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Civil–Military Relations: A Study of the Theories Explaining the Civil–Military Relationship

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Abstract:

Civil-military relations are a central topic in political science, defining the balance between civilian authority and the military's monopoly on force. Scholarly focus grew in the mid-20th century as armies gained political influence, making this relationship a key benchmark for democracy and stability. While foundational theories from scholars like Huntington and Janowitz remain important, they are insufficient to capture the full complexity of the subject. Empirical evidence shows that structural and historical factors decisively shape these relations, as seen in European states where armies have either aided or hindered democratic transitions. This demonstrates that civil-military dynamics are not fixed but evolve with domestic and international contexts. The core research problem is balancing a strong military for defense with the imperative of keeping it subordinate to civilian control. Ultimately, the field concludes that civil-military relations act as a mirror of the modern state's consolidation. They cannot be understood through a single model but require a multidimensional analysis combining theory with comparative historical study.

Keywords: civil–military relations, democratic transition, civilian oversight, elected authority.

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1. INTRODUCTION

The study of civil–military relations constitutes a vital field of inquiry within contemporary political science and strategic studies, given the direct influence these relations exert on the character and stability of political systems. Through this lens, it becomes possible to evaluate the extent to which civilian governance is consolidated and the ability of elected constitutional institutions to assert legitimate authority over the armed forces. This makes civil–military relations a foundational criterion for assessing trajectories of democratic transition or, conversely, regression toward authoritarianism.

Since the mid-twentieth century, political thought has been deeply concerned with regulating the relationship between civilians and the military. In 1957, Samuel Huntington advanced his thesis of “objective control” as a safeguard of military professionalism and insulation from political life. In 1960, Morris Janowitz emphasized the social integration of the military institution as a prerequisite for achieving balance and long-term stability. Later, Peter Feaver introduced the “agency theory” approach, conceptualizing the relationship as a socio-political contract between the two parties. Subsequently, postmodern perspectives emerged, highlighting the erosion of boundaries between the civilian and military spheres as a consequence of broader societal and technological transformations.

The research problem addressed in this study arises from the tension between two imperatives that may appear contradictory. On the one hand, there is a requirement for a strong and effective army capable of defending the state and safeguarding national security. On the other hand, constitutional legitimacy requires that this institution remain subject to civilian oversight in order to prevent it from becoming a dominant political actor. The central question, therefore, is: What are the principal scientific and theoretical approaches that have examined civil–military relations in pursuit of striking a balance between the necessity of maintaining a strong and effective army capable of protecting the state from threats and the necessity of subjecting it to legitimate civilian authority, so as to prevent it from becoming a power above the state or a hegemonic political actor?

The significance of this study is expressed through two main dimensions:

1. **Theoretical significance:** This lies in assessing the extent to which classical and contemporary models remain valid in explaining ongoing transformations in civil–military relations.
2. **Practical significance:** This resides in drawing lessons for decision-makers in the Arab world, where regulating the roles of the military institution constitutes a prerequisite for building more stable and democratic political systems.

In methodological terms, the study adopts a composite approach based on: The descriptive method, which is used to describe and analyze the concepts and theories addressed in the study. The analysis is also supported by a set of complementary approaches relevant to the topic, including the elite approach to examine the role of the military elite; the institutional approach to analyze the military institution; the decision-making approach to clarify civil–military relations through the lens of policy-making processes; and the systems approach to interpret the interactions between the military institution and the broader political system.

To examine and analyze the research problem, the following structure is proposed:

Introduction

First Section: The Civil–Military Relationship: A Theoretical and Conceptual Approach.

Second Section: The Main Theories Explaining the Civil–Military Relationship.

Third Section: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Civil–Military Relations in the European Space: Between Democratic Legacy and Emerging Security Transformations.

Conclusion

2. First Section: The Civil–Military Relationship: A Theoretical and Conceptual Approach:

A rigorous examination of civil–military relations requires situating them within the broadest possible framework, namely, the role of the military institution in safeguarding security within the national community. In essence, the fundamental relationship between civilians and the military is one of service: the military institution serves the wider civilian society from which it emerges. The army is established, organized, and sustained in order to serve the objectives and interests, particularly security-related objectives and interests, of society as a whole. This constitutes the basic and overarching relationship between civilian and military actors within a democratic society. Everything the army is, and everything it does, must ultimately be oriented toward fulfilling those collective goals.

However, this relationship has not always, and not in all contexts, served as the guiding

principle. In other states, historically and in the present, military and political authority have often fused. Even where a formal distinction between the two has existed, military authority has frequently prevailed. More broadly, national societies, like individuals, have long regarded survival and self-preservation as the foremost law of life. Today, as in the past, the security interests of the people require protection of both the population and the territory from attack, as well as from pressures or coercive attempts grounded in threats of military aggression. A distinctive factor in the nuclear age is the increasing, and fully justified, emphasis on achieving these objectives without resorting to actual conflict; that is, on preventing war while preserving national freedom, peace, security, confidence, and prosperity.

Moreover, these objectives must be pursued in ways that do not undermine their attainment in the future. This consideration alone highlights the central importance of civil–military relations. While the protection of the people and their vital interests rests primarily with the armed forces, supreme authority is exercised by a constitutionally elected democratic government. Accordingly, the relationship between civil society and the army is structured around a delicate balance between service and leadership, between execution and direction, and between the possession of force and submission to civilian legitimacy.(Goodpaster and Huntington, 1977, pp. 40–41.)

When accurately understood and effectively implemented, this relationship constitutes one of the essential pillars of political-system stability and societal vitality. When poorly managed or distorted, however, it can become a source of tension and institutional imbalance. A defining feature of the contemporary era, one that further heightens the importance of this relationship, is the substantial expansion in the size, scope, and influence of the military institution.

The modern army consumes vast national resources, relies on advanced technologies, and performs complex functions that extend well beyond combat to include intelligence, scientific research, logistical management, and, at times, civilian support during emergencies.(Goodpaster and Huntington, 1977, p.42.)

1. The Concept of the Civil–Military Relationship:

Civil–military relations constitute the most widely used term in this field of research, encompassing all forms of linkage between civilian society and armed individuals or the military institution. The term “civilian” refers to the role of civilian authorities within these relations, regardless of the manner in which such authorities exercise power in a given state. The term “military,” in turn, denotes the institution that performs a specific function within the structure of the state, namely, ensuring national defense.

