

***The Intractability of the Libyan Crisis:
A Study on the Impact of Socio-Cultural Structures***

**استعصاء حل الأزمة الليبية:
دراسة في تأثير البنى السوسيوالثقافية**

Nesrine NEMOUCHI *

*Echahid Cheikh Larbi Tebessi University
Tebessa / Algeria*

Nesrine.nemouchi@univ-tebessa.dz

Received: 25/01/2025 Accepted :26/06/2025 Published :27/12/2025

Abstract:

This study examines how Libya's socio-cultural structures, especially tribalism, shape the crisis. It delineates the concepts of crisis, structure, and socio-cultural orders, including sectarianism and tribal identity. The analysis evaluates the scope and limits of these structures' influence. It also investigates the motivations of constituent actors and the mechanisms of impact. Mechanisms analysed include patronage networks, kinship obligations, and identity mobilisation. Evidence indicates that socio-cultural structures have adversely steered the conflict. Tribalism, in particular, has intensified complexity and prolonged the crisis. Consequently, state-building and institutional reconstruction have been significantly impeded. The findings suggest that durable resolution requires engaging tribal governance while strengthening national institutions.

Keywords: Structure; Socio-Cultural Structures; Libyan Crisis; State-Society Relations.

* Corresponding author.

الملخص:

تعالج هذه الدراسة متغير على قدر كبير من الأهمية في حقل العلوم السياسية، حيث تسعى -بعد التطرق إلى مفاهيم الأزمة، البنية والبنية السوسيو-ثقافية (بما تنطوي عليه من مفاهيم الطائفة، القبيلة والنزعة القبلية) - إلى محاولة الكشف عن تأثير البنى السوسيو-ثقافية ودورها في الأزمة الليبية واستعصاء حلها، من خلال البحث في حجم وحدود هذا الدور، وكذا دوافع مكوناتها ومظاهر تأثيراتها. وقد خلص البحث إلى مجموعة من النتائج أهمها أن مكونات البنى السوسيو-ثقافية الليبية وفي مقدمتها الطابع القبلي أثر سلبا على منحنى الأزمة في ليبيا وعلى استعصاء حلها بل وإطالة أمدها، مما ألقى بضلاله على مسار إعادة بناء الدولة ومؤسساتها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: البنية؛ البنى الاجتماعية-الثقافية، الأزمة الليبية، علاقة الدولة، المجتمع.

1. Introduction

The purpose of life is for a person to adapt to circumstances and situations, interact with others, and reach a degree of satisfaction and self-defense, through compatibility, which is the cornerstone of an individual's life.

The Arab region is undergoing profound geopolitical reconfiguration that is reshaping state-society relations and regional-global power balances amid heightened polarization and rivalries. Given the tight coupling of national and regional conflicts, entrenched structural constraints and chronic instability demand rigorous analytical frameworks. Post-Arab Spring regimes largely failed to democratize, instead becoming arenas for external intervention. Libya epitomizes this dynamic - its geostrategic position and hydrocarbon wealth invite competing agendas, turning the conflict into a proxy theatre with spillovers for Algeria's strategic depth and wider North Africa-Sahel trajectories.

Nevertheless, while acknowledging the significant role external factors have played in exacerbating Libya's internal divisions and complicating prospects for resolving the crisis, one cannot overlook the role of internal dynamics that have created fertile ground for the success of foreign agendas. Among the most significant internal obstacles to

resolving the Libyan crisis is the country's complex socio-cultural composition.

Given the critical importance of socio-cultural dynamics within the Libyan political system, understanding the trajectory of conflict resolution and state-building efforts cannot be separated from these dynamics, which themselves constitute influential factors in the country's ongoing political and social transformation. Therefore, the central research question is framed as follows:

What is the nature and extent of the influence exerted by Libya's socio-cultural structures in obstructing efforts and initiatives aimed at resolving the Libyan crisis?

To address this central question, the following sub-questions have been developed:

- What are the conceptual and theoretical frameworks for studying socio-cultural structures?
- What factors have transformed Libya's socio-cultural structures into obstacles to resolving the crisis?

Accordingly, the importance of this study stems from its primary objective: to understand how socio-cultural structures hinder efforts to resolve the Libyan crisis, and to assess the degree of objectivity reflected in various interpretations regarding the nature and future scope of this influence, based on the observable indicators and manifestations emerging from the current phase.

