

Psychological Warfare in the Algerian Revolution**(The Blue Bird - The Blue Soldier)****الحرب السيكولوجية في الثورة الجزائرية****(العصفور الأزرق - الجندي الأزرق)**

Zitouni Hamza Ishak* University Mohamed El Bachir El Ibrahimi

Full affiliation, (Country)

ishak.univ.bba@gmail.com

Orcid : 0009-0003-4975-6271

Received 31./10/2024

Accepted 19/02./2025

• Abstract:

The French army attempted to infiltrate the Algerian Revolution using a psychological strategy considered one of the most severe tactics employed by the French to suppress the uprising. Based on this approach, the French army established five special offices, each assigned specific responsibilities to dismantle the revolution. The first office was responsible for labour and appointments. At the same time, the second focused on gathering all available information on the National Liberation Front (FLN) Army to study and infiltrate it. The third office was tasked with preparing operations and strategic plans, the fourth managed logistics, including supplies and equipment, and the fifth office—arguably the most significant and focused of this study—was responsible for psychological warfare. This raises the following problem statement: Did the fifth office succeed in infiltrating the revolution through psychological warfare, and what strategies did it employ to undermine the revolution from within? A historical, descriptive method was used to address this problem statement. This article aims to highlight the brutality of the French administration through its use of psychological warfare to suppress the revolution. It concluded that psychological warfare had devastating and bloody repercussions for the revolution.

Keywords:

Blue Bird - Blue Soldier - Psychological Warfare.

الملخص: عمل الجيش الفرنسي على اختراق الثورة بإتباع إستراتيجية سيكولوجية صنف من أخطر الاستراتيجيات الفرنسية للقضاء على الثورة، وعلى هذا الأساس، أسس الجيش الفرنسي خمسة مكاتب خاصة للقضاء على الثورة، كل واحد منه أوكلت إليه مهام محددة أين كلف المكتب الأول بالإشغال والتعيينات، أما المكتب الثاني فقد حددت مهامه في جمع كافة المعلومات على جيش جبهة التحرير الوطني بهدف دراسته واختراقه، أما المكتب الثالث فكلف بإعداد العمليات والخطط الاستراتيجية، المكتب الرابع للتسويق والتموين والتجهيز، أما المكتب الخامس وهو أخطر المكاتب المكونة وهو موضوع دراستنا في هذا المقال فقد كلف للعمل السيكولوجي النفسي (الحرب النفسية)، ومن هنا يمكن طرح الإشكالية هل تمكن المكتب الخامس من اختراق الثورة بالاعتماد على الحرب السيكولوجية، وما هي الاستراتيجيات التي اعتمد عليها لتدمير الثورة من داخلها، ومن أجل الإجابة على هذه الإشكالية اتبعنا المنهج التاريخي الوصفي. يهدف هذا المقال الى امادة الثام على دموية الادارة الفرنسية من خلال الحرب النفسية التي طبقتها للقضاء على الثورة. كما أوصلنا البحث في هذا الموضوع الى نتيجة تتمحور حول خطورة الحرب النفسية وانعكاساتها المدمرة على الثورة.

كلمات مفتاحية: العصفور الأزرق - الجندي الأزرق - الحرب النفسية

• Introduction

The French army sought to infiltrate the Algerian Revolution using a psychological strategy, regarded as one of the most dangerous tactics the French employed to suppress the revolution¹. On this basis, the French army established five special offices, each assigned specific responsibilities to defeat the revolution. The first office was responsible for labour and appointments, while the second focused on collecting all available information about the National Liberation Front Army to study and infiltrate it. The third office was tasked with preparing operations and strategic plans, the fourth handled logistics, encompassing marketing, supplies, and equipment, and the fifth was dedicated to psychological warfare.

The most serious of these offices for the revolution was the fifth, upon which Captain Léger² heavily relied to destroy the revolution from within. The office's strategy centred on psychological warfare, primarily through the spread of misleading rumors—one of the most challenging tactics in this field. This method is incredibly destructive, leading to internal disruptions or purges within the enemy's ranks. The approach involved planting false rumors suggesting widespread infiltration by French intelligence through Algerian agents within the revolutionary leadership to observe their reactions before attempting an actual infiltration³.

