

Attempts to reform the military institution in Algeria during the Ottoman era The experience of Dey Ali Khoja 1817-1818

محاولات إصلاح المؤسسة العسكرية بإيالة الجزائر خلال العهد العثماني تجربة الداي علي خوجة 1817-1818م

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Abstract

The Janissary army in Algeria during the Ottoman period played an honorable role in defending the Regency and repelling external raids, and this was demonstrated by its repeated victories against external attacks. However, its interference in political matters, its involvement in conspiracies against the rulers, and its participation in the repeated assassinations of the Deys, were a cause of political instability in Algeria. This led some Algerian rulers to think about disposing of this group and replacing it with local elements. Dey Ali Khoja (1817-1818 AD) almost succeeded in doing this, had it not been for his death due to infection with the plague epidemic. Despite the shortness period of his reign his reform experience was considered to be the most prominent attempted military and political reforms.

Keywords: military institution; Dey Ali Khoja; reform; Janissaries; military divisions.

ملخص:

قام الجيش الإنكشاري بالجزائر خلال العهد العثماني بدور مشرف في الدفاع عن الإيالة وصد الغارات الخارجية وقد شهد له بذلك تلك الانتصارات المتكررة على الاعتداءات الخارجية عليها. إلا أن تدخلاته في الأمور السياسية وتورطه في المؤامرات على الحكام، ومشاركته في الاغتيالات المتكررة للدايات، كان ذلك سببا في عدم الاستقرار السياسي في الجزائر؛ مما أدى ببعض حكام الجزائر التفكير في التخلص من هذه الفرقة واستبدالها بعناصر محلية، وقد كاد الداي علي خوجة(1817-1818م) أن ينجح في ذلك لولا وفاته اثر إصابته بوباء الطاعون، ورغم قصر فترة حكمه إلا أن تجربته هذه تعد من أبرز محاولات الإصلاح السياسي والعسكري حيث كاد أن يقضي على الجيش الإنكشاري.

كلمات مفتاحية: المؤسسة العسكرية؛ الداي علي خوجة؛ الإصلاح؛ الإنكشارية؛ الفرق العسكرية.

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1. Introduction

Many researchers specializing in modern history of Algeria have described the Ottoman rule in Algeria as ruthless and that it was the rule of a minority that had tyrannized the majority. However, if we examine the history of the Ottoman rulers in Algeria, we would realize that some of them had good intentions towards the Algerian people by embracing scholars and paying heed to the urban aspect, whose many achievements were attributed to them, such as the construction of mosques, baths, palaces, springs, etc., and even if the purpose of this is to get the love of God, erase sins, as well as gaining the trust of Algerian society - This matter cannot be discounted by simply granting a good image to the ruler, but nonetheless these achievements still suggest the extent of their desire to change the country's conditions.

If one explores the history of reforms in the Ottoman Empire, especially those related to the military institution, the latter did not witness radical change and general reform except in the last period of the history of the Ottoman Empire, which is the period of the rule of Sultan Mahmud II (1808-1839 AD) in the year 1826 AD. Because these reforms were met with strong opposition from the scholars and the Janissaries themselves, who created a barrier that impeded the reforms in general, the Janissary army in the Ottoman Empire, since the seventh century, had been transformed from an instrument of success into an instrument of sabotage and failure.

The question that comes to mind, is whether the reforms that were witnessed by the Ottoman Empire at the end of the eighteenth century had affected the state of Algeria, and whether the spirit of reform began to creep within the Deys of Algeria, and the Beys - the rulers of the provinces - , whose serious attempts to change the situation, targeting the weaknesses of the Ottoman rule in Algeria, the system of government, education, the Janissaries, foreign relations, and others were well noticeable. We find Dey Muhammad Othman Pasha (1766-1791 AD), whose period of reign in Algeria, had experienced political and financial stability. Studies indicate that he worked hard to reduce the number of Janissaries and establish their recognition. Bey Muhammad al-Kabir (1779-1797 AD) in Beylik El-Gharb, who was able to reclaim Oran from the Spanish once and for all, had adopted an integrated reform system, which was based on education, the spread of schools, and closeness to scholars. As for Bey Salih (1771-1792 AD) in Baylek El-Sharq, had focused his attention on reforming the conditions of the endowment(Waqf) institution, which was considered to be the primary resource for education. The attempt of Dey Ali Khoja (1817-1818 AD) at reforms was more daring and touched upon the most critical institution in the state, which is the military institution represented by the Janissary army (the

Janissaries), that the Ottoman Sultans, who led the reform movement, were unable to eliminate or even renew until the year 1826 during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II as mentioned previously.

The problems presented in this study are as follows : when did the ruleres begin to think about reforming the military institution in the Algeria Eyalat and that of local military groups ? what was the position of the Janissary army on that ? what were the reasons that led Dey Ali Khoja in 1817 AD to try to eliminate the heads of the Algerian Janissaries? Was this an act of reconciliation or merely revenge? What did these reforms represent ?, did they only affect the military institution or did they extend to some other aspects? and what was the fate of all these attempts?

Subject study methodology : During the process of searching the sources and references, we could hardly find sufficient news material, as most of it carry a lot of similarities, but nonetheless they all agree on the issue of Dey Ali Khoja, directly targeting the military establishment .What remains in this study is trying to find out the real reasons that led Dey Ali Khoja to liquidate the troubles of Algeria. The approach followed in this study is to extrapolate local and foreign sources, and compare what is stated in them, in order to understand the reasons and draw some conclusion.