Feaver defines civil–military relations as “the set of relationships and interactions that arise between the military institution, as the specialized agent entrusted with the exercise of violence, and the elected civilian authorities, as the principal holding political legitimacy. This relationship aims to ensure that the army fulfills its protective function for the state without intervening in the political process or threatening civil liberties.” Feaver further underscores that the essence of this relationship does not lie solely in “preventing coups,” but rather in the “day-to-day oversight” of how military personnel implement the policies formulated by civilian leaders. (Douglas, 1996, p. 154.)

To understand civil–military relations, Croissant and Kuehn argue that its two core components must first be clarified: the civilian and the military. Civilians include all non-military

bodies and individuals within government and parliament who are authorized to formulate, implement, and oversee political decisions. The army, or armed forces, comprises all permanent state institutions and their members whose primary role, as defined by law, is to use force to protect the state from external threats. The two scholars further note that the military may also be deployed domestically to assist in maintaining order during times of crisis. Civil–military relations, therefore, encompass all forms of interaction between the leadership of the armed forces on the one hand, and non-military political elites on the other. (Banwo, 2022, p. 107.)

The scholar Ebo likewise refers to this concept, often described as "civilian control of the military." It encompasses the relationship between civil society and military authority and includes all dimensions of the military institution's role, professional, political, social, and economic, within the life of the state. (Banwo, 2022, p. 107.)

"Military institutions in any society," as stated at the outset of *The Soldier and the State*, are shaped by two forces: a functional imperative arising from the threats confronting societal security, and a societal imperative stemming from the dominant social forces, ideologies, and institutions within society. Military institutions that merely reflect prevailing social values may prove incapable of effectively performing their military function. Conversely, military institutions formed solely in response to functional imperatives may become impossible to contain within society. The interaction between these two forces lies at the heart of the civil–military problem. (Huntington, 2000, p. 2.)

Samuel Huntington treats civil–military relations as an explanatory variable, arguing that the nature of this relationship substantially affects military effectiveness. In this view, professionalism represents the principal indicator for assessing the level of such effectiveness. On this basis, Huntington proposed a model defining the role of the military in democratic systems, within a political order grounded in professionalism and non-interference in political life. Through the execution of defense policy, and in order to preserve professional military competence within a liberal context, the army should possess only a minimal degree of political authority. According to Huntington, the defining characteristics of a professional army include the following: (Maen, 2020, p. 7.)

- **Expertise:** The primary function of the military institution is the management and application of force and organized violence. Accordingly, it must provide soldiers with specialized knowledge, training, and a structured cognitive framework, equipping them with distinct skills in this domain through sufficient periods of education and practical experience.
- **Collective responsibility:** All members of the military institution share responsibility for defending the state. The professional soldier performs a vital role in sustaining society through the function of security and protection.
- **Internal corporate solidarity:** Members of the military institution exhibit a high level of internal cohesion and solidarity, derived from their sense of professional distinctiveness and excellence in the performance of their duties, as well as from a military mindset that reflects their self-image and their understanding of the boundaries of their role within society.

2. The Meaning of the Civil–Military Relationship in Humanitarian Action:

Beyond their core military responsibilities, armed forces also undertake humanitarian roles, among which disaster-relief operations in the context of natural catastrophes constitute one of the

most critical domains. Natural disasters rank among the gravest threats facing humanity and have repeatedly occurred across the globe, producing devastating loss of life, particularly in developing countries that lack comprehensive and effective systems for disaster management and response. Humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief operations require the involvement of multiple actors. Although relief efforts are often viewed as primarily civilian in nature, the military sector has increasingly demonstrated substantial contributions to assisting affected populations, especially in the aftermath of large-scale disasters.

Since the post–Cold War era, the scope of military operations has expanded beyond conventional warfare to include non-war military operations in both conflict and peacetime settings. These now encompass humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief missions as distinctive peacetime tasks. Field experience has clearly shown that cooperation between military and civilian sectors is unavoidable. The rapid deployment of military units as first responders in the immediate aftermath of disasters has become a decisive factor in operational success. Equally important are the strengthening and expansion of information-sharing mechanisms as a basis for informed decision-making, along with the development of advanced civil–military coordination mechanisms, including clear frameworks and protocols for civil–military cooperation.

As a result, contentious debates have emerged regarding both the ideological and operational dimensions of the military's role among practitioners and scholars. The ideological debate centers on the argument that the expansion of non-war operations challenges the traditional emphasis of armed forces on combat-related functions. Some contend that military personnel should remain primarily devoted to warfighting competencies, whereas others call for a fundamental transformation of military roles toward non-combat operations.

For example, Gregory D. Foster argues that non-war military operations should become the primary focus of the armed forces. He maintains that the essential purpose of the military should shift from destructive forces to constructive forces, and that the traditional concept of national security is no longer appropriate to the post–Cold War environment. In contrast, Samuel Huntington asserted unequivocally that "the mission of the armed forces is a combat mission. The military should not be organized, prepared, or trained to perform such non-combat roles. Military force is inherently inhumane: its purpose is to kill people."

Nevertheless, some perspectives within the military community call for a balanced approach, stressing that non-war military operations should remain subordinate to the core combat mission (Chaisorn, 2022, pp. 16–17.). Given the diversity of their capabilities, armed forces often represent the principal resource for critical relief operations, particularly in developing countries that lack a comprehensive and stable civilian disaster-management structure. In light of the army's role in relief and rescue operations, military capabilities are frequently regarded as indispensable assets in responding to emergencies caused by natural disasters. As military involvement in crisis response has expanded, some observers have described these emerging roles as embodying "forces for good" or "humanitarian warriors."

Numerous military capabilities can be identified as central to effective relief operations. These include advanced technological and logistical capacities that form the backbone of humanitarian assistance; clearly defined command-and-control systems; self-sufficient and well-structured organizational frameworks; rapid-response capability, especially in hard-to-reach areas;

well-resourced search-and-rescue capacities; a mission-oriented and action-driven operational posture; a trained and multi-skilled workforce; strategic and tactical planning competence; effective decision-making processes; efficient communication systems; organizational flexibility; robust technical infrastructure and cultural openness; and substantial discretionary funding.

