

The Impact of Predictive Artificial Intelligence Systems on Political Decision-Making During Acute International Crises: A Simulation of the U.S. – China Conflict Over the Taiwan Crisis

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Submission date: 15/06/2026 Acceptance date: 19/09/2026 Publication date: 01/10/2026

Abstract:

This study derives its significance from the accelerated integration of predictive artificial intelligence algorithms into sensitive strategic environments. It aims to monitor and analyse the role of these systems in shaping political and military decision-making during acute international crises, focusing on a simulation of the U.S.-China conflict over Taiwan as an empirical model to understand the transformation in the interaction of international actors. The study adopts a descriptive, analytical, and deconstructive methodology, drawing upon the cybernetic approach and game theory to interpret both Azerbaijani (negotiating) and military behaviours. It concludes that while relying on artificial intelligence is highly efficient in processing big data and reducing time constraints, it increases the likelihood of "unintentional escalation." This is due to the absence of diplomatic tact and human emotional judgment, as well as the system's reliance on closed algorithmic feedback loops that may bypass the constraints of conventional human rationality and propel the crisis toward critical paths.

Keywords: Predictive AI; Political Decision-Making; International Crises; Military Escalation; Cybernetic Rationality.

Introduction:

The contemporary international system is undergoing a profound geopolitical and technological transformation, driven by the Fourth Industrial Revolution and the big data revolution. Within this context, the management of acute international crises is no longer the exclusive domain of traditional bureaucratic structures or abstract human perception; rather, predictive artificial intelligence systems have become an active partner and perhaps a director in decision-making chambers. These systems rely on processing massive influxes of unstructured data, analysing historical

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patterns, and forecasting adversaries' behaviour in fractions of a second, thereby granting leaders a decisive strategic advantage associated with compressing time and bypassing human cognitive limitations.

However, this growing reliance poses an existential dilemma concerning the nature of international stability. Acute crises are characterized by their existential nature and the narrow window of time available for response, as well as the ambiguity clouding the intentions of actors. Delegating strategic assessment to predictive algorithms raises fundamental questions regarding the machine's capacity to comprehend "cultural codes" and subtle diplomatic manoeuvres that originally rely on constructive ambiguity, human emotion, and the constraints of moral deterrence. Consequently, this research lies at the intersection of technological determinism and political realism, deconstructing the impact of automated prediction on altering the nature of state behaviour during acute crises, and exploring the boundaries between decision rationalization and the engineering of catastrophic escalation.

1.1 Problem Statement and Sub-Questions:

This systematic shift toward digitizing the security dilemma has not led to the rationalization of conflict as much as it has displaced the threat into a mutated cyber-geopolitical space. In this new domain, the "hyper-speed of automated processing operations threatens to zero-out political thinking time" and erode the intermediary spaces for diplomatic maneuver. The pinnacle of this security dilemma manifests in the acute cyber-geopolitical friction points within the Taiwan Strait, serving as an arena for a zero-sum strategic competition between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Based on the foregoing, we pose the following central problem:

To what extent does the level of integrating smart technology and the shift toward automation in military decision-making environments contribute to reshaping the correlative relationship between the efficiency of security response and the diplomatic flexibility of the two nuclear powers (the United States and China) during acute cyber-geopolitical crises?

To answer this pivotal question, we have deconstructed it into a set of sub-questions:

1. What are the most epistemologically and theoretically capable frameworks and approaches for tracking and deconstructing the strategic behaviour of states when integrating smart algorithms into strategic decision-making environments?

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2. How does the accelerating dynamics of big data processing by artificial intelligence systems reflect upon the structure of the "security dilemma" and the psychology of the time-constrained human decision-maker?

3. What are the inherent explanatory limitations within predictive modelling tools, and what is their mathematical capacity to simulate and absorb non-quantifiable strategic variables (such as political will, ideological and doctrinal tenets, and strategies of diplomatic deception and disinformation)?

4. Does the mutual interdependence and interaction between adversarial smart predictive systems (AI vs. AI) generate "self-feeding crises" or trigger scenarios of rapid, automated military escalation outside the frameworks of the states' political will?

1.2 Significance of the Study:

We have divided it into:

1.2.1 Theoretical Significance: *Enriching the Arabic political and academic library with content that merges the fields of international relations and security studies on one hand, with the fields of cyber sciences and artificial intelligence on the other a domain that still suffers from a theoretical scarcity in Arabic theorization.*

1.2.2 Applied Significance: *Providing an analytical framework for decision-makers and strategic planners that highlights the pitfalls and opportunities when relying on algorithmic recommendations during times of existential crises.*

1.3 Objectives of the Study:

This study seeks to achieve a set of objectives:

1. *Deconstructing the mechanisms through which predictive algorithms influence the stages of political decision-making.*

2. *Measuring the gap between the computational efficiency of the machine and the diplomatic flexibility of humans during crises.*

3. *Building a hypothetical simulation model of an acute international crisis to demonstrate the dynamics of escalation under algorithmic guidance.*

1.4 Conceptual Framework of the Study:

1.4.1 Predictive Artificial Intelligence:

An advanced generation of data-computing technological systems that structurally relieve machine learning and deep learning algorithms. It possesses the capability for self-feeding from historical and real-time data streams (both structured and unstructured). This system aims to construct probabilistic statistical models and simulate prospective scenarios, enabling decisionmakers to forecast the future behaviours, patterns, and

actions of actors (such as adversaries and competitors) with high temporal and cognitive accuracy, thereby reducing the margins of randomness in strategic environments.¹

1.4.2 Political Decision-Making in Acute Crises:

The inevitable, legally and institutionally binding strategic choice issued by the supreme political leadership or the ruling elite dominating the decision-making process. This choice comes as a decisive response to an emergency and turbulent environment (the acute crisis environment) characterized by a high level of direct threat to the vital interests and national security of the state, coinciding with a narrow timeframe available for maneuver, the element of shocking surprise, and a deficit or conflict in information flows. This forces the decisionmaker to trade-off between alternatives with high precision and under immense psychological and objective pressures².

1.5 Literature Review:

The intersection between decentralized technology and international politics has produced peer-reviewed academic literature that attempts to fathom the depths of this transformation:

1.5.1 Michael Horowitz's Study: Titled "Artificial Intelligence and Global Stability,"³ the researcher discussed how artificial intelligence can alter the traditional balance of power. The study concluded that data-processing speed leads to a compression of the "response time" available to leaders, which pressures the decisionmaker to adopt pre-emptive offensive strategies out of fear of losing the informational advantage.

1.5.2 Lindsay's Study: In his book "Information, Technology, and War,"⁴ he argued that complex technical systems increase the fog of war and do not provide absolute certainty as proponents of technological determinism promote. He emphasized that big data creates illusions of complete rationality, while international reality is characterized by political and social biases that algorithms fail to filter out.

1.5.3 Johnson's Study: Titled "Artificial Intelligence and the Future of Deterrent Warfare,"⁵ the study focused on "automated flash wars." The findings indicated that the interaction of predictive algorithms belonging to two adversarial states in an accelerated environment can generate spontaneous escalation because of misreading algorithmic signals sent by the other party, thereby negating human capacity for timely diplomatic de-escalation.

1.6 Methodology:

The study relies on a mixed-methods approach encompassing two dimensions: the descriptive-analytical method to deconstruct theoretical

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and conceptual frameworks, and the cybernetic approach, which views the state as an information-processing system that receives inputs and issues outputs through feedback loops. Additionally, the study operationalizes the systems analysis approach and game theory to interpret strategic interactions between international units.

1.7 Study Sample and Tools:

1.7.1 Study Sample: A Simulation Model of the Taiwan Cyber-Geopolitical Crisis (USA vs. PRC)

Given the strict classification imposed on classified documents from the Pentagon's operations rooms and the Chinese Central Military Commission, this study relies on a "purposive analytical sample" based on the methodology of "strategic war-gaming."⁶

First: Reasons for selecting the United States of America and the People's Republic of China as actors in the study sample:

1. Both parties possess the most sophisticated military infrastructures integrated with artificial intelligence, such as the American JADC2 (Joint All-Domain Command and Control) project, which relies on predictive algorithms for target recognition, and the concept of "intelligentized warfare" adopted by the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA).

2. The acute geopolitical friction in the Indo-Pacific region.

Second: Features of the Crisis Scenario:

1. ***Flashpoint of Collision:*** The Taiwan Strait (a maritime and geopolitical choke point).

2. ***The Crisis Trigger:*** An unintentional maritime collision between an American autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and a manned Chinese Type 054A frigate during simultaneous military exercises.

3. ***The Technical Environment of the Crisis:*** Both parties rely on predictive artificial intelligence systems to feed decision-making rooms with strategic options and forecast the opponent's steps based on satellite movements, electronic warfare, and encrypted communications.

4. ***The Time Window Available to Humans:*** The human response time has been compressed by immediate algorithmic recommendations from hours to a mere 15 minutes before a decision on a kinetic response must be made.

1.7.2 Study Tools:

Three integrated research tools were constructed and developed to ensure accurate measurement of the independent variable (predictive AI systems) on the dependent variable (political decision-making and escalation):

First: The Cybernetically Modified Strategic Escalation Matrix: The classic "escalation ladder" by strategic theorist Herman Kahn was

adopted, developed, and compressed into five operational degrees compatible with machine speed and its capacity to foresee intentions. The matrix measures how a decision-maker transitions from one level to another based on algorithmic recommendations:

1. Level One: Silent Algorithmic Friction: Pre-emptive, predictive cyberattacks to disrupt reconnaissance sensors without a political declaration.

2. Level Two: Automated Predictive Warning: Rapid tactical mobilization of forces based on the machine's anticipation of an imminent strike from the adversary (preventive repositioning).

3. Level Three: Automated Defensive Pre-emption: Electronic flooding and full jamming of the opponent's command and control systems to paralyze their predictive capacity.

4. Level Four: Limited Kinetic Strike: Targeting drones or unmanned naval vessels based on algorithmic calculations confirming that the cost of silence is higher than the cost of a response.

5. Level Five: Hyperwar: The crisis spirals out of human control, transforming into a fully automated missile and nuclear engagement.

Second: Strategic Effectiveness Measurement Indicators: To transform theoretical hypotheses into analysable data within the simulation matrix, three standard indicators were defined and calibrated:

1. Response and Analysis Time Indicator: Measures in minutes and seconds the gap between bureaucratic human analysis (which takes time for reading and diplomatic consultation) and instantaneous algorithmic analysis. The dilemma here is that machine-driven time compression pressures the human decisionmaker to adopt immediate offensive options.

2. Situational Cognitive Error Rate Indicator: Measures the percentage of "false positives" committed by the predictive algorithm. For example: the American AI system interpreting a Chinese tactical withdrawal or the opening of emergency communication channels as a "military ruse preparing for a wider attack," leading to a flawed human decision based on a distorted automated assessment.

3. Escalation Inevitability Ratio Indicator: A probabilistic mathematical equation that measures the closure of the diplomatic circle. The more leaders (in Washington and Beijing) rely on the outputs of the predictive machine, the higher the escalation inevitability ratio becomes, and the lower the diplomats' capacity to maneuver outside the system's pre-set mathematical models.

Third: Qualitative and Quantitative Policy Paper Content Analysis Tool: This tool is used to extrapolate and analyse the intellectual and military

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doctrinal structure of the two powers (America and China) toward artificial intelligence, by subjecting reports issued by strategic think tanks to coding and classification within three main categories:

1. The RAND Corporation: Policy papers concerning (JADC2, and deterrence stability in the machine age) were analysed to extract variables related to "the thresholds of trust that American leaders place in automated prediction during crises."