Methodology here refers to rule-governed procedures for answering questions and testing hypotheses. Given the complexity of political-social phenomena, this study employs a complementary design: (1) systems analysis to specify Libya's political components, interaction patterns, and external linkages (equilibrium $\neq$ stability); (2) structural-functional analysis to relate structures to roles and distinguish adaptive from erosive functions; and (3) a state-society lens (Migdal) to show how socio-cultural formations-especially tribal and sectarian-shape crisis dynamics and resolution pathways. Integrating these

frameworks reduces conceptual contradiction and exploits their distinct explanatory strengths.

2. Conceptual and Theoretical Framework of the Study

Engaging with key concepts^{1*} as analytic lenses is essential for diagnosing political reality; because politics is constituted through cognitive constructs, clear definitions at the outset discipline inquiry and bound interpretation.

2.1. The Semantic Scope of the Concept of Crisis

In political science, a “crisis” is a multi-dimensional, structural disturbance that threatens political and social stability, requiring precise, systematic analysis rather than treatment as a transient episode.

2.1.1. Defining the Concept of Crisis

The term "crisis" has ancient origins rooted in Greek medicine, where it originally denoted a "turning point," often used to signify a sudden, fundamental change in the condition of the human body².

In contemporary academic discourse, researchers have identified several characteristics that distinguish crises from other forms of conflict or contentious relations between states. These characteristics can be summarized as follows³:

- The element of surprise resulting from the unexpected nature of the crisis.
- The multiplicity of actors and influential parties involved, as well as the interwoven and overlapping causes and dimensions of the crisis.
- The actual occurrence and escalation of the crisis, accompanied by conflicting interests among the involved parties.
- The scarcity and inaccuracy of available information.
- The limited time frame available to address and manage the crisis effectively.

2.2. Concepts Related to the Notion of Crisis

The concept of crisis frequently intersects with, and overlaps, several other critical concepts, including:

a. War:

The Greek philosopher Plato (424–374 BCE) defined war as the "natural state of relations between political communities,"⁴ implying that war is an inherent condition that requires no justification, as it is intrinsically tied to the nature of human and consequently political relations.

The Italian political thinker Niccolò Machiavelli (1469–1527) echoed this sentiment in his work *The Art of War*, where he argued that "there exists a profound and inevitable connection between politics and war, such that they not only complement one another but must also be unified in a strong, inseparable bond"⁵. Similarly, the renowned German military strategist Carl von Clausewitz described war as the "continuation of politics by other means".

To understand the evolution and changing forms of warfare over time and across geographic spaces, a broader conceptualization is necessary. In this regard, the classical definition offered by Gaston Bouthoul remains instructive; he defines war as "a form of organized, systematic violence carried out by groups, often resulting in high-intensity, bloody confrontations between political communities—whether in the form of interstate warfare or internal civil wars." Violence, in this context, entails a deliberate assault on the physical and psychological well-being of individuals and groups involved⁶.

b. Tension:

Tension is a state of hostility, fear, suspicion, or perception of divergent interests, often accompanied by ambitions of domination or desires for retaliation. Notably, such conditions may persist without necessarily escalating into open, explicit conflict. Tension frequently precedes conflict, with numerous historical examples showing how unresolved tensions have ignited outright confrontations. Nevertheless,

tension can also coexist with cooperative frameworks between rival parties⁷.

According to Marcel Merle, tension refers to conflict-prone situations that, at least temporarily, do not culminate in the use of physical violence or coercion. Some manifestations of tension may acquire a prolonged, even permanent, character—albeit with fluctuating intensity over time—while others are temporary, dissipating once their root causes are addressed. Furthermore, certain tensions may contain the latent potential for armed crises that erupt intermittently⁸. Crises seldom arise *ex nihilo*; they accrete from unresolved tensions within political systems and among actors. These tensions signal structural imbalance—between state and society or among parties, institutions, and elites—and, absent effective absorption or reform, escalate into overt crisis.

2.3. Structure and Socio-Cultural Structure – A Conceptual and Theoretical Approach

Conceptual frameworks are indispensable gateways for investigating complex phenomena. Precise conceptualization—aligned with epistemological and logical standards—is a prerequisite for objective, scientifically grounded analysis. Accordingly, this section delineates the principal concepts and theoretical approaches associated with “structure.”

