

The impact of party divisions on the parliamentary performance of political parties in Algeria

أثر الانشقاقات الحزبية على الأداء البرلماني للأحزاب السياسية في الجزائر

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Abstract

This article aims to shed light on the splits in the Algerian political parties and their impact on the political process in general and parliamentary performance in particular. It also aims to identify the concept of party split and the concept of the political party as a theoretical framework, and then get to know the Algerian political parties with their various orientations and what their motives are. Those partisan divisions and how those partisan divisions affect the legislative and oversight role of political parties.

Keywords: Political parties, parliament, party crises, party splits, party performance.

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Introduction

If political parties are considered one of the most important institutions in democratic political systems due to the functions they perform and their influence on performance, many factors have prevented them from fulfilling their roles perfectly in Algeria. One of the most important factors is the phenomenon of splits, which has become one of the main characteristics of partisan practice.

Disagreements and crises within political parties are the main reasons for partisan divisions, leading to reform movements or what is referred to in Algerian political literature as "corrective movements". These movements have emerged in many political parties since the adoption of pluralism, resulting in critiques of the partisan reality and demands for change.

Based on the aforementioned, this study will explore the following main issue: What are the reasons for the occurrence of splits within Algerian political parties, and what is their impact on the performance of these parties in the Algerian parliament?

From this main framework, the following sub-questions arise:

To what extent have partisan splits contributed to the weakening of political parties' legislative and oversight functions?

What mechanisms have both the state and political parties adopted to limit partisan splits?

Study Methodology:

We used the descriptive-analytical method, which describes the political phenomenon and analyzes the causes leading to it. Additionally, we used the historical method to identify the stages of the emergence of splits within Algerian political parties during the era of party pluralism. Furthermore, we employed the case study method by focusing our research specifically on the case of political parties in Algeria.

Before delving into the phenomenon of party splits and their effects on party work in the Algerian parliament, we must first address the term party split and its beginnings.

Firstly: Theoretical Foundation of Party Splits:

Political parties form one of the most important forms of official political organizations and are a fundamental pillar of the effectiveness of a sound democratic system. They represent channels of communication between the ruler and the ruled and perform numerous functions such as political participation, political socialization, and political recruitment.

Despite being composed of groups of individuals who share certain ideas and seek to achieve them through access to political power or influence over public policy-making, disagreements arise among party members, transforming the party from a cohesive entity into competing factions. Over time, and in the absence of effective mechanisms to deal with these disagreements, these internal crises may lead to the split of a faction or factions within the party.

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1. The Nature of Party Splits:

The phenomenon of party splits has been an integral part of political practice since the establishment and consolidation of political parties two centuries ago. This phenomenon has become a fundamental part of party dynamics, as some believe that no party can be entirely free from it.

1.1. The Concept of a Political Party:

Political parties vary in every modern country, and they cannot be confined to a single academic definition. The concept of modern political parties goes beyond academic definitions to include the vision and general goals of these parties, as well as the purposes and reasons for their establishment in the first place.

Academic studies in political science provide various definitions of political parties. Some describe political parties as legal organizations seeking to attain power in democratic systems, aiming to implement their political, social, and economic programs. Others define political parties as democratic organizations practicing democratic processes within the party itself, where members are elected to leadership positions and strategic goals and visions are set. Generally, a political party is associated with a group of citizens who agree on a common political vision and act as intermediaries between these citizens and the government and state apparatuses.

1.2. The Concept of Party Splits:

Party splits represent a form of political conflict at the internal level of the party, where this conflict is manifested through the emergence of a faction within the parent party, ultimately leading to the formation of a new party or multiple parties¹.

A split refers to an act or state undertaken by a particular group, which is not necessarily directed against a specific person or entity. Instead, the split reflects a state of rejection and dissatisfaction within the group towards a particular opinion, action, or policy. The split highlights a significant distance and gap between this group and the government, political authority, or general leadership. Although this group may not necessarily engage in conflict with those entities, it separates and distances itself, seeking other environments or communities where it can find legitimacy that it no longer acknowledges from the group it originally belonged to.