2. The Royal United Services Institute (RUSI): Its reports on (algorithmic warfare and cyber-geopolitical nuclear deterrence) were analysed to extract indicators related to "the risks of the absence of moral constraints and flexible judgment in Western and Asian military doctrines."

3. Analysed Units of Analysis and Thematic Sections: First: The inevitability of relying on the machine to avoid temporal defeat; Second: The "black box" dilemma and the inability of leaders to understand how the algorithm arrives at a threat-prediction decision; Third: The impact of the absence of emotional contact between adversaries in accelerating an existential war.

Section One:

The Most Conceptually Capable Academic Theoretical Frameworks for Interpreting the Strategic Behaviour of Mechanized States:

This section presents the theoretical structures within the field of international relations and security studies that possess the highest explanatory capacity for the phenomenon of integrating algorithms into strategic decision-making.

Table No. (1): A Comparative Strategic Approach Between Classical Political Theory Frameworks and Algorithmic Behaviour in Crisis Management Environments.

<i>Academic Theoretical Framework</i>	<i>Core Independent Variable</i>	<i>Behavioural Interpretation of AI Integration</i>
<i>Structural / Offensive Realism</i>	<i>Anarchy of the international system and the balance of power</i>	<i>The inevitability of relying on the machine to avoid temporal defeat and maximize influential power.</i>
<i>Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making</i>	<i>Feedback channels and uncertainty reduction</i>	<i>The striving of military institutions to close out spaces of doubt through</i>

		<i>definitive mathematical outputs.</i>
<i>Cognitive (Psychological) Perspective</i>	<i>Perception and human cognitive error</i>	<i>Amplifying traditional suspensions and generating "false positives" due to automation bias.</i>

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on:

1.Kania, E. B., *Battlefield Singularity: Artificial Intelligence, Military Power, and China's Future Military Innovation*, Centre for a New American Security (CNAS), P. 32.

2.Steinbrunner, J. D., *The Cybernetic Theory of Decision: New Dimensions of Political Analysis*, Princeton University Press, P. 59.

3.Johnson, J., *Artificial Intelligence & the Future of Warfare: The USA, China, and Strategic Stability*, Oxford University Press, P. 234.

The First Requirement: The Realist Approach (Neorealism and Offensive Realism)

The Realist school remains the most robust framework for interpreting why great powers rush toward this "potential technological suicide" without moral constraints.

The First Subsection: The Anarchy of the International System and the Inevitability of Mechanization (Kenneth Waltz's Perspective):

Reading the motives behind adopting military artificial intelligence from the perspective of Structural Realism specifically through the theses of geopolitical thinker Kenneth Waltz reveals that the mechanization of operations rooms and reliance on predictive algorithms is not merely a voluntary technological choice or a traditional arms race. Rather, it is an "inevitable forced response" imposed by the flawed structure of the international system, where artificial intelligence shifts from a tool of military efficiency to an existential condition for survival in an international environment that does not tolerate temporal weakness.

This structural inevitability can be deconstructed through the following analytical dimensions:

1. The Dilemma of "Self-Help" in an Anarchical System:

According to Kenneth Waltz, the defining characteristic of the international system is anarchy meaning not chaotic lawlessness, but the absence of a "central supreme authority" or a world government capable of protecting states and enforcing international law. In this anarchical world, the governing structure of state behaviour becomes "self-help." Based on this principle, Washington and Beijing fully realize that there is no external security guarantor to ensure their survival; consequently, accumulating power and modernizing reconnaissance and decision-making tools become the primary, fundamental duty of each state to

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preserve its survival. From this standpoint, neither the United States nor China views systems like JADC2 as a technological luxury, but rather as inevitable shields imposed by the anarchical nature of the international system⁷.

2. The Dilemma of "Overwhelming Temporal Defeat":

In the era of cyber warfare and hypersonic weapons, Structural Realism has redefined the concept of the "balance of power" to become the "balance of algorithmic speed." Kenneth Waltz maintained that states are in a constant state of competition to match the capabilities of adversaries to prevent a disequilibrium in the balance. Today, the two superpowers realize that a "single second" of delay in data processing and early warning means the destruction of an entire fleet in the Taiwan Strait or the paralysis of missile silos deep within their geographical territory. A state that hesitates to integrate predictive artificial intelligence and relies on "human biological slowness" in decision-making condemns itself in advance to an "overwhelming temporal defeat." This existential fear of digital backwardness represents a colossal coercive force driving both parties to progressively mechanize their operations rooms.⁸

3. The Socialization of States and the Mimicry of Military Behaviour:

One of Waltz's most prominent ideas in his book "Theory of International Politics" is that the structure of the international system forces states to "mimic" the successful tactics and innovations of one another through a mechanism called the "socialization of competition."

First: If the United States develops algorithms to reduce military response time to fractions of a second, China by virtue of the system's structural pressure is forced to develop a parallel, instantaneous, and equivalent system, and vice versa.

Second: Any unilateral attempt to limit decision mechanization or retreat from using artificial intelligence in crisis management will be structurally interpreted as a "strategic vulnerability" that the adversary can exploit, making the automation race a vicious cycle of forced mimicry.⁹

Waltz argues that contemporary states, in their rational and continuous search for security and survival within an anarchical system, are forced to adopt ultra-fast and programmatically rigid artificial intelligence systems. However, the paradox lies in the fact that these very tools, through the dynamics of "algorithmic echoes" and the "closure of the diplomatic circle," ultimately lead to the destruction of collective security and ignite existential conflicts that neither party politically desired.

Kenneth Waltz's perspective proves that the blame for sliding into a "mechanized hyper war" does not fall upon software engineers in Silicon Valley or Beijing, nor upon the madness of military leaderships; rather, it falls upon the anarchical structure of the international system itself. This coercive structure places decisionmakers before two bitter choices: either hand over the reins of strategic decision-making to algorithms and neural networks to guarantee temporal supremacy, or risk biological annihilation before the adversary's superior machines. In the struggle for survival, the inevitability of mechanization always wins, even if the price is leading humanity toward the brink of the abyss with blind rational desire.

The Second Subsection: Maximizing Offensive Power and Deterrence Stability (John Mearsheimer's Perspective):

Deconstructing the motives for adopting military artificial intelligence from the perspective of Offensive Realism by geopolitical thinker John Mearsheimer reveals that predictive algorithms and automated command systems are not merely defensive tools to preserve the status quo. Instead, they are decisive strategic weapons designed to maximize relative power and achieve regional hegemony or prevent the adversary from achieving it. In Mearsheimer's world, great powers never feel secure merely by achieving a "balance"; rather, they constantly seek to be the sole hegemon in their regional system to eliminate any potential threat.

This mechanized geopolitical clash can be analysed through the following dimensions:

1. The Pursuit of Hegemony and Breaking "Geographical Access Prohibition" (A2/AD):

According to Mearsheimer, great powers formulate their strategies based on the assumption that the adversary's intentions are impossible to know with precision; therefore, the only means to ensure survival is absolute supremacy. When analysing policy papers issued by the "RAND" Corporation, it becomes clear that the United States' development of the Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) project was not a routine measure, but rather an attempt to maximize offensive and operational power with the aim of:

First: Deconstructing the Chinese Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) strategy: *Where American algorithms seek to process billions of data points in fractions of a second to detect and paralyze pinpoint Chinese missile networks and air defences that prevent American forces from entering the Taiwan Strait.*

Second: Achieving temporal and informational supremacy: *To guarantee Washington's ability to impose its military will in the South China Sea and*

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protect its allies, activating the logic of hegemony dictated by Offensive Realism.¹⁰

2. Chinese "Intelligentized Warfare" and Bridging the Strategic Gap:

In contrast, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) operates under the exact same offensive realist logic. The concept of "intelligentized warfare" adopted by Beijing primarily aims to employ artificial intelligence, quantum computing, and autonomous drones to break Western technological supremacy. From Mearsheimer's perspective, Beijing realizes that the presence of a superpower like America in its backyard (the Western Pacific) poses an existential threat to its plans for regional hegemony over Asia; hence, Chinese military automation becomes a hard tool to disrupt American JADC2 algorithms and reshape the balance of power in its Favor.¹¹

3. The Mechanization of the "Balance of Terror" and Deterrence Stability:

Offensive Realism argues that peace between great powers if it exists is a fragile and temporary peace based primarily on the "balance of terror" and mutual deterrence. In this context, the integration of military algorithms transforms into the primary pillar of modern geopolitical deterrence through two mechanisms:

First: Securing "Second-Strike Capability": Both Washington and Beijing realize that introducing artificial intelligence into early warning networks guarantees an immediate and inevitable response to any surprise attack, preventing the adversary from considering a pre-emptive strike because the machine's mathematical calculations will guarantee their destruction in return.

Second: Institutionalizing Mathematical Deterrence: Algorithms become a "cold, rational" tool to inform the adversary that the cost of escalation exceeds any potential gain, creating a type of stability established upon the mutual fear of the efficiency of the other party's machines.¹²

The real tragedy of Offensive Realism lies in the fact that Washington's continuous pursuit of distinctiveness through the JADC2 system, and Beijing's parallel pursuit of possessing "intelligentized warfare," creates an "inevitable and escalating security dilemma." Each party views the other's software as an imminent danger that must be responded to by accelerating its own automation, making the integration of algorithms a tool to maintain terror and deterrence. Yet, at the same time, it transforms this deterrence into a thin wire stretched over the abyss of a hyper-speed

war, where each party believes it is protecting its security while pushing the international system toward the brink of inevitable collision.

John Mearsheimer's perspective proves that the adoption of predictive artificial intelligence is not the product of a "technological aberration," but rather the tool that most embodies human and international nature in its feverish pursuit of power and control. In the Taiwan Strait, Washington and Beijing are not competing over technical standards; they are battling for the leadership of the international system, where mathematical equations and neural networks have become the new language and the hard matter with which the geopolitical balance of terror is forged in the twenty-first century.

The Second Requirement: The Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making and the Cognitive Perspective

These approaches provide the internal behavioural explanation of how complex military organizations operate when dealing with information flows.

The First Subsection: John Steinbruner's Model and the Reduction of Distorted Uncertainty:

Reading this dilemma from the perspective of the Cybernetic Theory of Decision-Making by political and strategic thinker John Steinbruner provides us with a profound explanatory tool to understand the psychological and bureaucratic architecture that drives great armies with an overwhelming desire toward adopting artificial intelligence, despite their awareness of its structural technical flaws. In his foundational book, "The Cybernetic Theory of Decision," Steinbruner developed a model that breaks the monopoly of "classical rational theory" in explaining political and military decisions. This perspective is built upon the following analytical dimensions:

1. The Illusion of Control and Mechanisms for Reducing Uncertainty:

Steinbruner argues that the human mind, and large military bureaucracies in particular, suffer from hypersensitivity toward high complexity and conflicting information. Therefore, in crisis management, they do not search for the "optimal" or "wisest" decision in its comprehensive philosophical sense; rather, they primarily seek fixed procedural mechanisms to reduce "uncertainty" and control the surrounding environment. In this context, predictive artificial intelligence represents the ultimate embodiment and historical pinnacle of the cybernetic machine described by Steinbruner. It grants military leaders what can be termed a "mathematical illusion of control." While the Taiwan Strait teems with complex geopolitical and psychological variables, the

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algorithm arrives to simplify this terrifying complexity into a single, decisive number (e.g., a recommendation for a kinetic strike with a 91% certainty ratio). This numerical evaluation provides the military bureaucracy with immediate psychological and organizational comfort because it deceives them into believing they have "fenced in" the unknown and converted the "fog of war" into a well-defined mathematical equation.¹³

2. Replacing Human Fog with Algorithmic Blindness:

The catastrophic paradox in Steinbrunner's cybernetic model when applied to modern systems like JADC2 is that the machine does not eliminate the classical "fog of war" spoken of by Clausewitz; instead, it performs a process of cognitive displacement and distortion:

First: Traditional Human Fog of War: Characterized by doubt, lack of information, human hesitation, and slow response. Despite its danger, it possesses an intrinsic advantage: it drives the human leader to exercise caution, deliberate, and leave a margin for diplomatic manoeuvre out of fear of the unknown.

