

**The Chinese vision for managing independence negotiations and  
building Algerian-French relations.  
An analytical reading of President Zhou Enlai's diplomatic advice**

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**Abstract:**

This article analyses the Chinese perspective on Franco-Algerian relations during the Algerian Revolution, focusing on the FLN's management of the independence negotiations and the post-independence period. It is based on the viewpoints of various Chinese decision-makers, particularly Minister Zhou Enlai, who was the architect of Chinese foreign policy under Mao Zedong.

The study demonstrates the scope of this realistic and forward-thinking vision, which was influenced by the nature and development of bilateral relations between China and France, as well as between China and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR) and the fledgling Algerian state. It also considers this vision within a global context, which was initially marked by the intensity of the East-West conflict and later by international détente.

**Keywords:** Algeria; China; France; Negotiations; Diplomatic relations.

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## **INTRODUCTION**

Despite the internal and external problems it faced, the People's Republic of China (PRC) was one of the most important countries in the fight against imperialism and colonialism. It firmly supported the liberation and emancipation of occupied peoples. While this principle was sincere and consistent with the adopted foreign policy orientations, it did not imply a lack of flexibility when it came to implementing it in response to the evolving nature and type of colonialism, as well as the changing international conditions resulting from geostrategic shifts. This adaptability demonstrated the foresight of Chinese leaders, who were able to maximise their gains while minimising significant risks.

In this context, we will analyse the Chinese perspective on Franco-Algerian relations during the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1962), the negotiations and the early years of the independent Algerian state, to examine the application of this principle. The fundamental question we will seek to answer is: how did China conceive of managing the 'coloniser-colonised' relationship during a revolutionary war? How did it envisage relations between the two parties during the period of regaining national sovereignty? Our analysis will consider the international context and policies in force at the time, as well as the nature of China's bilateral relations with France and the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR), and later the independent Algerian state. The same applies to China, which was considered one of the most important communist and socialist countries in the Eastern bloc during the Cold War and during the subsequent rupture with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

In order to gain a comprehensive understanding of the subject, this article will analyse the content of a published document that we deem essential for this purpose, but which, to our knowledge, has not yet been the subject of any studies or analyses. Titled 'Diplomatic Advice from China to the Algerian Revolution', this document was issued by President Zhou Enlai and presented to the representative of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (PGAR). The PGAR wanted to learn from past liberation

experiences to avoid embarking on a risky and ill-conceived path that could have turned the Algerian Revolution into an internal Cold War conflict, with all the ensuing consequences. This would have inevitably prolonged the conflict and delayed the goal of regaining sovereignty and independence.

In the interest of gaining a better understanding of the subject, we began our study by providing an overview of Algerian-Chinese and Franco-Chinese relations. We then analysed the document and attempted to evaluate its results by comparing them to what was subsequently achieved.

Finally, it is worth recalling that the document under consideration was written by President Zhou Enlai to the head of the Algerian diplomatic mission, Mr Abd errahman Kiwan, on 20 February 1962 — the date on which the second round of negotiations at Évian began. This document was published by Saad Dahlab in the appendices of his book *For the Independence of Algeria: The Mission Accomplished*, in the French edition only, as the Arabic translation did not include any reference to or translation of these appendices.

## **1. Algerian-Chinese relations: origins and development.**

Algerian-Chinese relations date back to the beginning of the Algerian War of Independence. The first official political contact appears to have been taken place between representatives of the National Liberation Front (FLN) and representatives of the People's Republic of China (PRC)<sup>1</sup> at the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia, from 18 to 24 April 1955<sup>2</sup>. China supported the conference's final declaration, which expressed the participating countries' support for the cultural, political, and human rights of Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco, respectively. Regarding cultural rights, the declaration explicitly states the following :

*«..colonial powers have denied to their dependent peoples basic rights in the sphere of education and culture which hampers the development of their personality and also prevents cultural intercourse with other Asian and African peoples. This is particularly true in the case of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco,*

*where the basic right of the people to study their own language and culture has been suppressed...»<sup>3</sup>.*

With regard to political rights, the statement made it clear that the Afro-Asian Conference recognises the importance of political rights :

*“..In view of the unsettled situation in North Africa and of the persisting denial to the peoples of North Africa of their right to self-determination, the Asian-African Conference declared its support of the rights of the people of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia to self-determination and independence and urged the French Government to bring about a peaceful settlement of the issue without delay...»<sup>4</sup>.*

