categories of non-free countries and partially free. As for the Middle East, we found that the percentage of free countries amounted to (11%) and the percentage of partially free countries amounted to (22%) while the percentage of non-free countries reached (67%) and thus the percentage of non-free and partially free countries reached (89%) which indicates a deep problem of freedom and democratic transition in the Arab world³.

Hybrid systems work to form intelligence and security services to monitor all aspects of life, security, and the military. Civil society in these systems is weak and does not achieve the

⁽¹⁾Tariq Mitri and others, *Sectarian Issue and Minority Industry in the Arab World*, first edition, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Beirut, 2017, p. 87.

⁽²⁾Mahmoud Abdel-Fadil, *Social Formations and Class Formations in the Arab World: An Analytical Study of the Most Important Developments During the Period: 1945 - 1985*, Second Edition, Center for Arab Unity Studies, Beirut, 1997, p. 121.

⁽³⁾Freedom in the world 2019, Freedom House, 2019, Retrieved from: https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/ABRIDGED_FH_FITW_2019_Report_FINAL.pdf



goal of its existence, so it is not able to impose its desires on the government except in exceptional circumstances through slow and limited action, and this system allows freedom of expression. The hybrid system gives the media a free space to work, but it is under the control of the regulatory and security agencies in the state, and sometimes it is an indirect spokesperson for them. Democratic practices in an authoritarian environment are controlled by them. These countries emerged from the womb of tyranny and moved together in the international environment but did not reach the ranks of democratic countries¹.

In its continuation and the imposition of its hegemony, the hybrid system depends on power factors, including external factors such as alliance and association with international or regional powers, through which the regime obtains financial and security support whenever it needs it, and internal power factors through controlling primary resources as a source of income, or by building the army's military doctrine on a functional basis to adapt it to serve its interests. In addition, it establishes internal security agencies to ensure its control over its opponents; the regime relies on societal forces such as tribes, political and economic elites, and influential groups; the sources of power are important to win supporters and punish opponents, whether they are rough, such as the army, or soft as an economy².

Hybrid systems protect themselves through unrealistic sources of power, such as claiming the existence of an external danger that diverts attention from internal issues or preoccupies citizens with living issues, which changes their priorities, such as rising prices or the lack of basic needs such as electricity, water, or fuel, or through Highlighting internal security threats to citizens under the rule (creating the enemy and fighting it). This is what is called the strategy of distraction and invoking terror, such as sham elections and limited political participation³.

Generally, the hybrid state is a case of institutional decline at the state level. This situation is evident in the presence of four elements. The first is a military system that does not reach an institutionalized national army. The second is a central authority that does not reach a national state that encompasses the boundaries of geography and the diaspora of society. The third is a legislative system that works on a set of laws that do not reach the strength of the constitutional texts that establish the civic society and the citizenship of society. The fourth is a political and economic elite who are not builders of a modern state and are not owners of reform projects for state institutions, but they are only stakeholders, whether they are in power or opposition.

That the hybrid country centered in the Arab republics came as a result of the political and economic failure in reform and development, which is the outcome of spontaneous, unplanned revolutions that quickly turned into coups in favor of political currents that do not reach the level of civil parties Such as Syria, Iraq, and Alyaman. Libya has armies not strong and a few organizations are led by sectarian and regional militias and play a role greater than its size and have more weapons than the army. It may make progress in a geographical point at the expense of another, but according to the determinants of the sect, not the homeland⁴.

⁽¹⁾Laurel E. Miller, Jeffrey Martini, op. cit, 2013, p 15-22.

⁽²⁾Khaled Tawazi, Hybrid Political Systems: The Paradox of Transformation and Adaptation - Reading in the Algerian Case, p. 7-9, see the website: <https://www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/article/63202>


⁽³⁾Ekman J, Political Participation and Regime Stability: A Framework for Analyzing Hybrid Regimes, International Political Science Review, vol. 30, no. 1 ,2009, p 7 -31.

⁽⁴⁾Amin bin Masoud, previous reference, 2015.



