

Taha Abderrahmane and the Legitimacy of Difference

طه عبد الرحمن ومشروعية الاختلاف

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Abstract:

This study aims to highlight one of the most prominent problematics around which contemporary Arab philosophical thought revolves: the dialectic of difference. This is due to its significance in regulating the trajectories of philosophizing and defining the horizons of philosophical inquiry, as well as its role in explaining a set of contemporary concepts characterized by considerable depth and complexity, which touch upon issues of heritage, modernity, and human thought in its universality. Within his intellectual project, the thinker Taha Abderrahmane emphasized the necessity of comprehending the foundations of this dialectic and its epistemological limits, and understanding the nature of the relationship between the global and the local, and between the self and the other. This allows for the construction of an Arab philosophy based on the principle of participation, liberated from the logic of subordination to Western philosophies.

Keywords: Taha Abderrahmane, legitimacy of difference, epistemological dialectic, participation, the universal and the particular.

ملخص:

نسعى من خلال هذه الدراسة إلى إبراز إحدى أبرز الإشكاليات التي تمحور حولها الفكر الفلسفي العربي المعاصر، والمتمثلة في جدلية الاختلاف، نظراً لما تكتسيه من أهمية في ضبط مسارات التفلسف وتحديد آفاق النظر الفلسفي؛ فضلاً عن دورها في تفسير جملة من المفاهيم الراهنة التي تتسم بقدر كبير من العمق والتعقيد، والتي تلامس قضايا التراث والحداثة، والفكر الانساني في عالميته.

وقد شدّد المفكر طه عبد الرحمن ضمن مشروعه الفكري على ضرورة الإحاطة بأسس هذه الجدلية وحدودها المعرفية، وفهم طبيعة العلاقة التي تجمع بين العالمي والمحلي، وبين الأنا والآخر، بما يتيح بناء فلسفة عربية قائمة على مبدأ المشاركة، ومتحررة من منطق التبعية للفسفات الغربية.

كلمات مفتاحية: طه عبد الرحمن، مشروعية الاختلاف، الجدلية المعرفية، المشاركة، الكوني والخصوصي.

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1. Introduction

Taha Abderrahmane is considered one of the most prominent contemporary Arab philosophers who sought to build an integrated intellectual project starting from questioning the foundations of Western modernity and rethinking the conditions for producing philosophical knowledge within the Arab-Islamic context. His thought is characterized by a

profound critical tendency that does not merely reject ready-made models, but rather deconstructs them from within by revealing their epistemological and ethical limits, proposing alternatives that stem from cultural particularity without closing off to the universal horizon. In this context, the centrality of the concept of difference manifests in his project, where it is not viewed merely as an accidental variation between cultures, but as a fundamental condition for creativity and renewal, and a constituent element of authentic philosophical action.

Abderrahmane argues that the crisis of Arab thought does not lie in the absence of contact with Western thought, but rather in the nature of this contact, which has often taken the form of assimilation and subordination, instead of genuine participation based on dialogue and critique. Hence, he affirms the legitimacy of difference as the foundation for establishing a balanced relationship between the self and the other, where difference becomes a means to enrich the intellectual experience rather than an obstacle to it. For him, difference is not a call for isolation or rupture; rather, it is an awareness of the epistemological limits of every civilizational experience, and a realization of the possibility of creative interaction between different frames of reference.

Furthermore, Abderrahmane links difference to ethics, considering that the philosophical act is incomplete unless it is founded on an ethical responsibility that guides it and regulates its trajectories. Consequently, the defense of difference is inseparable from the call to renew thought from within, by restoring the value system and liberating reason from the hegemony of blind imitation, whether it be the imitation of heritage or of the West. In this sense, his thought presents a philosophical vision that seeks to achieve a delicate balance between particularity and universality, based on creativity and participation instead of subordination and assimilation.

1) The Dialectic of Thought Between Difference for Participation and Subordination:

The dialectic of thought between difference and participation manifests in the fact that difference is not the antithesis of communication, but a condition for its enrichment. Thought that seeks universality does not dissolve or eliminate particularities; rather, it relies on them as multiple sources of creativity and meaning. Therefore, the philosopher only achieves presence when starting from their own context, language, and values, to contribute them to the shared human space. In this sense, difference becomes a productive force for dialogue, where visions intersect without becoming identical, and the shared human sphere is built on the basis of recognizing diversity rather than denying it.

