

The role of the Russian-Ukrainian War in the emergence of new energy sources for the European market

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Abstract:

This study dealt with the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022 on European energy security after the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West following its invasion of Ukraine, after which the supply of Russian energy sources to European markets was stopped, by addressing the strategic importance of Ukraine in the Russian perspective, as well as the European policies adopted in the face of cutting off the supply of Russian energy sources by heading towards new partners to fill the deficit left by the war, and the Russian strategy in the face of Western sanctions imposed on it after it invades Ukraine to find alternative markets for European markets to remedy the decline in exports.

Keywords: European energy security; Russian-Ukrainian war; European Union; energy security.

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1. INTRODUCTION

At a time when governments and peoples began to recover from the remnants of the coronavirus pandemic and its profound effects at all levels, the world found itself in the face of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the latter of which cast a shadow on all levels. Although it originated in Europe, it had wider and more comprehensive dimensions and constituted an important turning point, such as the global economic system. This is due to the extent of the prevailing interdependence and interdependence in economic relations in the international system, as both Russia and Ukraine are among the most important exporting countries for the most important consumer and other basic materials, as well as oil and natural gas as a vital element in the economy.

Russia is the most important supplier and trading partner of the European Union countries, which was greatly affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war and led to the rise in the prices of raw materials in the world markets due to the sanctions imposed on Russia by European countries, and Russia's search for alternative markets and new customers other than traditional partners used natural gas as an economic pressure card in front of the European political decision on sanctions imposed on them and saving their economies from collapse, while European countries tended to adopt rational economic policies, in order to reduce energy consumption, as well as to search for alternative sources of Russian gas in order to free themselves from dependence on Russia in the field of Energy as a step to achieve the independence of their political decision, but it is noticeable that these sanctions formed a point of difference between European countries between the conservative and those who exclude the energy sector from these sanctions, each party according to the degree of its dependence on Russian gas and the need of these countries' economies for Russian raw materials to meet their needs in order to continue their development and economic growth.

The main problem:

In light of these international changes and transformations that resulted from the Russian-Ukrainian war, as well as the shift in international

economic relations, the fate of Russian-European relations in the field of Energy remains contingent on Russia's dealing with these sanctions in the face of continued European support for Ukraine. Based on what has already been discussed, the following main problem can be raised:

How did the Russian-Ukrainian war affect the emergence of new energy sources in the European market?

Under this problem, the following sub-questions are involved:

- What does Ukraine represent from a Russian strategic perspective?
- What is the Russian strategy for providing new alternatives to European markets?
- What policies have European countries adopted to obtain alternative energy supplies from Russian sources?

To answer these sub-questions, the study was divided into the following axes:

- Russian-Ukrainian relations from the perspective of the geopolitical importance of Ukraine in the Russian strategic perception
- Russia's strategy to counter Western sanctions by finding alternative markets to European markets
- European policies adopted in the face of cutting off Russian energy supplies

The importance of the study: Its importance lies in:

- Analysis of Russia's Strategic Vision for its Relations with Ukraine
- Establishing academic awareness of the impact of the Russian-Ukrainian War on the nature of Russian-European relations
- Knowing the role of the energy element in the course of these relations and the extent of its impact in the long term

Study objectives: The study aims to:

- Russia's goal is to maintain its relations with Ukraine
- Knowing the most important strategies used by Russia in its relations with European countries in the field of Energy
- Knowledge of European policies in the face of cutting off Russian energy supplies.

2. Russian-Ukrainian relations from the perspective of the geopolitical importance of Ukraine in the Russian strategic perception

The Russian-Ukrainian war in 2022 was not the result of the moment but rather a war that came after a series of tensions that prevailed between the two countries since the separation of Ukraine from Russia following the disintegration of the former Soviet republics in 1991. Russian-Ukrainian relations were in a state of tide, from Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014 to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Ukraine represents an important strategic extension and depth for Russia in its regional neighbourhood, or the vital area, as it is a wall of separation between Russia and Europe. It also represents its backyard. Despite their separation, Russia is always keen to keep Ukraine away from Europe, especially in light of Ukraine's continuous demand to join NATO and the European Union. On the other hand, the West and the United States of America seek Ukrainian disengagement with Russia.

Historically, Russia has considered Ukraine a part of its traditional homeland and a major part of Russian history. Despite cultural differences and full control over Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalist elites called for independence from the Soviet Union. Russia remained determined to suppress any idea of Ukrainian nationalism until the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹

The collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 led to a large security vacuum for the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, which rushed to join Western organizations and blocs, such as the European Union and NATO, in front of the Russian opposition, especially NATO. According to the Russian vision, there is no longer a need for the presence of NATO after the collapse of the Warsaw Pact in 1991², and any expansion or strengthening of its capabilities threatens Russian security. On the other hand, Ukraine represents great strategic importance for Russia.

¹ George Friedman, *Russia's Search for Strategic Depth*, *Geopolitical Futures*, November 17, 2020 <https://geopoliticalfutures.com/russias-search-for-strategic-depth/>, Accessed. march.11, 2025

² Osama Farouk Mekhimer, *The Role of the Organization for European Security and Cooperation in Managing Conflicts in Europe after the Cold War: A Study of the Case of Bosnia*, PhD Thesis in Political Science, Cairo: Cairo University - Faculty of Economics and Political Science, 2004. P.73

Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has been guarded to keep its fleet in the Black Sea, at the Sevastopol naval base in Crimea, which Russia believes controlling means controlling the Black Sea and the areas bordering it. Ethnically, the Russians constitute approximately 17% of the population of Ukraine. This allowed Russia to extend its political, military and economic influence to Eastern Europe and the Black Sea countries. Ukraine is also a transit point for Russian natural gas to Europe, which has gained strategic importance for the Russian energy security system.¹ The Russians realize that Ukraine is the heart of Eastern Europe and that NATO's arrival, influencing it and placing it under its security and defence responsibilities, threatens Russia's security, blocking the way for its extension of influence and depriving it of being a global power.