This study focuses on the fifth office, the most dangerous of those established by the French authorities. It was tasked with psychological warfare (psychological operations), raising the following problem statement: Did the fifth office succeed in infiltrating the revolution through psychological warfare, and what strategies did it use to destroy the revolution from within? To address this problem statement, we used a historical descriptive method.

This article seeks to shed light on the brutality of the French administration through the psychological warfare it used to suppress the revolution. It concluded that psychological warfare was brutal, with devastating and bloody consequences for the revolution.

1. The Concept of Psychological Warfare

Psychological warfare is one of the most severe forms of warfare, employing non-physical violence. Napoleon Bonaparte emphasized this by stating that the war of the mind is stronger than wars fought with weapons.

Linguistic Definition: Psychological warfare is sometimes referred to as moral warfare. Experts differ on its linguistic origins; some associate it with guerrilla warfare or the Cold War, while others refer to it as the war of ideas or propaganda warfare. The term "psychological warfare" first emerged in a book by the German writer Colonel Blau, the head of the psychological laboratory at the Ministry of Defense. He published the book *Propaganda Ale Wathe* in 1930, in which he laid the foundations of warfare⁴.

In Algeria, during the liberation revolution, psychological warfare was one of the most serious challenges encountered by the National Liberation Front in its struggle against French colonialism.

It dealt severe blows to the revolution, shaking its core, as French intelligence relied on deception and misinformation from the outbreak of the revolution on November 1, 1954. Over time, this strategy evolved into an art form mastered by the French, who propagated the narrative that the revolution was merely a limited insurgency controlled by Moscow through Cairo. However, this disinformation failed to halt the spread of the revolution, prompting the French to shift tactics by undermining the people's trust in the revolution's credibility and its leaders. The aim was to cast doubt on the revolution's ability to fulfill its goals, instilling despair among the population and making the idea of independence through armed struggle seem like an unrealistic fantasy⁵.

France resorted to these malicious strategies only after realizing its inability to suppress the revolution in its early phases. This was due to the guerrilla warfare tactics adopted by the National Liberation Army, which relied primarily on hit-and-run operations, giving the revolutionaries the advantage of choosing the time and place of battle. These tactics inflicted heavy losses on the French army while preventing it from causing considerable damage to the revolutionaries⁶. As a result, the French authorities began rethinking more effective and efficient ways to separate the revolution from the people.

The French colonial authorities, recognizing their inability to suppress the revolution through military means, turned to a strategy they had previously used to destroy the revolution from within. This approach was more violent, bloody, and brutal than direct military confrontation, despite the French military's superiority in arms compared to the revolutionaries' simple weapons. The colonial authorities sought to defeat the minds of the people through psychological manipulation, indirectly swaying them in what is known as a "brainwashing" operation⁷.

Captain Léger's strategy aimed to sow doubt and suspicion among the revolutionary wilayas' leadership, persuading them that there were widespread infiltrations within the leadership of the districts and regions under their control. Historically, this serious operation became (the Blue Conspiracy), the "Blue Soldiers Operation," or the Akfadou Incident. However, before addressing this operation, we must first review the strategy it was modeled after, historically known as (The Blue Bird Operation).

2. The Blue Bird Operation

When the liberation revolution broke out, and the colonial administration recognized its inability to contain it, the French government appointed Jacques Soustelle⁸ as the Governor General of Algeria, tasking him with suppressing the uprising. Soustelle quickly realized that a military solution would not succeed, given the vast areas where the revolutionaries operated and the nature of their military strategy, which depended on a war of attrition—commonly known as "hit-and-run" warfare. Consequently, the Governor General turned to other, less costly and more effective methods, namely psychological warfare. For this purpose, he sought the expertise of ethnologist J. Servier, who had previously worked in Vietnam and devised a serious operation aimed at dismantling the revolution by destroying its human foundations. Specifically, they created a puppet force of traitors working for France, providing them with weapons, ammunition, supplies, and funds, and basing them in a specific mountainous region to combat against the revolutionaries, following the adage: "To hunt the wolves of Balochistan, one must use the dogs of Balochistan⁹..."