The hybrid state is closer to corruption than democratic states, so we note that some Arab countries have low ratings to some extent in terms of perceptions of corruption as the following table shows:

Ranking of Arab countries according to the Corruption Perceptions Index



Schedule 1

Global Rank	The state	Degree	Global Rank	The state	Degree
99	Bahrain	36	23	The United Arab Emirates	70
105	Algeria	35	33	Qatar	62
105	Egypt	35	53	Amman	52
138	Lebanon	28	58	Saudi Arabia	49
168	Iraq	18	58	Jordan	49
170	Libya	17	73	Morocco	43
176	Alyaman	14	73	Tunisia	43
178	Syria	13	78	Kuwait	41

Source: organization Transparency International (Global Coalition Against Corruption) Corruption Perception Index 2018, p10.

Perceptions level of corruption in the public sector at the level of 180 countries/ provinces in the world:

When talking about the rentier state, it must be taken into account that each state has its peculiarities in terms of its geographical and demographic composition, natural resources, and social composition, which includes ethnicities, clans, and tribes. Rentier states are dependent on oil, semi-rentier states are dependent on foreign aid, and rentier states as defined by

(Hussein Mahdavi) are: "Countries that depend for a major part of their revenues on oil and other natural resources."¹

In the same context, the two thinkers (Hazem El-Beblawy and Giacomo Luciani) tried to study the impact of the large and sudden rent that occurred in some Arab oil states in the seventies of the last century, where they linked the concept of rent to economic, political and social effects, and concluded that the transformation of the state into a rentier state occurs when the rentier income reaches no less than (40%) of the state's income, and also indicated that the rentier state imposes its legitimacy through direct spending on individuals, projects and public services, and not through their performance. Accordingly, it is not possible to draw lines between the state, the ruling regime, and the president, so the picture becomes blurry, and the relationship of the ruler with the ruled becomes a paternal relationship, as he is the one who spends on citizens who are politically loyal to him. Because this state is not productive, it is easy for them to enter into long-term conflicts and disputes and recruit more citizens and plunge them into wars and conflicts. The best example of this is the Iran-Iraq war².

In this sense, the state turns from a productive state (Productive) to an allocative state, thus marginalizing the legislative authority, civil society, and supervisory authorities, so creativity disappears and competition is absent. The main goal of the citizen becomes to obtain one of the allocation channels, which is in the form of government jobs, grants, or bids for the private sector, which works to develop the relationship of clientelism with the political elites in the state to obtain a greater share of the rent. As a result, individuals who obtained a satisfactory share of this rent on a tribal, sectarian, and ethnic basis feel satisfied and remain loyal to the regime. As for the marginalized individuals, in light of the obstruction of the political horizon and the suppression of freedoms, they feel social injustice. They tend to be extremist and violent. As for professional and labor unions and civil institutions, although they practice democracy in terms of elections and the peaceful transfer of power, they are linked to the rentier state through its leaders and beneficiaries, and thus they also become part of this rentier system, which leads to the values of corruption becoming more acceptable in society. Where laws are enacted in a broad and generalized way to protect these trends and not confront them, in contrast, the producing countries try to occupy their people with production, not with conflicts and wars³.

There is a clear relationship between the nature of the state and the extent of corruption in stocking healthy democracy in a country that requires the elimination of corruption. As we note in the following chart, democratic countries got a distinguished rating in corruption perceptions (79) points, while authoritarian, hybrid, and flawed democratic countries got a bad rating with degrees of corruption that ranged between (30-49) points. In this context, Delia Ferreira Rubio, President of Transparency International, said: "Our research has found a clear relationship between the establishment of a healthy democracy and success in combating corruption in the public sector. Populist and anti-democratic politicians prey on these

⁽¹⁾Hussein Mahdavi, The Patterns and Problems of Economic Development in Rentier States: The Case of Iran, Paper Presented at: MA Cook (ed.), Studies in the Economic History of the Middle East: From the Rise of Islam to the Present Day (London, New York: Oxford UP, 1970).

⁽²⁾Giacomo Luciani, Allocation vs. Production State: A Theoretical Framework, in: Giacomo Luciani (ed.), The Arab State (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990)


⁽³⁾See A Theoretical Framework, ibid.



institutions and use them to their advantage, which we have seen in many countries.”¹ The following chart shows the relationship between the nature of the system and the level of corruption in the country.

Corruption Perceptions Index for Political Systems in the World:

Diagram 1



Source: Transparency organization International (Global Coalition Against Corruption) Corruption Perception Index 2018, p5.