The return of Ukraine to the Eurasian circle is a matter of the existence of limits for President "Putin", who agrees with the thinker "Alexander Dugin" regarding the new Eurasian project based on the employment of the historical, geographical, and religious factors to attract former Soviet countries. Putin's historical speeches have goals after Ukraine that seek to redraw the vital field to ensure Russian national security and thus suppress Western expansion in Eastern Europe and NATO efforts to lure these countries.²

Ukraine is considered a geographical depth and a first line of defence for Western Europe and the Atlantic Basin, which made it a fundamental target for the expansionist goals of both Russia and European countries. Ukraine is Europe's second most populous country and the second largest economy after Russia in Eastern Europe. It is also of great importance in the Russian gas industry, as 80% of the gas exported to Europe passes through its territory, which made Russia categorically reject Ukraine's accession to the European Union, according to³ The Russian perception

¹ Ahmed Jalal Mahmoud Abdo, "American Policy Towards the Russian Military Intervention in Ukraine and Its Implications for NATO," **Journal of the Faculty of Politics and Economics**, Beni Suef University, 16th issue, October 2022. P. 419

² Taleb Hafiza, Ukraine's Place in Russian Geopolitical Thought (1999 _2022), **Journal of World Politics**, Volume 06, Issue 02, 2022. P. 86

³ Fairouz Amieur, The Russian-Ukrainian War and its Implications for European Energy Security, **Academic Journal of Political Studies**, Issue 01, Volume 07, June 2024, pp. 198_199,

that Ukraine's exit from space or Russian influence causes isolation of Russia from the world

In 1994, the "Budapest Memorandum" was signed, under which the Russian Federation pledged to respect the borders of Ukraine in exchange for Kyiv's abandonment of its nuclear arsenal inherited from the Soviet Union in favour of Russia. The latter sees the expansion of NATO in the east as a threat to it. It also rejects Ukraine's accession to the Western political, economic and military system. It does not accept military alliances on its borders, wants to impose its prestige, and respects its interests in its vital field or what is known as its regional neighbourhood.¹

Ukraine remained in traditional relations with Russia. After "Lewind Kravchuk" (1991-1994), "Leonid Kuchma" was elected (1994-2005) to be the new Ukrainian President, who hoped to maintain good relations with Russia. In 2003, he even approved the Russian proposal to establish a "common economic space" with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. In 2010, the Ukrainian presidential candidate supported by Russia, "Viktor Yanukovych", won the presidential elections. However, what was known as the Orange Revolution quickly appeared with demonstrators supporting the pro-Western candidate "Yushchenko", forcing them to reconsider the elections, to be won by "Yushchenko", whose arrival was a return of a crisis of confidence with Russia, which saw the colour revolution as the work of the CIA, to weaken Russia and disengage it from neighbouring countries.²

Russia worked intelligence and also employed its soft power by pushing pro-Russian leaders to participate in the Ukrainian elections. In 2010, it succeeded in supporting its candidate, "Viktor Yanukovych", and winning the presidential elections to restore relations with Russia again, and his government extended the lease of the port of Sevastopol to Russia, with the decline of its association with the European Union, to return again the pro-accession protests to the West, which prompted "Yanukovych" to leave

¹ Bishara Azmi, "Russia, Ukraine, and NATO: Reflections on the Wonderful Insistence on Not Avoiding the Path to War," *Derasat Series, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies*, February 27, 2022.

² Ahmed bin Daifallah Al-Qarni, Ukraine in Russian Geopolitics, *International Institute of Iranian Studies*, Riyadh, May 15, 2022, p. 16.

his post to elect the pro-Western "Alexander Turchinov " as President of Ukraine in 2014 in the face of the Russian refusal to recognize the Turchinov government, and then the Ukrainians again elected the candidate "Petro Poroshenko" in (2014-2019), which continued in his hostile rhetoric to Russia, after this crisis, Russian President "Putin " realized the inability of diplomacy to achieve Russian goals in Ukraine, and that the use of military force is a must in order to restore Russia's geopolitical status, starting with Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, the first time a European country annexed territory from another country since World War II¹

The first sparks of the Russian-Ukrainian war broke out in 2014, as Russia carried out several military operations on Ukrainian territory. After the European field protests and the isolation of Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovych, Russia took control of strategic and vital sites in Crimea. According to official results, it succeeded in annexing them under its sovereignty after a referendum in which Crimean residents voted to join the Russian Federation. As for Donbas, demonstrations by pro-Russian separatist groups escalated, which led to an armed conflict between the Ukrainian government and Russian-backed separatist groups.²

Russian President Vladimir Putin reinforced the idea of the historical monarchy of Ukraine in a 2014 speech to the State Duma, saying: **“In the hearts and minds of the people, Crimea has always been an integral part of Russia. This firm conviction is based on truth and justice and is passed down from generation to generation. Under any circumstances, despite all the dramatic changes our country has undergone during the entire twentieth century, our task was not to conduct a full-fledged military operation there but to ensure the safety and security of the people and to create a comfortable environment for the expression of their will.**”³

