

Michel Crozier's Theory of Strategic Analysis Analytical Perspective

نظرية التحليل الإستراتيجي لميشال كروزي رؤية تحليلية

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المخلص:

حاولنا من خلال هذا المقال الموجه الطلاب والباحثين خاصة في مجال أو تخصص سوسيولوجيا التنظيمات أن نتقدم بهذا الإسهام حول نظرية التحليل الإستراتيجي لصاحبها Crozier Michel ، محاولين عرف رؤية تحليلية لمجموعة من المفاهيم الأساسية لهذه النظرية وبناء عليه ارتأينا اختيار نظرية التحليل الاستراتيجي لصاحبها Michel Crozier نظرا لأهميتها لكونها من أبرز نظريات التنظيم هذا من جهة ومن جهة أخرى كونها نظرية شاملة معقدة من حيث صعوبة تحليلها وتباينها للطلاب والباحث، طبعاً وقد انطلقنا في تحليلها بالاستناد إلى البعدين الأساسيين الأوليين في النسق التحليلي وهو التنظيم الرسمي والتنظيم الغير الرسمي دون إغفال مدلول التنظيم من الناحية المفاهيمية والإبستمولوجية كمدخل لهذا المقال، ثم تطرقنا إلى جوهر الموضوع ومحور المقال وهو نظرية التحليل الإستراتيجي من خلال التطرق إلى أبرز مفاهيم هذه النظرية منها الفاعل الاجتماعي مدلوله ومعناه الإستراتيجية كمفهوم أساسي آخر بالإضافة إلى السلطة، الصراع، الحلقة المفرغة، منطقة الشك وعدم اليقين، إضافة إلى مفهوم مركزي آخر وهو العقلانية المحدودة دلالاتها ومضامينها.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التنظيم، الفاعل الاجتماعي، الإستراتيجية، السلطة والعقلانية المحدودة.

Abstract:

In this article, aimed at students and researchers—particularly those in the field of organizational sociology—we have sought to contribute to the discussion of Michel Crozier’s theory of strategic analysis, seeking to define an analytical perspective on a set of fundamental concepts of this theory. Accordingly, we chose Michel Crozier’s theory of strategic analysis due to its significance as one of the most prominent organizational theories, on the one hand, and on the other hand, because it is a comprehensive and complex theory in terms of the difficulty of its analysis and its diversity for students and researchers. Of course, we began our analysis by focusing on the first two fundamental dimensions of the analytical framework: formal organization and informal organization, without neglecting the conceptual and epistemological implications of the term “organization” as an introduction to this article. We then addressed the core of the topic and the focus of the article, which is strategic analysis theory, by examining the most prominent concepts of this theory, including the social actor, its meaning and significance, and strategy as another fundamental concept, in addition to power, conflict, the vicious cycle, and the zone of doubt and uncertainty, as well as another central concept: bounded rationality, its implications, and its connotations.

Key words: organization, social actor, strategy, power, and bounded rationality.

Introduction:

The field of organizational sociology is witnessing a remarkable development in its theoretical approaches that seek to understand the dynamics of action within modern organizations, particularly in light of the complexity of professional relationships and the overlap of roles and authorities. In this context, Michel Crozier's contributions stand out as an important epistemological turning point in the analysis of the organizational phenomenon, as he moved from deterministic and classical bureaucratic conceptions to an approach focused on the actor and their strategies within the system.

The theory of strategic analysis is based on reinterpreting the organization as a space for interaction, conflict, and negotiation, not merely a formal structure governed by rules and laws. It highlights the role of the social actor—whether an individual, a group, or an institution—in constructing strategies based on the margin of freedom available to them and their ability to navigate areas of doubt and uncertainty. This theory also reveals the centrality of concepts such as power, conflict, bounded rationality, and the pattern of concrete action in understanding organizational processes.

From this perspective, this article seeks to provide an in-depth analytical reading of strategic analysis theory by deconstructing its core concepts and highlighting their interconnections, with a focus on the dialectical relationship between formal and informal organization and the role of social actors in producing organizational dynamics within the system.

1-The Concept of Organization: An organization is a social unit established in a deliberate manner to define specific goals, taking on a structural character suited to achieving those goals (Ferribe, 1995).

An organization is considered an organized and rational human collective, characterized by the division of labor, authority, responsibilities, and communication; in this case, organization becomes a social characteristic of that social unit...

Since we will be addressing the theory of strategic analysis, we will examine the concept and definition of organization according to Michel Crozier and E. Adhard Fridberg, who view organizations not as a natural given nor as a product of the objective conditions to which individuals are exposed in their lives, but rather specific solutions invented, created, and established by individuals who enjoy relative autonomy and possess special abilities and energies to address the specific situations of social action, particularly those involving cooperation to achieve common goals. (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)

Organization is divided into two main types:

1-1- Formal Organization

This term refers to a highly organized group with clear objectives, legally established regulations, and defined roles (مداس، 2003).

Based on the definition provided, organization rests on three fundamental elements:

1. Organizational Complexity: This refers to the degree of specialization, division of labor, number of organizational levels, and increased geographical spread. Organizational complexity is a key characteristic of contemporary organizations, which include thousands of workers and employees, as well as numerous administrative and organizational levels.

2. Formality: This is one of the fundamental elements upon which modern organizations are built. Formality refers to the set of rules and norms that govern employees within the organization. We find that some organizations operate with a minimum of directives, while others have numerous directives; however, this does not depend on the size of the organization, the nature of the workers and their roles, the organizational structure, or the responsibilities undertaken. (بن نوار، 2006).

3. Centralization: This relates specifically to decision-making authority. In some organizations, decisions are made centrally, while in others they are decentralized. Centralization and decentralization are linked to the degree of organizational complexity, as well as the rules governing the organization; therefore, centralization plays an important role in shaping the organizational structure. (مداس، 2003).

1-2- Informal Organization

This refers to the pattern of personal relationships that develop spontaneously as individuals interact within the formal organization and encompasses a set of social norms within subgroups. (مداس، 2003) This second dimension of the organization coexists existentially and spatially in an inseparable and inevitable manner with the formal organizational structure; indeed, it arises and is established within it, yet as the institution operates and work proceeds, it is overtaken and dominated by the informal organization. However, the fundamental point that must be noted is that the formal organization never disappears; it is permanent and continuously present within the institution. It is merely limited in scope and range compared to the informal organization, whose scope expands ever further. However, we must emphasize that there is a correlation and inevitability in their coexistence. The institution is a comprehensive system, not a body whose reactions are isolated and sporadic. Formal organization assigns workers varying social positions and roles within the hierarchical structure, whereas the informal sector is formed and shaped to adapt not only to laws, decrees, and legislation, but even to the values imposed by the formal organization. Thus, the institution constitutes an integrated economic and social unit based on these two dimensions as well. and all theories and approaches have focused in their analyses of the institution or organization on these two fundamental dimensions or one of them. These include the classical theories, starting with Weber, Durkheim, and even Karl Marx—the first three pioneers, in historical chronological order, who contributed to organizational theory— followed by Taylor, Frederick W. Wilson (the father of scientific management), then Ford, Fayol, Elton Mayo, and Parsons, and finally the subject of this article and the focus of our research: Michel Croze and strategic analysis. All these theories were based on formal rules, laws, and

organizational structures, while others introduced both dimensions, particularly after the advent of Elton Mayo, the Human Relations School, and the Hawthorne experiments. We will attempt to address all these points in future articles; for now, however, we return to the theory of strategic analysis.

2-Michel Crozier and the Theory of Strategic Analysis:

The model or theory of strategic analysis developed by Michel Crozier focuses on a set of fundamental concepts that serve as the pillars of this theory, namely:

2-1-The Concept of the Social Actor (L'acteur Social)

Michel Crouzet did not define the concept of the social actor by limiting it solely to the worker (Ouvrier), the skilled worker (Ouvrier Califié), the civil servant (Fonctionnaire), the manager (Cadre), or the domestic manager (Cadre Maison); rather, it encompasses all of these. In this sense, the actor is any individual who performs manual or mental work in exchange for a specific wage, under the authority and supervision of an employer. A worker is defined as a person who performs a specific task requiring intellectual or physical effort to achieve a specific goal; through this work, their personality is revealed, and their freedom and responsibility are determined by the nature and type of that work. This working individual may be male or female, and workers have historically been classified into two categories:

-White-collar workers (Les Cols Blancs): This is a large, heterogeneous category that includes clerical workers and technical staff.

-Blue-collar workers (Les Cols Bleus): These are workers whose jobs primarily require physical exertion rather than mental or social labor (مداس، 2003).

