

Artificial Intelligence and International Relations: A Study of the US-China Competition for Global Leadership



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Submission date: 26/09/2025 Acceptance date: 13/12/2025 Publication date: 28/12/2025

Abstract:

This study examines the topic of artificial intelligence in the field of international relations, using the example of US-China global competition with AI. The importance of this topic lies in its attempt to explore the international areas impacted by AI. To complete this study, we used the descriptive and analytical approach. At the end, we reached a set of results, the most important of which is that artificial intelligence has become one of the most prominent analytical variables influencing international interactions, and that US-China competition through AI will contribute in the future to building a new international system based on multipolarity.

key words: artificial intelligence; US-China global competition; multipolarity; international relations; American Superiority;

JEL classification : F5 ; F52 ; F54 ; H77 ;

ملخص :

يتناول هذا الموضوع إشكالية الذكاء الاصطناعي في ميدان العلاقات الدولية عبر التنافس الأمريكي الصيني في ميدان الذكاء الاصطناعي، وتكمن أهمية هذا الموضوع في كونه يحاول اكتشاف المجالات الدولية التي أثر عليها الذكاء الاصطناعي كالسيادة وميزان القوى والأمن الدولي وكيفية استغلال الولايات المتحدة والصين في إطار التنافس بينهما لثورة الذكاء الاصطناعي كسلاح ناعم لتحقيق الهيمنة العالمية. ولإنجاز هذه الدراسة اعتمدنا على استخدام المنهج الوصفي التحليلي وفي النهاية توصلنا إلى أنّ الذكاء الاصطناعي بات من أبرز المتغيرات المؤثرة على التفاعلات الدولية وأنّ التنافس الصيني الأمريكي في هذا المجال سيساهم مستقبلا في بناء نظام عالمي جديد يقوم على التعددية القطبية.

الكلمات المفتاحية

: الذكاء الاصطناعي؛ النظام الدولي؛ التعددية القطبية؛ التنافس الأمريكي الصيني؛ الهيمنة الأمريكية؛

تصنيف جال: F5 ; F52 ; F54 ; H77 ;

.Introduction:

Technological progress has historically been one of the most essential weapons for changing how countries get along with each other. It affects how nations can force others to do things, which gives the most powerful governments an edge in changing the international power structure and the rules, procedures, and laws that control how people interact with each other in the international environment.

This time, what's new is that computers and software are being given the power to do things that people have always done, like deciding to use force. States are competing with one another in a fierce way to make smart systems that can be trusted while using military power, from soldiers' field activities to weapons of mass destruction.

This is a big deal since a state's position and power have always been tied to a number of characteristics, most of which are geopolitical in nature, like size, location, population, topography, natural resources, economic strength, military force, and others. Today, AI applications will change the issue by moving us from the geopolitical base of power to the geotechnological basis of power. This could make the steps we take to attain world peace less effective and efficient, since it is clear that this will cause two tendencies that hurt international stability. The first is that the top countries in the field of artificial intelligence are trying to improve their weapons systems by adding artificial intelligence to them.

They are afraid that other countries will be better than they will, like the US will and China are right now. The other tendency is that weaker countries that want to be more powerful are trying to make up for their weak military systems by using artificial intelligence, especially in the military and economic areas. This is what countries like Turkey, Iran and others are doing.

- **The question of the study:** How does artificial intelligence affect the US-China competition for leadership in the international system?

- Hypothesis:

Before arriving to answer this problem, we suggest the following hypothesis:

-The balance of power, sovereignty, and intelligent control during wars and arms races between countries are the most prominent areas that artificial intelligence will impact in international relations;

- Promoting innovation and tightening technological restrictions are the United States' most prominent tools for maintaining global hegemony;

- China seeks to develop a technological infrastructure based on making artificial intelligence globally accessible at the lowest possible cost as a strategic tool for future global economic dominance;

- The objective of the study:

This study aims to explore the impact of the artificial intelligence revolution that has emerged globally in the technological field on the process and developments of international relations, and in particular, to explore how both the United States and China are using it as a tool in the context of the competition to control the international system.

• The importance of study :

The importance of this study lies in the fact that it will contribute to enriching the field of political science and international relations with new scientific research that addresses a modern topic emerging in the international arena, namely the study of artificial intelligence as a new analytical change affecting international relations, particularly between the United States and China.

-Methodology:

This research paper followed the descriptive approach to clarify the different concepts relevant to the topic under study, along with the analytical approach to fully understand the issue.

