

Human Mortality and the Outcomes of Structuralism from Roger Garaudy's Perspective

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ABSTRACT: *In a profound engagement with Western philosophies, Roger Garaudy transcended being merely an interpreter of methodological and epistemological pathways; he was deeply immersed in critiquing and unveiling knowledge and reality. He robustly challenged the texts underpinning structuralism, critiquing their attempts to integrate structuralist theory, from linguistic and historical models to a societal way of life. Garaudy's dissent was not merely a defense of realism; it was grounded in a commitment to methodological rigor, scientific thoroughness, and the enrichment of philosophical self-curiosity alongside a conscientious research ethos. With his extensive knowledge, he meticulously employed a critique mechanism against structuralism in a disciplined, methodical manner. He systematically illustrated hypotheses, propositions, and examples, directed fundamental questions, and consistently critiqued the idea from its components to its entirety. Garaudy pinpointed the shortcomings of structuralism on both theoretical and practical levels, attempting to counter the proponents of this movement by identifying its intellectual deficiencies and the undermining of the theory, thus declaring structuralist theory as a narrative of 'human mortality.'*

KEYWORDS: Human Mortality; Structuralism; Roger Garaudy; Critique.

RÉSUMÉ: *Dans un profond engagement avec les philosophies occidentales, Roger Garaudy a transcendé le fait d'être un simple interprète des voies méthodologiques et épistémologiques ; Il était profondément immergé dans la critique et le dévoilement de la connaissance et de la réalité. Il a vigoureusement*

contesté les textes qui sous-tendent le structuralisme, critiquant leurs tentatives d'intégrer la théorie structuraliste, des modèles linguistiques et historiques à un mode de vie sociétal. La dissidence de Garaudy n'était pas simplement une défense du réalisme ; Il était fondé sur un engagement envers la rigueur méthodologique, la rigueur scientifique et l'enrichissement de la curiosité philosophique ainsi qu'une éthique de recherche consciencieuse. Grâce à ses connaissances approfondies, il a méticuleusement utilisé un mécanisme de critique contre le structuralisme d'une manière disciplinée et méthodique. Il a systématiquement illustré des hypothèses, des propositions et des exemples, dirigé des questions fondamentales et constamment critiqué l'idée de ses composants dans son intégralité. Garaudy a mis le doigt sur les lacunes du structuralisme à la fois théorique et pratique, tentant de contrer les partisans de ce mouvement en identifiant ses déficiences intellectuelles et l'affaiblissement de la théorie, déclarant ainsi la théorie structuraliste comme un récit de la « mortalité humaine ».

MOTS-CLÉS: Mortalité humaine ; Structuralisme; Roger Garaudy ; Critique.

Introduction

Roger Garaudy's* exploratory journey through contemporary philosophical methodologies, from Marx to the pioneers of structuralism, is notably one of his defining characteristics. His critical apparatus, richly laden with theoretical and practical foundations and applications - especially regarding structuralism- sought to dismantle it from its Marxist underpinnings to its implications on humanity. As a diagnostic critique of Western culture, he proposed a departure from the inherited cognitive and social systems of European modernity.

Given the rigorous critical scrutiny presented by Garaudy at the level of structuralist inquiries and examples, he compels us to reevaluate his position starting from a pivotal question: How did Garaudy interpret structuralism in its alignment with reality? Why did he proclaim the 'death of the human' within its framework? And what is the nature of the division between structuralism as a knowledge methodology and as a societal approach to human beings?.

* Roger Garaudy (1913–2012) was a French philosopher, writer, and political figure, known for his engagement with Marxism, Christianity, Islam, and his controversial stances on various historical and political issues, particularly his views on the Jewish genocide during World War II.

1. About Marx and the Foundations of Structuralism

Karl Marx (1818-1883)* ascended the philosophical stage of the modern and contemporary era, proclaiming one of history's most influential doctrines. His endeavor to internationalize the issue of social structures was based on the principle of equality and the denunciation of class antagonism, which runs counter to the life of an integrated society.

The foundational principles adopted by Marx and subsequently by Engels elicited a widespread response in establishing the structuralist methodology. It is conceivable that structuralism represents the most advanced stage of socialism's evolution in terms of its theoretical architecture and the practical representations sought.

