Human & Social Sciences Journal

Volume 11, Issue 01, June 2025, P.P. 72-82

Napoleon Bonaparte and the Algerian Conquest Project

نابليون بونبارت ومشروع غزو الجزائر

Napoléon Bonaparte et le Projet de Conquête de l'Algérie

Hamza Ishak, ZITOUNI[*1]

Date of submission 15/11/2024 - Date of acceptation 31/05/2025 - Date of edition: 11 /06 /2025

ملخص: اعتمد البلاط الفرنسي على سياسة خاصة أطرت علاقتها مع الجزائر، والتي تقوم على مبدأ الارتباط مع الجزائر بمعاهدات صداقة، مع بقاء الحل العسكري وارداً. فقد فضلت السلطات الفرنسية إعلان الحرب على الجزائر لتدميرها كلما شعرت بأنها تمتلك القوة لذلك. وعليه، يهدف هذا المقال إلى إماطة اللثام عن العلاقات الفرنسية الجزائرية خلال فترة حكم نابليون بونابرت ونوايا نابليون التوسعية في شمال أفريقيا. من خلال ما سبق، يمكن طرح الإشكالية التالية: هل اعتمد نابليون على هذه القاعدة في علاقته مع الجزائر؟ وهل كان فعلاً ينوي غزو الجزائر بعد فشل محاولته في غزو مصر؟ كيف كان موقف السلطات الجزائرية من السياسة النابليونية؟ للإجابة على هذه الإشكالية، اتبعنا المنهج التاريخي الوصفي لدراسة الأحداث التاريخية المتسارعة في تلك الفترة، ووصفها ثم تحليلها. توصل البحث إلى نتيجة تلخص العلاقات الجزائرية الفرنسية قبل وبعد الثورة الفرنسية، حيث تمسك نابليون بمبدأ الارتباط مع الجزائر بمعاهدات صداقة، مع إبقاء الحل العسكري وارداً كلما توفرت لفرنسا الفرصة والقوة لتدمير الجزائر.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الجمهورية الفرنسية، الجزائر، نابليون بونابارت، غزو الجزائر

Abstract: The French court adopted a policy that shaped its relationship with Algeria, based on friendship treaties while keeping the military option open. The French authorities preferred to declare war on Algeria whenever they felt powerful enough to destroy it. This article aims to examine French-Algerian relations during Napoleon Bonaparte's reign and his expansionist ambitions in North Africa. From the above, the following problem statement is raised: Did Napoleon rely on this principle in his relationship with Algeria? Was he truly planning to invade Algeria after the failure of his attempt to invade Egypt? What was the stance of the Algerian authorities towards Napoleon's policies? To answer these questions, we used a historical descriptive method to analyze the events of the period. The research concludes that Napoleon maintained the principle of friendship treaties with Algeria but kept the military option available whenever France had the opportunity and strength to destroy Algeria.

Keywords: French Republic; Algeria; Napoleon; Invasion of Algeria

Résumé : La cour française a adopté une politique fondée sur des traités d'amitié avec l'Algérie, tout en laissant l'option militaire ouverte. Les autorités françaises préféraient déclarer la guerre à l'Algérie lorsqu'elles se sentaient suffisamment fortes. Cet article examine les relations franco-algériennes sous le règne de Napoléon Bonaparte et ses ambitions en Afrique du Nord. La problématique pose : Napoléon a-t-il basé sa relation avec l'Algérie sur ce principe ? Envisageait-il d'envahir l'Algérie après l'échec de sa campagne en Égypte ? Quelle était la réaction des autorités algériennes aux politiques napoléoniennes ? Pour répondre à ces questions, nous avons utilisé une méthode historique descriptive pour analyser les événements de l'époque. La recherche conclut que Napoléon a maintenu les traités d'amitié avec l'Algérie tout en gardant l'option militaire ouverte chaque fois que la France avait la possibilité et la force de détruire l'Algérie.

