Revue : IMAGO Interculturalité et Didactique
Volume 23 Numéro 2/Année 2024, pp. 226-239
www.asjp.cerist.dz/en/PresentationRevue/543
ISSN:1111-3936 - EISSN: 2661-7722

Battle of Issin 1913 in Libya

Amel HACHEMI [1]
[1]Ahmed Ben Bella University – Oran, Algeria
hachemi_a@ymail.com

Received:13/07/2024, Accepted:13/12/2024, Published:25/12/2024

ABSTRACT: *This study deals with the issue of French expansion towards the Algerian desert, especially after the Battle of Tet, in 1902, in which the Tuareg of the Hoggar were defeated, as they were forced to surrender and look for protection from the French authorities, but some of the region's notables refused to submit and migrated to Fezzan, this migration worried the military administration that has been issuing various decisions, including sending search campaigns to the south region, to create military towers bearing the French flag, especially on the eastern border, to show the strength of France and its control over the tribes. But it was a policy behind which France hides its concern and confusion over how to arrest opponents who escaped to Libya. The French authorities had to be careful from invaders who were observing (- according to them -)France's movements in order to stop its expansion of lands and properties. One of the campaigns directed towards the desert to anticipate and discover the roads was the campaign of Captain Charlie. He went from Ain Salah to Timbuktu, and from there to Hoggar, then to the Djanet region .In 1911 , the captain was informed of the presence of a military squad of warriors on the Libyan border preparing to invade the French army. This news spread among the tribes, but the French portrayed these warriors as ghosts, that don't exist, however, military commander Gardel decided to penetrate the Libyan border until he entered the Issin region, in 1913, where he faced many Tuareg squads, and so the rumor became true.*

KEYWORDS: Ain Salah, Djanet, Essin, Fezzan, Hoggar, Libya.

الملخص:

تتناول هذه الدراسة موضوع التوسع الفرنسي نحو صحراء الجزائر، وخاصة بعد معركة تيت سنة 1902م التي انهزم فيها طوارق الهقار، حيث أجبروا على الاستسلام إلى السلطات الاستعمارية، لكن بعض أعيان المنطقة رفضوا الرضوخ والانصياع، فهاجروا نحو فزان، ما أقلق الإدارة العسكرية التي راحت تصدر قرارات مختلفة، من بينها إرسال حملات استطلاعية للمنطقة الجنوبية، لإنشاء أبراج عسكرية تحمل العلم الفرنسي، وخاصة على الحدود الشرقية، بهدف إبراز قوة فرنسا وسيطرتها على القبائل. ولكنها كانت سياسة تخفي وراءها فرنسا قلقها وحيرتها في

كيفية القبض على المجاهدين الذين تسللوا إلى ليبيا، فكان لابد على السلطات الاستعمارية من أخذ الحذر أمام مناضلين يترصدون لحركات فرنسا بغية توقيف توسعاتها على حساب أراضيهم وممتلكاتهم. ومن الحملات التي وجهت نحو الصحراء لترقب واكتشاف الطرقات والممرات حملة النقيب شارلي، الذي رسمت له الإدارة العسكرية مسلكا للمرور، فانطلق من عين صالح إلى تمبكتو ومنها إلى الهقار وصولا إلى منطقة جانت في سنة1911م، وحينها أبلغ النقيب بتواجد فرقة عسكرية من المحاربين عند الحدود الليبية يتدربون ويتأهبون لمحاربة الفرنسيين. وكثيرا ما انتشرت هذه الأخبار بين قبائل الأجر، ولكن الفرنسيين صوروا هؤلاء المحاربين أشباحا لا وجود لها، ومع ذلك قرر القائد العسكري قاردل اختراق الحدود الليبية إلى أن دخل منطقة إيسين خلال سنة 1913، أين واجهته فرقة مجاهدة من الطوارق، وهكذا أصبحت الإشاعة حقيقة.
الكلمات المفتاحية: الهقار، إيسين، جانت، عين صالح، فزان، ليبيا.