2.3.1. The Conceptual Meaning of Structure

Treating the political system as a dependent variable shaped by the wider social order, analysis begins with social structure: following Gabriel Almond, structure denotes regularised, role-based activity patterns constituting the polity, function the essential activities sustaining it; inquiry must therefore probe capacities embedded in the whole and its parts, while the concept of structure -migrating from engineering/physics via biology to signify interdependent organised wholes- serves, Hence, the structure can be viewed as an analytic device that renders component configurations like interlocking blocks for systematic explanation. This conceptual migration from biology to the

social sciences has transformed "structure" into an intellectual lens for conceptualizing social entities, which, much like biological organisms, are composed of interrelated parts⁹.

Political science adopted the term "structure" from engineering, following its earlier incorporation into sociology, economics, and psychology. In its engineering sense, structure refers to the manner in which the constituent parts of a unified whole are assembled and interlinked. The existence of structure presupposes coherence and interdependence among these parts, such that each component's existence and function are contingent upon the others, working together in harmony¹⁰.

Within this understanding, the concept of structure highlights the complex web of relationships connecting the various components of the political system. It transcends the formal, legalistic dimensions implied by terms such as "system," "form," or "institution," shifting the focus toward actual, power-driven interactions that govern the system's functioning. From the perspective of structuralist methodology, the political system represents a macro-structure composed of smaller, interdependent structures¹¹.

Socio-cultural systems, in turn, comprise three primary types of phenomena:

- **Material phenomena**, which possess tangible, observable attributes, such as the physical environment, demographic characteristics (population size, age distribution, gender ratios), birth and death rates, and the technologies employed to manage environmental resources and population dynamics.
- **Structural-social phenomena**, referring to human groupings, organizations, and institutions. The historical evolution of Arab societies reveals that their core social structures have traditionally revolved around entities such as clans, tribes, and extended families, which serve as fundamental units of traditional social organization¹².

2.3.2. Theoretical Approaches to the Role of Structure

a. The State-Society Relations Approach:

Joel S. Migdal's state-society approach offers a historically grounded framework for analyzing the dynamic interplay between state institutions and societal forces. His early work examines how states forge political authority robust enough to monopolize social control, highlighting the strategies and organizational capacities through which they seek predominance.

Migdal argues that regime type (democratic/authoritarian) shapes how states exert social control and condition individual behavior; state institutions and social organizations continually contest authority, and any equilibrium hinges on the system's capacity to accommodate pluralism¹³. Understanding this requires disaggregating the state into levels and analyzing interdependent linkages with societal forces. Using the variables of state strength and societal strength, Migdal proposes four ideal-typical configurations¹⁴:

- Strong state / strong society: balanced capabilities; negotiated governance.
- Strong state / weak society (hierarchical): state dominance; limited societal counterweights.
- Weak state / strong society (fragmented): societal actors set rules; state authority diffuses.
- Weak state / weak society (anarchic): pervasive incapacity across both spheres.

b. The Structural Approach:

The structural approach treats political orders as embedded in wider social and economic formations, tracing reciprocal interactions among societal, economic, cultural, and legal structures and conceiving the polity as a dynamic, emergent product of these interdependencies. Scholarly debates span two axes: as Welsh and Przeworski note, between structural preconditions and strategic choice in democratization; while Lipset links wealth, industrialization, urbanization¹⁵, and education to

democracy, others stress civic culture, class conflict, interests, religion, and more-fueling empirical disputes over both prerequisites and the durability of democratic rule¹⁶.

2.3.3. Determinants of the Socio-Cultural Structure

a. Tribal Allegiance

The tribe constitutes a long-standing and enduring socio-political, economic, and even military organization, where membership is fundamentally based on kinship ties. In essence, a tribe refers to a cohesive, kin-based community, often characterized by a Bedouin social fabric and a shared territorial identity, which, from the perspective of its members, grants it a degree of political autonomy¹⁷. Despite widespread usage, “tribe” lacks a settled definition and is often conflated with “ethnicity” (a culturally and territorially bounded community), whereas tribalism denotes a socio-political disposition privileging loyalty to tribal identity- whose salience varies markedly across societies and regions¹⁸.