1. Attempts to reform the military institution during the era of the Bailarbayat and Pashas and the establishment of local military teams

Algeria entered under the Ottoman banner in 1519 AD and continued for more than three centuries. The military institution consisted of a regular army, a land and sea army, and a reserve army specifically intended for cases of internal or external dangers and threats. The Janissary army played an effective role in stabilizing the pillars of the province of Algeria, which represented the mainstay of the military system as a whole, as it was the one that determined the province's internal and external policy. In addition, the regular military establishment was supported by reserve military divisions represented by the Karagla, the Zawawa divisions, and the Makhzen tribes in the countryside, which is used to support the regular army.

This military organization made many historians and researchers, especially Westerners, call Algeria a military republic (khalifa, 1988, p. 58) because the army of both land and sea, was the basis of the state's power and the source of all its events in over all aspects. It is the basic foundation on which the system of government in Algeria was postioned. Consequently, its weakness was among the direct causes of its deterioration and eventually falling under the yoke of French colonialism (Mymene, 2016, p. 23). However, we cannot completely accept this ruling because of the justifications and explanations it provides in many aspects, the most important of which is the circumstances that the Algerian state was going

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through, which found itself obligated to pay attention to the military side in order to be able to confront the European campaigns. At the beginning of this study, we will try to clarify the situation of the Janissaries in Algeria and the position of the Algerian rulers towards them during the period of the Baylarbayat and the Pashas.

The Ottoman rule in Algeria had gone through several successive political regimes during specific historical periods, and the transition from one period to another, known as Janissaryism, escalated to the point of interference in politics or the government system, at every stage, and obtained more and broader privileges that enabled it to participate in government and interfere in power, in return there were attempts on the part of the Algerian rulers to limit the dominance of the Janissaries and employed attempts to introduce local elements into the army. This matter was one of the biggest issues that the Janissary army had opposed in Algeria.

During the Beylerbayat period (1518-1588 AD), which began with the stability of Ottoman rule, thanks to the efforts of the brothers Oruj and Khair El-Din Barbarossa (Daraaj, 2010, p. 26), and ended with the removal of El-Alj Ali from the reins of power. We find that during this stage, Algeria had experienced political formation, sovereignty over the Mediterranean, economic prosperity, and social stability. This stability allowed the rulers to befriend the people and build a relationship which could be characterised as that of trust and acceptance, by emphasising on their common sense of destiny, jihad against the infidels, and the protection of the country. What resulted from this was the attempt of some Bayarbayats to include local elements in the army or to place them in special teams, and we find that the first teams that were recruited were elements from the Jijilians who came with Oruj in 1516 AD, then from Andalusian elements, who excelled in military tactics on land and at sea¹. The evidence is that Khair El-Din Barbarossa and the rest of the Turkish employees were in much favor of marrying women of the country, especially from within the leaders of powerful tribes, such as the sheikhs of the emirates of Koko and Qalaa Bani Abbas. They in fact tolerated such marriages (Saidouni Nacer El-Dine, 1984, p. 94).

Hassan Ibn Khair El-Din also worked to form elements of the Zawawa² for security and strategic reasons, including preventing the threat from the tribes that were not subject to the Ottoman rule and had remained at war with the Turks since the revolt of Ibn El-Qadi against Khair El-Din Barbaros in the year 1520. Hassan Pasha entered into a marriage with the family of Ibn El-Qadi. In 1560, he married one of the daughters of the leader of the Koko Emirate, and arranged a marriage to one of his close associates, named Kaid Hassan Qariqo, to his wife's older sister (Haëdo, 1881, p. 132).

In order to put an end to the opposition in this region, where there was a lot of rebellion and disobedience, Hassan bin Khair El-Din established a military division consisting of the Zawawa. This alliance with the Emirate of Koko resulted in Hassan Pasha bin Khair El-Din allowing the Kabyles to carry weapons while they were roaming within the city of Algiers. This situation was in fact not permitted at all, and in 1561 their number reached more than six hundred members from the Kokou Zouave. Eventually, this matter provoked the Janissaries against Hassan Pasha, and the matter ended with his removal, as he was sent in shackles to the Ottoman Sultan in September 1561 (Haëdo, 1881, pp. 132-133). It is worth noting, that Hassan Pasha had the intention of including this military section in the army divisions, and we find that this policy or this trend towards establishing local military divisions was pursued by most of Algeria's Beylerbies because it contributes to the stability of the country and ensuring the loyalty of the population, especially in the intractable areas that eluded the Ottoman rule. However, This matter was rejected by the Janissaries and the Sublime Porte.

We also find that all of these attempts were completely rejected by the Janissaries, as they accused Hassan bin Khair El-Din of treason and complained about him to the Ottoman Sultan, which exposed him to dismissal. Perhaps the policy of the Ottoman Empire towards Algeria contributed to all of this, as the increasing influence of the Beylerbayats who were leaders and ruler, was actually what prompted the Ottoman Empire to replace them with pashas, especially after the Spanish-Ottoman conflict in the Mediterranean basin had eased (Saidouni Nacer El-Dine, 1984, p. 15).

During the period of the ruling of the pashas from 1588-1659 AD, the term of each one's rule was set at three years. During this period, the Janissaries gradually seeped into the wheels of government, as circumstances had allowed them to control the pashas, who did not have experience and accurate knowledge of Algeria and the conditions it had been going through, which made it eventually easier for the Janissary men to share the power of ruling.

During the period of the Aghawat (1659-1671), the army commanders took over the government affairs and pursued a policy totally independent of the Ottoman Empire. Knowing that these military leaders were unable to get rid of their competitors and did not manage the country's affairs well, members of the Court decided to choose another type of government based on the principle of Oligarchic choice. Hence, the system of government had become something like a military republic, whose affairs were managed by an elected ruler who had absolute authority to govern the affairs of the province. The Deys were chosen from the leaders of the awjaq, who continued to hold the position of Dey until the end of the Ottoman era (Saidouni Nacer El-Dine, 1984, p. 15).