Implementing the Blue Bird Operation was entrusted to the French secret intelligence services in 1956, involving senior French generals and officers, including General Bouffard, General Lorello, General Ollé, and other high-ranking officials who oversaw its progress. The goal was to form self-defence units consisted of Algerians¹⁰. However, planning for the operation began in the second half of 1955, aiming to create an Algerian army resembling the National Liberation Army, but one that operated under French command and followed its orders to eradicate the growing and increasingly threatening revolution.

Given the significant influence of the Third Wilaya and the Third Region on the course and development of the revolution, they became the primary targets for the French administration's application of psychological warfare through the Blue Bird Operation, which Jacques Soustelle initiated in mid-1955 and was later continued by Robert Lacoste. This operation sought to recruit individuals from the Kabylie region into armed groups, each consists of 25 men, mimicking the structure of the National Liberation Army at that time¹¹. Consequently, the Third Wilaya became a battleground for its people, leading to the appearance of three warring factions: supporters of the National Liberation Front (FLN), followers of the Algerian National Movement (MNA) led by Belounis, who opposed the revolution and sympathized with Messali Al-Hadj, and the newly created puppet force, known as "Force K." The French administration selected the area extending from Tizirt in the west to Azazga in the east as the stage for the training of Force K¹².

The French intelligence services started recruiting Algerians loyal to them through Mr. Tahar Hachiche, who served in the French army during World War II and later worked for the French intelligence affiliated with General Lorello's office¹³.

Mr. Tahar Hachiche played a crucial role in forming the first core of Algerian recruits sought by the French administration. These recruits were provided with modern weapons, ammunition, supplies, and material incentives to eradicate the revolutionary group headed by Karim Belkacem, which had dominated the situation in the historical Third Wilaya since the outbreak of the revolution in 1945¹⁴. They would later spread to various regions of the country to eliminate the revolution. Hence, the French military administration aimed to destroy the National Liberation Army from within, without the burden of employing its exhausted army to pursue the National Liberation Army across vast and uncontrollable areas.

These units sought to begin their activities by infiltrating the ranks of the National Liberation Army and destroying the revolution from within. However, the individuals approached to form this force reached out to the leadership of the Third Zone, particularly to its commander, Karim Belkacem who instructed them to accept the offer, utilizing a strategy that harkened back to the days of the conquest of Andalusia: "... and by God, you will have no weapons or supplies except what you take from your enemy..."

This situation required a serious approach, as Karim Belkacem assigned trusted men to thwart this French plan, which could completely extinguish the spirit of the revolution in the region. He tasked Mr Si Said Frirouche¹⁵ with unravelling the details of the operation, monitoring it, and participating

alongside a third revolutionary individual named Mhallel Said, who had assumed the role of a collaborator with the colonizers¹⁶.

The Mujahideen immediately started training battalions of loyal fighters, consisting of 350 individuals. These recruits were trained by the French army and supplied with the latest weapons. The operation lasted for several months¹⁷, during which they acquired 1,200 weapons, including 250 heavy pieces, along with a sum of money estimated at 300,000 francs, to recruit more men and create a third force sought at sowing discord among the local population, leading them to fight against one another. This would subsequently enable French troops to gain control over the entire region.

However, at the Soummam Conference on August 20, 1956¹⁸, it was decided to incorporate the armed units into the ranks of the National Liberation Army to participate in the autumn offensive planned for all of Algeria on the evening of September 30, 1956. Karim Belkacem feared that French intelligence might start to suspect the army he had formed. As a result, the high command in the Third Zone decided to expose the conspiracy and integrate the armed units into the National Liberation Army. To deliver a decisive blow to the French Governor-General in Algeria, Robert Lacoste, Karim Belkacem sent him a telegram filled with mockery and derision towards the colonial administration, which read:

"Mr. Minister"

You believed you were introducing, with 'Force K,' a Trojan horse within the Algerian resistance. You were mistaken. Those you took for traitors to the Algerian homeland were pure patriots who have never ceased to fight for the independence of their country and against colonialism. We thank you for providing us with weapons that will help liberate our country.¹⁹"

The surprise was astounding for the French authorities, who could not fathom the blow they had received from the revolution. They had never imagined that an Algerian with a little education might take advantage of the ploy. This conspiracy was devised by cunning geniuses in the arts of politics and war, graduates of the French military academy²⁰.

