

The liberalism economic in the perspective of Islamic parties Comparison between the AKP in Turkey and HMS in Algeria

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Abstract:

This article aims to analyze the perspective of Islamic parties (the AKP IN Turkey and HMS in Algeria) towards economic liberalism, , using content analysis technique. The study results show that the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey is characterized by a moderate and pragmatic economic approach towards economic liberalism and the market economy. The party believes that free economy, investment, and free trade promote economic development and work towards enhancing the private sector and creating employment opportunities. Also believes that the state should play a regulatory role, promote social equality, and provide social care for those in need. On the other hand, the HMS Movement in Algeria adopts a different approach. It considers economic liberalism as a threat to society and opposes it.

Keywords:Economy, Liberalism, Akp, Hms, Economic Approach, Islam

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1. INTRODUCTION

It's impossible to analyze the economic approach of the Turkish Justice and Development Party and other Islamic parties, both Arab and non-Arab, without addressing an extremely important topic, which is economic liberalism. This is due to its significance as it has established itself as an effective model in managing the economic affairs and is promoted in economic circles as the unified model. This raises many cognitive and intellectual issues regarding its position within the economic programs of parties in general and Islamic parties in particular. Therefore, we believe it is necessary to shed some light on this subject in order to clarify its foundations and the challenges it poses compared to the economic system of the studied parties.

2. Methodology:

In our study, we used the qualitative content analysis method to analyze the political programs of the mentioned political parties, with a focus on their economic policies and their stance on liberalism as a dominant economic model.

3. Understanding Economic Liberalism:

The term is derived from "liberalism" in the English language, which means freedom. In fact, it is an intellectual doctrine that focuses on individual freedom and respects the independence of individuals. (saliba, 1994) It seeks to limit power and reduce its role, keeping it away from the market while expanding civil liberties based on the philosophy of enlightenment. This philosophy places humans at the center of things, as individuals with thinking minds capable of understanding everything and developing themselves and their communities through systematic and rational action. The philosophical dictionary defines it as a political and philosophical doctrine that recognizes the necessity of religious unity for social organization, and that the law should guarantee freedom of opinion and belief. These ideas raise many intellectual and cognitive issues for Islamic political movements that view religion in society as a non-

negotiable matter and reject its involvement in shaping the relationships and perceptions of individuals.

The historical interaction between Islamic and Western countries played a role in disseminating liberal ideas in Arab societies; it included enlightened elites without having the ability to horizontally spread within social circles. As a result, what is known as Arab liberals emerged, who were a group of pioneers of Arab intellectual thought, such as Al-Tahawi, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, and Muhammad Abduh. They incorporated many liberal concepts after being influenced by the social, economic, and political progress they witnessed in these societies. They attempted to reproduce them in their societies, especially in the field of political representation and economic choices, while preserving their religious and cultural identity. Some argue that these individuals were not true liberals in the real sense of the word, but rather used some of its concepts and ideas while making references to religious authority and the Arab Islamic cultural heritage. This period was a moment of exploration, investment, and establishment of some liberal concepts and ideas, rather than a complete reproduction of its systematic structure. Moving to the economic field, liberalism advocates for the unrestricted rights of individuals to unlimited ownership and acquisition of property and wealth. It calls for trade freedom, market freedom, and the market's ability to self-regulate. The changes, developments, and new conditions of global capitalism called for a reinterpretation of the liberal thought heritage. Liberal ideology, which emerged in Europe since the 17th century in the form of political theories by thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, faced criticism from thinkers of the Frankfurt School, headed by Adorno, Horkheimer, and Marcuse (mansour, 2008). then transitioned to political economy through the works of Adam Smith. It reappeared again in the form of a new liberalism with a new structure and new mechanisms. Economic dominance transformed into political dominance through the use of state ideological apparatuses such as the educational system, media, and culture, to the extent of total control. These apparatuses played a role in

reproducing and promoting liberalism, attempting to impose it as a unified model for managing public affairs at various levels.

The emergence of the term "Islamic liberalism" has witnessed the rise of various movements described as Islamic liberals. They do not see any contradiction between Islamic values and values such as freedom, human rights, equality, and other principles that have been achieved by Western civilization. These movements aim to free themselves from the control of religious leaders and to separate their opinions from Islam itself, calling for a reinterpretation of religious texts and not relying on classical interpretations by religious figures.

