

## **The Political Nature of Hiring Mayors and Its Impact on the Quality of Financial Management: The Algerian-Tunisian Experience as a Model**

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### **Abstract:**

Political hiring based on electoral mechanisms represents a predominant pathway to public sector employment, especially in municipal settings. The mayor, as the pivotal figure responsible for the effective administration of this service, which epitomizes regional decentralization and autonomous management, bears a significant burden. Considering the relative ease with which one may assume the mayoral role, it is imperative to underscore the responsibilities, particularly those pertaining to the financial governance of municipalities under local fiscal statutes.

**Keywords:** Political hiring, mayors, financial management.

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## **1. INTRODUCTION**

Human resources serve as an essential tool in the administration of public facilities, parallel to legal and physical resources. Although the methods for recruiting human resources can differ, the underlying objective remains constant: all state or private institutions strive to recruit competent, specialized employees who exhibit integrity, experience, and productivity sufficient to fulfil the goals of each entity. Political hiring, a process integral to upholding democracy as mandated in numerous global constitutions, plays a crucial role in this context.

Both Tunisian and Algerian legislatures have embraced this employment method, implementing it in critical national institutions such as the Presidency and Parliament, and in decentralized regional entities including local communities, regions, provinces, municipalities, local councils, and regional and provincial councils in Tunisian legislation (Constitution, 2014), as well as provinces and municipalities in Algerian legislation (Constitution, Constitution of the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, 2020).

In Algeria and Tunisia, political hiring is facilitated through the electoral mechanism, a vital marker of democratic systems globally, granting citizens or local community members complete autonomy in selecting their representatives and managing communal affairs. This practice encapsulates both participatory and representative democracy. Unlike conventional employment in public institutions, which adheres to the Labor Code and the Basic Law of Public Function, political hiring operates under the electoral laws and statutes governing regional communities in Algeria and local communities in Tunisia, positioning this employment type as a specialized provision for democratic engagement.

The municipality stands as the quintessential local community within the Tunisian and Algerian administrative frameworks, primarily tasked with steering administrative decentralization,

embodying the principles of free management, and facilitating devolution.

The community is helmed by a mayor, elected via direct secret ballot for a five-year term, positioning the mayor as the principal official responsible for municipal governance and the chief liaison between the municipality's residents and various state services, both at local and central levels. This role extends to representing the municipality, its inhabitants, and the state.

While Tunisian legislation employs written or oral examinations for public sector recruitment, its Algerian counterpart utilizes a variety of methods, including competitions and/or tests, qualification-based recruitment, direct appointments, professional examinations, and tests. These methods stipulate prerequisites such as nationality, requisite academic credentials, legal age, the enjoyment of political, civil, and capacity rights, potentially required prior training, necessary physical fitness, willingness to serve across the republic, and the fulfilment of national service obligations.

The responsibility for both the administrative and financial oversight of municipalities, particularly the financial management, is an exclusive mandate of the mayors, intertwined with their discretionary and appropriateness authority in these matters. Although Tunisian and Algerian legislative bodies have instituted mechanisms to assist mayors in managing municipal finances, such as public expenditure controllers, budgetary controllers, community accountants, and even financial judiciary oversight, this support is relatively constrained and minimal compared to the extensive discretionary powers these community financiers wield.

In this context, the accountability of mayors is multifaceted, encompassing: accountability to supervisory bodies or a supervisory authority; financial accountability before the financial judiciary or the Court of Accounts in cases of financial infractions; accountability before the criminal judiciary in instances of financial corruption;

accountability before the administrative judiciary regarding the legality of decisions; and liability in terms of compensation.

Given the extensive scope of responsibilities, the role of mayor is neither trivial nor straightforward. It has become imperative for both Algerian and Tunisian legislators to reevaluate the prerequisites for electing or assuming the mayoral position, particularly concerning financial governance, as outlined by the Tunisian Local Communities Code and the soon-to-be-amended Regional Communities Law in Algeria. The central question of our research is formulated as follows:

**To what extent does the political employment of mayors of municipal councils influence the efficacy of financial management in municipalities?**

To address this question, our study is structured around two principal axes: the first delineates the conceptual framework for the political hiring of mayors in Algeria and Tunisia, and the second examines the financial management responsibilities of mayors in both nations.

