

Journal of legal and social studies

Issn: 2507-7333

Eissn: 2676-1742

**The Role of the Third and Fourth Regions in Confronting the
Anti-Revolutionary Blounis Movement (1955-1956)**

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Date of send: 01/03/2025

date of acceptance: 01/04/2025

Date of Publication: 01/06/2025

Abstract :

This research paper aims to highlight the role of the third and fourth historical regions in confronting the Blounis movement, which opposed the revolution between 1955 and 1956. Since its inception, the liberation revolution faced several problems and challenges that hindered its rapid geographical spread, among which was the anti-revolutionary Blounis movement. This movement was one of the biggest challenges faced by the leadership of both regions in the beginning. Consequently, these leaders focused on organizing the people's ranks and countering this movement, which posed a significant obstacle in the regions. Its goal was to undermine the National Liberation Army and prevent the revolution's expansion, with support from French colonial authorities. The military coordination between the leadership of the two regions, following the failure of communications, led to the defeat of the opponents from the Blounis movement, forcing them to retreat south and concentrate in the geographical area of the sixth region. The strategy of the revolution's leaders in both regions in various fields thwarted Mohamed Blounis and his supporters' plans to eradicate the revolution and promote his project.

Keywords: Blounis Movement ; Third Region ; Fourth Region ; National Liberation Front ; National Liberation Army

Introduction:

The Algerian revolution faced several difficulties in its early stages, both internally and externally, which led to the disruption of its organizational, political, and military activities. Among these challenges was the movement led by Mohammed Belounis, considered the most dangerous anti-revolutionary movement against the Algerian revolution. The French colonial authorities initially exploited the spread of this movement in the third and fourth regions to thwart the revolutionary efforts led by the National Liberation Front, benefiting from the armed conflict between different factions.

The Belounis movement first emerged in the historical third province and then expanded to the fourth and eventually the sixth provinces. All of this occurred under the protection and support of the French colonial authorities, who allied with Belounis to fight the National Liberation Front. This cooperation significantly benefited the French colonial power and weakened the revolution in the third and fourth provinces during the years 1955-1956. Despite attempts at reconciliation and unifying the national front, these efforts failed, mostly due to personal political reasons and the involvement of other parties in the conflict, supporting one side or the other, either for the National Liberation Front or the Algerian National Movement.

The research question of this paper revolves around: What efforts were made by the third and fourth provinces to confront the Belounis anti-revolutionary movement through political and military coordination between them? And what were the results of these efforts on revolutionary activity in these two provinces?

First: The Emergence of the Anti-Revolution Boulanis Movement.

The Belounis movement strategy to crush As part of the French colonial 1 the revolution in its early stages by causing it to implode from within, this policy was emphasized by the Governor-General Jacques Soustelle. Soustelle focused on this approach to undermine the revolution from the inside, attempting to weaken it before it could gain momentum² His successor, Robert Lacoste, continued this approach. Based on a statement by Jacques Soustelle: "Messali Hadj is the last winning card he has," they began planning to recruit anti-revolutionaries such as Belhadj Djilali (Kubis), Cherif Ben Saidi, and Mohammed Belounis as part of an intelligence scheme aimed at misleading the public and distancing them from the revolution, In a testimony by the freedom fighter ³ Rabah Tineh regarding the colonial administration's reliance on Mohammed Belounis, he states: "This Algerian figure, a collaborator with the French enemy, was a fake leader created by French intelligence. He was nourished by the enemy's media, which aimed to create chaos and confusion, and to sow doubts among the Algerian people who supported the revolution, portraying him as the father and creator of the revolution."⁴

Belounis emerged on the scene about six months after the outbreak of the revolution, taking command of the first battalions of the Messalist movement in the Djurdjura region in 1955. It seems he benefited from the fact that neither Krim Belkacem nor Omar Ouamrane carried out awareness-raising efforts to inform the inhabitants of the Kabylie region, who were loyal to Messali Hadj, that the

revolution was being led by the new revolutionary movement, the National Liberation Front, after it split from the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties⁵ This explains the success of the Belounis movement in the Kabylie region. According to the French historian Yves Courrière, Belounis's forces were divided into two groups: the first was led by Rabah in the Douar (Beni Bouadou) and consisted of 25 fighters, while the second was led personally by Mohammed Belounis and was based in the outskirts of Guenzet, consisting of 500 fighters⁶.

