

Dismantling the Ideological and Military features of Al-Qaeda and ISIS

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Abstract:

Although, it seems that the two organizations of Al-Qaeda and ISIS are not very different from each other, we can point out some different aspects and an incompatibility, both in their origin nature the way they appeared on the world, as well as their different methods or means adopted in achieving the goals. But this difference is not one of contradiction, as most of those who belong to Daech today were yesterday members of Al-Qaeda. For the first time in the history of Jihadi-Salafi organizations, we observe the presence of two organizations in a state of conflict over legitimacy and priority to the point of fighting, as was the case between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, so we put the matter in front of an urgent question what is happening? And what kind of difference are these that made them in this way? These questions are being asked today in academic circles to determine the points of the nature of the interactions between them, which necessitated a re-reading of the heritage and references of these groups and examining them according to objective research methods.

Keywords: terrorist; al-Qaeda; ISIS; ideology; military; conflict.

1. INTRODUCTION

At a time when Al-Qaeda was the boom of Jihadi Salafi current, there was a wide spread expectation that it was the peak of the dominance and universality of this approach, until there is a new organization born, we talk about the Islamic State in Iraq and Sham (ISIS). Many questions have asked about the nature of the relation between them, especially in term of speed deployment and its superior ability to carry out very accurate operations, it came to that they declared the disown of each other. So that the world finds in the face of two organizations, each trying to prove itself.

This change has imposed great and fundamental questions about the state of global Jihad, about whether we are experiencing a phase of strategic change at the international level of terrorist organization and their practices? And if this two organizations really in a state of disagreement that cannot be overcome? What are the features of convergence and differentiation between Al-Qaeda and ISIS? Starting answer this problematic from a basic main hypothesis conclusion that: the difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS is a formal difference in application and strategies choices, not in the bases or the main objective.

The paper responds to the problematic drawing on the following plan; firstly I will start by clarifying the ideological differences between Al-Qaeda and ISIS, whether it relates to jihadi reviews which new targets have been set, until the topic of their legitimacy was raised in the leadership of the global jihad movement. Secondly, I will discuss about the military difference between Al-Qaeda and ISIS especially in terms of strategies and tactics and also the definitions of their enemy between the near or far one. And finally I will raise the similarities and convergence between the two organizations, because in the end, once they come from the same school, they carry the same values.

2. The ideological disagreement between al-Qaeda and ISIS:

It has been the issue of sectarian dimension and crash identification with Shi'a, one of the important question that made problems between two of the most religion terrorist groups all over the history. The difference in how Al-Qaida and ISIS deal is that the former was characterized by a wait to deal with the dispute, while the latter was more confrontational. Al-Zawahiri was written in a letter he had sent to Zarqawi in October 2005, stating that they agreed to consider Shia a refusal "Rawafed", that they were a polytheism and apostasy sect and that they had to be fought, but he saw no interest in targeting them now and that the priority was to fight the infidels, thereby avoiding prejudice to the feelings of Muslims.

Zawahiri saw that “at the present stage, Al-Qaeda must preach to them rather than kill them, unless they start fighting first.”¹ the opposite of ISIS, which considered it a priority to fight apostates (Shia and others) before the original infidels.² In Zarqawi's letter to Osama bin Laden, in which the first focused on the need to adopt a plan to stimulate the Shia Sunni's clash in order to correct and weaken them, and made the question of fighting the apostasy communities a point of convergence or difference between the two organizations. It can be said that the ideological argument that arose between Al-Qaeda and the ISIS was centered on the following points:³

2.1 The question of atonement (Takfir):

The issue of atonement is one of the most difficult issues in Islam, and therefore scholars have set him multiple conditions, in order to prevent people from excessive and negligence. “Thus, it is an ideal example of misunderstanding in the chari'a provisions, disciplines and the manner in which they are applied. At a time when ISIS adopts a radical approach to the use of text, Al-Qaeda adopts a pragmatic approach to the use of text.”⁴

According to this last one; ISIS has exaggerated the issue of atonement, granting itself the power to enforce chari'a provisions, which it does not already possess. (And that new legal don't understand the difference of Kafr al-Nu'a and Ai'n, whether about Sunni's Muslims or the belonging of other sects.) Although the two organizations were involved in the issue of atonement, but the ISIS was much more radical when he said serial atonement, that is, atonement for the unbidden, and the unbeliever also became disbeliever and thus the ISIS expanded in the chain's circle of infidels.