### **1. Conceptual Framework for the Political Hiring of Mayors in Algeria and Tunisia**

Starting from the premise that "things are known by their opposites," this section attempts to unravel the conceptual ambiguity surrounding the type of employment based on election as a principle of decentralization rather than appointment, as observed in central and non-central administrations in Tunisia, and both centralized and decentralized frameworks in Algeria. This segment also aims to underscore the powers of mayors, particularly in the realm of financial management, culminating this axis with a practical evaluation of the performance of mayors as pivotal actors in managing local public facilities.

## **1.1 Basic Concepts and Adjacent Concepts for the Approach to Political Hiring of Mayors**

### **1.1.1 The Concept of the Municipality in Algerian Legislation**

Algeria adopted the French administrative framework based on the principle of devolution, a concept enshrined in the first constitution of the Algerian Republic post-independence. This constitution, lasting only two years, was suspended in 1965 by Order 65-182 following President Houari Boumediene's ascension under the campaign of the Revolutionary Correction(jawadi, 2020, pp. 277-283).

The 1976 constitution, influenced by socialist economic principles and a single-party political structure, introduced the institution of the municipality under Articles 35-36, albeit under the term "regional communities," which was later renamed in the 1989 constitution. The constitutional founder solidified this terminology in subsequent amendments in 1996, 2002, 2008, and as recently as 2016. Following the constitutional amendment of 2020, the Algerian legislator revised the term from "regional communities" to "local communities."

### **1.1.2 The Concept of the Municipality in Tunisian Legislation**

Algeria was not alone in adopting this administrative division; the Tunisian administrative framework has followed a similar path since the first constitution of the Tunisian Republic in 1959, which recognized the system of local communities in Article 71, operationalized through municipal councils, regional councils, and all structures accorded this status by law (Constitution, Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, 2014). In 2018, the Tunisian legislator, under the Local Communities Code, amended the composition of Tunisian local communities to now include municipalities, regions, and provinces(barket, 2021, p. 277).

The Municipal Communities Journal defines a municipality as a local community that possesses legal personality and financial and administrative autonomy. It is responsible for managing municipal affairs in accordance with the principle of free administration. The municipality strives to develop the region economically, socially,

culturally, environmentally, and urbanistically. It also provides services to its constituents, addresses the concerns of its residents, and involves them in local governance.(barket, 2021, p. 200)

### **1.1.3 The Concept of Employment in Algerian Legislation**

Employment refers to the provision of human resources essential for the management of an entity. The methods of employment in the public sector differ from the private sector, with principles of equality, specialization, and competence at the forefront. The Algerian legislator has delineated methods of employment in municipalities to encompass direct hiring; recruitment through competitions; contractual hiring; and qualification-based hiring.

### **1.1.4 The Concept of Employment in Tunisian Legislation:**

In Tunisia, employment, commonly referred to as "recruitment," is conducted through competitive exams that leverage tests, diplomas, or portfolios, with the professional qualifications of the candidates assessed by an examination committee. This committee, appointed by a decision from the Prime Minister, is tasked with ranking the candidates. Graduates from accredited schools are often recruited through direct appointment, following the specific statutes applicable to each sector(law, 1983, p. 18)

### **1.1.5 The Concept of Political Hiring as a Special Mechanism for Joining the Municipal Service:**

While neither the existing legislation nor the regulations explicitly define the political hiring process, it can be characterized as a mechanism for filling certain politically-sensitive positions. This type of employment is inherently linked to the concept of democracy, notably because it occurs through elections rather than competitive exams and diplomas.

Despite the absence of this employment type in the public service laws of Algeria or Tunisia, it is prevalent in the statutes governing local communities and electoral laws(Albakouche, 2020, p. 27).

## **1.2 Conditions for the Employment of Mayors According to the Electoral Mechanism in Algerian and Tunisian Legislation:**

Attaining the mayoralty is not achieved through competitions or exams but rather via the mechanism of direct secret election, contingent upon other criteria such as registration on the municipal electoral list and residency.