Second: Manifestations of Cooperation and Coordination Between French Colonial Authorities and Boulanis ;

The French colonial authorities provided material and military support to the Balounis movement opposing the liberation revolution as part of their alliance and cooperation to confront the National Liberation Front and Army. This was aimed at creating areas hostile to the revolution to maintain the colonial project in the third, fourth, and later the sixth regions. This was evident in:

- General Olie's visit to the Riche area on August 10, 1956, where he addressed the residents, saying: "We must work together like the hand and the five fingers."
- Another visit by General Olie to the Nazliana area in the Dhraâ El Mizan region on August 11, 1956, where he was welcomed by the residents who expressed their support for France. The mayor of the mixed Dhraâ El Mizan stated: "You must be like your fathers who assisted General Randon, and therefore you must assist General Gouraud today in eliminating the fellagha." In this regard, one of the local leaders intervened, saying: "Our area has given all its sons to France, and they fell on the battlefields, raising the triangular flag. We always grant our trust to France, and if the fellagha come, we will fight them because they are not our brothers..."⁷.

Third: Boulanis's Activity in the Fourth and Third Regions

The beginnings of the Balounis movement's presence in the capital were marked by carrying out some operations, such as attacking Ibadi traders and assassinating a French police officer, in addition to monitoring the movements of the fighters and setting ambushes for them. ⁸

The largest confrontations between the Balounis forces and the National Liberation Army occurred in the third region due to the presence of elements of the Algerian national movement there. They managed to establish a military organization called the "Fedayeen Organization," under the supervision of Arab Al-Basir, with the help of Zitouni Mokhtar, Aït Qasi Ali, and Mustafa Ben Aref. The "Fedayeen Organization" transformed into a military wing of the movement, called the "National Army of the Algerian People." Its political and military activities were initially limited, focusing on deceptive and propaganda operations aimed at raising funds and taking advantage of the prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty at the time.

The conflict underwent changes starting in early 1955, after Mohamed Belounis took command of the first fighter groups in the Djurdjura region in April 1955. Belounis benefited from the lack of awareness-raising and mobilization

efforts by both Karim Belkacem and Omar Aouimran among the residents of the Kabylie region.⁹

Belounis established the first two armed groups in the Hizer area north of Bouira and in the Beni Yaala area and the village of Genzat near Bougaâ. The leadership of the two groups was taken by Mohamed Belounis and his assistant Si Rabah. Belounis and his men were based in this region due to the presence of a base loyal to Messali Hadj.¹⁰

The first armed confrontations in the third region occurred on October 10, 1955, in the Hizer area north of Bouira, Beni Yaala, and Genzat. These clashes lasted for two days under the watch of the French army, which did not intervene to take advantage of the weakening of both sides. The battles and clashes continued throughout 1956¹¹, A report on the major battles in the third region recorded 27 battles, most of which took place within the territory of the third region between January and August 1956. Among the most significant were: the Battle of Zemoura in Hizer on January 28, 1956, led by Abdel Rahman Mira, who was responsible for the Mechdallah area, and Mohamed Boukra in the El Khemis area; the Battle of Anseman in Hizer; the Battle of Oued Tassala; the Battle of Oued Amazair; and the battles of Beni Issa, Aslan, Azgar, Bourj Kharis, Ouled Anan, Djebel Bouzid, and Ghar El Hench.¹² There were also other battles in Dhraâ El Mizan and El Karkour. Some French reports indicate that on March 13, 1956, in the eastern region of Sedouk near Akbou in Bejaia, the French colonial army found 18 decapitated bodies, aged between 20 and 25, some of whom were wearing military uniforms. One of the bodies had a note attached that read: "Announcement and Warning: Let it be known to all that these soldiers are followers of the Messali Army, which has separated from the Algerian national unity to which all parties and organizations in Algeria have joined... These elements supported the split that was instigated by Messali, who refused to fight for God in the name of Algeria, while the National Liberation Army takes pride in belonging to the National Liberation Front, which has condemned them to death... From now on, this is the fate of anyone who divides national unity..."¹³.