The failed state:

In some systems, the politicians, the ruling class, parties, and members of the government work to exploit their positions by directing legislation, policies, and decisions to achieve special interests, so that they control decision-making centers while trying to control the parliamentary majority, some judges, public oversight bodies and the media, and thus extending their control over the state's executive, judicial and legislative institutions. The ruling class work to build a strong security sector whose goal is to protect and defend the political system, and they use the arbitrary power of the powers granted to them to serve their purposes and tighten control over political and economic decision-making positions without any legal or popular accountability, taking advantage of the weakness of parliaments and the

⁽¹⁾Transparency International (Global Coalition Against Corruption) Corruption Perceptions Index 2018, p. 6, see website: www.transparency.org/cpi


immunities granted to them. That is an authoritarian regime that does not believe in the separation of powers, even if it exercises some semblance of formal democracy¹.

Political corruption negatively affects the political, economic, and social levels and leads to a decline in the political participation of the masses, which negatively affects the concept of citizenship and marginalizes the role of the middle class in favor of the ruling class from parties and the military. As a result, this class controls all aspects of life, weakening the legitimacy of the system, fragmentating the foundations of democracy and good governance, and absenting accountability. As corruption increases, poverty and marginalization of middle groups fuel extremism and cause a low level of services to citizens².

The following chart shows the extent of corruption in the Arab world from the point of view of Arab citizens.

Corruption in the Arab world:

Diagram 2



⁽¹⁾For farther information please refer to: Anthony H. Cordesman, The Greater Middle East: From the Arab Spring to the "Axis of Failed States, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 2020.

⁽²⁾Anthony H. op. cit, 2020.

Source: Attitudes of Arab public opinion towards state institutions, Arab Politics Magazine, Public Opinion Survey Unit: The Arab Index, Issue 6, January-January 2014, p. 157.

If we look at the mechanism used to take power in most Arabic Republics, we find it mostly not done lydemocratically. That gives the regime a sound legitimacy to rely on the one-party system that derives legitimacy from tribe, or political ideology or alliance with military and security elites. This extends the life of these systems, and this is what we notice in most elites of the republics of The Arab state, who work to control state institutions, dominate decision-making centers and the media, reinforce the phenomenon of clientelism and nepotism based on family, tribe, and sect, and create governmental civil society institutions, so corruption becomes not linked to a specific person, but an entire segment such as the party, sect or tribe. As a result, accountability is disrupted due to the weakness of the legislative and judicial authorities and the weakness of civil society. Consequently, their people are not given the opportunity for political participation, but rather they are preoccupied with the search for a livelihood¹.

In his book (Modernizing Arab Tyranny) Stephen Heydemann puts five factors that the Arab authorities used to try to transform into democratic political systems, and those were: carrying out constitutional amendments that allow for partisan and electoral pluralism, giving a limited role to civil society, introducing limited economic reforms on the path of a free economy, and granting a greater role to women. With all these partial changes, there was a great desire to transform these authoritarian regimes into family regimes by ensuring political inheritance by introducing constitutional amendments that would allow children to inherit power by installing them in important political positions and granting them more executive powers which allow them to take over power after the death of their fathers².

Conclusions:

We conclude from the course of the research that there is a set of overlapping problems that some Arab countries, especially the Arab republics, have suffered from in one way or another to this day. Despite the changes and events that have occurred in the Arab state, all of these problems lead to the emergence of the barracks state, the police state, the neo-patrimonial state, the hybrid state, and the failed state.

Some countries still suffer from problems with the concept of the nation and the people, and the dialectic of religion and the state still poses a problem on two levels. First, in the administration of most Arab countries, there is confusion between the religious institution and the political authority and the emerging relationship between them in the administration of the state, especially in the Arab Mashreq countries. Second, there are many thinkers in the Arab world and political parties who still rely on the theory of unity on Islamic grounds.

As for other problems of different natures at the level of Arab countries in our contemporary world, some of these are related to the problems of upbringing and formation. The others can be divided into several problems and challenges: problems related to the developmental function of the state, problems related to building a state of citizenship, and problems related to the external relations of the state.

⁽¹⁾The Devolution of Power in the Arab World, Al Jazeera Net, 2004, see the website: <https://bit.ly/3lso0Nj>

⁽²⁾Radwan Ziadeh, The Arab Spring's Failure in the Democratic Transition, Al-Souria Net, 2018, see the website: <https://bit.ly/3FvkGJb>



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