According to the Basic Electoral Law No. 16 of 2014, dated May 26, 2014, which governs elections and referenda, the Tunisian legislator mandates the following prerequisites for candidacy for a municipal council position and subsequently as a mayor (Constitution, Constitution of the Tunisian Republic, 2014, p. 49):

- + Tunisian nationality;
- + a minimum age of 18 years at the time of candidacy submission;
- + absence of any legal disqualifications;
- + registration on the electoral list of the relevant municipality.
- + The Algerian legislator sets similar conditions for mayoral candidacy under the 2016 Election Law:
  - + registration on the electoral list;
  - + attainment of at least 23 years of age on the day of voting;
  - + Algerian nationality;
  - + evidence of having performed national service;
  - + absence of a definitive conviction for a felony or misdemeanor leading to liberty deprivation, unless rehabilitated, with the exception of unintentional misdemeanours.

It is noteworthy that, unlike appointments to higher positions such as governor or district head, where educational qualifications are mandated specifically a university degree not less than a bachelor's degree in Tunisia and a license in Algeria the conditions for mayoral candidacy in both countries do not stipulate any educational qualification level.

The Tunisian legislator has set the minimum age requirement for assuming the position of mayor at 18 years, in contrast to the Algerian legislator who has established the age requirement at 23 years. The

choice of 18 years as the qualifying age in Tunisia has sparked significant doctrinal debate, primarily because this age is perceived as misaligned with the profound responsibilities inherent to mayoral duties in terms of management and decision-making. This discrepancy raises critical questions regarding the criteria utilized by the Tunisian legislator in setting this age limit, especially considering the challenging nature of the mayoral role.

### **1.3 Powers of Mayors in Financial Management Under Financial Legislation:**

Mayors are endowed with a suite of powers concerning the administrative and financial management of the municipality, as stipulated by the Local Communities Code issued in 2018 in Tunisia and the Municipal Law in Algeria. Notably, the Tunisian Public Accounting Code designates the mayor as the primary spender of the municipal budget, a role mirrored by the Algerian legislator in the 2023 Public Accounting and Financial Management Law, which also allows the mayor to delegate responsibilities or appoint a secondary spender under their supervision.

Despite the substantial significance and inherent complexity of managing public funds, neither the Tunisian nor the Algerian legislation mandates specific prerequisites in terms of experience, competence, specialization, or educational level for those holding the positions of municipal council members or mayors. This lack of stringent requirements potentially paves the way for administrative and financial corruption, misuse of office, and undue influence, which have notably degraded the performance of municipalities, as evidenced during Tunisia's 2018 municipal elections.

Managing the budget of a regional or local community involves intricate tasks related to revenue collection, expenditure disbursement, and the administration of public contracts, real estate, and movable properties, all of which demand a substantial degree of knowledge and experience due to the significant and precise responsibilities involved.

Upon their election and subsequent installation by governors, mayors immediately assume the role of expenditure authorizers, a complex and risk-laden position given the responsibilities tied to public funds management(Hamamda, 2024, p. 27).

The mayor serves as a legal instrument tasked with overseeing public facilities, whether these belong to the state and its institutions or to local communities. As such, the mayor plays a crucial role in implementing financial policies determined by legislative or deliberative bodies, depending on the context, and in upholding the principle of separation between the expenditure authorizer and the public accountant,(Chouvel, 2020, p. 149) who is considered the cornerstone of the public accounting system in both Algeria and Tunisia.

The expenditure authorizer is responsible for executing the administrative phases of financial operations, including the initiation of commitment procedures to liquidate and issue payment orders for expenditures. On the revenue side, mayors oversee the verification, liquidation, and issuance of collection orders.

In addition to their administrative responsibilities, mayors also engage in accounting tasks that involve maintaining administrative accounts with a statistical character for revenues and expenditures incurred during the fiscal year. These tasks do not involve accounting entries or double-entry bookkeeping, as the operations of accounting recording are exclusively managed by the public accountant.(Decree, 1991, p. 25) At the end of each fiscal year, mayors are mandated to prepare the administrative account, which encompasses several critical elements:

#### **1.3.1 Revenue Accounting:**

This segment involves the revenue side managed by the expenditure authorizer and includes financial statements formatted in tables that display the total of revenue collection orders issued, alongside any reductions or cancellations, and the actual value of collections received.

### **1.3.2 Commitment Accounting:**

This form of accounting aims to represent the extent of operational and capital expenditures committed in relation to program licenses and annual payment appropriations (D.G.B, 2007)

- + It discloses various details such as the appropriations opened or delegated by budget chapters and items;
- + the delegations of appropriations granted to secondary expenditure authorizers;
- + the total commitments made for operational and capital expenditures;
- + the amount of available balances for these expenditures.

