

The Pragmatic Context between Deconstruction Strategy and Speech Act Theory

السياق التداولي بين إستراتيجية التفكيك ونظرية أفعال الكلام

Dr Bensqkhri Zoubeyr

Abdelhafid Boussouf University Centre-Mila, (Algeria)

Zoubeyr.Bensqkhri@centre-univ-mila.dz

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• Abstract:

With an emphasis on the idea of intentionality, this article examines the relationship between John Austin's Speech Act Theory (SAT) and Jacques Derrida's deconstruction theory of language and literature. It explores how both thinkers address the issues of context, meaning, and the speaker's or author's function. Derrida questions the idea of a stable, intended meaning, emphasizing the intrinsic instability of language and the iterability of signs, whereas Austin attempts to classify speech acts according to contextual appropriateness and traditional norms. The article investigates how each of them views meaning, performativity, and the constraints of context. It argues that Derrida's deconstructive interpretation of Austin highlights the importance of absence, supplementarity, and the "grafting" of meaning in the creation of discourse, exposing the aporias in SAT.

Keywords:

Pragmatic, Intentionality, Context, Deconstruction, misreading, supplementarity.

المخلص:

يركّز هذا المقال على فكرة القصدية من خلال دراسة العلاقة بين نظرية أفعال الكلام لجون أوستن (Speech Act Theory - SAT) ونظرية التفكيك اللغوي والأدبي لجاك دريدا. ويستكشف الكيفية التي يعالج بها كلٌّ من المفكرين قضايا السياق والمعنى ووظيفة المتكلم أو المؤلف. يشكّك دريدا في فكرة المعنى الثابت المقصود، مؤكداً على عدم استقرار اللغة في جوهرها وقابلية العلامات للتكرار، في حين يسعى أوستن إلى تصنيف أفعال الكلام وفقاً لملاءمتها السياقية والمعايير التقليدية. يتناول المقال رؤية كل منهما للمعنى والأداءية (performativity) وحدود السياق، ويجادل بأن القراءة التفكيكية لدريدا لأوستن تبرز أهمية الغياب، والإضافية (supplementarity)، وعمليات "التطعيم" في إنتاج المعنى داخل الخطاب، مما يكشف عن المفارقات الكامنة في نظرية أفعال الكلام.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التداولية، القصدية، السياق، التفكيك، سوء القراءة، الإضافية.

1-Introduction:

The confluence of deconstruction and speech act theory offers a rich terrain for investigating the pragmatic dimensions of language. Rooted in the philosophical inquiries of Jacques Derrida and the linguistic frameworks of J.L. Austin and John Searle, both deconstruction and speech act theory engage with the instability and performativity inherent in language. Deconstruction, as a strategy, interrogates the structural oppositions and hierarchies within texts, revealing the fluidity and multiplicity of meaning. Conversely, speech act theory centers on the performative nature of language, focusing on how utterances do not merely convey information but enact certain functions within specific

contexts. This investigation seeks to elucidate the pragmatic context where these two theoretical approaches converge and diverge, questioning how meaning is constructed, deconstructed, and reconstructed through linguistic practices. By examining how deconstruction unsettles the established interpretive frameworks of speech acts.

2-The myth of intentionality and misreading:

All postmodern approaches within the deconstruction strategy converge at this point, which is also the focal point around which all deconstruction concepts are centered, as Jacques Derrida acknowledges the myth of intentionality and the refusal to establish a fixed meaning for the text.

Because it is freed from intentionality or the dominance of an original meaning, the ontological condition of lack permeated structuralism and left it with imperfection. Therefore, as long as texts are devoid of a ready and complete meaning, there is no reason to search for one; this deficiency is the only constant in texts and serves as a suitable threshold for deconstructive readings. Since texts are freed from intentionality or the power of the first meaning, the ontological condition of lack has swept through structuralism, leaving it with imperfection. Consequently, as long as texts are incomplete, there is no reason to search for a ready and complete meaning; this deficiency remains the only constant in texts.