This theoretical convergence is concentrated in two primary outcomes: the first is concerned with the unification of production forces and the relationships that interlink within the production circles in an interactive and cohesive manner. Here, structuralists anticipate transforming Marx's idea into a methodological theory for categorized sciences, asserting that partial structures should reflect a radical aggregation in the overall structure.

This notion has been frequently pursued by Jean Piaget in the precise sciences and swiftly transitioned into an economic and social vision. The amalgamation of all production components inevitably leads to the creation of a comprehensive structure for a unified society system through various production mechanisms, encapsulated by a set of common denominators such as the environment, the market, and social conditions. The second outcome pertains to the philosophy of history or historical interpretations that include the political and civilizational development of society through its constitutive structures.

These two concepts are critiqued not only in terms of their philosophical and theoretical structure but also from their social purpose. Jean-Paul Sartre perceives the linkage between structuralism and socialism

* *Karl Marx was a German philosopher, economist, political theorist, and revolutionary whose ideas have had a profound impact on the course of history, especially in shaping modern socialism and communism. His works, particularly The Communist Manifesto (1848) and Das Kapital (1867), have become foundational texts for socialist movements worldwide.*

(specifically leftism) as a new ideological vendetta and the establishment of a parallel elite seeking a society that aligns with this theory. He posits that "the aim of structuralism is to establish a new ideology that served as the final bulwark erected by the bourgeoisie against the Marxist tide. (Abdel Wahab Jaffar, 1989, p. 12.)

In this vein, Thomas Friedman articulates a critical issue impacting those advocating for a socialist structuralism—individual freedom within public freedom, whether in creative pursuits or economic practices. "There might be a way for an individual to navigate these challenges and safeguard their freedom within a socialist society. This isn't entirely unfeasible, yet undeniably, numerous obstacles inhibit deviation from a unified structure, and to my knowledge, no proponent of socialism has tackled this dilemma, nor have they initiated any commendable efforts to develop institutional frameworks that could enable the realization of freedom within socialism." (Milton Friedman, 2002, p. 18.)

The concept of equality promoted by socialism in pursuit of social harmonization and the common good across the structures of a unified society might not appear realistic from a theoretical perspective due to the nature of individual differentiation within the economic market and artistic industrial creativity. The structuralist ideology could prove detrimental to this distinction, unlike systems predicated on individual freedom, which expedite personal gains for the development of a societal vision (Michel Foucault, 2013, p. 221.)

Michel Foucault ardently advocates for interpreting history from a structuralist lens, viewing it- as per the perspective of cognitive history- as "the perpetually vigilant and anxious conscience of modern knowledge." Foucault assumes a pivotal role in endorsing structuralism as the apt conceptual framework that society ought to adhere to, as it consolidates disparate elements into a cohesive structure. He asserts that it will not evolve into a comprehensive ideology or converge towards a definitive objective unless it is amalgamated within the framework of a singular structuralist philosophy.

It may strike readers as peculiar that Michel Foucault, a follower of Nietzsche's philosophy which champions liberation from all social obligations, defends structuralism as the sole methodology congruent

with the archaeological research he employs to trace the historical trajectory of theoretical concepts.

Moreover, he believes it surpasses the nihilism Sartre advocates as the terminus of contemporary European society. He synthesizes these two premises to substantiate the robustness of a unified structure within the continuum of an integrated society, potentially outperforming others in presenting this viewpoint that emancipates individuals from existential angst within the social fabric, thereby articulating the essence of structuralism with the potency of individual structures that underpin it.

Concurrently, Garaudy challenges structuralism on the grounds that it constrains individual value in favor of a collective vision. Through his dealings with Marxism, he does not merely distinguish them; instead, he identifies them as a manifest continuum. This rationale also underpins his critique of Marxism based on Nietzsche's notion of the eternal return as a void from human demise and acknowledgment of one's role within the cosmos, and his critique of structuralism through Freud's psychoanalytic theory, which encapsulates the principle of transcendence, an individual value that cannot be diminished by a structuralist outlook.

Thus, Garaudy articulates a critique of the fervor for the structuralist methodology as an intellectual fervor akin to the initial establishment of Marxist communism, "The temptation was immense, to adhere exclusively to this distinctive moment of human reality, the moment of objective reason or the objective unconscious, the moment of structure, and to deny even the veracity of any other moment." (Roger Garaudy, 1967, p. 110.)

