

## ***The Changing Concept of Security in International Relations in the Post Cold War Era***

المفهوم المتغير للأمن في العلاقات الدولية في حقبة ما بعد الحرب الباردة

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### **Abstract:**

Security has meant very different things to people depending on their time and place in human history. The traditional notion of security, as a reference to national survival, physical protection of state territory, and military power has expended its scope in the second half of the 20th century, particularly since the end of the Cold War. This was associated with development within the academic mainstream of security re-conception and re-theorization what led to the emergence of the current approaches in security studies such as the Copenhagen school and the approach of the asymmetric threat.

**Keywords:** Security, Cold War, security studies, Copenhagen school, asymmetric threats.

### **المخلص:**

معنى الأمن هو أمر يختلف بين الناس حسب موقعهم في الجغرافيا والتاريخ الانساني، الفكرة التقليدية للأمن و التي تشير إلى البقاء، حماية إقليم الدولة، و القوة العسكرية قد تم توسيعها خلال الجزء الثاني من القرن العشرين خاصة منذ نهاية الحرب الباردة، و قد إرتبط هذا بتيار أكاديمي حاول إعادة مفهمة الأمن و إعادة التنظير له ما دفع لبروز عدد من التيارات المستجدة في الدراسات الأمنية مثل مدرسة كوبن هاجن و مقترب التهديدات اللاتماثلية.

**الكلمات المفتاحية:** الأمن، الحرب الباردة، الدراسات الأمنية.

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**Introduction**

Most discussions over the present and future prospects of security studies in the last decade of the 20th century were accompanied with doubts of further purposes and benefits of this branch in a considerably changed nature of the international system. After the end of the Cold War that caused an alleviation of the probability of armed conflict outbreaks .

From today's point of view, it is evident how unreasonable these expectations were. The adaptive nature of Security Studies made it easy for it to maintain its position among the various disciplines of international relations through the development of its epistemological and ontological structures and the presentation of a 21st-century analysis to the phenomenon of security.

The notion of "security" is very controversial, there is no consensus exists of what security is, it can be understood in different forms depending on people's ideas cultures and perceptions, however; the changing perception of security that emerged in the 1980s has led to significant changes in security concept.

This study will focus on the changes that emerged since the end of the cold war and how they changed the conception of security and the theoretical perception of this conception in order to address the following problematic: To what extent the changes emerging in international relations post the cold war era changed the conception of security and the theorization movement in this field of study?

In order to answer this problematic we will follow the plan:

**1- Conception and Re-conception of Security****1-1 The Traditional Trend in Security Definition.****1-2 The Compound Trend in Security Definition.****2- Security from the international relations theories perspective****2-1 Security from Realist perspective****2-2 Security from Constructivist Perspective****2-3 Asymmetric Threats Approach**

## 1- Conception and Re-conceptualization of Security

*In the language of social science “security” is a controversial concept, a concept on which no consensus exists, it can be understood in different forms depending on people’s ideas cultures and perceptions, however; the changing perception of security that emerged in the 1980s has led to significant changes in security concept.*

### 1-1 The Traditional Trend in Security Definition:

*Security has meant very different things to people depending on their time and place in human history, traditionally; security is defined in military terms with the primary focus on state protection from threats to national interests.<sup>1</sup>*

*This traditional security model is reflected on national security which according to **George Kennan** (1948) is “The continued ability of the country to pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers”,<sup>2</sup> meaning the protection of territory from external military threats and attacks which was recognized as the ultimate reason of existence of sovereign states.<sup>3</sup>*

*Traditionalists define security as freedom from any objective military threat to state survival. **Stephen Walt** definition perhaps in the most explicit way expresses the traditional understanding of the problem; he defines security in terms of security studies as “the study of the threat, use, and control of military force”.<sup>4</sup> This view sees security as being virtually synonymous with the accumulation of power: the more power (especially military power) actors can accumulate, the more secure they will be.<sup>5</sup>*

*However; such a traditional notion of security, as reference to national survival, physical protection of state territory, and military power has expended its scope in the second half of the 20th century, particularly since the end of the Cold War<sup>6</sup> given to several reasons that emerged as a consequence of globalization:*