Second: Algorithmic Black-Box Blindness: The machine swallows the human fog of war and tames uncertainty by concealing it within its deep neural layers, presenting the leader with a "false certainty" charged with "automation bias." Here, the fog shifts from an external environment that the leader sees and cautions against, into a "structural blindness within his automated mind." The leader executes the algorithmic recommendation with complete certainty and blind trust, completely unaware that the machine has built its calculations on spurious correlations or distorted readings of the adversary's behaviour.¹⁴

3. Zeroing-Out Flexibility and the "Closed-Loop Feedback" Response:

According to cybernetic theory, automated systems are designed to respond to environmental indicators through decisive and fixed response protocols (Fixed Routines). When the American algorithm detects a Chinese naval movement, it does not analyse long-term political intentions; rather, it executes the specific cybernetic mission assigned to it: "neutralize the detected threat to lower operational uncertainty." This procedural fencing entirely eliminates "interpretive flexibility." Instead of the military command examining whether a camouflaged Chinese withdrawal is a gesture of peace, it resorts to the "stable programmatic routine" that classifies the withdrawal as a deceptive manoeuvre. The blind bureaucratic pursuit to eliminate doubt by relying on the machine closes the channels of

deep mental processing and drives the decisionmaker to adopt the distorted automated assessment as the sole objective reality.¹⁵

The cognitive tragedy of military artificial intelligence lies in the fact that it was designed to be an antidote to human uncertainty, only to transform into a cognitive trap for producing "distorted certainty." Military leaders in Washington and Beijing, in their search for fixed mechanisms to reduce the fog of battle, surrender their awareness to a "black box" system. Consequently, they head toward an existential conflict not because of an absence of data, but because they have replaced the caution stemming from human doubt with the momentum stemming from automated digital blindness.

The Second Subsection: Perception and Cognitive Error Theory (Robert Jervis's Theses):

When projecting Robert Jervis's classical theses on perception and misperception onto contemporary strategic reports issued by the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), the depth of the cognitive dilemma imposed by integrating artificial intelligence into operations rooms is revealed. Predictive algorithms do not operate as neutral tools to correct vision or filter data; rather, they transform into distorted cognitive lenses that amplify the suspicions already latent within the minds of military leaders.

Jervis's theory is established upon the idea that decisionmakers are governed by "pre-existing cognitive structures" and deeply rooted expectations formed through decades of accumulated historical hostility. This makes them structurally inclined to interpret any behaviour originating from the adversary as hostile and meticulously planned, while excluding the possibilities of chance, technical errors, or even a genuine desire for de-escalation. In a mechanized warfare environment, when a system like JADC2 analyses an ambiguous Chinese naval movement in the Taiwan Strait and issues a numerical assessment indicating a 91% probability of an attack, a dangerous fusion occurs between the human leader's doubt-ridden psychology and the mathematical outputs of the machine.¹⁶

This fusion grants the psychological illusion an objective, scientific legitimacy. Leaders who already suspect the adversary's intentions find in the machine's numbers and percentages conclusive evidence that removes the awkwardness of hesitation and legitimizes their internal fears. The self-scepticism that previously drove the human leader to deliberate and exercise caution for fear that his momentum was driven by dread vanishes. This occurs because the "sanctity of numbers" grants him a false certainty


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that his fears have transformed into scientific facts detected and measured by modern technology with indisputable accuracy.¹⁷

As a result of this fusion, military doctrine shifts from its traditional strategic and diplomatic flexibility to a dry mathematical inevitability. Military diplomacy, by its very nature, relies on fluid grey areas, reading political body language, catching veiled signals, and manoeuvring with time to gain space for withdrawal and face-saving. However, the mathematical inevitability of algorithms completely neutralizes this human political sense, converting a complex geopolitical reality into definitive binary outputs, thereby making the strategic behaviour of states more rigid and inflexible, and less capable of adapting to sudden peaceful initiatives.¹⁸

This digital rigidity transforms into fuel for the spiral of "mutual misperception" described by Jervis, where escalation accelerates at an unprecedented rate at the very first silent algorithmic friction. When the American machine fails to perceive that a Chinese tactical withdrawal is a gesture of de-escalation and classifies it as a military ruse based on the accumulated suspicion in its databases, it fabricates an automated cognitive error that the human leader immediately adopts due to automation bias. This adoption drives Washington toward a pre-emptive defensive response, which the Chinese algorithm captures through its distorted lens to see as evidence of a prior American intention to destroy. This proves that predictive algorithms, instead of being an antidote to human cognitive error, have become its primary feeder and greatest amplifier, closing the avenues of diplomatic adaptation in Favor of rigid equations that push states toward existential armed collision at the very first tactical spark.¹⁹

Figure No. (1): The Causal Path of Military Decision Automation from Tactical Collision to Flash War.



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on:

1.Parasuraman, R., & Manzey, D. H., "Complacency and Bias in Human Use of Automation", Human Factors, USA, Volume 52 and Number 3, 2010, P. 76.

***The Second Section:
Cybernetic Time, the Security Dilemma, and the Psychology of
Leadership***

This section examines how the hyper-speed of data processing by predictive algorithms re-engineers the international security environment and distorts the psychological perception of human leaders.

The First Requirement: The Transformation of the Classical Security Dilemma into a "Hyper-Speed Security Dilemma"

The security dilemma is historically defined (according to the theses of John Herz and Robert Jervis) as a situation in which a state's defensive actions lead another state to feel threatened, prompting it to take countermeasures that lead to an unintended escalation. In the era of artificial intelligence, this concept acquires critical dimensions:

The First Subsection: The Narrowing and Compression of the "OODA Loop":

Deconstructing the dilemma of compressing the "OODA Loop" in the contemporary cyber-geopolitical conflict environment requires first understanding this loop as the motor nerve of any military doctrine since it was formulated by Colonel John Boyd. The loop consists of four sequential stages: Observe via data collection, orient via contextual analysis and information filtering, decide by choosing the optimal option, and Act by transforming the decision into a kinetic or cyber action.

Historically, human effort in the "Observe" and "Orient" stages consumed the bulk of the time; sorting intelligence reports, verifying radar reliability, and convening operations room meetings required hours or days. This bureaucratic slowness, which was viewed as a tactical defect, represented a "strategic safety valve" that granted political leadership a sufficient time window to open back-channel communications and activate pre-emptive diplomacy to avoid sliding into war.

With the introduction of predictive artificial intelligence systems, such as the American Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) project or the Chinese "intelligentized warfare" systems, a mechanical leap occurred that eliminated this safety valve. These systems integrate thousands of sensors from satellites, unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs), and cyber radars into a single cloud network capable of processing millions of data points in fractions of a second. Here, the "Observe" and "Orient" stages fuse into a single, instantaneous algorithmic step. The machine does not merely detect the target; it forecasts its intentions based on prior

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probabilistic calculations and presents the human decisionmaker with a "pre-packaged option menu" for execution within a narrow window not exceeding 15 minutes. This algorithmic pressure transforms the loop from a contemplative analytical process into a semi-automated, reflexive response mechanism.²⁰

The most dangerous strategic impact of this time compression is the total elimination of what is known as "strategic time delay" in conventional warfare. If an American autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) collides with a manned Chinese Type 054A frigate in the Taiwan Strait, conventional human judgment would require time to ascertain whether the incident was a technical glitch, an offensive manoeuvre, or merely an unintentional friction. This time allows for the absorption of the cognitive shock; the U.S. Secretary of State could contact his Chinese counterpart to clarify the situation.

Conversely, in the era of the algorithmically compressed "OODA" loop, the JADC2 system would detect the collision, analyse the surrounding Chinese radar movements within seconds, and assume based on cost-benefit calculations that any delay in responding for more than 15 minutes would grant China an opportunity to paralyze American capabilities in the region. Consequently, the system places the human leader before an inevitable choice: either launch a limited kinetic strike immediately or risk an overwhelming tactical temporal defeat.²¹

This technological shift pronounces a practical death sentence on traditional diplomacy during times of crisis. Diplomacy is, by its nature, a biological and bureaucratic process; it requires drafting cables, summoning ambassadors, obtaining approvals from political leaderships, and negotiating flexible wordings operations that necessarily require hours at a minimum. When the speed of military decision-making is governed by a mere 15 minutes, diplomacy is driven completely out of the crisis management equation. Neither the ambassador nor even the president can intervene to halt a military machine that has already transitioned from silent reconnaissance to "automated defensive pre-emption" based on an algorithmic recommendation that warned of an imminent strike.

To illustrate this with an applied example, this dynamic can be compared to the "Cuban Missile Crisis" of 1962, where the White House took days to analyse aerial photographs and explore Soviet intentions. This granted John F. Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev sufficient time to exchange messages and forge a swift deal that spared the world a nuclear catastrophe. If systems like JADC2 had been managing that crisis with a

15-minute decision window, the algorithms would have interpreted any Soviet movement to transport missiles as a signal for an inevitable first strike. They would have issued an immediate recommendation to launch a comprehensive pre-emptive strike before either party could type a single draft of a diplomatic letter. The compression of the "OODA" loop transforms war from a political instrument as defined by Clausewitz into an independent mathematical operation that runs at the speed of light and electricity, leaving humans and diplomacy in the seats of helpless spectators.

Figure No. (2): The Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action Loop (Circle), where each letter in the acronym (OODA) represents a stage of this continuous loop:



Source: Prepared by the researcher based on artificial intelligence techniques and the following reference:

1. Boyd, J. R., *The essence of winning and losing*, Unpublished lecture notes presented at military briefings, Maxwell AFB, AL, 1996, USA.

The Second Subsection: The Inevitability of Automated Pre-emption as an Alternative to Deterrence:

The fundamental shift from traditional deterrence strategies to the inevitability of automated pre-emption represents a radical reformulation of the military philosophy that has governed international relations since the dawn of the nuclear age. Deterrence, in its essence, is an eminently psychological concept based on two pillars: sending clear signals to the adversary demonstrating that the cost of initiating an attack outweighs any potential gains and possessing the strategic patience to verify the intentions of the other party before taking a devastating counteraction. However,

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injecting predictive algorithms into decision-making chambers replaces this flexible psychological logic with a dry mathematical logic established upon strict probability calculations. In the language of numbers, there is no room for concepts like "good faith" or "diplomatic deliberation." These smart systems are structurally designed according to "Minimax" principles, a programming architecture that automatically forces the machine to adopt and anticipate the "worst-case scenarios" as a baseline rule for protecting military assets. This transforms defensive pre-emption from a deferred political choice into an inevitable technological necessity.²²

This structural deficiency in the machine is attributed to the nature of mathematical probability modelling. For a military AI system, the existence of a 51% probability that the adversary's movements represent a prelude to an offensive military strike mathematically dictates the necessity of immediate action on the assumption that the attack is inevitably occurring. The machine cannot risk waiting for the certainty ratio to reach 100%, because the time differential between the two percentages could mean the total destruction of military infrastructure or the paralysis of command-and-control systems. Consequently, the algorithmic model suffers from a "structural bias toward an offensive interpretation," whereby any misunderstood or suspicious movement by the adversary is classified as an imminent existential threat requiring a pre-emptive kinetic or cyber response to abort it before it occurs, which completely erases the traditional distinction between defence and offense.