Armed confrontations moved to the territory of the fourth region starting in September 1955, when the leadership of the National Liberation Front ordered its activists to confront Balounis elements militarily, especially in the capital. Some members of the Algerian national movement were assassinated in early 1956, including Bouguerida Ammar, Si Ahmed, and Madi Mohammed. The elements of the Algerian national movement retaliated against these operations by killing four soldiers from the National Liberation Front. Additionally, they managed to seize the National Liberation Front command center in Sour El Ghazlane on February 12, 1956, killing everyone inside.¹⁴ This led to an expansion of armed confrontations between the two sides, such as the Sidi Rabah clash, which resulted in the deaths of 18 members of the movement and the capture of their leader, known as "Omar." Another significant clash occurred in the Talouine area, where most of the movement's members were killed.¹⁵

Nevertheless, the movement's elements remained active and continued to target soldiers of the National Liberation Army, managing to assassinate about 35 fighters, according to the testimony of the fighter Lakhdar Boureka.¹⁶

Belounis attempted to relieve the pressure on his armed elements due to the military blows they received in the third and fourth regions by communicating with Zyan Ashour, the commander of the desert region. In this regard, Mohamed Tahar Bouaïchi mentions that Zyan Ashour intervened before his battalions in December 1955 and informed them that their brothers in Palestro (El Khemis) were being pressured by the French colonialists and had requested support and assistance. He expressed a desire to go to their aid, and 30 fighters responded to the call, including: Ashour Mohamed Chawi and Cherki Massoud, who took command of the group, with their guide being Marzouk Belhaj and seven communication personnel

Ashour Mohamed Chawi says: "We arrived in Dira on January 1, 1956, and our host informed us that the army we were aiming for had moved toward the Djurdjura mountains, so we changed our direction toward it. When we reached the Djurdjura army, named after its commander Ahmed, who had passed away a few days before our arrival, Belounis took command, and our numbers increased to ninety (90) soldiers with our joining... We were unaware of the conflicts in the region and the affiliations of the components of the fighting groups... We found ourselves under the command of a person named Belounis, who claimed to be fighting against the Karimists."¹⁷ «And sometimes the Keriya soldiers»¹⁸ And at another time, a group of Jews, we attended a speech in which he said: "There is an army in the region formed by France consisting of Jews called Keriya, under the command of Karim. We fought alongside France; fight them wherever you find them"¹⁹ It seems that Zyan Ashour was unaware that the army stationed in the El Khemis area was under Belounis until the arrival of the unit he sent to support this army. Therefore, we later find him refusing to cooperate with Belounis after receiving a response from Si El Hwaas. This is confirmed by Ashour Mohamed Chawi in his testimony, where he says: "The section of the Algerian national movement in Ouled Jalal had received a request from its central administration in Algiers to send a group of fighters to support their brothers, as they claimed, in the Kabylie region against the enemy, but Zyan refused that."²⁰

The situation was not clear for Zyan Ashour and his followers regarding whether to cooperate with Belounis, especially since Si El Hwaas did not provide a definitive resolution on the matter. His response emphasized the need to verify the truth about Belounis, test his intentions, and monitor him to confirm his claims. This issue was addressed by Chawi in his testimony about Belounis,²¹ where he says: "When we encountered those whom Belounis referred to at times as Jews supported by the French and Keriya, we found no evidence suggesting that the group was equipped by the enemy; they were in a state of misery similar to ours... The signs of deception began to become clear, and we realized that we had taken the wrong direction from our host in Dira toward the National Movement Army in the Djurdjura mountains instead of the National Liberation Army in Palestro. This misdirection from our host could have been intentional or

unintentional, as both the military administration of the national movement and the National Liberation Front used the term 'National Liberation Army.' We were at risk of being tricked into exchanging our military weapons, such as the Stati, five-shot, and four-shot weapons, with Belounis's armed men, who were equipped with single-barrel and double-barrel hunting rifles, as if one of us were to be told, 'Lend us your military weapon temporarily, and it may not be returned.'"²²