Mots clés : République française; Algérie; Napoléon; Conquête de l'Algérie.

* **Corresponding author.**
[1]**Hamza Ishak, ZITOUNI**, **University: Mohamed El Bachir El Ibrahimi University,Algeria,**
ishak.univ.bba@gmail.com

Introduction:

Franco-Algerian relations during the eighteenth century were distinguished by relative calm (Guenane, p. 16). After the failure of the force-based approach initially adopted by French authorities toward Algeria, France endeavored to adjust its policy, demonstrating a preference for peaceful coexistence with the Algerians (Curran, 1947, p. 19).

The French authorities began issuing directives to their consuls in Algeria, instructing them to seek mutual understanding, rely solely on themselves, and appeal to the goodwill of the Deys and influential figures without resorting to threats, regardless of the cost. The consuls were informed that previous bombardment campaigns would not resume and that French ships would merely make occasional appearances off the Algerian coast (Khir Fares, 1969, p. 133).

This period was characterized by increased activity from the British and Dutch authorities, who attempted by all means to entice and force Algeria to declare war on France and sever ties (Bouaziz, 1980, p. 94). However, the Algerian government refused to heed external demands, including the enticements offered by the British government to change its foreign policy toward France. Algeria continued to regard France as a friend to both Muslims and Algeria, which contributed to a period of relative calm and stability in Franco-Algerian political relations throughout the eighteenth century, in contrast to the continuous wars and tensions of the previous century (Guenane, p. 16).

These relations culminated at the beginning of the eighteenth century with the signing of a peace and trade treaty between Algeria and France in April 1718 (Guenane, 1987, pp. 327-329), followed by another in March 1724 (Guenane, pp. 329-334). These agreements bound the two governments for an entire century and reinforced the 1689 treaty (De Card, 1906, pp. 52-60) previously mentioned (Al-Djilali, 1980, p. 219).

1 Tension in Franco-Algerian Relations

The friendship between Algeria and France, established by the peace treaty signed by both parties on December 17, 1801, was short-lived. Despite the significant sacrifices made by Algeria to promote understanding and peace with France, there was a lack of understanding on the part of the French authorities regarding Algeria’s challenging situation following Napoleon’s campaign in Egypt, which led the Ottoman Caliphate to declare war on France. The situation took a dramatic turn when Algerian authorities insisted that France pay all its outstanding debts. However, the French government chose to delay and ignore the matter. As the French historian Duval remarked, "He who does not pay his debts loses the respect of others (Dufal, p. 31)," and thus, Algeria's favorable view of France began to diminish.

The situation did not end at this point; it worsened further when France refused to pay the dues owed and failed to find solutions to its debt problems with Algeria. In response, the Dey instructed the Algerian navy to harass French commercial fleets to pressure the French government into resolving the debt issue, which had become a thorn in the side of Franco-Algerian relations.

2The Franco-European Conflict and Its Impact on Algeria

The British fleet's occupation of the French port of Toulon in 1793 is regarded as the beginning of an entrenched naval hostility between the two countries, resulting in British dominance over the Mediterranean sea (Al-Tawil, 2001, p. 279). Following this brief occupation, despite lasting only a few weeks, the British fleet maintained a permanent presence along the Mediterranean coast. This presence quickly transformed into total British control over the Mediterranean, which greatly troubled Napoleon Bonaparte.

Napoleon believed that Britain had no right to interfere in the affairs of the Mediterranean, regarding it the exclusive domain of France (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 35). He harbored intense animosity toward Britain, viewing it as a curse on his life and the primary obstacle to realizing his ambitions. He often called Britain as "perfidious Albion" (Will & Ariel, 2002, p. 84) and declared that British money was the main cause of France's hardships, particularly after the crushing defeat of the French navy and the destruction of most of its fleet in the Battle of Aboukir Bay in 1798 by the British fleet under Nelson. This decisive victory granted the British navy complete control over the Mediterranean, and Britain's wealth grew even further as it expanded its trade relations with the East, capitalizing on the diminishing French presence in the eastern Mediterranean (Al-Tawil, 2001, p. 283).