Introduction:

Exploring the annals of local skirmishes and their pivotal role in fortifying the principles of defending territory, honor, and selfhood provides irrefutable evidence of efforts to repel and halt colonial encroachments in the south-eastern Algerian and Libyan border regions. This area was particularly tumultuous, marked by numerous vigorous disturbances and resistances, most notably the Battle of Issin in 1913. This confrontation was spearheaded by the vanguards of the Sanusi order, who embraced the call for jihad to elevate the divine command and combat nonbelievers, irrespective of their ideological or political affiliations. The core questions driving our study are:

- To what extent did the strategic policies employed by the resistance disrupt and foil the colonial forces' objectives?
- How significant was the impact of the resistance fighters on the morale and psychological state of French officers?

To thoroughly examine the subject matter, we have structured our study around several fundamental axes:

1. The geographical and chronological context of the conflict zone.
2. A profile of key figures involved in the skirmishes.
3. The strategic and economic significance of the Djanet region.
4. The socio-political landscape of southeastern Algeria from 1902 to 1913 AD.

5. The fate of Djanet following the Turkish and French negotiations.
6. A detailed account of the Battle of Issin, April 1913.
7. A general summary.

1- Geographical and time frame of the fighting location:

Issin, a vital agricultural hub in Libya, lies 45 km south of the Ghat oasis(Gorrée, 1946, p. 319)The area is divided into two distinct blocks by a Wadi corridor: (Anonyme, 1913, p. 9855) "Esseyen-n-Afella," translating to "the source of Esseyen," and "Esseyen-n-Ataram," meaning "the mouth of Esseyen." The local population primarily engages in agriculture, residing in huts constructed from straw and grass. This settlement thrives due to the presence of water from artesian wells. The village of Issin gained historical prominence due to a notable battle that occurred on its soil on April 10 and 11, 1913. This battle was led by the warriors of the Sanusi (Duveyrier, 1864, pp. 301-306) movement, under the command of Sultan Ahmoud, against the French lieutenant Gardel, who was later reinforced by Captain Charlet.

2- Introduction to the most important figures involved in this fight

Discussing the progression of the battle necessitates an introduction to some pivotal figures, notably:

First: Sultan Ahmoud:

Often considered a figure requiring no introduction, Sultan Ahmoud, or "Ahmud Ak al-Mukhtar," born in 1856, is an emblematic resistance leader who instilled fear in French generals over many years. Originating from the Ihérir Valley in Djanet, a region inhabited by two smaller tribes who paid him taxes—Sultan Ahmoud wielded significant influence and authority over the renowned Ihadânârènes tribe.(Duveyrier, 1864, pp. 301-306)In the 1895 Battle of Tânhart, he tragically lost his father, two uncles, two brothers, and several relatives in clashes between Kul Ahaqar and Kul Ajar. During the conflict in Amguid, (Bissuel, 1891,

pp. 107-108) he sustained severe injuries, with two bullets striking his arm and right leg, which resulted in a mobility disability. Despite this major impairment, his resolve to confront and combat the French forces, who had overrun his tribe, remained unshaken. His resilience became legendary, especially after the French officers' attempts to subdue him proved futile. (Gast, 2001, p. 7) Following the pivotal defeat of the Hoggar Tuaregs (Gorrée, 1946, p. 331) in the 1902 Battle of Tit (Peyronnet, 1930, pp. 509-518), sultan Ahmoud strategically withdrew, relocating to a region nestled between Djanet and the Ghat. This area, renowned as a hub for disciples of the Senussi movement, became his place of settlement and reflection. Sultan Ahmoud, distinguished by his noble stature and prosperity, owned the lush orchards of Bjanet, earning the deep respect and admiration of neighboring tribes due to his honor and influence.

Conversely, Lieutenant Gardel, representing the French military interests, stood as Sultan Ahmoud's formidable opponent.