Therefore, to achieve this goal, we divided this study into the following axes:

-The first axis: The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the International Power Hierarchy.

-The second axis: Dimensions of the Sino-American competition.

-The third axis: China and the Future of Artificial Intelligence.

-The fourth axis: Possible scenarios.

1.The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on the International Power Hierarchy

If we were to define key terms for international relations, we would find that the two words most associated with this field are interest and power. Both have a central presence in the nature of relations between states. Once states define their interests and embark on procedural steps to achieve these interests, they simultaneously prepare the material resources that enable them to impose their will, even by force, to achieve their goals.

States do not hesitate to engage in coercive measures that influence the behaviour of international actors. Therefore, they seek to maximize their power and continually develop their capabilities to avoid falling under the influence of another power that might force them to compromise their interests. States' capabilities have always been linked to the development of their tools of power, which politicians use to achieve their goals (Council, 2021, p. 93). Hence, it is imperative to focus on the impact of artificial intelligence on tools of power, as they are the most important factor in regulating relations between states.

Artificial intelligence is expected to affect the international environment through several approaches, the most important of which are:

Subheading 1: The emergence of new threats in the international environment: It is known that there are a number of autonomous weapons powered by artificial intelligence, the development of which is escalating among several countries, such as drones, boats, torpedoes, and autonomous submarines controlled by algorithms. It is not unlikely that the algorithm will be biased; attacking targets other than those for which it was designed, hitting populated areas, or launching weapons of mass destruction. This could happen through malicious software sabotaging the algorithm's learning process, or through a software glitch. An algorithm may be mathematically fair but morally biased, placing civilians as military targets (Lee, 2018, p. 28).

With the emergence of autonomous weapons, the possibility of war breaking out by mistake increases. These weapons are likely to respond automatically and target neighbouring forces or specific targets such as leaders and presidents, especially in situations of tension between countries. The age of artificial intelligence also predicts the possibility of an increase in the number of casualties due to weapons controlled by artificial intelligence.

Ultimately, the order to fire is linked to an assessment of the situation, the circumstances of the battle, the type of threat, and the psychological factors surrounding the soldiers. However, autonomous weapons do not operate in this

way. Rather, they operate through analysis and response. Artificial intelligence algorithms can raise the level of risk within countries by using them in cyberattacks to sabotage infrastructure such as nuclear power plants, divert train tracks, control the closure of dams, or affect electrical power grids (Schmidt, 2021, p. 132).

Subheading 2 : Changing the power of international actors: Although the state is the primary actor in international relations and the international system, artificial intelligence applications can create a power shift between the state and new actors such as multinational corporations, particularly technology companies. SpaceX's intervention in the Ukrainian war enabled the Ukrainian Navy to attack several Russian naval targets in the Black Sea Fleet and sink some of them with boats. Artificial intelligence will also strengthen the position of individuals in the international environment (Goncharuk, 2024).

Through individual talents, computing power, and data, states can design and produce artificial intelligence applications that enable them to make a difference in power. Although these talented individuals are small in number, their influence transcends the national framework of their nationalities or the nationalities of their companies.

Artificial intelligence contributes to changing the effectiveness of terrorist forces with these applications to launch attacks, reconnaissance, or sabotage communications and infrastructure. This escalates their influence in the international environment and makes the issue of prosecuting them more complex.

Artificial intelligence affects international organizations by enhancing their operational efficiency with AI applications. For example, it can enhance the effectiveness of organizations that track organized crime, analyze terrorist patterns and behaviours, predict the emergence of diseases and epidemics, or use AI in climate engineering programs and the creation of green belts planted by drones with minimal or almost no human intervention (Weimann, 2024).

Subheading 3: Ease of producing weapons of mass destruction: The impact of AI is expected to extend to the production of weapons of mass destruction. It can be employed in several activities related to the production and development of nuclear weapons, such as exploration, drilling, and mining operations, which can be carried out by robots, as well as controlling enrichment stages and production lines.

Deep learning systems can also contribute to introducing new designs for nuclear weapons. This will naturally be easier with chemical and biological weapons, as all stages, from design to weapon assembly to launching them at

specific targets can be carried out without human intervention using robots and autonomous weapons (PFAFF, 2024).

Subheading 4: The outbreak of an arms race in artificial intelligence:

The 21st century military and security systems are transitioning towards artificial intelligence applications, leading to an arms race among countries like the United States, China, Russia, and the European Union. Global leaders emphasize the importance of AI, with Russia stating it is the future. China is developing its military capabilities and creating an AI industry. The US is leading advanced AI research, neural networks, and brain-computer interfaces, enabling human command and operation (Weimann, 2024).