The French media did not address this incident, which involved the defeat of French intelligence at the hands of Karim Belkacem, until ten months later. The scandal's impact was felt not only by French intelligence but also by France's military power and war academies.

As a reaction to save face, France prepared its military arsenal against the Kabylie region through Operation Djanad, consisting of 10,000 French soldiers from different specialities, sought at mending the rift and reducing losses. However, they missed the mark, as Operation Djanad fulfilled little more than scraps, inflicting a crushing blow on France's intelligence apparatus, demonstrating its fragility and vulnerability to infiltration.

Despite the defeat of French intelligence at the hands of the National Liberation Army, they insisted on attempting again and employing the same strategy, relying on the experience they had gained and correcting their mistakes. They targeted the Kabylie region through a serious operation known as the Bleuite operation, which resulted in the deaths of hundreds of Algerians.

3. The Bluetie Conspiracy or The Blue Soldier²¹

The Bluetie conspiracy appeared as a reaction to the defeat of French intelligence in Operation THE Blue Bird, which attempted to divide the revolutionaries by placing a "Trojan horse" among their ranks. Karim Belkacem's leadership cleverly turned all 1,500 soldiers involved in the operation to serve the revolution after the Soummam Conference in 1956, enabling the revolution to gain soldiers, weapons, ammunition, and funds used to confront the French colonial authorities.

French intelligence could not comprehend the blow it received from the revolution's leaders and the scandal of its failure to infiltrate it. Therefore, they decided to develop their strategies in psychological warfare to target the historical Third Wilaya. In the shadows, they devised another plan to trap the revolution, dragging it into self-destruction through Operation "The Blue Soldier," one of the serious strategies aimed at killing the revolution at the hands of its people²².

However, why did French intelligence particularly choose the Third Wilaya?

The colonial administration sought a revolutionary area to sow the seeds of discord. It noted the rising revolutionary momentum in the Third Wilaya, which was pivotal in the revolution through coordination with the Fourth Wilaya to support the Aurès Mountains and the Sahara. Consequently, several leaders of the French army started to contemplate implementing their destructive strategy to the Third Wilaya.

The Bluetie operation was a well-orchestrated psychological campaign²³ led by Captain Légi, who recruited some Algerian collaborators by enticing and persuading them to work with him. He endeavoured to create a counter-revolution, effectively shifting the conflict from a Franco-Algerian struggle to an Algerian-Algerian one, with French backing.

Captain Légi enlisted numerous Algerians, including Elias Safi Kendriche and Mohamed Hani, known as Amar²⁴. Both were fighters captured by French forces, which kept their capture a secret²⁵.

Once the French authorities completed their meticulous preparations for this strategy, they instructed their agents to inform Colonel Amirouche²⁶ that elements among his officers and soldiers—particularly educated individuals and students who joined his Wilaya after the 1956 strike²⁷ from Algiers—were in close contact with French intelligence²⁸. This initiated a process of scepticism, especially among intellectuals and the masses, including soldiers and their leaders. Ultimately, this created distrust among the officials through forged letters containing intrigues and discord²⁹.

This operation raised a considerable challenge to Colonel Amirouche and his Third Wilaya Command Council comrades. It introduced poisoned and booby-trapped bait, meticulously planned to lead to a singular and certain outcome that would serve the interests of the French special agencies that orchestrated it. These agencies anticipated that if the Third Wilaya leadership ignored the situation, it would provide them with a prime opportunity to infiltrate the ranks of the revolution—all under a favorable climate to conceal the operational elements recruited in the

capital from the groups deployed to target individuals involved in the Battle of Algiers led by Al-Arbi Ben Mhidi and his comrades in 1957³⁰.

Colonel Amirouche's response was consistent with his revolutionary firmness. He declared a state of maximum alert in the Third Wilaya and a state of emergency from June 20 to July 5, 1958. He also conducted large-scale purges throughout the Third Wilaya, resulting in the deaths of 2,000 people, most of them were intellectuals³¹. Some reports demonstrated that 6 out of 10 detainees under interrogation died³².