When projecting this logic onto the crisis scenario in the Taiwan Strait, we find that the incident of the unintentional maritime collision between the American autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and the manned Chinese Type 054A frigate transforms instantly from an isolated tactical accident into digital inputs in the Chinese PLA's "intelligentized warfare" system. If American naval vessels, immediately following the accident, engage in rapid repositioning, activate electronic jamming systems to protect themselves, or increase the rate of encrypted communications, the Chinese algorithm will not view these actions as precautionary defensive steps or an attempt to rescue the stranded UUV. Instead, the machine will match these physical and electromagnetic indicators with historical databases of offensive manoeuvres, concluding immediately that the United States is preparing to launch a "kinetic retaliatory strike" in response to the seizure or damage of its drone.

At that critical moment, the Chinese machine eliminates the path of diplomatic justification. Waiting for the Chinese Foreign Minister to

contact his American counterpart via the hotline or waiting for the reports of bureaucratic military investigation committees, represents in the view of the algorithm a "suicidal temporal risk" that could lead to the loss of the frigate or even the naval bases on the eastern coast of China. Based on these purely mathematical calculations, the predictive system issues an mandatory and immediate recommendation to the human decisionmaker to transition to level three of the escalation matrix: "Automated Defensive Pre-emption." This pre-emption translates practically into launching a comprehensive cyberattack and intensive jamming flood against American command and control systems (JADC2) to paralyze their predictive capacity and prevent them from delivering their presumed strike.

Here, the grand strategic paradox and the security dilemma manifest in their ugliest forms. The step taken by the Chinese leadership based on the machine's recommendation was classified in its internal software as a "purely defensive measure" aimed at thwarting an imminent American attack predicted by the algorithm. However, as soon as this electronic flooding and comprehensive jamming are executed, the American JADC2 system will capture this behaviour and interpret it immediately as an "unprovoked first strike and a total paralysis of American capabilities."

This distorted automated assessment will, in turn, drive the American system to bypass all stages of de-escalation and diplomacy, immediately recommending a transition to a kinetic missile response to protect what remains of military assets. Thus, the behaviour that began as a defensive step driven by algorithmic dread of worst-case scenarios transforms into the actual and direct spark triggering a comprehensive and open war between the two superpowers. This proves that the inevitability of automated pre-emption does not protect states but forcibly drives them toward inevitable escalation, transforming predictive technology from a tool for crisis management into a self-contained engine for generating wars.

The Second Requirement: The Psychological and Behavioural Dynamics of the Decisionmaker Under Algorithmic Pressure

Integrating the machine into operations rooms does not eliminate the human element but rather places it under unprecedented psychological pressure known as "situational cognitive siege."

The First Subsection: Automation Bias and Cognitive Alienation:

The intersection between leadership psychology and smart cybernetic systems produces a critical phenomenon known in cognitive psychology and security studies as "automation bias." This is a state of psychological and cognitive dependency that affects the human element when finding

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themselves confronting highly complex technological systems. In the context of contemporary military operations rooms, this bias is no longer a passing error in judgment; rather, it transforms into a complete cognitive alienation, where the human decisionmaker is stripped of the faculty of critical analysis and strategic manoeuvre, becoming a captive to the data and outputs generated by algorithms. The danger of this phenomenon multiplies exponentially as the time window available to humans is compressed to a mere 15 minutes.

Psychologically, when a human falls under the weight of acute time pressure coupled with an existential threat (such as the potential for naval vessels or military infrastructure to suffer a fatal blow), the human mind stops operating its "slow analytical cognitive system" and forcibly switches to the "fast reflexive system." At this critical juncture, the predictive algorithm (such as the American JADC2 project or Chinese intelligentized warfare systems) appears as a "cognitive lifeline." The human leader automatically and unconsciously tends to assume that the machine, which processed terabytes of data in fractions of a second, possesses a comprehensive and infallible vision. This drives the leader to Favor its offensive recommendation over their personal political or diplomatic doubts.²³

This scenario creates what can be termed the "technocratic validator," where the military or political leader who possesses the legal and constitutional authority to open fire practically loses their actual authority in Favor of the "engineers and mathematical models" who designed the algorithm in advance. The 15-minute window makes it impossible for the leader or their supporting team to review raw data; they cannot verify whether the Chinese movement in the Taiwan Strait is an actual attack or merely a tactical manoeuvre or a sensor error. Consequently, the human leader's role is restricted to pressing the approval button within the countdown, out of fear of falling into what is known as "temporal defeat" the psychological dread that the adversary's artificial intelligence will be faster in taking the first step.

Recent military history offers telling evidence of how this bias operates, albeit in environments less complex than current artificial intelligence:

1. The Iranian Airliner Incident (USS Vincennes) in 1988: When the crew of the American warship relied blindly on the automated "Aegis" air defence system. Although human radar operators indicated that the Iranian civilian airliner was on a normal ascending flight path, the automated system classified it as a "hostile attacking fighter on a descending path."

Under time pressure and the crew's absolute trust in the system's automation, the civilian aircraft was shot down based on "automation bias" that overrode flexible human judgment.

2. The Saving Historical Paradox (Stanislav Petrov) in 1983: *In contrast, when the automated Soviet early warning system warned of America launching five ballistic missiles, the Soviet officer Stanislav Petrov possessed a sufficient "time window" that enabled him to exercise his human judgment. He concluded that if America wanted war, it would crush the Soviet Union with thousands of missiles, not just five. Thus, he considered the automated outputs a technical error and refused to validate them, saving the world from a nuclear catastrophe.*

In the current Taiwan crisis simulation model, the "Petrov" model is completely destroyed; 15 minutes do not allow for logical contemplation. If the autonomous UUV collides with the Chinese frigate, and the algorithm outputs a recommendation that Chinese coastal radars must be bombed immediately to "neutralize an imminent danger with a 93% certainty ratio," the human leader will fall victim to cognitive alienation. The leadership will be seized by the fear that rejecting the recommendation could lead to the total destruction of the American fleet within minutes if the machine is right. Predictive artificial intelligence transitions from a decision-support tool to a "dominant strategic actor" dictating its will to humans by imposing choices it engineered in advance in a dry laboratory environment. This transforms decisionmakers into mere political facades executing the will of algorithms, accelerating the slide toward a devastating kinetic collision that the political leadership did not originally desire.

The Second Subsection: The "Narrow Tunnel" Phenomenon and the Erosion of Psychological Flexibility:

The intersection between extreme time pressure and existential threats in automated operations rooms produces a dangerous psychological and cognitive symptom known in political psychology and crisis management as the "Narrow Tunnel" phenomenon (Tunnel Vision / Cognitive Tunnelling). This phenomenon represents a sharp narrowing in the human decision-maker's perceptual field, where the instantaneous influx of algorithmic recommendations, coupled with the critical 15-minute deadline, psychologically and bureaucratically isolates the leader from their advisory environment. It traps them in a unilateral vantage point focusing exclusively on immediate military survival and the defence of physical assets, at the expense of any long-term geopolitical calculations or diplomatic dimensions.²⁴

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In normal cases of international crisis management, political leadership relies on an expanded advisory structure (such as the National Security Council) that includes diplomats, economists, and psychological analysts alongside military leaders. This diversity ensures balancing military options with political alternatives, searching for margins to manoeuvre and de-escalate tension. However, the pressure of the 15-minute window immediately dismantles this bureaucratic network; there is no time to convene an emergency meeting, and no space to listen to the State Department's analysis of economic repercussions or international diplomatic reactions. The decisionmaker detaches physically and morally from their political advisors, becoming surrounded solely by technicians and the screens of predictive systems (such as the American JADC2 or Chinese intelligitized warfare systems) that flash red, announcing the imminent expiration of time.

This bureaucratic and temporal siege drives the human mind toward the "erosion of psychological flexibility," where the brain fails to process multiple scenarios or absorb complexity, reducing a complex crisis into a binary zero-sum equation: (either we strike or we are struck). ²⁵ in this "narrow tunnel," the absolute and sole priority becomes protecting weapon systems and naval vessels from the imminent destruction predicted by the machine. Calculations of international system stability, arms control treaties, or even the catastrophic repercussions of a world war break out slip from the leader's consciousness at that moment; the concept of "comprehensive national security" is compressed into the survival of the carrier, the frigate, or the radar network during the next ten minutes.²⁵

This cognitive degradation reflects directly in the collapse of flexible human judgment and emotional contact between adversaries. Historical diplomacy succeeded because human leaders (despite hostility) possessed the capacity for "strategic empathy" putting themselves in the adversary's place to understand their fears and read the non-verbal signs of de-escalation originating from them. In the narrow tunnel of automation, this human advantage vanishes entirely. The adversary is no longer a political entity that can be reasoned with; instead, it transforms into a "set of vectors, digital indicators, and radar directions" measured by the algorithm and classified as an inevitable existential threat.

Cold War literature presents clear models of how "psychological flexibility" saved the world when time allowed for breathing outside the narrow tunnel:

1. The "Hotline" Model in the Cuban Missile Crisis (1962): When John F. Kennedy possessed sufficient psychological flexibility to ignore his generals' advice to launch an immediate airstrike against Cuba, choosing instead to impose a naval quarantine to grant Nikita Khrushchev a face-saving exit. This flexible human judgment required days of discussion and analysis outside the narrow tunnel, which the current time window entirely prevents.

2. The Downing of the U-2 Reconnaissance Plane Over Cuba (1962): At the height of the crisis, Soviet air defences shot down an American spy plane, killing its pilot. Pure military logic (inside the tunnel) dictated an immediate retaliatory response and bombing the bases in Cuba. However, Kennedy and Khrushchev possessed the emotional contact and psychological flexibility to consider the incident a "tactical error by a field commander" rather than a political decision to start a war, thereby absorbing the shock and avoiding catastrophe.

In the current Taiwan Strait crisis model, these human margins are wholly obliterated. As soon as the American autonomous drone collides with the Chinese frigate, the leader (whether in Washington or Beijing) falls into the narrow cognitive tunnel of the 15 minutes. If the predictive screen displays that the other side is activating missile-guidance radars, the leader trapped in the tunnel of "immediate survival" will not possess the psychological space to consider that this measure might be defensive or resulting from the adversary's panic. Flexible judgment will collapse, emotional contact will vanish, and the leader will rush to adopt "pre-emptive offensive options" as the sole mechanical mechanism to guarantee the survival of their forces.²⁶ This proves that the narrow tunnel phenomenon transforms decisionmakers into blind executive tools, accelerating a devastating kinetic collision merely due to their psychological inability to see what lies beyond the machine's screen.²⁶

The Third Section:

The Limits of Predictive Modelling and the Dilemma of Qualitative Variables

This section discusses the structural inability of artificial intelligence to measure and interpret human, psychological, and political variables that cannot be converted into rigid numerical equations.

The First Requirement: The Inability of Algorithms to Quantify Ideology and Will

Predictive modelling feeds on "hard data" (radar signals, geographical movements, encrypted communications) but suffers from complete blindness toward soft variables.

The First Subsection: Reductive Compounding of the Concept of "Political Will" and "Face-Saving":

The injection of predictive modelling and artificial intelligence into strategic situational assessment produces a sharp structural deficiency manifested in reducing the qualitative value of political determinants, chief among which are the concepts of "political will" and "face-saving." Predictive systems are engineered to handle hard quantitative inputs that are amenable to mathematical measurement and quantification, such as the number of carriers, missile ranges, trade volume, and economic inflation indicators. However, these systems completely lack any mathematical tool or metric to decode the complex psychological and ideological motives that drive human behaviour during existential crises. This causes them to build their forecasts on distorted rational and utilitarian foundations that do not match the historical and cultural reality of the conflicting powers.