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2 . The era of the Days in Algeria and the control of the Janissaries over the reins of government:

During the reign of the Days, the Janissaries controlled the military and political apparatus, and their members were able to assume many positions of political and even religious nature. The Awjaks controlled the administrative apparatus, such as the Khaznaji, the agent of the forest, the Khoja of Horses, the agents of the endowments of the Two Holy Mosques, the position of the House of Malji, and the Khojas. Andre Raymond confirms that the essence of power in the Arab states in general was in the hands of a class whose members were recruited to a large extent of foreign origin(specifically from Anatolia), and the bulk of those working in the political and military fields were chosen from among the members of this class. In the case of Algeria, the Janissaries maintained their traditional character until the nineteenth century. This allows us to understand how the Janissaries were recruited and organized in Algeria which represents an extreme case, as almost all of its recruits were from Anatolia, and this can be explained by the desire of the Turkish element to maintain the upper hand in power there (André, 1985, pp. 55-58). This is what makes us acknowledge and determine that Algeria had a special situation in terms of recruitment methods.

Hamdan ben Othman Khodja raised this issue from his own perspective, where he acknowledged, on one hand, that since the provinces were under the rule of the Sublime Porte, it was recognized that its rulers were always Turks, as was its military regime, and, on the other hand, he pointed out that Arabs were never accepted into the ranks of Janissaries (Khodja, 2005, p. 56).

The German traveler J. or. Habenstrait said that the Janissary army had the highest authority in the country. The military dismisses the Deys and appoints others in their place according to its desire. Because most Deys end up being excuted to a certain point where if any one had skipped this fate was reguarded as being a righteous guardian and due to the rarity of this situation his grave would eventually become a sacred entity, (Habnistriete, 2007, p. 13).

Western sources also pointed out the nature and morals of the Janissary army in Algeria, in which some of them had contradictory opinion. There are those who characterised them as being religious and well disciplined, while others saw them as thieves, beggars, and criminals (Bouchanafi, 2009, p. 31). This is what Hamdan ben Othman Khodja had come to conclude over the reasons for the decline and fall of the Turkish government in Algeria and this goes back to the fact that so many dishonest men had infiltrated the ranks of the army, including people who had been convicted of crimes , adding to the fact that there were Jews and Greeks amongst the recruits (Khodja, 2005, p. 111).

.The position of the Days of Algeria towards the Janissaries:

The Janissaries represented a source of terror for the rulers of Algeria, as they led the rebellious movements in which the phenomenon of political assassination became clearly apparent. This situation existed and its beginning was during the era of the Aghawat, when the Janissaries took complete control of the reins of government, and then it became more prominent in the late era of the Days³.

Some of the Deys initiated some measures to limit the rebellion of the Janissaries, and some of them worked on implementing them, including the Dey Abdi Pasha (1723-1733 AD), who established a special guard to monitor search and disarm anyone who came to the Emirate's residence, for a private meeting with the Dey (Elmnaour, 2009, p. 378).

It was stated in Cathcart's memoirs that Dey Muhammad Othman Pasha was known to be the least unjust and tyrannical of all the deys of Algeria. He wrote about Dey Hassan Pasha, who succeeded Muhammad Pasha after the latter's death in 1791, that he always lived in fear and terror of assassination, and he told stories about the Dey's fears (Kathkarte, 1982, p. 29).

Paradis points out that Dey Baba Ali had prevented any armed Janissaries from entering the palace (Paradis, 1983, p. 161), and he also adds that the election of the Dey in the absence of opposition or revolution, was almost considered to be a rare event (Paradis, 1983, p. 189).

3. Dey Ali Khoja's experience in reforming the military institution

3.1. Introduction to Dey Ali Khoja (1817-1818 AD) and the circumstances of his accession to power

He is the Dey who ruled Algeria for a short period of less than a year (six months), right after the assassination of the Dey Omar Pasha, who died of strangulation on September 8, 1817 (Rotalie, 1841, p. 412). His job was supposed to be a Khoja (writer), but we find William Schaller stating that he did not practice the profession of a Khoja, but rather the Turks had given him this title (Schaller, 1982, p. 175)

We do not possess information about his date of birth or place, as Hamdan bin Othman Khoja stated that he was an unknown man (Khodja, 2005, p. 115), Perhaps this had to do with his lack of reputation or not being mentioned before coming to power, but it is clear that his origin was Turkish, because the official condition for assuming the position of Dey requires being Turkish.

Sharif Al-Zahar mentioned him in his memoirs: "This Ali Pasha was one of the Turks, and he remained silent" (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 131). Perhaps this silence had an impact on his tracking of events, his consideration of the matter, his recognition of the extent of the seriousness of Algeria's troubles

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for the rulers and the extent of their interference in governance, especially the period of the rule of Dey Omar Pasha (1815-1817) and the troubles that Algeria had been experiencing, as well as the decisions that he took immediately after assuming power and the reforms that he initiated. In its implementation, the most important one was changing the seat of government from El Geneina to the Kasbah and eliminating the Janissaries, as will be discussed later.

Historians have differed in defining his character and moral qualities, and some even contradicted themselves on this issue, including William Schaller, the American consul in Algeria. For example, on one hand, he describes him as intelligent and deliberate, but on the other hand, he says that he was a tyrant, a selfish person, possessed of whims and a bloodthirsty person (Schaller, 1982, p. 175). One could think that his opinion stems from his strong influence towards the personality of Dai Omar, whom he considered to be a noble personality. Ali Khoja's attempt to reform the military institution was seen as a bold act, and he was described as being an intelligent, kind man with special talents, but he was also known for his impudence and quick temper (Schaller, 1982, p. 174). He also described him as a scientist: "Perhaps he was the most forward-thinking scientist at that time" and also described him as being hard working and very knowledgeable. This inconsistency by William Schaller about the character of Dey Ali Khoja, perhaps, came in order to evade the acknowledgment of the reforms that Ali Khoja had carried out, especially towards the Janissary army. We find, for example, Hamdan bin Othman Khoja describing him as a shadowy man and a lunatic person (Khodja, 2005, p. 115).