Despite serious concerns expressed by many participating countries, such as India, China was a key player at the conference. Within the framework of its new policy of rapprochement and openness towards Arab and African countries, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai<sup>5</sup> announced in his closing speech that China «*..expresses its sympathy and full support for the struggle of the Algerian, Moroccan and Tunisian peoples for self-determination and independence...»<sup>6</sup>.*

Ait Ahmed Hussein and M'hamed Yazid managed to attract the attention of Zhou Enlai, who was keen to meet with them. Given the nature of relations between Algeria and China at the time, it is quite possible that Zhou Enlai verbally supported the Algerian people's struggle<sup>7</sup>.

According to many observers, this initial contact with Bandung was truly the beginning of Chinese support for Algerian independence<sup>8</sup>. During the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference, which took place in Cairo from 26 December 1957 to 1 January 1958, relations between the National Liberation Front (FLN) and China were further strengthened thanks to the efforts of Egypt's then president, Gamal Abdel Nasser. Consequently, 30 March 1958 was designated a day of solidarity with the Algerian people by several countries, and China invited FLN representatives to participate in the event<sup>9</sup>.

It is worth noting here that Ibrahim Ghafa<sup>10</sup> was the first Algerian to be received in the People's Republic of China, alongside the Secretary-

General of the Arab League, Atef Daniel. They were both accorded numerous receptions by official circles represented by Zhou Enlai and Chen Yi<sup>11</sup>, as well as by popular circles that participated in the various demonstrations of Chinese solidarity with the Algerian people. In the media, newspapers and periodicals covered the event extensively. The Beijing magazine titled an article «*Our 600 Million people Back Up Algerian People*»<sup>12</sup>. The Chinese People's Daily also covered events as they happened, with editorials including statements such as «*Algeria: We support you*»<sup>13</sup>. According to the June 1956 issue of Peking Magazine, Zhou Enlai called for «*..negotiations based on the recognition of the national aspirations of the Algerian people in order to build peace on this land...*»<sup>14</sup>.

Relations between the National Liberation Front and the People's Republic of China continued to strengthen, with ongoing visits by foreign delegations and representatives to China. For example, Benyoucef Benkhedda led a delegation representing the National Council of the Algerian Revolution<sup>15</sup>. This had a considerable impact, which was further developed after the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was established on 19 September 1958. China was the first non-Arab country to recognise the Provisional Government, regarding it as the true government that expressed the will of the Algerian people.

In terms of financial support, China was one of the first countries to provide material assistance to Algeria's war effort, both during the War of Independence and afterwards. According to some sources, this aid amounted to around one billion dollars per year. Following Algeria's independence, China also granted interest-free loans to the Algerian state, some of which financed the construction of the Algiers Exhibition Centre and the Guelma ceramics factory. This is in addition to the consistent military, social, medical and other assistance that China has provided to Algeria<sup>16</sup>.

Although some believe that Algeria refused to take sides with either the Soviets or the Chinese during the crisis between them, despite its

apparent inclination towards the Soviets<sup>17</sup>, a consensus existed between China and the Soviet Union — despite some internal disagreements — on the issue of supporting liberation movements. Algeria and other African and Asian nations benefited from this, as China and the Soviet Union shared the belief that the liberation movement had reached a point at which imperialism could not prevail, and that «*..the era of colonialism is definitively over...*». Furthermore, they believed that any attempt to maintain «*..the rules of colonialism or to revive its laws in a direction contrary to the course of history would be detrimental to peace and doomed to failure...*»<sup>18</sup>.

The attraction exerted by the leaders of the National Liberation Front, and subsequently by Algerian state officials after independence, to establish close and growing relations with China can be explained by the principles that have guided Chinese foreign policy. These principles have earned China considerable credibility, particularly among Algerians and on the international stage. This is evidenced by China's adherence to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence:

1. Respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of states.
2. Non-aggression.
3. Non-interference in the internal affairs of states.
4. Equality and mutual benefit among states.
5. Peaceful coexistence between states<sup>19</sup>.

Later, China adopted the Three Nos policy alongside Mao's foreign policy principles: no to hegemony and power, no to military alliances, and no to the arms race<sup>20</sup>.