Conversely, this dialectic turns into subordination when the universal is reduced to a single model imposed as the sole standard for thought, rendering particularity a mere echo or imitation. Here, thought loses its independence (طه، روح الحداثة - المدخل الى تأسيس الحداثة 2006، صفحة 148) and turns into ready-made consumption instead of creative production. Therefore, overcoming subordination is not achieved by rejecting the universal, but by reconstructing it starting from the particular—that is, by transforming the relationship from passive imitation to active participation. Thus, a balance is achieved

between openness to the other and preservation of the self, within the framework of a thought that contributes to universality without losing its roots.

2) Intellectual Universality Does Not Negate Particularity:

Intellectual universality, as it appears in contemporary philosophical conception, does not in any way mean the elimination of cultural particularities or their fusion into a single model. Rather, it presupposes the presence of these particularities as necessary conditions for enriching the shared human space (طه، سؤال العمل بحث في الأصول العملية في الفكر والعلم، 2012 Thought does not acquire its universal character except to the extent that it opens up to the multiplicity of human experiences and accommodates the different pragmatic contexts in which it arises. Hence, universality is not the antithesis of particularity; it is a horizon where particularities converge without losing their identity, such that the shared human sphere is realized through interaction and integration, not through elimination or exclusion.

In this context, the vision defended by Taha Abderrahmane stands out, as he refuses to reduce universality to its totalitarian dimension, which claims to contain all philosophical experiences within a single mold. Such an understanding leads to the marginalization of intellectual particularities, transforming them into a mere reflection of a dominant thought. Therefore, he asserts that true universality is based on the principle of the "right to philosophize" (طه، تجديد المنهج في تقويم التراث، 2007، صفحة 166)—that is, enabling every nation to produce its philosophical discourse starting from its own pragmatic context, in terms of language, belief, and knowledge. In this sense, particularity becomes a condition for contributing to universality, not an obstacle to it, since no thought can be universal unless it is rooted in its environment and capable of expressing its subjective issues.

Moreover, acknowledging universality without paying attention to its limits may lead to a kind of intellectual subordination, where imported philosophical methods and contents are adopted without critique or scrutiny, under the pretext that they represent shared human thought (طه، الحق الاسلامي في الاختلاف الفكري، 2005، صفحة 52). However, this conception overlooks the fact that what is presented as universal may, in reality, be an expression of a specific historical experience that has been generalized. Hence, preserving particularity does not mean isolation; rather, it requires reconstructing the relationship with universal thought on the basis of critical participation, so that give-and-take occurs within a framework of parity, not subordination.

Accordingly, the intellectual universality that does not negate particularity is one that is based on creative interaction between cultures, where each party contributes its epistemological and value-based constituents to build a shared human horizon. Instead of being a tool for imposing a single model, universality transforms into a vast space for a multiplicity of philosophical voices, ensuring the vitality of thought and the continuity of its development. From this standpoint, the Arab-Islamic philosophical project is called upon to achieve its creative independence, not by breaking with the other, but through active participation that stems from the self and addresses all of humanity.

3) The Dialectic of Particularity to Prove Difference:

It is understood from Taha Abderrahmane's conception that the call for particularity is not synonymous with isolation or rupture with human thought; rather, it establishes an awareness of difference as a condition for contributing to universality. The Arab, as he sees it, needs to acknowledge his need to find a philosophy that distinguishes him as an Arab from other peoples—not a distinction of disconnection and seclusion, but a distinction of completion and enrichment. This means that particularity is not built on negating the other, but on engaging in dialogue with them from a different standpoint. In this sense, difference becomes not an obstacle to universality, but a path to it, because universality in its essence is not a ready-made given, but the outcome of the interaction of multiple particularities, each with its own angle of vision and its contribution to uncovering the truth.

Consequently, the dialectic of particularity shows that any claim to an abstract universality is a claim that ignores the plurality of perspectives. Concepts that appear universal, such as the concept of justice, are only perceived through different representations that vary according to cultural and historical contexts. Justice in a modern democratic context is not the same as in an Islamic context during the early days of Islam (بدران ، 2011 ، صفحة 121), despite their sharing the root of the concept. This variation does not invalidate universality, but rather confirms it as a space for difference, where truth is not reduced to a single image, but is distributed across multiple formulations. Here, particularity is affirmed as a mechanism for highlighting difference, and as a force that exposes the limits of any tendency toward uniformity.