Al-Qaida also rejected the ISIS's treatment of other organizations, considering that he had exaggerated the question of atoning and bloodshed all those who disagreed with them. He even entered into a series of battles with such organizations as the Nusra Front, Ahrar al-Sham, and the Army of Islam. They even atoned Hamas in Palestine, considering it an obstacle to a jihadist movement in Palestine. On this occasion, in January 2018, the Sinai branch of ISIS released a video in which one of its members was executed one of its members on charges of smuggling weapons and equipment to Hamas (Palestine), because they were considered Hamas-according to a spokesperson of the organization- : (Hamas had come to sanctify the earth and the flag far from God's legitimacy... Hamas is nothing in our account.)

2.2 In many of their judgments, the two organizations relied their chari'a rules on the concept of apostasy, but the ISIS further expanded the characterization of

apostasy to include all Arab countries in all of its governors, institutions and security and government agencies. And anyone who worked for any of these organs was considered as an infidel and could be killed even if they did not fight them.

2.3 The ISIS accused al-Qaeda of affiliation in Hamajia and Murjia doctrines, as they did not atone the Muslims who had committed acts of exorcism. Mohammed Hafez (Professor at Monterey University in California) wrote in an article published in CTC Sentinel that “the ISIS sees itself as having exclusive legitimacy in punishing infidels... What explains the conflict between the cleansing of the ISIS and the populism of al-Qaeda...The ISIS represents an exclusive and non-compromising vision of jihad, while Al-Qaeda has transformed it into a global, inclusive, Pragmatic and populist Islamic movement.”⁵

2.4 On the question of Shi'a targeting:

Although the two organizations agree that Shi'a is Kharijites and that they are infidels, but their treatment with them differed. Since they were never targeted by al-Qaeda, the ISIS considered Shi'a the top of the enemy list, only missed an opportunity or occasion and targeted them with killing attacks. As an example, we recall in 2015 when the ISIS attacked two Shi'a mosques in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, killing 140 people, which Al-Zawahiri and Al-Qaeda denounced. The same happened in Afghanistan when the ISIS targeted a wedding in a popular neighborhood west of the capital, Kabul, killing 63 people, what the Taliban considered as a forbidden and unjustifiable barbaric killing, while the ISIS celebrated it as the target of a large gathering of the Shiite Hazara minority.⁶

2.5 On the question of declared caliphate:

Most international jihadist movements, whatever their impact and force, agree that their supreme project is the establishment of the caliphate, as a strategic objective and as a result of their armed action. But they vary between themselves about the mechanisms for achieving it. This was the case between Al-Qaida and ISIS, where the first considered that the declaration of ISIS to establish the caliphate without empowerment was inadmissible. In fact, it is only an allegiance from some of the jihadist organizations active in Iraq but are not all Muslims. Al-Baghdadi was not a well-known figure before that Declaration, not for the masses of Muslims, but even for many terrorist organizations. This means that the terms of the caliphate are incomplete and therefore any allegiance given to him as a caliph is incorrect and invalid.⁷ Zawahiri said, an online audio recording states: “We do not recognize this caliphate, we do not see it as a caliphate to the prophecy approach, but rather as a seizure emirate without shura, and Muslims do

not need to pledge allegiance to him, and we do not see Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as eligible for be a caliph.”⁸

Although all these doctrinal and ideological differences that are the ultimate in complexity, it remains the nature of the conditions that distinguished each era from the other that imposed the logic of defining the enemy near or far for each organization, not as it seems to be a doctrinal choice, but in fact it is a strategic choice. With regard to Al-Qaeda, the United States of America - which represents the far enemy - had imposed its control and logic on the countries of the world without exception, and even more than that, it was the United States of America who provided protection to the infidel Arab regimes - according to their classification - and therefore it was necessary to confront them as a first step to remove protection from those systems and easy to eliminate. While Al-Zarqawi, when he laid the first step to structure the organization in Iraq, it was experiencing the climax of its sectarian conflict, and the predominance of the Shiite over the Iraqi government and the Iraqi state in general in the post-US exit phase. And more than that, the Sunnis became in great suffering from the violence practiced against them from The Shiite side, which made Al-Zarqawi prefer to confront the Shiite enemy first.

The question of disagreement between the ISIS and Al-Qaeda, although it seems so complex, but that it is difficult to determine precisely where the problem is. We are driven by the fact that Al-Qaeda has not accepted and will not accept that someone shared its leadership of the scene, He sees himself as the world's only legitimate, political and intellectual viewer. And will not accept a State in Iraq or anywhere in the world beyond its leadership, to begin the deviations between the two organizations, and to concentrate the propaganda war between them in an attempt to prove who is the truest, most accurate and rightful guarding the founding ideas presented by Abdullah Azam, Osama ben Laden and Zawahiri.