The widespread influence of structuralism was not attributable to its intellectual integrity, as it had yet to demonstrate that it was a concept founded on robust theoretical bases. Instead, the anticipation was that it would rejuvenate comprehensive socialism across all human and scientific domains.

In this gestation, one can discern the excessive zeal to defend structuralism, particularly among French academies, because it aligns with the scientific pathways of humans, despite criticisms from even its earliest proponents. There is also an effort to salvage and reinvigorate it, albeit through its resurgence in certain scientific domains where its

efficacy was intended to be justified. Nevertheless, the critique of the structuralist model became pronounced, especially with the emergence of the deconstructive methodology alongside the process of empowering structuralism.

2. The Influence of Nietzsche on Shedding Communal Values

Roger Garaudy regards Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900)* as the quintessential figure epitomizing the rejection of central dogmas that have historically dominated and dictated human progress. Nietzsche's vehement protest against the lofty and universal values represents a significant liberation from the ideological shackles that bind human thought, irrespective of their origins and references.

Garaudy delineates Nietzsche's vehement repudiation of the vestiges of Judaic and Christian principles infiltrating the concept of absolute equality among humans. Nietzsche dismisses the idea of equality, criticizing its underlying purpose driven by a predetermined desire. He elucidates, "The quest for equality might manifest as either a desire to reduce others to one's level (by devaluing, disregarding, or ensnaring them) or as an aspiration to elevate oneself to their level (by acknowledging their worth, assisting them, or reveling in their achievements)." (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2002, p. 162.)

According to Garaudy, Nietzsche identifies that the pursuit of a homogenous pattern of equality represents a simplistic generalization of humanity, which he contends is fundamentally at odds with its intrinsic essence and natural order, which ought to be transcendent and hierarchical.

In this context, Nietzsche characterizes the concept of equality as emblematic of dependency and subjugation to a doctrine of generalization that subsequently negates the principle of individual distinctiveness. Garaudy references Nietzsche's philosophy in his

* Friedrich Nietzsche was a German philosopher, cultural critic, poet, and philologist, whose radical ideas about morality, culture, religion, and the nature of existence have had a profound influence on modern philosophy, literature, psychology, and the arts. Known for his provocative, often controversial assertions, Nietzsche challenged the very foundations of Western thought, calling into question the validity of traditional Christian values, the concept of objective truth, and the notion of a universal moral order.

critique of socialism, seen as a contemporary manifestation and a theoretical foundation for the structuralist approach.

He argues against it from the standpoint of supreme human values, stating, "Denying life for the sake of higher values, be they divine or human, renders life an oppressive and negating force. Nietzsche instructs us on how to refuse this denial, how to restore the unity of identity that merges thought and life, advocating that life is inherently about renewal and creation." (Roger Garaudy, p. 109.)

Nietzsche perceives socialism as diametrically opposed to the true vocation of humans since it ostensibly adheres to numerous religious doctrines (specifically Judaism and Christianity) which exalt principles equating individuals thereby negating any claims to superiority and distinctiveness. He asserts, "The phrase 'equal plots of land' is easy to utter; yet consider the profound anguish and societal ruptures that necessitate such sharing and the subsequent loss of cherished, ancestral possessions, along with numerous degraded and forsaken doctrines." (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2012, p. 179.)

According to the socialist ideology, which fundamentally avoids inflicting harm or violence towards another, while respecting and valuing individual will and facilitating immediate sharing of life's resources, this represents the typical conduct connecting individuals within a socialist framework.

Nietzsche contends that such principles contradict the essence of life and deny its inherent values of uniqueness, distinction, and the pursuit of excellence and differentiation. He argues that life's inherent value involves dominating others, imposing our will, and subjugating them, this is the essence of life within societal structures predicated on power dynamics. (Ammar Trabelsi, 2021, p. 18.)

Furthermore, Nietzsche's challenge to the doctrine of differentiation among humans is seen as an ontological consequence of undermining the reality of transcendence, attempting to foster harmony among societal classes—an endeavor Nietzsche deems a fundamental existential error, reflecting a latent animosity towards the elite and transcendent segments of society.