Day and night, Napoleon planned to build a fleet that would rule the seas and embody France's greatness on the oceans. He spent lavishly and brought in workers to shipbuilding centers like Toulon and Brest, testing twelve commanders to choose an admiral capable of leading the growing French navy to victory (Will & Ariel, 2002, p. 84).

Amid this Anglo-French rivalry for dominance over the Mediterranean, the significance of North African states, particularly Algeria, increased for both competing powers. Britain's growing presence in the Mediterranean expanded its interests with Algeria, which offered supplies for its naval bases and troops. During the period between 1803 and 1814, Britain stationed around 9,000 soldiers in Malta, 23,000 soldiers in Sicily, and more than 28,000 sailors on ships patrolling the Mediterranean (Al-Tawil, 2001, p. 283). On the other hand, Napoleon believed that whoever could seize control of North Africa, especially Algeria, would be capable of starving Europe (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 37) and disrupting British interests in the Mediterranean.

All of these factors made Algeria's strategic significance in the Mediterranean increasingly clear. Algeria emerged to be situated at a central point between British bases at the Strait of Gibraltar and Malta, which would support British naval control of the Mediterranean in the event of British occupation of Algeria or if permission was granted by the Algerian authorities to establish military naval bases along its coasts. Therefore, any successful military campaign against Algeria, or any Anglo-Algerian alliance, would forever break France's dominance in the region and shatter Napoleon's dreams of controlling the Mediterranean, much like the Mediterranean waves crashing against Algeria's shores. On the other hand, if Napoleon were able to occupy Algeria or form an alliance with it against the British, he would undoubtedly gain military naval bases along Algeria's coast, strategically located between British military bases in the Mediterranean. This would enable him to cut off British naval routes, isolating their bases and rendering them ineffective.

Napoleon, the Emperor of France, realized that his expansionist projects and his ambition to dominate the Mediterranean were threatened if Britain took advantage of Algeria's strategic position.

Algeria's strategic significance was not only of interest to the British; Napoleon also sought to leverage it in his war against them. Undoubtedly, if France gained naval bases along Algeria's coast, it would enable cooperation with the Toulon base, strengthening the link between north and south and allowing France to dominate the western Mediterranean basin (Yahya, 1981, p. 86). Moreover, Algeria's economic importance grew as the French agricultural and farming sectors declined due to a labor shortage caused by Napoleon's policy of conscripting every able-bodied Frenchman to support his European campaigns. This led France into a severe famine and increased its need for wheat, meat, and oil—products that were abundant in Algeria. Consequently, French authorities aimed to benefit from Algeria's resources while simultaneously preventing the British from doing the same.

Thus, Algeria's strategic location and its economic potential made each of the conflicting parties wary of the possibility that the other side might gain control over Algeria or secure its alliance against the other.

Napoleon realized that he could not subjugate Algeria, and that Algeria's debts problem, which burdened him, was a considerable obstacle to Franco-Algerian relations. Thus, he decided to take action to occupy Algeria and cut off Britain's access, rather than seeking to appease Britain in the hope of securing an alliance against the British. However, the dilemma Napoleon faced was that his armies stationed in Europe could not be divided or dispersed. Therefore, he preferred to postpone the occupation of Algeria until the right time, rather than spreading his forces across multiple continental fronts.

Projects to Conquer Algeria

In these circumstances, several projects for the occupation of Algeria began to emerge, many of which encouraged Napoleon to pursue this goal. He instructed his military officials to collect necessary information about Algeria from travel books, prisoners, and other sources (Zeroual, 1994, p. 57). Following his mission in Algeria between August 8 and 9, 1802, upon his return to France, Holland submitted a special report on Algeria to Napoleon and sent a copy to the Foreign Minister. In his report, Holland wrote that Napoleon was responsible for the campaign on Algeria, with the goal of liberating its people from Turkish oppression (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 58).