According to Maurice Duverger, the phenomenon of splits and factions within political parties is not indicative of the freedom of the members or the weakness of the leadership's authority, but rather reflects the fundamental differences in opinions within the leading class. Each faction becomes an authoritative body formed by the gathering of supporters around some leaders, thereby subjecting themselves to a discipline no less stringent than that within the party itself.

Italian researcher Angelo Panebianco notes that major parties experience power struggles, which he calls the "dominant coalition". This coalition consists of leaders of varying levels within the party, and the degree of its cohesion determines the intensity of the party's division. Although ideological diversity within a party is

considered a healthy phenomenon reflecting a variety of political views, when these currents turn into wings competing for influence, it can threaten the party's unity and lead to its split.

This section covers the nature and theoretical foundations of party splits, including definitions of political parties and the concept of party splits.

Secondly: Intraparty rifts within political parties in Algeria

1. Reasons for intraparty rifts in Algeria

The phenomenon of intraparty rifts in Algeria has become widespread to the extent that it is one of the defining features of party politics, for several reasons including:

1.1- External factors:

Particularly embodied in the nature of the political system and its vision of the role and importance of political parties, as well as interventions aimed at controlling the party landscape.

1.2- Internal factors:

Closely related to the absence of democracy within parties, resulting from historical and cultural residues, manifested in organizational distortions that hinder ideological pluralism, freedom of expression, and participation in decision-making processes. This situation also obstructs achieving equal opportunities for accessing leadership positions and assuming electoral and executive responsibilities.

1.3- Political opportunism:

Characterized by legislators changing their party affiliations which were instrumental in their entry into the legislative body, resulting in serious imbalances in the parliamentary power dynamics since the number of party-affiliated legislators is the institutional criterion for forming parliamentary structures. This also weakens political parties and casts doubt on the credibility of elections and the legitimacy of the entire system.

2. Manifestations of intraparty rifts in Algeria

2.1 Intraparty rifts within loyalist parties

Intraparty rifts reflect ideological divisions, conflicting interests, and escalating tensions between leaders and members within political parties. These rifts may sometimes follow a moderate path, where they do not significantly affect the cohesion and stability of the party. However, at other times, these rifts can be strong, leading to the fragmentation of the party and the emergence of scattered internal factions².

2.1.1 National Liberation Front (FLN)

Throughout its long history, the National Liberation Front and other Algerian political parties witnessed a series of rifts reflecting political and social transformations in the country. As the first political party known in the Algerian political arena, and with the succession of generations and leaderships that controlled it, it is natural for the party to undergo many of these rifts.

Between 1989 and 2012, the National Liberation Front witnessed several rifts that significantly affected the party's trajectory and stances. Many of these rifts arose due to disagreements over the political system. For example, disagreements may have arisen over democratic reforms, economic or social policies, or cultural issues. Researchers argue that these rifts left a significant mark on the party's history, as they posed a major challenge to the party's internal cohesion and stability.

After the presidential elections in 1995, rifts intensified within the National Liberation Front, especially with Abdelhamid Mehri adopting a policy opposing the regime and its institutions. Mehri's policy revolved around boycotting all state institutions and the party joining the opposition.

This strong opposition and boycott greatly affected the party's unity, leading some members who differed in views and approaches to split from the party. These rifts reflected internal disagreements within the party on how to deal with the political system and ruling institutions³.

Due to the lack of welcome from many members of the National Liberation Front and its militants who were accustomed to holding positions and ministries under the prevailing position, the party decided to hold an extraordinary session in December 1996. In this session, confidence was withdrawn from the Secretary-General Abdelhamid Mehri, and based on this decision, Belkheir Boualam was appointed to replace Mehri as Secretary-General⁴.