3. Military disagreement between al-Qaeda and ISIS :

Although the ISIS is one of the new organizations on the global jihadist scene, but it has been highly critical of the previous jihadist salafist organizations, considering that their operations are isolated acts of violence and nothing more, without having a comprehensive military strategy or an integrated approach.⁹ In contrast, he considered himself to be the owner of a well-defined military strategy, written by their theorist Abu bakar Naji in his book (Administration of the Savage) based on a set of important bases in the face of the enemy. The strategy is divided into three phases:

3.1 Phase I: Spite and Empowerment:

What happens at this stage is implement operations in order to break the enemy's will by draining it militarily and economically. In the sense of relying on wars of attrition, and striking the enemy in its economic and military interests. Therefore, most of the geographical areas in which ISIS is fighting its wars are rich in raw materials, in order to achieve two goals together, the first being to obtain their own financial resource, such as what was planned in Syria, when ISIS was able to control the Sha'ar field in Homs on 17 July 2014.¹⁰ The second objective is to drain the enemy's strength by exerting more security capabilities to protect the rest of the interests, ultimately leading to be more vulnerable and exposed, and the moment for organizing to move towards the second phase.¹¹ During this period, qualitative operations must be organized from time to time, so that the target is less of a strike force, all in order to draw views and attract young people towards them, such as those of Djerba, Tunisia, and Bali, Indonesia, in short, with a view to reviewing the force.¹² The ISIS has relied on this strategy to gain the media momentum that it portrays to its enemies as its material and human potential.¹³

3.2 Phase II: Managing the savagery:

It is the stage of directing serial attacks to the enemy in order to exhaust it from the entrance and provoke it in preparation for its destruction. In his book, Abu bakar Naji identified the United States of America as that enemy, but viewed it as an example no more. This phase is being implemented through two plans:¹⁴

- The first: is to diversify the enemy's attacks, both spatially and temporally, in order to drain it, relying on the application of one of the most popular principles in the military tactic (systemic armies if concentrated, loss of control, and, conversely, if spread, loss of effectiveness)¹⁵ According to their military operations in their first part, they must be in order to disorder the balance between the enemy's mass and its proliferation, so prior knowledge of the nature and types of sites and the number of troops in them is needed to prepare the appropriate force to attack them. The second part of this step is to attack many targets as possible in quantity and quality and on as much of the space as possible, which will disperse the enemy's forces. For example, if the organization hits a tourist resort in France, all tourist resorts in all countries of the world will be secured, with a consequent doubling of material expenditure. The same is true of the diversity of purpose, whether it be bank, petroleum field or other enemies's interests.

•Second: The second plan submitted by Abu Bakr Naji relates to governments in Arab countries, where he considered that they must be dispersed by forcing them to redistribute their armies and security forces, especially in order to protect their own families, or to protect foreigners, or any other sites that these Arab regimes consider so important that they must be protected. The army would enter the phase of relaxation resulting from the dispatch of the best forces to protect strategic objectives and leave the least efficient at the city level, thereby facilitating the ISIS's task of achieving field control over the areas.

3.3 phase III: Empowerment:

According to Abu Bakr Naji, this phase must combine persuasion with violence, with the aim of winning hearts and minds, seizing legitimacy and recognizing their Islamic rule. The intention is to empower here “faith allegiance, when everyone in the group or in the savage zone - no matter how inferior - gets allegiance from the rest of the individuals, and hence allegiance to the remainder so that he is redemption for them and they are his redemption, this group is formed in the face of enemies.”¹⁶ Although ISIS does not avow political action, at this stage, but it considered the necessary to combine political and military action with jihad among the organization's members, so that the persistence of violence remained in their practices. The organization depends very much at this phase on what Abu Bakr Naji calls a policy of paying the price. So that any act carried out by the enemy against them must be reacted even after a long time, even after years. The enemy should be reminded of this in the justification statement for the paying the price, the mission of (paying the price) entrusted to groups located in other areas outside of ISIS, such as those in the Arabian Island, Nigeria or Indonesia... and others.¹⁷