¹ Christopher Kernan Schmidt E-international **Relation**, Evaluating Russia's Grand Strategy in Ukraine, July 6 2020, Accessed, March 03, 2025, <https://bit.ly/36uOE30>

² Guarantor of electronic payments, **what does Putin want from Ukraine, what are the causes of the Russian-Ukrainian war, and what are the latest developments** on the website: <https://damen.com.eg/ar/2023/10/30/>, Date of implementation 06/03/2025, 15:23

³ Christopher Kernan Schmidt,opcit

This speech came days after the annexation of Crimea by holding a referendum in support of returning it to Russia and weeks before the start of violence in eastern Ukraine between Russian-backed forces and the Ukrainian army. After the occupation of Crimea and the outbreak of revolutions in eastern Ukraine in 2014, Ukraine went to NATO and asked to join and enter the defence umbrella of the alliance. For Moscow, the mere thought of the Ukrainian leadership joining a state that was affiliated with it and has this geographical and economic importance to NATO would be a major failure of the Russian grand strategy.

In 2016, the conflict was renewed again when Ukraine announced that Russia had intensified its military presence along the Crimean borderline and then closed border crossings. These disputes continued until 2018 when Russian warships fired on three Ukrainian ships. Lawmakers in the Ukrainian parliament overwhelmingly supported the imposition of martial law along Ukraine's coastal areas and areas adjacent to Russia in response to Russia's shooting and seizure of Ukrainian naval vessels near Crimea a day earlier.¹

In 2019, Volodymyr Zelensky won the Ukrainian presidential election against President Poroshenko. Zelensky was no less hostile than his predecessor regarding the relationship with Russia. His victory confirmed that the majority of the Ukrainian people wanted to go west, so Zelensky did not bow to Russian blackmail, called for a complete Russian withdrawal and the disarmament of all illegal formations and military formations in eastern Ukraine, and strengthened the procedures for joining NATO and the European Union. The West, especially the United States of America, rushed to provide Ukraine with many qualitative weapons and military training and to impose more economic pressure on Russia.²

The Russians realize that as NATO expands eastward towards Russian interests, it weakens Russia's ability to defend its territory from land, air and sea incursions. The Russians began to re-read what Halford Mackinder wrote when he said: "Whoever controls Eastern Europe controls the heart of

¹ <https://damen.com.eg/ar/2023/10/30/>, op. Cit.

² Ahmed bin Dhaifallah Al-Qarni, op. Cit., P. 19.

the world, and whoever controls the heart of the world controls the island of the world, and whoever controls the island of the world rules the world¹. Russia confirmed that NATO's attempt to annex Finland and Sweden and its expansion to the east poses a threat to Russian borders by NATO forces.

2

Russia is always concerned about the foreign penetration of Eastern European countries bordering Russia, not only in terms of Western political or military influence but also in terms of cultural penetration, which Russia sees as a dangerous Western tool to distance those countries from Russia and make them adopt the principles of Western liberalism, as President Putin sees it as a culture that contradicts traditional social values, warning of the moral decline that it leads to.³

Beginning in mid-2021, Russia began to mobilize its military forces on its western border in conjunction with a US-European military buildup in Ukraine. Washington has provided Kyiv with \$2.5 billion in military assistance since 2014, including \$450 million in 2021. This prompted Putin to demand several times the need to ease the US military buildup in Ukraine for lack of justification.⁴

At the end of 2021, Russia submitted the "security guarantees" document, which Washington rejected. Russia began to threaten to use the military tool by carrying out military manoeuvres personally supervised by Putin on February 19, 2022. Then Putin officially recognized the separatist republics of Lugansk and Donetsk, known as the "Donbas region", on February 22, 2022. He also announced his intervention to help separatists in that region, announcing the "limited" Russian military operation, as Putin described it, on February 24, 2022, as "the defence of Donbas."⁵

The follower of Russian-Ukrainian relations since its independence in

¹ Mahmoud Dalal, The Ukrainian Crisis: The Real Goals of Russia and the United States, **Egyptian Center for Thought and Strategic Studies**, February 22, 2022, at: <https://bit.ly/3wnQpdb>, Date of discharge: March 4, 2025.

² Lev Topor, Strategic Perspectives on the Russia-Ukraine War, E-International Relations, March 6 2022, available at: <https://www.e-ir.info/2022/03/06/opinion-strategic-perspectives-on-theru> Lev Topor, Strategic Perspectives on the Russia-Ukraine War/

³ Ahmed bin Daif Allah Al-Qarni, op. Cit., P. 17.

⁴ Issam Abdel Shafi, op. Cit.

⁵ Suleiman Mouna, "Consequences and Possible Paths of Russia's Military Operation in Ukraine," **Journal of International Politics**, Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Cairo, February 26, 2022.

1991 realizes that it is a reflection of Ukraine's geopolitical importance in the Russian strategic perspective, which always seeks to keep it under its control in the face of the Ukrainian desire to get rid of Russian dependence, especially in light of the intervention of the United States of America and the West and Ukraine's support in achieving its goals away from Russian interference. Because of the sanctions imposed by the West on Russia, the latter has made it search for alternative markets to free its dependence on Europe in the field of Energy and save its economy from collapse. European countries have also rushed to search for new sources of energy supplies in order to free themselves from their dependence on Russia and protect their economy from the fluctuations and vibrations of the international market resulting from the sanctions imposed on Russia following the Russian-Ukrainian war.