This shortcoming appears clearly when analysing how the algorithm calculates the expected Chinese reaction. When processing the data of the Taiwan Strait crisis following the collision of the autonomous UUV with the Chinese frigate, the American predictive system (JADC2) will resort to conducting a "Cost-Benefit Analysis" via classical balance-of-power equations and Game Theory. The machine will calculate the volume of economic losses that Beijing would incur in the event of escalation, such as freezing its international assets, cutting semiconductor supply chains, and targeting its maritime infrastructure. Based on these rigid numbers, the algorithm will conclude with a high certainty ratio that the cost of escalation for China outweighs the returns. Consequently, the predictive recommendation will state: "The Chinese leadership will retreat and swallow the shock if faced with a specific American kinetic response, because rational calculations prevent them from economic suicide."²⁷

Yet, what mathematics fails to grasp is that the strategic behaviour of the Chinese Central Military Commission and the Communist Party is not managed by the logic of commercial accounting, but rather by doctrinal and value-based determinants that are non-digitizable. The "One China" doctrine and the recovery of Taiwan do not represent a "negotiable political choice" for the leadership in Beijing; rather, it is a matter of existential legitimacy for the Party and a core component of the "Chinese Dream of National Rejuvenation." For the sake of this doctrine, the Chinese political leadership possesses a human and psychological readiness to bear heavy economic and military losses, zero-out growth rates, and enter into a long war of attrition a psychological and qualitative variable that lies entirely

outside the scope of electromagnetic reconnaissance or the algorithmic calculation of the American machine.

Furthermore, the concept of "national dignity" and the culture of "face-saving" emerge as a decisive factor in Asian military doctrine. In the Eastern strategic environment, public concessions or accepting military humiliation before Western powers are considered a total collapse of political prestige internally and externally a price the Chinese leadership views as far higher than the cost of losing a few naval vessels or a decline in economic indicators. If the American algorithm suggests a "limited and precisely calibrated kinetic strike" (Level 4) based on the hypothesis that China will understand the message and halt to protect its interests, it fails to realize that this limited strike will directly touch "Chinese national dignity." This forces the human leadership in Beijing to respond comprehensively and shockingly to repel the insult and save face, completely aborting all the dry mathematical calculations of the machine.²⁸

Political and military history is replete with living examples embodying how qualitative "political will" destroyed the quantitative calculations of systems and experts:

1. The Vietnam War (Robert McNamara's Quantitative Model): Then-U.S. Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara relied on quantitative rationality and mathematical efficiency metrics to manage the war (body counts, ammunition volume, land control percentages). Calculations confirmed the inevitability of North Vietnam's surrender given the quantitative asymmetry between a superpower and a developing nation. However, the American equation omitted the unmeasurable variable of "Vietnamese will" and an unlimited readiness to bear human losses for liberation, leading to the historic American defeat despite numerical supremacy.

2. The October War of 1973 (Israeli Technological Blindness): Israeli intelligence relied on a rigid quantitative assessment (the "Concept" theory) stating that Egypt would not wage war because it lacked the qualitative air supremacy necessary to neutralize the Israeli Air Force according to military calculations. What the Israeli systems failed to measure was the Egyptian political will and the inevitability of overcoming the "humiliation of the 1967 war," restoring national dignity, and saving face the qualitative motive that drove the Egyptian leadership to innovate tactical solutions (such as the air defence missile wall) to shatter the mathematical calculations of the traditional military balance.

In the contemporary Taiwan crisis simulation, this structural blindness is repeated but at a faster and more dangerous pace. When the JADC2

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project builds its assessments on ignoring "Chinese national dignity," it drives the American decision-maker toward reckless, misguided behaviour. The algorithms' lack of capacity to model "will, emotions, and national pride" transforms predictive technology into a mechanism for producing erroneous strategic judgments; the machine calculates the numbers of the physical world and completely ignores the motives of the psychological world. Thus, it leads great powers to detonate a comprehensive conflict because of its programmatic inability to understand that humans are sometimes ready to destroy economic calculations for the sake of their political dignity.

The Second Subsection: The Rigidity of Models in the Face of Ideological Doctrines:

The most dangerous structural deficiency in contemporary predictive modelling lies in the "rigidity of models in the face of ideological and combat doctrines" a political and military space that does not submit to the logic of "rational flexibility" assumed by western creators of algorithms. Predictive systems, such as the American JADC2 project, base their options on the "Classical Rational Actor" model inspired by economics and Western theories of deterrence, which assumes that the adversary will respond to any military pressure proportionally and cautiously, always searching for an equilibrium point that minimizes their losses. However, this programmatic assumption collides with the "doctrinal combat doctrines" of armies like the Chinese PLA, which do not view military escalation as a step-by-step bargaining process, but rather as a zero-sum equation directly tied to national sovereignty and the protection of the political regime.

This cognitive gap between the machine's rigidity and the doctrine's hardness appears clearly when simulating the transition of the American predictive system to level four of the escalation matrix: a "Limited Kinetic Strike." If the American algorithm detects a Chinese escalation after the drone collision incident, the machine might suggest striking an isolated Chinese radar platform or targeting a Chinese maritime drone in the Strait. From the perspective of American programming, this step is classified as a "rationally calibrated and precise deterrence measure"; its goal is to send a strong signal to Beijing that Washington is ready to fight, while keeping the strike intensity below the threshold of total war to force the Chinese leadership to retreat and recalculate.²⁹

However, what the American algorithm fails to realize due to its programmatic rigidity is that the combat doctrine of the Chinese PLA

saturated with Communist Party ideology and the history of confronting the "Century of Humiliation" does not contain the concept of an "acceptable limited strike" when it comes to its geographical sovereignty in the Taiwan Strait. Chinese military doctrine adopts the principle of "Active Defence" and shocking paralysis; any physical infringement upon Chinese sovereignty or military assets by a foreign power is viewed not as a signal for bargaining, but as an explicit declaration of war that grants Beijing full justification to deploy the maximum level of available force immediately.

Consequently, the "limited" American step engineered by the machine as a tool for de-escalation and deterrence collides with the wall of Chinese doctrine that dictates a "comprehensive and shocking" response. Beijing will not settle for responding in kind by targeting an equivalent American asset; instead, it will transition immediately according to its combat doctrine to a comprehensive bombardment of American bases in Okinawa and Guam and launch massive missile salvos for Area Denial (A2/AD) in the Pacific. This shocking and disproportionate response completely overthrows all the mathematical hypotheses upon which the American algorithm built its choices.

Military history provides telling evidence of how the rigidity of combat doctrines destroys the rational calculations of adversaries:

1. The Soviet "Massive Retaliation" Doctrine in the Cold War: In the 1960s, the United States developed the "Flexible Response" strategy, which assumed the possibility of waging a limited or tactical nuclear war in Europe without sliding into a comprehensive world war. However, Soviet documents declassified later proved that the Red Army's combat doctrine considered any use of even a single tactical nuclear missile by NATO as a signal to launch a full and comprehensive nuclear response against American and European cities. The rigidity of Soviet doctrine completely rejected American "incremental rationality."

2. The Japanese Cognitive Error in the "Pearl Harbor" Attack (1941): Japanese military leaders built their plan to bomb the U.S. fleet based on quantitative rational calculations stating that destroying American naval power in the Pacific would shock Washington, driving it to accept the status quo and negotiate a division of economic influence in Asia. What Japanese calculations failed to understand was the political and ideological doctrine of American society, which translated the surprise attack as an unnegotiable existential insult. America immediately shifted to total war and mobilized its maximum industrial capacity until the complete destruction of the Japanese Empire.

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In the contemporary Taiwan crisis model, it becomes clear that the mathematical rational calculations of artificial intelligence transform into the primary driver detonating an existential conflict. The rigidity of American predictive models and their blindness to absorbing Chinese combat doctrine cause them to offer catastrophic advice to the human decision-maker. The machine measures the volume of its own power and ignores the nature of its adversary's mind; when military recommendation becomes based on mathematical models that ignore ideology, the first "deterrence" strike suggested by the algorithm will be the first and only step toward a hyper-speed world war, where the crisis explodes not because of both parties' desire for suicide, but because the machine's rational calculations failed to understand the hardness of human doctrines.

The Second Requirement: Diplomatic Manoeuvres and Strategic Deception in Confronting the "Black Box"

International relations rely on constructive ambiguity and deception, spaces that completely confuse predictive systems.

The First Subsection: Tactical Deception and False Positives:

The interaction between human tactical deception and predictive systems based on deep learning reveals a sharp structural deficiency in the machine's capacity to distinguish between genuine diplomatic intentions and camouflage military manoeuvres. In a crisis management environment, predictive AI relies on probabilistic matrices fed by "Accumulated Distrust Data" and a long history of geopolitical tensions. This negative historical saturation makes the algorithm structurally inclined to assume bad faith as a default option to protect military assets, transforming any human gesture toward de-escalation into a danger indicator and generating what is scientifically known as "False Positives" on the reconnaissance and simulation front.

This algorithmic misperception manifests clearly in the complex scenario of the Taiwan Strait crisis. When the Chinese political leadership initiates the opening of emergency diplomatic communication channels and simultaneously orders a "camouflaged tactical withdrawal" of some of its naval vessels such as the Type 054A frigate and surrounding missile boats its human goal is to de-escalate, find a geographical and psychological breathing space, and prove good faith by reducing the military buildup at the core of the collision.

However, the American AI system (JADC2) will not interpret these data according to human diplomatic logic; the machine lacks the political consciousness to understand the significance of "de-escalation signals."

Instead, the algorithm will process the movement of Chinese ships as purely physical inputs and compare them to military deception models recorded in its historical databases (such as past Soviet tactics or classical combat doctrines based on camouflage). The machine will read the "camouflaged withdrawal" not as a step backward, but as a strategic repositioning aimed at clearing the bombardment zone, manoeuvring to encircle the American aircraft carrier from a blind spot, or preparing for a second, wider, and more destructive offensive wave.³⁰

This distorted algorithmic reading immediately produces a "false positive"; the machine raises the alarm level to the maximum and issues a definitive recommendation to the human decisionmaker stating that: "The emergency Chinese diplomatic contact is nothing but a political deception manoeuvre (Decoy) to gain time, and the naval withdrawal is a tactical cover for an imminent missile attack." ³¹

Under the pressure of the 15 minutes available to humans, and because of "automation bias," the human leader finds themselves unable to question the comprehensive automated assessment. This drives them to make a catastrophic decision to launch a pre-emptive strike to abort the "illusionary" Chinese attack, turning the Chinese de-escalation attempt, due to the faulty automated reading, into the direct driver detonating actual kinetic conflict.

Military historical literature is rich with models embodying how tactical deception and the misinterpretation of indicators led to strategic disasters models whose danger multiplies today with the mechanization of decision-making:

1. The Yom Kippur War (October 1973): *Prior to the outbreak of the war, Egypt carried out a long series of "military manoeuvres and mobilizations" along the canal, followed by discharging soldiers multiple times over a span of months. This tactical deception caused the Israeli intelligence assessment system (relying on the "Concept" theory) to consistently classify these movements as false positives (merely routine manoeuvres not aimed at war). When the Egyptian army moved on October 6, the Israeli leadership believed in the early hours that it was just another manoeuvre based on prior distrust data, causing a massive strategic shock due to the failure of interpretive models to distinguish between a manoeuvre and an actual attack.*

2. The Gulf of Tonkin Incident (1964): *At the height of tension in Asia, radar equipment on the American destroyer (USS Maddox) detected electromagnetic indicators interpreted immediately as torpedo attacks from North Vietnamese boats (false positives resulting from bad weather*

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conditions and a human interpretation loaded with suspicion). Based on this distorted and rushed assessment, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson took a catastrophic decision for expanded military response the decision that officially and completely dragged the United States into the quagmire of the Vietnam War; only to reveal later that the second attack never occurred and that the radar indicators were faulty.