*First, threats have no longer a purely military character, global problems, the majority of which are cross-borders, like organized crime, terrorism, deterioration of environment, disputes over natural resources, uncontrolled refugee flows, illegal immigration poverty and famine have become risks for humanity which seem as important as traditional military defense.<sup>7</sup>*

Second, the territorial context of security has changed. Security has traditionally been understood in relation to states sovereignty and its territorial integrity, however; as technological advancement has enabled exploration and exploitation beyond state borders, security concerns has extended geographically and spatially to different maritime zones, outer space, the Arctic, Antarctica, and even cyber space.

Third, the notion of “human security” has also added a new dimension to the expansion of the security concept,<sup>8</sup> it has subsequently provided a theoretical foundation for the development of the “responsibility to protect” concept as a policy agenda,<sup>9</sup> yet human security according to one popular definition is not a concern with weapons; it is concern with human dignity.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore; some believe that it is necessary to extend the concept of security in multiple sectors and at different levels, and that the territoriality and military defense are not the only main concepts.

The key development within the academic mainstream of security re-conceptualization occurred in 1983 with the publication of **Barry Buzan**’s book ‘**People, States, and Fear**’ plus the contribution of Copenhagen school.

### **1-2- The Compound Trend in Security Definition:**

Security is of vital importance. The term is frequently used to raise consciousness of the importance of particular issues, which are then so labeled in the minds of the population at large;<sup>11</sup> this consciousness revolves around four (4) basic questions: What is security? Whose security? What counts as a security issue? How security can be achieved ?

*Barry Buzan defines security as: “The pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change which they see as hostile.”*<sup>12</sup> Thus, so called “wideners” with **Barry Buzan** has challenged this conception of security by widening and deepening security agenda both horizontally and vertically. Having in mind the horizontal dimension, the security concept has expended from exclusively military onto political, economic, societal, and environmental sectors. Vertically, the altered security concept should also be open to referent objects other than state (individuals, social groups, humanity as a whole).<sup>13</sup>

In this context, military security concerns two-levels interplay of the armed offensive and defensive capabilities of states and states perceptions of each other's intentions. Political security concerns the organizational stability of states, systems of government, and the ideologies that give them legitimacy. Economic security concerns access to the resources, finance and markets necessary to sustain acceptable levels of welfare and state power. Societal security concerns the ability of societies to reproduce their traditional patterns of language, culture, association, religious, national identity and custom within acceptable conditions for evolution. Environmental security concerns the maintenance of the local and planetary biosphere as the essential support system on which all other human enterprises depend. These five (5) sectors do not operate in isolation from each other. Each defines a focal point within the security problematique, and a way of ordering priorities, but all are woven together in a strong web of linkages.<sup>14</sup>

Moreover; this “wideners” view sees that it is necessary to rethink about the term security by using an alternative speech in which individuals and/or social groups are the center of attention<sup>15</sup> means moving from state-centric definition of security to people-centric definition where the priority is given to human beings as argued some analysts based on a set of dynamics:

First, the complexity and the interrelatedness of both old and new security threats.

Second, these threats cannot be tackled through conventional mechanisms alone. Instead they require a new consensus that acknowledges the linkages and the interdependencies between development, human rights and national security.<sup>16</sup>

In light of this, the concept of human security has been adopted by a number of states as well as regional and international organizations. Chronologically, we can establish three (3) broad stages :

-1A world debut was the Global Human Development Report of the UN in 1994 that sought to seize the opportunity provided by the end of the Cold War.

-2Between the 2001 and 2003 the concept was revived in the debate on the “responsibility to protect.”

3- In the years 2004 and 2005 as the need to readjust to the new realities of the 21st century and in particular to find means of mounting concerted, collective responses to new threats became increasingly clear, human security, conceived of as the linking of security to development.<sup>17</sup>

Back to the UNDP, the commission on human security (CHS) in its final report 'Human Security Now' defines human security as: "... To protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhances human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life. It means protecting people from critical (severe) and pervasive (widespread) threats and situations. It means creating political, social, environmental, economic, military and cultural systems that together give people the building blocks of survival, livelihood and dignity."<sup>18</sup>

Overall, the definition proposed by the CHS re-conceptualizes security in a fundamental way by:

-1Moving away from traditional, state-centric conceptions of security that focused primarily on the safety of states from military aggression, to one that concentrates on the security of the individuals, their protection and empowerment.