In addition, many experts have introduced the concept of militarization in disaster contexts, and the militarization of humanitarian relief efforts, into the international agenda. Although some leaders view disaster-relief missions as a diversion from the military's fundamental task of national defense, many military commanders recognize that participation in relief operations yields multiple benefits for the armed forces. Such missions are often seen as legitimate duties that reinforce broader state policy objectives and help integrate the modern army's overall mission. These benefits include enhancing the army's positive public image, strengthening institutional credibility, creating valuable training opportunities that diversify roles and expertise, and improving personnel morale.

Consequently, some actors are prepared to accept military deployment as a means of limiting losses, and have noted effective cooperation in the field between military and civilian agencies. Scientific studies identify four principal patterns of military involvement in relief operations: disaster management as part of a non-war military operation; the military acting as a coordination hub; foreign humanitarian assistance; and military disaster training exercises. Operational discussions have consistently emphasized that civil–military cooperation is among the most decisive factors in the success of relief operations, (Chaisorn, 2022, pp. 18–19.) a conclusion reinforced by numerous real-world experiences in contexts of natural disasters.

3. Second Section: The Most Important Theories Explaining the Civil–Military Relationship:

Theories of civil–military relations constitute an essential analytical framework for achieving a more objective understanding of the military phenomenon. They help clarify the scope, nature, and determinants of military involvement in public affairs. The importance of these frameworks lies in their focus on examining conflicts that emerge from the interrelationship between the armed forces and governmental institutions, particularly situations in which military actors seek to expand their influence over political decision-making processes.

The prevalence of military intervention in the political life of many developing countries has driven scholars to analyze this phenomenon in depth. At their core, these theories aim to define the appropriate balance between civilian oversight and military autonomy in the conduct of professional duties.

A. Traditional Theories:

Military intervention in political life is not a phenomenon confined to the present century. From ancient Greece through to the end of the twentieth century, the overthrow, or the threat of overthrow, of elected governments has frequently been associated with military action, making it a recurring subject in academic literature. Early thinkers often viewed the military institution as a political body alien to society, incapable of constructive interaction with other social groups, yet fully capable of acting against them. However, it was only after the end of the Second World War that political scientists began to develop a markedly different view of the military institution.

Accordingly, while Machiavelli argued that "a soldier cannot be a good man," Voltaire described

soldiers as "manifestations of brute force in rational form," and Samuel Adams maintained that a standing army, regardless of its necessity, constitutes a perpetual threat to the liberties of the people (Karabelias, 1998, p. 6.). What is striking, however, is that these thinkers overlooked a fundamental reality: public liberties cannot be secured in the absence of security itself, security that presupposes the existence of a protective force capable of safeguarding the homeland internally and externally, and of ensuring a public space within which constitutional freedoms can be meaningfully exercised.

In the post-war period, many political scientists began to regard the military as a legitimate pressure group capable of playing a constructive role in the social and political transformation of emerging states. Several appeared to align with Finer's assumption that "in all countries ruled by civilians, the armed forces… are not morally superior, but certainly not worse than any other departments of civil administration… in persuading the government of their point of view." (Karabelias, 1998, p. 6.)

This shift in academic attitudes toward the military institution was, of course, not accidental. After the Second World War brought an end to the army's traditional role as an instrument of territorial expansion, its domestic utility increased substantially. As one of the few institutions organized along Western lines, the military came to be perceived as the most effective pressure group capable of contributing positively to the state's pursuit of higher levels of social and political development. Given that the introduction of liberal Western economic and political institutions into newly emerging states had destabilized their traditional social and political structures, the army appeared to many observers to be the only institution capable of imposing and preserving political stability and order. Consequently, as officers' duties underwent profound transformation and the institution as a whole was called upon to assume a multidimensional domestic role, Western academic scholarship was compelled to reconsider earlier assumptions about civil–military relations.

1. The Theory of Professionalism and the Separation of Roles (Samuel Huntington):

Huntington argues that civilians and military personnel constitute two distinct groups, each defined by specific characteristics. Civilians occupy positions within government, formulate domestic and foreign public policy, enforce laws, and manage conflicts. By contrast, military functions are confined to training in the use of force, defending the political order, safeguarding national security at both domestic and international levels, and advising civilians on security-related matters. Civil–military relations are therefore, by their nature, marked by potential tension. What restrains this tension, in Huntington's view, is the subordination of the military to civilian authority. This subordination is secured through the advancement of military professionalism, which, in Huntington's formulation, requires depriving the military institution of any political role. (Huntington, 2000, p. 83.)

For Huntington, the ideal model of civil–military relations is one that balances civilian and military roles while maintaining firm civilian control. The evolution of civil–military relations is directly linked to the effectiveness of civilian oversight, and strengthening professionalism, he contends, constitutes the most solid foundation for ensuring civilian control over the armed forces. In this regard, Samuel Huntington identifies three levels of civil–military relations:

- The relationship between the armed forces and society as a whole.

- The relationship between the military elite and other elites within society.
- The relationship between the senior leadership of the armed forces and the state's highest political leadership.

Huntington further maintains that any theory of civil–military relations must address two fundamental requirements:

- The functional requirement: confronting threats and ensuring the security of society.
- The socio-political requirement: integrating the military into the political community.

Huntington argues that establishing an equilibrium between these two imperatives constitutes the core of the theory.

Nevertheless, Huntington's theory has been subject to several criticisms. Foremost among them is the argument that its rigid dichotomy exceeds empirical reality. It is not persuasive to conceptualize the armed forces and civilian institutions, or society more broadly, as inherently antagonistic entities. The objective conditions for such a stark contradiction rarely exist within the sphere of civil–military relations, particularly given that the various ranks within the armed forces emerge from diverse social backgrounds that limit the possibility of a genuine structural conflict between the army and society. The armed forces do not constitute a separate social class or a distinct social stratum, and the same is true of civilian institutions. (Dakhouche, 2024, pp. 152–153.)

A further critique concerns the context in which the theory of professionalism and the division of tasks was formulated, namely, the Cold War. Applying it to the contemporary era, characterized by networked environments and the proliferation of non-state actors, presents substantial difficulties. Huntington assumed a clear demarcation between politics and strategy on the one hand, and tactical operations on the other. This assumption becomes increasingly untenable in contexts involving asymmetric operations or interventions shaped by multiple actors. Moreover, the theory places disproportionate emphasis on military professionalism while marginalizing civilian dynamics, such as political parties, civil society, and the media, that exert considerable indirect influence on decision-makers.