Subheading 5: Widespread unemployment and threats to stability:

Artificial intelligence is expected to replace 40-50% of jobs in the labor market over the next 15 years, leading to economic and social disruption. This could increase unemployment, particularly among those lacking skills for automation. Addressing these burdens will affect countries' standing in the global balance of power, potentially transforming them into fragile states reliant on external resources. These shifts are influenced by geopolitical and technological transformations (Nigar, 2025, p. 27) .

Subheading 6: The emergence of geographic artificial intelligence

(Geo AI): The traditional measure of a state's power is based on fixed and variable factors. Variable factors, such as political systems and public opinion, are crucial in transforming fixed factors into capabilities. Artificial intelligence is increasingly important in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of these elements. A new standard will emerge, focusing on the availability of artificial intelligence technologies that can compensate for a state's deficiency in fixed geopolitical elements. Countries with small populations can use military robots, intelligent command systems, and autonomous weapons to compensate for human shortages.

Countries with scarce natural resources can also rely on marketed technologies and artificial intelligence for detection, exploration, and operation in difficult environments. The availability of knowledge that harnesses these resources is more important than resources. Small, sparsely populated countries can gain a global role greater than their size by traditional geopolitical standards (NGA, 2024).

Subheading 7: The rising importance of the fifth domain of warfare

(space): There is no question about the importance of air superiority over the conduct of combat operations in other domains (land, sea, cyber), given the wide coverage it provides for multiple activities. The higher the altitude ceiling achieved, the more severe the impacts and the less risk associated with reaching

outer space. Since attempting to preserve human life in this environment is more difficult, the alternative has been to entrust this task to robots. Indeed, automated flight and control systems and unmanned flights have become common today. The production of autonomous space robotic weapons is expected to expand in a way that ensures the neutralization of military forces in other traditional arenas (PFAFF, 2024).

They provide command and control, monitoring, reconnaissance, and the ability to wage cyberwarfare, as well as fire and destroy targets with conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. This heralds an escalation in the race for military space robots.

Subheading 8: The emergence of new legal requirements: The rise of new technologies raises questions about their legal status and criminal liability. As technologies diversify, the legal framework becomes more complex, especially in the era of artificial intelligence. New requirements emerge, such as the legal personality granted to natural and legal persons. The third path, artificial intelligence, is still under investigation due to the instability of the definition of AI.

The problem of determining criminal liability for AI actions arises, with the programmer, producing company, or user being liable. Some countries have attempted to establish legislation on this subject, but the speed of development does not match the modest efforts. A new legal problem related to algorithmic bias is expected to emerge, requiring technical safeguards and legal rules. Legislators and legal experts face a complex task to establish rules governing the age of artificial intelligence, possibly by establishing a new social contract specific to this age (Treleaven, 2025).

Subheading 9: Power Shifts: Realist theory has constantly asserted itself in the international environment, establishing the principle of power as a central element in international relations. Therefore, states seek to maximize their power and attempt to monopolize a form of power that guarantees their leadership and dominance for the longest possible period. Artificial intelligence is expected to bring about an unprecedented qualitative development in the power equation (Schmidt, 2021). This will be based on the state's ability to mobilize and organize individual talents specialized in artificial intelligence, harvest data, and find appropriate computing power.

This will enhance the capabilities of multinational corporations, as they are the entities leading research and development operations. Most underdeveloped countries will non-nationally produce the construction of smart cities, the operation of automated transportation systems, and the supply of drones and autonomous weapons. This means that the security system and technical and

economic control of countries will be in the hands of the non-national producer (Rawas, 2024) .

This will widen the power gap between countries producing artificial intelligence technologies and countries dependent on foreign resources. The concerns of the international system in the twenty-first century will revolve around scientific research, especially in the field of artificial intelligence and outer space.


2.Dimensions of the Sino-American competition

Which can be addressed by developing the following elements:

Subheading 1: Elements of American Superiority: The competition between the United States and China in the field of artificial intelligence reflects transformations that go beyond the technical dimension, extending to economic, geopolitical, and strategic dimensions. This is evident in the following:

- **Chip Manufacturing:** China is rapidly advancing in the AI market, with US restrictions on China, including a ban on exports of advanced chips like the NVIDIA H100, prompting Chinese companies to develop alternative solutions. NVIDIA's H800, designed to be 10% to 30% slower on some tasks, has been supplying these chips to companies like Tencent, Alibaba, and Baidu. Chinese companies are preparing to exploit these chips to accelerate AI development, with Byte Dance, owner of TikTok, surpassed by major companies in purchasing NVIDIA chips in Asia. Byte Dance has allocated \$12 billion to AI infrastructure by 2025, reflecting the continued demand for AI chips in the Chinese market (reuters, 2025).