Thus, this working individual, as a social actor in Crouzet's conception, possesses his own strategy within the organization possesses a social identity through which they enter and are hired; the hiring process is essentially the first stage before entering the organization. As is well known, this active individual has a social environment in which they were raised and grew up, and from this environment they acquired a set of norms, values, ethics, and beliefs that they carry with them into the organization.

Thus, the individual joins the organization carrying with them the product of their social upbringing, and always in the same context, and to emphasize that the social actor carries a social identity with them even before entering the organization and working within it. This is confirmed primarily by the fact that the social actors who make up the organization are characterized by their diverse affiliations. Based on this social reality, it cannot be expected that all of them will be in the service of the system and the prevailing authority. (بو عيشة، 2015)

Thus, from this perspective, we establish that this actor possesses a social identity and then a socio-professional identity, given that the institution itself is a microcosm of society and an extension of it, within the framework of considering the institution as an open system, This is from the perspective of strategic analysis theory as well as Sainsaulieu. If the professional identity of the social actor is a product of socialization, it branches into: **self-identity and personality**, (مداس وآخرون، 2015) a cognitive identity, which pertains to all the scientific and cognitive qualifications and abilities possessed by this actor, in addition to a normative identity, such that each

individual carries their own value references represented by their customs, values, beliefs, and behavioral patterns—and everything that distinguishes this social actor within their family and cultural environment—which is part of the formation of their personality. There are also value systems for groups and work teams within the organization.

Within this framework, the social and professional identity of the social actor is defined, which is primarily linked to the hierarchical ladder, the organizational structure, and the position held by this social actor within the institution within the framework of the division of labor and specialization. This can be called **a formal professional identity**, which is based on professional credentials and rank and is subject to formal regulation, that is, the set of rules, laws, and regulations within the institution. In addition, there is **the informal professional identity**, which is formed within the framework of the system as an open system within a network of informal relationships based on friendship, neighborliness, kinship, and barter in Algeria and elsewhere.

2-2-The Social Actor's Strategy:

Before discussing Michel Crouzi's strategy of the social actor, we must briefly revisit what came before, particularly Max Weber's bureaucratic model, which is based on rationality, legitimacy, and faith in mandatory official rules of a punitive nature—which, according to Weber, are characterized by objectivity—as well as the division of labor, specialization, and the hierarchical sequence of functions. All of this is subject to organizational oversight and monitoring in accordance with the institution's objectives.

Both **Frederick Wilson Taylor (1856–1915)**, founder of the scientific management school, and the 1911 book *Principles of Scientific Management* were based on this. According to the latter, knowledge and thinking are the prerogatives and tasks of management, while workers are paid solely for execution—that is, carrying out the orders of officials and supervisors. and here he established what he called “the scientific organization of work.” (Edighoffer, 1996)

In addition to **Henry Ford**, the founder of the automobile factories and the pioneer of assembly line work and mass production, and the Frenchman **Henri Fayol (1841–1925)**, who believed that efficiency is linked to management and that management, within its formal framework, is based on fourteen administrative principles, as well as **Talcott Parsons** and his concept of the system, function and dysfunction. What concerns us in this article is that all of them relied on formal organization and based their theories on it, the first of whom was Max Weber, who established the rules and laws of formal organization through **his** bureaucratic **model**. Formal rules, efficiency, organizational structure, specialization, division of labor, and others are the essence of formal organization. However, **Michel Crouzet** holds a different view. Through his critique of the bureaucratic model, he asserts that “there are no strictly regulated and controlled social organizations, for the individual or collective actors who constitute the organization cannot be reduced to abstract and intangible tasks; rather, the actors themselves constitute an entity.” Amidst pressures, actors retain a margin of freedom that they use strategically; the persistence and survival of this freedom undermines the most complex controls, making authority—as a common mediator of various

strategies—a central and necessary mechanism for regulating the whole. (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)

Through his statement, Cruse asserts that:

1- There are no strictly regulated and monitored social organizations: What Crusey means is that these social organizations have control and monitoring mechanisms subject to formal regulation, rules, and laws, but the mechanism of control and monitoring here is not subject to the principle of coercion and oppressive determinism that leaves no room for movement; that is, he means it is relative, and its meaning exists but its effects are relative. In Crusey's words, it is rational, but its rationality is limited (*Rationalité Limitée*), and there is no absolute rationality in the organization.

2- Individual or collective actors (whether the actor is an individual or a group) who constitute the organization cannot be reduced to abstract, non-embodied tasks; but rather, the actors themselves constitute an entity. According to Kruse's interpretation of the first point—based on the premise that there is no coercion or inevitability in the organization, but rather limited or relative rationality as we see it— and accordingly, these social actors are a dynamic, fluid, and social entity that enters into complex, intertwined relationships within the organization. Therefore, according to Michel Croze: No administration, regardless of its efficiency, authority, or precision of oversight, can reduce these social actors to mere functions and tasks whose scope, scale, and reach are confined to the realm of formal organization—which is simultaneously their origin and their very narrow environment. This means that the worker cannot be reduced to a mere relationship between the position and the worker or the worker and the wage; The social actor is far broader and more multifaceted, and cannot be “be confined to work, position, and wages.” He is “a social entity with his own goals, which may differ from the goals of the organization or system to which he belongs,” and he has his own strategy and margin of freedom, which he uses strategically, as well as the margin of freedom that remains and persists through the exploitation of “more complex and rigid controls,” and then authority intervenes through a central mechanism of joint mediation of various strategies to regulate the whole, and here the issue of **negotiation** arises.

Crozier and Fridberg, in their critique of earlier organizational theories that studied the individual and the group in isolation from the organization's strategy, continue to emphasize that **the organization is an autonomous phenomenon**; consequently, they view the organization as an autonomous and artificial phenomenon that must be interpreted as a potential construct, This means that organizational management relies on multiple strategies; each category or group has its own strategy, and each individual actor has his or her own strategy. As **Crozier and Erhard Fridberg** emphasize, it is this actor who possesses a margin of freedom within the system in which he or she operates, linked to the pursuit of his or her actions. (مداس، 2003ب)

Thus, the actor's strategy **refers to a set of behaviors and actions of individuals in their workplaces or groups, such that these behaviors may be individual actions performed by a person—referred to as an actor, as previously mentioned—who possesses a margin of freedom within the system in which they operate**, Thus, the actor's strategy is “any behavior that has meaning, even if it is undesirable or was performed by the actor unconsciously.” (Lafaye, 1996) This applies when considering the actor's strategy as an individual operating within the system; the totality of active

individuals within the organizational system possesses multiple and diverse strategies. How so?

2-3-The actor's strategy as an individual within the system:

This is because every working individual within the organization, as a social actor, has their own strategy, which is based on:

-The limited rationality that, according to Croze, prevails in organizations, upon which the actor builds his strategy.

-Their position within the formal organization:

A. Whether the social actor is a worker, an employee, a manager, or a director, they build their own strategy, first and foremost based on their acquisition of an official professional identity—which essentially refers to the position they hold within the organization and their rank in the hierarchical ladder. and most importantly, the nature of the position, because while there are many types of positions, certain specific roles—such as those held by maintenance workers in factories—grant them very strong professional authority.

B. His affiliation within the formal organization to a professional category: Or, to put it another way, a formal work group such as the category of doctors or specialists within a hospital or healthcare system. Simply by belonging to this category within the formal organizational framework, these doctors are granted very strong professional influence and authority within the institution; they have the final say, and their spheres of influence and authority are very strong. If we examine the position of the social actor within the formal organization, we find that from the very beginning (upon hiring), the actor can begin to formulate and shape their own strategy simply by entering the system or organization and taking up the position. This strategy, which is based on and developed within the formal organization, expands and deepens further and further, gaining greater weight and authority within the informal organizational framework. It becomes **a professional authority** that seeks to expand and occupy new spheres of influence within the institution as a system. At this stage, **the formal organization** and its bureaucratic rules and laws **are unable** to keep pace with it; indeed, it becomes impossible to regulate it or control its reach and influence. The more its spheres of influence and authority expand, the greater its margin of freedom becomes. This applies to the social actor, whether an individual or a group.