Deconstructive reading was pioneered in the United States by Paul De Man and Harold Bloom, who coined the slogan, "All readings are misreadings." The distinction between the "reading text" and the "written text" is based on the text's capacity to "produce" new connotations. This multiplicity and infinity become an ontological difference in the language performance between oral and written forms. The former generates a new reading each time, even if the reader is singular, while the latter allows for only one consumable reading, which is typically abandoned once the reading is complete.

I think that the misreading of deconstruction was related to its extension to the means of reading. Structuralism advocated the multiplicity of reading for its implicit recognition in a consistent way that can at least open a debate about it and its internal relations and positions, while deconstruction is dug even under its feet; it is looking for adventure in any form. If there were a single tenet for the deconstruction—which I doubt—it would be that deconstruction is an heir of languages, logic, sentences, and syllables, and particular languages since it employs forms of legacy. Either he needs to translate other special languages or translate himself into other special languages. He must first swap out one tool for another and never be afraid to discard some in order to borrow others when the plan calls for it. Deconstruction is a never-ending process that continuously re-uses the instruments of criticism; it is not a method. Instead, criticism as a concept (Derrida, *Of Grammatology*, 1976), deconstruction sees in every reading an opportunity to reconsider its means. It is a reading that differs from other readings that seek meaning.

The meaning is a myth and a dissipative effect between the self, the soul, and language, and all creativity lies in those who find the means to reveal this semantic richness. Reading in deconstruction is a double work: meaning and continuity of criticism by revealing the failure of techniques and strategies every time. Deconstruction is the "what happens" that pushes us to alter the tools because of the event's transience and exigency. It is necessary to abandon some tools—not to deposit them—but to shift the tone by

marginalizing some at a certain point in time, putting others in the forefront, and then removing them; in other words, changing conceptual sites and sites of emphasis: in a specific place, language, nation, or "personal history" as a whole. This is an ongoing process that shouldn't be halted at any point, but it also shouldn't be stopped by the philosophical perspective known as empirical skepticism or relativism. We are always in danger of infinite regression; there is no way to avoid it. (Derrida, Limited Inc., 1988)

Jacques Derrida constantly acknowledges the rejection of the idea of the center around which reading and concepts, including translation, are organized, and calls for constantly changing its location, even if it is not possible, so that concepts change from one culture to another and from one country to another. His view differs from relativism and empirical skepticism in its rejection of structuralism within the framework of time, since the structure never stabilizes—that is, permanently ceases—as an existential goal that we do not expect, but seek with institutional human will. Translation was the most prominent facet because it was constantly searching for stability and relatively open to synchronization.

3-The Metaphor, meaning and translation:

The law of metaphor is an important part of the economy and structure of the text, and it is never conditioned by it, and there is no difference between ordinary language and metaphorical language. De Man does not recognize that readers, and likewise authors, control meaning; rather, the truth value of interpretation cannot be verified in relation to the text read because the metaphorical dimension of language, from which no text can survive, always overlaps with the desire to establish a fixed meaning for the text and rhetoric. In this sense, it is a linguistic use that always refers to something other than itself (Quillan, 2001). In our reading of the metaphorical language in the text, our interpretation of it also depends on a metaphorical language. This blowing up of the linguistic gradient from ordinary to figurative is a recognition of the unity of language as a single whole, whose manifestations differ only from one text to another, but whose law is metaphor and not truth. This, in turn, makes us re-theorize the translation that was based on truth.

This term "misreading", coined by Paul de Man, stems from the reader's ideal assumption of the possibility of the right and absolute that exists somewhere. This assumption, on which the essence of literature is based in the continuity of its giving, makes it impossible to consider the study of literary language in isolation from the processes of misreading and misinterpreting the text (Quillan, 2001). Paul de Man places "rhetoric" within writing as an economy that governs the ontology of meaning based on the sweeping of the impact in its deconstructive concept, and not as a procedure or technique, whether in traditional criticism or formal criticism. Thus, the readability of texts is questioned, and the possibility of openness to the infinite is seen as a textual essence that differs from the linguistic structure. We are also open to the continuous act of translation, not as a finished achievement, but as a continuous formation.