In the contemporary Taiwan Strait crisis model, it becomes clear that predictive algorithms completely lack the "interpretive flexibility" necessary to decode constructive ambiguity and political intentions. The rigidity of mathematical models transforms cyber technology from a tool for risk reduction into a magnifying lens that amplifies suspicions and manufactures illusionary threats out of genuine peace initiatives. When the machine fails to distinguish between a withdrawal aimed at de-escalation and a maneuver aimed at deception, it robs humans of their capacity to take a step backward and condemns any diplomatic effort to advance failure. This makes the distorted automated assessment the true creator of the existential wars into which humans are driven while believing they are protecting themselves.

The Second Subsection: The Black Box Dilemma:

The "Black Box Problem" in deep learning algorithms represents one of the most complex epistemological and technical vulnerabilities facing modern political and military sciences. Multi-layered artificial neural networks operate in a way that mimics the human brain in processing massive data matrices, but they do so through millions of hidden weights and mathematical variables that exceed the human mind's capacity to track or comprehend. This structural absence of transparency, technically known as "Inexplicability," means that the machine transforms into an ambiguous epistemic authority; it provides definitive and decisive final outputs and recommendations, but completely conceals the logical and causal path that led to the generation of that recommendation.

In the context of the Taiwan Strait crisis, this ambiguity manifests when the American JADC2 system issues a definitive military recommendation following the drone collision incident, stating: "Transition immediately to level four and launch a limited kinetic strike against a specific Chinese naval base, with a certainty and utility ratio of 91%." The dilemma here is that the system does not attach an explanatory report to this percentage; it does not clarify to military leaders whether it detected an encrypted wireless signal indicating an imminent Chinese attack or based its conclusion on visual reconnaissance of a change in the positioning of

Chinese missile launchers, or if the percentage rose merely because it detected a sudden surge in power consumption at Chinese military facilities.³²

This total absence of causal justification pronounces a death sentence on "military diplomacy" and strategic manoeuvre during times of crisis. Rational negotiation between states relies primarily on understanding the "adversary's fears" and knowing the sensitive points triggering their anxiety to dismantle them; diplomats can offer mutual concessions or objective justifications if they know the core of the problem. However, when human decision-making is driven by a "black box" recommendation, military diplomats in Washington become strategically blind; they fail to open a rational negotiation window with Beijing because they themselves do not know the "true point" that panicked the machine and made it demand the bombardment of Chinese forces.

Moreover, this ambiguity eliminates the possibility of validating the correctness of the decision; the 91% ratio might be the result of a "spurious correlation" in the machine's algorithms, such as mistakenly linking a routine movement of Chinese fishing boats with a presumed war scenario what is known in the technical environment as "algorithmic hallucination." Under the pressure of the 15-minute window, followed by automation bias, human leaders are driven to execute the kinetic strike without the capacity to question the machine, turning war from a conscious political act into the product of obscure digital mutations that cannot be justified or halted, closing diplomatic communication lines in Favor of silent equations that do not disclose their secrets until it is too late.³³

The Fourth Section:

Mutual Algorithmic Engagement (AI vs. AI) and the Phenomenon of "Flash Wars"

This section focuses on studying the most terrifying scenario in modern cyber-strategy: the interaction of two hostile intelligent systems independent of comprehensive human will.

The First Requirement: The Mechanics of Self-Generating Crises

When opposing predictive systems confront each other, an independent crisis erupts, driven by what is called "negative feedback loops."

The First Subsection: Identical Algorithmic Echo:

The dynamic of "identical algorithmic echo" represents the most dangerous aspect of the privatization and mechanization of war. It manifests the transformation of technology from a tool assisting humans into an independent strategic actor possessing the capacity to impose its own rhythm on the course of conflict. In military AI environments,

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algorithms do not operate in isolation from their surroundings; rather, they rely on continuously and instantaneously observing, tracking, and analysing the behaviour of the adversary's algorithms. When two hyper-speed predictive systems saturated with the doctrine of mutual distrust meet, their interaction produces "negative feedback loops," where the defensive reaction of one machine transforms into offensive inputs for the other side's machine, creating an ascending identical echo that amplifies itself independently of any human will or direction.

This destructive mechanical interaction appears sequentially and terrifyingly when projected onto the flashpoint in the Taiwan Strait. The loop begins with an unintentional maritime collision between an American autonomous Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) and a manned Chinese Type 054A frigate. As soon as the incident occurs, the Chinese "intelligentized warfare" system captures the physical data. Given its programming based on worst-case scenarios, it does not wait for human evaluation; rather, it immediately transitions to level two of the escalation matrix by launching an "automated predictive warning." This warning translates practically into directing immediate and automated orders to the surrounding Chinese naval vessels to execute a "rapid precautionary repositioning" and form a circular perimeter of protection around the damaged frigate to prevent it from being subjected to a second strike.³⁴

Here, the other automated party intervenes. Within fractions of a second, the American Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system detects this immediate and organized Chinese movement via satellites and radar sensors. For the American algorithm, this rapid tactical movement is not read as a precautionary measure resulting from the panic of shock; instead based on prior mathematical models of accumulated distrust data it is interpreted as an "escalation and the initiation of an offensive encirclement operation to isolate American naval assets." In response, and driven by the dread of temporal defeat, the American machine immediately transitions to level three: "Defensive Pre-emption." It launches a comprehensive electronic flooding campaign and activates electromagnetic jamming systems to paralyze the Chinese communication network and thwart the presumed attack.³⁵

At this exact moment, the vicious circle closes, and the crisis transforms into a self-generating and self-amplifying engine. The Chinese AI captures this sudden, large-scale American electronic flooding and mathematically translates it as "the first phase of a coordinated American strategic strike to paralyze Chinese command and control capabilities." Based on this new

input, the Chinese machine immediately escalates to level four of the matrix, issuing a mandatory recommendation to launch a limited kinetic strike with artillery shells or tactical missiles against the source of the American jamming to protect the rest of the fleet.

This identical interaction closely resembles placing a microphone in front of a loudspeaker; where capturing the sound and re-amplifying it generates a sharp, piercing screech that spins out of control in mere seconds. Each machine in this conflict reads the behaviour of the other machine as definitive proof of its offensive intentions and responds to it with a more aggressive measure. This forces the other machine to match and exceed it in a closed, vicious loop running at the speed of light and electricity. Human leaders in Washington and Beijing, trapped within the 15-minute window and detached from their advisors due to the narrow tunnel phenomenon, find themselves facing screens flashing with successive escalatory choices imposed by the "algorithmic echo." They become incapable of breaking this loop because any human attempt to de-escalate or retreat will be interpreted by the adversary's algorithm as an opportune moment to strike. This proves that the algorithmic echo transforms tactical crises into hyper-speed existential wars, manufactured by machines and paid for by humans.³⁶

The Second Subsection: The Closure of the Diplomatic Circle:

The inevitable and most terrifying outcome of the "algorithmic echo" dynamic is what can academically be termed the "closure of the diplomatic circle." In classical international relations theory, war is viewed as a continuation of politics by other means, as formulated by Carl von Clausewitz; meaning that the military decision always remains subordinate to and governed by the state's political will, which possesses at any moment the capacity to restrain its forces, offer concessions, or open back-channel negotiations to end the crisis. However, mechanizing operations rooms with predictive artificial intelligence breaks this traditional subordination, turning the crisis into an independent cybernetic entity entirely uncoupled from the actual political desire of Washington or Beijing to de-escalate.

This closure occurs due to the conflict between the bureaucratic logic of diplomacy and the programmatic logic of automation. Hostile military machines are designed with rigid software that dictates protecting military assets and maximizing immediate survival chances based on the observed physical behaviour of the adversary, not on political declarations of intent. When these systems interact within mere minutes, they create an escalating operational reality faster than diplomatic channels can process. Even if the political leadership in the White House and the Central Military

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Commission in Beijing possess a genuine and mutual desire to avoid war; algorithms impose a reality that prevents translating this desire into political action.³⁷

In this scenario, human decisionmakers find themselves facing a "fully mechanized crisis"; machine (A) jammed because machine (B) repositioned, and machine (B) fired a tactical missile because machine (A) jammed. This rapid succession completely closes the diplomatic circle through three structural mechanisms:

First: Zeroing Out the Space for Constructive Ambiguity: *Diplomacy historically relies on ambiguity and flexible rhetoric to buy time and draft face-saving understandings. Conversely, AI software does not comprehend ambiguity; it converts political signals into binary categorical data (Threat / Not a Threat), eliminating the grey margins in which diplomats operate.*

Second: Generating a Successive Algorithmic "Fait Accompli": *By the time the hotline between Washington and Beijing rings, the American JADC2 system has already transitioned to level four based on probabilistic calculations indicating that "the cost of silence is higher than the cost of a response." Here, the diplomat becomes incapable of negotiating to prevent the strike, because the strike has already been executed by order of the software that warned of the expiration of the 15-minute deadline.³⁸*

Third: The Transformation of Retreat into "Tactical Suicide": *If the human leader orders their algorithm to halt or execute a unilateral retreat to defuse the situation, the predictive system will immediately trigger a programmatic warning stating that: "Retreating at this moment raises the probability of forces being subjected to a fatal blow from the adversary to 98%." Under automation bias, this pressure transforms any diplomatic attempt at de-escalation into a suicidal military risk rejected by the leaders.*

The closure of the diplomatic circle represents the moment humans lose "sovereignty over the crisis." Foreign policy becomes merely a delayed echo of decisions taken by silent artificial neural networks operating at the speed of light. Political leaders in this environment do not guide events; rather, they pant behind them to justify them politically and medially after they occur. This transforms war from a rational tool to achieve state interests into an algorithmic collision accident that has escaped human control because of the human mind's window closing before the speed of the machine.

The Second Requirement: Flash Wars and the Loss of Control

The concept of a "Flash War" is inspired by the "Flash Crash" witnessed in global stock markets when high-frequency trading (HFT) algorithms

interact erroneously. However, the results here are not financial losses, but mutual military destruction.