2. The Theory of Integration and the Army as Part of Society (Morris Janowitz):

Janowitz concurs with Huntington on the need to distinguish between civilians and the military; however, he argues that civilian control over the armed forces should be understood as emanating from society as a whole, rather than solely from political authority. Such an understanding, in his view, facilitates the integration of the military institution into the broader social fabric.

At the same time, Janowitz begins by stressing that discipline should not be conflated with organizational capacity. Although officers are trained to perform efficiently when assigned specific tasks, their influence on a country's comprehensive economic development will, at best, remain limited due to the inherent constraints of their profession. More broadly, many Western academics found it extremely difficult to justify overt military intervention and direct rule, particularly because, according to the Anglo-American political–economic model they advocated, democracy represents the political system that completes and complements the development of economic capitalism. (Karabelias, 1998, pp.7-8.)

From this perspective, Janowitz advanced what became known as the "convergence" theory, or the "social approach." While he acknowledges the subordination of officers to civilians, he does not ground this subordination merely in military professionalism, but rather in the genuine

internalization of civilian values within the military institution.

Janowitz's seminal work, *The Professional Soldier* (1960), offers what is widely regarded as the most substantial alternative to Huntington's theory. Like Huntington, Janowitz attracted a broad academic following among scholars of civil–military relations. The central debate between the "Huntington school" and the "Janowitz school" concerns whether the most effective form of civilian control over the military is achieved through strict institutional separation or through the full integration of civilian and military decision-making processes. According to Huntington, the military is a unique institution that does not belong to the civilian world and must remain distinct from it. By contrast, Janowitz argues that the military and society constitute an organic whole that should not be artificially divided.

For Janowitz, it is highly problematic to treat the military as an institution detached from, or isolated from, society. The armed forces must evolve in step with society and remain responsive to political change. Civilian control, in this conception, is realized by encouraging competition over resources and public attention. Janowitz rejects the possibility of a clear-cut separation between civilian and military functions. His empirical study of the twentieth-century American military includes an analysis of the social background, origins, motivations, lifestyles, social status, and related characteristics of military personnel.

Janowitz argues that the Allied victory in the Second World War, together with technological innovations in military affairs, transformed both the character of military operations and society more broadly. These developments redirected the army's role toward what he described as a constabulary function. He used the term "constabulary forces" to characterize this new type of military organization. (Morris, 2017, pp. 418–420.)

Janowitz therefore advanced a balanced approach between the army and society by emphasizing the integration of the military institution into the civilian fabric and the sharing of societal values. However, such integration may reduce the degree of differentiation required to preserve an autonomous and professional military identity. It may also risk drawing the military into political life or weakening effective civilian authority. Moreover, reliance on assumptions of institutional or value homogeneity within society may be difficult to apply in multi-ethnic or deeply pluralistic contexts.

3. The Military–Industrial Complex Theory:

President Dwight Eisenhower introduced the concept of the military–industrial complex in the United States, warning in his 1961 farewell address of the potentially vast influence and power arising from the "conjunction of an immense military establishment and a large arms industry," which had emerged from the massive military mobilization of the Second World War. He cautioned that "we must guard against the acquisition of unwarranted influence, whether sought or unsought, by the military–industrial complex. The potential for the disastrous rise of misplaced power exists and will persist." (James, 2011, pp. 6–7.)

National governments have adopted decisions to strengthen their defensive and offensive capabilities, determining both the means to achieve them and the budgets required. One limitation of this perspective, however, has been its neglect of the political and social dynamics underpinning arms-production and procurement systems. The scale and significance of the defense industry in many countries have led to its deep interconnection with other sectors of

society and the economy. Once the defense industry is no longer viewed merely as a passive supplier of weapons systems, and its potential proactive tendencies are recognized, such as rent-seeking behavior and efforts to influence clients or regulators, these linkages become critically important.

This issue has been addressed in modern neo-classical studies that have sought to incorporate political variables such as bargaining processes and interest groups that shape sources of armaments and levels of protection. Yet such analyses have often remained partial, focusing on specific segments of the broader process. They have tended to overlook the complex dialectical interaction between the demand and supply sides, each of which influences and shapes the other in determining decision-making criteria, a process that is inherently dynamic, intricate, and at times contradictory or conflictual.

The military industry has been described as representing a constellation of interests that may diverge from the broader interests of capitalism, a perspective that Ron Smith (1977) identified as the liberal or institutional approach. This approach emphasizes the defense industry's character as a configuration of competing interest groups and institutional linkages. The defense sector becomes a self-generating structure (agency) embodying the interests of various segments of society. The strength of these vested interests, and their competition over resources, generate internal pressures for military expenditure, while external threats supply the justification. In this way, the defense industry imposes a burden on the rest of society.

Smith (1983) further argued that the defense industry should be understood as an alliance of interests, and that analysis should focus on the structural couplings that have developed between particular sectors of private industry and specific branches of the military, couplings that inevitably produce reciprocal interests. (Smith, 1977, pp. 61–63./ Smith, 1983, pp. 17–19.)

By contrast, Brontén (1988) argued that the military–industrial complex should be examined as a developed institutional system rather than through an isolated assessment of its individual components. Although the military–industrial complex is not a sharply delineated theoretical concept, it is evident that such a complex exists and possesses the capacity to influence military-spending policies. Certain similarities can be observed with other "industrial complexes" in sectors such as health and education, yet important differences remain, most notably that the arms industry produces instruments of violence.

When Eisenhower warned against the unwarranted influence of the military–industrial complex, he was addressing a specific historical context. In earlier periods, large American and international defense firms did exist, but their scale and their relationship to the state differed substantially. The emergence of the New Deal in the 1930s expanded the roles and responsibilities of the federal government and institutionalized national economic planning for both economic and military security. The outbreak of the Second World War then spurred unprecedented technological innovation and generated immense industrial demand. Industry, universities, and the military became closely interconnected, while large-scale, government-funded research and development generated patents awarded to corporations, with aircraft and electronics production gaining particular prominence.