The French administration succeeded in imposing a psychological war on the revolution, which severely affected the Third Wilaya, costing it dearly. As a result, Légi was able to fulfill some significant results in striking and weakening the revolution, particularly since the contagion of the conspiracy spread to several historical wilayas after Amirouche sent a message to the leaders of the wilayas, urging them to take essential precautions to thwart what was called "La Blulette" conspiracy³³.

While the Third Wilaya was the first to identify the affliction and was the most daring in exposing and eradicating it, the other wilayas also took their share, except the Second Wilaya, led by the combatant Ali Kafi.

Amirouche communicated with the leaders of the historical wilayas and informed them of the news.

Here is the translated text of the message:

“ I have discovered conspiracies in my area, with an octopus-like extension in all wilayas. We must take precautions to isolate any suspicious member with gangrene; otherwise, we will lose our case. It is my duty to inform you... I pray to Allah that this notification reaches you in time. Our Wilaya (the Third) has discovered a wide-ranging conspiracy effectively planned by the French, led by Colonel Kouader and Captain Légi, against the Algerian revolution. Thanks to Allah and His help, we have mitigated the risks. We acted quickly and boldly upon the first signs of the conspiracy. I took strict measures: halting recruitment, examining individuals who had previously been recruited, detaining nationalists and soldiers who fled from French barracks, stopping all soldiers residing in Algiers, and detaining all suspicious individuals and all those accused, regardless of their ranks, who are now under interrogation and investigation. This should demonstrate that the matter is unusual. The network that targeted our Wilaya is currently paralyzed. Although the investigation is difficult, its leaders seem above suspicion”.

Signature , 'Colonel Amirouche'"

The psychological war posed a severe challenge to the Third Wilaya, costing it dearly, as colonial forces refined their tactics and fulfilled some results in this area. However, in response, the revolution in the Third Wilaya dealt heavy blows back, as its leaders recognized the treacherous scheme and were able to take the necessary measures to counter the diabolical plan, which had indeed made some progress due to the contributions of certain traitors³⁴.

3.1 Strategy of the Second Wilaya in Confronting the Blue Conspiracy

When Ali Kafi learned about the ongoing events in the neighbouring Third Wilaya, he sent a message to Colonel Amirouche advising him to exercise caution and refrain from any impulsive actions outside the directives of the Coordination and Execution Committee. He stated: "... I warned Colonel Amirouche of the necessity to return to the Coordination and Execution Committee before rushing into executions, especially of officers, as this falls outside his authority according to the decisions of the Soummam Conference. He can only issue a death sentence for the first soldier down to lower ranks after a fair, deliberate, and precise trial, and the Coordination and Execution Committee must send an investigative committee..."³⁵

Despite Ali Kafi's warning to Colonel Amirouche to exercise caution and refer any decisions to the Coordination and Execution Committee, he was surprised by the wide-scale purges in the Third Wilaya under the impulsive orders of its colonel. His astonishment grew further when Minister of Defense Karim Belkacem and Minister of Communications Abdelhafid Boussouf sent a message of congratulations and thanks to Colonel Amirouche for uncovering the Blue Man operation that Légi had planned before it could escalate. This was in spite of Ali Kafi sending a message to the provisional government informing them of the conspiracy, its serious implications, and the necessity of sending an investigative committee. He stated that "all elements that Amirouche deems treasonous" would be ready to be received by the leadership of the Second Wilaya. He conveyed this to the government for prosecution, but Ali Kafi did not receive any response³⁶.

Ali Kafi protected his Wilaya from the affliction that impacted the Third Wilaya, which then spread to the Fourth Wilaya. Cleverly, the Fourth Wilaya also witnessed a crisis of trust among its fighters. Mohammed Tkia suggested that Amirouche, who was alarmed by the situation, managed to persuade Colonel Bouguerra that the infiltration had reached the ranks of the Fourth Wilaya as well and hinted at the involvement of various of his senior officers. As a result, the Fourth Wilaya entered a spiral of purging and cleansing operations³⁷, resulting in the deaths of 500 individuals³⁸. Despite the hysteria surrounding the Blue Conspiracy among the leaders of the wilayas, the Second Wilaya was able to develop immunity against it, thanks to Ali Kafi's astuteness in handling the situation, despite several leaders assuring him that infiltration had indeed impacted the Second Wilaya.