4-Interview between Jacques Derrida and John Searle:

The dialogue between Jacques Derrida and Austin has evolved into a debate, and each time its circle expands in the understanding of the ever-moving phenomenon of meaning, and these dialogues are published in the book Limited Inc. After Michel Foucault reflected the author as a legal functional framework in the seventeenth century and after he was the first reason for creativity, his interpretation became an outlier element in the structural feature that rejects the self as the dominant guide of the text meaning, where we do not find

a direct relationship between the self and linguistic relations in his work within the text. The scientific ambition in criticism and translation makes it absolutely recognize the right of the linguistic model to theorize. Is the literary text a message or a performance text? Does this affect its translation?

Through the function that Michel Foucault assigned to the author in the nineteenth century, which is legal responsibility and intellectual rights, what distinguishes the author from the resulting linguistic structure is the intentionality that precedes the formation of signifier systems. Despite the fact that the language structure plays a role in its formation, the meaning of the operative differs depending on the speaker.

When confronted with this approach, the structural analyst questions how a speaker can convey many meanings in a single phrase. We interpret the meaning of the pronunciations when we analyze the linguistic system to determine the meaning of a group of sentences. By examining another pattern, the pattern of speech verbs, Austin also refers to it as the power of action in speech. Austin is, in fact, reiterating a fundamental move made by Saussure, but on a different level (and with less clarity): understanding inarticulate events by outlining the pattern that enables them (Keller, 1982). For Austin, the recognition of the stillness of the structure and the author made the movement only in the context, because the author is an extension of a social linguistic phenomenon that cannot depart from its structure.

What brought deconstruction and speech act theory together was the opening up of the question of the continuing significance of form and context and the isolation of language in the dimensions of textuality. The essence of Austin's theory, known as Speech Act Theory (SAT), has gained great importance within the critical and linguistic scene since the early 1970s, opening up horizons for the theory of reception and participating in its formulation and development, especially with regard to the final and substantial transformation of the reader, which has finally become the focus of attention of the great reception critics.

The impact of SAT theory was not limited to the mere achievement of the shift to involve the reader in the conditionality of meaning but also contributed to the achievement of the infinity of interpretation, the chaos of reading, and the multiplicity of translation. In the light of cultural postmodernism, all fixed constants and reliable references have disappeared, and dualities are no longer a formal prototype. Austin's theory presents a clear duality between declarative words and words of action. Dualism is subject to a constant exchange of roles through the creation of ever-changing contexts, and this is what we will know in the discussion of Derrida and Austin, and this split constantly shifts functions and positions between the marginal and the central, the origin and the branch.

5- The starting points of Derrida and John Austin:

Just as Derrida's point of departure was de Saussure, so was Austin's; the adoption of structuralism as a matter of course in Western thought, and an open and unfinished project, whether at the level of form or meaning, has cast a shadow on translation in applied linguistics. There is a theory based on difference that does not survive the centralisation of the Logos but instead finds itself based on presence, as we have seen in our observation of Saussure dissecting himself. This is because the concepts of analysis, explanation, and objectivity imply this reliance. One is forced to think of some meanings as given, as if they

were nearly "presence" as a starting point, in order to identify which differences are responsible for producing meaning. Even if it makes a substantial contribution to the study of meaning, a theory that infers meaning from linguistic structure does not entirely explain meaning. When interpreting a particular act's meaning as the result of linguistic interactions, we must acknowledge (Keller, 1982).

Structuralism left meaning conditional out of its form. Thus, de Saussure's prophecy was the emergence of semiotics and the transformation of form into part of meaning and not vice versa, not to mention the physical context, which has a large and important presence in many fields and systems of evidence, such as theology, history, mythology, and psychology, which are dwarfed and neglected in language for the simple reason that it is not amenable to formulation or abstraction. These fields are ultimately transformed into a second text, so that translation imposes a new text that goes beyond form and context to an approximate counterpart, widening the gap of meaning between Derrida and Austin.