In his revision of Aristotle's famous assertion that "Man is by nature a social animal," Nietzsche counters with "Man is a predatory animal inclined to solitude; the strong, who are the masters of the human species, naturally tend toward isolation and individuality, repelling any system that coerces them into union and collective existence. (Zakaria Ibrahim, Issue 588.)" This philosophical pivot, embraced by Garaudy, signals a significant shift in European cultural orientation towards a philosophy of transcendence and the autonomy of the human self.

Roger Garaudy's engagement with Nietzsche was not superficial; he followed the trajectory of those profoundly influenced by Nietzsche's philosophy, using it as a framework to critique the intellectual nexus between socialism and structuralism. This approach prompts us to scrutinize Garaudy's method in critiquing structuralism, particularly how he reintroduces contemporary philosophical figures to challenge this philosophical direction. Although Garaudy experienced socialism firsthand, he invoked renowned philosophical doctrines to dissect the core of socialism and its theoretical linkage with structuralism.

Garaudy lists several shifts in human thought, supporting them qualitatively for their role in re-centralizing the human essence and the meaning of human existence on Earth. These shifts, however, did not encapsulate a complete philosophical stance and were the starting points for specific critiques.

Moreover, structuralism's advocates failed to lay down its theoretical and conceptual foundations vis-à-vis socialism, instead positioning structuralism as a novel method designed to assimilate the remnants of the ideological clashes within humanity. Structuralism emerged from nihilism and the rejection of absolute ethical centrality, aspiring to establish a humanistic perspective that preserves all species within a unified system. (Roger Garaudy, p. 109.)

The dismantling of major centralizations, perceived as distinct from the reality of existence, and the promotion of an ontology that venerates the human, introduce the challenge of defining a space where individuals and groups converge within a unified framework governing both their public and private interactions. Structuralism's distinct contribution lies in its

initiation of a new order designed to address the void left by nihilistic philosophies, from Darwin to Freud. It did not negate these philosophies but rather evolved from their conclusions to forge a new project at the nexus of science and society.

Consequently, Garaudy's portrayal of structuralism as primarily rooted in socialism appears as a one-dimensional perspective, especially given his initial embrace of socialist thought. His subsequent rejection of structuralism, based on its alignment with socialist principles, represents a subjective viewpoint that distances itself from the communist ideology that Garaudy eventually renounced.

Garaudy also draws from Nietzsche's critique of values derived from the religious and intellectual history of humanity, emphasizing the need to reevaluate the concept of will and the framework it necessitates. "In this view, the dialectic serves merely as a method to reclaim appropriated values; it presents nothing new, as it still harbors distorted ideas. Forms of bondage become deeply embedded within us, turning us into their perpetrators."

Here, Garaudy's objective is to completely forsake structuralism, surpassing any potential associations with the intellectual foundations of socialism and equality. This is achievable only by enhancing and revitalizing the concept of human will, which determines its value based on life's trajectory. Nietzsche challenges the modernist preferences that preserved the core essence of human thought while merely attempting to amend its methodology. "

The exalted values that humans are expected to serve, especially when they impose their burdensome dictates: these societal values, bolstered as if divine edicts raised above humanity, posited as 'facts' as though they represent the 'real' world." (Friedrich Nietzsche, 2011, p. 25.) Through this lens, Nietzsche's rejection of value idealization, and his advocacy for empowering human will to redefine norms, leads Garaudy to observe that the structuralism endorsed by contemporaries has strayed from its original purpose—fluctuating between being a comprehensive methodology that encapsulates knowledge and offering a viable scientific perspective, and reconnecting human activities within a singular framework. Yet, this interpretation tends to foster a philosophy devoid of soul. "Today's notion of intent fosters a dogmatic philosophy, aligning

with the philosophy of human demise—it is a philosophy without a self." (Roger Garaudy, p. 110.)

In conclusion, Garaudy's stance can be perceived as a dialectic within the postmodern critique, where all ideas, positions, and theories undergo rigorous evaluation to either validate their relevance to human reality or be surpassed by alternatives that better preserve human essence and elevate their ontological attributes and roles.

3. Structuralism and the Dialectic of History

Michel Foucault championed the cause of a structuralist interpretation of the history of knowledge. He elaborated extensively on the role of history and historians in extricating this discipline from potential contradictions. However, Foucault's preoccupation during this time was with the extent to which we could access an authentic history where narratives align with their eras, incidents resonate with their emotions, experiences correlate with outcomes, and narrators with their plots.