Observed through the set of operation's phases presented by Abu Bakr Naji and the organization applied it in the most precise detail, that the basis of its foundation is geographical expansion and field control for growth and extension", the opposite of al-Qaeda, whose never planned any geographical expansion in any State, even Afghanistan itself, despite the Taliban's strong presence in the region, he did not consider using it to geographically expand the region or build an Islamic state or caliphate at the time. Since its emergence, the ISIS has relied on his military doctrine on blitzkrieg war based on speed movement and mobility to develop its operations, relying on the "**filtering-sticking-building**" American military formula. Where it begins with the imposition of field presence on the ground, then the operation of filtering the area of any other jihadist groups or even

their enemies, this is what it has done in Iraq since the period of Abu Omar al-Baghdadi and the beginning of planning for the establishment of a State. The same was noted in Syria when it entered into a conflict with both the Nusra Front and the Free Army, without engaging in any real confrontation with the Syrian Government, even though it was the first to fight in order of its enemies' list. Next comes the operation of adhering and pushing the local population towards alliance with him and here the operation of reconstruction begins in accordance with their own governance approach, such as the establishment of courts, Police, schools, imposing sharia principles, providing services, taxing and dealing with them as a regular state and as its citizens. This is what we saw in both Iraq and Syria during the period of the organization's dominance over their respective areas.¹⁸ The successful of this strategy is that it relied on the integration of applied military sciences that were mastered by the old military responsible who joined them especially from the ex-Iraqi army, as well as the experience of jihadist operations of some of the members who had previously participated in this type of operation in other areas such as Afghanistan and the Chechnya... etc.¹⁹

It is noteworthy even after the loss of ISIS's influence in certain Iraqi and Syrian territories, but he didn't give up. On the contrary, he went on to apply an alternative strategy called the non-empowerment strategy in the city of Mosul in September 2017 and Baghouz in Deirez-Zor in March 2019. This strategy is based on the idea that after the loss of many power's elements, it is necessary to take a break in the geographical inexorability to enable the organization to rebuild itself from within, while maintaining the imperative of encounter with the enemy once the situation permitted. The ISIS relied in this strategy on three main tactics:²⁰

- 1- Intensify the rate of terrorist operations based on what are known as (individual wolves) and sleeper-cells spread deployed the world, thus identifying new targets for conducting specific operations.
- 2- The appearance of the ISIS's official spokesperson, in order to provide reassurance to its members, especially after the killing of the spiritual leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, as well as to present to the world the picture that the ISIS remains coherent despite the decline.
- 3- Relying on a strategy (emergence and fading) that relies on sudden operations based on limited geographical area and wide impact, using somewhat tactics and crude weapons, to become more like reprisals and provocations after being thoroughly carefully operations.

By comparing all organized and complex military planning of the ISIS with Al-Qaeda's strategy, we find that this last one did not actually reach as professional as it was with the first one. Since the 1990s, Al-Qaeda has relied on a strategy of guerrilla based on logistical data and information about international and field developments, far from the logic of direct and traditional confrontation on the ground, as opposed to ISIS, which has often fought traditional wars special in Iraq. In general, according to Charles R. Lister, Al-Qaeda had adopted a more patient and long-standing strategy to achieve social control and authority, and had emphasized the need to create appropriate social and political conditions to accept the step of declaring a caliphate. A good example would be to observe the behaviour of the Nusra Front in Syria, who had considerable a social influence in Syria compared to the ISIS, but it has never sought to force or enforce the execution of Islamic law to the people. She felt that social conditions were not suitable for such a step, apposite the behaviour of the ISIS in the same region.²¹

In last years, particularly in his struggle with ISIS, Al-Qaeda has adopted a pragmatic local strategy that it has clearly worked with the Al-Nusra Front in Syria and has previously succeeded in both Yemen and Mali. Investing its relatively limited capacity locally, the Penal Code prevented, and built alliances with Islamists and non-Islamists, in order not to draw attention to it, leaving the ISIS alone in the forefront as an enemy of the International Allied Forces, avoiding clashing with them.²²

Therefore, Al-Qaeda has adopted a strategy based on the pattern of political than military confrontation, reformed alliances to neutralize enemies as it has with Iran, as opposed to ISIS, which has insisted in all its strategy and movements on pursuing an identity approach in the conflict. The ISIS's strategy was aimed at spatial control first before transfer to the global confrontation.²³

4. Similarities between Al-Qaeda and ISIS:

The experiences of jihadist groups in general, al-Qaeda and ISIS especially, they are similar nature in:

4.1 Work on the application of Islamic law according to their interpretations:

Both organizations are classified as actors with religious ideological dimensions, combined by the commitment to disseminate hard-line ideas. In order to spread that ideology, they chose violence to establish an Islamic government on the approach of a radical caliphate and focusing on appearances, such as women's hijab, the establishment of institutions for the promotion of virtue and prevention of vice, and make the national economic; economy based on Islamic foundations and is concerned with development in all domains, the choice of an Islamic

approach encompassing all schools and universities, and the most importantly is the preparation of an Islamic army to reopen the infidels countries -as they classify it-.²⁴ If in fact, the theory of the legitimate caliphate is not a new requirement in political Islam, it is itself the rules that the Wahhabis wanted to apply in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in the 1920s. In this regard, the writings of Mohammed bin Abdul Wahab and Najda scholars are the main references in religious approach taught within the ISIS,²⁵ focusing on fighting the outside enemies and emphasizing internal unity in the face of external challenges. The existence of an Islamic State is based on the existence of an Islamic Ummah defined by both the Islamic religion and the Arabic language.

4.2 The Caliphate fantasy:

Since the beginning of its formation in the 1960s, jihadist groups aim to gain control and rule under Islamic law. All jihadist groups, from Al-Qaeda to ISIS, despite some disparities in their intellectual approach and operational strategy, have always been governed by Islamic sharia law and the State of Caliphate has been re-established as its main objective²⁶. Although many of those who wrote on the subject of the relationship between the two organizations considered that there was intellectual disagreement between them, but, in fact, there is no such type of disagreement about caliphate itself. For example, with regard to the timing of the declaration of the caliphate, al-Qaeda saw nothing worse. In fact, since bin Laden's leadership, he has often supported and stimulated the establishment of emirates in Arab countries. But his only condition was to provide the right situations, which are: geography, human, material and popular acceptability. A letter from Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi in 2005 was also found urging him to speed up the announcement of the Islamic State in Iraq, where conditions were appropriate, despite al-Qaeda's pledge of allegiance to Taliban at the same time, there was no contradiction from this perspective in establishing parallel Islamic emirates.²⁷ The declaration of caliphate by ISIS was therefore not an innovation but a natural extension of grassroots thought.²⁸

4.3 Ideological accessibility: Jihadi Salafist approach:

Al-Qaeda and the ISIS a unified asset, both come from jihadi approach, where they are characterized by the strictness of applying Wahhabi and Kotb's principles, and not recognizing or introducing compromise solutions. Both have blended the nature ideology with Mr. Kotb's political character, including:

- call for the application of the principle of governance and monotheistic; They are central concepts of salafist thought, but they have special discourse about jihadist

salafit, manifest in the necessity for public rejection of government other than God's rules, atonement of governors and positive laws. It also exposes in the society governance perception promoted by many pioneers such as Sayed Kotb, Al-Maudoudi and others. What made them call this period in their literature the “New Jahliya”.²⁹

- Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Kafr; It is one of the basic concepts in their speeches, where they consider the Muslim states as the Islam's Home, and the occidental states as the Home of infidels. Accordingly, they emphasize the necessity of Islamic rule's predominance in Dar al-Islam and then transmit it to Dar al-Kafar. They consider that Dar al-Kafr does not be so once Muslims have taken control and established their religious rites and applied Islamic rules. Also, they admit that Dar al-Islam is transformed into a Dar al-Kafr with the appearance of certain provisions of infidels.³⁰

- Refusing regimes; It is intended to reject all dominant regimes that adopt positive laws, including democracy and secularism, and recognizes only those that govern Islamic law. That reason would have ensured that any transactions with those regimes would have been totally rejected in everything about belief questions and the regulation of relations between the community components. In such a manner, Adnani stated (... Our problem is not the governing regimes, but the polytheism laws by which they are governed. There is no difference between a governor and another... all of them are oppressors... and the cause of this is: the indulge in life and leave jihad. If we want to eliminate injustice and permit the dignity, we have to reject the polytheism positive laws of marital status, and to consolidate God's legitimacy.³¹

- The allegiance and renunciation (Al-Walaa wal Baraa); the requirement of the Islamic community, its allegiance and hostility to other disbelievers and apostates, and all those who hostile it implicitly or ostensibly, by adopting jihadist salafist approach. It means that a Muslim not only has to hate the disbelievers but it is necessary to openly atone for them, especially Governments, who in their reference books have been called (Tawaghit).