Second: Lieutenant Gardel:

Born on January 7, 1884, in France, Gardel graduated from the prestigious military school "Saint Maixent." His initial military commission as a second lieutenant involved overseeing the welfare of Algerian "citizens (Bissuel, 1891, pp. 39-40), which subsequently led to his role as a trainee in the Native Affairs Office in Djelfa. His early career was marked by a series of rigorous duties, culminating in his participation in the desert campaign in Tadaklet (Peyronnet, 1930, p. X).

By 1912, Gardel had ascended to the rank of commanding officer of the mobile Ajjer group in Tripoli, a position that underscored his rapid rise through the military ranks and his central role in the colonial military operations against local resistance forces.(Gorrée, 1946, p. 336)

Third: Captain Charlet:

A distinguished graduate from the military academy at Saint-Cyr, Captain Charlet devoted twelve years to serving as a military officer in

the Arab Office in Baghhar, where he was responsible for overseeing the affairs of Algerians. In 1900 AD, his duties extended to leading a military campaign through the desert oases, tasked with the crucial role of transporting and safeguarding a convoy laden with aid destined for the south of the Oran sector. His journey led him to Igli, a region where the French military was actively pursuing Al-Barabi(Yver, 1912, p. 93).By the year 1902 AD, Captain Charlet was appointed to the Arab Office within the mixed municipality of Maghnia. His career between 1904 and 1907 saw him at the helm of the center in Labeid Sidi Sheikh. Subsequent assignments involved military engagements against the Beni Zanasen tribe(Lehuraux, 1932, pp. IV, VII, VIII),culminating in his leadership of the Sahrawi military campaign in Tidikelt(Lehuraux, 1932, pp. IV, VII, VIII)

One of Captain Charlet's primary objectives during his tenure was to establish a network of roads and corridors across various terrains. He meticulously worked on placing markers and signals along these paths using solid stones on either side of the roads. In areas like the Erg (sandy desert), he constructed kilometer-long landmarks from bricks intermixed with robust, dry soil. He then commanded the placement of stones to secure these columns firmly in place. Upon completing this engineering feat, he strategically positioned palm trunks every two kilometers and excavated numerous wells to enhance the navigability and accessibility for vehicles such as cars and trucks traversing the desert.

3- The importance of the Djanet region geographically and economically:

Djanet is recognized as a pivotal area in southeastern Algeria, notable not only for its geographical positioning adjacent to Libya but also as a crucial hub for the distribution of dates to neighboring regions. The locality serves as a bustling center for the trade of goods imported from Ghat, and stands as a vital junction for commercial routes utilized by caravans transporting "Amdug" salt, which is subsequently sold in Western Sudan. Additionally, Djanet is a key reception point for convoys arriving from Tripoli, Marzouq, and Al-Ayer.(Carrouge, 1954, p. 338; Grevoz, 1994, pp. 95-96)

Despite these significant geographical and economic attributes, during Captain Touchard's visit on January 19, 1905, he opined that while Djanet is one of the foremost oases of the Tassili, it does not serve as an economic nor strategic hub of primary importance. For France and the Turks, the principal objective remained reaching and dominating the Bilma region to secure control over the sub-Saharan territories.

4- **Conditions in the south-east of Algeria between (1902-1913 AD)**

The French expeditions into the Algerian desert during this period aimed to extend their reach to the farthest points of Algeria and forge connections with other French colonies in Africa. These missions, led by generals, sought to establish alliances with tribal leaders, including the Tuareg. Captain Touchard noted in his report from January 19, 1905, that his entry into Djanet was as an explorer rather than a combatant, reflecting a broader French approach during this time. Most French accounts describe the period between 1902 and 1905 as one of relative calm and stability (G.G.A, n.d., p. 274). Touchard remarked on the acquiescence of most Imghad tribes, although many dignitaries and honorable figures resisted(Grevoz, 1994, p. 95), although many dignitaries and honorable figures resisted(G.G.A, n.d., p. 91),retreating towards Djanet and subsequently to Tripoli, settling between Ghat and Fezzan. (Grevoz, 1994, p. 96)