Abderrahmane goes further when he considers that "particularity is an element in universality" and that it is "the body of universality," meaning that the universal only exists embodied in particular forms. Universality is not a transcendent essence, but a synthesis of disparate particularities, connected by a logic of interaction, not a logic of identity. Therefore, it seems strange to him to believe that particularity opposes universality, because the relationship between them is not one of contradiction, but of intersection and integration, where particularity represents the origin of universality and its living matter. Hence, insisting on erasing particularities in the name of universality only leads to the impoverishment of thought, because it destroys its multiple sources.

Furthermore, adhering to particularity does not mean stagnation or isolation (طه ، الحق) rather, it opens a space for a dynamic difference that allows the nation to preserve its constants in some aspects and open up in others, according to its civilizational needs. Particularity in this sense is not static, but a continuous movement between taking and giving, between permanence and change. Conversely, universality cannot be understood as a single, fixed system, because philosophical thought itself fluctuates between multiple ranks—sometimes approaching science, and other times art or religion (طه، سؤال العمل بحث في الأصول العملية في الفكر والعلم، 2012، صفحة 42)—making any monolithic conception of universality inadequate to accommodate this diversity.

On this basis, one cannot speak of a pure universality stripped of its pragmatic conditions, because every philosopher thinks within a specific language and values that frame their vision of the world. For this reason, Taha Abderrahmane asserts in his book *The Question of Action (Su'al Al-'Amal)* that "even if we assume that the philosopher attains universal meanings in his mind, their universality cannot be an abstract universality" (طه). (سؤال العمل بحث في الأصول العملية في الفكر والعلم، 2012، صفحة 44) since these meanings are only evoked through the mediation of a specific tongue and the structures and rules it carries. Here, the role of particularity in proving difference manifests once again, as linguistic and cultural structures stand as a barrier against attaining absolute universality, keeping thought tethered to its specific roots.

Finally, the distinction between universality as a principle and universality as a reality deepens this dialectic and highlights the centrality of difference. The principle of universality represents a value directed toward human agreement, but it remains an open horizon that is only realized through a multiple and fragmented reality, governed by specific contexts. As for realized universality, it is a partial historical manifestation of this principle, formed according to certain conditions, and cannot claim to encompass all forms of truth. Hence, the dialectic of particularity remains necessary to deconstruct any reductionist tendency, and to affirm that difference is not merely an accidental symptom, but an authentic structure in the formation of human thought, and a fundamental condition in building its universality.

4) The Claim to Particularity Versus Identification with Universality:

The claim of pure universal philosophy, as presented by Taha Abderrahmane, is based on a central assumption that reason, or Logos, inherently ascends to the level of totality and comprehensiveness, such that philosophical discourse becomes "purely rational discourse" (طه)، (سؤال العمل بحث في الأصول العملية في الفكر والعلم، 2012، صفحة 86) liberated from all pragmatic conditions that limit it. According to this conception, the philosopher believes that the concepts produced by this reason are abstract concepts, detached from language, belief, and epistemological context. This drives them to attempt to project these concepts onto their own domain, even if they do not align with it, as: "he tries to extract what corresponds to the meanings brought by this or that philosopher, fearing that he might miss them; and thus miss humanity" (طه)، (تجديد المنهج في تقويم التراث، 2007، صفحة 99). Here, the features of identification with universality manifest in their extreme form, where universality becomes a justification for abandoning particularity, under the pretext of engaging in a shared human horizon based on abstract universal concepts.

However, this conception, in Taha Abderrahmane's view, involves a detrimental reduction of the nature of the philosophical act, because it assumes the possibility of establishing pure rational knowledge that transcends all pragmatic mediations and addresses "human reason" as an abstract entity. This understanding has been reinforced by some modern Arab intellectual trends, as seen in Abdallah Laroui's discussion of "universal reason," where the idea of progress was linked to the possibility of assimilating Western

modernity as an expression of pure rationality that addresses issues of humanity, existence, and history in isolation from their cultural particularities. Consequently, the call to absorb this rationality became a condition for integration into the "new humanity" (العروي ، 1995 ، صفحة 203), and was even considered more viable than the call for distinction and difference.

Yet, Taha Abderrahmane rejects this trajectory, and in his book *The Arab Right to Philosophical Difference* (Al-Haqq Al-'Arabi fi Al-Ikhtilaf Al-Falsafi), he works to deconstruct what he calls the "myth of pure philosophy" or the "myth of rational purity." This myth, in his view, is based on the belief that philosophy is pure rational thinking, devoid of any mythical or allusive trace, whereas this claim itself is not based on a rational or realistic foundation, but is an implicit mythical belief. Hence, identification with this vision only leads to entrenching intellectual subordination, as it makes Western rationality an absolute model, "and they made its purity and absoluteness applicable to themselves and no one else" (عباس ، 2013 ، صفحة 153), which leads to negating the right to independent philosophizing within the Arab-Islamic context.