Kafi used a strategy of patience and rationality instead of rushing into execution and purging decisions against new arrivals among the fighters and students, seeking to protect the revolution's freedom fighters and loyalists. Ali Kafi explained why his Wilaya was not impacted by the contagion that afflicted the neighbouring wilayas, stating: "Therefore, if the Second Wilaya did not experience such tragedies, it is due to the nature and quality of its leaders at all levels, worthy heirs of Zighoud Youcef. Hence, we see that some leaders were not at this danger level, which is the greatest threat facing the organization."³⁹

He also emphasized that the most important factor preventing the Second Wilaya from slipping into the quagmire of the La Blulette affair was the relationship binding the individuals of the same cause, which is essentially based on mutual trust between the leader and his group. He stated: "There is, above all, the trust that connects, at some point and in some respects, the leader with the

people he leads. The continuity of this bond or its rupture and disintegration fundamentally relies on the character and competence of the leader.⁴⁰"

Ali Kafi relied on a policy of caution and prudence in dealing with these circumstances to emerge from this crisis with minimal damage, as reflected in his statement: "The Second Wilaya encountered this shock with calmness, awareness, and foresight. The issue is too serious to be discussed at the grassroots level; it remained at the level of the Wilaya Council until time would take its course."⁴¹

Kafi noticed a rise in the number of individuals accused of treason, estimating that there were over 1,800 accused in the Third Wilaya alone. This raised doubts and suspicions in Kafi's mind, prompting him to wonder how such a vast number of individuals from several social backgrounds could be agents for France unless there were a scheme devised by French intelligence to sow doubt among the Mujahideen, undermine their morale, and spread discord among them. He attempted to convince Amirouche when he said: "If this huge number in my Wilaya were accused of treason, I would have joined them"⁴².

Kafi was certain and fully convinced that the Blue Man operation was merely a conspiracy hatched in the French Fifth Bureau in the capital to eliminate the Algerian revolution.

• Conclusion

- France's resort to psychological warfare came only after it confirmed its inability to eliminate or contain the revolution due to the fight strategy adopted by the National Liberation Army, which relied mainly on the principle of hit-and-run tactics. This strategy granted the revolutionaries the advantage of choosing the time and place of battle, resulting in severe losses for the French army without inflicting considerable damage on the revolutionaries' ranks.
- Psychological warfare represented one of the most serious battles waged by the National Liberation Front against French colonialism, during which it suffered painful blows that shook the foundations of the revolution, as French intelligence depended on principles of deception and misinformation.
- Through the La Blulette operation, the French authorities could dismantle the Fedayeen networks in the capital and arrest a thousand Fedayeen, thus delivering a significant blow to the revolution.
- French intelligence greatly benefited from its failure in the Blue Bird operation. After reviewing its mistakes, it transformed its setback into success in the La Blulette operation.

¹ Yahia, Bouaziz: *Topics and Issues in the History of Algeria*, Vol. 3, Dar Al-Huda, Algeria, p. 296.

² Born in 1922 in Morocco, he was one of the officers in the French Intelligence Service. He volunteered during World War II, then participated in the Indochina War. He entered Algeria in 1955, where he was assigned to the Documentation and Intelligence Service, later tasked with leading the intelligence and exploitation unit to undermine the revolution from within. For more on this figure, see:- Allistair, Horne: *Histoire de la guerre d'Algérie*, Albin Michel Editions, Paris, 1980, pp. 268–269.

³ Abdennour, Khither: *The Development of the Leadership Bodies of the Liberation Revolution 1954/1962*, Doctoral Dissertation in Contemporary History, History Department, University of Algiers, 2005/2006, p. 271.

⁴ Ranim, Tabbaa: *Psychological Warfare*, <https://political-encyclopedia.org/dictionary>, published on 2021-11-23.

⁵ Shawki, Abdelkarim: *The Role of Leader Amirouche in the Algerian Revolution (1954/1962)*, Master's Thesis in the History of the Revolution, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of History, University of Algiers, 2001/2002, p. 134.

⁶ Shawki, Abdelkarim: *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁷ Amar Bouhouche: *Algerian Workers in France*, National Publishing and Distribution Company, N.d., Algeria, p. 6.