Austin refused to prioritize the author's intention at the expense of the customary form on which it is placed, as if the possibilities of each form were predetermined, but intention would not create a form that had not been previously agreed upon. According to Austin, a particular operative does not refer to the accomplishment of an activity that is fundamental to meaning. As if this were the decisive element, the possibility that I might mean different things when I ask, "Can you move this box?" forces us to explain the meaning by looking into the speaker's thoughts, something Austin declines to do. A word, a request, or a promise are only defined by customary rules, not by the speaker's emotional state at the time of utterance. The promise is an action subject to particular rules that are explained by speech act theorists (Wharton, 2009). The structure of speech act theory is reflected in the transformation of the physical context and customs into formal units governed by relationships, distributed between the phrase and the context society, but the problem lies in the nature of this transformation. So, how do I convert what is material into linguistic elements?

This formalization to which we have referred falls within the project of the critique of logos, which has severely limited the performance of language within the philosophy of values, as if everyday speech had no impact on people's lives, whereas it is the background in which all values and all language are woven, and the infinity of everyday phrases are translated outside of this theoretical debate, performing more than one function and confirming the premises of truth and intentionality. Throughout the conversation, fully present, these theories, which his project challenges.

Austin therefore recommends that we focus on the marginal and troublesome cases that have been disregarded in the past and approach them as examples of autonomous phrase types rather than just unsuccessful phrases (Wharton, 2009). The adoption of custom or context made him look for the law in what is more common and widespread as a social code and closed, and whoever admits to closing it for the purpose of science opens it to others to develop the theory. So, are phrases that are not subject to the structure of custom linguistically rejected despite their performance?

6- The Supplement between Derrida and Austin:

As if integration is the fate of postmodern theories or epistemologists in research and analysis procedures, it makes the results converge even if the angle of vision is different, so deconstructionists find Austin's theory resorting to "complement" in a form closer to their proposal, even if the vision is different. Austin's analysis bears witness to the

complementarity logic at work in his theory. The features of the marginal stage of the philosophical hierarchy, which regards true or false statements as a standard of language and views other utterances as faulty phrases or forms, are where Austin's research starts. Additional or complementary: the hierarchy is overturned and dismantled as a result of this same research. Since the declarative phrase is a specific instance of the achievement phrase, the achievement phrase is not a flawed declarative phrase (Navarro, 2017). This transfer is only a recognition of the movement of the center and the margin, instead of stabilizing the positions and then fixing the theory to include the theory of translation, to include rhythm and form as an identity for the margin.

Austin refuses to interpret the meaning according to the state of mind and intentionality, and believes that it is more correct to analyze the norms of discourse and formalization. Is the presence intractable to formalize, or is its problem in the continuous transformation between consciousness and unconsciousness, especially since the essence of human being ended with the idea of "state" with postmodern thought? Austin can continue his theory without reconsidering the idea of meaning with the intention of the presence of meaning in consciousness at the moment of speech—that idea according to which there is an intended meaning other than the meaning of the act of speech.

This idea, according to which there is an intended meaning other than the meaning of the act of speech, a specific meaning or based absolutely on the intentionality of the consciousness present to itself in full presence, is required by many transactions and linguistic performances, whether oral or written. However, I can even blow up a complete speech I said under the pretext that I did not mean this, but I meant something else, such as the will, oath, signature, and organ donation. This is in what is human material or what was exclusive to Western culture, let alone the openness of speech act theory to experience religious legacies in which language is located above the sacred, transcending meaning and human being.

Austin's attempt to remove intention is an attempt to avoid the complementary and marginal, and to emphasize translation. The formalization of custom can go beyond small contexts in which we are not interested in linguistic performance, similar to the complementarity-addition relationship. The non-official metaphor here implies that non-serious language use is something extra, something that is added to and entirely dependent on everyday language. Since it is merely a parasitic phenomenon, it is unnecessary to include it while talking about the usage of everyday language.

John Searle contends that this exclusion is both transient and irrelevant in his reply to Derrida's response. In addition to everything mentioned above, it is evident that idealisation, even if it is systematic and conditional, is impossible and illegitimate at the structural level. We must set aside the use of marginal language in order to develop a theory of everyday uses in language (Navarro, 2017). Derrida, in his discussion, established the marginal in order to equate it with the center, and this is not a duality of structuralism and conditionality, but the argument of the center as a moving law from which the marginal emerges and can be its open horizon in the history of the development of the phenomenon.