-2Drawing attention to a multitude of threats that cut across different aspects of human life.

-3Promoting a new integrated, coordinated and people centered approach to advancing peace, security and development within and across nations.

In sum, regardless of labels given to concepts of security (traditional-compound / narrow-wide / state-centred - human-centred) any security conception must take in consideration the facts that the values to be secured are variable, the degree of security sought is variable, the potential threats to security are multiple, the means by which security may be pursued are many, the costs of security are inescapable and the time period matters.<sup>19</sup>

## **2- Security from the international relations theories perspective**

Beginning in the early twentieth century, the U.S. created its own scholarly traditions of international relations (IR). Eventually, IR became an American social science with the U.S. becoming the epicenter for worldwide

IR community engaged in a set of research programmes and theoretical debates.

*The first debate occurred in the late 1930s between ‘realist’ and ‘idealist’ followed by a series of other debates included the behavioral approaches and the liberal paradigm down to the last great debate in 1990s between the so-called rationalist and constructivist orientations. In this continuity it is not altogether clear what the current or ‘next’ great debate is especially with the appearance of new approaches in IR.<sup>20</sup>*

*This study will focus on the contribution of this theories and approaches in explaining the phenomenon of security.*

### **2-1 Security from Realist perspective (Realism and Neorealism Theory):**

*Realism is often seen historically as the dominant IR theory and this is certainly correct in terms of the study of security.<sup>21</sup> Although definitions of realism differ in detail, they share a clear family resemblance which defines realism as a tradition of analysis that stresses the imperatives states face to pursue a power politics of the national interest.<sup>22</sup>*

*It is customary to trace realism back to antiquity, with claims that its arguments can be found in important works from Greece, Rome, and India, like Thucydides’ History of The Peloponnesian War, and Kautilya’s Arthashastra from India, or Niccolo Machiavelli.<sup>23</sup>*

*Another tradition which realism draws from is that of geopolitics which includes the work of people like Mahan (1890), Machender (1919), Haushofer (1921) this tradition draws from geography highlights the spatial dimensions of state power.<sup>24</sup>*

*Classical realism is generally dated from 1939 and the publication of Edward H.Carr’s The 20 Years Crisis, in addition to Carr, works by Shuman (1933), Nicolson (1939), Niebuhr (1946), Wight (1946) formed a part of realist cannon.<sup>25</sup> But **Hans J.Morgenthau** put forward the first comprehensive modern realist theory in his 1948 book, **Politics among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace**.<sup>26</sup>*

*According to classical realism, because the desire for more power is rooted in the flawed nature of humanity, states are continuously engaged in a struggle to increase their capabilities. The absence of the international*

equivalent of states government is a permissive condition that gives a human appetites free reign. In short, classical realism explains conflictual behavior by human failings. Particular wars are explained by aggressive statesman or by domestic political systems that give greedy parochial groups the opportunity to pursue self-serving expansionist foreign policies.<sup>27</sup>

The 1960s saw classical realism coming under increasing scrutiny, thus by the 1970s the realist world view revived and revised with the publication of Kenneth Waltz's 1979 *Theory of International Politics* and what is known as the Neorealism theory. In this theory Waltz argue that systems are composed of structure and their interacting units. Political structures have three (3) elements: an ordering principle (anarchic or hierarchical), the character of the units (functionally alike or differentiated), and the distribution of capabilities. Waltz argue that two elements of the structure of international system are constants: the lack of an overarching authority means that its ordering principle is anarchy, and the principle of self-help means that all the units remain functionally alike. Accordingly, the only structural variable is the distribution of capabilities, with the main distinction falling between multipolar and bipolar system.<sup>28</sup>

The difference between classical realism and neorealism is their contrasting views on the source and content of states preferences. In contrast to classical realism, neorealism excludes the internal makeup of different states; Waltz's theory omits leader's motivations and state characteristics as causal variables for international outcomes.

