

The Originality of the Inductive Method in Arabic Grammatical Studies

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Abstract :

The inductive approach to Arabic grammar was founded on observing Arab speech and inferring its evidence, far removed from the influence of Aristotelian logic. Grammarians paid attention to the explanation of linguistic phenomena, relying on common sense and instinct, rather than philosophical metaphysics. Their view of causation differed from that of theologians and legal theologians, as they held a sensory dimension linked to induction, rather than a rational or teleological one. This approach went through three stages: the initial stage with Abdullah ibn Abi Ishaq and al-Khalil ibn Ahmad, where simplicity prevailed; the growth stage with Sibawayh and al-Khalil's students, where explanation pervaded most details; and the maturity stage with Ibn al-Sarraj and those after him, where investigation of causes preceded the establishment of rules. This approach was characterized by a departure from Greek demonstrative reasoning and a reliance on Arabic nature and the objectives of the language. Thus, it became clear that grammatical induction was inherent in its Islamic environment, and that the claim that it was influenced by Aristotelian logic is an inaccurate claim

Key Words: The inductive method - grammatical reasoning - causation - grammarians - Aristotelian logic.

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Introduction :

The nature of the human mind dictates the ability to pose questions and investigate causes and reasons in every area of life. Since language is the closest of these areas to human life, it is only natural that it generates many inquiries during a stage of maturity and intellectual advancement. Perhaps this is the work of Arabic grammarians, who were so passionate about explaining the phenomena of the Arabic language that their method of explanation attained a lofty status. Discussions of this method became linked to the origins of grammar itself, as its history is intertwined with its history and the history of its composition. The development of the inductive, causal method was dependent on sciences other than grammar, such as jurisprudence, philosophy, and theology (Mazen Al-Mubarak, 1965, p. 5), which prompts us to pay special attention to this aspect in this article.

I. The Law of Causality among Muslim Scholars and Aristotelian Logic: The issue of causality occupied a wide space in the research of Muslim scholars, including theologians, theologians, and grammarians. This indicates that each of them presented it in a manner consistent with their scientific specialization, attempting to establish the foundations of its generalities and particulars, addressing its positive aspects and criticizing what they saw as its negative aspects. What prompted us to present this topic by returning to the research of all these scholars is the widespread belief that grammar was influenced by Aristotelian logic with regard to causation in its original stages. Therefore, we will attempt to clarify some of the doctrines of causality among Muslim scholars, addressing the course of grammatical causation in its arena. The idea of causality is closely linked to the idea of the world and nature, and has been adopted by theologians to explain divine efficiency, meaning that the universe needs an efficient cause, since these causes cannot be subject to an infinite sequence. In this view, it is an important idea for those who believe in strict determinism in the world, because this results from their adoption of the inevitable connection between cause and effect, between reason and result, and between action and reaction, since for them everything is by measure. (Jamal Al-Marzouki, 2001, p. 155)

Mu'tazilite thought is at the forefront of the schools that discussed the issue, and it is no wonder that they based their analysis on the spirit of their creed. For them, cause is an intrinsic description that does not depend on a maker, and it is effective in itself. Therefore, they recognized the law of causality based on the principle of good and evil, because for them, judgment is subject to benefit and harm. Therefore, they saw that a thing can only be good or bad in itself, which led them to recognize the law of causality in general, whether in the rational sciences or in the religious sciences. (Ali Sami al-Nashar, 1984, p. 155) This led them to say that the relationship between causes and their effects is necessary and cannot be neglected. (Jamal Al-Marzouqi, 2001, p. 134)