However, some, such as Kayel Haddad, argued that the strengthening of bilateral relations between China and Algeria — particularly after 1958, when he characterised them as an 'alliance' aimed at challenging France and other Western powers, as well as influencing the domestic politics of both countries — resulted from the Chinese government's instrumentalisation of its support for Algeria in order to bolster its claim to adopt a genuine revolutionary ideology. This legitimised the National Liberation Front's (FLN) control over the 'Algerian national movement', highlighting the mutually beneficial nature of the relationship between China and the FLN,

and its usefulness in expressing the 'ideologies' of nationalism, unity and revolution — ideologies certainly directed more against the Western bloc than towards liberation<sup>21</sup>.

This view appears to be inaccurate, as we will demonstrate through our analysis of the document's content later on. We will see how China sought to sow discord within the Western camp, particularly following General de Gaulle's rise to power. De Gaulle, who favoured a certain degree of independence from American decisions, believed that France was a colonial power doomed to disappear, and that it needed to be neutralised discreetly and effectively to prevent it from falling into the trap of American policy and filling the power vacuum. The Indochina scenario was still fresh in the minds of Chinese politicians, which is why China and its representatives did not share the same view of the various colonial powers.

## **2. Franco-Chinese relations: origins and development.**

Many scholars divide the history of Sino-French relations, especially with communist China, into two main phases. The first, from 1949 to 1964, marks the period during which France officially recognised China. Numerous tensions arose during this period due to the Cold War and the Afro-Asian liberation movement supported by China, which negatively impacted attempts at rapprochement between the two countries<sup>22</sup>.

These tensions also stemmed from France's various considerations regarding the impact of this issue on its presence in Indochina, as well as on the level of coordination between France and its natural allies — particularly the United Kingdom and the United States. The debate among the Allies in 1949 concerning the recognition of Communist China and its consequences for the balance of power in the region likely explains the trajectory of Franco-Chinese relations during this period<sup>23</sup>.

The second phase, from 1964 to 1976, was notable for two things: first, that France, under the leadership of General de Gaulle, was the first Western country to recognise Communist China; and second, the exchange of visits between officials of the two countries, and the significant

statements indicating friendship between them. However, no acceptable bilateral agreement was reached on the various international issues at hand<sup>24</sup>.

However, the rapprochement that took place in this context in 1964 was facilitated by France's loss of most of its main colonies due to the liberation movement, the independent policy pursued by General de Gaulle — stemming from his conviction in French independence — and the climate of coexistence and international détente. Not to mention the French particularities, of which Zhou Enlai and Deng Xiaoping were aware<sup>25</sup>. Having studied in France, they understood the importance and advantages of a breakthrough within the Western camp. It is also worth noting that President Zhou Enlai was in constant contact with the French regarding liberation issues, particularly the Algerian question.

For example, Zhou indicates in the document we will analyse below that he constantly raised the issue of liberation with French officials: «..Four or five years ago, I said to certain figures in the French political establishment, such as Mendès France and Edgar Faure<sup>26</sup>, "Since France has recognised the independence of Morocco and Tunisia, why does it not recognise the independence of Algeria?"...»<sup>27</sup>.

Therefore, it can be said that China did not value its relationship with France, particularly under De Gaulle's regime, as highly as its relationship with the United States. China considered France to be the “lesser evil”: a declining colonial empire. In contrast, the United States was seen as a neocolonial power seeking to fill the void left by the decline of traditional colonial powers in the wake of liberation movements.

### **3. The diplomatic document and the China's perspective on Algerian-French relations<sup>28</sup>.**

#### **3. 1. Part One: The pre-independence period and the 'walking on two feet' policy:**

President Zhou considered the victory of the Algerian people a victory for the Chinese people, as well as for the peoples of Africa and Asia. He explained that the Chinese people and government were closely following every victory and every stage of the Algerian people's development in their

struggle for national independence. However, from a realistic perspective, and drawing on the experience of past liberations, he believed that achieving independence depended on maintaining a delicate balance and genuine reconciliation between two elements: *armed struggle and the acceptance and conduct of negotiations within that framework.*

According to him, accepting negotiations as a principle does not mean a truce or cessation of hostilities. On the contrary, it requires the continuation of the struggle and resumption of armed action during the negotiation process. This struggle must continue until the final agreement is signed, and abandoning it in favour of negotiations would be suicidal, given that France did not listen to the demands of the Algerian people beforehand and the negotiation proposals were, in fact, merely the result of the armed struggle. In this regard, President Zhou stated: «..*The negotiations between Algeria and France are the result of the armed struggle waged by the heroic Algerian people for seven and a half years. Without this struggle, the French government would not have been in a position to negotiate on equal terms with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic...*»<sup>29</sup>.