Today there are at least four (4) strands of neorealism: rise and fall realism, neoclassical realism, defensive structural realism, and offensive structural realism.<sup>29</sup>

The flagship of the offensive structural realism is **John J. Mearsheimer** with his 2001 book, **The Tragedy of Great Power Politics**, Mearshiemer tries to answer one central question "Way states pursue power?", therefore; he drives five (5) assumptions about the international system as follow:

1- The international system is anarchic, which does not mean that it is chaotic or riven by disorder. The realist notion of anarchy has nothing to do with the conflicts; it is an ordering principle, which says that the system comprises independent states that have no central authority above them.

2- Great powers inherently possess some offensive military power, which gives them the wherewithal to hurt and possibly destroy each other. States are potentially dangerous to each other, although some states have more military might than others and are therefore more dangerous.

3- States can never be certain about other states intentions. Specifically no state can be sure that other state will not use offensive military capability to attack the first state.

4- Survival is the primary goal for great powers; hegemony is the ultimate aim of every state. Specifically, states seek to maintain their territorial integrity and the autonomy of their domestic political order. States can and do pursue other aims of course but security is their most important objective.

5- Great powers are rational actors. They are aware of their external environment and they think strategically about how to survive in it.<sup>30</sup>

When the five (5) assumptions are married they give us three (3) general patterns of behavior as result: fear, self-help, and power maximization.

1- Fear: great powers regard each other with suspicion, they worry that war might be in the offing. From the perspective of any one great power, all other great powers are potential enemies.

2- Self-help: states in the international system also aim to guarantee their own survival because other states are potential threats from one hand and there is no higher authority from the other hand, therefore; states cannot depend on others for their own security .

Self-help does not preclude states from forming alliances. But alliances are only temporary (today's alliance might be tomorrow's enemy).

3- Power maximization: states understand that the best way to ensure their survival is to be the most powerful state in the system. The stronger a state is relative to its potential rivals the less likely it is that any of those rivals will attack it and threaten its survival. That is way states pay a great attention to how power is distributed among them, and they make a special effort to maximize their share of world power.

This behavior forced by the international system structure led states to find themselves confronting a security dilemma.

*The “security dilemma”, which is one of the most well-known concepts in the international relations literature, reflects the basic logic of offensive realism. The essence of the dilemma is that the measures a state takes to increase its own security usually decrease the security of other states. John Herz first introduced the security dilemma in a 1950 article in the journal World Politics according to Hers: saying that states are power maximizers is tantamount to saying that they care about relative power, not absolute power.<sup>31</sup> Therefore; any defensive action and capabilities are often misinterpreted as being aggressive. Steps taken by states seeking to preserve the status quo are ambiguous and are often indistinguishable from preparations for taking the offense.<sup>32</sup>*

*The so-called defensive structural realism, in contrast; believe that domination is an unwise strategy for state survival. They note that seeking hegemony may bring a state into dangerous conflicts with its peers. Instead, defensive realists emphasize the stability of balance of power system, where a roughly equal distribution of power amongst states ensures that none will risk attacking another, thus we can overcome the security dilemma.<sup>33</sup>*

*In sum, this theory provides a structural explanation of great power security and war, suggesting that the main causes are located in the flawed nature of humanity (classical realism) or the architecture of the international system (neorealism), but what matters the most is the number of great powers and how much power each one controls.*

## **2-2 Security from Constructivist Perspective (Constructivist theory):**

*Constructivist theory or as some call it The Bridge Gap Theory is a theory that came to bridge the still vast divide separating the majority of IR theorists from postmodernists.<sup>34</sup>*

*The need for this bridge gape theory so called constructivism was promoted by three (3) factors which are:*

*First, the Cold War`s peaceful conclusion undermined the explanatory pretensions of neo-realists which couldn`t predict nor could adequately comprehend the systemic transformations reshaping the global order.<sup>35</sup>*

*Second, while the threat of great power war appears to be in abeyance, the international community now confronts in transnational*

jihadist terrorism threat that differs fundamentally from the powerful revisionist states that threatened international peace and security in the 20th century, this was emphasized by the attacks of 9/11.