Ali Khoja came to power through a coup, like most of the Deys who assumed this position, as the military were the ones who seated him on the throne with the approval of the court, the jurists, and the notables of the country. They dressed him in koftans, fired the cannons and the Nuba, and the herald in the markets called out his victory, including the jurists, all the ministers, and the people of the court, all eventually swore allegiance to him (Al-Zahar, 1974, pp. 131-132). This was on Shawwal 26, 1232/1817 (Tachrifate, 1852, p. 84). Hamdan Khoja believes that he took advantage of the Janissary army's dissatisfaction with Dey Omar Pasha because of the treaty he concluded with Lord Axmouth in 1816 after he bombed the city (Khodja, 2005, pp. 114-115).

Despite the reforms carried out by Omar Dey and the satisfactions he made to the Janissaries, where he visited the military barracks, distributed funds, repaired and restored the towers, created new artillery, cleaned the port and bought four new ships, in less than a year he put Algeria in a secure position from any attack from the sea (Rotalie, 1841, p. 412). But nonetheless, he was not safe himself from the ruthlessness of the Janissaries,

as they removed him from power, and was replaced by Ali Khoja, and as it is said, without putting any resistance (Rotalie, 1841, p. 412). Dey Ali Khoja finally, died of the plague epidemic on Rabi' al-Thani 23, 1233, March 1, 1818 AD (E., 2005, p. 140).

3.2. Dey Ali Khoja's position on the Janissary army in Algeria

There are several reasons that led Ali Khoja to reform the military institution, and we will list them by extracting the opinions of those who wrote on this issue. Some believe that the instability caused by a series of revolutions at the beginning of the 19th century AD led Ali Khoja to isolate himself inside the citadel (Casbah) until he further strengthened the royal position (André, 1985, p. 32). William Schaller mentioned that Ali Khoja had drawn up a plan to completely abolish the Janissaries, with the intention of making the throne to be hereditary (Schaller, 1982, p. 176). What would confirm this is what was stated in Sharif Al-Zahar's statement in his description of the way Ali Khoja assumed power: "When the soldiers revolted against Omar Pasha, and wanted someone else, the Pasha heard about their matter and immediately sent them a shawshah(gardian) . He found Ali Khoja among them and they said to him: "Return to the Pasha. Tell him to leave the emirate's house, as we have no need for him," (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 131) Then he added: "When he died, they sent his dagger to Ali Khoja, who was appointed by the soldiers." (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 131). Even if he was not the one who incited it, he was among the group that decided to depose Dai Omar. There are those who acknowledge that Ali Khoja had a hand in the secret arrangements to depose Omar Pasha (Sameh, 1989, p. 613).

Others believe that Ali Khoja's attempt was a reaction and precaution on his part in order to stop the attempted rebellion and coup led by a group of members of the Janissary army against him. Many plots were hatched inside the military barracks to depose him (Schaller, 1982, pp. 175-176). This was the direct reason and pretext taken by Dey Ali Khoja in order to eliminate once and for all not only the leaders of the sedition, but also the Janissaries. The matter did not just include the Janissaries of the city of Algiers and the seat of government, but it also included the beylikas, as we will see later.

It can be said that there is almost a complete agreement among contemporaries of the event and researchers about Ali Khoja's intention to get rid of this immoral group, which is stated in De Grammont's description: "Debarrasser of this indisciplinable group" (Grammont, 1887, p. 381) . It is noted that Ali Pasha began implementing the project on the first day of his assuming power, and therefore the project was brewing in his mind and implementing it was intended after the conditions were met, which was his accession to power.

This was a reaction and position on the part of Ali Khoja when he was told about the Janissaries, and he was one of them. He lived through the circumstances that Dey Omar Pasha had went through, and he experienced

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them well, as he was subjected to assassination several times. The trauma of assassination and deposition haunted him, and did so to all the rulers of Algeria, and the fact that Ali Khoja himself who hatched the conspiracy with the Janissaries to depose Omar Dey, cannot be ignored or excluded.

The conditions that Algeria experienced during the rule of Omar Dey were represented by American and Dutch-English foreign threats, in addition to the defeats that Algeria suffered following the Axmonth campaign of 1816 AD, and internal threats, especially the mutiny of the soldiers. In addition to the assassination attempts that were planned to remove him from power and the accusation of being the cause of bad luck and instability to the country, and even was called the unlucky Dey Omar, (Sameh, 1989, p. 616), all of these factors were a direct reason for his assassination and the appointment of Ali Khoja Daya as ruler of Algeria. In this regard, one source indicates that Dey Omar Pasha had already planned to eliminate the Janissaries, but his attempt failed (Ghatase, 2007, p. 88).

4. Dey Ali Khoja's experience in reforming the military institution

4.1. His plan to eliminate the Janissaries and change the situation

. Changing employees at the Emirate House

Immediately after assuming power, he took two hundred soldiers as his personal guards, who stayed with him day and night (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132), but nonetheless, Al-Zahhar did not mention whether the members of this guard consisted of the Janissaries whom he trusted or Algerian elements⁴. The most likely possibility is the latter, because all circumstances indicate a complete lack of confidence in the Janissary soldiers, except for few of them. This is considered a good strategy in thinking about gradually replacing the Janissary soldiers with local Algerian elements.