Huawei is also focusing on developing its own AI processors, such as the Ascend series, to improve data processing efficiency in AI applications like deep learning and big data analysis. However, Huawei faces significant challenges in expanding within the AI market, as its processors accounted for only 6% of the market in China during the first half of 2023. NVIDIA dominated the market with a 90% share, reflecting the superiority of NVIDIA's technologies in this field. The launch of the new Blackwell generation of processors on March 18, 2024, reflects a trend toward improving processor performance and increasing efficiency in accelerating artificial intelligence operations. Additionally, Huawei faces restrictions due to US sanctions that affect its ability to access some advanced technical components (Wu, 2025).

Figure 01: Top 05 countries with highest AI investment (2009-2023)

Source: Altius Investec, china in the global AI race :strengths, challenge and the road ahead, [https://www .linkedin.com /pulse/china-global-ai-race-strengths-challenges-road-ahead-scn2c](https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/china-global-ai-race-strengths-challenges-road-ahead-scn2c).

- **STEM Education:** The educational model focusing on STEM, which aims to develop analytical and problem-solving skills and enhance innovation in these fields, has seen China lead the way in recent years. According to a 2021 report by Georgetown University, China has a five-fold increase in STEM graduates compared to the United States, with over 77,000 doctoral degrees awarded by 2025. This disparity is due to China's strategic investments in education and research infrastructure, which attract more students to study these disciplines (Investec, 2025).

Despite the American educational system's technological superiority, there is an urgent need to reconsider the approach to STEM education. This requires developing more attractive educational frameworks, implementing policies to attract and retain talent, and increasing investments in this field. The United States faces challenges such as declining interest among local students and restrictions on foreign talent immigration, which threaten its technological superiority (Zhang, 2025).

- **Data center efficiency:** is another crucial aspect of AI, as it requires vast amounts of data for training, learning, and continuous improvement. The United States currently holds 77% of the world's cloud computing capacity, while China holds 24%, with companies like Alibaba, Huawei, Baidu, and Tencent representing a rising competitor. However, the biggest challenge facing both sides lies in continuously providing sufficient new data to train complex generative models (Mitre, 2025, p. 62).

- **Energy sovereignty:** is also essential for AI models and massive data centers, as they consume an estimated 460 terawatt-hours in 2022, equivalent to 2% of total global energy consumption. Securing sustainable and cost-effective energy sources is crucial for continued development in this field. The Chinese government has invested over 43.5 billion yuan in an ambitious project called

"East Data, West Compute," which aims to build advanced and sustainable data centers to support AI innovations.

Transforming the innovation environment is crucial for AI to become a strategic element that influences the balance of power and reshapes economic and political interactions. Resource-rich countries may find themselves less motivated to seek new solutions compared to those facing technological or financial constraints (Zhang, 2025).

Lastly, concerns about algorithmic colonialism and worsening technological dependency arise from the increasing reliance of developing countries on technology produced by developed countries, particularly in artificial intelligence. This could lead to algorithmic colonialism, where countries lacking the capacity to develop their own AI technologies become completely dependent on those possessing these technologies, exposing them to exploitation and control of their data, decisions, and policies (Girishankar, 2025).

- Changes in the Innovation Environment: AI is no longer just a tool; it is now a strategic element that changes the balance of power and how people engage in politics and the business. In a place where new ideas are often being made, having a lot of choices and resources may make people less inclined to think of new ways to solve problems. When there are not enough resources, on the other hand, people and businesses may have to find new solutions to solve problems. Countries that have many resources may not be as keen to come up with fresh solutions as countries that are having difficulties with money or technology. These countries might be better at using new ideas to address problems and move forward (Zhang, 2025).

- Algorithmic colonialism and growing technological dependency: Developing countries are becoming more reliant on technology made by rich countries, especially in the field of artificial intelligence. This is a severe problem because it means that people are becoming more reliant on technology. Some people call this "algorithmic colonialism." This idea indicates that countries that cannot build their own AI technology (laggards) might have to depend on the countries and firms that do have these technologies (innovators). People might find it easier to use and manage its data, regulations, and decisions because of this (Mitre, 2025).