In contrast to this identification, Taha Abderrahmane establishes the claim of particularity as a condition for philosophical creativity. A living philosophy cannot be produced except by breaking free from the illusion of rational purity, and acknowledging the multiplicity of modes of thinking and the difference of pragmatic contexts. Therefore, he posits the necessity of moving beyond the pure philosophical concept, asking: "How do we address the pure philosophical concept, such that we make the Arab philosophical concept a living concept?" (طه ، الحق الاسلامي في الاختلاف الفكري، 2005 ، صفحة 88) The answer, according to his conception, lies in acknowledging two fundamental dimensions that invalidate the claim of purity: rational multiplicity and the plurality of concepts on the one hand, and implicit referencing and conceptual biases on the other. Reason is not singular in its manifestations, but multiplies with the multiplicity of contexts; likewise, concepts are not neutral, but carry within them semantic and cultural charges that reflect their original environments.

Accordingly, the call for particularity does not mean rejecting universality, but rather reconstructing it on the basis of productive difference, not dissolving uniformity. Philosophy is only universal to the extent that it recognizes the multiplicity of its sources, and makes room for every culture to contribute to its construction from within its own conditions. Hence, overcoming the "myth of rational purity" represents a necessary step toward reclaiming the right to philosophize, and establishing an Arab philosophy capable of creativity (محمد ، 2016 ، صفحة 70)—not through imitation, but through critical participation that makes particularity a source of richness, not an obstacle to openness.

5) The Idea of Rational Multiplicity and the Difference of Concepts:

The concept of "rational multiplicity" (التكوير العقلي) is one of the most prominent critical mechanisms adopted by Taha Abderrahmane in deconstructing the claim of pure

philosophy. Through it, he opposes the idea of a single, abstract reason that produces universal knowledge transcendent of contexts. Reason, in his conception, is not understood as a fixed essence or a self-sufficient faculty, but as a renewed act that accepts plurality and diversity. Thus, he asserts: "Hardly any of my books is devoid of an insistence on the plurality of rationalities, which is that reason is an act and not an essence. The purpose of this insistence is precisely to liberate Arab thought from subordination to the rationality of the thought of others, and to make it strive to establish its own rationality" (طه ، حوارات من

أجل المستقبل، 2011، صفحة 51) In this sense, rational multiplicity becomes an entry point for proving difference, and a refutation of the idea of rational identity upon which the claim of pure universality was based.

Based on this conception, Taha Abderrahmane reconstructs the concept of reason itself, moving beyond the Aristotelian conception that makes it a fixed essence, to considering it a dynamic and changing activity. He defines reason by saying: Reason is the act by which a human being perceives a specific aspect of existing things, similar to sight in relation to sensible objects. Sight is not an independent entity in itself, but an act caused by the eye. It follows from this definition that reason does not settle in one state, nor is it subject to fixed universal controls; rather, it fluctuates according to epistemological and pragmatic contexts. Hence, the assertion of the unity of reason or its purity is merely an extension of an essentialist tendency that does not align with the nature of the rational act in its multiplicity and transformation.

In the context of detailing the stations of rationality, Taha Abderrahmane highlights that multiplicity is not limited to one level, but extends to an internal plurality within the modes of rationality themselves. In his book *The Foundations of Dialogue and the Renewal of Islamic Theology*, he distinguishes between a demonstrative rationality of a formal scientific nature, and an argumentative rationality that regulates daily pragmatic discourse. However, he expands this conception in *Religious Action and the Renewal of Reason* to acknowledge three modes of rationality: abstract rationality, guided rationality, and supported rationality. The first is characterized by abstraction and relative detachment from practical values; the second is linked to ethical practice and the achievement of benefit; while the third transcends that to an allusive horizon with a value-based and spiritual dimension. This plurality reveals a difference in concepts and logical structures, which negates the possibility of reducing reason to a single model or an absolute universal system.

The concept of multiplicity reaches its peak in the book *Al-Lisan wa Al-Mizan* (Language and Balance), where Taha Abderrahmane settles the debate over the unity of reason by saying: "It has become clear to me beyond a shadow of a doubt that among cognitive acts, there is no act more fluctuating or changing than the rational act... For the same thing may be rational in one epistemological domain or logical system, and may not be so in another system" (طه ، حوارات من أجل المستقبل، 2011، صفحة 53). This conception highlights that reason changes not only across history, but also within individual experience, and even within different epistemological systems. Hence, the difference of concepts is not

an accidental symptom, but an inevitable result of the multiplicity of the rational act, which makes every philosophical practice conditional upon its specific context.