2-4-The strategy of the actor as a group, class, collective, or economic institution:

- **Considering the social actor as a formal or informal work group:** We have previously addressed the concept of the social actor in Crozier's definition, considering it to be a working individual, an employee, or a manager; this is the first characterization of this social actor within the institutional framework. As for the second meaning and connotation of this social actor according to Crozier, it relates to both formal and informal work groups. (بن نوار، 2006)

Considering each of them (formal and informal) as a social actor with its own strategy, there are many examples of formal work groups, such as what we mentioned

earlier regarding the category of doctors and medical specialists in the therapeutic system, In fact, there are multiple work groups rather than a single one; the focus here is on the work group or professional category of specialists or doctors. This is a formal work group recognized by the official organization based on the division of labor and organizational structure; it is officially recognized and constitutes a formal work group with official authority on the one hand, and, on the other hand, very strong professional authority at the level of informal organization. A work group is “a social group whose structure and activities depend on rational appointment and organization, as well as the availability of specific rules for clear objectives and appropriate leadership.” (مداس، 2003)

As for the informal work group as a social actor—for example, “**the maintenance workers at the French Renault factories**”—If a social actor is one who possesses a margin of freedom within the system in which they operate, then the dynamics surrounding the power relationship clarify the positions and behaviors of the actors on the one hand, and on the other hand, the organizational process in general—namely, that department heads (in the Renault factory) possess no actual means to exercise their legal authority according to the hierarchical ladder.

The power of the other actors—namely, the maintenance workers—is evident in the control they exert over breakdowns, as they essentially possess an illegitimate yet professional authority within the informal organizational framework. (Bernoux, 1999)

On this basis, the power of professional authority and the extent of its influence within the informal organizational framework stem from its control over breakdowns; this expands its margin of freedom and allows it to occupy new spheres of influence and authority—of course, in contrast to the administrative authority of the department heads, who are powerless to control these workers, Although they are at the bottom of the hierarchical ladder—or, in other words, lower in rank than department heads in the hierarchy on the one hand, and on the other—their professional authority is considered illegitimate from a legal perspective; nevertheless, it is very strong, and its influence and reach are very extensive.

In this regard, **Crozier M.** states: “The maintenance problem is not merely a technical one; rather, the system of human relations and the system of authority are responsible for it.” (Crozier, 1968) Whether the social actor is a group or a collective, we find that, officially, it is a professional category—such as the category of specialist physicians in a hospital, as we mentioned earlier. and from an unofficial standpoint, specialist doctors possess professional authority whose influence is well-known to both the public and private sectors, particularly within the hospital system. Thus, these specialist doctors hold administrative authority alongside professional authority; moreover, these doctors may belong not only to a single work group within the official organizational framework, but to several other sub-groups as well. Membership in a particular group may depend on specialization—that is, each doctor has their own informal reference group, such as cardiologists...

- **Considering the social actor as an economic institution:**
-Conceptually:

Terminological definition: It should be noted that there are various Arabic terms that convey the same meaning as the word “institution,” including “project,” “system,”

“organization,” and “establishment,” all of which are translations of the single French word “entreprise” (المعجم العربي الشامل، 1997). This is in terms of the linguistic definition.

Definition (concept): It is an economic, technical, and legal form for organizing collective work and the workers involved, and for operating the means of production according to a specific method of social division of labor, with the aim of producing the means of production or consumer goods. (عبيد، 1994)

In fact, there are many definitions of an economic institution, which are not the subject of our current study; rather, what we wish to focus on and clarify is how **an economic institution** can be considered **a social actor from the perspective of strategic analysis theory**.

As we mentioned earlier, the concept of a social actor is not limited to a worker, an employee, or even a workgroup or collective—whether within a formal or informal organizational framework—but extends to considering the institution itself, regardless of its size (small, startup, medium, or large). **It is considered a social actor with its own strategy** within the overall system. For example, if we take any economic or service-oriented institution—such as the Sidal* institution, to name just one—it is a **social actor** belonging to the pharmaceutical industry sector. It is, of course, a public institution considered a social actor at the local or national level of the pharmaceutical market. So it is a social actor operating within the market framework, and all these social actors operate within a larger framework, which is the national pharmaceutical market. Of course, Sidal’s strategy as a social actor is to meet the national market’s future needs for medicines. In terms of strategic analysis theory, it is a social actor with an offensive strategy aimed at capturing and controlling the pharmaceutical market in Algeria in the future, that is, to occupy spheres of influence and authority and to sit at the top of the Algerian pharmaceutical market. This is a local strategic goal, followed by entering into competition with Arab and African pharmaceutical companies. This represents an offensive strategy, according to the strategic analysis perspective, aimed first at occupying spheres of influence and authority outside the national pharmaceutical market and establishing units in Arab or African countries such as Mali, Niger, and other countries bordering Algeria, whether Arab or African. In addition to all this, there is the export process—that is, the export of medicines as a first and fundamental stage. It is **this expansion strategy of this social actor (Sidal) that will (perhaps in the future) unfold in three fundamental phases:**

- **The phase of controlling the national pharmaceutical market with state support, given its status as a strategic institution in the field of pharmaceutical production.**
- **The phase of exporting to Arab, African, or European countries**

This aligns with Michel Crouzet’s theory of strategic analysis, of course, given that the actor is neither an individual nor merely a group, but rather an institution—specifically, that Sidal is an institution acting as a social actor that adopts an offensive strategy to dominate the export process, mirroring its dominance of the larger national pharmaceutical market. Then, in a second phase, this actor moved on to seek markets for the pharmaceuticals it produces—that is, as a social actor, seeking new spheres of influence outside the homeland by competing with other institutions, or social actors, in the global pharmaceutical market as a larger framework. This was always part of this social actor’s aggressive strategy to occupy spheres of influence and authority—that is, to capture other markets in order to sell its products, naturally

through the export process—after this social actor had achieved complete control over the local market, namely the pharmaceutical market in Algeria.

3-The phase of establishing production units in Arab, African, or European countries:

In this phase, the social actor (Saidal Corporation) moves to a third phase, which is the phase of establishing its presence outside the homeland by setting up units in Arab and African countries, either independently or through partnerships with pharmaceutical companies in those countries. At this stage, this social actor seeks to expand its spheres of influence and authority through an aggressive strategy, while attempting to maintain the spheres of influence and authority it previously occupied and controlled—such as the national pharmaceutical market— This applies to multinational economic institutions that own production units in most countries around the world, such as Coca-Cola and Pepsi in the soft drink sector, and the French company Total and Bretich Petroleum in the petroleum sector—that is, fuels and energy—and so on...

In contrast, this actor employs a defensive strategy aimed at preserving the spheres of influence and authority it previously occupied. This actor seeks to maintain control over its spheres of influence through two key factors: product quality and, on the other hand, abundance and reasonable pricing. In the context of establishing new production units, it also seeks cheap labor and reduce production costs. All these elements form the pillars of the offensive strategy adopted by this social actor to expand its margin of freedom—that is, its room to maneuver—within the framework of the larger market, namely the global market for medicines, whether Arab, African, or European, as recently occurred with the production of COVID-19 vaccines among a group of social actors (institutions) or laboratories, including Russian, American, French, English, and especially Chinese ones. The broader system (i.e., the global vaccine production market) is witnessing competition among laboratories and vaccine-producing institutions—considering these institutions as a group of social actors within the pharmaceutical and vaccine market system—as well as the competition, attempts at control, and the occupation of spheres of influence and authority that have arisen among them. economically speaking, this means seeking markets for these vaccines; and in sociological terms, and according to the concept of the social actor as defined by strategic analysis theory, it means a group of social actors relying on an offensive strategy to occupy spheres of influence and authority and expand their margin of freedom—that is, seeking exclusive contracts to sell the vaccine. To clarify further, Russian vaccine manufacturers are considered a group of social actors (a group of laboratories) that obtained a concession contract to market their product to Algeria due to the shared interests between the two countries. Algeria was a sphere of influence and authority for Russian vaccine manufacturers, and the concession contract obtained by Russia represents, from the perspective of strategic analysis theory, the scope of freedom for these social actors—the Russian vaccine manufacturers.. The same occurred with Chinese vaccine manufacturers, which also secured a franchise agreement representing the scope of freedom for Chinese social actors in the vaccine market, similar to the situation in Algeria. Thus, in the context of the vaccine market in Algeria during the COVID-19 pandemic, there were two key social actors: one social actor or group of social actors—namely, a group of **Russian** laboratories with the **Sputnik** vaccine—and another group of social actors—namely, a group of **Chinese** laboratories with **the Sinovac** vaccine. Algeria imported the

vaccine from Russia and China, and the concession granted to Russia and China by Algeria, from the perspective of strategic analysis theory, is the margin of freedom () that Algeria granted to both the Russian and Chinese laboratories, considering them social actors in the global vaccine market. This is because Algeria did not import the vaccine from France, England, or the United States. Thus, Algeria, as a vaccine market system during the COVID-19 pandemic, represented the spheres of influence and authority of Chinese (institutions) and Russian social actors, The market granted them this influence by importing Chinese and Russian vaccines and awarding them a concession contract, which represents a margin of freedom for these social actors within the Algerian vaccine market system, given that Algeria imported vaccines only from these two countries.