Returning to Arab societies, during the mid-20th century, the voice of liberalism diminished, and its concepts became less prevalent in the face of nationalist and Marxist leftist movements dominant at that time. Following the defeat of 1967, a significant crack occurred in the socialist model and its social concepts, allowing alternative currents to emerge, attempting to influence social spheres by employing religious elements. This was represented by political Islam movements, whose activist model emerged on the eve of the collapse of the Ottoman Caliphate. However, it remained latent in the political and social fields, gradually gaining significant influential power by addressing deeply rooted religious values and standards within individuals' consciousness and collective awareness.

With the beginning of the 1990s, and in light of the failure of the Afghan jihad experience and its retreat upon itself, along with its inability to establish the desired Islamic state, coinciding with another failure affecting the political Islamic experience in Algeria, and the contemporary Islamic intellectual movement's inability to produce a conscious societal vision regarding its social peculiarities and the current state of its society, and with the bankruptcy of the socialist model, liberalism began to be marketed in the Islamic world as the only intellectual model that humanity should follow. This eventually led Francis Fukuyama to proclaim the end of history, meaning that this model is the highest achievement of humanity, to be promoted as a binding cultural framework that should prevail and spread

across all human societies, regardless of their religious, cultural, social, and economic peculiarities. This model advocates a set of values summarized as follows:

- Freedom: The individual's fundamental rights are based on natural material law, and the state is formed by the social contract that regulates and preserves these rights, based on nature itself, rather than being an external matter. In the Islamic system, freedom is constrained, not absolute.
- Religious Belief: The state remains neutral regarding religious beliefs because freedom necessitates uncertainty and skepticism. The truth can only be reached through reason and experience. Based on the principle of tolerance, religious commitment is invalidated as long as individuals have the right to believe as they wish, and it is the duty of the state, which was formed to safeguard the natural rights of individuals, to defend this. However, freedom of belief poses numerous challenges in the Islamic system, as some accept it while others see it as deviating from the faith.
- Law: Law regulates freedom to prevent anarchy, and it is a man-made law based on abstract reason in legislation. In contrast, in Islam, it is Sharia law.

4. Liberalism as an AKP choice:

The poor economic situation, commercial and financial collapse of Turkey was the main challenge for the AKP when it took power in Turkey. This included a decrease in the growth rate, an increase in inflation, and a budget deficit. Therefore, the overall economic performance became crucial in the success of AKP governments since 2002. It became the legitimate leverage for government policies, applying a well-known saying in the political arena that when the economy is doing well, voters are more tolerant of other policies. In general, the economic approach of the AKP cannot be

understood or dissected without linking it to the preceding periods and the nature of the social actors within it. It did not emerge out of nowhere; rather, it is the result of a relatively long intellectual heritage that lasted for over 50 years. On the one hand, it started with the integration of the Turkish economy into international trade since the 1980s, especially its integration into the Common European Market. On the other hand, it was influenced by political pluralism and the victory of the Democratic Party led by Adnan Menderes in the 1950 elections. This continued with the victory of NecmettinErbakan in the 1974 elections and the formation of a coalition government with the left. (ural, 2009) For this purpose, we have identified in our study a set of elements and variables that can help clarify the economic approach in a concrete and realistic manner. They are as follows:

a. New Islamic Bourgeoisie: Gilles Kepel argues that the political rise of Islam since the 1970s is supported by the convergence of three socio-cultural groups: the urban youth class, the impoverished rural migrants, and the devout Islamist engineers. Lastly, there is the small pious bourgeoisie seeking social mobility and advancement. During the period from 1950 to 1960, a new class emerged, consisting of landowners and successful small traders who excelled in the religious field. They aimed for political and economic growth but faced skepticism and marginalization from the secular elite in Istanbul and Ankara, remaining excluded from positions of power. Their access to wealth was conditional on navigating the central government, leading to the emergence of clientelism, benefiting specific elites and a minority urban bourgeoisie. (Maigre, 2005)