### **1.3.3 Disbursement Orders Accounting:**

Maintained according to single-entry practices, this accounting needs to disclose elements such as: (Decree, 1991, p. 24)

- the appropriations opened or delegated;
- the delegations of appropriations granted to secondary expenditure authorizers;
- the volumes of disbursement or transfer orders issued;
- available appropriations.

## **1.4 Practical Evaluation of Mayoral Performance under Tunisian and Algerian Legislation:**

The laws governing elections, municipalities, and local communities do not impose any prerequisites concerning the level and competence of mayors or municipal council members. (Basic law, concerning elections, 2016) The leader of the list that secures the most seats in the municipal council is appointed without any condition concerning restriction, competence, experience, or probation (Hamamda, Algeria Administrative Law, 2024, p. 47).

Due to the challenges supervisory bodies face in addressing misconduct and poor management by mayors, and in an effort to support and improve municipal management, the state has established the roles of the municipal budgetary controller in Algerian legislation and the public expenditure controller in its Tunisian counterpart.

These controllers play a crucial role by endorsing or rejecting and advising mayors. Additionally, they are responsible for notifying central services about the municipality's expenditure progress. The financial budgetary controller also holds a permanent seat on the municipal public procurement committee, as stipulated in the decree regulating public procurement currently in force (hamamda, 2022, p. 137).

The deliberative bodies within municipalities and regions, such as the People's Councils in Algeria or the Municipal Councils in Tunisia, consist of members from various political currents and ideologies. This composition reflects the population density and the political diversity of the regional or local community. Notably, the qualifications for members of municipal councils, regional councils, local councils, or provincial councils are not specified or mandated (benltaif, 2021, p. 5)

akin to the requirements for mayors and municipal councils. As a result, the approach to thinking and analysis within these councils tends to be more politically populist rather than adhering strictly to legal procedural norms. This orientation may or may not align with the legislation and regulations that govern municipal expenditures, despite the fact that budget management involves highly complex technical and legal rules and procedures.

To mitigate potential mismanagement, both legislatures have implemented extensive pre-administrative oversight as the final stage following the preparation of budgets by state agents. This oversight is intended to ensure the legitimacy of public spending by these local entities, despite it potentially conflicting with the principle of free management of municipalities. (sedrati, 2023, p. 1002)

Judicial reports have highlighted numerous transgressions by elected officials, particularly mayors, which are punishable as crimes of corruption, especially those involving public funds. The abuse of mayoral powers has been a persistent issue since independence. For instance, following the 2018 municipal elections in Tunisia, there

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were numerous judicial investigations and prosecutions of municipal council presidents for misusing their functions, particularly concerning municipal funds.(elhiwar, 2024)

The number of municipal council presidents in Tunisia either imprisoned with final sentences or under investigation for corruption reached 324 during this period. The 2012-2017 electoral term saw a significant number of prosecutions and investigations against mayors for mismanagement of public funds and granting undue privileges. In March 2023,

after the dissolution of the municipal councils in Tunisia, several mayors were prosecuted for financial corruption; some have been convicted and are currently serving prison sentences, while others are still undergoing trial.

## **2. Responsibilities of Mayors in Financial Management in Both Tunisia and Algeria**

Given the critical importance and sensitivity of managing public funds, both the Algerian and Tunisian legislatures have delineated multiple responsibilities for those managing these affairs. This section will explore the administrative responsibility of mayors, their financial accountability, and, ultimately, their criminal liability before the judiciary. This comprehensive approach underscores the gravity of their roles and the serious repercussions of any mismanagement or corruption.

### **2.1 Limitations of the Administrative Responsibility of Mayors Under the Specificity of Guardianship and Supervision Systems**

While public service legislations delineate the administrative responsibility of public officials, predicated on errors and penalties outlined within the same texts, wherein any public employee or agent committing an administrative error is subject to disciplinary proceedings before the appropriate disciplinary committees, mayors are exempt from these procedures according to local community legislations in Tunisia and Algeria.