Despite these efforts, Foucault persistently critiqued these partial forms, which he believed contributed to the relativity of scientific history. He notably expressed skepticism about their integrity, emphasizing, "But after all this, we are still far from understanding how to establish theoretical concepts that envelop all the delicate sensory perceptions that comprise lived experiences (Paul Veyne, 1992, p. 47.), continually questioning the authenticity and utility of historical narratives.

Furthermore, Foucault sought to dismantle the dominance of humanist perspectives over the historiography of science and discourse. He consistently advocated for the archaeological method, despite its origins, urging the necessity to curb the overwhelming influence of humanistic tendencies in historical research.

Structuralism, in Foucault's view, offered a fresh appraisal of history by amalgamating all discourse elements without detaching them from event outcomes. It provided a framework for studying significant historical moments, comprehending their underpinnings, and subsequently deriving them in a unified methodological schema to adjudicate them as structured knowledge (Abdel Wahab Jaffar, p. 141.)

Foucault concluded that the cohesion of discourse lends comprehensive meaning to human experiences. He argued against separating these elements but rather advocated for integrating them, thereby structuring all societal and state interactions. For Foucault, the consistency of foundational discourse components mattered less than their collective alignment into a structuralist paradigm, which he believed could redefine scientific and cognitive interpretations. Thus, Foucault distinguished himself from other structuralists by his ability to synergize structuralism with interdisciplinary sciences.

Roger Garaudy contested Michel Foucault's approach to constructing a parallel historical narrative through archaeology. Garaudy argued that Foucault's methodology lacked comprehensive conceptualization and was driven more by intellectual passion than methodological rigor. He critiqued Foucault's thesis for not meeting the necessary theoretical standards to qualify as a scientific method, particularly in its handling of historical research(Roger Garaudy, 1979, p. 40.)

Garaudy highlighted Foucault's urgent push to establish a structuralist doctrine as an attempt to transcend postmodern human thought, noting that this involved a problematic reversal of chronological sequences to simplify doctrinal construction. "Foucault's thesis, which facilitated the doctrinal construction by manipulating the chronological order, would have been insignificant if not for the persistent and unfortunate tendency of this abstract and doctrinal structuralism to frivolously handle historical sequencing and to disregard anything that does not conform readily to the doctrine."

Garaudy was critical of Foucault's segmentation of European history into stages based on intellectual progress, deeming it an overly narrow perspective. He pointed out that Foucault often reverted to narrative history, which lacked complete scientific rigor due to the relativity of its data and details.

Moreover, Foucault's categorization of human historical activities into a tripartite schema drew heavily from Auguste Comte's positivism, which Garaudy believed did not adequately address the interrelations of phenomena with the broader human experience. "This approach verges on positivism, describing phenomena only in their structural

interrelations, never questioning their connections with the entirety of human life, practices, and history."

In this light, Garaudy saw the exaltation of theoretical methods over human realities as a retreat into the contemporary inclination to formulate abstract doctrines and concepts without proper consideration for human agency and historical sensibility. He criticized Foucault's claim that Marxism was an unprepared concept within modern structures to be established as structuralism, describing it as an unfounded outcry lacking substantial intellectual justification.

Garaudy challenged Foucault's modernist focus on the superficial aspects of existence and visibility, arguing that Marxism's historical and theoretical engagements were more substantively grounded in materialist dialectics than Foucault's critiques suggested. "Marx's foundational thesis about epistemology was that the essence of science necessarily involves the hidden, not merely the overt and stable relations between facts. The critique of positivism, according to Marx and Engels, is a never-ending process." (Roger Garaudy, p. 42.)

Through these analyses, Garaudy and Foucault engage in a deep-seated debate on the validity and applicability of structuralist approaches to history, questioning the extent to which these methodologies can truly capture and reflect the complexities of human historical experiences.

In this discourse, Garaudy articulates significant concerns regarding Foucault's methodological approach, notably his failure to provide historical and scientific justifications for the diversity and transitions between theories and ideas throughout history.