- Jihad or armed action; Al-Qaida and ISIS did not neglect the jihad question and did not cancel it in their program. There is no other way of achieving their objective of the Islamic caliphate, but it was the first, most efficient and greatest. Both of them made jihad its first way of achieving change and reaching the

ultimate end of the Islamic caliphate, only through fighting and violent confrontations with disbelievers. This was announced by bin Laden more than once in his speeches both in Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan, including in the book "Basic Features of Jihad" (Maalem Assassiya fi Jihad): "I will mention here of Jihad marvels and its purpose and importance in the establishment of this religion. Some of these features are indeed part of the Muslim faith relating to faith in God's power. And Muslim should know and believe in these features to understand the nature of his conflict with disbelievers. We can call these features the jihadist doctrine of Muslims... etc."³² This means that Muslims should refuse to emulate their governments or work peacefully with them,³³ they must be confronted in difficult wars and eliminated. Jihad was set in motion in order to establish Al -Tawhid, as also expressed by Abdullah Azam when he said: "Whoever went to jihad would not return on the same vision for him and for the other."³⁴

4.4 The jihadi crowd:

is one of the most features of jihadist organizations' movements. With the beginning of their formation, all groups are working to win over supporters, sympathizers and participants, whether Arab or non-Arab. The founders begin by attracting advocates and inspiring young people to implement their ideas and even carry out individual terrorist operations, as we have seen in the last years in European states in particular.

Here we can cite how al-Qaeda has exploded media channels and videos to create a state of solemnity for him which made him earned a public support, and his issue became a fair one in the eyes of many Muslims and non-Muslims. The same with ISIS, which has gained a great popularity and advocates only for its good use of communication technology, such as encrypted messaging apps that are in our day something accessible to everyone anywhere, anytime.

4.5 Leading jihadist ideology:

in order to continue the mobilization process and the existence of organization at the top of the global event, it is always necessary to create a special situation for the leader regardless of his objectives and how they prioritize, and we find this orientation has been focused on the two organizations; Al-Qaeda has been create a caste of what are known as "Mujahideen scholars", such as Abdullah Azam, Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Nasser Abdul Karim al-Wahishi, Adam Aden, etc. The same is true for ISIS, although they not having gained the same fame as Al-Qaeda scholars, but has not neglected their role in mobilizing; such as: Abubakar Naji, Turki al-Benali, Abu Abdullah al-Muhajir,

and Abu Ali al-Anbari. Consequently, these persons, whom they considered to be scholars of what is known as “Feqeh al-Jihad”, were given the priority of advisory opinions and jihadist interpretations that motivate people to join them and give importance to their cause and a place in the Islamic situation.

4.6 Takfir approach:

Religious orientation in jihadist Salafist groups was not the birth with Al-Qaeda or ISIS but it goes back earlier like Mr. Kotb's writing at the end of the 1950s, Those who opened the door to the emergence of jihadist salafist movements in the mid-1970s, and then blending the concepts of both salafisme, jihad and atonement, To start his using officially with al-Qaeda in the Islamic world in 1989, and began theorizing atonement and all that would support his thought.³⁵

4.7 The policy of hostility:

Carl Schmitt is the most prominent in explaining and presenting the policy of hostility. According to him, any State or organization, it is necessary to understand very well to distinct between political friend and enemy and to focus on it. A State is not a State unless it is among its capabilities to declare war whenever it has its own power³⁶. If the Arab nations produced after the end of the colonial period were unable to do so, they were confronted with the amount of violence they possessed, namely in the face of their peoples. According to Al-Qaeda and ISIS, they have been able to create an external enemy of each, drawing up their own map of hostility policies with all clarity. Al-Qaeda has made the United States and the Zionist entity its first enemy, and all those with whom it has a good relationship or common interests fall into the enemy circle. The circle of hostility to the ISIS has included governments and regimes in the Arab region, Shiite, and even some jihadist groups, including al-Qaeda and others who have refused to bow down.

5. CONCLUSION

Although both al-Qaeda and ISIS are no different from others in their entities from other extremist jihadist groups and organizations, but this did not prevent some elements of difference and incompatibility, which the main cause is the conflict of interest between them to reach the same target: the caliphate. The differences between the two organizations vary in the nature of their conditions created, those have necessarily produced incompatibility in the methods and strategies. At a time when Al-Qaeda has focused on planning as many of its operations as possible affecting the strategic interests of the enemy States, while the ISIS focused on field control and expansion.

At the end, the difference between al-Qaeda and ISIS is not a contradiction or absolute inconsistency, in the end we note that today many members of the ISIS have in the past been members of the Al-Qaeda.

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