It seems that Belounis's situation became clear to the unit that Zyan Ashour initially sent to support him, believing it was part of the National Liberation Army, after Belounis accused the National Liberation Front of being influenced by communists and spread this news among the residents of the Kabylie region²³. The members of the military unit realized that they had been deceived, but this came too late, as they were captured by "Si El Sadiq."²⁴ Assistant to Karim Belkacem, there were forty fighters from Ouled Jalal, Bousaada, and Djelfa. Omar Aouimran wanted to execute them, but after interrogating them, he learned that Belounis had deceived them and that they were unaware they had taken the wrong direction. Therefore, he released them. Belounis then sent a threatening message to Zyan Ashour, demanding the return of the fleeing soldiers. The message included: "... I will fight you and fight the Front and France, and no one will save you from me, not Ben Boulaid..."²⁵.

Fourth: Communications Between the Leadership of the Two Regions and the Boulanis Movement

The first attempts at unity and rapprochement between the Algerian national movement and the National Liberation Front at the national leadership level were made by Messali Hadj but were unsuccessful. The second attempt came from Ahmed Mehassas, who contacted Ahmed Ben Bella, a representative of the National Liberation Front, and Mohamed Marouk, a representative of the Algerian national movement. The latter expressed his willingness to stop the bloodshed, which was the same approach that Ahmed Ben Bella initially adopted. However, he refused to sign, citing his inability to bear the responsibility alone²⁶.

Mohamed Harbi mentions that the commander of the third region, Karim Belkacem, was initially convinced that the Messalians could be swayed to the side of the revolution. Therefore, he did not cease his communications with the Messali elements until April 1955, hoping to attract them to prevent armed confrontation with them, which primarily served the French enemy. Based on this, there were numerous communications between the two sides, including in the capital, to contain the situation. In this regard, Mustafa Ben Mohamed, one of the leaders of the armed wing of the Algerian national movement, stated that several communications were made with some leaders of the National Liberation Front, such as Rabah Bitat, Karim Belkacem, and Omar Aouimran, to avoid confrontation between them, and this took place in El Ebiar in the capital. According to his testimony, the Front's leadership offered the elements of the Algerian national movement to join the Front and dissolve the movement, to which our response was that it was easier to align under the banner of the movement led by Messali Hadj or to leave things as they were without entering

into confrontation between us and directing our weapons toward the common enemy²⁷.

Nevertheless, Karim Belkacem did not lose hope in reaching an understanding with the elements of the movement after the arrest of Rabah Bitat, the commander of the fourth region, on March 16, 1955. However, Abane Ramdane opposed Karim's conciliatory approach toward them. It seems that the clash that occurred between Mustafa Ben Mohamed and Omar Aouimran in October 1955 further deepened the divide between the two sides.

In another testimony, Mohamed Ali Khidher, one of the Messalian elements who led several armed groups in the capital, mentioned that he communicated with some leaders of the National Liberation Front, such as Rabah Bitat, Omar Aouimran, and Yasaf Saadi, but these communications did not resolve the differences between them. These contacts were confirmed by Mokhtar Bouchaafa, the chief responsible for the cells of the National Liberation Front in the capital. There was also communication between Mohamed Boukra and some Messalian elements in July 1955 to coordinate jointly within the framework of the National Liberation Front; however, the meeting failed like its predecessors²⁸. Due to the refusal of Belounis's elements to come under the umbrella of the National Liberation Front, they stipulated the opposite²⁹.