For the renowned Arab historian Ibn Khaldun, tribalism represents a social bond that transcends mere blood ties, embodying enduring alliances among individuals driven by shared, permanent interests. Tribalism serves as a mechanism for transferring kinship-based solidarity from its genealogical and social dimensions into the realms of political engagement, power competition, and conflict¹⁹.

Political elites have long criticized tribalism as inimical to national and Pan-Arab projects. Political elites have long cast tribalism as antithetical to national and Pan-Arab projects; as Ricardo Bocco observes, Mashreq tribal structures fuse kinship and politics, and -echoing Ibn Khaldun- dense tribal/sectarian allegiances erode central authority, fuel recurrent rebellion, and impede postcolonial modernization and the shift from lineage to citizenship²⁰.

b. Sectarianism

While human societies are plural, in the Arab region sectarianism -amplified by historical legacies and instrumentalization- stems less from sects per se than from politicized identities that harden difference

into exclusion, fuel polarization, obstruct coexistence, and subordinate national interests.


3. The Libyan Crisis Amid Tribal Fragmentation

Since 2011, lacking a unifying center, Libya's deepening tribal cleavages have splintered state and society and obstructed stabilization and reconstruction.

3.1. The Tribal Composition of Libya

Libya is not homogeneous: a ~90% Arab, Sunni-Maliki majority coexists with minorities - Amazigh (~6%, mainly Nafusa/western coast), Tebu (~3%, far south incl. Ouzu, Qatron, Kufra, Ghadames)²¹, Tuareg (~1%, Saharan borderlands with Chad/Niger/Algeria/Mali) plus a small Ibadi community; sectarian-ideological cleavages have been limited, and the Jewish and Italian communities largely departed in 1967 and 1970²². The tribal field is anchored by Warfalla, Qadhadhfa, and Magarha, alongside southern Tuareg confederations and Zintan—configurations that sustain pluralism despite broad Arab-Sunni alignment.

Fig.1. Libya's Tribal Configuration and Ethnolinguistic Distribution



Source: Angelo Benuzzi; *Talking About Libya*, obtained from:

<https://angelobenuzzi.wordpress.com/talking-about-libya>

3.2. The Libyan Crisis

It is important to note that Security Council Resolution 1973 primarily called for the establishment of a no-fly zone over Libya, with the stated objective of providing aerial protection for civilians in

response to the Gaddafi regime's excessive use of force against protesters²³.

Protests on 17 February 2011 quickly escalated into armed confrontation, drawing external actors and prompting a recalibration by international and regional institutions²⁴. Under UNSC Resolutions 1970 and 1973, NATO launched operations on 19 March 2011, with Resolution 1973 authorizing a no-fly zone ostensibly to protect civilians from regime violence²⁵. Despite elections in 2012–2014, profound state fragility -indeed, state absence- has obstructed democratic consolidation, fueling fragmentation and deepening chaos. Libya thus poses urgent questions about the sequencing and interdependence of democratization and state-building²⁶.

4. Tribalism, Regionalism, and the Spoils Logic - The Triad of Division in Libya

Libya's post-2011 trajectory is shaped by a durable triad -tribalism, regionalism, and spoils-driven resource competition- that embeds authority in solidarities, hardens territorial cleavages, and fuels patronage, obstructing state reconstruction and stability; this chapter maps its historical and contemporary roots, mechanisms, and implications for reconciliation and an inclusive state.

4.1. The Political Instrumentalization of Tribalism in Libya

Tribalism is foundational to Libya's polity: over a hundred tribes shape authority and mobilization, and -per Sanussi al-Fitouri- tribal allegiance is integral; since 1977, People's Congresses/Popular Committees further entrenched tribes as a de facto national umbrella, with regimes systematically leveraging tribal leadership networks. While the 1969 al-Fateh Revolution is often blamed for reviving tribal alliances, the party ban dates to King Idris (1952); Gaddafi then dismantled remaining organizations, installing Revolutionary Committees and Popular Congresses that preserved and politically instrumentalized tribal structures to serve regime interests²⁷.