Meanwhile, rural traders, who became prominent supporters of the political Islamic movement, were marginalized. This movement developed under the leadership of NecmettinErbakan in the 1970s, with hidden support from the banned religious brotherhoods and their established networks, which would later have a significant influence on shaping the trajectory and directions of political Islam. As a result, the Turkish political, cultural, and social fields witnessed the emergence of a new integrated group at different social levels, commonly referred to by experts as the Islamic bourgeoisie. This group manifests its connection to Islam in the

public sphere and markets. Therefore, the continued presence of the Justice and Development Party in power since 2002 is merely a translation of support for this bourgeoisie and an increase in its economic and political influence. If the Justice and Development Party is its political vehicle, the Independent Industrialists' and Businessmen's Association, abbreviated as MUSIAD, is its powerful economic force. Founded in 1990 by an economic elite closely linked to the Islamic movement, MUSIAD stands in opposition to TUSIAD, a secular Turkish business association. MUSIAD currently comprises over 2,700 heads of institutions across various economic sectors. It contributes more than 15% of the country's annual income and employs over one million workers. (Yankaya, 2011) Its members are deeply integrated into the international economic system through economic and trade exchanges with Europe, Central Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa. MUSIAD is seen as an association of devout Muslim businessmen united by an Islamic ethical concept. They aim to defend their economic interests within the framework of comprehensive capitalism while maintaining Islamic morals. This behavior, according to Patrick Haeni, represents a form of non-messianic religiosity open to the outside world. It is the result of a bourgeoisification process that undermined the Islamic order, which, until recently, was responsible for producing a system of meaning. (haeni, 2015). This decline coincided with the growing social mobilization of the urban bourgeoisie and merchant classes, who sought to redefine religious offerings in line with their religious aspirations. Consequently, the focus shifted from discussing the eternal rewards for the impoverished marginalized by the economic process due to economic openness. Instead, they sought to produce a more practical and open Islam that embraced clear economic directions, as discussed by Max Weber in relation to Protestantism. This shift in religiosity was a product of social distinction, benefiting the bourgeoisie, and the emergence of religious entrepreneurs who capitalized on intensive media exposure. This transformed the bourgeoisie from an elite phenomenon into a prominent social phenomenon, particularly within the urban middle class.

Returning to MUSIAD, its economic opinions and proposed solutions for the 2001 economic crisis played a role in reinforcing its social standing and consolidating its presence. Belonging to MUSIAD became a form of social distinction and a symbol of economic efficiency. It became an attraction for heads of small and medium-sized enterprises who dreamt of expansion and market domination. Thus, MUSIAD and its members:

- ✓ **ikhlāṣ Group:** It is the largest Islamic conglomerate, comprising more than 500 companies in the fields of contracting, banking, tourism, automotive, broadcasting, radio, and television.
- ✓ **compassan Group:** It operates in the field of paper, packaging, leather, construction materials, transportation, and foreign trade.
- ✓ **ambash Group:** It invests the funds of Turkish workers abroad, especially in Germany, and has a large chain of stores in Turkey and abroad.
- ✓ **Ilker Group:** It specializes in the food industry and exports its products to more than 70 countries. It is noteworthy that the activities of these companies cover a significant portion of important economic sectors. This explains the penetration of Islamic political movements and actors within the Turkish society and their development of an effective economic approach. This has earned them a strong social and political presence. According to Haeni, Islam has transformed from the highest example of conflict into a creed of success, especially for these new groups of young Islamists who are fascinated by management theories that have introduced new ideals of individualism to the religious sphere, such as ambition, success, and wealth. This is particularly evident after the failure of the preceding Islamic struggle, and the goal becomes not to establish an Islamic state or implement Sharia but to build prosperous civil communities that move alongside the state based on their religious principles.

b. Social Islam and the Turkish Islamic movement:

It is called Hizmet and others refer to it as the Gulen Movement, named after its founder FethullahGulen. It was influenced by the Nur Movement, associated with Sheikh Said Nursi, who formed its initial nucleus in 1970 in Izmir before expanding to become one of the largest social movements within Turkey and beyond. It is called the "parallel entity" because it is a non-political formation seeking to bring about social change and enter the political arena based on a vision that works to shape a social incubator revolving around the founder or leader. Despite its social, media, and economic influence, Gulen's followers reject the label of "movement" as they are not a party or organization. They are more to a current that has grown and infiltrated state institutions through educational, cultural, and media institutions. They have gained a wide presence in the judiciary, the police force, and financial institutions. This group controls prominent Turkish newspapers like Zaman, Exion magazine, and several satellite channels. It also manages research centers and numerous financial and economic networks. Its reference point is the ideology and the leader. It has benefited from the political openness led by former Turkish President TurgutOzal to expand and include all the independent republics of Central Asia after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It has received state support to form a local social elite that aligns with Turkish culture. In 1992, it established Asia Bank, which is considered the largest Islamic bank in Turkey. Around this bank, sympathizing businessmen gather in the TUSKON Association, its financial arm. (hilal, 1999). It has branched out into various financial entities that provided financial support to economic, commercial, agricultural, and service projects sponsored by the Islamic movement. Its goal was to build a social incubator connected to its financial and economic activities. These banks played a significant role in building small projects and transformative industries that had a prominent role in achieving positive results on the economic level, combating unemployment, and overcoming the economic crisis and interventions of the World Bank and its financial institutions, which restricted Turkey's economic

movements during the 1980s. Gulen adopts an unsophisticated concept of religion. He sees Islam not as a political ideology, a governance system, or a form of state but insists on describing his group as above politics. (political, 2014).

c. Defending the Idea of Joining the European Union:

Turkey's relationship with the European Union began in the 1960s with the signing of the Partnership Agreement with the European Economic Community in 1963. It continued in this manner, evolving into a request for membership in 1987. However, the relationship faced numerous obstacles at various stages, leading to occasional ruptures. Turkey's candidacy for the European Union was accepted at the Helsinki Summit in 1997, after which it embarked on an accelerated path, especially since 2002 when the Justice and Development Party came to power. The driving force behind Atatürk's pursuit of membership was to reinforce his secular modernization approach to Turkish society and attempt to detach it from its historical and geographical Islamic context that lasted for centuries. His aim was to direct Turkey towards Western European culture by establishing a popular base that supported this choice. This base consisted of the expatriate cultural and political elite, also known as the modernists, who viewed the membership process as a continuation of Atatürk's modernization efforts. Ironically, this task would be undertaken by an Islamic-based party, the Justice and Development Party, which expressed strong support for Turkey's membership in the European Union, making it a priority. Before forming his government in 2002, Erdogan led a delegation to the headquarters of the European Union and important European capitals in an attempt to explain his perspective and reassure Europeans on this matter. Many believe that Erdogan's handling of this issue was purely pragmatic, enabling him to exploit the strict conditions set by the European Union to modernize the Turkish political system in accordance with the requirements of the Helsinki Summit. This included restructuring traditional Turkish political institutions, especially the National Security Council, which was considered the driving force behind the secularist elite and the Turkish military. This would enable him to curb their influence and reduce their interference in

political affairs, thereby dismantling the black box that led to many coups against legitimately elected governments under the pretext of threatening the secular direction of Turkish society. The secularist elite found themselves faced with a new reality, stripped of an important card they used against their Islamist opponents by accusing them of opposing Turkey's membership in the European Union and attempting to Islamize Turkish society, thus threatening secular values. It was not surprising, therefore, that the new party, the Justice and Development Party, appeared more European and more receptive to Western democratic values and respect for human rights than the Kemalist military institution, which was supposed to be the guardian of Turkish secularism. Thus, the Turkish secular institution seemed more conservative than its Islamic counterparts in its stance on EU membership, which the Justice and Development Party pursued with genuine determination, differing from its predecessors, including its adoption of democracy and the values of human rights, often viewed by Islamists as Western inventions. Therefore, the Justice and Development Party appeared more open and liberal than the Kemalist secularist movement. However, this openness is characterized by the ability to engage in a "critical interaction" with the European value system, devoid of the logic of rupture and isolation that was often posed by most Islamists. The party advocates for a properly functioning market economy based on its rules and institutions and defends against state interference in the economic sphere. It also defines the economic role of the state as a regulating entity and considers privatization as a means of rationalizing the economic structure.