4-Sources of authority for the institution as a social actor:

Building on what we said earlier, we will attempt to identify the sources of authority upon which the institution relies as a social actor within the market system, which brings together a group of social actors competing among themselves to seek and occupy spheres of influence and authority and to gain control over this market as a system—as illustrated by the example of the Sidal institution mentioned earlier. we seek to identify the sources of authority that enable this social actor to occupy spheres of influence and expand its margin of freedom within the market system, the most notable of which are:

4-1- The designation of the Sidal Corporation as a strategic institution in the pharmaceutical industry, which consequently enjoys state support and receives numerous privileges through this support, allowing it to be a powerful social actor within the pharmaceutical market in Algeria and even beyond its borders; This support and these privileges allow the company to expand its scope of freedom and establish spheres of influence and authority within the national market. In fact, according to recent estimates, it is projected to cover more than 40 percent of the national pharmaceutical market, as stated in the Health Minister's latest announcement.

4-2- Product Quality: Given that this factor is fundamental to market consolidation—not only in the pharmaceutical market but across all products and sectors— it is considered the fundamental criterion for the institution as a social actor seeking to gain authority, standing, and spheres of influence in the market. These quality standards are global standards applicable to all institutions; they are the key, foundation, and a primary source of authority for the institution as a social actor within the framework of its competition in the national or international market. For the higher the quality of its products, the greater its authority and power, the more new spheres of influence it occupies, and the wider its margin of freedom becomes.

4-3-Production Costs: The lower the production costs, the greater the institution's authority and the wider its margin of freedom as a social actor—a fact well-known to economists. Production costs, particularly their reduction, lead to an increase in this social actor's authority and spheres of influence in the market, thereby expanding its margin of freedom.

4.4. Production Volume, Availability, and Price: These three elements also constitute the fundamental mechanisms and sources that underpin this social actor's

power, expand its scope of freedom in the market, and increase its spheres of influence and authority.

4-5-Advertising and publicity in the media: This social actor (the institution) promotes its products through various types of media, and this is also considered one of the primary sources that help this social actor establish spheres of influence and authority within the market system.

4-6-Human Resources: This is considered one of the fundamental elements for this social actor (the institution). “The development of a competitive spirit within the institution stems from its organizational environment, its means of production, and the periodic and continuous training of its human resources.” (Peritti, 1994)

The involvement of human resources in the production process is a vital and fundamental element upon which human relationships are based; it also helps foster these relationships and cultivate a sense of belonging.

“Participation boosts employee morale, as their role is not limited to merely submitting to and obeying management’s orders and instructions; rather, they play an active role in the work system and its procedures.” (1995، الزبيدي)

4-7-Technical and Technological Factors: This factor is considered one of the pillars for the social actor to acquire power and spheres of influence; it can even lead to dominance over the market system and expand the actor’s margin of freedom to accelerate the pace and rhythm of production, as well as the speed of communication and information access. All these factors enable this social actor to compete from a position of strength and influence, constantly seeking to expand their scope of freedom within the market system and thereby reflect their standing within it.

4-8-Product Diversification: In terms of product diversification, any economic institution—as a social actor within the framework of gaining power and occupying new spheres of influence in the market—naturally seeks to diversify its products so as to first meet the demands of customers in the market on the one hand, and on the other hand, I note that institutions (social actors) in the market adopt an aggressive strategy. If we take the many examples of soft drink or juice companies, we find, for instance, diversification in the types of glass bottles, such as Hamoud Boualam, Pepsi, and Coca-Cola, and juices such as Rami, Kandia, Al-Rouiba, and other varieties. These companies have produced large, small, and medium-sized cartons as part of their competition, market penetration, expansion, and efforts to increase their influence in the market. As a result of this competition for spheres of influence and power within the soft drink and juice market, these social actors (companies) in the market to secure a strong position and attempt to dominate the soft drink and juice market. Areas of influence and authority mean that each of these social actors seeks to impose its dominance and authority over this market, of course through quality, variety, price, and availability, as well as by reducing production costs. Indeed, some of these social actors, always operating within the framework of an offensive strategy to occupy spheres of influence and power, may resort to methods that could be termed unlawful, by relying on advertising campaigns—whether in visual or print media, or even on social media—to distort or diminish the value of a competing social actor’s (institution’s) product. This can even extend to funding such propaganda campaigns to distort a specific product or warn against its consumption, as happened years ago

with the “Balat” product and other cases we have witnessed. All of this takes place within the framework of competition among social actors (institutions) in the market context, as they seek new spheres of influence and power, and even attempt to maintain and defend the positions they have secured in the market.

5- Power as a Fundamental, Strategic, and Central Concept in Strategic Analysis Theory:

Power is one of the fundamental and central concepts in strategic analysis theory, and it is no exaggeration to say that the essence and core of this theory revolves around power. Of course, this concept is not new, as Max Weber addressed it previously when he discussed types of power, including charismatic, traditional, and democratic. **Michel Crouzié**, however, focused primarily on bureaucracy—that is, the authority of the office—and discussed bureaucratic dysfunction (Dysfonctionnement Bureaucratique). **Weber** had relied on formal organization in formulating the bureaucratic model, meaning the set of mandatory official rules and laws characterized by objectivity, which is not the subject of this article; rather, our focus will be on the strategic analysis model. In this regard, **Crozier** states that authority is a central concept expressing unequal relationships that necessitate exchange and negotiation among work groups within the organization. (مداس، 2001)

He focused his attention on studying the phenomenon of bureaucracy with the aim of explaining the problem of conflict in professional social relations within the social system, on the grounds that power relations are considered the fundamental problem in the sociology of organizations. **Crozier and Fredberg** were able to analyze power relations based on the strategies of individuals and groups within the organization and concluded that power involves and requires the ability of certain individuals or groups to control other individuals and groups; controlling others means entering into a relationship with them, and within this relationship, the power of some over others develops. (Crozier, 1968)

Both **Kruse** and **Friedberg** concluded that maintenance workers—in Renault automobile factories—are characterized by their authority over production workers due to the imbalance of qualifications between the parties in the professional social relationship; this privilege enables them to **engage in conflict** and use their authority to negotiate with management to obtain privileges. They exercise power despite its illegitimacy and informality by withholding machine diagrams and maintenance manuals.

Crozier identified four sources of authority:

- The first source: based on competence and professional specialization.
- The second source: based on control over relationships with the environment.
- The third source: is based on control over internal communication.
- The fourth source: the use of organizational rules.

6-Professional Authority from a Strategic Analysis Perspective:

We have already touched upon the concept of professional authority in our discussion of previous concepts of strategy and the actor; however, to emphasize and elaborate further, Kruse focused in his analysis on informal professional authority, particularly among maintenance workers who have acquired professional authority that rivals or

even surpasses administrative authority within the factory. Since maintenance is a collective activity, it takes the form of an alliance among individuals and groups within the workplace to address their problems and seek a position that allows them to negotiate from a position of strength. Therefore, every structure of collective activity is a system of power, and any analysis of any collective activity within the organization must place **power at the center of its primary concerns. Thus, the entire organizational structure, regardless of its size, is a power structure.** Consequently, as active individuals seek to achieve relative freedom within the organization, they **enter into a struggle for spheres of influence and power, which ultimately constitutes the source of all conflicts.**

The pursuit of any goal always requires planning and strategy. **The maintenance workers possess professional authority centered on malfunctions and maintenance and repair issues,** which must remain confidential, based on individual control known to no one else. Maintaining this system constitutes a fundamental pillar of their strategy; it is accepted by them and constitutes an indispensable necessity. “Authority is built on the actor’s ability to control zones of uncertainty—that is, areas not defined within the official framework of the system.” (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)

It is observed that there is a **direct relationship between the zone of uncertainty and the amount of power derived from it,** According to Crouzié, the actor begins by constructing a strategy based on stakes that are open to interpretation, depending on the meaning the actor assigns to them, and at the expense of rules and methods of play that are open to change—a flexible system of play used to maintain control over these stakes (2001، مداس). Thus, in **, Kruse’s critique of the bureaucratic model is based on a fundamental and central concept: **power, and specifically professional power,** which itself is grounded in **the zone of uncertainty and the margin of freedom** of the social actor, whether an individual or a group. However, before reaching this fundamental and pivotal conclusion, in his critiques of the Weberian bureaucratic model—with all its mandatory and punitive formal rules and laws, specialization, division of labor, and organizational structure—all of this, in his view, produced what he called **the vicious circle of bureaucratic organization,** a central and strategic concept, before he spoke of professional authority and the margin of freedom of the within the system.