Garaudy argues that Foucault tends to make hasty judgments that miss the essential goals that ought to be uncovered in the culmination of scholarly research. This issue, according to Garaudy, propels Foucault towards a modern intellectual stance that denies the Marxist foundations of structuralism, despite Garaudy's persistent efforts to explore these Marxist roots to facilitate a thorough historical and critical examination of this theoretical stance.

Central to Garaudy's critique is the interaction between humans and history, which Foucault addresses through his distinct critical lens. Foucault dismisses pre-eighteenth-century epistemology, favoring a

narrative that prioritizes human intellectual evolution, a perspective that, according to Garaudy, seems to manifest a contrary intent that lays bare the superficiality of evidence and the depth of analytical exploration. (Mutaa Safadi, 1986, p. 56.)

Foucault's adherence to a secular stream appears to absolve him from recognizing traditional theories, pushing him towards a form of contemporary disarray. Garaudy contends that Foucault perceives knowledge as merely accumulative, failing to yield the historical insights necessary for humans to grasp the core of their existence and to organize the visible happenings of their lives within a framework of biological supremacy. He criticizes Foucault's assertion, "Life is... and knowledge becomes an active methodology that simultaneously effects change in oneself and the surrounding world." Garaudy views this as a departure from genuine knowledge, skewed towards a doctrinal bias without adequately addressing this substitution. (Ibid, p. 47.)

"This abstract and dogmatic view of structuralism does more than just recreate history through decrees; it renders the flow of history itself opaque and impenetrable to comprehension," Garaudy notes, underscoring the necessity to recognize that Foucault's persistently advocated doctrine does not, in any capacity, accommodate the connections established by established methods of cognitive and historical research in defining the interrelations between human agency and methodological approaches, or more broadly, between life and knowledge.

Foucault's philosophy seeks to transcend all rational and spiritual values to elevate a will that dominates the inherent values of life and the quintessence of humanity. He resists attributing any historical significance, effectively dispersing any references to the intellectual history in favor of a concept of all-encompassing history. "The notion of an exhaustive history and its feasibility are fading, heralding the early signs of what may be termed a universal history, starkly different from its predecessor." (Michel Foucault, 1987, p. 11.)

In this analysis, Foucault is portrayed as diving deep into his postmodern ideology, consistently rejecting a goal-oriented historical narrative as a manifestation of rational and religious traditions. This stance reaffirms Foucault's retreat into twentieth-century nihilism, drawing upon its

outcomes to substantiate his preferred interpretations in scholarly debates, a practice Garaudy frequently criticizes as "Foucault's recklessness in proclaiming" a dominant stance in historical and cognitive inquiry.

Michel Foucault asserts that the formation of history and its related concepts inherently lacks a legal or methodological framework. He emphatically rejects the derivation of knowledge from immutable essences or causal laws, contending that consensus within this realm emerges from a dispersion that ultimately coalesces into a vibrant, functional structure seeking a utilitarian and aesthetic linkage to reality. In this philosophical endeavor, Foucault draws inspiration from Nietzsche, especially in valuing the physical body and asserting its dominance over the traditional elements of knowledge.

At this critical point, Foucault navigates through the exemplification of structuralism, validating it by conceptualizing the body not merely as a physical entity but as a comprehensive structure integrating various interacting substructures that act as dynamic forces complementing one another. He cautions, "We must be wary of believing in historical identities as they are merely masks for unity; the deeper truth that the genealogical researcher seeks to unveil is the secret that things are essenceless, or that their essence has gradually evolved from forms previously alien to them (Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, p. 99.)

This perspective clearly challenges much of traditional human history and the intellectual contributions of philosophers of mind and religion, among others. It is a viewpoint that Foucault undeniably adopts from Nietzsche, who advocated for the dismantling of all essences that elucidate the relationships between the mind and humanity, essence and existence, causality and history, metaphysics and life.

However, this narrow viewpoint renders Foucault incapable of articulating a comprehensive style of structuralism, which he depicts as an amalgamation of intertwined structures collectively moving towards an ontological objective across two dimensions. The first dimension involves advocating for the demise of humanistic orientations as Nietzsche insisted, emphasizing the imposition of hierarchical values and the primacy of the physical body, with structuralism serving to encompass and integrate the parts within the whole.