According to Abdelrahman Belaïd, one of the leaders within the National Liberation Front who opposed Abdelhamid Mehri's policy, one of the reasons for his removal was Mehri's denial of party cadres privileges that were available to them during the party's rule. These privileges included ministerial positions, ambassadorial posts, and other high-ranking positions. Consequently, Mehri was dismissed from his position.

Belkheir decided to return to work with the state and accept participation in power by adopting the party's choice of participation. The party decided to support the candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika, known as the power candidate in the 1999 presidential elections. One of the leaders of the National Liberation Front, Ali Benflis, was the campaign manager for him, and after the 1999 presidential elections, Benflis assumed the position of Secretary-General of the National Liberation Front in 2001. He was also appointed Prime Minister as the secretary general of the party owning the largest number of seats in the parliament. His appointment as prime minister was aimed at ensuring the president's support for the majority party in his second presidential term.

However, the results of the eighth congress of the National Liberation Front came to the contrary, resulting in the most dangerous conflict known to the National Liberation Front, which split into two conflicting factions, one supporting the secretary general Ali Benflis who wanted to run for the presidency against Abdelaziz Bouteflika, and another group known as the correctionists wanting to establish a

corrective movement within the party under the leadership of Abdelaziz Belkhadem and Abdelkader Hachjar who wanted to support the candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Benflis accused President Bouteflika of pressuring him and keeping him as Prime Minister in exchange for the National Liberation Front's support for him in the 2004 presidential elections, claiming that an official in the presidency, without mentioning his name, told him: "There is an issue between you and the president, which is that your remaining as prime minister is linked to the National Liberation Front's endorsement of Bouteflika's nomination for a second term"⁵.

After the presidential elections in which President Abdelaziz Bouteflika won, the number of Benflis' supporters within the party decreased, even among those who used to support him. The National Liberation Front decided, due to the cancellation of its eighth congress, to hold a conference called the transitional conference of the comprehensive conference, which was held on January 22/23, 2004.

The conference resulted in the decision to remove Ali Benflis from the general secretariat of the party in favor of the leader of the corrective movement Abdelaziz Belkhadem, who announced after taking over this position to work to succeed the program of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. This was manifested in his signing of the alliance contract to support the program of the president with both the Movement of Society for Peace and the National Democratic Rally on February 16, 2004.

The alliance includes the parties of the National Liberation Front, the Movement of Society for Peace (Hams), and the National Democratic Rally, which supported Bouteflika's candidacy in the presidential elections. The internal law of the alliance document, signed by the coordinator of the corrective movement for the National Liberation Front Abdelaziz Belkhadem, the president of the Movement of Society for Peace Abu Jarrah Sultan, and the general secretary of the National Democratic Rally Ahmed Ouyahia, provides for the formation of an administrative committee comprising the heads of the political parties. Its task is to determine the general policy of the alliance⁶.

The internal law of the alliance document provides ample scope for the concerned parties to cooperate at various levels, including popular events based on the joint program during President Bouteflika's second presidential term.

Party leaders affirmed their commitment to work on implementing the presidential program and fulfilling the promises they made to the Algerian people during the electoral campaign.

After the ninth congress of the party in 2010, signs of renewed division appeared on the horizon, as members of the party's central committee demanded that the Secretary-General Belkhadem correct the situation, rather than resign, because, according to them, the problem did not concern individuals but the party. Given the tense atmosphere preceding the central committee meeting of the party, due to the disagreement between Belkhadem and some party leaders, a member of the party's political bureau, Abdelrahman Belaïd, stated: "There are two fundamental elements behind this situation. The first group formed the corrective movement, and another

group became parallel to the first. Some electoral lists emerged for the legislative elections in 2012, and both groups blame the Secretary-General, each for their own reasons... It is known that the corrective movement opposes the formation of the central committee because it contains infiltrators..."⁷

2.1.2. National Democratic Rally R.N.D:

The National Democratic Rally was founded in February 1997, just before the legislative elections, under the leadership of Abdelkader Ben Salah, who held a position in the army. It was known as the party of authority and managed to become the leading political force in Algeria in the first elections in which it participated, namely the legislative and local elections of 1997. Abdelkader Ben Salah assumed the position of President of the National People's Assembly after these elections, and he was succeeded by Tahar Benbaibech as the party's general secretary. Upon its establishment, it managed to incorporate a number of associations, unions, civil society figures, government ministers, as well as a considerable number of militants from the National Liberation Front⁸.