3. The Russian strategy in the face of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets for European markets

Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, and the imposition of sanctions by European countries and the West on Russia, the latter has begun to search for quick solutions to remedy the situation that the Russian economy has become, maintain its position in energy markets, and find alternative markets the size of the European market.

To limit the repercussions of Western sanctions on Russia, the Central Bank of Russia decided on January 18, 2023, to expand the list of currencies covered by the official trading system to include nine new currencies, such as the Thai baht, the Vietnamese dong, the Serbian dinar, the Georgian lari, and the Indonesian rupee, in addition to some Middle Eastern currencies, bringing the total number of currencies determined by the Central Bank of Russia at official daily rates to 43 currencies for the continuation of the war. This decision came in a global economic context characterized by uncertainty due to the Russian war on Ukraine and the consequent sanctions imposed by international parties on Russia to isolate it globally. This

prompted Moscow to adopt policies to alleviate the impact and severity of these sanctions.¹

After the West imposed economic sanctions on Russia, the latter tended to reduce the costs of importing Russian oil for Chinese refiners. This allowed China to save nearly \$10 billion in oil import costs compared to the pre-Russian-Ukrainian war period and Western sanctions on Moscow. The Russian-Chinese² rapprochement is interpreted as a confrontation and rejection of US hegemony and confronting NATO expansion.

From January 2023 to September of the same year, China imported about 2 million barrels per day of oil from Russia, representing about one-third of Russia's exports. The two countries manage many joint projects in energy production and development, especially oil, and about 40% of Russian oil exports pass through the East Siberia-Pacific Ocean pipeline.³

China is the largest economic partner, especially after the "borderless" strategic partnership statement signed between the Russian and Chinese presidents on February 4, 2022, which included more than 15 agreements. China increased its imports of Russian oil in May 2022 by 55%, which helped Russia compensate for what it lost due to the closure of Western markets due to the sanctions imposed on it. In September 2022, Russia announced the establishment of the "Siberian Power 2" pipeline to replace the "Nord Stream 2" pipeline that transports Russian gas to Europe. Russian Energy Minister Alexander Novak confirmed that Russia and China will sign an agreement under which China will import about 50 billion cubic meters of gas annually from Russia through the "Siberian Power 2" pipeline from the northern Yamal region in Russia to China through Mongolia, which it is expected to enter service in 2030⁴ This cooperation, Equivalent to Nord Stream's maximum capacity of 55 billion

¹ Bassant Jamel, "De-Dollarization: **Motives for Russia's Inclusion of New Ruble Basket Coins**," February 7 2023 at: <https://futureuae.com/ar-AE/Mainpage/Item/7995> (Discharge Date, 07/03/2025)

² Evan S. Medeiros, Michael S. Chase, "**Russia-China relations Assessing Common Ground and Strategic Fault Lines**", Op.Cit, p9

³ Abdel Moneim Mohamed Obaid Ali, Motives for Forming the Russian-Chinese Axis to Confront American Hegemony, **Scientific Journal of Research and Commercial Studies**, Volume 38, Issue 03, 2024. P.1070.

⁴ Al Hosani Aisha Ibrahim, Prospects for Sino-Russian Relations, **Trends for Research and Studies**, UAE, June 4 2024.

cubic meters per year, will undoubtedly ease the impact of Western sanctions on the Russian energy sector.

Russia has also tended to increase its supplies of natural gas to India and the Central Asian republics through the "Siberian Power 1 " line, which is not working at its maximum capacity yet ¹, and has succeeded in attracting the Indian market for its crude oil after Moscow offered fictional discounts of up to 40%. Russian crude oil exports at the end of 2022 accounted for a quarter of Indian oil imports and rose to 57.7 billion dollars during 2023. Agreements were announced on building the Kudankulam nuclear power project, according to the statement of Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov that cooperation with India serves the interests of the two countries.²

Asian markets are an ideal destination for Russian oil. Before the war, energy markets obtained 35% of Russian oil. After the war, the flow of Russian oil through sea routes to Asia increased by 50%. In the same context, Dr Leonid Su Kya Nin, a professor at the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, points out that Asian markets enjoy two things that are in Russia's interest: The first is the increasing demand for oil, especially industrial China, which needs a lot of cheap crude, and the second is that it does not need the swift system for international financial transfers to pay Russia for imported oil.³ In addition to opening new markets, Russia is reducing the price of crude sold to attract new customers

Russia also tended to reduce its forecast for the price of a barrel of Brent oil in 2025 to \$65 from \$68 in 2024. Elvira Nabiullina, the governor of the Russian Bank, stated that the bank will not publish its forecasts for future Brent oil prices. Russia is ⁴, pursuing a policy of lowering its expectations

¹ Budan Adly, **Europe and Signs of Overcoming the Russian Gas Crisis**, 02.03.2023 at: <http://www.aljazeera.net>

² Artimty Ahmed Khalil, **International Tensions and Their Impact on Russian-Indian Relations: An Analysis of Western Fears and Economic Opportunities**, **Al Bayan Center for Studies and Planning**, February 7, 2024

³ Kasim Nagham, **Russia and Ukraine: How Moscow Can Sell Its Oil Despite Sanctions**, June 14, 2022 at: <http://www.bbc.com>.

⁴ The Russian centre lowers its forecast for the price of a barrel of Brent to \$65 at <http://www.argaam.com>

for oil prices to protect its economy from collapse, shocks, and vibrations due to price fluctuations in global markets.