Finally, the traditionally state-centric focus of IR has been problematized by both globalization as well as the increasing prevalence of state failure across large swathes of the developing world.<sup>36</sup>

Therefore; beginning in the 1980s constructivism has become an increasingly significant approach in North America IR, however; it has deeper roots, and it can be traced back to the 18th century writings of the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico who said: “The natural world is made by God, but the historical world is made by men ”.

Constructivism was firstly appeared in sociology when Anthony Giddens (1984) proposed the concept of structuration as a way of analyzing the relationship between structures and actors. According to Giddens, structures (i.e. the rules and conditions that guide social action) do not determine what actors do in any mechanical way. Structures do constrain actors, but actors can also transform structures by thinking about them and act about them in a different ways.<sup>37</sup>

Therefore; the notion of structuration leads to a less rigid and more dynamic view of the relationship between structure and actor, IR constructivists use this as a starting point.

Constructivism was introduced to IR by **Nicholas Onuf** (1989) who coined the term, but **Alexander Wendt** was the one that give the major contribution with his 1992 book “**Anarchy is what States Make of it**”.<sup>38</sup>

Constructivism runs from the criticism of other theories, their critique for other theories concern not what this scholars do and say but what they ignore: the content and source of states interests and the social fabric of world politics. Thus; constructivists do not reject science or causal explanations; their quarrel with mainstream theories is ontological not epistemological.<sup>39</sup>

Ontologically, constructivists and realists differ on three (3) points:

First, about material cause much IR theories especially neorealism is materialist, it focuses on how the distribution of material power such as military forces and economic capabilities. Constructivists reject such one-

sided material focus. They argue that the most important aspect of IR is social, not material.<sup>40</sup> E.g. Canada and Cuba both exist alongside the U.S; yet the simple balance of military power cannot explain the fact that the former is a close American ally, the latter is a sworn enemy.<sup>41</sup>

Second, constructivists contend that agents (states) and structures (global norms) are mutually constituted. Normative and ideational structures may well condition the identities and interests of actors, but those structures would not exist if it were not for the knowledgeable practices of those actors.<sup>42</sup>

According to Alexander Wendt social structures have three (3) elements: shared knowledge, material resources and practices.<sup>43</sup>

Finally, norm-driven behavior, the social and political world, including the world of IR, is not a physical entity or material object that is outside human consciousness. Consequently the study of IR must focus on the ideas and beliefs that inform the actors on the international scene as well as the shared understandings between them.<sup>44</sup> In Alexander Wendt's words "identities are the basis of interests". Tannen Wald gives four (4) types of ideas: ideological or shared belief systems, normative, causal beliefs, and policy prescriptions.

According to the assumptions stated above we can emphasize two points:

-1/The international system, according to constructivist theory, is not something 'out there' like the solar system. It does not exist on its own. It existed only as an inter-subjective awareness among people; in that sense the system is constituted by ideas, not by materials forces. It is human invention or creation not of physical or material kind but of a purely intellectual and ideational kind. It is a set of ideas, a body of thoughts, a system of norms, which has been arranged by certain people at particular time and place.

2- The security dilemma, accordingly; is a social structure composed of inter-subjective understandings in which states are so distrustful that they make worst-case assumptions about each other's intentions, and as a result define their interests in self-help terms.<sup>45</sup>

In sum, constructivists emphasis on the centrality of nonmaterial factors as determinants of phenomena in global politics can and should serve the agenda of world politics in the twenty-first century.

### **2-3Asymmetric Threats Approach (Asymmetric Threats to U.S. Security):**

The rise of asymmetric threats is a consequence of the development of new generation of war, this discussion of 3GW (generation of war) and 4 GW is based on the book **“The Sling and the Stone”** by COL **Thomas X Hammes**, according to COL Hammes, the evolution of war from generation to generation is a function of political, economic, social, technologic, and military developments.

The first of four generations of war grew out of the invention of the gunpowder and political, economic, social developments that grew out of Europe’s emergence from feudalism. The first generation of war peaked with the Napoleonic wars of the early 19th century.