However, the responsibility of mayors, particularly concerning financial decisions, remains relatively intact before supervisory or guardianship bodies. Algerian legislation, for instance, permits governors to reject any financial decision, including unbalanced budgets or those omitting mandatory expenditures, citing explicit refusal grounds.(Hamamda, algeria Administratif law, 2024, p. 86)

Contrastingly, the Algerian legislator has endowed governors with the authority to reject unlawful financial decisions under the umbrella of supervisory administrative control, while the Tunisian legislator assigns this jurisdiction to the financial judiciary rather than supervisory bodies.(zakraoui, 2013, p. 33)

Furthermore, the administrative responsibility of mayors extends beyond supervisory authorities to include accountability before the administrative judge, who oversees the legality of administrative decisions and compensation for damages resulting from unlawful decisions, especially those with financial ramifications such as public contracts (announcement, conditions, granting, exclusion, competition).

Field experiences have highlighted the arbitrariness and recklessness of mayors in their administrative decision-making, whether financial or otherwise. This behavior is often influenced by the populist nature of their election and the policy of plunder they pursue. Additionally, the influence of the elected council significantly impacts these decisions, where the administrative judge serves as an effective safeguard against the arbitrary decisions made by mayors, which tend to be more political than administrative in nature.

## **2.2 Financial Responsibility of Mayors Under the Legislation**

Aside from the civil liability that mayors incur from causing harm through personal mistakes driven by negligence or rash and personal considerations, or through institutional errors that also result in harm and are borne by the administration as classified by the judiciary (as stipulated in the Algerian Civil Law)(hamamda, Financial Controller's Responsibility When Supervising Committed Municipal

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Expenditures," Article published in the Journal of Human Resource Development for Studies and Research,, 2021, p. 259), mayors also bear personal responsibility towards the state for errors committed during the execution of their duties, even if these errors do not harm others.

These errors, which fall under the jurisdiction of the financial judiciary, are specified in Article 88 of Law 95-20 related to the Algerian Court of Accounts and can be summarized as follows:(Hamamda, Specialized Judicial Control over Administrative Actions, 2024, p. 67)

- ✚ Breach of legislative and regulatory provisions related to expenditure execution;
- ✚ Committing expenditures without the requisite authority or in violation of the rules applied in the area of prior control;
- ✚ Committing expenditures without the necessary appropriations or exceeding the special budget authorizations;
- ✚ Illegally deducting expenses to either conceal exceeding appropriations or to alter the original allocation of commitments;
- ✚ Unfounded refusal of visas or explicit obstructions by pre-audit bodies;
- ✚ Granting visas outside the legal conditions.

The control wielded by the Court of Accounts is both deterrent and punitive, reflecting the sacredness of public funds. The decisions that mandate a mayor to return remaining funds, which have been legally substantiated and even obtained executive form, along with imposing financial penalties for violations in financial management that fall under the jurisdiction of the National Chamber for Financial and Budgetary Discipline, penalties that can amount to up to twelve times (12x) the monthly salary of the responsible individual, highlight the

efficacy of the Council's oversight. This oversight encompasses not only budget management but also the management of property within local communities.(Hamamda, Specialized Judicial Control over Administrative Actions, 2024, p. 45)

Moreover, the Court of Accounts extends its oversight beyond the accounts of public accountants to include the actions of mayors in executing the general budget. The legislator has empowered the Court to penalize errors identified by its judges, emphasizing the significance of these duties. The Basic Law of the Court of Accounts of 2019 dedicates an entire chapter to the punishment of management errors, mirroring the role played by the Financial and Budgetary Discipline Control Council in France. Under Article 113 of the Basic Law of the Court of Accounts, the Tunisian legislator identifies the following actions as management errors:(barket, 2021)

- ✚ Any management action resulting in the non-liquidation or collection of receivables and amounts due or their non-deposit in the treasury for the benefit of the entities stipulated ;

- ✚ Any management action that fails to meet the conditions of the control to which it is subject according to applicable laws;

- ✚ Any management action undertaken by an individual without the legal delegation for the purpose, resulting in financial obligations on behalf of one of the entities;

- ✚ Granting advances not expressly stipulated by law;

- ✚ Violation of legal and regulatory provisions related to the recruitment and management of agents by the entities mentioned in Article 111 of the Court of Accounts Law of 2019;

- ✚ Violation of legal and regulatory provisions related to public procurement and obligations and other contracts entered into by the entities;

- ✚ Violation of rules for managing public properties;

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✚ Any action resulting in a breach of the laws, regulations, rules, and procedures applicable to the management of the entities mentioned in Article 111 of the Court of Accounts Law, resulting in damage to the bodies concerned with their oversight.