Due to the sharp decline in Russian gas exports to the European Union as a result of Western sanctions on it, Russia has strengthened its cooperation with Turkey, as Russian exports to Turkey in 2022 recorded a clear increase, followed by the energy sector by 103.1% compared to 2021. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Turkey has doubled the amount of crude oil imported from Russia to reach a record level of 400,000 barrels per day in November 2023 (about 14% of Russian maritime oil shipments). Turkey became the third destination for Russian crude oil exports after India and China¹

This reinforced the Turkish strategic position in the Russian strategy of achieving independence from European dependence, especially with the growing Turkish role regionally and internationally and its control over the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles as routes for the passage of Russian maritime oil shipments.

Russia has adopted several strategies by reducing the volume of exports to the European Union since the beginning of the invasion of Ukraine and facing economic counter-sanctions against the West, which targeted the gas sector with the emergence of an acceleration after the invasion in the diversification of Russian LNG resources and export destinations as Russia moves towards new partners, most notably China

The Russian-Ukrainian conflict has contributed to the acceleration of the vertical corridor, and the development of this corridor mainly seeks to increase the reverse flow transmission capacity on a pipeline across the Balkans. With a capacity of 27 cm/year, the latter transports Russian gas to the Balkans and Turkey via Ukraine, Moldova and Romania. The commissioning of the TurkStream pipeline in 2020, which is part of Russia's strategy to bypass the Ukrainian transit route, makes the Trans-Balkan pipeline available to transport gas from infrastructure from the south to northern Turkey and Greece.²

¹ Mahmoud Dina: The Turkish bet: Trends in the Russian-European conflict over Energy in the Black Sea, **Future Center for Advanced Research and Studies**, Abu Dhabi, August 12, 2024.

² Mahmoud Dina, op. Cit.

Since it invaded Ukraine, Russia has tried to adapt to the post-war situation and Western sanctions by adopting new export policies, searching for new markets to compensate the European market, reducing prices, diversifying export materials other than energy and gas elements, and trying to get rid of its dependence on the European market, especially in the field of Energy, which was the most important sector affected by the Russian-Ukrainian war.

4. the European strategy in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war to obtain alternative energy sources for Russia

European countries are the most important markets for Russian Energy, as Russia represents the security source and the most important partner for Europe. Perhaps the most important reasons that put Russia first among the priorities of European energy security are proximity and geography. This means an abundance of transport and greater protection from sabotage; the availability of infrastructure for transporting Energy through pipelines and the relations between them confirm that the European Union is one of Russia's major economic and trade partners, and its share in Russian foreign trade is 50 per cent. Energy is also the main and most important axis of Russian-European relations. The Russian-Ukrainian war shocked the global economy and Europe because of their mutual energy dependence. Energy is the main channel for transmitting the effects of war to Europe, leading to wider supply chain interruptions and disruption of European economic projects.

Putin's energy war on Europe also spurred renewable energy projects. As EU governments sought to accelerate the pace of granting licenses for those projects, rates of solar panel installations and heat pumps witnessed one of their best-ever years in 2022. In this context, solar capacity increased by 41.4 gigawatts, or 25% on an annual basis, recording 208.9 gigawatts in 2022 and is expected to grow faster in the coming years¹

Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in February 2022, Moscow was the main energy supplier to the EU; the latter imported about

¹ Mohamed Abdel Sanad is losing the energy war with Europe when magic turns on the magician.

45% of its gas, 27% of its oil and 46% of its coal in 2021. Russian energy exports amounted to about 300 billion euros, and it was Moscow's main source of income. The total demand for gas in the European Union amounted to about 400 billion cubic meters annually, of which 150 billion cubic meters came from Russia, mostly through pipelines. However, to undermine Russia's war effort in Ukraine, the EU has announced that it will significantly reduce its energy imports from Moscow through 2022 and end them by 2027, with a package of sanctions on imports from Russia of oil and coal by sea.¹

For all these reasons and others, European countries have adopted quick solutions, searching for safe new sources of energy supply as alternatives to Russian gas and oil and diversifying strong supply lines and sources.

An agreement was signed between the United States and the European Commission to supply the United States of America with liquefied gas supplies of 15 billion cubic meters until the end of 2022. Germany also concluded a partnership with Qatar to supply it with liquefied gas. Italy signed agreements with several countries to supply it with liquefied gas, namely Algeria, 09 billion cubic meters; Angola, 1.5 billion cubic meters; and the Republic of the Congo, 5 billion cubic meters. Denmark went on to raise the productivity of its largest field in the north, the Tyra field, as European countries accelerated renewable energy projects to eliminate Russian dependence. In this regard, the Union has allocated about 195 billion euros according to a preliminary plan for renewable energy investments.²

Two years into the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the EU's sources of energy imports have diversified, and the share of Russian gas has fallen dramatically. During 2022, the share of Russian imports decreased to 80 billion cubic meters, reaching 43 billion cubic meters in 2023, and the EU's dependence on Russian gas witnessed a sharp decline from 45% of the European market share in 2021 to 15% in 2023.³

¹ Dina Mahmoud, op. Cit.

² Ibrahim Al-Ghaitani, Global Energy Trends Report, The **Future of Advanced Research and Studies**, Issue 2, May 2022, p. 09.

³ Noémie Rebière, Sami Ramdani, Luca Baccarini, "Guerre russo-ukrainienne: la région de la mer Noire au cœur de la reconfiguration des flux énergétiques", OSFME, Avril 2024.p 12.