He also explained that the fundamental principles that this armed struggle was initially aimed at achieving were national sovereignty, territorial integrity and national and popular unity. Therefore, none of these principles could be compromised:

*«..We fully support your just struggle and your position of engaging in negotiations while simultaneously pursuing the armed struggle. We sincerely hope that you will achieve new and greater successes in both, and that you will obtain Algeria's full independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as unity and solidarity among its people...»*<sup>30</sup>

This position stemmed from past experiences and had also formed a conviction within the Provisional Government. Proof of this can be seen in the fact that even when the French government unilaterally declared a truce on offensive operations at the start of the first Évian negotiations on 20 May 1961 and released the five leaders and other detainees, the Provisional

Government refused to do the same. Saad Dahlab justified this stance in his testimony as follows: *«..we could not relinquish the only advantage that had compelled France to negotiate with us...»*<sup>31</sup>.

In his commentary on the document presented to him by Abdul Rahman Kiwan, President Zhou also welcomed this point, as stated in the document:

*«..As stated by the head of the diplomatic mission, Mr Abd el Rahman Kiwan, the Algerian people did not interrupt the armed struggle during the negotiations. On the contrary, they strengthened and consolidated it wherever possible. It was on the basis of their perseverance in the armed struggle that the Algerian people entered into negotiations with France. This attitude proved to be wise...»*<sup>32</sup>.

President Zhou added that armed struggle is much more than just a tactic to put pressure on the occupier. He said that a national liberation army is the true guarantee that a people can achieve and maintain their liberation goals, even after gaining independence.

*«..In the struggle against imperialism, we can never lay down our arms or disband our armies. When negotiations are taking place under favourable conditions, we must count on the support of the armed forces; when negotiations encounter obstacles, we must count on them more than ever. In the struggle during negotiations and in the struggle to organise the Provisional Executive Government and the referendum, the Algerian people cannot renounce this armed struggle. For the Algerian people, the armed forces are the means to achieving total independence and are also employed by all revolutionary governments and people's authorities...»*<sup>33</sup>.

This analysis seemed to stem from the Chinese experience, to which President Zhou referred when he drew on the lessons learned from the Chinese people's negotiations with the Kuomintang: *«..Every time negotiations proceeded under favourable conditions, they encountered numerous setbacks, sometimes even total failure. As for negotiations, it's*

negotiations, failure, then more negotiations. As for war, it's truce, resumption of hostilities, then another truce...". President Zhou also added that adapting to the reality of a revolutionary war is necessary :

*«..To wage a protracted war, it is necessary to undertake repeated large-scale confrontations to ensure the success of the negotiations and the war itself. Experience shows that even the Algerian people themselves must engage in repeated and large-scale confrontations during negotiations with French imperialism, demonstrating patience throughout...»<sup>34</sup>.*

In a similar vein, he believed that the Algerian people's struggle against France was influenced by the nature and experience of the French government. President Zhou warned of the danger posed to the revolution by General de Gaulle, stating: *«..De Gaulle is very cunning. He has extensive experience of colonial domination and we must expect him to use every possible means to confront the Algerian people. Therefore, the Algerian people must prepare for any eventuality...»<sup>35</sup>.*

Regarding the conduct of the negotiations, both procedural and substantive, President Zhou emphasised the importance of addressing the issues raised with absolute clarity and precision to ensure that all options were carefully considered. The aim was to prevent a French military and diplomatic defeat from being transformed into a negotiated victory due to any diplomatic or negotiating naivety. During the negotiations, he said, *«..All points under discussion must be precisely defined so that French imperialism cannot find any loopholes or legally exploitable pretexts...»<sup>36</sup>.*

President Zhou also stressed the need to consider all possibilities, including the worst case scenario, and to prepare for all eventualities regarding the outcome of negotiations, should an agreement be reached. This is because imperialism is utterly untrustworthy :

*«..Even if an agreement is reached during the negotiations to end the war and establish a provisional government, French imperialism may not implement it and may resort to any means necessary to sabotage it. It may even denounce the agreement*

*and provoke a new war. In short, the people must prepare a two-pronged strategy in the face of French imperialism: to achieve the best possible outcome and to prepare for the worst...»<sup>37</sup>.*

President Zhou concluded that the Algerian people were finally confronting French imperialism as an adversary, just as they had done in Indochina previously. This imperialism had been significantly weakened in Algeria due to widespread popular opposition and numerous political and economic difficulties, so its demise was only a matter of time<sup>38</sup>.