Across the monarchy, Jamahiriya, and post-2011 orders, Libyan regimes instrumentalized tribal structures allying with major tribes²⁸, using affiliations to manage crises and suppress opposition, and leveraging deep loyalties that also served as protection so that after 2011 grievances were reframed through tribal/ethnic identities, the security collapse birthed tribe-branded militias, and retaliatory cycles akin to inter-tribal feuds eroded national cohesion.

4.2. The Negative Impact of Tribalism on Resolving the Libyan Crisis

In Libya, tribes are agile political actors -instrumentalized under Gaddafi and, post-2011, recast as security sanctuaries and quasi-autonomous providers of order. They can check extremism, but parochial loyalties and customary justice impede state-building, entrench conflict and contest legitimacy, stalling a consensual transition. Tribal and regional allegiances continue to play divisive and destabilizing roles in the absence of robust national consciousness and institutional foundations necessary for state-building. Meanwhile, the logic of spoils and resource competition dominates Libya's internal political scene²⁹.

Skhirat's quota-based power sharing and Libya's inclusive electoral engineering (2012 party ban, hybrid system, high independents) widened participation but entrenched subnational identities and empowered tribal notables, undermining the consolidation of a unified, institution-based state³⁰. Petrov argues that Warfalla, Tuareg, and Tebu amassed coercive power and seized local resources -substituting for the absent state and stoking conflicts such as Ubari (2014)- while aligning with eastern or western coalitions to secure rents. This fragmentation pushed factions toward external patrons, enabling foreign powers to exploit socio-cultural cleavages and prolong the crisis despite Algerian-led reconciliation efforts³¹.

5. Conclusion

Tribal diversity has long been a defining feature of Libyan society. However, the core issue does not lie in the mere existence of this social and ethnic mosaic, but rather in the tribal structure's persistent inability to coalesce into a unified national framework, nor to successfully transition from a tribal entity to a modern state. This failure has exacerbated Libya's social fragility and deepened the problem of fragmented loyalties, ultimately creating a conducive environment for foreign interventions and divisive agendas.

In light of this, it is imperative for Libya's political and security elites to overcome the destructive structural and tribal imbalances by prioritizing the national interest, which must be embodied through state institutions. The future of state-building efforts and the restoration of security are fundamentally linked to the new leadership's ability to construct an inclusive national project - one that unites Libya's diverse factions and strategically incorporates tribal components in a way that serves the country's transitional needs.

By channeling strong intra-tribal loyalties and normative codes into rule-of-law frameworks, Libya can convert tribal influence from a centrifugal force into democratic and institutional capital, easing the transition beyond polarization and anchoring cohesion in a modern, unified state.

Bibliography List

- [1] Jones, Natalie A.; Ross, Helen; Lynam, Timothy; Perez, Pascal; Leitch, Anne, "Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods," *Ecology and Society*, vol. 16, no. 1, Mar. 2011.
- [2] Milašinović, S.; Kešetović, Ž., "Crisis and Crisis Management – A Contribution to a Conceptual & Terminological Delimitation," *Megatrend Review*, vol. 5, no. 1, 2008.
- [3] Griffiths, Martin; O'Callaghan, Terry, *International Relations: The Key Concepts*, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge, 2008.
- [4] Mallet, Joan-Antoine, "War and Peace in Plato's Political Thought," *The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence*, vol. I, no. 1, 2017.