Due to the youth of the National Democratic Rally in the political arena, its significance, and the circumstances surrounding its formation, it experienced only a few crises that did not affect its status. The most prominent of these crises was during the conference held in April 1998, where a leadership crisis occurred due to the vacancy of the presidency position within the party after Abdelkader Ben Salah assumed the position of President of the National People's Assembly. This crisis witnessed a fierce struggle between Ahmed Ouyahia, who was the Prime Minister, and Tahar Benbaibech, who was the party's general secretary.

The reason for the disagreement was the stance on supporting Abdelaziz Bouteflika, whom Ouyahia supported, while the other side refused to support Bouteflika and nominated the party's general secretary, Benbaibech. This conflict ended with Benbaibech's resignation from the party presidency along with 7 members of the national bureau, and the position of general secretary was given to Ahmed Ouyahia, who announced his support for the National Consensus candidate Abdelaziz Bouteflika.

Benbaibech founded the New Dawn Party, and this party became one of the active parties in the political arena. Except for this crisis, the National Democratic Rally did not witness any crises that affected its trajectory or its position as a secondary political force in the country

2.2. Internal party defections within opposition parties:

2.2.1. The Socialist Forces Front

After the suspension of the electoral process, the stance of the Socialist Forces Front was one of strong rejection of what the party considered a coup against electoral legitimacy. This led the party leader, Hussein Ait Ahmed, to participate in dialogues and national forums known as "Saint Egidio," which were organized by the opposition in Rome in 1994.

The party leader's participation in the Rome conference and his engagement in dialogue with representatives of the Islamic Salvation Front caused a major rift within the party. This resulted in the emergence of what became known as the "Barbarian Current" or the "Barbarian Group" within the party. These were secular individuals imbued with Amazigh culture who rejected dialogue with the Islamic trend in general and, in particular, the Islamic Salvation Front. Among the most notable defectors following this incident were the Lunausi brothers, Mouloud and Ahmed, who joined the Rally for Culture and Democracy Party. Ahmed Lunausi obtained a ministerial position in the government representing the National Democratic Rally, while Mouloud Lunausi won a seat in the provincial assembly in Tizi Ouzou province.

2.2.2. The Movement of Society for Peace (MSP)

The Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) is a political party with an Islamic reference founded by Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah, may he rest in peace, succeeded by Bouguerra Soltani in 2003, and currently led by Abderrazak Makri after the May 2012 legislative elections.

The MSP defines itself as a "comprehensive reformist popular political movement, adopting a peaceful, moderate, centrist change-oriented approach, aiming to build the individual, the family, and society." It participates in the political process to complete the construction of the Algerian state within the framework of Islamic principles, through peaceful power rotation using democratic means.

The MSP believes that the elite governing Algeria since independence in 1962 have failed to establish the desired Algerian state. Therefore, it struggles within the "Coordination of Freedoms and Democratic Transition," an opposition alliance, which challenges the legitimacy of the ruling power and calls for a transitional period for democratic transition in the country.

In terms of economics, the MSP advocates for the adoption of Islamic banking in the banking system, amending the loan and credit law for this purpose, and promoting the culture of endowment (waqf) by reclaiming, developing, and activating its system.