At the beginning of 2024, only two of the five main routes for Russian gas supplies to Europe were in operation: the TurkStream gas pipeline, which crosses the Black Sea to reach Turkey, and the Fraternité gas pipeline, which passes through Ukraine.¹

To fill the Russian gas deficit, the EU has worked to strengthen its relations with its traditional partners, especially with Norway, which accounts for 30% of the EU's gas imports in 2023, and with Azerbaijan, whose gas exports to the EU have increased by more than 46% since 2021.²

EU countries also cut Russia's share of gas imports to 15% in the first seven months of 2023, compared to about 24% in 2022 and 45% in 2021, according to the European Commission. Half of the Russian gas imported by the EU was LNG from January to July, compared to only a quarter in 2022.³

In light of the sanctions on Russia, the European Union has worked to support the exporting countries in Central Asia by diversifying their export routes and developing the Central Asia Corridor Project, a multimodal land and sea transport corridor that allows the transport of raw materials and consumer goods from China to Europe.

The volume of trade between Central Asian countries and the European Union has increased significantly since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. In 2022, the volume of goods transiting this route increased by 2.5 times to 1.5 million tons. It is assumed to reach about 4 million tons in 2024 and 10 million tons in the medium term.⁴

By supporting this major geopolitical project politically and economically, the EU aims not only to relaunch land links with China but also to develop a corridor that allows it to bypass Russian networks through ports, requiring

¹ Caspian Barrel, “ **LNG imports test EU resolve to quit Russian fossil fuel** ”, 13 Avril 2023 <https://caspianbarrel.org/en/2023/04/analysis-lng-imports-test-eu-resolve-to-quit-russian-fossil-fuel/> (consulté le 04/3/2025).

² Claudia Patricolo, “**EU and Azerbaijan to expand Southern Gas Corridor and double gas trade by 2027**”, CEENERGYNEWS, 4 mars 2024, <https://ceenergynews.com/oil-gas/eu-and-azerbaijan-to-expand-the-southern-gas-corridorand-double-gas-trade-by-2027/> (consulté le 05.03.2025).

³ La Tribune, «**Gaz liquéfié russe: les députés européens réclament un embargo**», 9 November 2023

⁴ Nova News, «**Le volume de fret sur la route transcaspienne a été multiplié par 2,5 en 2022** », 23 May 2023, <https://www.agenzianova.com/fr/news/il-volume-delle-merci-sulla-rotta-transcaspica-e-aumentato-di-25-volte-nel-2022.> / (consulted 05.03.2025).

the modernization of rail, road and port infrastructure to increase its export capacity. In February 2024, the Ministry of Energy of Kazakhstan, four-fifths of whose crude oil transits Russian territory through the Caspian Pipeline Union, of which Moscow owns 31%, announced that it was negotiating with Azerbaijan to increase the volume of its oil exports to 3 million tons of oil per year through the Baku-Supsapipeline.¹

As part of the search for quick alternatives to contain the Russian energy crisis, some European countries have adopted several rational consumption policies that support citizens in the face of high prices. Some of them, which were dependent on Russian gas at a very high rate, set a ceiling on electricity and gas prices to protect their citizens. In contrast, others stopped using Russian gas in July 2022 through alternatives and quick policies.

European countries also moved to strengthen strategic negotiations with the State of Qatar, which ranks fifth in the world, to agree to increase its share in the European market, and announced its readiness to raise its production to 30 percent and produce 126 million tons by 2027, where German Chancellor "Showlitz" toured several energy-producing countries such as Canada, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar to hold negotiations and sign agreements to enhance imports to Germany. The visit of the German Chancellor to Qatar coincided with the announcement of "Qatar Energy", an agreement with Total Energies, as part of the largest liquefied natural gas project in the world, an indication of Germany's desire to diversify its imported energy sources and to go to the State of Qatar as a reliable supplier. Emphasizing the strategic economic alliance with a safe supplier of liquefied natural gas²

Europe is racing to find new energy sources to eliminate Russian gas in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war, and Qatar seems to be one of the best partners that Germany seeks to partner with. All these measures can be considered short-term alternatives.

¹ Noémie Rebière, Sami Ramdani, Luca Baccarini, opcit, p13.

² To activate the partnership agreement between the two countries. Energy file The visit of the German Chancellor to Qatar is issued on 26/09/2022 at <https://www.aljazeera.net/ebusiness>. Date of discharge 06/03/2025, 23:15

One of the most important strategic alternatives for the countries of Europe to get out of the energy crisis is to increase the volume of imports of liquefied gas, as its global production for 2022 reached a value of 455 million tons,⁷⁰ percent of which was sold by long-term contracts, equivalent to 320 million, leaving 30 percent called the spot market equivalent to 135 million and 118 million of which represents the needs of Europe, and the most important countries exporting liquefied gas are the United States of America, Qatar and Australia, which are countries with good strategic relations with Europe, and this allows providing Europe's needs of liquefied gas initially, as some European countries such as Germany and the Netherlands began to prepare for the storage of liquefied gas.¹

The increase in energy prices, with the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, exacerbated the situation in energy markets, more specifically gas and electricity markets, as the Commission published on March 8 2022. This preliminary REPowerEU plan identified measures to significantly reduce Russian gas imports from the 2021 level of 155 billion cubic meters before the end of 2022. The main elements of this plan are to diversify supply, reduce demand and increase green energy production in the European Union.²

Europe is betting on several countries to provide its strategic gas needs, foremost of which is the United States of America has announced several projects, including the " Golden Pass " project in Texas with a joint investment of \$10 billion. Canada has announced its full readiness to raise production to meet Europe's needs, and Norway has effectively become the largest gas exporter to European countries. Algeria comes as one of the most important strategic alternatives, as it contains the largest reserves of crude gas in the world, estimated at 2,400 billion cubic meters, as its exports reach 50 per cent towards Spain and Italy, and it also exports

¹ Issam Abdul Shafi, The Russian Gas Crisis: Strategic European Alternatives, 2/10/2022, at: <https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/>, discharged 03/03/2025, time:11:22.