It follows from this proposition that plurality in reason necessarily leads to plurality in philosophizing, and consequently to plurality in the production of concepts. This plurality is not a weakness, but an expression of the vitality of thought and its capacity for creativity. Therefore, Taha Abderrahmane asserts: "The original state of reason is multiplicity, not unity as the general public and the elite believe. Multiplicity brings to the rational being that which manifests their humanity and elevates it through varying ranks" (30). In contrast, the "reason that does not change" is a rigid, purist reason that leads to the impoverishment of the intellectual experience, because it excludes the possibilities of difference and renewal.

Accordingly, the concept of rational multiplicity represents a theoretical foundation for critiquing assimilation with Western rationality, and opens the way for reclaiming the right to philosophize from within pragmatic particularity. The difference of concepts is not an obstacle to universality, but a condition for enriching it, because every concept carries the imprints of its cultural and epistemological context. Hence, overcoming the myth of pure philosophy can only be achieved by acknowledging the plurality of minds and the difference of concepts, allowing for the construction of an Arab philosophy capable of creativity—not through subordination, but through the practice of difference as an authentic philosophical value.

5-1) Implicit Referencing and Conceptual Biases: A Critique of Rational Purity

Taha Abderrahmane's thesis in critiquing pure philosophy is based on highlighting what he calls "implicit referencing" (الإضمار الإشاري), considering it an inherent dimension of all conceptual production, no matter how much it claims abstraction and universality. The reference (الإشارة), in his conception, is not merely a semantic ornament, but a deep structure that permeates meaning, and is linked to the pragmatic domain in which the concepts originated, in terms of language, belief, and knowledge. Hence, every philosophical concept carries within it the traces of its original environment, even if it appears on the surface as "purely rational discourse." For this reason, he warns against falling into the illusion of literal reception of imported philosophies, because the philosopher who fails to notice the presence of the reference in the context of the phrase within the translated Western philosophical text, brings forth a philosophy that contains as much Western particularity as it does rational generality, which makes this philosophy "sterile with no creativity, and rigid with no life" (طه ، الحق الاسلامي في الاختلاف الفكري، 2005، صفحة 90).

This conception leads to a central conclusion: the impossibility of the existence of philosophical concepts that are completely pure of any allusive load or cultural background. No matter how much thought strives for abstraction, implicit references remain interspersed in its structure, whether consciously or unconsciously. Therefore, overcoming this problematic is not achieved by attempting to erase the reference, but by being aware of it and utilizing it in producing new concepts that stem from pragmatic particularity. Here, Taha Abderrahmane's thesis intersects with what Abdelwahab Elmessiri posits in his

discussion of "bias" (التحيز), where he asserts that concepts and methods "are not completely neutral, but express a set of values that determine the field of vision and the trajectory of research", which makes every epistemological model conditional upon its latent references.

- ❖ The reference represents the implicit dimension that links the concept to its pragmatic context.
- ❖ There are no pure philosophical concepts devoid of cultural and value-based backgrounds.
- ❖ The uncritical reception of Western concepts leads to the production of a subordinate and sterile philosophy.
- ❖ Awareness of implicit referencing is a condition for creating new philosophical concepts.
- ❖ Bias according to Elmessiri corresponds to implicit referencing according to Taha Abderrahmane in terms of epistemological function.

In this framework, both Taha Abderrahmane and Abdelwahab Elmessiri call for the necessity of reconstructing concepts from within the Arab-Islamic context, not through literal transfer, but through generating new semantics that respond to the particularity of reality. What is required is not isolation or rejection of the other, but achieving a "genuine openness" based on interaction, not subordination, where imported concepts are assimilated after deconstructing their biases and reformulating them. However, Taha Abderrahmane goes further than Elmessiri, as he does not merely attribute the problem to Western hegemony, but holds the Arab philosopher responsible for this adoption, considering that subordination was not only imposed, but was also the result of a desire for assimilation and alienation within the Western system.

5-2) Modernity Between Universality and Particularity: From Assimilation to Creativity

Taha Abderrahmane presents the model of "modernity" to embody the distinction between universality as a principle and universality as a reality, distinguishing between the "spirit of modernity" and the "reality of modernity." The former represents the shared universal values to which all nations can affiliate, while the latter consists of specific historical manifestations of these values in the Western context. Hence, the methodological error into which many Arab thinkers have fallen lies in confusing the spirit with the reality—that is, in considering the Western model as the final embodiment of modernity, which has led to subordination instead of creativity.