### **3. 2. Part Two: The post-independence period and the policy of "strategic vigilance".**

Initially, President Zhou stated that he agreed with the head of the diplomatic mission, Mr Abdul Rahman Kiwan, that even if the negotiations were successful and concluded with an agreement, this would only mark the start of a new phase in the struggle, not its end. He considered this to be a fair point of view<sup>39</sup>.

Regarding the basis for this step, he welcomes the adoption of a direct negotiation approach with France, without third-party intervention — not even from the United Nations. This avoids the risk of a 'vacuum-filling' policy and imperial substitution, as he emphasises: «*..The Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic opted for direct negotiations with French imperialism during the negotiations, without seeking the intervention of the United Nations or the participation of other countries. This was a wise choice...»<sup>40</sup>*. He believes also that this act will lead to the internationalization of the confrontation, which will allow the implementation of a policy aimed at filling the void: «*..because if the United Nations and other countries had intervened, the situation would have followed the Chinese proverb, 'The wolf was driven out the door and the tiger was let in through the window', meaning that traditional colonialism would have been replaced by modern colonialism...»<sup>41</sup>*. Mr Benyoucef Benkhedda shares this point of view, rightly stating that the Algerian people still face a difficult and arduous struggle against neocolonialism and imperialism.

President Zhou also referred to the group of natural allies of

independent Algeria and the Algerian people. This group is represented by the Afro-Asian space and a large part of the socialist space. This implies that he is ideologically closer to this group than the other group. This seems to be in line with the Declaration of 1 November. Conversely, France continues to isolate itself, as he pointed out :

*«..The Algerian people's struggle for national independence is entirely just. You have earned the profound sympathy and unconditional support of people around the world, particularly in the Arab, Asian and African communities, as well as among socialists. The colonial war waged by French imperialism has failed miserably on a moral level. French imperialism is increasingly isolated on the international stage, facing unequivocal condemnation, opposition and denunciation from people around the world...»<sup>42</sup>.*

He considered the authorisation of French military bases and the granting of certain economic privileges, as required by existing agreements, to be a 'temporary necessity' and the lesser evil, as it would prevent American imperialist intervention in the absence of such arrangements. However, he also called for the strengthening of military capabilities and the development of a national economy, in order to encourage the gradual withdrawal of the French and thus enable full independence :

*«..Once it has achieved independence, Algeria will be faced with several complex and challenging issues. The Algerian people have accepted that France will retain its military bases and economic privileges for a period of time. Therefore, Algeria must use this time to strengthen its armed forces and develop its national economy, thereby forcing French imperialism to withdraw gradually. This was a wise tactic...»<sup>43</sup>.*

In the same context, he adds:

*«..It is preferable to allow French imperialism to retain some forces in Algeria and prevent the new American imperialism from filling the French vacuum there. I am*

*convinced that the officials of the provisional government will continue to apply this tactic in future, because it is easier to confront French imperialism than American imperialism. The latter is evident in the Congo, South Korea and Vietnam. This is why we have said that American imperialism is difficult to confront, but the vigilant peoples will inevitably succeed in expelling it. However, it will take longer and the confrontations and struggles will be more arduous and complex...»*<sup>44</sup>. (Dahleb, 1990, p 289-290).

In this context, President Zhou certainly assumed that, at this stage, it was better to deal with General de Gaulle, despite his 'cunning', than with the Americans or their representatives. He believed that de Gaulle was dealing with extremists who supported the idea of a French Algeria. He believed that a man like de Gaulle had no choice but to consider negotiations with the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, rather than accept the solution proposed by the extremists and fascists, which serves and flatters American imperialism. After all, the Americans seek to support these extremists and fascists in order to remove de Gaulle from power<sup>45</sup>.