The second dimension is rooted in archaeological research, probing the origins of ideas and their relationships to concepts, which elucidates Foucault's penchant for weaving a wide array of linguistic expressions that detract from his precision in defining his ideas and consistently advancing them.

4. Structuralism from Knowledge to Society

The need for structuralist theory to reassert itself within the intellectual sphere necessitates demonstrating the mechanisms of its societal applications, transitioning from a purely scientific methodology to a philosophy that pervades public life. This transition is facilitated through the exploration of connective values that define the structure of society by delving into the essence of human anthropology through both historical narratives and realistic literary depictions. This approach involves mimicking the literary and historical text to reflect the societal ontology, extending from individual life boundaries to delineating class struggles and discussing distinct systems of governance.

Levi-Strauss stands out as one of the pioneers in studying ancient societies as segments for analytical scrutiny and research samples, consistently aligning his insights with the structuralist direction while steadfastly adhering to Marxist thought, particularly its societal aspects. This involves discerning variations in the application of economic theory to historical societies in a manner conducive to understanding and quantification.

He posits, "Marxism provided a historical perspective on nature and a materialistic view of history, where real-life practices constitute the actual vital processes by which human existence is defined, and human consciousness is merely a reflection of this historical practice." Thus, human consciousness and memory are not natural products but constructs of historical evolution (Salah Fadl, 1998, p. 285.)

This viewpoint allows Strauss to prefer his methodology over Marx's, focusing on addressing historical societies through their economic frameworks, whereas Marxists contented themselves with the realistic literary portrayal of ancient societies. This distinction is pivotal as Strauss endeavors to formulate a comprehensive theory that seamlessly

integrates the essential dimensions between the scientific method and social life(Edith Cresswell, 1993, p. 53.)

The approach of comparison and measurement scrutinizes the conditions of diverse societies that have historically exhibited individualistic tendencies regarding property, or existential orientations at a societal level. Levi-Strauss, through meticulous analysis, asserts that these characteristics will inevitably pose obstacles in identifying the underlying principles, values, laws, and relationships crucial for dissecting structures and fostering the development of a cohesive social structure(Mohamed Majdi Al-Jaziri, 1999, p. 43.)

Consequently, Strauss's endorsement of Marxism and its structural adaptation stems from his principled agreement with Marx's view that the cultural spirit of any society necessitates a comprehensive economic framework. Strauss elucidates, "The dialectic in Levi-Strauss arises directly from the customs and philosophies of the group from which an individual learns, and from this individual's belief in guardian spirits and from the fact that the entire society teaches its members that their only hope for salvation within the fixed social system lies in a futile attempt to free themselves from this system."

Despite Strauss's commitment to Marxism in his analysis of primitive societies, he acknowledges the shortcomings in his philosophical approach, particularly his attempt to apply Marxism to societies that lack a robust industrial and economic base, recognizing this as a fundamental flaw in his methodology.

Strauss resonates with Rousseau's perspectives on nature and equality, particularly embracing the historical discourse on the origin of inequality and the imperative to revert to a principle of natural, inherent equality. However, Strauss introduces a subtle variation to align with contemporary times, positing that "the real conception of man is intricately linked to language, and language itself is inconceivable without society."

While Strauss critiques Rousseau's detailed depiction of the historical narrative of primitive society, he distances himself from the direct realism of comparing the three scenarios outlined by Rousseau with his own aspirations for deriving historical study benefits in a structural

format for classical society. This raises questions: Is Strauss enumerating this study to explore a contemporary model of society that diverges from the current norms, or is he employing it to validate the efficacy of the structural method in analyzing ancient societies? This introduces a layer of ambiguity and overlap in his utilization of concepts and terminology that depict societal conditions, which has yet to yield concrete outcomes in these historical studies of past societies.

Strauss's exploration of structuralism begins with the acknowledgment that every material or cognitive phenomenon possesses a distinct structure comprising a network of relationships within a single, analyzable system. He emphasizes, "It's a fundamental rule of structural analysis... And by this, I mean that the analysis must extend beyond mere words to comprehend, through the words, the relationships that bind them. These relationships alone constitute the true focus of analysis." This perspective is rooted in examining the essential connections between all components and elements to decipher their interrelations and integrate them within a unified structure (Claude Lévi-Strauss, 1990, p. 79.)