As for the Ash'arites, they held a distinguished position among the theological sects. Their fame perhaps surpassed that of the Mu'tazilites in this regard, due to their strong and convincing views, as opposed to the views of the Mu'tazilites. They

believed that "the cause is what necessitates the ruling by the legislator's making." (Ali Sami Al-Nashar, 1984, p. 116), meaning that it is influenced by the influence of God Almighty. Perhaps this view is what led them to reject the intrinsic nature of beings. (Jamal Al-Marzouqi, 2001, p. 133) Contrary to the Mu'tazila, of course, this is clearly evident in one of the greatest Ash'ari theologians, Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali (d. 505 AH), who believes that the coupling of existence between two things does not necessitate causality between them. Proving one does not entail proving the other, nor does denying one entail denying the other. Rather, God Almighty creates when two bodies meet, and He, the Almighty, is able to create combustion without throwing them into the fire. (Al-Ghazali Abu Hamid, 1987, p. 240) It is worth noting that this position of Abu Hamid was a precaution to avoid a contradiction between the natural law of determinism and the prophetic miracles, because it is a position that opens up permissibility and possibility between causes and effects, as "conjunction replaces necessity and possibility replaces determinism." (Jamal Al-Marzouqi, 2001, p. 141) This is supported by the fact that this observed coupling in existence between causes and effects is a necessary coupling, as it is not possible or feasible to find the cause without the effect, nor the existence of the effect without the cause (Ali Sami Al-Nashar, 1984, p. 159) because the statement of causality is based on the fact that we observe the succession of two events, one after the other, so we have agreed to call the first a cause and the second an effect without the existence of any rational connection between the two events. (Ali Sami Al-Nashar, 1984, p. 159)

This immersion in research into the issue of causes and effects has been somewhat tinged with philosophical tinge, which has made it easy for some to say that the Aristotelian law of causality could influence their discussions and opinions on the cause. However, the reality is different. Ibn Taymiyyah (d. 728 AH) criticizes this Aristotelian law that was adopted by logicians and philosophers: "None of the Muslim theorists paid attention to it. Rather, the Mu'tazilites, Ash'arites, Karramites, Shiites, and all other groups of theorists found fault with it and proved its corruption." (Ibn Taymiyyah, 2005, p. 282)

The Mu'tazila clearly denied the Aristotelian law of causality, and even denied its conception in the natural realm. However, they advocated for the freedom of human will and viewed man as the true agent. Therefore, they did not fully embrace the Aristotelian concept of causality, which led to a kind of confusion and disorder in their discussions of divine power and the natural world. (Ali Sami al-Nashar, 1984, p. 156) As for the Ash'arites, they began their criticism of this law and their rejection of its metaphysical conception by asking: How can the notion of substance and the impermanence of accidents be reconciled with the notion of causality? The idea of continuous, new creation advocated by the Ash'arites stems from the notion that accidents do not last for two periods of time. However, the natural world and the human world are governed by these accidents—that is, the parts. While we do not find choice in the natural world, we find human will influencing God's creation within it. (Ali Sami al-Nashar, 1984, p. 156)

As for the law of causality among scholars of the principles of jurisprudence, there is no doubt that "the pursuit of knowledge of the rulings of the Shari'a regarding the new actions of human beings has required jurists to exert *ijtihad* (exercise) to understand the causes of Shari'a rulings in order to generalize the relationship between causes and rulings. Thus, the cause necessitates the ruling, and the same cause necessitates the same effect, and consequently, the same ruling." (Mahmoud Yaqubi, 1987, p. 157), the provisions of the Sharia were not legislated in vain, but rather were legislated for the benefit of the servants, sooner or later, and this benefit is either bringing about a benefit or warding off a corruption and removing a hardship, and this benefit in both its aspects is the original motive for legislation, whether it is a command, a prohibition or permission, and this is indicated by the induction of the texts (Abdul Karim Zaydan, 1976, p. 201), and the reason is thus the basis of the legal analogy and its great foundation, and on the basis of knowing it and verifying its existence in the branch, the analogy is completed and its benefit becomes apparent. (Abdul Karim Zaydan, 1976, p. 201)

What concerns us now is that scholars of the principles of jurisprudence have their own methods for arriving at their goals, other than the methods logicians have used to acquire knowledge. This is because jurists, like theologians, were even more averse to deriving legal rulings through logic, because it fails to achieve the goal of knowledge of the rulings of the Shari'a, which can only be achieved by understanding its conditions and causes, which are determined through observation and understanding the objectives of the Shari'a (Mahmoud Ya'qubi, 1987, p. 157). This is because even if the cause is not derived from an explicit text, an allusion, or an allusion to the cause, it is derived through two methods: circumlocution, investigation, and division. (Mahmoud Ya'qubi, 1987, p. 162)