## **CONCLUSION**

Clearly, the diplomatic advice given by Chinese President Zhou Enlai and the Chinese government to the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic was founded on a profound and realistic understanding of China's past experience of liberation and struggle against imperialism.

The analysis of the international situation, the trajectory of liberation movements, the ensuing nation-building process and the key principles to be adopted — direct negotiations without intermediaries or supervisors, continuation of the armed struggle during negotiations, importance of territorial and national unity, management of the transition phase, gradual consolidation of national independence in all areas and, finally, wary consideration of imperialist interventions and policies aimed at filling vacuums — has all been borne out by history.

Algerian history since independence has undoubtedly confirmed the

foresight of Chinese diplomacy under Zhou Enlai regarding liberation issues and the fight against colonialism in all its forms, as well as the relevance of its negotiation philosophy based on a two-pronged approach. This approach was embraced by the leaders of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic, who agreed with it almost entirely.

The choices made by the independent Algerian government, particularly its desire to impose a *fait accompli* and its efforts to mitigate the consequences of the Évian Accords under the presidencies of Ahmed Ben Bella and Houari Boumediene, are simply further illustrations of this.

### **Bibliography List :**

<sup>1</sup>. To learn more about the history and circumstances of the founding of this republic, consult:

- Alain Roux & Xiaohong Xiao-Planes, ***Histoire de la République Populaire de Chine***, Armand Colin, 2ème édition, 2024.

<sup>2</sup>. Twenty-four countries from Asia and Africa participated in this conference, along with delegations from liberation movements in occupied countries, such as the Algerian National Liberation Front (FLN). Discussions focused on economic, cultural, and political cooperation. To learn more about The conference's final declaration see :

- The Ministry of the foreign affairs (Republic of Indonesia), ***Asia-Africa speak from Bandung***, Djakarta, 1955, pp. 161-169.

<sup>3</sup>. ***Communiqué final de la conférence afro-asiatique de Bandoeng (24 avril 1955)***, in: *Annuaire français de droit international*, 1955, p 725.

<sup>4</sup>. *Ibid*, p 726.

<sup>5</sup>. Zhou Enlai was born on March 5, 1898, in Jiangsu, China, and died in Beijing on January 8, 1976. He served as Minister of Foreign Affairs (1949–1958), Premier (1949–1976), and Chairman of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference (1949–1976). For more information on his life and political career, see:

- Dick Wilson, Chou, ***the story of Zhou Enlai 1898-1976***, Hutchinson, 1984.
- Barbara Barnouin & Yu Changgen, ***Zhou Enlai. A political life***, Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 2006.

<sup>6</sup>. Pan, *La guerre d'Algérie et les relations franco-chinoises*, Thèse de Doctorat, Université de Lyon-East China Normal University, Lyon, 2020, p 111.

<sup>7</sup>. *Ibid*, p 112.

<sup>8</sup>. C.Chau. Donovan, *The French -Algerian war, 1954-1962: Communist China's support for Algerian independence*, in: *Military Advising and Assistance: From Mercenaries to Privatization, 1815–2007*, Donald Stocker, New York, Routledge, 2008, p 120.

<sup>9</sup>. Pan, *op.cit*, p 113.

<sup>10</sup>. He was one of the most prominent Algerian students in Egypt, renowned for his cultural, radio, and later diplomatic activities. After independence, he served as ambassador to several countries, including Kuwait, Pakistan, and Japan, and as director of higher education and the director of University of Algiers. He is also the author of several works on Algerian culture. For more information, see:

- أبو القاسم سعد الله، *تاريخ الجزائر الثقافي (1962-1954)*، دار البصائر، الجزائر، 2007، ج 10، صفحات 22، 220، 243، 282 وما يليها.

- Brahim Ghafa, *L'intellectuel et la Révolution algérienne*, Alger, Éditions Houma, 2001.

<sup>11</sup>. Chen Yi (1901-1972) had a military career, reaching the rank of marshal in 1958, and was a political activist who succeeded Zhou Enlai as head of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and they worked together with clear coordination and cooperation between them. For more information about Chen Yi, see:

- Khoon Choy Lee, *Pioneers of Modern China. Understanding the Inscrutable Chinese*, World Scientific Pub, 2005, p 212-213.