² Oujida Soufian, Trends of European countries towards the use of renewable energies and their potential effects on oil markets, **a study by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries**, April 2023, p. 23.

liquefied natural gas via ships. The focus of the visit of French President "Macron " in August 2022 was to discuss increasing Algeria's gas exports to Europe. In the same context, Italian Minister "Mario D Raggi" visited Algeria within the framework of the fourth Algerian-Italian summit chaired by Algerian President "Abdelmadjid Tebboune", and the signing of several special agreements in the field of gas, as Algeria became the main supplier of gas to Italy after it was 45% of Italy's gas imports from Russia. This agreement also seeks to ensure flexibility, a Larger power supply, and a progressive supply of increased volumes of gas as of 2022 ¹

Recent data published by the European Statistics Agency «Eurostat» revealed that Algeria outperformed Russia in the field of energy exports to Europe, thus becoming the main supplier of natural gas to the European Union, according to the «Eurostat» report, as Algeria's share in European gas imports reached 21.6 percent. It rose from 1.1 billion euros in September to 1.3 billion euros in October 2024, recording an increase of 5 percent compared to September. Algeria was the third supplier of gas to Europe, and due to the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, it has become a "key player" among the most important energy exporters to Europe, as it is expected to reach about 85 percent by 2030. I have known several visits by prominent European figures to Algeria during this period. In 2022, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, the European Commission for Energy "Cadre Simpson", and the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy "Josep Borrell". Energy was the essence of these visits. Algeria is linked to Europe through the Midgaz gas pipelines towards Spain and Galsi towards Italy. As for Russia, which was at the top of the list of countries exporting to the European Union, fell to second place.

2

On July 18, 2022, the European Union and Azerbaijan signed an agreement to double the imports of Azerbaijani gas to Europe, which is looking for alternative sources of Russian gas. The President of the European Commission, Ursula von der Leyen, announced that the European Union

¹ Issam Abdel Shafi, op. Cit.

² Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Energy strengthens Algeria's position in Europe, December 18, 2024, at: <https://aawsat.com/> Date of discharge: March 19, 2025. Time: 01:07

seeks to double gas imports from Azerbaijan. The agreement provides for 12 billion cubic meters of gas to Europe annually. The expansion of the southern gas corridor through Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and Greece to reach "20 billion cubic meters annually within a few years, as Azerbaijan will become a key partner for supply security and on the path of climate neutrality, according to the statement of the President of the European Commission.¹

Azerbaijan is one of the natural gas-producing countries, and it has an estimated reserve of 2.5 trillion cubic meters, and its annual gas production reaches 50 billion cubic meters, according to the data of 2020. In 2020, Turkey and Azerbaijan also opened the TANAP pipeline, which extends from the Shah Deniz field in Azerbaijan and passes through Georgian territory to Turkey. It is connected to the tap pipeline in the Uppsala region of Edirne, Turkey, on the Greek border, transporting gas to southern Europe. The maximum export capacity through the TANAP gas pipeline is 31 billion cubic meters annually, where Turkey will be supplied with 15 billion cubic meters, while the rest of the 16 billion cubic meters will be exported to the countries of southern Europe²

Europe has tended to increase its exports from the countries of the Middle East, Israel, and Egypt, where a tripartite agreement was signed on June 15, 2022, for three years, renewable for two years. The agreement stipulates the transfer of natural gas from Israel to liquid stations in Egypt and then shipped to European markets, in addition to the tendency of European countries to strengthen their relations with African countries, especially Nigeria, which produces about 50 billion cubic meters annually, Libya 11 billion cubic meters, and Equatorial Guinea 6.2 billion cubic meters.³

In March 2023, the Commission and the Council of the European Union reached an "interim political agreement" aimed at increasing the share of

¹ The European Union and Azerbaijan signed a memorandum of understanding to increase gas supplies to Europe on July 18, 2022, at <https://www.kuna.net.kw/ArticleDetails.aspx?id=3046364#>. The Discharge date is March 17, 2025, 08:11.

² Dimensions of strategic studies, the **transformation of energy policies of the European Union countries and its repercussions on Russian energy security**, May 27, 2024. Discharged: March 19, 2025, 02: 53.

³ Issam Abdel Shafi, op. Cit.

renewable energies in total energy consumption to 42.5% by 2030. This represents a turning point for Europe in the face of climate change.¹

The leaders of the European Union countries have realized the need to abandon Russian Energy and completely dispense with it starting in 2027 by launching a new process to reformulate a European policy at a broader level. Many European companies decided to freeze their investments. Still, they did not withdraw from the Russian market, as they were able to reduce dependence on Russian supplies, meaning that they reduced Russian gas imports within two months from more than 40 percent of total natural gas consumption to 31 percent.²