The trajectory of the Movement of Society for Peace is closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood. Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah was the general supervisor of the group in Algeria. Disagreements within the movement arose with the suspension of the electoral process in the country, where it was understood that it stood with the regime against the Islamic Salvation Front. Despite the arrests and exile of activists and leaders of the latter, Nahnah always insisted that he stood with the state "to prevent its collapse, not with the regime".

The Movement of Society for Peace has participated in various political events and denounced the "fraud" that prevented its leader, Mahfoud Nahnah, from assuming the presidency in the 1995 elections. However, it entered the government in 1996 and participated in the 1997 elections. In 1999, Nahnah was prevented from participating in the presidential elections on the pretext of not participating in the

revolution, despite presenting certificates from leaders in the historical Fourth District, leading Nahnah to support Abdelaziz Bouteflika in those elections.

"The death of the movement's president and the beginning of internal disputes".

After the departure of Sheikh Mahfoud Nahnah, the intensity of conflict between the poles of the movement increased, between hardliners and those tolerant towards authority. This was evident in the first conference of the movement following the departure of its founder Mahfoud Nahnah. The conflicts surfaced with the emergence of two factions, one supported by Abou Jarrah Sultan and another supported by Abdul Rahman Saidi. The conference attendees attempted to choose between the candidates, and after the voting, Abou Jarrah Sultan won with 105 votes compared to 95 votes for Abdul Rahman Saidi.

The tensions between the leaders significantly affected the party and its coherence of positions, through conflicts that lasted until the fourth conference in 2008. Abou Jarrah Sultan hastened to join the government and enter the presidential coalition, despite being the weaker party between the Islamic Renaissance Movement and the Front of Socialist Forces, due to not obtaining sovereign ministries. Meanwhile, sidelining the movement during important decision-making processes, as its role was limited to endorsement only, contrasted with the personal gains achieved by the movement's president at the expense of the movement, its history, and its popular base.

This is what the leadership of the movement worked on during Abou Jarrah Sultan's era, where it disconnected from its popular depth and political orientation, becoming associated with political power and the privileges it gained, both legitimate and illegitimate. Here, the movement began to reach a dangerous crossroads that would ultimately lead to its fragmentation and political decline, especially concerning programs with Islamic flavor, which were entirely abandoned due to accepting participation in a government with a national orientation.

Moreover, the new policies and choices of the movement affected its weight, internal relations, and even its relationship with its popular bases. At the same time, they influenced its political decisions, especially since Abou Jarrah's beginnings in leading the movement posed a significant challenge in filling the organizational vacuum left by the founder.

Abou Jarrah Sultan attempted to preserve these factors for the party's continuity and the strength of its established structures, as affirmed by one of the party's militants, stating: "The problem of succession, the Sheikh left a vacuum or did not leave mechanisms for succession in the consensual sense, not organizational, as it was present in the party's fundamental law. It split at the leadership level into two teams, and this dispute continued until the formalization of the split in 2008."⁹

Post the fourth conference: Consequences of the splits and the establishment of new parties

The fourth conference reversed the deteriorating situation within the movement among its leadership, as their disagreements became public, starting with the re-election of Abou Jarrah Sultan as the head of the movement for a second term. Additionally, several leaders split and formed other political parties, such as Amar Ghoul who split and founded the Rally for Hope of Algeria, and the formation of a group supporting the Call for Change Movement. Abou Jarrah Sultan attempted to contain these splits through initiatives for reconciliation, which was rejected by supporters, saying, "His movement has come a long way, so it's difficult for us to listen to Abou Jarrah Sultan and his group because the file is completely closed for us, and we left the movement to them entirely".

This confirms the festering situation within the movement and among its leadership, indicating that the state of division within the Islamist trend since the fourth conference led to the depletion of the Movement for Society of Peace from its leadership and founders, accusing its president of marginalizing them, in addition to many supporters and militants.