Each individual proven guilty of committing any of the aforementioned management errors is subject to a financial penalty ranging from one-twelfth to the entire annual gross salary of the concerned individual at the time of committing the error, excluding family allowances. This is irrespective of any disciplinary or criminal penalties that the management errors committed might warrant. (barket, 2021, p. 118)

### **2.3 Criminal Responsibility of Mayors Under the Legislation**

The mayor is considered a public official in the technical sense, as previously discussed. This status is also defined by the Algerian legislator through Law 06-01 on the prevention and fight against corruption, specifically in its second article defining a public official. Referring to the provisions of this law that define corruption crimes and the prescribed penalties, it is evident that the mayor, like any public official, is criminally responsible if they commit any of the offenses stipulated in the law on the prevention and fight against corruption. These offenses carry penalties of up to 20 years, considering some additional penalties. The crimes include: (hamamda, Financial security of local governments, 2022, p. 255)

- ✚ Receiving undue benefits (both passive and active bribery);
- ✚ Unjustified privileges in public contracts;
- ✚ Embezzlement or unlawful use of properties;
- ✚ Failing to declare assets or making false declarations;
- ✚ Abuse of power;
- ✚ Misuse of office;

- ✚ Conflicts of interest;
- ✚ Receiving gifts;
- ✚ Failing to report crimes;
- ✚ Obstructing the proper course of justice;
- ✚ Interfering with the execution of a judicial decision;
- ✚ Signing documents in a language other than Arabic;
- ✚ Obstructing or refusing the execution of a judicial decision.

In line with the Algerian approach, the Tunisian legislator has criminalized many actions that may be taken by mayors, with penalties also extending to 20 years, considering additional penalties. These crimes include: (law, Related to reporting corruption crimes and protecting whistleblowers, 2017)

- ✚ Any act contrary to the law and regulations in force that harms or is likely to harm the public interest;
- ✚ Misuse of authority or influence or office for personal gain;
- ✚ Bribery in all its forms;
- ✚ Appropriation of public funds;
- ✚ Mismanagement or squandering of public funds;
- ✚ Abuse of influence;
- ✚ Exceeding authority or misuse of it;
- ✚ Illicit enrichment;
- ✚ Breach of trust;
- ✚ Misuse of funds of legal entities;
- ✚ Money laundering;
- ✚ Conflicts of interest;

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- ✚ Insider trading;
- ✚ Tax evasion;
- ✚ Disrupting decisions of the judicial authority;
- ✚ Any actions threatening public health, safety, or the environment.

Given the large number of crimes for which mayors are criminally responsible in cases of financial and administrative mismanagement of municipal funds and interests, the mode of political hiring based on elections, partisanship, and populism inevitably exposes mayors to these crimes. This was evident in Algeria through the campaign of prosecutions following the national movement that dates back to February 22, 2019.

According to statistics from the Ministry of Justice, the largest category of those prosecuted were mayors, not appointed officials. Similarly, in Tunisia, during the revolution of December 17, 2017, and following the dissolution of municipal councils in March 2023, these events negatively impacted the performance of the municipal domain in general and the mayors in particular.

### **Conclusion**

In conclusion to our study, based on the extensive discussions presented, it is clear that the efficacy and governance in the performance of mayors are relatively poor when measured against previously established goals. This shortfall is largely attributed to the limited capabilities of mayors. In light of these findings, we are pleased to conclude our research with the following recommendations:

- ✚ Reconsider the law on political parties in Tunisia, which has remained unchanged since 2011 despite the significant transformations that have reshaped the Tunisian legal landscape following the 2014 constitution. Similarly, the Algerian political parties law, last updated in 2012, no longer addresses the current challenges of political hiring effectively.

✚ Revisit the candidacy conditions for the position of mayor in the election laws and laws of regional communities within both Tunisian and Algerian legislation. It is particularly critical to evaluate the educational level requirements in light of the challenges posed by good governance and the advancements in electronic administration.

✚ Propose the inclusion of specific provisions for mayoral positions in the forthcoming amendments to the basic law of public service and labor code, which are currently under review and subject to enrichment in both Algerian and Tunisian legislation.

✚ Implement continuous training mechanisms for mayors throughout their term to provide both administrative and political support, recognizing that municipal management is an amalgamation of administration and politics.

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