- [5] Hörnqvist, Mikael, "Machiavelli's Military Project and The Art of War," in John M. Najemy (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- [6] De Montbrial, Thierry; Klein, Jean (eds.), *Dictionnaire de stratégie*, Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- [7] Hafeznia, Mohammad Reza; Ghorbaninejad, Rebaz; Ahmadipour, Zahra; Ghavam, Abdolali, "Tension and Conflict Theories between Countries: Review, Critique and Presenting a Theoretical Model," *Geopolitics Quarterly*, vol. 9, no. 4, Winter 2014.
- [8] Merle, Marcel, *The Sociology of International Relations*, D. Parkin (trans.), Providence, RI: Berg Publishers, 1992.
- [9] Almond, Gabriel A.; Powell, G. B., Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach*, New Delhi: Amerind Publishing, 1972.
- [10] Easton, David, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*, New York: John Wiley, 1965.
- [11] Waltz, Kenneth N., *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979.
- [12] Elwell, Frank W., *Sociocultural Systems: Principles of Structure and Change*, Athabasca, Canada: Athabasca University / Canada Book Fund, 2013, p. 31.
- [13] Migdal, Joel S., *Strong Societies and Weak States: State–Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988.
- [14] Lambach, Daniel, "State in Society: Joel Migdal and the Limits of State Authority," paper presented at Political Concepts Beyond the Nation State: Cosmopolitanism, Territoriality, Democracy, Danish Political Theory Network Conference, University of Copenhagen, 27–30 Oct. 2004.
- [15] Welsh, Helga A., "Political Transition Processes in Central and Eastern Europe," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 27, July 1994.
- [16] Przeworski, Adam, *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- [17] Lipset, Seymour Martin, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," *American Political Science Review*, vol. 53, Mar. 1959.
- [18] Van Der Steen, Evelin, "Tribal Societies in the Nineteenth Century: A Model," in Jeffrey Szuchman (ed.), *Nomads, Tribes, and the State in the Ancient Near East: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives*, Ann Arbor, MI: Edwards Brothers, 2009, pp. 105–107.
- [19] Peterson, J. E., "Tribe and State in the Arabian Peninsula," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 74, no. 4, Winter 2020/21.

- [20] Allinson, James, "The Social Origins of Alliances: Uneven and Combined Development and the Case of Jordan 1955–57," PhD thesis in Anthropology, University of Edinburgh, 2011.
- [21] Lacher, Wolfram, *Fault Lines of the Revolution: Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya*, SWP Research Paper, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, May 2013.
- [22] Cole, Peter; McQuinn, Brian (eds.), *The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath*, London: C. Hurst & Co., 2014.
- [23] United Nations Development Programme, *UNSDCF – Libya 2023–2025*, 2022. (Available at UNDP website)
- [24] United Nations Security Council, "Resolution 1973," 17 Mar. 2011. (Available at Daccess-dds-ny.un.org)
- [25] Hammady, Omar, "Libya's Stalled Political Process: Options for the Way Forward," Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Mar. 2025.
- [26] Ben Lamma, Mohamed, *The Tribal Structure in Libya: Factor for Fragmentation or Cohesion?*, Paris: Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, Sept. 2017, pp. 26–32.
- [27] Petrov, Dmitry, "Role of Tribes in Current Libyan Conflict," no. 4(45), Dec. 2018.
- [28] Bravin, Hélène; Almarache, Kamel, "Le temps des milices et des gangs," *Les Cahiers de l'Orient*, no. 111, 2013/3.
- [29] Chaker, Salem; Ferkal, Masin, "Berbères de Libye: un paramètre méconnu, une irruption politique inattendue," *Politique africaine*.

References:

¹ * The term "concept" refers to a mental representation of a specific reality. Hence, a concept is a cognitive tool through which we mentally perceive political reality in a particular form. When this term is mentioned, political analysts recall a set of elements and relationships relevant to the targeted political reality in research. See: Natalie A. Jones, Helen Ross, Timothy Lynam, Pascal Perez and Anne Leitch, *Mental Models: An Interdisciplinary Synthesis of Theory and Methods, Ecology and Society*, Mar 2011, Vol. 16, No. 1 (Mar 2011), Resilience Alliance Inc.

² S. Milašinoviæ Ž. Kešetoviæ, crisis and crisis management– a contribution to a conceptual & terminological delimitation, *Megatrend Review*, vol. 5 (1) 2008, p,p 168,169

³ Martin Griffiths, Terry O'Callaghan, *international relations The Key Concepts*, 2nd Edition, New York: Routledge, 2008, p 57

⁴ Joan-Antoine Mallet, *War and Peace in Plato's Political Thought*, *The Philosophical Journal of Conflict and Violence*, Vol. I, Issue 1/2017, p-p 87-89

⁵ Mikael Hörnqvist, *Machiavelli's military project and the Art of War*, in : John m. Najemy, *the cambridge companion to Machiavelli*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010, p112

⁶ Thierry de Montbrial et Jean Klein (dir.). Dictionnaire de stratégie, Paris :press universitaire de France, pp. 566–567.