There were also other communications after the Soummam Conference. In this regard, the fighter Lakhdar Boureka says: "... that the leadership of the fourth region attempted to contact the Messalians in the fall of 1956 and tasked Ali Zouyouche with this mission to persuade them to cease their antagonistic role against the revolution and negotiate for joint cooperation. He went to them accompanied by 35 fighters, but the Messalians betrayed them and carried out their execution..."³⁰.

The reasons for the failure of communications between Belounis and the National Liberation Front are attributed to:

- The predominance of personal interests and the desire for visibility and leadership among a group of managing officials from both sides, according to the opinion of Mohamed Arabi Zubairi.
- The desire for control and dominance from both parties played an important role in undermining attempts at unity, according to Mohamed Harbi.³¹
- The negative impact of the armed confrontations between the two parties, especially in the Kabylie region, based on the testimony of Colonel Slimane Dehélys.
- The role of French intelligence in fueling the conflict between the factions.
- The rigidity of both parties' positions and their refusal to consider concessions, as stated in the testimony of the fighter Ahmed Mehassas, who said: "I was certain in 1955 that matters would lead to armed conflict between the two sides, simply because the nature of the activists from both movements was the same, considering they graduated from the school of the Algerian People's Party and then the Movement for the Triumph of

Democratic Liberties. Neither side would back down in their statements..."³².

- The decision of the National Liberation Front to respond to Belounis's movement with the same approach regarding physical eliminations, according to the testimony of Ahmed Yazid..³³

Fifth: Military Coordination Between the Third and Fourth Regions and Forcing Boulanis to Move South

The Soummam Conference marked the beginning of operational coordination among the historical regions to organize revolutionary work and its framing, due to the difficulties the revolution faced in its initial phase, resulting from the entry of opposing elements that engaged in armed actions, which nearly undermined and ended the revolution at its outset. This led to a setback in military and political coordination among the revolutionary areas.

Given the increasing threat of Belounis's movement and its geographical expansion in the third and fourth regions, and the failure of all attempts to heal the rift and end the conflict, the leadership of the two regions decided to engage in military confrontation to eliminate this opposing movement that obstructed armed action, in implementation of the decisions of the Soummam Conference.

The armed confrontation between the two sides continued throughout 1956, with numerous clashes and battles, including one at Mount Sidi Rabah in August 1956, in which 18 members of Belounis were killed. According to a report from the third region submitted to the second national conference on the history of the revolution in May 1984, the toll of the confrontations between the two sides was heavy, but their field results favored the National Liberation Army, which managed to force them to retreat toward Mount Sabah, Kef Lakhder, Mount Dira, and Bouqadoun³⁴.

After being appointed to lead the sixth region, which was established under the decisions of the Soummam Conference on August 20, 1956, Ali Malah attempted to expand revolutionary activity in the southern areas of the third and fourth regions, where Belounis's elements were concentrated. His goal was to drive them out and to educate and raise awareness among the populations of areas that had not been reached by Belounis's elements, warning them of the dangers of cooperating with this movement, as it was implementing colonial policies aimed at dividing the ranks of the Algerians³⁵.

The National Liberation Army in the third and fourth regions was able to push Belounis and his followers out of the area, forcing them to retreat toward the high plateaus and the desert.

³⁶ After initially extending his activities to Ain Bessam, Bouira, El Qsar, and Mechdallah, he later retreated toward Sour El-Ghozlane, Chlafa, El-Bireen, Bouira El-Ahdab, and Ain El-Hajal, and then expanded his activities throughout 1956 in Berrouaghia, El-Qsar El-Bukhari, Mahdia, Frenda, El-Bayadh, M'Sila, and Hassi Bahbah³⁷. In these areas, Belounis began to regain his military strength by recruiting militants from the Messalist movement and the local population, even if it required using military force.³⁸

Conclusion :

Through this study, we reached the following conclusions:

- The third and fourth wilayas (regions) contributed significantly to activating armed struggle and countering the anti-revolutionary Belounis movement.
- The roots of the conflict between the Algerian National Movement (MNA) and the National Liberation Front (FLN) date back to the pre-revolutionary period, during which a disagreement arose between those advocating armed struggle and those favoring continued political activism, leading to the fragmentation of national unity.
- The core of the conflict between the two parties was not ideological but rather organizational, managerial, and, in some cases, personal.
- The colonial power benefited from the conflict between the two groups, facilitating its divide-and-rule policy, which weakened revolutionary activity in regions where the MNA was present.
- The Belounis movement disrupted revolutionary activities in the regions where it was active, resulting in significant losses for both sides-losses that the revolution desperately needed to face the true enemy.
- All attempts at rapprochement and healing the rift between the two movements were individual efforts and did not carry the official endorsement of their leaderships.
- The reason for the failure of multiple meetings, both inside and outside the country, was due to a lack of trust between the two sides, as well as external interference (Egypt), which supported the FLN but was not trusted by the MNA leadership.

Reference:

¹ Mohamed Belounis (1912-1958) was born in Bordj Menaiel and was a follower of Messali Hadj. He attended a French primary school and joined the Algerian People's Party in 1938. He was arrested for his suspected involvement in the May 8, 1945 demonstrations. He ran for the Algerian Assembly elections and was imprisoned in Barbarous in 1948. Belounis remained loyal to Messali Hadj after the internal party crisis between 1953 and 1954. Six months after the outbreak of the revolution, Messali Hadj entrusted him with leading the armed groups affiliated with the Algerian National Movement in the Kabylie region. Belounis confronted the National Liberation Army there, but after suffering defeats, he moved south and established a base for his army in Housh Al-Nâas (now Dar Chioukh). He allied with French forces to fight the National Liberation Front. He was killed by French forces in Sidi Amer in 1958 after a disagreement with their leadership. See also; "Ashour Sharafi, Dictionary of the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962), translated by Alam Mukhtar, Dar Al-Qasba, Algeria, 2007, pp. 64-65.

² "National Organization of Mujahideen, Report of the Second Regional Symposium on the Writing of the History of the November 1954 Revolution (for the Sixth Wilaya), Volume 1, Section 1, Biskra, February 5-6, 1985, p. 27."

³El-Hadi Darouaz, The Sixth Historical Wilaya: Organization and Events (1954-1962), Homa Publishing and Distribution House, Algeria, 2002, pp. 118-119.