The second generation of war grew out of the technological developments associated with the Industrial Revolution and the state’s ability to levy and collect taxes. Taken together, these developments allowed for the creation of mass armies and the dominance of the defense. The second generation of war peaked with the stalemate of World War I.

The third generation of war - maneuver war – evolved out of the lessons learned from World War I and first showed itself in German invasion of Poland in 1939. The third generation peaked during the Cold War.

The fourth generation of war is unconventional or asymmetric war in which the less capable opponent fights across the spectrum of the political, economic, social, and military activity and uses an equivalent of sling and a stone against its Goliath-like opponent. Another way to think about 4GW is to say what is not, it is not high-technology, short-duration war where technology is vital and essentially machines fight machines. 4GW is the complex, long-term type of conflict that has grown out of Mao’s People’s War .

Perhaps the most important thing to say about the fourth generation of war is that it is the only kind of war America has ever lost. According to Hammes, the United States lost three (3) 4GW – Vietnam, Lebanon, and

Somalia. Indeed, 4GWs continue to bleed America in Iraq and Afghanistan. Moreover; the global war on terrorism is a fourth generation war.<sup>46</sup>

*The multiple application of the term ‘asymmetry’ in military journal – ‘not fighting fair’ ‘attacking a weak point’ ‘information or cyber war’ ‘public relation war’ ‘weapons of mass destruction’ – made the definition of the term controversial, however; only very few people understand asymmetry’s formal definition.*

One civilian lexicon explains asymmetry using mathematical term ‘incommensurability’, the relationship between things which have no common measure. Another civilian definition refers to defective, disproportionate correspondence between things or their parts. From the other part U.S National Defense University (NDU), in its 1998 strategy assessment defines asymmetry by listing four (4) asymmetric responses that other nations could take to counter U.S. superiority: acquiring weapons of mass destruction, acquiring high technology weapons, acquiring cyber weapons, and fighting in environment that degrade U.S. capabilities.<sup>47</sup>

Therefore; we can say that asymmetric threats are recognition of an enduring truth: weaker powers, both state and non-state, will seek ways to mitigate the dominance of the strong. The problem with defining ‘asymmetric threats’ is that a definition implies that the universe of threats divides neatly into the symmetric and the asymmetric, Notwithstanding the apparent clarity of some cases, there is no more definitive a test for what is an asymmetric threat than there is for who is terrorist.<sup>48</sup>

*The term has been used to describe specific ‘asymmetric’ dangers posed to U.S. security. This approach outlines a range of potential asymmetric threats that the U.S. could face, it identifies a typology of five (5) potential asymmetric threats: Nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, informational operations, and terrorism.*<sup>49</sup>

**1- Nuclear weapons:** nuclear weapons rely on nuclear energy produced by either fission or a combination of fission and fusion of atomic nuclear. Nuclear weapons have not been detonated in armed conflict since 1945, and most concerns today tend to center on state selling nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations.

**2- Chemical weapons:** the Organization for Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) defines chemical weapons as any toxic chemical or its precursor that can cause death, injury, temporary incapacitation or sensory

irritation through its chemical action. Chemical agents can be classified according to the degree of effect (harassing agent, incapacitating agent, lethal agent) or the duration of hazard (persistent agents and non-persistent agents). (

3- **Biological weapons:** also refers to as bioweapons, are deadly pathogens – bacteria, microorganisms or viruses – or toxins which can be deliberately released in order to inflict harm.<sup>50</sup>

4- **Informational operations (IO):** is a category of direct and indirect support operations for the U.S. military by definition in Joint Publication 3-13, “IO are described as the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own”.<sup>51</sup>

5- **Terrorism:** The U.S. Department of Defense defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to inculcate fear intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological .

In sum, asymmetries exist everywhere, of course they can be found in market economics and in political systems. There are also strategic operational and tactical asymmetries. Strategically, theorists discuss asymmetries in the force structure of intercontinental ballistic missiles or information warfare forces, while tactical-level analysts try to calculate the correlation of forces between sides. In these cases, asymmetries refer to quantities, total numbers or different philosophies.