Here, it appears that Strauss does not explicitly delineate the nature of social structuralism, as he transitions from depicting the scientific structural method to generalizing it in governing social interactions, a move that does not correspond with the traditional anthropological trajectory. Strauss's stance is primarily conceptual rather than based on empirical observations or a grounded philosophical outlook.

Despite his attempts to mitigate these concerns by stating, "We are compelled to conceive of social structures as entities independent of people's consciousness of them, capable of differing from the perceived images as much as physical reality diverges from the sensory representations we form of it and the hypotheses we construct about it," this position is subject to Garaudy's critique (Ibid, p. 40.)

Garaudy contends that by subjecting a linguistic entity to a dialectic of human contents and relegating society to an untested methodological hypothesis, the assumptions have not realized the outcomes Strauss anticipated. Garaudy reiterates his view of structuralism as a modern

reinterpretation of Marxism aimed at recalibrating society, and occasionally aspiring to a Kantian philosophy devoid of a transcendental self, both of which encapsulate the methodological and conceptual skepticism that Strauss encounters.

Strauss's main challenge lies in his approach to analyzing ancient societies with a non-historical perspective that seeks to unify study hypotheses with the present conditions, viewing the past of these societies as somewhat forming the present of contemporary societies through the retrieval of past qualities.

This approach subjects his perspective to the realm of myth rather than adhering to the principles of historical study, which demand a systematic chronology and objective bases that narrate events with clarity for each phase and its unique and collective traits. Herein lies the ambiguity: Strauss oscillates between seeking hypothetical justifications and attempting to establish natural laws that analytically govern society with a disciplined set of relationships.

Garaudy, delving deeper, argues that social structuralism has not yet achieved the substantive satisfaction it aims for, considering that individuals are portrayed as unconscious conduits of an overarching system. He states, "Based on this, the unconscious, not in the Freudian sense of being laden with desires but in the Kantian sense of being comprised of categories without reference to a thinking self, is the source of all other structures. Yet, it remains itself an uninterpretable datum, inherently primitive by definition(Roger Garaudy, p. 32.)

Consequently, the structural method cannot adequately formalize the social conditions of individuals since external reality is fluid and not bound by the static rules or examples Strauss sets out in his theoretical application to social realities. Individuals or societies cannot be confined to a single subject or a fixed timeframe, as their diversity is shaped by the experiential evolution that humans undergo, acquiring historical insights, and the transformative leap that distinguishes human subjects from other entities like language and culture.

Conclusion

Structuralism champions the activation of a unified system among diverse elements and components, positioning itself as a singular framework that encapsulates all essences and directs them towards an inclusive vision that safeguards all participants. It has proven its theoretical capabilities across various disciplines, including linguistics, history, methodology, and sociology, consistently striving to maintain its capacity for generalization and inclusivity, thus presenting a viable perspective for the sciences, knowledge, and human life.

However, the critical perspectives offered by advocates of individual freedom, proponents of hierarchical systems, and theorists of inequality challenge the Nietzschean underpinnings of structuralism in its methodologies, techniques, and results. This challenge introduces confusion and ambiguity by surpassing essential and referential frameworks without delineating the central model it should adhere to.

Given that the fundamental human drive for superiority and distinction through the principle of disparity has limited structuralism's opportunities to substantiate its validity and navigate the dilemmas of instrumental breakdown, its alignment with philosophies of equality, from Rousseau to Marx, has diluted its practical effectiveness, precipitating Roger Garaudy's characterization of it as a philosophy of human demise.

He points to moments when structuralism diverges from the natural life inherent to human existence, advocating a system rooted in equality, uniformity, and comprehensiveness. Garaudy critiques this methodological effort by structuralists to extend their academic pursuits into a social theory that confines human activity within an all-encompassing structural framework.

In this context, while structuralism seeks to integrate all facets of human existence into a coherent whole, it faces substantial criticism for its capacity to authentically reflect the complexities of human society and the singularity of individual experiences. Garaudy's critique highlights a fundamental tension in structuralism's approach to human life, suggesting that its analytical model often suppresses the intrinsic disparities and individualities that define human experiences.

Therefore, while structuralism provides a powerful framework for understanding interconnected systems, its application to human social

structures must be approached with caution to prevent oversimplification and the potential erasure of the unique human elements it endeavors to comprehend.

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