This development signaled a profound shift in orientations. At the end of the war, reductions in procurement compelled this newly expanded defense industry to lobby for continued weapons purchases in order to preserve its scale and capacity. The fall of the "Iron Curtain" responded to

these demands, as the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union was invoked to justify maintaining a standing army and a permanent defense industry to safeguard American interests.
Subsequently, the U.S. Department of Defense shifted its attention from strictly military considerations to the economic implications of changes in defense budgets, the standing army, and the defense industry. The administration of the Department of Defense was no longer confined to military officials alone; it increasingly came under the influence of corporate executives, who were viewed as possessing indispensable expertise. Through what became known as the "revolving door," these executives moved from their corporations into positions within the Pentagon, before returning once again to the private sector. (Paul, and Sköns, 2009, pp. 3–4,)

The military has experienced numerous major transformations during and after the Second World War, extending into the present day. These changes are apparent across several dimensions: (Paul, and Sköns, 2009, pp.6-14)

First: Technological and structural transformations in the military industry:

- **Technological inversion:** The Second World War contributed to the professionalization of the armed forces and intensified interaction between the military and industry. By the 1990s, however, military technology, particularly in electronics, had fallen behind civilian technology due to lengthy procurement cycles, resulting in greater reliance on commercially available off-the-shelf (COTS) products.
- **Changing corporate identities:** Subcontracting and outsourcing enabled information technology and electronics firms to enter the defense base, thereby blurring its boundaries and making it more difficult to identify which companies benefit from defense contracts.
- **Internationalization and economies of scale:** The high costs of research and development pushed governments to internationalize ownership structures and supply chains, and to pursue cross-border mergers and acquisitions in search of economies of scale.

Second: The expansion of military service sectors and geographical implications:

- **Privatization of services:** The post–Cold War period witnessed a marked expansion of the military services industry, including research, logistical support, and intelligence, through the outsourcing of defense ministry tasks to private firms, a trend that became particularly visible during the Iraq War.
- **Geographic and social interdependence:** Defense industries became geographically concentrated in specific areas due to security considerations, creating communities heavily dependent on defense activities. The closure of such facilities can therefore generate social and economic disruption, as the skills of displaced workers often do not align with available civilian employment opportunities.

Third: The evolution of the military–industrial complex from the Cold War to the War on Terror:

- **Cold War dynamics:** During this period, the military–industrial complex developed into a powerful mechanism linking the armed forces, government, and legislators. Emphasis was placed on performance rather than cost, creating substantial barriers to entry for new competitors and reinforcing structural stability among major contractors.

- **The impact of the War on Terror:** After a decline in defense spending at the end of the Cold War, expenditures began to rise rapidly again in 2001 with the launch of the War on Terror. This resurgence strengthened ties between the military and the arms industry in the United States and introduced greater procurement flexibility, often beyond the reach of stringent congressional oversight.

Fourth: The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and international restructuring:

- **Changing patterns of demand:** The Revolution in Military Affairs redirected attention toward communications technologies, command-and-control systems, asymmetric warfare, homeland security, and NATO peacekeeping missions, thereby altering the types of systems required.
- **Continuity despite change:** Despite the entry of new actors and the internationalization of ownership, particularly through transatlantic linkages, traditional defense firms continue to dominate by acquiring emerging technology companies, while political logic remains a decisive force shaping the international defense market.

Overall, it is clear that substantial changes have occurred in both the character and scope of the military industrial base, although the precise consequences of these transformations remain somewhat uncertain. The defense industrial base has unquestionably undergone extensive restructuring and consolidation on a global scale, accompanied by increasing U.S. dominance and the deepening of American–European linkages.

Ultimately, these developments confirm the continuing relevance of Eisenhower's concerns. The contemporary military–industrial complex has become more expansive, more powerful, and more diversified, yet less transparent than before, due to its deep international entanglements and its partial concealment behind civilian technological innovation.

B. Modern Theories:

Studies of civil–military relations have moved beyond traditional frameworks, such as professionalism, because these approaches proved insufficient for explaining many non-Western realities. Contemporary theories increasingly emphasize concepts such as elite consensus and the sharing of responsibilities. They also incorporate analyses of the military–industrial complex through the lens of public choice theory, which highlights the self-interested motivations of individual actors.

1. Postmodern Military Theory:

At the beginning of the twentieth century, one academic approach gained growing prominence among several competing perspectives, postmodern theory. This perspective has centered on an ongoing debate among military sociologists concerning the possible emergence of a postmodern army. Such an army is defined by the structural and cultural interpenetration of civilian and military spheres; a reduction of internal distinctions within the armed forces based on branch of service and rank, as well as the differentiation between combat and support roles; and a shift in the military's purpose from waging wars to undertaking missions without clearly defined objectives, such as international deployments that often extend beyond homeland-defense commitments. It is also marked by an increasing internationalization of military forces compared to the Cold War era.

Before the emergence of the postmodern army, the traits now associated with it were closely intertwined with the values and norms imposed by the military institution, while personal

interests were subordinated to the broader public good. By contrast, the postmodern soldier is often portrayed as primarily concerned with personal matters. Moreover, the media have come to exert substantial influence over postmodern warfare, and advances in communication technologies have transformed the ways in which soldiers deployed on missions maintain contact with their families and loved ones at home. (Charles, Allen, and Laura, 2000, pp. 1–10.)

The postmodern model emphasizes the erosion of boundaries between military and civilian actors through the multiplication of new and overlapping roles for the armed forces, intensified interaction with civilian stakeholders, a noticeable shift in military values, and the exceptional use of media and communication technologies that have generated profound transformations across multiple domains. Nevertheless, it must be emphasized that these changes have not appeared uniformly across all states, raising important questions about the possibility of generalization. Furthermore, translating cultural and communicative shifts into measurable indicators remains an exceptionally challenging task.

2. Normative Theory:

Eliot Cohen, widely known within American academic circles as a neoconservative scholar concerned with the norms governing the use of military force, military leadership, and civilian oversight from a normative theoretical perspective, offered, in his book *Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime* (2002), a comprehensive reflection on the relationship between civilian authorities and military commanders in a democratic state.

Cohen frames this relationship through an illustrative analogy: professional officers resemble highly trained surgeons, while the statesman occupies the position of a patient in urgent need of care. The statesman has the authority to decide whether or not to undergo surgery, to choose one physician over another, and, though rarely, to select among different surgical options. However, he may not, and indeed should not, supervise the procedure itself, select the surgeon's scalpel, or rearrange the operating room according to personal preference. Even a medically trained patient is advised against such intervention; indeed, a physician would almost certainly resent that kind of interference.

The implication of this analogy is that civilian control over military affairs should be limited in scope. Excessive questioning, let alone issuing directives on tactics, specific equipment, campaign design, measures of success, or forcefully advocating the promotion or dismissal of anyone other than senior officers, amounts to inappropriate and potentially dangerous interference. The central difficulty, Cohen argues, is that great wartime leaders often do precisely what appears improper. More importantly, their success is frequently rooted in that very willingness to intervene. In this way, Cohen developed a theory that both complements and refines Huntington's classical framework. (Eliot, 2002, p. 3.)