⁸ Jacques Soustelle: A French academic who held several political and administrative positions in French governments, including serving as Governor-General of Algeria from January 26, 1955, to January 30, 1956. He was the architect of the "Blue Bird" conspiracy and the socio-economic project bearing his name, which aimed to separate the people from the revolution by implementing reforms to improve the living standards of the Algerian people. He claimed that the Algerian revolution was not a national revolution but a "revolution of the hungry."

⁹ Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *The Blue Bird Operation*, in *Al-Hiwar Al-Mutamaddin*, Issue 3783, 07/09/2012, p. 2.

¹⁰ Yahia, Bouaziz: *The Revolution in the Third Wilaya*, 1st ed., Dar Al-Ummah for Printing and Publishing, Algeria, 2004, p. 383.

¹¹ Mohamed Saleh, Al-Seddik: *The Blue Bird Operation*, 1st ed., Dahlab Publications, Algeria, 1990, p. 42.

¹² Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹³ Lounici, Ibrahim: *Colonel Amirouche and the Blue Operation*, Dar Al-Houma for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Algeria, 2012, p. 32.

¹⁴ Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁵ Said Frirouche, whose real name is Mohand M'Ziane Aizouhran, was one of the early revolutionaries. He briefly led the Third Wilaya, after which Colonel Amirouche succeeded him as the leader of the historic Third Wilaya.

¹⁶ Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Ibid.*, p. 3.

¹⁷ Mohamed Saleh, Al-Seddik: *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 49.

¹⁹ Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁰ Shawki, Abdelkarim: *The Role of Leader Amirouche in the Algerian Revolution (1954/1962)*, Master's Thesis in the History of the Revolution, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of History, University of Algiers, 2001/2002, p. 137.

²¹ When a member of the National Liberation Front (FLN) is captured, they are imprisoned, interrogated, and tortured in an attempt to obtain information. This process may escalate to blackmail and extortion, aiming to turn these prisoners against the revolution (changing sides) under the threat of harm to their families and livelihoods if they do not comply. Those who succumbed to this plan under coercion were dressed in blue uniforms, which led to their being called *Les Bleus* (the Blues). See: - Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Colonialism and Experiments of National Dialogue, Les Bleus (the Blues)*, in *Al-Hiwar Al-Mutamaddin*, Issue 3812, August 7, 2012, p. 1.

²² *Ibid.*

²³The first to apply psychological warfare tactics in Algeria was Officer Jean Servier, a social-psychological expert who led psychological warfare operations in the Chlef Basin and surrounding areas. In 1958, he was appointed as the General Inspector for model operations. See: Yahia, Bouaziz: *Ibid.*, p. 297.

²⁴ They began their covert anti-revolutionary activities toward the end of 1957 in the direction of the Third Wilaya. On October 15, 1957, Hani made direct contact with the Third Wilaya's leadership, where he was appointed as the revolutionary organization leader in the independent area of Algiers.

²⁵Shawki, Abdelkarim: *The Role of Leader Amirouche in the Algerian Revolution (1954/1962)*, Master's Thesis in the History of the Revolution, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of History, University of Algiers, 2001/2002, p. 98.

²⁶ The martyr Amirouche Aït Hamouda was born on October 31, 1927, in the village of Tassaft in the town of Aqmun, near Tizi Ouzou. Coming from a poor family, he was known from a young age for his hatred of French colonialism. He joined the People's Party and the Special Organization. He was arrested in 1950 and banned from living in the capital. Facing constant harassment and daily detentions, he decided to travel to France in 1954, where he continued his activism. He returned to Algeria following the outbreak of the Liberation Revolution and joined its ranks. He played an active role in mobilizing and organizing the Lower Kabylie region and leading the Third Wilaya. Rising through various positions, he consistently demonstrated exceptional leadership ability and remarkable courage in confronting the enemy and traitors, foiling numerous French schemes. Since assuming the leadership of the Third Wilaya in 1957, he worked to unify ranks and coordinate between wilayas, successfully establishing contact with the First and Second Wilayas. In this context, he met with Si El Haoues on January 12, 1957, coordinating efforts to eliminate remnants of the Messalist movement. Amirouche firmly confronted the "Blue" conspiracy after discovering the infiltration of enemy agents into the ranks of the revolution. Once he completed organizing his wilaya and confronting the enemy's plots, he turned his attention to other wilayas to provide them with support and guidance. In November 1958, he attended a meeting of wilaya leaders in the Wilaya of North Constantine, where he emerged as a prominent figure. It was decided to send him and Si El Haoues to Tunisia to meet with leaders of the Provisional Government and discuss the issue of arms shortages. In March 1959, while en route to Tunisia near Bousaada, he fell into a French ambush, valiantly resisting until he was martyred along with several mujahideen on March 29, 1959. The French authorities celebrated his death, considering it a great achievement, as "the king of the mountains" was no longer a threat to them. Abdallah Megulati: *Encyclopedia of Figures and Heroes of the Algerian Revolution*, Bayt Al-Hikma Publishing and Distribution, Algeria, 2009, p. 215.