Ali Khoja replaced all the employees in the Emirate's office. On the second day of his accession to power, he dismissed the ministers. Some of them he kept in his position and others he excuted. He also exiled Al-Khaznaji to Tlemcen, and Khoja El-Khail to Mostaganem, and ordered the Agha of the military to be strangled (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132). As for the new appointments he had arranged: he appointed a new Khaznaji, who was very old and reached one hundred years of age, and in the position of Agha he installed a Turkish man named Masash El-Quraji, and appointed Hussein Khoja to the position of Khoja El-Khail⁵who had been the clerk of the planting store, while the position of forest agent was held by a Turk who worked in the linen weaving industry, and another Turk took over the position of the Malji House. Among other additions, he raised the number of deputies, and the forest agent, from two to four (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132).

. Transferring the seat of government to the Kasbah

-Inspection and protection: The idea of changing the seat of government caught the attention of historians and was one of the most important steps taken by Khoja, says Schaller : “If Dey Omar had decided to abandon old customs and move his residence to the Casbah, where he would be safer from sudden conspiracies, he would have been now most likely still alive and still on the throne of Algeria” (Schaller, 1982, p. 172). Only days after assuming power, Ali Khoja visited the Kasbah and inspected it in complete secrecy for two hours without revealing his intention or informing anyone of the matter (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132). This is also further evidence of his fair intelligence and immaculate management of matters, due to the tense atmosphere and precaution in which he had lived since the first days of his accession to power. He ordered the fortification of the Kasbah, the provision of cannons, and the storage of the necessary ammunition (gunpowder, balls, and bombs), until the fortification of the Kasbah was fully completed (Grammont, 1887, p. 381).

-Moving to the Kasbah: Changing the seat of government was a smart and successful move on the part of Dey Ali Khoja, but this matter will not happen easily. He managed the matter well and developed a solid plan, the most important element of which was conducted in complete secrecy and used the Algerian elements in its implementation. It manifested into contacting the Sheikh of the country (definition) and asking him to order the people of the local crafts (definition), that were non-Turks, to attend the sunset prayer at the Sayyida Mosque adjacent to the Emirate House, and remain there until they receive his order (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132).

The second step was regarding the Janissary army, in which he ordered the shutting of the doors of the military barracks after the sunset prayer (Al-Zahar, 1974). The number of military barracks in Algiers, or the Castles as they were called, was seven, and they were located in the lower part of the city which was surrounded by the Emirate's palace. This was among the reasons that would possibly facilitate the Janissary rebellion and the speed of their movement to the seat of government.

The third step was preparing to transport the contents of the Emirate's residence, including weapons, furniture, mattresses, the treasury, and the money, gold, and silver it all contained, to the Casbah, where he ordered the residents of the city of Algiers to close their doors at early hours, and he also ordered the barracks to be closed (Khodja, 2005, p. 115). The load was very large and heavy, which forced him to prepare means to transport it, including four hundred mules, which he brought into the Emirate's residence, and to recruit the Emirate's workers from the Mamluks, slaves, soldiers, and servants to load it onto the mules (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 132). Hamdan Khoja pointed out that all the treasures of Algeria were stored in the emirate's house (Khodja, 2005, p. 115) and the transfer of the contents of the treasury were transferred into stages⁶. The first stage was carried out as was mentioned

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above, and the second stage took place at the end of the strife and his preoccupation with eliminating the rebel Janissaries and stabilizing the situation. He prepared about three mules to carry the remainder of the garnish, under the cover of night. This operation had taken thirty six nights, according to Al-Zahar, (Al-Zahar, 1974, p.136).

With all these measures and precautions that had been undertaken, the Pasha did not know about his intention to move to the Kasbah that night, and of course he would not be able to do so unless he obtained the support, approval and confidence of the residents of the city of Algiers, so moving to the fourth step was what would guarantee the success of this bold step. Eventually, he called the people of the country who were waiting in the mosque, worried and confused about the matter, to enter the emirate's house and close the door. The Pasha addressed them and informed them of the truth of the matter while detailing the reasons for calling them on his plan. El-Zahar did not detail what was stated in the sermon, but he specified the basic points it contained. It seems that it was a short speech, in which he clarified the reasons by getting to the point, in doing so, he received the direct response, which was hearing and obedience.

These reasons, as stated in the letter, were: "I want to move to the Casbah and live there, so that the daily turmoil of the military in the country will cease and all the people will calm down. I have asked for you so that you may help me this night, and that you will have a solid presence." (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 134). What is notable here is that the focus of the speech was towards the Janissaries "in order to stop the military strife," because he knew well that the people were tired of the military's rebellion and the unrest inside the city.

The residents of the city of Algiers, including the municipality and the people of the craft, participated in carrying weapons, gold, and silver. He ordered each of them to lit a candle in their hand, and carry all the money and furniture they could, with the exception of the money on the mules (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 134). Was Ali Khoja's trust in the residents of the city of Algiers greater than his trust in the Janissaries? This is a clear indication that the Janissaries in Algeria had reached a great level of tyranny and rebellion.

It is worth noting the personality of Mustafa bin Malek, the Mufti of Algeria, who is the son-in-law of the Dey Ali Khoja, who was on his side during all this stage, and it seems that he was the one who was intermediating between the Dey and the residents of the city of Algiers and had guaranteed their assistance and full support to him in everything he had done (Sameh, 1989, p. 613). He assigned him to carry out some orders and accompany the soldiers. He appointed him as overseer of the Agha, who was in charge of executing the Bey of Constantine, and installing a new Bey, and confiscating the funds (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 138).