When Napoleon appointed Officer Beric to deliver his message (Plantet, 1889, pp. 500-502) to Algeria, the French authorities also tasked him with spying (Slimane, 1994, p. 71) on Algeria's fortifications and collecting intelligence useful for France's planned campaign.

During his stay in Algeria, Officer Beric took the opportunity to draft a plan and map of the country as preliminary work for the occupation project (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 58).

Among the most important French projects for occupying Algeria during this period (1802) were the plans of Jeanbon Saint André (Devoulx, 1872, p. 440). He received a letter from Foreign Minister Talleyrand dated July 27, 1802, including twelve questions about Algeria. Talleyrand instructed Officer Jeanbon Saint André to keep the project confidential.

Officer Saint André responded to all of Talleyrand's questions, concluding that the most successful operation would be a naval one, conducted swiftly and without mercy. He remarked, "If Algeria is to be disciplined, the strike must be aimed directly at its heart. (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 59) "

The second project was prepared by Thédenat (Amiraoui, 2003), who, upon hearing of Napoleon's intention to conquer Algeria, quickly compiled his notes into a detailed report entitled An Overview of the Regency of Algiers, which he submitted to Talleyrand on August 18, 1802. In this report, Thédenat summarized the political, social, and military state of Algeria, drawing from his experience as a former prisoner there for several years (Bouaziz, p. 228). He described what he considered to be acts of piracy and the brutality of the Berbers, explaining that the authority and power of the despotic Dey in Algeria were sustained by the cowardice of European trading nations, who were always willing to submit and pay tribute to Algeria (Schaller, 1824). He argued that a well-planned military campaign would enable France to take control of the region at minimal cost, as seizing the Dey's treasury would cover the entire expense of the campaign. He suggested sending an army to Tenes, then laying siege to Algiers in coordination with the fleet, which would force the Dey to surrender the gold and all warships (Amiraoui, 2003, p. 41), thus allowing France to transform Algeria into a civilized, trading nation rather than a piracy-based state that terrorized and exploited other nations.

In addition to these two plans for the conquest of Algeria (Bouaziz, p. 228), Dubois-Tanafiel proposed to Napoleon that he proceed with the campaign, assuring him that Algiers would fall as soon as the locals heard of his arrival to liberate them from Turkish oppression. According to Tainville, the local population was prepared to revolt against the Turks, making the conquest of Algeria both easy and certain if the determination was there[2]

All these projects emerged in the context of the Treaty of Amiens of 1802, which ended the European wars that had engulfed the continent and drawn all of its nations into conflict. This peace marked a temporary end to hostilities between France and England, the latter having led the European coalition to oppose Napoleon's expansion across Europe and even into Egypt.

The peace treaty granted Napoleon sufficient time to seriously contemplate the invasion of Algeria as compensation for his failed Egyptian campaign. However, the decline of the Treaty of Amiens and the renewed hostilities between England and France in May 1803 forced Napoleon to delay executing his plan to occupy Algeria (Guenane, p. 200).

During his European campaigns, Napoleon achieved significant victories, defeating the Austrian army on October 20, 1805, and the Russian army at the Battle of Austerlitz in early December. By the end of 1805, the Third Coalition—a European alliance led by England aimed at destroying France—had collapsed. France then began consolidating its dominance over occupied European territories (Guenane, p. 183), such as Germany and the Italian Peninsula. Napoleon saw

[2] It appears that French Consul Dubois-Tanafiel, when he proposed to Napoleon the idea of occupying Algeria, overlooked the miserable condition in which he first arrived in Algeria, how the Algerian authorities received him with care and respect, and how they ignored his miserable condition upon his escape from Spain aboard an Algerian ship. Nevertheless, Algeria elevated his and his country's status, defying both England and the Ottoman Empire.