For more details on the martyr Amirouche, see: Shawki, Abdelkarim: *The Role of Leader Amirouche in the Algerian Revolution (1954/1962)*, Master's Thesis in the History of the Revolution, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Department of History, University of Algiers, 2001/2002.

²⁷ On May 19, 1956, the leadership of the Liberation Revolution issued a call to Algerian students, urging them to go on strike. The aim was to send a message to the French colonizer that all segments of Algerian society were united in their quest for freedom, regardless of the cost, and the students heeded the call.

²⁸ The penetration of the revolution began when French intelligence arrested the young revolutionary fighter, Tadjir Zahra, known as "Rosa," in Bordj Menaïel in January 1958, accused of sewing the Algerian flag. The young woman was gradually broken down and appeared willing to cooperate with French intelligence. Captain Léger took her in his car, walked with her in the market to further implicate her after she was seen with him, and took her to his private residence in El-Biar, above the capital, where he set up a carefully devised and dangerous scenario. With his intelligence agency, he prepared a forged letter containing names of revolutionaries allegedly cooperating with France from the Third Wilaya, signed by a senior officer and stamped with the FLN seal. He placed the letter on his desk for her to see clearly, then pretended to receive a call from his superior, demanding his immediate presence elsewhere, deliberately leaving the letter visible for Rosa to satisfy her curiosity. The letter contained "poison in honey," a list of supposed traitors from the Third Wilaya allegedly cooperating with French intelligence, signed by a senior revolutionary officer. Rosa memorized the names carefully. Afterward, she pledged to return to provide Captain Léger with information as soon as she had any. As planned and expected, Rosa left the capital, heading to the mountains to inform the revolutionaries of the content of the letter she had seen in Paul-Alain Léger's office. The names she relayed were mostly educated people from Algiers—intellectuals, doctors, high school, and university graduates. This led Captain Ahsan Mahyouz to categorize the intellectuals who had recently joined the revolution as traitors. Tayeb Aït Hamouda: *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁹ Layla, Tita: *Ibid.*, p. 222.

³⁰*Ibid.*, p. 297.

³¹Georges Fleury: *La Guerre en Algérie*, ED Plon, Paris, 1993, p. 345.

As for Alistair Horne, he estimated the number of individuals executed by Amirouche to be 3,000 during his leadership of the Third Wilaya. See: Alistair Horne: *Histoire de la Guerre d'Algérie*, Ed. Albin Michel, Paris, 1987, p. 337.

³²Claude Paillat: *Dossier Secret de l'Algérie*, Paris, Edition Le Livre Contemporain, 1961, p. 95.

³³ See the text of the letter in Ali Kafi: *Memoirs of President Ali Kafi: From Political Activist to Military Leader 1946–1962*, Dar Al-Kasba for Publishing, Algeria, 1999, p. 391.

³⁴ Ali Kafi: *Ibid.*, p. 120.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 124.

³⁷ Abdenmour, Khither: *The Development of the Leadership Bodies of the Liberation Revolution 1954/1962*, PhD Dissertation in Contemporary History, Department of History, University of Algiers, 2005/2006, p. 285.

³⁸ The purging operations in the Fourth Wilaya resulted in the torture of a large number of young students and the execution of over 500 individuals. See: Shawki, Abdelkarim, *Ibid.*, p. 140.

³⁹ Abdenmour, Khither: *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁴⁰ Ali Kafi: *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 134.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 148.