After the process of carrying the treasury was secured, the flag that was above the Emirate House was lowered, and all the people and mules exited the paramaters. Then he was left with his family, and no one remained in the Emirate House, after the door was closed. There was half of the population in the front carrying weapons, and the other half in the back had the Pasha with them. They arrived at the Kasbah safe and unscathed. They brought in everything they had with them, and the Pasha thanked them and then ordered them to return to their homes, not before he had taken a full pledge from them to stand by his side, no matter what: "No matter what I need, you will be with me." (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 134). Because he was about to implement a dangerous decision whose consequences were unimaginable. The next day, everyone had realized that the Pasha had moved to the Kasbah, and fear had overwhelmed all the people because this would certainly bring the wrath of the Janissaries.

The matter of transferring the treasury from its old headquarters in El Geneina to its new headquarters in the Kasbah sparked controversy in terms of the estimated amount of money and ammunition it contained, as Hamdan Khoja called it the treasures of Algeria. Also in terms of how long the transfer process had taken and the nature of the people involved in the transfer process, including the possibility of whether violations occurred during the transportation, such as looting and theft, because the matter is hardly devoid of such violations, especially if the treasury funds were large and diverse and contained a lot of ammunition. It is not certain for the operation to be carried out without breach from the part of supervisors and those charged with it, and El-Zahar referred to the looting of the treasury, describing it as follows: "...they would enter the ancient treasury and carry the coins of gold and silver, just as they were cultivating crops in the circumstances." (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 136) The matter was not limited to money, but also to the furniture, mattresses, weapons, and copper utensils that were present in the emirate's house, because the latter became empty of its thrones (Al-Zahar, 1974). Hamdan bin Othman Khoja confirms that the ministers and members of his entourage were the ones who did this (Khodja, 2005, p. 115). This affected the social situation, as people became dependent on this wealth ,(Al-Azhar, 1974,p.136)

-Eliminating the Janissary army and replacing it with local elements: Ali Khoja' policy was characterized by strength, strictness, and violence towards the Janissary army. He had never allowed them to get alligned against him , so his choice of the Kasbah was strategic, as he directed the cannons towards the military barracks and threatened to demolish them over their heads, he ordered the announcer to make announceements: "Whoever is from the Pasha's party, come over and join me, and whoever is from the party of this oppressive group, go and join them." (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 134) We find that a large number of residents and soldiers preferred to join him and entered the

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Kasbah until it was packed to the point where a large number had to remain outside the Kasbah, and when he provided them with arms, it substantially raised the fears of the rebellious Janissaries, which had made them seek safety and hand him the seditious and disloyal elements (Al-Zahar, 1974).

He ordered the beheading of seven of those who initiated the insurrection, at the Kasbah Gate, as a humiliation to them because, traditionally the Turks would carry out the capital sentences secretly in Sarkaji's house. El-Zahar indicated that the number of leaders of the revolt was ten men (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 136)

When he settled the matter in the city of Algiers, he began thinking about eliminating the Janissaries in the garrisons and beyliks, and the matter had been extended as far as the Beys. He formed a network of spies that carried intelligence information to the military, and he issued orders of execution and exile (Al-Zahar, 1974). He also let some of them free to return to their places of origin (Grammont, 1887, p. 381), One of the methods he used to eliminate the Janissaries, especially the senior officers and those he perceived as a danger to him, as El-Zahar stated, ' anyone who saw him as a devil, he would gather them in a camp, and executed them' (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 136).

El-Zahar cited many incidents about the brutality of Dey Ali Khoja towards the killing of the Turks (the military), to a degree where Hamdan Khohja had described them as terrible crimes (Khodja, 2005, p. 115). Schaller adds that it is not plausible to reach the Dey without passing through some twenty corpses (Rotalie, 1841, p. 412). He would never disarm himself. He would carry two rifles and a sword hanging around his waist, and whenever he would come upon a Turk, he would shoot him with those rifles, and sometimes he would finish him off with a sword, then the zabaniya would drag him to the building site and bury him under the stones of the wall which becomes his permanent grave, without granting him religious prayer (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 137). As for the fate of the Beylikat rulers, he killed the Bey of the west and replaced with Hasan Bey. He also ordered the execution of Bey Jaafar of Constantine (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 136).

5. The reaction of the Janissaries

There was an attempted coup from the military battalion located in the eastern province (eastern Mahala), joined by those who were able to escape from the grip of Ali Khoja, and altogether they declared disobedience and rebellion and headed towards the city of Algiers. The Pasha wanted to block the road for them near the Bayan Mountains, and so he conveyed a message to the tribesmen ordering them to do so. But unfortunately, Al-Mahalla had already crossed the point where they could not be stopped, way before the Dey's message had reached them, and by now they did not have much distance left to reach the walls of the city of Algiers, and did so on November

29, 1816 (Grammont, 1887, p. 381). The Dey had just taken appropriate measures to prepare for the confrontation, so he installed six thousand Karaglas under the command of trusted Turkish officers, and well positioned in the citadel, ready to carry out orders. At this moment, Yahya Agha proposed for them to surrender while submitting to obedience without any restrictions or conditions. However, they refused his proposal. Then Ali Khoja ordered their bombardment around the Emperor's Fortress and Bab Azzun where they were located. In addition to that, the Kabyles and Kologlis had launched another strong attack on them, and by now, the Pasha called in for all localities that whoever brings him a Turkish or olive head from among the men of the locality will in return receive a reward. With that everyone seems to have responded for him and as a result, The Janissaries were weakened and dispersed, and it was estimated that about one hundred and fifty officers and one thousand two hundred Janissaries were killed, those who were arrested were executed, and those who survived had asked for forgiveness and safety, which was granted to them (Grammont, 1887, p. 382).