In interpreting complex civil–military relations, Cohen draws on four historical figures, Abraham Lincoln, Georges Clemenceau, Winston Churchill, and David Ben-Gurion, to demonstrate the critical importance of political leadership during wartime. By evaluating and analyzing the conduct of these statesmen across extended, though not authoritarian, periods of leadership within democratic systems, he highlights both their similarities and their differences. Although these four leaders share enough common features to permit comparison, they differ sufficiently to reveal distinct dimensions of the civil–military problem in wartime.

Despite the risks of approaching these issues from an exclusively American vantage point, Cohen's analysis suggests that, notwithstanding their diverse backgrounds, the rural lawyer, the French physician-turned-journalist, the aristocratic maverick, and the impoverished Jewish socialist, all confronted remarkably similar dilemmas: admiring their generals while simultaneously despairing of them; leading some, dismissing others; and even supervising the most capable among them with measured caution and restrained affection. (Eliot, 2002, p. 4.)

However, Cohen's theory rests on a limited set of historical cases that may not reflect the orientations of political leaders more broadly. His analysis also proceeds from the assumption that civilian authorities invariably possess both the information and the legitimacy required to make military decisions, an assumption that may not always hold, particularly in an era shaped by information warfare. Moreover, Cohen's framework does not offer a clearly specified model for managing ethical tensions between political objectives and military risk.

3. Agency Theory (Institutional):

Peter Feaver's book *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil–Military Relations* (2003) introduced a new framework for examining the relationship between civilian officials and the military in the post–Cold War era. Feaver draws on sociological terminology and institutional theory to analyze civil–military relations. He argues that politicians, who are civilians, issue directives, while professional military officers carry them out, as they are tasked with implementing defense and security policies formulated by civilian authorities.

However, the military may hesitate to implement orders exactly as issued. It may choose either to comply with the directives or to act in accordance with its own preferences. Civilian politicians, in turn, face four possible choices: whether to monitor the implementation of their orders or not, and whether to punish noncompliance if it is detected. The factors shaping these choices include the costs and benefits of monitoring, the distance between civilian and military policy preferences, and the costs and benefits of punishing shirking behavior.

Feaver examines the conditions that shape the smoothness of cooperation between civilian and military actors. He maintains that, in today's evolving security environment, analysis must consider whether civilian leaders view oversight of the military as worthwhile, whether military leaders' preferences align with those of civilian officials, and the extent to which the military regards punishment for disobedience as credible.

The most significant contribution of Feaver's theory lies in its assertion that civilians ultimately have the final say, and that they "have the right to be wrong." The military is expected to identify potential risks and propose appropriate countermeasures, yet only civilian authorities possess the legitimacy to decide whether those risks are acceptable to society. The military may describe the risks, while civilian officials determine whether the state is genuinely endangered and, if so, how that danger should be addressed. The military may recommend a level of armament deemed necessary for national defense, but civilian leaders decide the price the state is willing to pay for that defense.

Nevertheless, Feaver's theory has notable limitations. It does not provide a clear, affirmative action plan for ensuring effective oversight of the military or for persuading it to take potential punishment seriously. In addition, Feaver may be criticized for oversimplifying civil–military relations by reducing them to a bilateral "principal–agent" interaction. In practice, the choices of civilian and military leaders are shaped by a wide range of additional factors, making the

relationship considerably more complex. (Merle, 2015, p. 10.)

By framing civil–military relations as a game of choice and monitoring between civilian principals and military agents, Feaver simplifies the relationship and confines it to two actors, overlooking the many other actors who may directly or indirectly shape the dynamic. Moreover, the framework assumes that actors can accurately measure and calculate costs and benefits, whereas political reality is often defined by incomplete information and conflicting interests. Finally, it does not specify precise operational mechanisms for addressing potential abuses or deviations that may emerge.

4. Concordance Theory (Rebecca Schiff):

Rebecca Schiff's theory of concordance aligns in certain respects with Janowitz's perspective, particularly in emphasizing the distinction between civilians and the military while underscoring the importance of dialogue and the sharing of values and objectives among the armed forces, political elites, and society at large. In developing her theory, Schiff highlights the central role of institutional structures and cultural variables in either limiting or increasing the likelihood of military intervention. She argues that the higher the level of concordance among the military, the political elite, and society, the lower the probability of military intervention.

Concordance theory emphasizes cooperation among the armed forces, political institutions, and the broader community. It conceptualizes military leaders, political authorities, and citizens as partners rather than adversaries. Schiff identifies three main levels of analysis within this framework: the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry. She also sets out several criteria as the basis for achieving concordance between civilians and the military, primarily including the social composition of the officer corps, the political decision-making process, recruitment methods, and the institutional pattern of the military establishment. (Schiff, 2009, pp. 32–45.)

The normative core of Schiff's theory lies in the view that concordance constitutes a condition of partnership. If these three actors agree on the role and place of the military within the state, there is no impetus for coups or intervention, even in the absence of strict institutional separation.

5. Power-Sharing Theory (Douglas Bland):

Douglas Bland proposed the theory of shared responsibility, arguing that the military has a defined role primarily in the domain of defense and, when necessary, in maintaining internal security. This theory rests on the following assumptions:

- Civilian control over the military is established, yet authority is shared between the two parties. Each side has clearly defined responsibilities and functions, without overlap.
- The sole source of direction for the military is the elected civilian authority external to the military institution. This control is not static but dynamic, evolving in response to prevailing ideas, values, surrounding circumstances, and pressures associated with crises and wars. (Douglas, 1999, pp. 9–15.)

This theory seeks to move beyond the idealized conception of rigid civilian control. It proceeds from the premise that the military is not merely an instrument of execution, but rather a partner in governance. It affirms:

- **The dynamic nature of control:** Bland maintains that civilian control is not a fixed legal condition imposed once and for all; instead, it is an ongoing process shaped by cultural and

political variables.

- **A system of shared responsibility:** The theory assumes that stability is achieved when both sides recognize their respective spheres of influence. Civilians retain authority over strategic direction and budgetary decisions, while the military exercises control over tactics and technical operations.