England as the final barrier to his grand ambitions, considering it a curse on his life and the primary obstacle to his imperial vision.

Napoleon was convinced that the destruction of the English fleet would inevitably lead to England's downfall, opening the gates of Europe and paving the way for his dream of building a unified European empire on the foundations of the former Roman Empire.

The young French Emperor eagerly anticipated this moment, especially after having managed to bring all of Europe to its knees, with only England left to disturb the thrill of his victory. During this period, Napoleon completed the construction of a promising new navy, designed specifically to confront and defeat the English fleet, thus ending the English threat once and for all. He appointed Captain Pierre de Villeneuve[3] as admiral to lead the rising French navy to victory (Will & Ariel, 2002, pp. 83-84).

On October 23, 1805 (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 65), the English navy, led by Nelson, confronted the French fleet near Cape Trafalgar, close to Gibraltar (Brun, 2006, p. 401). This fierce battle ended with a decisive victory for the English, leading to the complete destruction of the French fleet (Will & Ariel, 2002, pp. 82-87).

This victory solidified England's dominance over the seas and oceans, completely eliminating French impact on the world's waterways. However, would the destruction of Napoleon's fleet prevent him from pursuing his expansionist ambitions, especially his plan to invade Algeria?

These events coincided with the assassination of Dey Mustafa in Algeria in 1805, after which Ahmed Khodja assumed leadership. The new Dey's foreign policy was characterized by firmness, particularly toward France, as he was neither lenient nor tolerant in his dealings with them. He maintained a strict policy of neutrality regarding the internal European conflicts (Guenane, p. 200). During his tenure, tensions in Europe continued to escalate, shifting from direct military confrontation to a war of attrition. In 1806, England declared a blockade on the coasts stretching from the Elbe River to Brest (Brun, 2006, p. 402), prompting Napoleon to respond with an imperial decree issued in Berlin, enforcing the Continental System[4].

Neutral countries, including Algeria, were adversely impacted by the harsh policies imposed by both England and France. The Dey of Algeria protested, viewing these measures as a veiled attempt to drag neutral countries indirectly into the ongoing conflict between England and France.

Relations between Algeria and France worsened, especially after Napoleon refused to pay the tributes and gifts owed to the Dey. Meanwhile, all other European nations maintaining treaties of peace and trade with Algeria continued to pay the necessary tributes and gifts to the Dey (Samah, 1989, p. 589).

[3] Admiral Pierre participated in the French campaign against Egypt and was one of those responsible for its failure and the destruction of the French navy at the Battle of Abu Qir.

[3] A measure that prevents all countries from trading with the British Isles and forbids correspondence to England from any states under French influence. It also considers British nationals residing in French-occupied territories or allied states as prisoners of war, and their property can be seized.

The Dey grew increasingly frustrated with Napoleon's treatment and could no longer tolerate the arrogance of the French Emperor and the behaviour of his consul, who seemed to overstep professional boundaries by speaking to the Dey in a tone that hinted at defiance (Doudou, 1989, p. 49). Therefore, in 1806, the Dey decided to reconsider his policy toward France and respond in kind. He ordered the Algerian navy to seize any French or Italian vessels sailing in the Mediterranean. He went further by directing his corsairs to confiscate coral-fishing vessels in Annaba and El Kala, seizing coral worth fifty thousand piastres and enslaving about two hundred crew members under the pretext that they were Neapolitan subjects, despite carrying French passports. When the French consul Tenafiel demanded their release as French nationals, the Dey responded that he did not consider Italians as French nationals, particularly given that Bonaparte had not presented him with the customary gifts symbolizing harmony between the two countries, as other European nations had offered (Doudou, 1989, p. 50).

France's response to the Dey's actions was swift. Rather than offering the appeasement the Dey sought, Talleyrand ordered the seizure of Algerian ships and goods in France (Plantet E. , p. 511).