- ⁴ Rabah Tina, *Memoirs of Mujahid Rabah Tina bin Mohamed bin Ahmed: Testimonies and Events from the History of the National Liberation Revolution*, edited by Abdelbaki Qarboa, 1st edition, Dar Al-Watan for Printing, Publishing, Distribution, and Translation, Algeria, 2012, p. 117.
- ⁵ Souad Yamina Chabout, *The Fourth Wilaya in Confrontation with the Movements Opposing the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962)*, Dar Al-Huda for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution, Ain M'lila, Algeria, 2015, p. 91.
- ⁶ Wves Courrierc *La Guerre D'algerie*, Le Temps Des Léopards, Ed: Fayard, Paris, 1969, P325.
- ⁷ Aisha Husseini, *The Revolution in the First Zone of the Fourth Wilaya (1954-1958)*, Master's Thesis, University of Algiers, Academic Year 2001-2002, p. 94.
- ⁸ Op.cit, p91
- ⁹ Souad Yamina Chabout ; op.cit , p89-90.
- ¹⁰ Mohamed Teguia , *l'Algérie en guerre*, Opu, Alger,1980,p174.
- ¹¹ Souad Yamina Chabout ; op.cit , p94.
- ¹² Aisha Husseini ; op.cit, p93.
- ¹³ Belhadj Mohamed, *The Opposing Movements and Their Impact on the Algerian Revolution*, Doctoral Thesis in Modern and Contemporary History, Djillali Liabes University, Sidi Bel Abbes, Academic Year 2014-2015, pp. 137-138.
- ¹⁴ Op.cit, ,p137-138
- ¹⁵ Fath Eddine Ben Azzoua, *The Confrontation Between the National Liberation Front and the Algerian National Movement of Messali Hadj (1954-1962)*, *Journal of Social and Human Sciences*, Volume 6, Issue 10, University of M'sila, June 28, 2016, pp. 61-62.
- ¹⁶ Lakhdar Bouregaa, *Memoirs of Commander Si Lakhdar Bouregaa: Witness to the Assassination of the Revolution*, 1st edition, Dar Al-Hikma, Algeria, 1990, pp. 73-74.
- ¹⁷ The term "Kremists" refers to the followers of Krim Belkacem, the leader of the Third Wilaya (region) before the Soummam Conference
- ¹⁸ The term "CRUA" (Comité Révolutionnaire d'Unité et d'Action) refers to the Revolutionary Committee of Unity and Action, which was established on March 23, 1954, after the intensification of the crisis within the Movement for the Triumph of Democratic Liberties (MTLD)
- ¹⁹ Mohamed Taher Baiji, *The Bitter Orange Operation: Ashour Ziane, the Key Figure in the Desert*, Dar Kokab Al-Uloom for Publishing, Printing, and Distribution, Algeria, 2019, pp. 253-254.
- ²⁰ Op.cit, p253
- ²¹ "National Organization of Mujahideen, Biskra Report, Volume 1, Section 1, p. 29."
- ²² Mohamed Taher Baiji, op.cit, p255.
- ²³ Djemaa benzeroual, op.cit, p205.
- ²⁴ Colonel El-Sadek, whose real name is Slimane Dehelis, was a mujahid and leader of the Fourth Wilaya. He was born on February 14, 1920, in Wadiya, Tizi Ouzou. After World War II, he joined the ranks of the Algerian People's Party. He traveled to France to work in early 1947 and joined the National Liberation Army after the outbreak of the revolution. He participated in the Soummam Conference in 1956. After Ouahran went to Tunisia in 1957, he succeeded him as head of the Fourth Wilaya. He held several ranks, including colonel, and was a member of the National Council of the Revolution from 1957 to 1962. He was also appointed as deputy to Colonel Houari Boumediene on the Western Front. Look; Mohamed Cherif Ould El-Hussein, *From Resistance to the War for Independence (1830-1962)*, Dar Al-Qasba for Publishing, Algeria, 2010, p. 154.
- ²⁵ Mohamed Taher Baiji, op.cit, p256-258.
- ²⁶ Belaid Rabah, "Thus, the National Liberation Front Hijacked the Revolution from Messali," *Al-Shorouk Al-Yawmi Newspaper*, Issue 152, Algeria, May 7, 2001, p. 5.

²⁷ Abdelmalek Bouarioua, Attempts at Reconciliation Between the National Liberation Front and the Messali Movement (1954-1962), Rafouf Journal, Volume 9, Issue 1, University of Adrar, January 28, 2021, pp. 397-401.

²⁸ Op.cit, p401-402

²⁹ Belaid Rabah, "Thus, the National Liberation Front Hijacked the Revolution from Messali," Al-Shorouk Al-Yawmi Newspaper, op.cit, p. 11.

³⁰ Lakhdar Bouregaa, Memoirs of Commander Si Lakhdar Bouregaa: Witness to the Assassination of the Revolution, op.cit, pp. 73-74.

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³⁴ "National Organization of Mujahideen, Second National Symposium on the History of the Revolution, Volume 2, Part 2, Palace of Nations, Algeria, May 8-10, 1984, pp. 16-18."

³⁵ Souad Yamina Chabout, The Fourth Wilaya in Confrontation with the Movements Opposing the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962), op.cit p. 97.

³⁶ Souad Yamina Chabout, The Role of the Sour El-Ghozlane Area in the Algerian Revolution (1954-1962), Dar Al-Oummah, Algeria, 2014, p. 47.

³⁷ Belhadj Mohamed, The Opposing Movements and Their Impact on the Algerian Revolution, op.cit, p. 134.

³⁸ Djemaa benzeroual,, Algerian Movements Against the Liberation Revolution (1954-1962), op.cit, p. 208.

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