Taha Abderrahmane establishes the "spirit of modernity" on three fundamental principles: Maturity (الرشد), Critique (النقد), and Comprehensiveness (الشمول). Maturity is based on independence and creativity; critique on rationalization and detailing; while comprehensiveness means openness to universality without losing particularity. However, achieving these principles is not done through assimilation with the Western model (روح طه)

المدخل الى تأسيس الحداثة الاسلامية - الحداثة, 2006, p. 15), but by reactivating them within the

specific context of each nation. Therefore, participating in modernity does not mean cloning its reality, but contributing to its construction starting from particularity.

- ❖ The distinction between the "spirit of modernity" (a universal value) and the "reality of modernity" (a specific historical embodiment).
- ❖ Western modernity represents a possible application, not an absolute model.
- ❖ The principle of Maturity: Intellectual independence and rejection of tutelage (طه, المدخل الى تأسيس الحداثة الاسلامية -روح الحداثة, 2006, p. 26).
- ❖ The principle of Critique: Not accepting ready-made concepts.
- ❖ The principle of Comprehensiveness: Interactive openness, not assimilation (طه, روح المدخل الى تأسيس الحداثة الاسلامية -الحداثة, 2006, p. 28).

However, this conception has not been immune to criticism. Nassif Nassar considered that linking philosophy to historical particularity does not negate its universality, and that language is not the essence of thought but merely a medium for it. Fethi Meskini viewed Taha Abderrahmane's project as belonging to an identity-based discourse of a theological nature, lacking philosophical depth in addressing the problematic of modernity. As for Idriss Hani, he criticized the concept of the pragmatic context, arguing that it might lead to isolation instead of creativity, and that it overlooks the role of the human being as a historical actor capable of transcending contexts.

Despite these criticisms, Taha Abderrahmane's project remains founded on the attempt to achieve a delicate balance between universality and particularity, by rejecting assimilation and calling for creativity. Philosophy, in his view, is only alive if it stems from its own reality, and assimilates others without dissolving into them. Thus, it transforms from mere imitation into an authentic practice that contributes to building shared human thought.

Conclusion:

This study, in its entirety, concludes that the concept of the legitimacy of difference for Taha Abderrahmane is not merely a passing theoretical position, but represents the cornerstone of his entire philosophical project. Upon it is founded an integrated vision for reconstructing the relationship between the self and the other, and between the local and the universal. Difference in this context is not the antithesis of unity nor a threat to universality; rather, it is one of its conditions, since the universal can only be realized through the multiplicity of its tributaries and the difference of its manifestations. Thus, the defense of difference is, at its core, a defense of the vitality of thought and its capacity for creativity and renewal, far from any reductionist or assimilative tendency.

It also becomes clear that Taha Abderrahmane's critique of intellectual subordination is not based on rejecting Western thought in itself, but on rejecting the pattern of relationship based on imitation and simulation, where concepts turn into imported tools that lose their efficacy within the Arab-Islamic context. Therefore, the alternative he proposes consists of moving from the logic of assimilation to the logic of participation, allowing for the reconstruction of universality on a critical dialogical basis that acknowledges difference and invests in it. In this sense, philosophizing becomes a creative practice conditioned by

pragmatic affiliation, not an abstract act detached from its cultural and epistemological conditions.

On the other hand, the concepts of rational multiplicity and implicit referencing reveal the depth of the Abderrahmanian project in deconstructing the myth of "pure reason." He highlights that all philosophical thinking is governed by its contexts and value-laden carriers, and that the claim of absolute universality is nothing but an expression of implicit biases. Accordingly, awareness of these determinants does not lead to isolation, but opens a broader horizon for creativity, because acknowledging the plurality of minds and the difference of concepts allows for enriching the human experience instead of reducing it to a single model.

Finally, it can be said that Taha Abderrahmane posits a philosophical horizon that seeks to achieve a delicate balance between particularity and universality, based on ethical creativity and critical participation, not on subordination or rupture. The legitimacy of difference, as he establishes it, is not only a philosophical call, but also a civilizational project aimed at restoring the intellectual agency of the nation, by building a philosophy that stems from itself, and simultaneously opens up to all of humanity, contributing to the formulation of a multi-voiced universality, rich in its creative diversity.

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