4. Third Section: An Analysis of the Dynamics of Civil–Military Relations in the European Space: Between Democratic Legacy and New Security Transformations

First: An analysis of classical theories within the European context:

The European case constitutes a genuine laboratory for testing the resilience of classical theories. It reveals profound transformations in the meaning of "control," shifting from the mere prevention of coups to a complex process of institutional management in which economic interests intersect with democratic values. Within this framework, Europe cannot be understood as a homogeneous bloc; rather, it must be differentiated between the long-established democracies of Western Europe and the transitional democracies of Eastern Europe. In both contexts, the central issue concerns balancing military professionalism with political loyalty.

1. Testing Huntington's Theory of Objective Control in the Eastern European Context:

The post-1989 experience of Eastern European states, such as Poland, Romania, and Hungary, offers a concrete illustration of Samuel Huntington's theory. The primary challenge was how to transform armies that had functioned as "instruments of the Communist Party" into "professional state armies." The central task involved cultivating objective professionalism within these forces, as reflected in:

1. **Depoliticization of the military:** These states adopted Huntington's model of "objective control" by stripping the military institution of its former political character. As Bruneau and Matei note, this transformation was far from straightforward, as it required the development of civilian institutions capable of understanding military affairs, what is termed "civilian control competence." (Bruneau, and Matei, 2013, pp. 45–47.) In practical terms, new constitutions were enacted prohibiting military personnel from engaging in partisan political activity, in line with Huntington's call to confine the armed forces to their barracks in order to preserve professionalism.
2. **External conditionality:** The European case introduced a variable not fully anticipated by Huntington, namely, the role of NATO. Professionalism was no longer driven solely by internal will; it became a prerequisite for integration into the Western security architecture. NATO standards, for instance, imposed strict parliamentary oversight over defense budgets, thereby reducing the degree of military decision-making autonomy that had prevailed during the Soviet era. (Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster, 2002, p. 112.)

2. The "Citizen in Uniform" Model (Janowitz) in Western Europe:

Where Huntington emphasized separation, Morris Janowitz advocated integration. This is reflected in:

- **Normative integration:** In the German Bundeswehr, Germany adopted the philosophy of *Innere Führung* ("internal leadership"), which affirms that the soldier is first and foremost a citizen endowed with full political and civil rights, and legally obligated to disobey orders that violate human dignity. This approach limits the sharp military isolation that

Janowitz warned against and renders the army a mirror of civil society. It embodies his conception of the professional soldier as possessing democratic political awareness. Some scholars argue that this integration has protected Europe from the emergence of a secluded military subculture detached from society, thereby reducing the likelihood of confrontation between civilians and the armed forces. (Kuhlmann, and Callaghan, 2000, pp. 89–91.)

- **Crisis of military identity:** Nevertheless, this integrative model has faced challenges following the abolition of compulsory military service in most European countries. Analysts note that European armies have gradually moved toward a narrower form of professionalism, a shift that may generate a renewed gap between the military and society. (Kuhlmann, and Callaghan, 2000, pp.104.)
- **Parliamentary oversight:** In the United Kingdom and France, civilian oversight appears not merely as a coercive mechanism, but as a form of partnership. Society places trust in the military because it is viewed as an integral part of the national community. This reduces the likelihood of coups, the scenario emphasized in classical theories, and replaces it with more subtle forms of influence exercised through budgetary mechanisms.

3. The Military–Industrial Complex and Defense Lobbies (The French and British Cases):

Europe has developed its own version of this dynamic within the broader framework of military–industrial complex theory. In the French and British cases, the military does not intervene in politics through tanks, but rather through technological leverage and economic influence. This is reflected in several ways:

- **The alliance between technology and politics:** Major arms companies such as Airbus and Thales have become significant centers of political gravity within Europe. In this context, civil–military relations are managed less through military hierarchies than through armaments contracts. The political economy of defense becomes a primary driver of the relationship. Senior European officers frequently transition, after retirement, to positions on the boards of arms corporations, creating networks of mutual interests that may shape parliamentary decisions on defense budgets. (Narcis, 2010, p. 215.)
- **Economic oversight:** Civil–military relations in Europe are increasingly managed within budgetary committees rather than in military barracks. In some instances, civilian oversight has weakened; military actors, supported by defense corporations, may exert pressure on parliaments to adopt interventionist policies (as occurred in Mali or Libya). This raises a fundamental question: are civilians truly directing the military, or does the economic logic of defense industries shape political decisions? In this regard, Feaver would argue that civilians exercise principal control through agency mechanisms, monitoring the military via financial incentives and contractual arrangements rather than solely through formal legal directives. (Feaver, 2003, pp. 76–78.)

The relationship between civilian authority and the military institution is not static, but an evolving dynamic shaped by political and economic change. The preceding cases illustrate the following:

1. **Integration of theoretical models:** The European experience indicates that Huntington's model of professionalism through separation and Janowitz's model of professionalism

through integration do not necessarily negate one another. Democratically successful states are those that have built a technically professional army reinforced by constitutional civilian values, granting it the identity of the citizen in uniform.

2. **Primacy of institutional oversight:** In European practice, civilian control has shifted from a focus on the fear of coups to bureaucratic management. Parliament, budgetary committees, and the judiciary have become the principal actors regulating the military institution, thereby refining and extending the concept of objective control.
3. **The influence of the economic variable:** Eisenhower's warning regarding the military–industrial complex remains salient in major powers. In certain contexts, the relationship has shifted from a struggle for authority to a partnership of interests between political elites and the defense manufacturing sector, potentially affecting the autonomy of foreign policy decision-making.
4. **The role of international conditionality:** The Eastern European experience underscores the importance of external actors, such as NATO and the European Union, in accelerating democratic military reform. These institutions provided both standards and pressure mechanisms to ensure the subordination of the military to civilian authority.

Second: Evaluation and analysis of modern theoretical structures within the European context:

Within the preceding analysis, it becomes evident that political thought has undergone a profound transformation in the study of civil–military relations. The focus has shifted from the traditional preoccupation with preventing coups, central to Huntington's framework, toward improving administrative efficiency and functional performance. Theories such as agency theory and shared responsibility proceed from the assumption that civilian control has become an established reality, and that the contemporary challenge lies in ensuring that the military agent does not monopolize technical decision-making beyond the reach of civilian oversight. (Feaver, 2003, pp. 298–302.)