In essence, the Advocacy trend had popularity and mobilization at the grassroots level, which negatively impacted the movement after the fourth conference and its ability to control the behaviors of the group. This created a kind of defection to other groups that focused on the success and unity of the community. The movement was negatively affected by all of this through the experience of individuals and private institutions in developing a culture of managing differences, dialogue, and coexistence. Also, the movement got rid of the idea of sanctity, descending into a human experience that makes mistakes and succeeds, an endeavor embracing the Islamic solution.

This means that the policy of splits emerged early and was not completed at that time, but the fourth conference solidified it. The leaders exploited it to recruit militants as actors for obedience and struggle within what is called polarization as a mechanism to create other political entities, creating internal conflicts and leading the movement away from its oppositional political line. Defection transcended organizational and political disagreement logic and went far into the ethical and moral realm, weakening the party.

In other words, the stability situation after the fourth conference created a kind of weakness within the structures and bases of the movement, stripping it of its credibility among the public, especially in the context of its leaders defecting and founding other parties in addition to engaging in power dynamics. Similar to Amar Ghoul, who was granted several ministerial portfolios by the authority and solidified the principle of political integration and party non-commitment. Abou Jarrah Sultan emphasized this about defections, saying, "Those who withdrew from the movement were politically contracted generals; they were not doing anything in the party, and their exit did not leave any void¹⁰".

Thus, the defections that followed the fourth conference resulted from the tug-of-war and disagreements among the movement's leaders, seeking to gain advantages

during President Bouteflika's era and the accompanying financial prosperity and wastefulness of money. Soon, signs of failure and infiltration by the political system appeared due to the search for gains, reinforcement of internal alliances, or seeking allies from outside the party. This is the same mechanism employed by tribal communities in the Arab Maghreb, where tribes or Maghrebi communities rely on several strategies in expansion and transition from clan and narrow interests to political practice¹¹, it mean searching for power centers and benefits, causing the party to abandon its traditional affiliation and search for new affiliations.

2.2.3. Movement of Renaissance

The internal crisis of the Renaissance Movement dates back to 1998, revolving around political and organizational disputes. These disputes stemmed from a faction within the party's desire to participate in power, ending the political opposition the party had been practicing since its inception in 1990¹². This resulted in the withdrawal and political isolation of activists, defining the movement's activities. This faction was led by Secretary-General Habib Adami, in contrast to the party president Abdullah Jaballah, who opposed the positions and directions of the first faction. This led to mutual accusations between the two sides regarding the management style and decision-making within the party, resulting in a severe split in the party¹³. This split led to the emergence of a new party led by Jaballah in 1999, known as the National Reform Movement.

The political nature of this crisis is evident in the ramifications it left on the contemporary party map, as well as its connection to the results of the legislative elections of 1997, which produced new leaderships. These new leaders attempted to change the power balance within the party between the historical leadership and the new leaders who occupied important positions in the political decision-making centers of the state. This nature is also evident in the circumstances of both parties (Renaissance and National Reform) and their political significance in reality.

The role of the Renaissance Movement declined in terms of activity and political effectiveness, especially in the legislative and local elections of 2002, where it only obtained one seat in parliament. This was despite the departure of the second faction, which opposed the positions and directions of the first faction in this dispute. This led to division and then defection, negatively affecting the party.

2.2.4. The National Reform Movement

the National Reform Movement faced a serious internal crisis starting from 2004, precisely after the presidential elections, where the party's results significantly declined. It was only able to achieve a percentage of 5.2%, equivalent to 511,526 votes for its candidate and leader (Jaballah), out of a total of over 10 million participating voters, which was a weak percentage that affected the internal stability of the party's structure. Consequently, organizational disputes emerged at the leadership level, extending to its party base. The party split into two groups: Jaballah's group, comprising his followers like Khadir Ben Khalaf and others, and the Twelve Group (12), also known as the "Assessment Wing," led by Mohamed

Boulahia, the President of the National Shura Council, along with Boukhal Farouk, Ahmed Ben Amer, Ben Khawa Khawja, and others.