The marginal in the speech act theory takes more than an image of its openness simply to a wide world called context. Rejecting intentionality and adopting structure makes you believe in the law of performance, and performance itself is like individual, relative, and variable speech. Once the phrase is separated from its context, thousands of contexts can be

imagined for it. In other words, if the form in which a hearing, ship's sailing, or marriage contract is declared is not a specific formula that matches a returnable form, and if it is therefore not possible to be designated as a "witness," does the operative part succeed?

This is the question that Derrida wants to pose, or pretends to pose: "Will the operative achievement succeed if its wording is not repeated in a coded or repeatable utterance?" (Mangion, 2011). This correspondence between what is linguistic and non-linguistic is not a static template; rather, it is a desirable feature in the history of language development, which makes its performance dynamic and faithful to the nature of meaning. The oldest texts, which we still translate and understand according to our taste standards, reflect this, not to mention the social deliberative aspect that lies at the core of speech act theory. A young child learns language through repetition in contexts similar to its initial contexts, though never exactly matching them—this is impossible. An actor's performance on stage provides a compelling illustration of this repetition, which must be acknowledged as a repetition of a conventional method as long as the "standard case" of the promise is present. Because accomplishments rely on the repeatability that performances explicitly state, the possibility of "serious" accomplishments depends on the possibility of performances.

That is a broad principle that merits attention. When a course can be discussed and mocked, when it can be repeated in a variety of serious and non-serious circumstances, and when it welcomes recurrence, it becomes a course. Simulation is a prerequisite for the potential of originality rather than an incidental occurrence of it (Keller, 1982). So, repetition is a condition for the existence and possibility of the context corresponding to the intended ordinary meaning.

The susceptibility to error and repetition in conditions close to the point of congruence is what Austin insists allows us to chase meaning in its distant bottlenecks and works to constantly develop the theory of the act of speech. Therefore, Austin does not view failure as an outside chance that happens in the operational achievement and does not change its nature; rather, the operational achievement itself suggests the prospect of failure, which serves as the foundation for his research. Without making mistakes, an operator cannot become an accomplished operator (Bublitz, 2013).

Deconstructive reading sheds light on how any serious performance phrase can be reproduced in a variety of ways, and the phrase itself is a repetition of an ordinary procedure. The possibility of repetition is not an external matter that occurs in serious performances, which undermines the structure and custom argument in the first place. On the other hand, Derrida insists that achievement is built from the beginning based on this possibility, which is the distribution of one meaning in more than one form, especially in linguistic performance, which is far from scientific and academic norms, or that linguistic taste does not like this excessive pursuit of accuracy in linguistic usage. This possibility is part of the state that claims to be normative; it is an intrinsic, neutral, and continuous part, and the exclusion of what Austin himself admits is a fixed possibility from his description is a description of something other than the so-called normative state. If someone gives an example of a sentence that has no meaning or is found isolated from the context in a torn manuscript or paper, the listener or reader is usually able to imagine a context. What can make sense of this sentence is that we use beautiful phrases and aphorisms in completely new contexts and perhaps even more informative. By framing them, we make them a function; this aspect of the functionalism of language that Derrida calls grafting.

Austin is forced to reintroduce an idea that he had previously rejected in order to limit or control this process, which threatens the viability of a successful theory of speech verbs.

This idea is that the meaning of the operative depends on the speaker's consciousness having intentionality of significance (Bublitz, 2013). Other theories in the same field, until deconstruction proposals on the theory of speech acts, became part of the development of the approach rather than its criticism.