Subheading 2: China and the Future of Artificial Intelligence: To develop this axis, we divided it into the following analytical elements:

- The Chinese Strategy for Superiority in the Field of Artificial Intelligence:


Amid the accelerating race among major powers for technological dominance, Western companies face an unprecedented challenge to China's rise.

Following the remarkable progress achieved by the Chinese company DeepSec in this field, which raised a wave of questions in global technological and economic circles, the American company OpenAI rushed to announce its Deep Research tool on February 3, 2025, in an attempt to maintain its leadership in the face of growing Chinese competition and to enhance ChatGPT. This announcement comes in direct response to the emergence of advanced Chinese AI models, such as DeepSec R1, developed by DeepSec, Coin 2.5 Max, produced by Alibaba, and Kimi K 1.5, created by Moonshot AI (smith, 2025).

These models have demonstrated remarkable efficiency superior to DeepSec and have the same ability to compete. Therefore, this development has raised questions about the nature of the strategies Western companies will adopt to confront China's technological rise, and the extent to which this competitive trend will affect the global technological system. While major companies race to develop more advanced AI models, other dimensions of competition are emerging, such as expanding the use of these technologies cost-effectively. This raises a fundamental question: Will the United States be able to maintain its leadership, or will China reshape the rules of technological dominance?

China has sought to build a dominant position in open-source artificial intelligence and has developed cloud infrastructure (X Platform) (social media). The world is experiencing a global cold war in the information technology space, with the United States and China as its main weapons, and its primary weapon is to dominate the world through artificial intelligence (heeks, 2024, p. 08).

Figure 02: global competition with AI in business.



Source: Philipp gerbert, China's momentum and challenges in artificial intelligence investments yield telling lessons for its worldwide observers,

<https://sloanreview.mit.edu/article/global-competition-of-ai-in-business-how-china-differs/>.

Perhaps one of its most revealing battles occurred a few months ago when China, at a modest cost of no more than \$5.6 million, launched the artificial intelligence application "DeepSec," effectively slamming American applications that cost billions, such as ChatGPT.

This event shook the world and even became a technological earthquake that shook the IT giants in the United States. The American premise is that America's artificial intelligence computing power is unrivaled, and that blocking access to advanced digital chips and cloud service providers will give America the ability to contain China and limit its capabilities (smith, 2025).

The truth is that China is following the opposite approach: it is building growing open-source AI capabilities, while the United States is moving toward closed, tightly controlled AI systems.

Trusted, which includes 18 countries, excluding Poland, and Greece, which are allies; Moderately Trusted; and Untrusted, such as Iran. This classification has led many countries to rely on Chinese cloud providers, risking giving China unparalleled access to their data, enabling the continued training and development of Chinese AI capabilities.

In this context, it is crucial to recognize that China's national security and cyber laws give the government broad oversight over companies like Alibaba Cloud and Huawei Cloud. This means that data stored on their servers for their customers is accessible to them, giving China a significant advantage in developing AI models. The more data, the greater its capabilities, further cementing its dominance of AI in emerging markets. Advertisement The United States has made a costly mistake by building solid defenses against China in the AI arena, but it does the opposite when it plays the offensive role (heeks, 2024).

Washington has been busy building solid walls to restrict China's access to computing power (a term referring to the computational resources used to train and run AI models), while China has circumvented these barriers and developed strategic asymmetric advantages with its American counterpart.

Chinese companies have realized that it will take time for China to match the United States in high-performance AI, so they have focused on developing highly efficient and less expensive AI technologies. China has sought to build a dominant position in open-source AI and has developed cloud infrastructure and global data ecosystems.

This strategy has enabled China to provide cheaper and unrestricted access to AI services, enabling it to enter emerging markets in ways that will be difficult to eliminate. This is not an AI competition; it is a battle for control of the global digital infrastructure, today and in the future. Europe and the United States' failure to understand China stems from the Western school of thought's belief that communist China cannot effectively innovate and outperform the West. Meanwhile, the Chinese Communist Party has developed its capacity to absorb diversity and differences within China. China has become increasingly a leader in all areas of technology and increasingly independent, emerging as a peer and competitor in robotics, artificial intelligence, electric cars, lithium batteries, etc (Roberts, 2021, p. 67).

China is adopting a long-term development strategy, aided by its huge market, which can absorb any product, thus ensuring its continuity and development, and then exporting it at a competitive price. Furthermore, China places no restrictions on its products.