However, given the reality and the extent of interconnection and interdependence, especially in the field of Energy between the European Union and Russia, it remains impossible for Europe to completely dispense with Russian energy sources, at least in the near term, because there are contracts between it and the Russian company " Gazprom " ending in 2025 and some extend to 2030. Finding alternatives to Russian energy sources is also difficult because of the high costs of establishing new facilities and pipelines to transport gas with the same development and security as Russian transport routes. For Africa, this sector needs significant investments in developing technologies and construction. The transport lines and mechanisms for the arrival of African gas to Europe and the producers lack the negotiating experience that allows them to work in a coordinated manner and unify policies and positions to cover the needs of the global energy market. For the Qatari alternative, European countries must take into account some logistical issues, especially since the main shipping routes to Europe pass through many choke points such as the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab and the Suez Canal, all of which are points witnessing political turmoil. Algeria's distinguished strategic relations with Russia remain the most important obstacle to Algerian-European cooperation in the field of Energy. On the other hand, they dispense with

¹ Soufian Oujida, op. Cit., P. 43

² Kabouch Sifeddine, European Politics in the Face of the Implications of the Ukrainian-Russian Crisis 2022on European Energy Security, **Revue des Sciences Humaines**, Issue 04, Volume 34, December 2023. P.30.

Aruba is dependent on the American support for Russian gas and dealing with the European crisis with the logic of the supporter and partner, not to exploit the opportunity and achieve hegemony in the absence of Russia due to the sanctions imposed on it. The most influential internal factor remains the degree of cohesion of the European Union countries, and the absence of parties that tweet outside the current to serve their interests at the expense of the unified European position, as well as the size of popular support for government policies and procedures, especially in light of the growth and arrival of Yemeni currents to power in Europe, and what these currents can adopt from new trends, not only the direction of the war in Ukraine but also the direction of the relationship with Russia, as well as its desire to stay in the European Union in the first place.

The Russian-Ukrainian war is the main reason for the return of talk about Russian-European relations, especially in the field of Energy, which is a vital and effective element in the wheel of development and the continuation of development projects in various sectors for both the Russian and European parties.

5. The results of the study

The study reached a set of results that can be limited to the following:

- This war will have major economic repercussions that threaten global food security. It will also create a scarcity of energy sources and high prices, negatively affecting the world's short- and long-term economies.
- Russia is the largest and most important external supplier of oil and natural gas to the European Union, so it seeks to strengthen its role as a reliable security supplier in the field of Energy. As European demand for Russian energy increases, Russia seeks to turn this demand into a strategic power factor, as it has transformed Energy into political and economic gains, especially in light of the Russian-Ukrainian war.
- The Russian-Ukrainian war raised the dependence on European energy security, as did the dependence of Russian energy security

itself on the reason for the interdependence of the two poles on transit countries in the security of energy supplies. European-Russian relations are very important due to their high levels of economic interdependence.

- Russia is a reliable security source and the most important trading partner of the European Party in the field of Energy. In contrast, the European Union is the most important market for Russian Energy, and this has deepened their degree of dependence and each party's awareness of its importance to the other party.
- The energy sector is one of the most affected sectors due to the sanctions imposed on Russia by the West. These sanctions decreased Russian natural gas exports to Western Europe, which passes through Ukraine and Belarus. Oil markets are also vulnerable to vibrations and fluctuations. Most of Russia's oil routes pass through Ukraine.
- This war has led to natural gas prices more than doubling during the last six months of 2022, and oil prices have risen to their highest levels.
- The most prominent repercussion of the Russian-Ukrainian war on European countries is the threat of energy supplies, meaning that they are threatened by the interruption of the most important source of energy supply, as Russia is the largest energy supplier to the European Union.
- The Russian-Ukrainian war and its great effects on all levels were the main reason for the exposure of the severe dependence between the European Union as an important economic pole and Russia as a pivotal actor in energy balances in the international market

The Russian-Ukrainian war has led to weaknesses and disturbances in global trade, food and fuel price shocks, and high inflation rates, and the eurozone has witnessed a significant deterioration in the second half of 2022 due to faltering supply chains, with high energy prices in light of a significant decline in Russian energy supplies

6. CONCLUSION

Military power is no longer the only engine for international relations. The Russian-Ukrainian war showed that Energy is a pivotal actor in international relations and an effective tool in guiding foreign policies. Russia used Energy as an economic pressure card against European countries against the backdrop of sanctions imposed on them due to its invasion of Ukraine. Russia tried to use Energy as a strategic weapon to pressure European countries that rely on it to provide energy sources. On the other hand, European countries used the energy sector to pressure Russia by banning Russian goods in European markets and forcing it to stop the war. This war also constituted an important turning point in Russian-European relations. Europe was reminded of its reliance on Russian gas and Russia's difficulty in compensating and finding an alternative market with the weight and importance of the European market. Although the repercussions of the Russian-Ukrainian war are many, and the degree of its impact on each party varies, the common factor between them all remains that this war has cost them great losses. Russia has suffered huge losses as a result of its military intervention in Ukraine for a length of time and in the face of the steadfastness of the Ukrainian resistance supported by the West. It has also suffered economic losses due to the sanctions imposed on all economic sectors, especially the oil and gas sector, which is the artery of the Russian economy. Moreover, the policy of isolating Russia from the international community, stopping dealing with it at all levels, cutting off trade, cultural and political exchange, and closing the airspace to Russian aviation. Russian ships have also been prevented from entering the ports of many countries. As for European countries, they have faced many damages and challenges, recording a slowdown in economic growth. The sanctions imposed on Russia have also formed a point of division and internal rift between the countries of the European Union and between rejectionists and conservatives regarding these sanctions. Trade relations between the European Union and Russia have also significantly declined. This war has highlighted the subordination of European countries to Russia in the field of Energy and Russia's difficulty

in finding new markets that compensate for the European market.

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