The Vicious Cycle of Bureaucratic Organization: Although Kruse did not deny the influence of formal organization—with all its aforementioned components—within the system, he asserts that formal organization is the origin and foundation of the system (formal rules, organizational structure, formal communication, specialization, and division of labor...), Cruzi criticized bureaucratic organization for being characterized by **rigidity, coercion, and the disciplinary** nature of its control mechanisms, as well as the strictness of the laws imposed on the worker or employee regardless of their position in the hierarchical ladder. This strict control mechanism imposed on the worker is the result of applying rules and laws that are, at their core, nothing more than strict formal organization. All these strict formal mechanisms and procedures have turned **the organizational system into a quasi-dead system characterized by monotony, routine, and boredom, killing the desire to perform, work, and take initiative.** This monotony, routine, and boredom have led to numerous consequences, the most significant of which are negligence and frequent absences among workers. Add to that the absence of incentives of any kind, whether material or moral. **Michel Crozet summarized all of this by saying: Bureaucratic**

organization operates in a vicious cycle. Thus, from Michel Crozet's perspective, it is bureaucratic organization that has produced bureaucratic management—if one may put it that way—which is **the management of office authority.** This official authority, with its rules and laws, means that for those with professional authority (doctors and specialists in a hospital or maintenance workers at Renault factories), this administrative management—with all its rules, laws, regulations, coercion, control, monitoring, and strict oversight—no longer means anything to them nor does it intimidate them; which is why, as we said about the maintenance workers at Renault factories, their authority, power, and influence were based primarily on **breakdowns.** When the machines break down, production stops, and consequently the factory grinds to a halt; thus, they became the ones who decide when the machines will be repaired and how long it will take, and they are even the ones who know how to read and analyze the technical manuals. This is what gave them a very strong professional authority that far exceeded that of the administrative supervisors. Faced with this kind of authority and such a strong professional identity, management—with its rules, coercion, and strictness—cannot confront, overcome, or undermine this group, because they **simply ignore all these rules, as Crousier noted.** Ultimately, all these official regulations—with their formal top-down and bottom-up communications, instructions, orders, and the like—none of this can shake the professional authority **of maintenance workers,** their influence, or their power. In other words, the official organization has been operating under a system of regulations where it can impose itself on this professional group, even though they are workers—that is, maintenance workers—who are roughly at the bottom of the hierarchy. This means that the hierarchy no longer holds any meaning for them, to the extent that they can impose their views even on the general manager **of the Renault factory. What does this mean?** According to **Michel Crozet,** it means “that the entire formal organizational structure **becomes a vicious cycle,** because what is the point of all those laws, positions, task assignments, division of labor, and other formal organizational and communication processes—and even the organizational laws of deterrence and punishment? All these systems have failed to undermine and subdue the professional authority of the **maintenance** workers. So what is the point **of** organization, rules, and laws? That is why **Kruse** (Crozier, 1979) says **that bureaucratic organization is caught in a vicious cycle;** in other words, in the face of the maintenance workers' authority, the formal organization falls into a state of near-paralysis. Kruse did not say that the formal organization collapses, but rather that it is caught in a vicious cycle—and the same applies here.

This means **that the vicious cycle of bureaucratic organization is the relative impotence or paralysis afflicting formal (bureaucratic) organization due to its inability to control the spheres of influence of professional authority, which is, in essence, an illegitimate authority.** Of course, and to be clear, Cruse emphasizes the continuity and survival of the formal organization with all its components, laws, and rules—from the division of labor to specialization and so on. According to Cruse, all these elements are the foundation of the institution or system, for this system cannot exist without the formal organization, which always remains the foundation in its origin, establishment, and even in its operation. Thus, **according to Crousier, formal organization is characterized by permanence and continuity. What happens is that the administrative authority, in conjunction with the administrative body, suffers from a relative—not absolute—inability to keep pace with, accompany,**

and even control professional authority and its holders, despite the fact that it is an illegitimate authority.

Bureaucratic organization enters a vicious cycle Bureaucratic (formal) organization suffers from a kind of relative incapacity and paralysis; the reason is the administrative authority's inability to control, keep pace with, and dominate professional authority, which is characterized by the strength and breadth of its spheres of influence , leading to an expansion of the margins of freedom for these social actors (holders of professional authority) This means that formal organization, with its administrative authority, is incapable of controlling and dominating the professional authority of maintenance workers in French Renault factories, for example, although, as we mentioned earlier, their authority is illegitimate and they are near the bottom of the factory hierarchy, their professional authority is very strong, rendering administrative authority powerless in the face of it. Consequently, this leads to conflict, and both parties resort to negotiation, as Kruse confirms. However, the very issue of negotiation is subject to the dominant party, which negotiates from a position of strength to exert further pressure to obtain more privileges, grants, and other benefits. meaning that in this case, those with professional authority are the ones who impose their terms at the negotiating table with administrative authority.

7-Characteristics of the vicious cycle of bureaucratic organization:

1. It is a characteristic or feature of bureaucratic organization, meaning here the formal organization and all that it entails in terms of rules, laws, legislation, division of labor, specialization, and organizational structure, including its formal communication system.
2. It is an inherent and persistent condition that accompanies the continuity and permanence of formal bureaucratic organization; wherever formal bureaucratic organization exists, the vicious cycle exists.
3. It (the vicious cycle) represents or is a state of impotence and the relative form of formal organization with its various components.
4. Its source and origin lie in bureaucratic organization, but its causes stem from informal organization, particularly resulting from the administrative authority's inability to control professional authorities; thus, the increase in the power and influence of professional authorities leads to the weakening, subjugation, and decline of administrative authority in the face of the growing influence of professional authorities.
5. The issue of the relative paralysis and incapacity of formal organization does not in any way imply its lack of continuity, survival, or permanence, as previously affirmed by Crousier.
6. Within an institution, system, or organization—whatever the terminology—there are two types of organization: formal and informal. These two types are inseparable from the organization or system itself. and as long as there is formal organization (Formelle), there is **a vicious cycle for this formal bureaucratic organization** due to another fundamental and inevitable reason: the existence of informal organization and, consequently, the inevitability of professional authority for groups such as

doctors or workers at the French Renault factories, This is an inevitable correlation between the existence of formal organization—and thus administrative authority—and, conversely, informal organization and professional authority; **hence, the inevitability of bureaucratic organization entering a vicious cycle.**

7. There is also a fundamental aspect or characteristic of this vicious cycle: according to Crousier's theory of strategic analysis, it prevails in all bureaucratic systems, regardless of the system's nature or size. In other words, we find it in all organizations and institutions, regardless of the nature of their activities or their size, because all such systems involve formal organization—and thus administrative authority—as well as informal organization and professional authority.

8. Another fundamental issue is the nature of the problem itself: we can describe this vicious cycle as a relative failure or paralysis of formal regulation, even beyond the institution's boundaries; In fact, more than that: for example, **if we consider that the state, with its formal economy and strict economic laws and regulations, has been unable to combat or even reduce the spread of the parallel informal economy across all financial, productive, and other sectors**, and at times the informal economy even appears stronger; in this case, we say that the formal economy often operates in a vicious cycle—meaning that the set of rules and laws governing it (formal regulation) have failed to eliminate the parallel economy. For example, in financial transactions, the currency market in Skoir has remained highly active for several years. Although it is illegal, its influence is strong, and thousands of Algerians visit it to buy and sell currency. Why? Because the owners of this market and those working in currency exchange possess very strong professional authority and influence; consequently, they continue their work with complete confidence. The state, which represents the administrative authority here, is aware of their activities. This is just one example among many. What we have concluded is that, **ultimately, there is a formal economy with strict rules and laws, and in contrast, there is a parallel economy that is inseparable from this formal economy; they are inseparable in their existence and activity. The former is based on official administrative authority, rules, and laws, whereas the latter is officially illegal, yet the professional authority of its operators is very strong.** From this perspective, we can say that Algeria's economic regulation often operates in a vicious cycle: which we described as a relative incapacity and paralysis affecting various official legal systems (as in the previous example regarding the economy and the financial system), due to the existence, for instance, of a parallel market—which is unofficial but whose operators possess very strong professional authority and extensive influence.