However, this perspective has been criticized for presupposing the existence of a fully developed institutional environment capable of optimizing coordination between ministries and military leadership in stable states (such as Canada and the United Kingdom). It is less able to account for civil–military relations in fragile environments that lack a unified democratic political culture. As a result, transferring these theories to transitional democracies becomes highly complex, particularly in contexts where the legitimacy of civilian authority remains contested.

In a related vein, the dichotomy between separation and concordance has gained prominence. Whereas normative theories emphasized strict institutional separation, Rebecca Schiff advanced concordance as an alternative intended to prevent conflict through partnership among political elites, the military, and society. Yet several criticisms have been directed at this model: (Schiff, 2009, pp. 43-45.)

- **The dilemma of dissolution:** Full concordance may lead either to the militarization of society or to the politicization of the military institution, thereby eroding the boundaries required to protect democratic practice.
- **Predominantly descriptive rather than explanatory character:** The theory largely describes cases of stability without adequately explaining how such stability is produced. It rests on the premise that "if concordance exists, stability follows," but does not answer

the more consequential question: how can concordance be constructed in divided societies? Nor does it address what should occur if the military refuses to align with civilian elites. In this sense, it functions as a retrospective theory that accounts for success after the fact rather than serving as a reform-oriented framework.

- **Neglect of power relations:** The assumption of an equal partnership among the three actors is, in practice, somewhat idealized. The military possesses weapons and organizational capacity, whereas society and civilian specialists rely primarily on softer instruments of influence. In times of crisis, the stronger party, the military, may impose its preferred version of concordance, producing what might be termed "coercive concordance."
- **Cultural centrality and ambiguous criteria:** The theory relies heavily on culture as a variable, yet culture is inherently fluid and difficult to measure with academic precision. What one society regards as concordance may be viewed by another as submission or politicization. Moreover, its application in cases such as India suggests that concordance may endure for decades, yet fracture abruptly under acute political pressures.

Rebecca Schiff's theory marks a significant departure from the Huntingtonian American model and is particularly useful for understanding states that do not conform to the Western paradigm of strict separation (including many countries in Asia and Africa). Nevertheless, its principal limitation lies in its marginalization of conflict. It assumes that dialogue and agreement are always attainable, overlooking the reality that civil–military relations are often struggles over sovereignty, legitimacy, and resources.

For this reason, contemporary scholars frequently employ Schiff's theory to interpret cultural stability, while turning to agency or institutional approaches to analyze practical mechanisms of oversight. When these theories are applied to the European context, a clear gap emerges between theoretical ambition and practical effectiveness. This can be observed through two illustrative models:

1. **The postmodern army model:** Countries such as Germany and France have succeeded in reshaping their armed forces into institutions that emphasize humanitarian missions and peacekeeping operations, in line with the "postmodern military" perspective (Charles, Allen, and Laura, 2000, pp.14-16.). However, this model has faced serious challenges in the presence of renewed conventional security threats, such as the Ukrainian crisis, which have suggested that excessive civilianization may weaken combat professionalism and readiness to confront existential dangers.
2. **The agency model and the competence gap:** The British and Canadian cases indicate that effective oversight depends heavily on whether civilian authorities possess comparable military expertise. In the absence of strategic understanding among parliamentarians, oversight risks becoming a purely formal procedure, thereby granting the military a form of reverse agency control under the guise of technical expertise.

Ultimately, it may be concluded that modern theories suffer from an excessive Western centrism. They often presume the existence of independent institutions, such as the media, the judiciary, and parliament, capable of exercising neutral and effective oversight. Where such conditions are absent, theories such as Douglas Bland's shared responsibility model may

degenerate into a mere façade that legitimizes the military institution's influence within political corridors.

The success of the European case did not stem from adherence to a single theory, but rather from the construction of a complex equilibrium. Agency mechanisms were used to regulate budgets, concordance to secure loyalty, and normative principles to protect the constitutional order. Most importantly, civilian control in the twenty-first century depends less on distancing the military and more on strengthening civilian capacity. Democracy weakens not necessarily when the military institution grows stronger, but when strategic understanding declines among governing civilian elites.

5. CONCLUSION

The study of civil–military relations shows that, since the mid-twentieth century, this field has represented one of the most intricate and interdependent domains within political science, given its location at the intersection of security, politics, and society. Traditional theories, foremost among them Samuel Huntington's thesis of "objective control" and Morris Janowitz's work on "social integration", established a foundational framework for understanding the relationship between military and civilian institutions. These approaches stressed the need to confine the army's role within clearly defined professional boundaries while preserving its professionalism and relative autonomy from politics, treating this as a basic condition for consolidating civilian rule.

When applied to the European case, these classical theories remain relevant but require institutional contextualization. European democracy did not rely solely on isolating the military (as Huntington suggested), nor exclusively on integrating it (as Janowitz proposed). Rather, it developed a system of multi-level oversight involving courts, parliaments, the media, and international institutions such as the European Union.

Modern theories have introduced important qualitative contributions. Agency theory reframed the relationship as a reciprocal contract of obligations and oversight between civilians and the military. Rebecca Schiff's concordance approach emphasized agreement among political elites, military leaders, and society as a prerequisite for stability. Postmodern perspectives offered a new vision, highlighting the erosion of rigid boundaries between the civilian and military spheres due to globalization, the rise of non-state actors, and technological revolution. In doing so, these modern theories broadened the analytical lens beyond a narrow concern with institutional control to encompass the social, cultural, and technological dimensions of the relationship.

Despite these contributions, civil–military relations continue to face profound structural and complex challenges, most notably:

- The dilemma of balancing the need for a strong and effective army with the imperative of civilian oversight.
- The weakness of civilian institutions in many developing countries, which opens the door to the militarization of politics.
- The influence of international and regional factors, as interventions and alliances contribute to reshaping the functions of the military institution.
- The rise of non-state actors (militias and armed groups), which fragments the instruments of

legitimate violence and weakens the state's monopoly over force.

- Technological and media transformations that have reduced the state's capacity to regulate interaction between the military and society, while generating new forms of legitimacy and accountability.

Accordingly, the added value of this field of study lies in recognizing that civil–military relations are not merely a strictly institutional matter, but rather a reflection of a broader political, social, and cultural structure. The contemporary challenge is to develop an integrative approach capable of reconciling two interdependent dimensions: the professionalism of the military institution on the one hand, and the consolidation of civilian and constitutional legitimacy on the other, thereby ensuring state stability and strengthening its democratic trajectory.

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