The Dey handled this French reaction with significant tact. Instead of escalating the conflict, he aimed to strike France by aligning with its archenemy, England. On January 7, 1807, Dey Ahmed Khodja revoked the French monopoly on trade and coral fishing and granted it instead to the English in exchange for an annual tax of 50,000 piastres, equivalent to 267,000 francs (Samah, 1989, p. 590).

Napoleon could not digest the idea of France being excluded—or rather swept out—from Algeria in such a humiliating manner. On this, Turkish historian Arjmand Curran stated that the Dey's actions pushed Napoleon to seriously reconsider the idea of occupying Algeria (Curran, 1947, p. 20). However, how could Napoleon reach Algeria, blockade its coasts, bombard its cities, and then occupy it, given that France lacked a reliable war fleet for such circumstances, particularly since the French navy had been devastated by the English fleet at the Battle of Trafalgar in 1805.

Could Napoleon also afford to open a new front in North Africa and scatter his forces across different fronts already spread throughout Western Europe?

The idea of occupying Algeria did indeed reoccur to Napoleon at this phase, particularly after he received the consent of Russian Tsar Alexander I to occupy Algeria under the Franco-Russian Treaty of Tilsit (Spencer, 1980, p. 183) on July 7, 1807 (Naït Belkacem, 1985, p. 29). Furthermore, Napoleon's control over Spain and his installation of his brother, Joseph Bonaparte, as its king after dethroning the Bourbon royal family (Khir Fares, 1969, p. 140) granted Napoleon the Spanish fleet at no cost. He could now use Spanish ports and their fleet, which had effectively become his own, to reach Algeria.

In the eyes of the French Emperor, the path to occupying Algeria now seemed clear. All that remained was to draft a well-structured military plan that would turn Algeria into French territory. Therefore, on April 18, 1808, Napoleon summoned his Minister of the Navy and ordered him to seriously consider and plan for the invasion of Algeria (Zahra, 1996-1997, p. 77). He raised a series of questions about Algeria's defenses, probing both their strengths and weaknesses and evaluating

whether these weaknesses could be exploited for a successful campaign. Ultimately, he requested that a military engineer be appointed to prepare an occupation plan for Algeria. The choice fell on Lieutenant Boutin, who was attached to the engineering corps, to undertake an intelligence mission in Algeria and collect the necessary information for this purpose.

Napoleon gave Lieutenant Boutin specific instructions, which were as follows:

• Do not tell stories or let your imagination run wild when you return and write your report. You must record even the smallest details as they occur.

• Provide a precise, detailed written report without using words like "but," "if," or "because." (Naït Belkacem, 1985, p. 32)

Boutin arrived in Algeria on May 24, 1808 (Bouaziz, p. 229), and the following day he was welcomed by French Consul Tanafiel, who allowed him to visit the fortifications and gun emplacements to such an extent that it aroused suspicion (Guenane, p. 202). However, historical records suggest that Tanafiel was unaware of Boutin's espionage mission until after Boutin's stay in Algeria. Engineer Boutin was able to study the conditions of the city of Algiers, the situation of its fortresses, and all its structures. He also evaluated the strategic areas of the city (Al-Djilali A. , p. 308).

Boutin stayed in Algeria from May 24 to July 17, 1808. During his departure from Algeria (after being expelled by the Algerian authorities) and his return to Toulon, an English warship captured the vessel that was carrying Boutin. England seized all the maps, plans, and the detailed report that Boutin had carefully prepared for the occupation of Algeria. Boutin was taken prisoner to Malta but managed to escape to Izmir, then Constantinople, and finally Paris, where he rewrote his report, accompanied by a geographical atlas containing around 15 maps and illustrations. The report was entitled: "General Information on the Cities, Fortresses, and Gun Batteries for the Conquest and Permanent Presence in the Country". (Naït Belkacem, pp. 247-250).