He persecuted the Turks without any hesitance, or reluctance, and with all possible form of brutality and cruelty and it is estimated that he killed about one thousand five hundred men (Schaller, 1982, p. 176) El-Zahar said: "If we wanted to mention all his information with the Turks, we would not be able to do so, he brutalized all of them dead or homeless, and none of them had survived except those whom God saved, and very few of them were. He did not call any of them a stumbling block, nor did he forgive their slip" (Al-Zahar, 1974, pp. 136-137).

With regard to the integration of local elements into the main stream military army and the expansion of the circle of Algerians and their acceptance into the army, had become the most important elements that was neatly close to Dey Ali Khoja. He was guarded by 2,000 tribesmen, including the Qaraglas whom he fully armed and made them to be his special units, and their number had reached six thousand (Grammont, 1887, p. 181). He formed two divisions, the first of the Karagla's and the Hadar's, which were stronger in numbers, and the second comprised of the Negroes and made the Kasbah their residence and made sure that the Turkish division and the garrisons were the least stronger divisions in the Janissary army, (Ghatase, Al-hirafe wa Al-hirafiyoun bi madinate Al-djazair 1700-1830, 2007, p. 24) so as, to prevent any insurgency against him, as pointed out by Ilter Aziz Sameh, that Ali Khoja was somehow influenced by the measures taken by Hamouda Pasha in Tunisia (Sameh, 1989, p. 613).

6. Ali Khoja's other reforms

Ali Khoja's reforms did not only focus on the military aspect, but rather these reforms had stretched as far as the social aspect of it. In fact he

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abolished the prevalent practices that were forbidden by the Islamic religion, such as adultery and the use of alcohol, and ordered the judges to implement the Sharia ruling, and made emphasis on people praying in congregation (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 136). He also issued orders to throw obscene women into the sea. However, people around him had narrowly managed to amend this order, so instead of dumping them into the sea, they were ordered to be exiled to Cherchell (Sameh, 1989, p. 615).

He also sought reconciliation with the governorate of Tunis (Al-Zahar, 1974, pp. 138-139). It was known that during his ruling, Algeria was struck by the plague epidemic, in which he was a victim himself. Furthermore, there had been a wave of drought and severe famine, so he ordered the confiscation of wheat crop. Fearing famine, he imposed a high value tax on it that was unfair and arbitrary. As a result of his confiscation of wheat, the country had become completely devoid of it (Grammont, 1887, p. 382).

4- The importance of Ali Khoja's experience, its fate, and impact on the conditions of the Janissary army in Algeria:

This endeavor, even if it was unsuccessful from the part of those who succeeded him in power, showed the danger the Janissary army had on the fate of the rulers of Algeria and the extent of their interference in matters of governance and the running of the country, and their holding of major and important political, administrative, civil, and even religious positions.

Ali Khoja worked very hard to rely on the Algerians (residents of the city of Algiers), whether scholars or administrators of the city in implement his project, that was mainly to eliminate the Janissary army, which was a source of unrest and anxiety for the days of Algeria. Alter Aziz Sameh believes that Dey Ali Khoja was influenced by the reforms implemented by Hammuda Pasha (1782-1814) in Tunisia (Sameh, 1989, p. 613).

Here, we note that there are different opinions about Ali Khoja experiment. The first opinion described it as the real crisis that Algeria experienced during the year 1817 AD, resulting from the madness of Dey Ali Khoja. William Schaller and Hamdan bin Othman Khoja, who describes him also as an idiot, agree with this particular opinion. He committed a number of atrocious crimes and exiled many people. He also adds that during his term, which only lasted six months, the conditions of the province had worsened to an extreme degree: "If he had lived longer, he would have undoubtedly caused more damage to the city." (Khodja, 2005, p. 115). Meanwhile, he acknowledges the following: "This, Dey Ali, had carried out a comprehensive revolution in the ancient systems of Iyalla" (Khodja, 2005); here, It's as though, he's actually talking about reform.

But, contrary to the first opinion, the second one considers it a real revolution: "This is a veritable revolution" (Grammont, 1887, p. 381).

Perhaps those who described the experiment as a failure and did not trust its success were actually afraid of these reform ideas. Because if it had succeeded, Algeria would have witnessed many changes and would demonstrate a new stage in which Ali Khoja's attempt was aimed primarily at reforming the army, and replacing it with a local army, when he made sure that this was done in complete secrecy and during the darkness of the night. (Ghatase, *Al-hirafe wa Al-hirafiyouna bi madinate Al-djazair 1700-1830*, 2007, p. 24).

What Dey Ali Khoja did was considered the beginning of the era of Ottoman reforms in Algeria. The evidence suggests that Dey Hussein (1818-1830 AD) had preserved some of what Dey Ali Khoja had approved of. He even initiated new reforms, and he is accused of his extreme tolerance for the Janissaries, as well as his killing of Mufti Ibn Malik, son-in-law of Dey Ali Khoja⁷. Moreover, allowing immorality to be permissible after Ali Khoja abolished it (Al-Zahar, 1974, p. 144) and when Hussein Dey assumed power to succeed Ali Khoja, he also chose the Kasbah as his headquarters with full security, (Schaller, 1982, p. 176), and this is perhaps clear evidence of the Days' fear of the Janissaries. But in return, he issued an amnesty to the rebel elements and declared security in the country, furthermore, The Sublime Porte was asked to recruit members of the army due to the significant decrease in their number after the killings of Janissary army officers in Algeria as a result of the decisions taken by Dey Ali Khoja. In her study, Aicha Ghattas noticed a shortage in the number of the Janissary army through studying the remains of the estates (Ghatase, *Al-hirafe wa Al-hirafiyouna bi madinate Al-djazair 1700-1830*, 2007, p. 23). We also find that he began to integrate the Zawawa band into the regular army and register their children in the regular army's books. Actually he registered about two thousand of them, to be exact, (Al-Zahar, 1974, pp. 165-166).