In 1905, the Turkish authorities sought to assert control over Djanet, influenced by Sultan Ahmoud who encouraged the Turks to establish a presence in Djanet and align with the Senussi order's call for jihad against the infidels.(G.G.A, n.d., pp. 92-93)By 1908, in recognition of his efforts and leadership, the Turkish authority conferred upon Sultan Ahmoud the title of “Al-Mushir,” accompanied by an annual stipend of F/F**.**(Lehuraux, 1932, p. VI)

Sultan Ahmoud established his base in Djanet, leveraging the strategic geographic positioning of his orchards and properties, along with the taxes he collected there. This geostrategic situation facilitated his establishment of commercial ties with Sudan and allowed him to construct a headquarters for the Senussi zawiya in the region in 1901 AD. The zawiya was initially led by the imam "AkhmoukAkAgada," a

member of the Ihedhanarènes tribe, with Sultan Ahmoud serving as his deputy**.**(Carrouge, 1954, p. 338)

However, the tranquility of the border region was short-lived, as unrest erupted within a year. In September 1908, Captain Djami Bey, also known as Abdelkader, led a revolt against the French presence in Djanet. His uprising, however, was quelled, and he was subsequently stripped of his command. (Gast, 1995, p. 2386)

Following numerous exploratory missions by French officers (G.G.A, n.d., p. 96) in Djanet, geopolitical tensions escalated between Turkey and the combined forces of Britain, France, and Italy, exacerbating the already fragile situation of the Ottoman Empire on both external and internal fronts. This decline significantly impacted the Turkish influence in Djanet, particularly during periods marked by Turkish-led demonstrations in 1906, 1907, and 1910(G.G.A, n.d., p. 96) in Djanet, geopolitical tensions escalated between Turkey and the combined forces of Britain, France, and Italy, exacerbating the already fragile situation of the Ottoman Empire on both external and internal fronts. This decline significantly impacted the Turkish influence in Djanet, particularly during periods marked by Turkish-led demonstrations in 1906, 1907, and 1910 (Grevoz, 1994, pp. 96-97)

Nevertheless, the Turks failed to adhere to this accord, expanding their reach perilously close to French territories, a development that alarmed Laperrine. In response, he constructed the Polignac Tower in 1908 and deliberately avoided risky exploratory ventures towards Libya (Grevoz, 1994, pp. 96-97). Amidst this turbulent backdrop, the situation in Djanet continued to deteriorate, compelling Ahmoud to lower the Turkish flag in June 1909 when control of the region was transferred to Inguedazène.(Grevoz, 1994, p. 96)

5- Djanet's fate after the Turkish and French meetings:

Following the geopolitical tensions and subsequent negotiations between the Turkish and French officials, Sultan Ahmoud felt compelled to leave Djanet due to escalating threats. He relocated to the Marzouq area after his orchards and properties in Djanet were confiscated.

Meanwhile, Captain Charlet entered Djanet and repurposed the headquarters of the Senussi zawiya into a military tower, which housed 135 Maharists. This transformation occurred on November 27, 1911, a significant date that coincided with the onset of the war between Italy and Turkey in 1911**.** (Meynier, n.d., p. 40)

Despite the passage of eight years during which Sultan Ahmoud led numerous battles, France relentlessly pursued its goal to suppress local resistance. This included efforts from the southwestern front to dismantle the Barabi and the militants of the Senussi movement.

Several battles ensued against factions that resisted French dominance, notably Sultan Ahmoud, Les Oraghen, Les Imanghassaten, and Les Iforas (Meynier, n.d., p. 40).In this climate of heightened insecurity, priest Charles De Foucauld actively warned his fellow soldiers about the dangers and advocated for the construction of fortified structures equipped with the latest armaments and robust military personnel, recognizing the perilous conditions in the region (Delaye, 1959, p. 122)**.** The strategic occupation of Djanet and the establishment of a small barracks (Furon, 1957, p. 77) there were perceived by France as crucial to countering Italian ambitions to expand westward(Castillon Du Perron, 1982, p. 485) towards the French colony.