9. The vicious cycle is a relative failure of formal, i.e., bureaucratic, regulation; the longer this relative failure persists, the wider the cycle becomes, and the widening of the vicious cycle means **an increase in the fragility and weakness of official laws** and the inability of the managers of the institution, factory, or organization to control the situation, Conversely, **due to pressure, the dominance, control, and influence of professional authority expand**, and its control over the situation **grows** in contrast to the fragility and weakness of administrative authority—this is from the perspective of strategic analysis.

10. The widening of **the vicious cycle** in formal bureaucratic organization is caused by **the expansion of the margin of freedom enjoyed by those with professional**

authority—in the previous example, the maintenance workers mentioned earlier. The greater the margin of freedom enjoyed by those with professional authority, the wider the vicious cycle of formal bureaucratic organization becomes, and the more fragile and weak official regulations become. Although we emphasize in this particular article **that the expansion of the margin of freedom for those with professional authority is relative, the expansion of the vicious cycle of formal bureaucratic regulation is also relative.**

11. Based on the previous point, we can view both **the vicious cycle as a relative failure of formal bureaucratic regulation and the margin of freedom for actors—that is, those with professional authority—since the fundamental cause of the relative failure of formal bureaucratic regulation is the expansion of the margin of freedom for those with professional authority.** The wider the vicious cycle becomes, the greater the scope of freedom for social actors with professional authority, and the more the margin of freedom narrows and becomes confined to those with professional authority, the more the vicious cycle of bureaucratic organization narrows, and that relative deficit shrinks—meaning that the decline of professional authority and the confinement of its margin of freedom, given that the margin of freedom is not fixed but subject to variables within the system's internal environment (the institution or organization), Likewise, just as the vicious cycle expands—and its expansion signifies an increase in the fragility of laws—it also narrows and becomes confined, particularly in response to internal changes within the system. This means that the strength and influence of professional authority are matched by the weakness of the administrative authority of the formal bureaucratic organization, and vice versa.

12. The margin of freedom enjoyed by social actors, naturally within the framework of informal organization, is directly and inextricably linked to the expansion or contraction of the vicious cycle, and is also linked, on the other hand, to a zone of uncertainty and suspicion.

8. The Conflict Between Administrative and Professional Authority:

We previously discussed professional authority, bureaucratic organization, and its entry into a vicious cycle; that the root of bureaucratic organization—and thus formal organization—is **administrative authority**, which is considered fundamental; and that every institution is based on administrative authority, which is concerned with carrying out various activities, and consequently, there is an administrative body based on this authority. There is a head of this administrative body, who may be a general manager or a director depending on the size and nature of the institution, and who exercises this authority by virtue of the position he holds and the status he occupies within the institution, which grants him the right to provide guidance and make decisions. It serves as a link between superiors and subordinates, who are subject to it because it is legal and legitimate. This authority is called administrative authority, without which no organization or institution can function. “Administrative authority is what leads and directs the institution, as it sets goals and selects the policies, means, programs, and procedures necessary to achieve these goals.” (هليلين 1990، وهنجر،)

We have cited these two definitions to demonstrate that administrative authority is one of the pillars of any institution, and that work and activity cannot exist without this authority; rather, the institution derives its existence and the legitimacy of its rules

and laws from it. That is why we stated earlier **that Michel Crozier** never denied the existence of this authority—indeed, he could not deny it—nor did any of the theorists of organizations do so. **Crozier** affirmed **that** the rationality characterized by rules and laws—and thus legitimacy—is limited, not absolute. If we say that **administrative authority is characterized by limited rationality, then its legitimacy is also limited in terms of implementation and is not absolute. This is what we meant when we said that when bureaucratic organization enters a vicious cycle, it results in a state of impotence within these laws despite its legitimacy, it is not enforced by those in professional authority; therefore, we said that its legitimacy is limited.**

Of course, this is within the framework of comparing administrative and professional authority. If we say that rationality is limited and legitimacy is limited, we do not mean that it is not lawful; rather, the limitation of legitimacy in accordance with the limitation of rationality means that the issue lies in the mechanisms and procedures for applying these laws, such that they do not resonate. Even if implemented, they do not receive a full response from all workers, there are always obstacles to the implementation of these laws, as well as evasion and circumvention; however, the situation remains relative, and this undermines the legitimacy of these laws. Indeed, there are laws within the institution that are met with outright refusal to implement them and protests from workers, and in many cases, these laws are withdrawn, rewritten, or their implementation delayed due to negative reactions, even though they were drafted in a critical manner. This implies that their rationality is limited, and thus the bureaucratic organization finds itself in a vicious cycle, **as the essence of the conflict begins at this stage**, since the professional authority that its holders derive from their recognized professional experience is based primarily on two elements: competence and responsibility. For professional groups, competence does not mean possessing the technical knowledge that allows them to address technical problems such as repairing and maintaining machinery—in the context of factories, of course—nor does it mean controlling the production process; rather, it refers to **these technicians' ability to organize, manage, and direct, as well as to coordinate and supervise** to ensure that orders are carried out. This naturally results in a duality of authority between professional authority and administrative authority. Doctors typically begin by breaking the rules set by the director or administrative manager, as doctors generally consider administrative work to be of lower status than their specialized work. This means that those with technical expertise remain in a position of strength because they alone possess the necessary competence to solve many technical problems, while administrative authority works hard to strengthen **its power through rationalization and negotiation**. Meanwhile, **specialists (those with professional authority)** want to play a role in this process, as they are always consulted to resolve technical problems—meaning they are indispensable. **This is the essence of the conflict between administrative and professional authority, as Michel Crozet confirms.** (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)

9-Characteristics of those with professional authority:

Professionals possess several characteristics and distinctions, the most important of which are:

- The motivation to perform work among those with professional authority, given their expertise in the field.

- Work depends exclusively on those with professional authority, such as doctors in a hospital, as much of the work depends on their direct interventions and suggestions.
- The thinking and approach of a professional specialist differ greatly from those of an administrative manager, as the former operates according to the principles and values dictated by the nature of their work and related to the profession entrusted to them, practicing their profession with a high degree of professionalism. (Débonasfos, 1996)
- The professional enjoys freedom, as well as the ability to follow the rules he sets for himself; The specialist wants to be free and demands that his peers enjoy greater freedom, such as managing their work in their own way to solve their problems and organizing their projects according to their own methods. In doing so, they resist the **detailed and numerous directives from management** because they are very sensitive and do not want to feel that they are being controlled or restricted in the performance of their duties. (مداس، 2001)

Thus, the essence of strategic analysis theory is authority—specifically, two types of authority: administrative and professional—particularly within the hospital setting, where the distinction is clear and evident between those holding professional authority (doctors and specialists) and those holding administrative authority. Regarding the importance of the treatment system, **researcher Muhammad Rida states** that the current treatment system has made the hospital a central and foundational element, (Reda, 2008) serving as a hub for capital and labor. The economic model followed by institutions, which relies primarily on technological development, has led to the emergence of a class of experts within the hospital. Their disdain for technology has granted them an authority parallel to executive authority, namely professional authority, defined as the competence of those in the highest technical professions to judge or analyze matters related to their profession. (Bolman, 1996)

Having discussed the types of authority within the organizational structure—professional and administrative—as well as the source **of conflict between them and the inevitability of negotiation** between them, we now proceed to present some concepts in strategic analysis theory, the most important of which, in addition to the above, are as follows.

10-Zone of Doubt and Uncertainty: Zone d'indistitude

We touched on this concept earlier in the context of our discussion of previous concepts, though perhaps only briefly, and we will now attempt to elaborate further, as **the zone of doubt, suspicion, or uncertainty** is considered one of the most prominent concepts in strategic analysis. Every organization is subject to limited rationality and a vicious cycle and is therefore subject to **zones of uncertainty** in all technical and administrative fields. Whoever best controls these areas—thanks to their abilities, qualifications, scientific and intellectual competencies, and network of relationships and connections—can seize the greatest sources of power. Therefore, to understand the strategy of an actor—whether an individual, a group, or an institution—one must examine and understand **the zones of uncertainty** that afford the social actor relative freedom and enable him to act with agility and dynamism within the system.

11-Characteristics of the Zone of Doubt and Uncertainty:

- Their existence, context, and scope are defined by the system, which is divided into formal and informal components. Regardless of the nature of the system, zones of doubt and uncertainty exist, and they are informal in origin, context, and scope³⁹.

-The social actor—whether an individual, a group, or an institution—naturally, as an actor within the market system—seeks, through their strategy, to control and dominate the zones of uncertainty. (Bernoux, 1999)

-Professional authority, power, and influence are fundamentally built on the social actor's ability to control areas of uncertainty; the more control they exert over these areas, the greater their authority and influence become, thereby securing a position of strength **in negotiations with management**.