7.conclusion

Finally, through the events that have been tracked, we note that there are actually attempts on the part of some Algerian rulers to introduce some reforms to the military institution. Hoping to extinguish the fire of the Fatwa, undermine the Janissaries, and limit their interference in political affairs, Ali Khoja's experience in 1817 AD was a bold attempt, given the fact that, he ruled for only six months (1817-1818 AD). This attempt aimed at reforming the Janissary army and moving the seat of government from El Geneina to the Kasbah, unfortunately, this attempt was short lived as he died during the plague epidemic.

Whatever the reasons, circumstances, and different interpretations of the event by contemporary historians and researchers, the most important goal has to do with security and strategic reasons. This experience also indicated the beginning of the idea about actually involving Algerian society in the regular army, by running the country and assigning jobs. We also find

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that the attempt of Dey Ali Khoja to completely eliminate the Janissary army preceded the decision of the Ottoman Sultan Mahmud II in eliminating the Janissary army, which was suffering from the Janissaries' strife and recklessness, and replaced it with the new army in 1826 AD, which was known as the Battle of Charity.

Through our reading from a group of sources and references, we find that the issue of reform in general and the military institution in particular existed and was of a great concern to a group of Ottoman rulers in Algeria, especially in the late Ottoman period, by Involving local elements, especially in the army and administration, and getting closer to scholars and others. But the strength of the military institution, represented by the Janissary army (Al-Awjaq), and its control over the functions and powers granted to it, especially through the Diwan, made the reforms extremely difficult. The central administration in Istanbul did not encourage this, and did not agree to the matter, because the province of Algiers represents the security barrier and the center of power for the Ottoman Empire in the Mediterranean. Therefore, we find that all of these attempts failed or were aborted, Because the idea of integrating local elements into the army was completely rejected by the senior officers of the military institution and the central authority in Algeria, and the strong connection to the Ottoman Empire prevented the achievement of these goals.

It should also be noted that the reforms of the military institution was not limited to the rulers only. Rather, Algerian scholars called for it. We mention here the book written by Ibn al-Annabi, entitled: "The Praiseworthy Striving in the Soldiers' System."

Notes

¹ - Withdrawal of a Spanish correspondence from Bejaia dated 1536. The Turkish forces in Algeria consisted of two thousand Turks and 7,000 or 8,000 Andalusians. Twenty years later, Philip II mentioned to the French ambassador in Madrid that there were about 15,000 soldiers in Algeria who were riflemen at that time, including 6,000 Andalusians who were very good soldiers. looks: Almunawir Mrush, *dirasat ean aljazayir fi aleahd elOthmani alqarsanat, al'asatira, walwaqieu, aljuz' althaani, dar alqasabat lilnashri, aljazayar*, 2009, p 62. Haydo De Dego also point out this, as teams consisting of Andalusians accompanied the Ottoman army in Algeria in internal and external wars When Hassan Pasha bin Khair al-Din intended to liberate Wahra and Mers-el-Kébir in the year 1563, he prepared an army consisting of fifteen thousand fighters and a thousand Sabbahiyya It consists of the Turks, the Alaaj, and the people of Andalusia. The Sheikh of the Emirate of Kuku provided him with a thousand horsemen, and the leaders of the Arab tribes

led ten thousand men. looks: Venture de Paradis, Tunis et Alger au XVIII, Sindbab, Paris, 1983, p139 .

² - The Zawawa tribes, stationed in the center and consisting of three hundred villages who do not pay taxes, entered the city of Algiers and formed a group with its own privileges. They were assigned to guard the night. looks: Venture de Paradis, Op-cit, p 118.

³ - For a list of the days who were assassinated, see: Hanifi Halayli, Bunyate El djaiche Eldjazayiri

⁴ - De Grammont mentions that the private guard of Dey Ali Khoja was composed of Kabyles and numbered 2,000. See: De Grammont, Op-cit, p. 381.

⁵ - A reference to Dey Hussein, who became Daya, succeeding Dey Ali Khoja, and Hamdan bin Othman Khoja indicates that he was a supporter of Dey Omar to the point that he said: "Who among the Ansar succeeds except Hussein Khoja, whom he appointed as a khaznag... Everyone was astonished when they saw that Hussein, who was close to Omar, received such appreciation from Ali Pasha" He answered this by saying: "The truth is that Hussein - among the personalities who surrounded that dey - was the only one who was honest and had virtuous morals; as for the others, they were nothing but adventurers..." See: Hamdan bin Othman Khoja: previous source, pp. 115-116.

⁶ -According to a report dating back to the beginning of the French occupation of Algeria in 1830, it is estimated that the process of transporting the treasury would be impossible to take place in one night - in response to what was stated in De Grammi's book - and it was estimated that the matter would require one thousand six hundred and fifty transport loads by mule. See: (footnote No. 1, p. 381). Klein, quoting Bavous, says that the transportation required seventy-six mule-loads of gold, and fourteen hundred mule-loads of silver. Lucien Golvin, Palais et demeurs d'Alger à la période ottomane, EDISUD, Frace, 1988, p 29 référence 01.

⁷ - To learn more about this issue see: Ahmed Al-Sharif Al-Zahar's memoirs, pp. 142-144(Where we find that Ibn Malik was the one who stood by Dey Hussein to reach power Even though he could have assumed power himself, if he gathered the people of the country, the children of the Arabs, the Zawa, the slaves, and the reed, then none of the cunning of the Turks would haunt him). It is as if Balzahar wished that rule would shift from the Turks to the Algerians.

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