The persistent threat of raids along the Libyan-Algerian border by the robust and fervent Senussi movement, along with fears of Italian expansion into Libya, remained a significant concern for France. Indeed, by 1912, Italy had commenced its occupation of Ghadames, and by August 1914(G.G.A, n.d., p. 93)**.** The persistent threat of raids along the Libyan-Algerian border by the robust and fervent Senussi movement, along with fears of Italian expansion into Libya, remained a significant concern for France. Indeed, by 1912, Italy had commenced its occupation of Ghadames, and by August 1914 ,(Lehuraux, 1932) to secure and survey the routes and corridors.

In this turbulent context, Captain Cauvin's arrival at Taoudni in 1906 marked the beginning of a series of French military occupations including Timbuktu, Tichitt, and Owalata by 1912. France was also intensely focused on securing and enhancing communications with Chad and Sudan. (Lhote, 1954, pp. 215-216)

Captain Charlie's extensive journey in 1912, starting from Tadaklet in Ain Salah and stretching to Timbuktu via Erg El-Gash, Kidal, and Al-Haggar, and then penetrating through Libyan territory to Ghat, reflects the strategic importance of these expeditions. Upon reaching Ghat, he proceeded to the fort of Taghat, established by the Turks in 1910, before returning to his starting point in Tidikelt. His mission was not only to mark the roads with kilometer posts but also to establish communications with tribal sheikhs and military-political leaders, emphasizing the intertwined military and political objectives of these operations **(**Lhote, 1954, p. 215).

6 - Battle of Issin, April 1913

At the outset of 1913, while en route to the Motylinsky Tower, Captain Charlet was informed of a precarious situation developing along the Libyan border. Intelligence suggested an imminent uprising against the French forces in the Djanet region**.** (Blanguernon, 1955, p.233)

With this knowledge, Captain Charlet departed from Hoggar on March 25, 1913, with a contingent of eight men. Their mission was to surveil the activities of Sheikh Ahmoud and his adherents, who had relocated to the Ghat region and were amassing support. Sheikh Ahmoud had successfully rallied the Tuareg Arabs and Tubu tribes, bolstering his ranks through an alliance with the Senussi, united in their resolve to combat the invaders.

Simultaneously, the residents of Djanet were abuzz with rumors of an impending attack on their town. Three months after these whispers began, Captain Charlet noted that no hostile actions had materialized toward Djanet, leading him to suspect that the threats might have been exaggerated or misconstrued**.** (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9855)

In parallel, Lieutenant Gardel was acting on orders received on the same day, March 25, 1913. His directive was to lead a group of 45 Sahrawi fighters southward to Ain Guzzam (Lhote, 1954, p. 215) (Ezzam), near Ghat, to rendezvous with a military detachment arriving from Bilma, comprised primarily of Maharists from Sudan. (Lehuraux, 1932, p. 122)

On his journey, near the Amais well on April 5, 1913, Lieutenant Gardel received a dispatch confirming that his forces were being shadowed by a substantial resistance force of 350 Maharists. This formidable group was commanded by Sultan Ahmoud, alongside notable leaders such as Inguedazen, Boubekeur Ag Alleguio, and MatekouAgwig.