- China's geopolitical and strategic goals toward the United States:

China's ambition is to break the United States and dethrone it from the global economic throne. In the absence of a Western presence, it is gradually dominating the world, as is the case in Africa.

The difference between the United States and China is the difference between the tortoise and the hare. The United States possesses advanced technologies and unique innovations, but it slowly transfers them to market products, like a tortoise, while China leaps quickly like a hare into the market with multiple applications.

This gives China a position that allows it to set the technical standards for future technology and shape its governance of this space, especially given the presence of a huge market in the South and the technology-hungry BRICS countries. This raises questions about the long-term geopolitical competition between China and the United States.

China is expected to control 30 % of the global industrial output, realizing that robotics and artificial intelligence will compensate for the high cost of labor. This is something it has realized with the decline in population density in favor of India, the world's largest country in terms of population and cheap labor. Advertisement Trump's \$500 billion "Stargate" plan is an attempt to counter China's rise, but the United States' lack of manufacturing capabilities poses a major obstacle, especially as China develops its manufacturing capabilities, such as in the fields of nuclear reactors and renewable energy, while

Trump has focused on fossil fuels, knowing that nuclear energy and renewable energy are growing (Heeks, 2024).

China controls 61.13% of global AI patents, while this percentage represents 20.90% for the United States. This is also a significant share, although China is superior to it between 2010 and 2022, while the European Union and Britain come in last place with 2.3%. As for prominent machine learning models, between 2003 and 2023, China has 15 models, which confirms its increasing influence in AI research. In the field of complex industrial robotics, among the top five countries in the world in this field, China tops the list, as it owns more than 290,000 robots, which confirms its technological strength in this field.

In general, this analysis confirms China's superiority and its transformation into a dominant force in AI and robotics patents. However, this does not mean that the United States of America is not superior in its turn, as it still has a strong position in this field, despite its declining share compared to China.

3. Possible scenarios:

The complexities of the US-China competition reflect an increasing intertwining of technological, economic, and geopolitical factors, making the course of this rivalry uncertain. Several possible scenarios reflecting future development trends can be envisioned as follows:

Subheading 1: Continued US supremacy: The United States may maintain its leadership through multiple strategies, including promoting innovation in semiconductors, tightening technological restrictions on China, and leveraging strategic international alliances. However, this scenario may require addressing internal challenges, such as a shortage of specialized personnel, rising infrastructure costs, and regulatory complexities (Edelman, 2025).

Subheading 2: China may succeed in bypassing US restrictions by developing domestic alternatives to semiconductors, expanding its digital dominance through the Belt and Road Initiative, and achieving breakthroughs in the field of generative artificial intelligence. However, it may face structural challenges, such as continued reliance on certain Western technologies, restricted access to international data, and regulatory challenges (Podda, 2025).

Subheading 3: A relative balance of power may emerge, with each country maintaining competitive advantages in specific areas, without either nation achieving absolute dominance. This scenario may see the entry of new players into the competition, such as the European Union and India, further

complicating the landscape and reducing the chances of unilateral dominance (Zhang, 2025).

Subheading 4: Tech giants may become the primary players and controllers of AI development, surpassing the role of states and governments. This scenario could exacerbate monopolies and data control, raising questions about the future of democracy and national sovereignty (Edelman, 2025).

Conclusion:

The competition between the United States and China in the field of artificial intelligence is a critical development, as technological, economic, and geopolitical dimensions are intricately intertwined. While each country seeks to enhance its capabilities and achieve superiority, the most likely scenario in the near term appears to be a technological balance, with continued competition and increasing multipolarity.

However, the future of technological dominance in the world of artificial intelligence remains open to multiple possibilities, which may depend on each party's ability to adapt to accelerating challenges and capitalize on emerging opportunities, as well as on the nature of alliances and partnerships that may form in the coming years.

In light of the above, this competition is not limited to possessing the latest technologies; it extends to the ability to employ them to serve strategic objectives and enhance international standing. While indicators point to a growing likelihood of technological balance in the near term, the future trajectory remains contingent on complex factors, including the ability of both sides to adapt to accelerating changes, develop more flexible innovation systems, and build effective technological alliances.

It thus appears that the essence of technological dominance in the next phase will not be merely a matter of technical or financial superiority, but rather the ability to transform innovation into a tool for reshaping global balances, redefining the criteria for superiority from possession to the optimal exploitation of technology in shaping the contours of the new international order.

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