<sup>12</sup>. «*Our 600 Millions Back Up Algerian People*», in: Peking Review, Vol 01, 1958, April, 08, p 21.

<sup>13</sup>. Pan, *op.cit*, p 115.

<sup>14</sup>. «*Our 600 Millions..*», «*op.cit*», p 21.

<sup>15</sup>. سعد دحلب، *المهمة منجزة من أجل استقلال الجزائر*، منشورات دحلب، 2007، ص 75.

<sup>16</sup>. N. Grimaud, *La politique extérieure de l'Algérie (1962-1978)*, Paris, Karthala, 1984, p 277.

<sup>17</sup>. *Ibid*, p 277.

<sup>18</sup>. Ogunsanwo Alaba, *China's policy in Africa*, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1974, p 49.

<sup>19</sup>. أحمد البرصان، «السياسة الخارجية الصينية والشرق الأوسط»، مجلة دراسات شرق أوسطية، العدد 57، السنة 15، خريف 2011، ص 37.

<sup>20</sup>. "المرجع نفسه"، ص 37.

<sup>21</sup>. Kyle Haddad-Fonda, *«An illusory alliance: revolutionary legitimacy and Sino-Algerian relations, 1958–1962»*, in: *The Journal of North African Studies*, 19 (3), 2014, pp. 338–357.

<sup>22</sup>. Liu Kaixuan, *«Les relations politiques franco-chinoises de 1949 à 1983 : entre mythe et réalité»*, in: *Monde chinois*, 2019/3 (N° 59), p 25.

<sup>23</sup>. Thierry Robin, *«Faut-il reconnaître la Chine rouge ? L'attitude de la France et de ses alliés anglais et américain (janvier 1949-janvier 1950)»*, *Histoire@Politique*. Politique, culture, société, n° 19, janvier-avril 2013, passim.

<sup>24</sup>. Liu Kaixuan, *«op.cit.»*, p 25.

<sup>25</sup>. During this period, Deng Xiaoping (1904-1997) held the position of General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, then Vice President under Zhou Enlai, and finally President of China, where he was the architect of its comprehensive economic renaissance. For more information, see:

- Jean-Pierre Cabestan, *Deng Xiaoping. Révolutionnaire et modernisateur de la Chine*, Tallandier, livre numérique, 2024.

<sup>26</sup>. They were successively heads of the French government under the Fourth Republic. For more information on their terms, see:

- Pierre Miquel, *La Quatrième République: hommes et pouvoirs*, Paris, Bordas, 1982.

<sup>27</sup>. Saad Dahleb, *Pour l'indépendance de l'Algérie: Mission accomplie*, Éditions Dehleb, Alger, 1990, p 290.

<sup>28</sup>. The document appears in Appendix 11 of Saad Dahlab's book, under the title "President Chou-En-lai's Opinion on the Algerian-French Negotiations" (Opinion du président Chou-En-lai sur les négociations Algéro-Françaises). It is a translation of the meeting held between Mr. Abdel Rahman Kiouane, head of the diplomatic mission of the Provisional

Government of the Algerian Republic in China, on February 20, 1962. Due to the importance of the content of this meeting, Mr. Kiouane requested that the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs provide it in the form of a written summary. To read the summary, see:

- Saad Dahleb, *op.cit*, pp. 286-290.

<sup>29</sup>. Saad Dahleb, *op.cit*, p 286.

<sup>30</sup>. *Ibid*, p 290.

<sup>31</sup>. سعد دحلب، المرجع السابق، ص 130.

<sup>32</sup>. Saad Dahleb, *op.cit*, p 287.

<sup>33</sup>. *Ibid*, p 289.

<sup>34</sup>. *Ibid*, p 288-289.

<sup>35</sup>. *Ibid*, p 288-289.

<sup>36</sup>. *Ibid*, p 288-289.

<sup>37</sup>. *Ibid*, p 288-289.

<sup>38</sup>. Saad Dahleb, *op.cit*, p 286.

<sup>39</sup>. *Ibid*, p 288.

<sup>40</sup>. *Ibid*, p 287.

<sup>41</sup>. *Ibid*, p 287.

<sup>42</sup>. *Ibid*, p 287.

<sup>43</sup>. *Ibid*, p 289-290.

<sup>44</sup>. *Ibid*, p 289-290.

<sup>45</sup>. *Ibid*, p 286-287.