In the introduction to his report, prepared at the end of spring 1808, Engineer Boutin emphasized that the two primary factors requiring the most attention in planning the campaign were, first, selecting a suitable location for landing troops near the capital, and second, the resistance the troops would encounter upon landing. He argued that the best site for landing was Sidi-Fredj coastline. In his report, Boutin explained the strategic significance of Sidi-Fredj area for the success of the campaign, as well as the disadvantages of choosing any other location. The report also addressed the regular Algerian army, the forces the Algerian Beylics could mobilize through tribal support, and the efficiency and effectiveness of the Algerian military.

Boutin's report is comprehensive, covering all the significant points that could either assist or thwart the campaign (Khir Fares, 1969, p. 140).

Events unfolded in such a way that Boutin's report was relegated to the shelves of the Ministry of the Navy. From 1808 to 1814, France was preoccupied with the peak of the European wars, which led the French authorities to cancel plans for launching a war against Algeria (Al-Tamimi, 1972, p. 235).

The war France entered in Europe was unlike other wars, as it marked the beginning of the decline and retreat of the French army. The resistance in Spain fulfilled one victory after another against the French occupying forces, which started to retreat toward the French borders.

The resistance was not limited to Spain alone; numerous national resistances appeared in other European countries under French domination, and these revolts quickly turned into a new continental war.

The English attempted to win Algeria's favor by introducing Boutin's report, which sought at the occupation of Algeria, to the Algerian authorities, revealing the true French intentions against Algeria.

How did the Algerian government respond to Napoleon's ambitions to occupy its country?

The Algerian historian Djamal Guenane answers this question by stating: "...The Algerian authorities were not afraid of Napoleon and did not fear the possibility of him launching a campaign against Algeria. On many occasions, these officials expressed to their French interlocutors that Napoleon would make a grave mistake if he believed he could easily win in this country, as he would confront fierce resistance utilizing all available means... (Guenane, p. 203) "

The French Empire collapsed with Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, and thus the balance of power in Algeria's foreign relations shifted from France to England. The English moved the focus of relations between Algeria and European countries from grain to the Algerian navy, which made Algeria a target once again due to its maritime activities.

Conclusion:

Algerian-French relations in the late 18th century witnessed a degree of rapprochement due to financial aid and Algeria's support for the young French Republic, especially through the protection of French commercial vessels by the Algerian navy, which were blockaded by the European coalition that aimed to eliminate the republican system in France and restore the Bourbon monarchy to the French throne.

However, relations soured when both parties failed to resolve the issue of debt. Consequently, the Dey of Algiers instructed the Algerian navy to harass the French commercial fleet in an effort to pressure the French government into settling the issue, leading to a deterioration in Franco-Algerian relations.

The Treaty of Tilsit (French-Russian) ignited Napoleon's ambition to invade Algeria, shifting his expansionist focus towards the country for two significant reasons: first, to control maritime navigation in the Mediterranean by securing both its northern and southern shores (the French and Algerian coasts), and second, to strike at British interests and attempt to exclude Britain from the Mediterranean.

The French Empire fell with Napoleon's defeat at the Battle of Waterloo in 1815, altering the balance of power in Algeria's foreign relations from France to England. This change redirected the

focus of Algeria's relations with European countries from grain to the Algerian navy, making Algeria a target once again due to its maritime activities.

References

Al-Djilali, A. (1980). *The General History of Algeria.* Lebanon: Dar Al-Thaqafa.

Al-Jilali, A. (n.d.). *The General History of Algeria.*

Al-Tamimi, A. J. (1972). *Research and Documents in the History of Morocco (1816-1871).* Tunis: Tunisian Company for Arts and Drawing.

Al-Tawil, A. S. (2001). *The Tripolitanian Navy During the Reign of Yusuf Pasha Al-Qarmani (1795-1832).* Libya: National Book Publishing and Distribution.