The possibility of grafting a spoken with a new context and in different circumstances does not shake the conditionality of the context, nor the intention to determine the power of the act in speech, but rather emphasizes the opposite. In the process of citation or repetition, iteration or framing changes the new contextual features of the power of the act in speech by creating new experimental conditions for understanding more. Since what puts the coherence of achievement and performance in question is not to determine the power of the act in speech through context, but the possibility of dominating the field of actions speaking through the exclusive detail of the contextual determinants necessary for the power of the act in speech by changing the circumstances surrounding the context, the constitutional oath of the President of the Republic of the United States of America, the constitutional oath of the President of the Republic after the political performance of a mandate requires the search for its impact on political, legal, and moral life; otherwise, this question turns it to the right of rhetoric, leading to its end as a legal, political, and moral linguistic act.

In principle, speech act theory must be able to identify any feature in the context that may affect the success or failure of a particular verbal act, even if this research is a matter of prior disclosure of semantic changes at the institutional physical level, not the abstract lexical semiotic level, or may strongly affect what is achieved by the operative act of a particular speech through the new circumstances. The Qur'anic section in the rhetorical context was maximization of the response to the section, but in the cognitive mental context, God does not divide, and the power of verbal action comes out in the dynamics of cosmic phenomena instead of rhetoric, which finds justification only at the level of linguistic rule and its graduations.

Austin acknowledges that this requires the complete supremacy of context, that the act of full speech in a situation of the full speech is only a real phenomenon that we are trying to explain, and that it is not at all possible to codify it, since one variable can be substituted for another as if it were a mathematical equation, and that is the only way available. There is no way at all to separate the context from the structure of the phrase, even if we change it to a context because the finished phrase will maintain an implicit dissonant relationship with its new contexts. Austin says that it is not possible to control the context in meaning is the limit of context, but context is not limited, and Derrida explains: My starting premise is that context is essential to defining meaning, but no context is completely saturated. Here, I'm talking about the structure, the structure of what's left, or the structure of replay, rather than the richness of the content, or semantic fertility (Peter, 2007). From this point of view, Derrida began to acknowledge the "impact" of presence against the absence, the presence of the context is only a continuous postponement because he does not have the power to impose the meaning alone. The difference between Austin and Derrida is that the first is immediate and the second is historical.

The context, according to Derrida, is not defined; any given context is subject to an additional and open description in its ontological structure since even his description of formalism is a transfer from a physical structure to a language, from a relational concrete

world to an abstract being attached to the self as the first variable, and to what may appear to be related to the performance of a specific speech act of precise conditionality that varies from reader to reader. This structural openness to context is essential in all branches of knowledge. The scientist discovers that previously ignored factors are related to the behavior of certain subjects, and this is a condition in the epistemology of knowledge that theories are based on new additions to previous theories; the historian presents new material, and the critic puts a paragraph or a text back into a context that makes the text appear in a new light. Derrida notes that the striking moments of additional contextual possibilities are displacements offered by the idea of the unconscious, and this openness to psychology is an openness to the constant variable in the human self.

The context is what determines the meaning, and therefore it is subject to change when additional possibilities are mobilized, and the set of possibilities is a kind of new relationship possible in the same context that was not available in the first reading, and the context is uncontrollable. After all, its essence is the essence of linguistic meaning and not the form because it is based on a complete ontology in itself. Any attempt to organize the context is only a graft of the context we want to describe, which gives us a new context that is different from the previous formulation of it. Attempts to describe boundaries always allow us to shift or extend those boundaries.

7-Conclusion:

This article has explored the intricate interplay between deconstruction and speech act theory, revealing a dynamic and multifaceted relationship. While seemingly disparate, both frameworks grapple with the performative nature of language, challenging fixed meanings and emphasizing the fluidity of interpretation. Deconstruction, by highlighting the instability of language and the myth of intentionality, unsettles the foundational assumptions of speech act theory, particularly its emphasis on authorial intent and stable contexts. Conversely, speech act theory, with its focus on the performative force of utterances, provides a valuable framework for analyzing the social and cultural contexts within which deconstructive readings emerge. Ultimately, the confluence of these two perspectives offers a richer understanding of how meaning is constructed, deconstructed, and constantly renegotiated through the intricate interplay of linguistic practices, social conventions, and individual interpretations. This ongoing dialogue underscores the importance of considering both the structural and performative dimensions of language in any meaningful analysis of human communication.

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