Mohamed Boulahia believed that the autocracy of the party president and his sole control over its affairs, along with his rejection of all calls directed to him, his attempts to establish contact with the government and his rejection of its proposals regarding the appointment of ministers from the party without consulting the Shura Council, and his adoption of a policy of extravagance in the party's budget¹⁴, were all factors contributing to the organizational crisis within it. However, this direction rejected all these accusations, considering them "blatant fallacies."¹⁵ They also believed that this dissenting direction was supported by some parties in the presidential alliance, especially the National Democratic Rally¹⁶.

These organizational disputes within the party between the two factions extended to direct confrontations and conflicts, which would have escalated further without the intervention of public security forces¹⁷, which played a significant role in calming the situation. This intervention occurred when the Assessment Wing decided to hold a regional conference in Constantine to nominate delegates for the National Conference planned for June 2005. However, the opposing faction, affiliated with Jaballah, led by Hacène Arribi, forcefully prevented them¹⁸.

These disputes appear to be multidimensional, involving political, ideological, and even personal aspects. This was evident in the depth of the crisis experienced by the National Reform Movement, especially after the intervention of the supervisory authority (Ministry of the Interior), followed by the judiciary. They left significant impacts on the content of the party map in general and on the status of the party in particular.

conclusion

political parties in Arab countries in general, and in Algeria in particular, have experienced intense conflicts over ideology and politics, leaving a profound impact on the future of these parties and their roles in society.

These conflicts have taken various forms, in circumstances and atmospheres characterized by a general approach that deviates significantly from democratic practices, in addressing disputes. There has been a predominance of partisanship, self-centeredness, and personal interests of leaders over the organizational and national interests. If these crises were handled with more civilized democratic methods, much of the losses, wastage of time, and energy could have been avoided.

The causes of party splits vary from one party to another and from one situation to another, with historical and cultural factors playing crucial roles. Historical and cultural stages often explain these divisive tendencies, as the Algerian society is deeply rooted in a culture of division, with tribal and clan affiliations having clear implications on political behavior, particularly in party affiliation, nomination, and voting.

Moreover, historical factors often explain these divisive tendencies. Even during the national movement, political parties were not immune to disintegration, when party activism was one of the mechanisms of resistance against colonialism.

Many party divisions could have been avoided if internal democracy had been respected, as it reinforces the principle of rotation of responsibilities and respects differences. The inability to manage differences is a fundamental reason behind party splits that could have been avoided.

The personality of the party leader plays a fundamental role in creating a crisis within Algerian parties. The party's history aligns with the life of its secretary-general. In clearer terms, the party's history is the history of its secretary-general. This divisive approach does not help us in dealing with the current Algerian political reality or the state of party life.

Criticism has been directed at the divisive approach, and whether we agree or disagree with such criticism, analyzing the current state of Algerian party life based on the premises of that approach does not help us identify the dynamics experienced by Algerian society, especially at the level of civil society activities and their connection to party activities in general.

Suggestions:

- Supporting political reforms in the country and working towards creating genuine political pluralism in Algeria, allowing for the existence of a law regulating the work of parties that ensures all political parties the right to operate within the framework of a civilized democratic constitution, giving party members a significant morale boost to improve their performance.
- Dealing with the social sphere is not about relying on strength derived from others, from allies, but rather relying on self-sufficiency, and appointing the most competent and deserving of responsibility, earning the trust of friends, allies, and the public, not just close associates.
- Embracing the principle of continuous renewal and following a proper educational policy within the party, nurturing its members with correct values and combating opportunism and exploitation, to align with both itself and the social environment it operates within.
- Empowering the party to obtain diverse and continuous sources of funding, to serve as a support for the party and its members in improving their performance.
- Adopting democratic organizational methods within the party and avoiding organizational frameworks that contribute to creating unnatural atmospheres within the party and making it controlled by a small group at the center.

Margins

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