Amiraoui, H. (2003). *Algeria in the Writings of Travelers and Prisoners During the Ottoman Period (Thedenat's Memoirs as a Model).* Algeria: Dar Al-Huda, Ain Mellila.

Bouaziz, Y. (1980). *Algeria's Foreign Relations with European States and Kingdoms (1500-1830).* Algiers: University Publications Bureau.

Bouaziz, Y. (n.d.). *Topics and Issues in the History of Algeria and the Arabs.*

Bouaziz, Y. (n.d.). *Topics and Issues in the History of Algeria and the Arabs,.*

Brun, G. (2006). *Modern European History.* (t. b. Al-Marzouki, Trans.) Beirut, Lebanon: Al-Ahlia Publishing and Distribution.

Curran, A. (1947). *Ottoman Policy Towards the French Occupation of Algeria (1827-1847)* (Vol. 2nd). (t. b. Al-Tamimi, Trans.) Tunis: Tunisian Company for Arts and Drawing.

De Card, (. (1906). *Treaties Between France and the North African Countries, Algeria, Tunisia, Tripolitania, Morocco* . Paris: A. PEDONE, Publisher.

Devoulx, A. (1872). *Record of the Principal French People Who Resided in Algiers from 1686 to 1830.* IN, (R-A).

Doudou, A. A.-A. (1989). *Algeria in the Writings of German Travelers (1830-1855),.* Algeria: National Book Foundation.

Dufal, A. (n.d.). *The Rais Hamidou.* (t. b.-A. Zbeiri, Trans.) Algiers: National Printing Foundation.

Guenane, D. (1987). *Treaties of Algeria with France (1619-1830).* Algeria: National Book Foundation.

Guenane, D. (n.d.). *Franco-Algerian Relations (1790-1830).* Mujahid Museum Publications.

Guenane, D. (n.d.). *Franco-Algerian Relations (1790-1830).*

Guenane, D. (n.d.). *Treaties of Algeria with France (1619-1830).*

Guenane, D. (n.d.). *Treaties of Algeria with France (1619-1830).*

Khir Fares, M. (1969). *The Modern History of Algeria from the Ottoman Conquest to the French Occupation.* Syria: Dar Al-Sharq for Publishing and Distribution.

Naït Belkacem, M. K. (1985). *Algeria's International Status and Its Global Prestige Before 1830* (Vol. 1st ed). Constantine, Algeria: Dar Al-Baath for Publishing and Distribution.

Naït Belkacem, M. K. (n.d.). *Texts and Documents in the History of Modern Algeria (1500-1830).*

Plantet, (. (1889). Correspondence of the Deys of Algiers with the Court of France,. Paris: Ministry of Foreign Affairs,.

Plantet, E. (n.d.). *Correspondence.* NTE 1.

Samah, A. (1989). *Alter: The Ottoman Turks in North Africa.* (t. b. Amir, Trans.) Lebanon: Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya.

Schaller, W. (1824).

Slimane, A. (1994). The Political System of Algeria in the Ottoman Period. Dahleb Publications.

Spencer, W. (1980). *Algeria During the Era of the Rais of the Sea,* (Vol. 1st ed). (t. b. Zbidi, Trans.) Algiers: National Publishing and Distribution Company.

Will & Ariel, D. (2002). *History of European Civilization (1789-1815).* (t. b. Sheikh, Trans.) Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Jabal for Printing, Publishing, and Distribution.

Yahya, D. (1981). *The Maghreb: Modern Ages and the Colonial Assault.* Beirut, Lebanon: Dar Al-Nahda Al-Arabiya for Printing, Publishing.

Zahra, Z. (1996-1997). *French-English Rivalry Over Algeria and the Sublime Porte's Position on It (1792-1830).* Master's Thesis, Modern and Contemporary History Department, University of Algiers,.

Zeroual, M. (1994). *Franco-Algerian Relations (1791-1830).* Algiers: Dahleb Printing.