### **Conclusion:**

To sum up :

The concept of security has expanded, particularly after the end of the Cold War, in terms of both security threats and security objects. With respect to threats, they moved from being exclusively military onto political, economic, social, and environmental threats. As for objectives, they moved from preserving the state's sovereignty to enhance the human dignity. These changes made the international community adopt the notion of human security that shows up in the "responsibility to protect" which is considered as the major impact of Copenhagen scholar studies or the so-called "security

wideness" on the policies where states intervene to protect individuals for humanitarian reasons .

The expansion of the security concept didn't only influence policies but also political theorization. International relations theories included in their analyses the non-material dimensions of security moving away from the rigid interpretation based on power as a determinant (realism) to more flexible interpretations that take the influence of social structures as a primary basis(constructivism).

The significant changes that emerged after the end of the cold war set a place for a new world order where the state is no longer the objective of security, but this was not the only change about the state new status the other huge change was the nature of threats, indeed, states are no longer a source of threat for one another but instead, the new world requires states to collaborate together in order to face the asymmetric threats that goes beyond state borders.

International organisations especially the United Nation adjusted its activities in a way that matches the new security requirements by making individuals in the centre of its peace efforts overcoming the traditional notion of sovereignty to a more universal approach.

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<sup>22</sup> Scott Burchill and others, *Theories of International Relations*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2005, p 29.

<sup>23</sup> Martin Griffiths, *International Relations Theory of the Twenty-First Century*, Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, London, 2007, p 11.

<sup>24</sup> Roland Dannreuther, *Op.Cit*, p 2.

<sup>25</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Op.Cit*, p 12

<sup>26</sup> John Lewis Gaddis, *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, *International Security*, N 17 (2014), p 7.

<sup>27</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Op.Cit*, p 12.

<sup>28</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Op.Cit*, p 16.

<sup>29</sup> The U.S. foreign policy is influenced to a great extent with the principles of the offensive structural realism that is way the study will focus on this theory more than the others.

<sup>30</sup> John J. Mearshiemer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, Norton, New York, 2001, p-p 29-30.

<sup>31</sup> John J. Mearshiemer, *Anarchy and the Struggle for Power*, Norton, New York, 2001, p-p 55- 57.

<sup>32</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Op.Cit*, p 18.

<sup>33</sup> Anne- Marie Slaughter, *International Relations Principal Theories*, Oxford University Press, London , 2011, p 2.

<sup>34</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, *The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory*, Cambridge University Press, London, 1998, p 328.

<sup>35</sup> Scott Burchill and others, *Op.Cit*, p 195

<sup>36</sup> Martin Griffiths, *Op.Cit*, p 60.

<sup>37</sup> Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Introduction to International Relations Theories and Approaches*, 3<sup>rd</sup> ed, London, Oxford University Press, 2006, p 163.

<sup>38</sup> Ole R. Holsti, *Theories of International Relations*, Electronic Version, p 19.

<sup>39</sup> Jeffrey T. Checkel, *Op.Cit*, p 325.

<sup>40</sup> Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Op.Cit*, p 162.

<sup>41</sup> Scott Burchill and others, *Op.Cit*, p 196.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid*, p 197.

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<sup>43</sup> Robert Jackson and George Sorensen, *Op.Cit*, p 165.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*, p 162.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid*, p 165.

<sup>46</sup> John C.F.Tillson, *Learning to Adapt to Asymmetric threats*, Institute for Defense Analyses, United States, 2005, p-p 9-10.

<sup>47</sup> Timothy L.Thomas, *Deciphering Asymmetry`s World Game*, *Military Review*, 2011, p-p 32-33.

<sup>48</sup> Steven Lambakis, *Understanding Asymmetric Threats to the U.S*, National Institute for Public Policy, United States, 2002, p13.

<sup>49</sup> Kenneth F.McKenzie, *The Rise of Asymmetric Threats: Priorities for Defense Planning*, **Air Force Magazine QDR**, 2001, p 78.

<sup>50</sup> Beyza Unal, *Use of Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Weapons by Non-State Actors*, The royal Institute of International Affairs, 2016, p 5.

<sup>51</sup> Joint publication 3-13.