Meanwhile, Captain Charlet had traversed approximately 550 kilometers to reach Djanet by April 2, 1913, after a grueling nine-day march, averaging 60 kilometers per day. His skepticism about the rumored combat had grown due to the absence of any verifiable confrontations. Upon his arrival in Djanet, he initiated inquiries with the town's elder statesmen, who confirmed the movements and intentions of Ahmoud and his coalition. To better understand the unfolding events, he dispatched Maharist scouts to monitor the situation (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9855). Finally, on April 9, 1913, he received a message from Charlet Gardel, urging him to return to Djanet and to proceed with caution on his journey back**.** (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9855)

According to a French report published in the Official Gazette in November 1913, (Lehuraux, 1932, pp. 150-152) the morning of April 10th saw Gardel and his army arriving at Bir Isin. They discovered the village devoid of residents, prompting them to set up a temporary rest stop among the sand dunes near the well.(Lehuraux, 1932, p. 153)

However, by noon, an urgent warning was received: a Mujahideen squad consisting of approximately 300 Maharist men and infantry was advancing towards their encampment. Suddenly, and within a short span, the resistance fighters unleashed a barrage of gunfire on the French forces. The confrontation escalated rapidly, with both sides exchanging intense gunfire from three in the afternoon until late into the night.

The Muslim fighters, wielding Italian-origin rifles that were more advanced than those of their opponents, managed to dominate the skirmish (Lehuraux, 1932, p. 153).These superior arms contributed to the ferocity of the battle, allowing them to target and incapacitate many of the prominent French fighters.

The situation for the French army grew increasingly dire as their supplies dwindled and the resistance fighters effectively besieged both the army and the vital water source at the well. Facing the imminent threat of

defeat, an envoy was hastily dispatched to Charlet, seeking urgent reinforcements.(Lehuraux, 1932, p. 154)

In response to the dire circumstances, Gardel reluctantly authorized the use of artillery, cautious of the potential destruction this might cause to his own forces. At the break of dawn, he ordered the firing of shells at the resistance fighters, who were by then exhausted and lying on the ground (Lhote, 1954, p. 215)The explosive barrage caused panic among them, leading to their disarray and retreat, albeit leaving behind many wounded and dead**.** (Lehuraux, 1932, p. 155)

Upon receiving news of Gardel's precarious situation, Charlie promptly decided to mobilize. On April 11, he led a group of 30 Maharistas out of Djanet towards Col Asskao. (Carrouge, 1954, p. 5341)Arriving two days later, he found that Gardel had vacated the area two days prior, having taken the route towards Col Abdennefog**.** (Carrouge, 1954, p. 5341)

7- Conclusion :

- The battle endured for 14 hours, marking a significant timeline in the confrontation.
- Initially, victory was claimed by the Muslim resistance fighters, who inflicted a decisive defeat on the French army, imparting an unforgettable lesson in military resilience and tactics.
- What was once dismissed as mere rumors and ghostly threats by the resistance fighters materialized into a stark and formidable reality.
- The resistance force comprised 300 members, equipped with rifles more advanced than those of their adversaries.
- The resistance fighters employed critical strategies that proved effective: a. Utilization of the element of surprise.

b-They strategically encircled the French army, effectively cutting off their water supply.

C-Psychological warfare played a significant role, with direct appeals to the Muslim soldiers within the French ranks, urging them to abandon their posts and join the resistance."Lehuraux, 1932, p. 152)

D-At the onset of the battle, the resistance fighters targeted camels, forcing Gardel and his men to retreat on foot to Djanet by the battle's end**.**(Anonyme, n.d., p. 9836)

- The resistance fighters exploited the battlefield tightly and intelligently**,** (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9836) as if the resistance band was trained and marched in a European military manner, as through intelligence they discovered and came to realize the extent of the strength and weakness of the French army**.** (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9836)
- The withdrawal of the resistance fighters from the battlefield, prompted by the French use of artillery, was a tactical decision rather than a defeat. This strategic retreat was intended to conserve resources and re-strategize for future engagements.
- The French army suffered significant resource depletion, losing approximately 4,843 cartridges.(Lhote, 1954, p. 215)
- The Sultan's brother, Ahmoud Matekou ag goüik, was killed in this resistance, and Ingdazen (I-n-Guedazen) was wounded**.**(Anonyme, n.d., p. 9836)
- Amidst the chaos of battle, "Ahmed Ben Amar Boukhchba" suffered a severe leg injury. In a critical and controversial act, Lieutenant Gardel performed an emergency amputation on a makeshift table at the Gant Center, in the absence of a medical doctor. This act led to Gardel's subsequent punishment of 15 days in prison for unauthorized medical practice once the injured had recovered at Qalya (Al-Maneia).(Lhote, 1954, p. 217)
- In a regrettable incident, Gardel acknowledged the misappropriation of a sum totaling 2,576 francs from military funds, highlighting the moral complexities faced during times of war.