-The control exercised by social actors—whether individuals, groups, or institutions—over zones of uncertainty and ambiguity, as defined above, inevitably leads to an increase and expansion of their margin of freedom.

-Limited rationality is a defining characteristic of formal bureaucratic organization; it is an inseparable and inherent trait resulting primarily from a vicious cycle that inherently implies the relative weakness of this formal organization, and the more this vicious cycle expands—and expansion implies an increase in the fragility and weakness of bureaucratic organization—the more it leads to the expansion and spread of zones of doubt and uncertainty within the informal organization; and the more the social actor controls these zones, the greater their margin of freedom becomes. The very existence of zones of doubt and uncertainty is rooted in the limited rationality of formal bureaucratic organization and the vicious cycle into which this organization itself enters, which is due to the power and influence of professional authority, of course, according to strategic analysis theory.

-The social actor can control the zone of doubt and suspicion through his strategy, which is fundamentally based on his scientific abilities, knowledge, and network of formal and informal relationships. Even if it is a group **such as the maintenance workers at Renault factories**, for example, or specialist doctors who represent an official group—that is, a professional category—and at the same time an with its own authority and influence—we are, of course, referring to professional authority—all of this allows the social actor, whether an individual, a group, or an institution, to control areas of doubt and suspicion, and even more than that, given the strength of their control over these areas, they can **predict and anticipate the behavior of others or individuals, and this leads to an increase in their occupation of positions of influence and authority, especially a very strong negotiating position with the administrative authority**.

12-Rationality and Bounded Rationality in Strategic Analysis Theory:

Rationality and limited rationality are among the fundamental and central concepts in strategic analysis theory; under no circumstances can we overlook this limited or relative rationality, as **Michel Crouzet states: “The actor's strategy always stems from rationality, provided that this rationality is limited.”** (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977)

Limited or relative rationality is contrasted with absolute rationality, so to speak, a central concept particularly in **Max Weber's work**, and particularly when he discusses the bureaucratic model and bases his arguments on bureaucracy, using this term to refer to the administrative tasks, duties, and systems carried out, supervised, and established by administrative staff, (مداس، 2003) which he defined on the basis of office authority. Then came Taylor with scientific management, followed by Fayol and Ford, who regarded **the factory as a closed system** with a **rational** organization based on formal rules and laws, hierarchical authority, organizational structure, and so on. Later came Elton Mayo and the Human Relations School, Parsons and functionalism, However, the system became **open**, and the factory came to constitute a social unit—that is, a part of society—until we arrived at the theory of strategic analysis, the subject of this research, **and the concept of limited rationality (Rationalité Limitée)**. This means acknowledging the existence of organization, rules, and formal laws, but **according to Kruse**, these are not coercive, controlling, or strictly regulatory; but rather, in his view, all of this is negative and limited, and while the actor builds his strategy upon it, it remains limited.

Among the basic premises of strategic analysis: (Lafaye, 1996)

- That individuals never accept being treated as mere tools to achieve the specific goals of the controlling organization by those in charge; rather, every individual actor has their own goals and aspirations, which may initially conflict with the system's goals, as the system operates on the basis of the multiplicity of goals held by the social actors within it.
- The relative freedom of actors in any type of organization; they possess a sphere of freedom within which they exercise a degree of choice.
- An actor's strategy always stems from rationality, provided that this rationality is limited.

In the context of discussing limited rationality, we examine the views of some Algerian researchers, such as previous studies that addressed the topic of limited rationality in strategic analysis theory, including:

12-1-The therapeutic system and the rationality of the actors within it: (بالمختار ، 1991)

What concerns us in this study are the researcher's findings and his discussion of bounded rationality within the healthcare system, as he demonstrated and emphasized that this bounded rationality is influenced by the economic and social conditions of user groups, in addition to the impact of their educational or academic level, particularly among doctors. In conclusion, the researcher emphasizes that medical service depends on limited rationality based on the actors' position within the therapeutic system, in addition to the issue of educational level; however, social conditions revealed that there are multiple rationalities rather than a single one. According to the researcher, these rationalities are diverse, as are the positions of these actors within the system. As for educational level as a hypothesis, the researcher demonstrated through it—particularly among doctors, as they are the holders of professional authority and the most prominent actors in the therapeutic system— This limited rationality within this group is, in fact, a set of multiple and distinct rationalities unique to this group compared to the rationalities of other professional

groups, of course, because, according to the researcher, the group of doctors possesses a value framework fundamentally linked to the nature of their formation even before joining the institution or system and seeking spheres of influence and authority.

The researcher thus focuses on the existence of multiple, limited, and diverse rationalities rather than a single rationality, which is relatively consistent with the theory of strategic analysis. Perhaps the researcher added the element of the multiplicity and diversity of rationalities to the therapeutic framework under study, and this study is considered one of the first to address rationality and limited rationality, according to the researcher, and this study was later published as a book by the same researcher.

12-2-Industrial Organization Between Socialization and Rationality: (رثيمي، 2005)

This study is also one of the prominent studies that addressed the concept of rationality and limited rationality by linking limited rationality to a set of factors, including social socialization, family, and school, as well as work values within the organization—by which he means the organizational culture specific to the workplace. According to the researcher, these factors also contribute to the spread of limited rationality, or as the researcher put it, “irrational behaviors on the part of some workers within the organization.” Of course, through a set of variables, the researcher was able to highlight the concepts of rationality and limited rationality among social actors within the organization. The researcher emphasizes the existence of a distinct rationality among workers in Algerian institutions, which is, of course, limited rationality. The researcher was able to highlight the characteristics of this limited rationality, particularly its sources. The thesis was published in two parts.

12-3-The Organization and Labor Relations Among Socio-Professional Groups: As Well as the Hospital Institution and the Challenge of Healthcare Quality: (مداس، 2017)

Through these two theses, and particularly in the second one, we have sought to highlight the concept of limited rationality within the hospital institution or the therapeutic system, We sought to highlight the nature of the conflict between professional authority and administrative authority and to define the concept of limited rationality among all professional groups within the hospital institution, focusing primarily on the exercise of professional authority without neglecting the most important formal aspects and the issue of negotiation between administrative and professional authorities, as well as the necessity and imperative of the existence of bureaucratic system and its survival and continuity within organizations, as it is the origin and foundation, and this continuity, with an emphasis on the limited rationality of this system, All of this was a summary of the views of some Algerian researchers who addressed the topic of rationality and limited rationality, of course, from the perspective of strategic analysis theory. To complete the analysis of limited rationality, we will pause at:

13. The Weberian Perspective on Rationality and Its Bureaucratic Model:

The intention is not to delve into the details of Weber and rationality, as that is not the subject of our current discussion; however, since we are addressing the topic of limited rationality, we would like to briefly refer to Weberian rationality. Thus, Weber defines bureaucracy as **the authority of the office** rather than the authority of

the individual within the office, because he—that is, Weber—focuses on the office and the function associated with it, and he is not concerned with who holds the position; what matters is that the person is competent and capable of managing it. Thus, there is a position, there is an office, and there is authority over that office. This position is characterized **by permanence and continuity**, which is a feature of work in the capitalist system and Western societies, unlike the Chinese and Indian societies that Weber studied, as well as other societies. Continuity and permanence are considered qualities essential for the survival of the position in the office and, consequently, of the authority. Therefore, Weber emphasizes the necessity of adopting a set of **abstract rules** to organize the relationship between supervisors and executors, and between superiors and subordinates. These rules are not based on personal considerations that leave room for subjective and personal factors to influence the organization, including:

- The existence of an organized division of labor based on the definition of rights and duties and the distribution of roles.
- Adopting a formal structure that defines positions and ranks according to a hierarchical sequence, ensuring that this structure facilitates oversight.
- Hiring and promotion are based on the competence individuals demonstrate in their jobs, not on favoritism, nepotism, or other subjective factors.
- Separation of ownership of the means of production from management and administration, such that owners of the means of production should not be members of the institution's board of directors.
- Focus on written procedures, so that all forms of communication take on a formal character that can be referenced at any time. (عشوي، 1992)

Thus, the bureaucratic model is a rational model based on the exclusion of subjectivity and the adoption of objectivity, particularly a set of mandatory and binding rules and laws that are not subject to people's inclinations and moods but rather to the function and authority of the office, and to written forms of communication that can be referred to and relied upon at any time, in addition to the division of labor, specialization, organizational structure, and specific timelines for completing work.