5. The Economic Approach of the H.M .S Movement:

The economic indicators generally demonstrate the difficulty of the economic reality in Algeria, where high rates of poverty, unemployment, decreased productivity, and competitiveness, as well as weak levels of integration into the global economy, are recorded due to the significant reliance of the Algerian economy on revenue derived from hydrocarbons. There is also significant social inequality between classes and regions, with a widespread presence of corruption. All these challenges require profound and radical changes in the existing system, as well as long-term plans. Therefore, the question that arises is: to what extent can the islamist Movement propose a comprehensive economic approach to overcome the impasse? Furthermore, what are the social, cultural, ideological, and theoretical determinants upon which it was built and contributed to its formulation? To answer these questions, we will attempt to clarify and present the economic vision of the islamist Movement and deconstruct it by highlighting its most important elements, its interaction with reality, as well as its relationship with the capitalist economic system and the specific characteristics that distinguish it from its counterpart, the Turkish Justice and Development Party. Since its establishment, the MSP Movement has adopted a political approach based on participation, built upon a three-dimensional strategy: moderation, participation, and gradualism. Therefore, we can exclude the possibility that its political and economic program aims to create a radical rupture with reality, meaning the elimination of the old system and replacing it with another, as can be observed through the idea of establishing an Islamic State—an ultimate goal shared by many political Islamic movements until recently—which cannot be achieved except with the existing state, not against it. The public policy statement that was approved during the Movement's fifth conference, which outlines the economic orientations of the movement, focuses on adopting an alternative economic vision based on the approach of participation, prioritizing investment and harnessing sufficient resources for renewable wealth creation, making humans the center and goal of development, while utilizing hydrocarbon revenues in service of the economic vision with the

aim of building a productive economic fabric beyond hydrocarbons. This is accompanied by encouraging spending in its three components: consumption, investment, and charity. It also embraces Islamic banking within the banking system, alongside the classical banking system. Moreover, it fights financial corruption and money laundering, while advocating for the preservation of the strategic public sector as a national asset and promoting a balanced relationship with the productive private sector.

Additionally, it calls for the establishment and development of Zakat institutions to contribute to development and expand the basis of partnership and cooperation between the countries of the Arab Maghreb, Arab and African countries, and the Islamic world. It is worth noting that the economic approach did not address the market economy and international financial institutions that represent the dominant capitalist economic system in the global economy, nor did it express its position towards it, neither acceptance nor rejection. Overall, understanding and analyzing the economic approach of the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) cannot be done without dissecting the backgrounds and ideas that have historically influenced it. Here, we are referring to the ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite its distinct local characteristics associated with the Algerian context. The writings of the Brotherhood leaders or those close to them have played a role in shaping the economic outlook of many Islamic political movements in Arab societies. Hasan al-Banna, despite emphasizing individual (private) ownership, presented an economic vision that included conditions to ensure protection against monopolistic companies and to establish a tax system based on progressive taxation according to wealth and zakat (charitable giving). Zakat is an expression of religious solidarity that renders any effort to establish a general social security system futile. In this latter case, public policies for redistribution, social security, or poverty eradication diminish in the face of charitable acts by believers and Islamic solidarity. One characteristic of the Brotherhood's capitalism is its lack of development. It focuses on trade, which has a

positive position in the intellectual framework of the Brotherhood, as supported by the Prophetic Hadith, "Nine-tenths of sustenance is in trade." Al-Banna agrees with legitimate profits, considering them the foundation of life, and calls for reducing the gap between social classes and making the state responsible for achieving social balance. Similarly, SayyidQutb, one of the Brotherhood's leaders, in his book "The Battle between Islam and Capitalism," refers to the existence of a battle between Islamic values that call for social justice and capitalism based on pursuing individual interests without regard for the concept of justice, which is absent from its literature. The common link among many Brotherhood writings is their endeavor to highlight the moral and ethical considerations of economics as an integral part of the Islamic system. (houidi, 2011) They attempt to emphasize Islam's moderate stance between capitalism and socialism, although Islamists generally avoid explicitly citing specific texts as direct sources for their economic policies, citing the local specificity of their societies. Contrary to the Turkish economic experience led by an educated bourgeoisie elite with rural origins from Anatolia, who took on the task of developing Islamic-tinged economic transactions, the Algerian reality was different. This is because the economic system followed since independence did not allow for the emergence of a true bourgeoisie class. Mustafa Al-Ashraf emphasizes in this context that the Algerian bourgeoisie, which allied with the landed gentry, colluded and cooperated with the active middle class for their common interests, was not homogeneous in its composition. (el ashraf, 2007)