- Using sugar and gauze as bandages after the resistance fighters seized the medicines. (Anonyme, n.d., p. 9836)
- The withdrawal of the resistance fighters is not considered a defeat, but rather a strategic way to re-plan for other resistances in the future, in order to preserve lives.
- Sheikh Ahmoud insisted on continuing the fighting, especially since France was a party in World War I.
- Sheikh Ahmoud stood against the French occupation since 1908 and continued his struggle against the infidels until 1923 AD
- The Senussi movement was truly resistant to Italian and French colonialism, as it posed a danger to the French invaders.

In historical retrospection, the Tuareg inflicted notable defeats on French forces, events which have been etched into the annals of history as testaments to their resilience and tactical acumen. Despite the French military's portrayal of the Issin fight as a narrative of heroism and valor, it remains a poignant reminder of the fierce and enduring spirit of the Tuareg resistance.

References

- Anonymous. 1913. Report on the Fight at Esseyen (Tripoli Borders 10/04/1913). Paris: Official Journal of the French Republic.
- Bissuel, H. 1891. The French Sahara. Algiers: Printer – Librairie Adolphe Jourdon.
- Blanguernon, Claude. 1955. Le Hoggar. Paris: Arthaud.
- Carrouge, Michel. 1954. Charles De Foucauld: Mystical Explorer. France: Éditions Cerf.
- Castillon du Perron, Marguerite. 1982. Charles de Foucauld. Paris: Bernard Grasset.
- Delaye, TH.J. 1959. Saharan Unit with Méhari and Motorized. Revue Historique de l'Armée, n°4. Paris: Ministry of the Armed Forces.
- Duron, Jean Marc. 1993. The Exploration of the Sahara. France: Actes Sud.
- Duveyrier, Henri. 1864. The Tuareg of the North. Paris: Publisher Challamel Ainé.

- Furon, Raymond. 1957. The Sahara: Geology - Mineral Resources Developed. Paris: Payot.
- G.G.A. 1922. The Territories of Southern Algeria: Presentation of Their Situation 2nd Part, 01/01/1903–31/12/1921. Algiers: Jules Carbonnel.
- Gast, M. 1995. Djanet. In Berber Encyclopedia XVI: Djalut-Dougga. France: EdiSud.
- Gast, M. 2001. Imenân. In Berber Encyclopedia, Vol. 24. Belgium: Peeters Publishers.
- Gorrée, Georges. 1946. The Saharan Friendships of Father de Foucauld. Paris: B Arthaud.
- Grevoz, Daniel. 1994. The French Méharistes à la Conquest of the Sahara (1900–1930). Paris: Editions L'Harmattan.
- Lehuraux, Léon. 1932. In the Sahara with Commander Charlet. Paris: Plon Nourrit.
- Lehuraux, Léon. 1944. In the Sahara with Father Charles de Foucauld. Algiers: Baconnier Editions.
- Lhote, Henri. 1954. The Hoggar: Space and Time. Paris: Armand Colin.
- Meynier, O. n.d. The Pacification of the Sahara and the Saharan Penetration (1852–1930). Publications of the National Metropolitan Committee for the Centenary of Algeria.
- Peyronnet, R. 1930. Golden Book of Native Officers (1830–1930) T1-T2: History and Directory. Algiers: P and G. Soubiron.