⁷ Mohammad Reza Hafeznia, Rebaz Ghorbaninejad, Zahra Ahmadipour, Abdolali Ghavam, Tension and Conflict Theories between Countries: Review, Critique and Presenting a Theoretical Model, Geopolitics Quarterly, Volume: 9, No 4, Winter 2014, p, p 3,4

⁸ Marcel Merle, The Sociology of International Relations, ([D. Parkin](#) (Translator), [Providence, Rhode Island, United States](#): Berg Publishers, 1992, p420

⁹ Almond & G. B. Powell Jr., Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach, New Delhi: Amerind Publishing, 1972, p. 23.

¹⁰ David Easton. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley, 1965, p32.

¹¹ kenneth n. waltz, Theory of International Politics, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company Reading, 1979, p,p 80,81

¹² Frank W. Elwell, Sociocultural Systems: Principles of Structure and Change, Canada: The Canada Book Fund, Athabasca University, 2013, p. 31.

¹³ Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, 1988, p. 35.

¹⁴ Daniel Lambach, "State in Society: Joel Migdal and the Limits of State Authority" (paper presented at the conference Political Concepts Beyond the Nation State: Cosmopolitanism, Territoriality, Democracy, Danish Political Theory Network Conference, University of Copenhagen, Department of Political Science, Copenhagen, October 27–30, 2004).

¹⁵ Adam Przeworski, Democracy and The Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp. 95–99.

¹⁶ Seymour Martin Lipset, "Some Social Requisites of Democracy," American Science Review, Vol. 53, March 1959, p. 69.

¹⁷ Evelin Van Der Steen, Tribal societies in the Nineteenth century: A model, in: jeffrey szuchman, [nomads, tribes, and the state in the ancient near east cross-disciplinary perspectives](#), The United States Of America : Edwards Brothers, Ann Arbor, Michigan, 2009, p, 105,106

¹⁸ J. E. Peterson, Tribe and State in the Arabian Peninsula, Middle East Journal Vol. 74, No. 4 (WINTER 2020 / 21), pp. 501-520

¹⁹ James Allinson, The Social Origins of Alliances: Uneven and Combined Development and the Case of Jordan 1955-7, PhD Thesis in Anthropology, The University of Edinburgh, Royaume-Uni, 2011, p-p 204-206

²⁰ Evelin Van Der Steen, Previously cited, p. 107

²¹ Wolfram Lacher, Fault Lines of the Revolution Political Actors, Camps and Conflicts in the New Libya, SWP Research PaperStiftung Wissenschaft und Politik German Institute for Internationaland Security Affairs May 2013Berlin, available at: https://www.swp-berlin.org/publications/products/research_papers/2013_RP04_lac.pdf, see also: Peter Cole and Brian McQuinn (eds). The Libyan Revolution and Its Aftermath London: C Hurst & Co, 2014. p 300

²² [United Nations Development Programme *Libya 2023-2025*](https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-12/UNSDCF-Libya_2023-2025_final_rev.pdf), available at https://www.undp.org/sites/g/files/zskgke326/files/2022-12/UNSDCF-Libya_2023-2025_final_rev.pdf. See also: Hélène Bravin, Kamel Almarache, *Le temps des milices et des gangs*, Les Cahiers de l'Orient, (N° 111) 2013/3, pp. 107-146. And , Salem Chaker, Masin Ferkal, « Berbères de Libye : un paramètre méconnu, une irruption politique inattendue », *Politique africaine*, pp. 105-126.

²³ See: UN Security Council Resolution No. 1973 dated March 17, 2011, available at: [Daccess-dds-ny.un.org](https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/scres1973.html).

²⁴ See: UN Security Council Resolution No. 1973 dated March 17, 2011, available at: [Daccess-dds-ny.un.org](https://www.un.org/press/en/2011/scres1973.html).

²⁵ Omar Hammady, *Libya's stalled political process Options for the way forward*, *friedrich-ebert-stiftung*, March 2025, p04

²⁶ *Ibid*, p. 09

²⁷ Mohamed Ben Lamma, *The Tribal Structure in Libya: Factor for fragmentation or cohesion?* Paris : Fondation pour la recherche stratégique, septembre 2017, p-p 26-28

²⁸ *Ibid*, p 32

²⁹ Omar Hammady, *Previously cited*, p 05

³⁰ Mohamed Ben Lamma, *Previously cited*, p 29

³¹ Dmitry Petrov, *Role of Tribes in Current Libyan Conflict*, n 4(45), December 2018, p-p75-83