14-Limited Rationality in Michel Crozier:

We have seen in the Algerian studies we presented earlier the sources of limited rationalities, including the existence of multiple rationalities rather than a single one within the hospital system, as well as the impact of the level of training and the nature of doctors' education. The second thesis focused on the role of socialization as a fundamental factor in shaping limited rationality, The third thesis focused on professional authority, particularly among doctors, and how limited rationality was formed not only among them but among all professional groups.

From this perspective, we observe that the sources of limited rationalities are multiple and diverse, but everyone agrees on the existence of this limited rationality, which aligns with the proposition of strategic analysis theory.

Bounded rationality is a fundamental given; indeed, for Croze, it is a prerequisite for the construction of a strategy by an actor—whether an individual, a group, or an institution (a social actor, of course)—so we cannot speak of **this actor's strategy if rationality is not bounded**.

“Rationality is a term that refers to any type of thinking or action derived from the rules of logic and empirical knowledge, in which goals are logically interconnected and achieved through the most appropriate means.” (مداس، 2003)

If this is the meaning of rationality—which implies rationality, not wasting time, and adherence to the rules and laws that organize and govern the institution (the system)—then **why does Kruse emphasize the necessity of limited rationality for constructing the actor's strategy?**

What Kruse (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977) emphasizes is that this limited rationality is the foundation for constructing the actor's strategy; on this basis, he focuses on the limitations of official organizational laws and rules—the rationality and limitations of these laws—and, in , he originally refers to the bureaucratic model and its entry into a vicious cycle, which essentially signifies the relative impotence of these rules and laws **in keeping pace with and monitoring the professional authority of their holders**, as we noted in the previous examples regarding doctors and hospital specialists or maintenance workers at Renault factories. **Therefore, from this perspective and on this basis, the actor's strategy is grounded in the limited rationality of formal bureaucratic organization, since limited rationality is a fundamental characteristic and feature of formal bureaucratic organization from the perspective of strategic analysis** (this rationality, as we stated earlier, is limited rationality).

-The absolute (abstract) rationality of bureaucratic organization is a characteristic and feature of the Weberian bureaucratic organization.

-Bureaucratic organization relies on the authority of the office, which is based on formal rules and laws, division of labor and specialization, organizational structure, and the use of written and documented communication within the system.

-This formal bureaucratic organization, as exemplified by the Weberian model, was adopted by a group of organizational theories—or rather, these theories relied on its absolute rationality—including Taylor's scientific management, Ford's assembly line and mass production, and Fayol's theory of administrative structure. All of these relied on Weber's bureaucracy and formal organization, and they viewed the factory as a unit independent of society—that is, they relied on a closed system. The greatest flaw in these theories was their neglect of the human aspects of organization and work, until Elton Mayo's Human Relations School emerged, drawing attention to the importance of human factors in the workplace. Afterward, the system became open, or the factory became an integral part of society. Subsequently, the concept of absolute rationality receded, but rationality was neither negated nor eliminated; rather, formal organization with all its components remained in place. What changed, however, was rationality, which became limited rather than absolute according to the perspective of strategic analysis theory. This marks the turning point in the analytical trajectory of organizational development within this theory. Thus, the transition from

the closed system to the open system is a fundamental reason for deriving limited rationality as an initial starting point, followed by other causes no less significant.

In conclusion:

- Limited rationality is a fundamental characteristic of formal organizations and the basis for constructing the social actor's strategy.

- Limited rationality was also a fundamental consequence of the vicious cycle in which the Weberian bureaucratic organization—characterized by absolute rationality—was caught.

- The fact that the bureaucratic organization entered a vicious cycle—which implies the relative weakness and inability of the formal organization to control professional authority, even though it was considered legally illegitimate— This weakness and incapacity of the formal organization, with all its structures and laws, was termed by Croze the vicious circle of bureaucratic organization. Due to this relative weakness and incapacity on the part of the formal organization, and the strength and influence of professional authority on the other hand, there was no longer absolute rationality, according to Croze; rather, rationality became limited.

- After Crozier found that bureaucratic organization operates in a vicious circle (i.e., he found it to be in a state of weakness and impotence), he proposed and incorporated limited rationality as another fundamental concept of strategic analysis theory, since the concept of the vicious circle is a preliminary and preceding stage in strategic analysis theory relative to the concept of limited rationality, as the vicious cycle of bureaucratic organization (the relative weakness and impotence of formal bureaucratic organization) is what prompted Michel Crouzière to add the concept of limited rationality. This was in line with his critique of Weberian bureaucracy, viewing the system as open; on the other hand, it was the professional authority, its power and influence, and the pressure exerted by experts on the administration that caused the formal bureaucratic organization to enter a vicious cycle, as Crozier described it, that is, it declared its relative impotence in the face of the loss of this professional authority and influence, after which limited rationality replaced absolute rationality. What we have said can be clarified as follows: According to Michel Crouzet: The absolute rationality of the bureaucratic organization is an absolute (abstract) rationality that is considered a characteristic, trait, or feature of the Weberian bureaucratic organization (the bureaucratic model). This absolute rationality has trapped the formal bureaucratic organization in a vicious cycle. The vicious cycle itself can be described as a state of relative impotence and weakness, or a state of dysfunction in the bureaucratic organization—what Croze would call “Dysfonctionnement Bureaucratique”—which resulted in the relative impotence and influence of the formal organization, represented by the administrative authority that failed to keep pace with the power of professional authority. This is the vicious cycle that has become a hallmark of all organizations. Thus, limited rationality is a product of the of bureaucratic organization that has neglected the human and informal aspects of organizations. The areas of doubt and uncertainty and the margin of freedom of the social actor are the pillars of this limited rationality, in addition, of course, to professional authority.

15-The System of Concrete Action (Système de L'action Concret):

The system of concrete action, or as Crozey calls it, Le Système de L'action Concret. Crozey starts with the social actor—whether an individual, a group, or **an institution**—and this social actor constructs their strategy, which must be based on relative or limited rationality. This strategy is a set of behaviors and actions that have meaning, even if they are not desirable.

Thus, the strategy is a set of behaviors and actions by actors in their workplaces within the framework of the organizational system. According to Cruse, all of this occurs on the basis that the actor possesses a margin of freedom within the informal organizational framework and professional authority through which they manage areas of uncertainty and suspicion. This actor builds their strategy on limited rationality, but within the context of anticipating the behavior of the other actor in pursuit of areas of influence and authority; this anticipation is the foundation of the actor's strategy. In other words, the sum of the actors' behaviors and actions is based on reading and anticipating the behavior of the other actor. For example, when those with professional authority make a decision to limit production—as an individual or collective strategy—they await the administrative authority's reaction; yet even before this, they anticipate its response, even if it has not yet been issued. This is what we mean by anticipating the behavior of the other and building a strategy based on it—which ultimately amounts to a struggle for power. Here, the conflict leads both parties to resort to negotiation. According to Kruse, the concrete system of action is the result and outcome of the sum of these strategies issued by social actors within the framework of interactions and reciprocal relationships that take place within the system. (Crozier, 1968) Within this system, differential relationships develop in which each actor's interests and desires are revealed primarily through the strategy they employ when negotiating with the other party. Crozee emphasizes this, stating: “Controlling others means entering into a relationship with them, and within this relationship, the authority of some over others develops; thus, in this sense, authority is a relationship and not a property of the actors.”

Thus, the system of concrete action is that relational system that drives a set of strategies issued by a group of social actors and is likewise founded on a set of limited rationalities, as each actor establishes a differential relationship that contributes to achieving their specific goals, even if these do not align with the system's goals, within the framework of an offensive strategy to occupy spheres of influence or power, or a defensive strategy to preserve these spheres and positions within the system. (Crozier & Friedberg, 1977).

Conclusion:

In conclusion, it is clear that Michel Crouzié's theory of strategic analysis represents a comprehensive sociological approach to understanding organizations, as it goes beyond the traditional view that reduces them to rigid formal structures, emphasizing instead the dynamic and interactive nature of the relationships within them. This theory has highlighted that social actors are not merely passive executors, but rather active agents possessing specific strategies through which they seek to advance their interests by controlling zones of uncertainty and building power relations within the system.

It also demonstrated that power within an organization is not limited to its formal administrative dimension but is distributed among various actors according to their capabilities and positions, resulting in a constant state of conflict and negotiation. In this context, concepts such as bounded rationality and the vicious circle served as effective analytical tools for understanding the dysfunctions of the bureaucratic organization and the limits of its effectiveness.

Consequently, grasping the implications of this theory allows researchers and students to gain a deeper understanding of organizational processes and contributes to the development of more realistic analytical approaches that take into account the complexity of human action within organizations, thereby opening new horizons for the study of organizational phenomena in various social contexts.

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