The First Subsection: Escalation in Fractions of a Second:

The Copernican revolution brought about by artificial intelligence in military doctrine does not lie in the nature of the lethal weapons themselves, but rather in the "zeroing out of strategic time." While human biological mental processes are measured in fractions of a second (it takes about 200 to 300 milliseconds for a human neural signal to respond to visual stimuli), electronic impulses within cyber processors move at the speed of light and electricity, achieving millions of calculations in a single nanosecond. This vast temporal disparity creates a cognitive gap that leaves humans structurally incapable of keeping pace with the operational rhythm of the machine, which is known in modern military literature as the hyper-speed dilemma.³⁹

At the flashpoint over the waters of the Taiwan Strait, this temporal disparity manifests in a swift vertical leap that overthrows all traditional incremental theories of crisis management. The spark begins with a silent friction (Level 1) an ambiguous physical collision between the American unmanned drone and the Chinese frigate. In conventional warfare, this incident would require hours of inspection, routing reports through bureaucratic chains of command, and waiting for imagery analysis, granting diplomats a precious time window to intervene. In an intelligentized environment, however, opposing predictive systems capture the incident, process it, and deliver mutual responses in the blink of an eye. This flash escalation shapes itself through the following digital sequence:

Table No. (2): A Temporal Simulation Model of Autonomous Algorithmic Escalation (Hyperwar) at Machine Speed

<i>Level</i>	<i>Nature of Action & Mechanical Algorithmic Interaction</i>	<i>Approximate Timeframe</i>
<i>Level 1</i>	<i>Silent Friction: An anonymous physical collision between autonomous and manned assets in the Strait.</i>	<i>0.0 Seconds</i>
<i>Level 2</i>	<i>Predictive Warning: The Chinese algorithm orders vessels to execute a rapid precautionary repositioning around the incident.</i>	<i>0.5 Seconds</i>
<i>Level 3</i>	<i>Defensive Pre-emption: The JADC2 system interprets the movement as an attack and launches a comprehensive electronic flooding campaign to paralyze communications.</i>	<i>1.2 Seconds</i>

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Level 4	<i>Limited Kinetic Response: The Chinese machine detects the electronic paralysis and orders an immediate kinetic strike to neutralize the jamming sources.</i>	<i>2.1 Seconds</i>
Level 5	<i>Automated Hyperwar: Mutual launching of hypersonic missiles, loitering munitions (suicide drones), and the neutralization of military satellites.</i>	<i>5.0 Seconds</i>

Source: Prepared by the researcher based on:

- 1.Scharre, P., *Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War*, W. W. Norton & Company, P. 89.
- 2.Hoehn, J. R., *Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) (CRS Report No. R46725)*, Congressional Research Service, P. 34.
- 3.Allen, J. R., & Husain, A., "On Hyperwar", *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, Annapolis, MD, Volume 143 and Number 7, 2017, P. 68.

The crisis escalates from a mere localized maritime friction into a "fully automated hyper war" within a matter of seconds or minutes. This terrifying temporal pressure generates a state of total strategic blindness for both parties in Washington and Beijing. Political and military leaders fail to comprehend what is occurring on the screens; danger indicators flash and shift from green to deep red without providing any causal explanation, while the predictive system has already pre-emptively made hundreds of sub-decisions (directing radars, launching tactical decoys, and activating air defences).⁴⁰

This digital acceleration eliminates the very concept of "crisis management" from its foundation. The velocity of developments becomes faster than the existential cycle of human decision-making, which relies on comprehension, analysis, and consultation. Before the hotline between the White House and Beijing can even ring, and before national security advisors can assemble in the situation room to unpack the crisis and discuss options, the algorithms have locked in their choices and transitioned humanity into a comprehensive existential war. The machine was designed to win tactical seconds in battle; however, by robbing humans of time, it closed the window of the political mind and transformed war from a means of achieving state objectives into a closed mathematical equation accelerating toward destruction at the speed of light.

The Second Subsection: The Slide Toward Automated Missile and Nuclear Warfare:

The zeroing-out of strategic time and the closure of the diplomatic circle inevitably led to the most terrifying threshold in cyber-warfare doctrine: the transition to automated missile and nuclear warfare. At this stage, the danger bypasses the limits of localized maritime engagement and electronic jamming in the Taiwan Strait, directly touching the vital infrastructure of global strategic deterrence. The exact moment where hyper-speed algorithmic velocity intersects with fears of a "nuclear first strike" is the moment humanity surrenders the keys to its survival to silent, blind software driven by the language of numbers and abstract probabilities.⁴¹

This catastrophic slide occurs because of an inevitable mechanical sequence triggered by the algorithms of both sides:

1. The Shock of "Strategic Blindness" and the Annihilation Complex: *When the American Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) system transitions to level three by launching a "comprehensive electronic flooding campaign," the purely programmatic goal is to paralyze the Chinese communication network surrounding the incident to thwart any presumed attack. However, due to the interconnectedness of Chinese military networks, this flooding expands to encompass the strategic command and control systems belonging to the People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF).*

Here, the Chinese side suddenly experiences total "informational blindness" screens go dark, and vital data lines are severed. From the perspective of both human and machine military doctrine, this sudden paralysis is not interpreted as a defensive or tactical measure; rather, it is immediately classified as the "cyber preparation for a surprise American nuclear first strike" aimed at decapitating the political leadership and destroying Chinese missile silos in their launch pads to prevent them from retaliating.⁴²

2. Activating "Launch Under Attack" Protocols: *Confronted with this existential threat, and due to the dread of absolute temporal defeat, the crisis completely escapes tactical logic. The strategic military doctrines of all great powers (whether the American side via automated deterrence systems or the Chinese side via the doctrine of "Comprehensive Active Defence") dictate that if command systems suffer widespread paralysis in conjunction with an ongoing crisis, the command must immediately transition to the "Launch Under Warning" protocol. The decision-making authority shifts here to "automated early warning and deterrence systems,"*

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which operate according to a rigid arithmetic principle: "If we do not launch our missiles within the next five minutes, we will never exist to launch them at all."

3. Comprehensive Algorithmic-Driven Missile Engagement: Based on the recommendation of early warning systems that read electronic paralysis as an imminent nuclear aggression, the gates of missile silos open automatically:

First: From the Chinese Side: A shocking and disproportionate retaliation erupts via massive salvos of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), such as the DF-41, alongside nuclear and tactical-tipped hypersonic missiles. These are directed toward major American bases and aircraft carriers in the Pacific, and even toward the American homeland to paralyze Washington's capacity to respond.

Second: From the American Side: Within fractions of a second, American satellite networks such as the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS) detect the thermal plume emitted by the ascending Chinese missiles. At this critical juncture, neither the U.S. President nor Pentagon commanders have the time for consultation or reviewing the "Black Box." The automated missile defence system classifies the threat with a 100% certainty ratio. American Minuteman III missiles launch immediately from their silos in the northern United States, and nuclear submarines (Ohio-class) lurking beneath the oceans begin firing their payloads in a mutual, automated retaliatory response.⁴³

4. The Automated Deterrence Paradox: The very systems engineered by superpowers to prevent nuclear war by proving their capacity for immediate, devastating retaliation (the principle of Mutually Assured Destruction - MAD) transform, by virtue of "machine speed" and "programmatic rigidity," into the inevitable instrument that detonates this war automatically at the first accidental tactical collision.

At this final stage, the exit of the crisis from human control is complete. War is no longer a political decision seeking influence or a balance of power; rather, it has transformed into a comprehensive missile and nuclear engagement steered entirely by blind algorithms that correct missile trajectories, guide loitering munitions, and distribute warheads across cities and bases at the speed of light and electricity. Human decision-makers in Washington and Beijing stand as helpless spectators before screens counting down the minutes of imminent annihilation. They designed intelligent machines to protect them, but the inability of these machines to comprehend intentions, combined with a speed that surpasses

human biology, made their rational mathematical calculations the true architect of the end of human history.

The Fifth Section:

Analysing the Results of the Case Study (International Crisis Simulation)

To apply the theoretical framework, a model was constructed to simulate an acute international crisis (the Taiwan Cyber-Geopolitical Crisis) between two nuclear poles (the United States of America vs. the People's Republic of China).

The levels of decision-making were divided into three distinct operational environments to observe differential behaviour:

1. The First Environment: Traditional human decision-making (without artificial intelligence intervention).

2. The Second Environment: Hybrid decision-making (human with predictive support from artificial intelligence).

3. The Third Environment: Fully automated decision-making (artificial intelligence handles both prediction and immediate response).

Table No. (3): An Analytical Comparison of Military Decision-Making Environments and Their Impact on Security Response and Diplomatic Flexibility:

<i>Decision-Making Environment</i> <i>t</i>	<i>Response & Analysis Timeframe</i>	<i>Situational Cognitive Error Rate</i>	<i>Index of Unintentional Military Escalation Probability</i>	<i>Systemic Capacity for Diplomatic De-escalation</i>
<i>Environment 1:</i> <i>Traditional Human</i>	Slow (Hours to Days)	High (Due to pressure and information asymmetry)	Low to Moderate (35%)	Flexible and Highly Adaptive
<i>Environment 2:</i> <i>Hybrid (Human + Machine)</i>	Moderate / Fast (Minutes)	Very Low (Due to automated analytical filtering)	Moderate (55%)	Constrained by Algorithmic Bias
<i>Environment 3:</i> <i>Fully Automated</i>	Instantaneous (Milliseconds)	Mathematically Zero / Structurally High	Inevitable and Critically High (92%)	Completely Non-Existent

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Analysis of the Results of Table No. (3):

An analytical reading of the data in Table No. (4) reveals a critical inverse equation in the field of security studies: the more the operational environment shifts toward automation and technical speed, the more strategic control and the capacity to maintain international stability diminish. This dynamic becomes clear by deconstructing the three environments included in the simulation model:

1. The First Environment: Traditional Human Decision-Making:

This theoretical framework manifests concretely when projected onto the complex geopolitics of the Taiwan Strait, classified as one of the most sensitive conflict flashpoints between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China. Examining the strategic behaviour of both poles in a traditional human decision-making environment reveals how "bureaucratic slowness" and "human cognitive flexibility" transform into tools for preventing total nuclear clash, despite ongoing tensions.

In terms of the time factor, crisis management in Washington and Beijing is subject to strict bureaucratic and doctrinal complexities. On the American side, decision-making requires proposals to pass through the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Defence (Pentagon), and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in coordination with regional allies like Japan. On the Chinese side, authorities are concentrated within the Central Military Commission and the Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. This institutional multiplicity imposes an procedural timeframe extending to hours or days before committing to direct military action. This deprives both sides of an "instantaneous response" but grants them a golden opportunity to catch their breath and assess the situation away from momentary passion.

When examining the "situational cognitive error rate" and the "index of unintentional escalation probability," the Taiwan Strait crisis emerges as a classic arena for the "fog of war." The United States may interpret intensive Chinese naval manoeuvres around the island as a precursor to an imminent invasion, while China may interpret American arms sales or destroyers crossing the Taiwan Strait median line as an official declaration of support for Taiwan's independence. Despite this sharp rise in cognitive misunderstanding between the two poles, the probability of their sliding into an unintentional war remains confined within the limits of 35%.

The reason for this strategic restraint is attributed to "diplomatic flexibility" and the high capacity of human leaders to read "strategic ambiguity." The U.S. President and the Chinese leadership understand well

the dividing lines between "nationalistic political rhetoric directed for domestic consumption" and "military movements with genuine offensive intentions." Human leaders here possess a cognitive advantage that the machine lacks: the capacity to comprehend concepts such as "face-saving" and to offer mutual tactical concessions without disrupting the strategic deterrence equation.

Perhaps the most prominent illustrative example embodying this analysis is a scenario where Taiwan is subjected to a massive, hybrid cyberattack that leads to the complete paralysis of the island's power, communications, and air defence networks, coinciding with sudden Chinese naval manoeuvres. In a traditional human decision-making environment, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) will not initiate the launching of cruise missiles or direct immediate military strikes against Chinese ports.

This human hesitation stemming from the necessity of intelligence verification regarding the source of the cyberattack and ensuring the accuracy of the invasion data grants Washington and Beijing a crucial window of days. During these hours, back-channel diplomatic avenues and direct communications via the "hotline" between the Pentagon and the Chinese Ministry of National Defence are activated. Through these human contacts, the conflicting parties can send clear de-escalation signals; Beijing can clarify that the manoeuvres do not target an invasion, or Washington can pledge not to intervene directly on the condition of halting the cyber escalation. This allows "crisis diplomacy" to absorb the shock and defuse the detonator before the cyber-geopolitical crisis transforms into World War III.