In addition to the wealthy, it included craftsmen, traders, and workers in the major cities, which hindered the development of an advanced social perception of the bourgeoisie concept that led the modernization processes in Europe and particularly in Turkey. The weakness of the bourgeoisie and the private sector here is not only attributed to the regulatory measures of the closed political nature, but also the oil rent contributed to its marginalization and excluded any contribution from the private sector and individuals, giving the state independence from other actors in society. It should not be forgotten that the prevailing ideological context during the

independence period viewed it as being aligned with colonialism and global capitalism. (hms) Regarding state intervention in the economy, we notice that the Movement for the Society of Peace (MSP) gives a greater role to the state in the economy, as it ensures the formulation of the desired religious collective entity, in contrast to the individualistic tendency that knows no bounds. It also seems evident through the economic approach of the MSP's development and prioritization of integrated economic development with Arab and Islamic countries to form an Islamic economic front. Here we can observe the similarities with Erdogan's positions, rather than those of the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Generally, the economic aspect did not receive abundant attention in the programs of the MSP due to its preoccupation with intellectual and ideological foundations and the upbringing of its members on religious values (ahmed) It began as a religious advocacy movement, but due to political circumstances, it found itself compelled to engage in political work by transitioning from a missionary group to a political party without adequate preparation. In contrast, the AKP's clear and realistic economic approach was a factor in achieving significant political success and establishing its social presence within Turkish society.

As mentioned earlier, the political program of the MSP did not address the movement's position on the capitalist system, not even with a single word. Therefore, this position is not arbitrary but a strong indication of an unspoken rejection. Overall, this position cannot be separated from the general context experienced by Algerian society, where the European colonization experience played a significant role in shaping the stances of many social and political movements, including Islamist movements. Additionally, the historical and eternal animosity in the collective Islamic imagination between Islam and Christianity is evoked whenever there is an external threat. The main difference that can be observed between the Turkish and Algerian experiences is that the Turkish state did not undergo any form of external occupation, which influenced the thinking structure of the AKP, which developed a pragmatic and realistic discourse towards

capitalism and the market economy. On the other hand, Algeria remained under occupation for more than 130 years, which resulted in a strong and clear sense of Western antipathy among all social groups, especially among Islamist movements that viewed post-independence regimes as an extension of forced modernization and Western-imposed secularization. Hmida El Niffer affirms in this context that political Islam in Arab countries emerged as a reaction to the fall of the Ottoman Empire, which represented Islam. Therefore, establishing an alternative structure against colonialism and challenging its program became essential. Islamists see their ideology as an alternative to capitalism, socialism, and other ideologies. According to them, Islamic ideology is characterized by its focus on positive individual values. (ennifer, hmida, 2015)

6. CONCLUSION:

Islamic parties, including the Justice and Development Party (AKP) in Turkey and the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) in Algeria, have a different perspective on economic liberalism compared to traditional liberal parties. The AKP in Turkey is characterized by a moderate and pragmatic economic approach towards economic liberalism and the market economy. The party believes that free economy, investment, and free trade promote economic development, enhance the private sector, and create job opportunities. Also believes that the state should play a regulatory role, promote social equality, and provide social welfare for those in need. On the other hand, the MSP in Algeria adopts a different approach. It considers economic liberalism a threat to society and opposes it. The movement believes that the economic system should be based on Islamic principles and be compatible with Islamic law. Consequently, the MSP calls for the implementation of Sharia regulations in the economy, trade, and finance. The movement also seeks to promote social solidarity and achieve social justice through a more equitable distribution of wealth.

In general, it can be said that the AKP in Turkey adopts a more compatible approach with economic liberalism and the market economy, while the MSP in Algeria sees economic liberalism as a threat to Islamic

values and emphasizes the application of Islamic principles in the economy, trade, and finance, with a focus on social solidarity and achieving social justice. These differences reflect the different economic interests and values of Islamic parties and their perceptions of the role that the state and Islamic law should play in organizing the economy and achieving social justice.

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