2. The Second Environment: Hybrid Decision Making:

Based on the path of strategic analysis, this part addresses the projection of the second operational environment included in the simulation model onto the study sample, to deconstruct the dynamics of interaction between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China in the context of constrained automation:

The transition toward a hybrid decision-making pattern (human + machine) in the Taiwan Strait workspace brings about a radical transformation in the temporal architecture of the crisis; the strategic response and analysis timeframe shrinks from days and hours to mere minutes. This structural acceleration is attributed to integrating predictive artificial intelligence algorithms into the command-and-control systems of both poles, such as the Advanced Battle Management System (ABMS) in the United States, and parallel systems for the "intelligentization of warfare" within the Chinese People's Liberation Army. These systems

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possess a superior capacity for the automated filtering of millions of digital data streams, granting military commanders an instantaneous, updated intelligence dashboard, and reducing the technical cognitive error rate to a "very low" level regarding the tracking of immediate physical indicators.

Despite this noticeable rise in the accuracy of technical data, projecting the simulation results reveals a contrasting strategic dilemma: the probability of unintentional military escalation between Washington and Beijing rises to reach 55%. This paradox finds its scientific explanation in political science literature and the psychology of leadership through the phenomenon of "automation bias." Here, the human commander (whether in the White House or the Central Military Commission in Beijing) falls under the weight of severe time constraints. This drives them to place absolute, uncritical trust in the probabilistic models and strategic recommendations formulated by the machine, without possessing sufficient time to question the algorithm's inputs or its human calculations.

This implicit compliance with machine recommendations inevitably leads to making the diplomatic flexibility of both poles "constrained by algorithmic bias." Artificial intelligence, by its nature, crafts response options based on closed mathematical models and Game Theory that calculate profit and loss according to sharp, tangible tactical metrics divorced from human understanding of the dimensions of psychological de-escalation, trust-building, or resorting to mutual tactical concessions. Diplomacy in this environment loses its wide margin of manoeuvre and becomes subordinate to the logic of inevitable escalation imposed by the pre-emptive calculations of the machine.

This scenario materializes practically in the Taiwan Strait when American predictive sensors monitor sudden, intensive Chinese naval and air movements east of the Strait's median line, coinciding with suspicious cyberattacks targeting allied communication centres. In these critical minutes, the AI systems will process the data instantly, presenting a decisive recommendation stating that: "The probability of Beijing executing a comprehensive invasion of Taiwan is 92%, and the temporal window to prevent the disaster is only 15 minutes."

Under this terrifying time pressure, and due to "automation bias," the human decisionmaker in Washington tends to grant immediate approval to the machine's recommendation to activate "hard pre-emptive deterrence" (such as directing cyberattacks to paralyze Chinese coastal missile systems or scrambling strategic bombers).

The grand dilemma here lies in the possibility that the Chinese movements were merely a complex training manoeuvre or a reaction to faulty intelligence, carrying no actual intention of invasion. However, the pre-emptive automated recommendation adopted by the human decision narrowed the diplomatic margin entirely and placed the two poles on an inevitable collision course. This raises the probability of unintentional war to 55% because of the hyper-speed imposed by the machine on human perception.

3. The Third Environment: Fully Automated Decision-Making:

Arriving at the most radical operational pattern in the simulation model, projecting the third environment represented by (Fully Automated Decision-Making) onto the conflict dynamics in the Taiwan Strait transfers the geopolitical confrontation between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China from the human and behavioural sphere into the domain of "kinetic cyber-warfare at the speed of light." At this level, strategic deterrence and response authorities are completely transferred to autonomous, self-activating artificial intelligence systems, changing the rules of international crisis management in an unprecedented manner.

In terms of the time factor, the response and analysis timeframe recedes to fractions of a second (milliseconds). This temporal collapse completely eliminates the concept of "political thinking time." The automated American and Chinese systems do not operate according to human clock time; rather, they run according to computer processing speed and algorithmic flow through Fiber-optic cables, aiming to achieve absolute tactical precedence and prevent the adversary from securing a first-strike advantage.

Although this environment records a cognitive error rate that is "mathematically zero" from a technical standpoint (meaning the machine does not err in reading codes or calculating coordinates), the results reveal a terrifying paradox: the probability of unintentional military escalation rises to the point of inevitability at a rate of (92%). This sharp increase is explained in political science as the "structural error of algorithms and the collapse of context." The machine fundamentally lacks "strategic awareness"; it cannot comprehend concepts like "self-restraint," "tactical retreat for diplomatic purposes," or the "constructive ambiguity" that has preserved the fragile peace in the Taiwan Strait for decades. For artificial intelligence, a crisis is a zero-sum mathematical equation: either absolute victory or absolute defeat.

As a result of this mathematical inevitability, the capacity for diplomatic de-escalation between Washington and Beijing becomes "completely non-

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existent." The full automation of decisions eliminates formal and back-channel diplomatic pathways, neutralizing the role of heads of state and foreign ministers. When autonomous American defence algorithms interact with counter-offensive Chinese algorithms, what is known as a "flash escalation loop" emerges a series of accelerating automated reactions that feed off one another in a matter of seconds, causing the crisis to escape the political will of both countries entirely.

This catastrophic scenario crystallizes in the Taiwan Strait workspace when the fully automated American AI system detects a wide-scale Chinese cyberattack (of unknown source to humans but carrying Chinese algorithmic signatures) aimed at paralyzing the offensive capabilities of the U.S. Seventh Fleet in the Pacific. Within fractions of a second, and in application of the "autonomous self-defence" protocol, the American system launches an immediate counter-cyberattack to disable the command-and-control centres belonging to the PLA Eastern Theatre Command.

The Chinese algorithms, in turn, upon monitoring the immediate paralysis of their communication networks, will not wait for an intelligence report or an order from the Chinese President. Instead, the system will automatically interpret this behaviour according to its databases as the "prelude to a treacherous pre-emptive American nuclear strike to wipe out Chinese capabilities." Based on this mathematical conclusion, the Chinese system activates the comprehensive response protocol, issuing an immediate, automated order to launch Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) toward American bases in Guam and Japan, and even toward the West Coast of the United States.

All of these destructive interactions occur and reach the point of no return within a mere two or three minutes, before the President of the United States or his Chinese counterpart can even wake up, open the hotline, or draft a single diplomatic statement. This signifies inevitable strategic suicide and the total replacement of the political mind with a zero-sum mathematical equation.




Figure No. (3): "A Descriptive Graphical Plot of Temporal Escalation Dynamics"

Conclusion:

This study concludes that predictive artificial intelligence represents a double-edged sword in the arena of international politics and acute crisis management. On one hand, it offers a structural solution to the dilemma of "bounded rationality" by filtering and processing information at hyper-speed, thereby reducing human errors resulting from the psychological and physiological factors of leaders. On the other hand, this technical integration fundamentally alters the essence of the "diplomatic act." Reducing complex, political international crises into mute digital equations accelerates the pace of structural military escalation.

By perpetually seeking maximum military efficiency and constantly assuming the worst-case scenario, the predictive algorithm eliminates the margins of "constructive diplomatic ambiguity" and "emotional flexibility" that have historically saved the international system from catastrophic existential wars. Consequently, artificial intelligence does not resolve the security dilemma; rather, it endows it with an accelerated momentum that surpasses human cognitive capacity for control.

By subjecting this problem to the Taiwan Strait crisis simulation model, the study successfully provides a clear scientific answer demonstrating that the relationship between automation speed and strategic stability is a sharp inverse correlation. To the extent that technology grants a fractional tactical advantage, it robs the decisionmaker of the ability to manoeuvre and contain unintentional escalation.

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In light of the in-depth statistical and political analysis, the study concludes with a set of the most prominent findings:

First: The Dilemma of Tactical Efficiency vs. Strategic Suicide: *The study proved that transitioning from traditional human decision-making to full automation reduces response time from days to milliseconds. Conversely, it raises the probability of unintentional military escalation from 35% to a catastrophic inevitability of 92%, meaning that the technical efficiency of the machine may generate pure self-destruction devoid of political rationality.*

Second: The Illusion of Algorithmic Processing and the Collapse of Context: *The results demonstrated that despite recording a "mathematically zero" cognitive error rate, artificial intelligence systems suffer from a "fatal structural error." Algorithms are incapable of understanding "human situational awareness" or interpreting "constructive strategic ambiguity." They cannot distinguish between a manoeuvre intended as a show of force and a genuine intention to invade, which consistently drives them toward executing pre-emptive strikes.*

Third: The Erosion and Disappearance of Diplomatic Flexibility: *The study showed that incremental automation exerts a "systematic encroachment" on the diplomatic margin. While the human element enjoys high flexibility, hybrid decision-making falls under the weight of "automation bias" which constrains diplomacy. Ultimately, diplomacy becomes entirely non-existent in a fully automated environment due to the emergence of the "flash escalation loop" that bypasses the will of presidents and political leaders.*

Fourth: The Inevitability of the "Human-in-the-Loop" as a Safeguard: *The Taiwan Strait case study confirmed that "human bureaucratic slowness" and the ability to read verbal and psychological de-escalation signals represent the sole safety valve preventing cyber frictions from transforming into a comprehensive nuclear war.*

Recommendations:

First: Strategic and Political Recommendations:

1. The Strict Institutionalization of the "Human-in-the-Loop" Protocol:

An absolute rejection of transitioning toward the third environment (full automation) at strategic and nuclear decision-making levels. It must be ensured that artificial intelligence remains a predictive, advisory tool for data filtering only (the second environment), while restricting the authority to launch kinetic force or retaliatory cyber operations solely to the legitimate, elected political leadership.

2. Developing an "Algorithmic Bias Restraints" Pact Among Great Powers:

Obligating military academies and strategic planning centres in the United States and China to include an "Automation Psychology" course in commander qualification programs. Training must focus on mitigating the phenomenon of automation bias to prevent blind compliance with the sharp mathematical recommendations presented by the machine in the opening minutes of a crisis.

Second: Legal and Diplomatic Recommendations:

1. Drafting an International Treaty to Regulate "Military Artificial Intelligence":

Striving toward concluding an international convention under the auspices of the United Nations (similar to Strategic Arms Limitation Treaties - SALT). This pact should completely prohibit delegating deep learning algorithms with the authority to make pre-emptive strike decisions and establish verification inspection frameworks for the command-and-control software of major powers.

2. Establishing "Algorithmic Cyber Hotlines":

Recommending the establishment of direct, immediate diplomatic and technical communication channels between military automation centres in Washington and Beijing. This aims to allow the mutual automated exchange of de-escalation data if one party's software detects suspicious interactions, thereby breaking the "**flash escalation loop**" before it escapes human control.

Third: Operational and Technical Recommendations:

1. Engineering "Algorithmic Emergency Brakes":

Recommending that engineers and defence systems developers embed automated protocols within military source codes for temporary halts or forced de-escalation of responses upon sensing a silent hostile mutual interaction (AI vs. AI). This is necessary to impose an "artificial time space" that forces the system back to human control and absorbs the shock of the first cyber engagement.

2. Deconstructing Crisis Attribution Based on "Constructive Ambiguity":

Developing predictive software that does not merely calculate military deterrence options but is programmed to calculate options for "strategic ambiguity." It must reintegrate qualitative, non-quantitative variables (such as face-saving signals and mutual diplomatic concessions) within the scenario outputs presented to political leaders.

Future Research Suggestions:

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1. Conducting comparative studies on how the cultural and ideological differences of states influence the design of their respective political prediction algorithms.

2. Researching the impact of generative artificial intelligence, in alliance with predictive intelligence, in manufacturing and fabricating international crises through real-time deepfake technologies during wartime.

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