It appears that the first jurist to diminish the value of Aristotelian logic was Imam al-Shafi'i (d. 204 AH), who is reported to have said: "People are ignorant only because they have abandoned the Arabic language and inclined towards the language of Aristotle." This statement suggests that jurists and hadith scholars have turned away from logic because of its unsuitability for deriving legal rulings and because legal issues do not follow its rules. (Mahmoud Yaqubi, 1987, p. 23)

If the context does not call for an extensive and detailed discussion of some aspects of jurists' aversion to logic, we will suffice with a brief overview of the systematic attempts to criticize it in general, and to criticize the law of causality in particular, among Muslims. By this, we mean the serious attempts that sought to present a purely Islamic alternative that would fulfill their objectives. It is understood from this that some parties sought to introduce logic into the science of the principles of jurisprudence, which is the reality. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali considered logic "the introduction to all sciences, and whoever does not master it cannot be trusted in his knowledge at all." (al-Ghazali Abu Hamid, 1987, p. 166), which led Ibn Taymiyyah to hold him responsible for imposing logic on the science of the principles of jurisprudence. (Mahmoud Yaqoubi, 1987, p. 238) Knowing that the principles of jurisprudence in its original stages used reasoning for non-legal legal rulings in the innate way that all people are born with. (Mahmoud Yaqoubi, 1987, p. 166) This is

supported by the fact that most of its examples are derived from non-legal incidents, which indicates that the jurists' method of reasoning is the one used by ordinary people who, once they know something, cannot prevent themselves from moving from the existence of the cause to the existence of the effect, on the basis that the relationship between the cause and the effect is considered one of the principles of coupling between meanings and thus a matter of the interconnection and association of meanings. (Mahmoud Yaqubi, 1987, p. 162)

The attacks on logic by jurists and hadith scholars took the form of fatwas (religious edicts) of prohibition, as Ibn al-Salah (d. 643 AH) and al-Nawawi (d. 676 AH) did. However, they continued to take a systematic form and an objective scientific framework with Taqi al-Din Ibn Taymiyyah, who based his critique of logic on two aspects: a destructive aspect of Greek logic and a constructive aspect based on establishing a purely Islamic logic unrelated to Greek logic. (Ali Sami al-Nashar, 1984, p. 185)

Thus, the reason that prompted theologians and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence to reject logic was their rejection of Aristotelian metaphysics. This necessitated that they reject the research methodology upon which it was based and instead create a purely Islamic logic with its own methodology. If this is how theologians and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence view Aristotle's law of causality, what do grammarians think?

Aristotle's cause is divided into four categories: material, which answers the question "what is something?" formal, which answers the question "how?" efficient, which answers who did something; and teleological, which answers the question "why?" (Muhammad Eid, 1973, p. 131).

From this exact perspective, some have argued that grammatical cause is influenced by logic. Indeed, after applying logic to certain grammatical issues, some have asserted this and viewed grammatical reasoning as "an echo of logical reasoning, on the one hand, and of the general intellectual effort that later imposed its authority on researchers in religion and language." (Muhammad Eid, 1973, p. 131)

Grammarians were influenced in their approach to grammatical reasoning by theologians and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence, whose aversion to logic we saw a moment ago. This aversion was paralleled among grammarians, exemplified by the famous debate between Abu Sa'id al-Sirafi (d. 368 AH) and Matta ibn Yunus al-Mantiqi (d. 328 AH), held in the presence of prominent figures of the era. Abu Sa'id refuted Matta's statements, demonstrating that the usages of the Arabic language diverge from those of the Greek language. (Abu Hayyan al-Tawhidi, 2004, p. 78)

What clarifies the connection between grammarians and theologians is that the Mu'tazilite doctrine imposed its authority on the leading grammarians, so they exploited the phenomenon of grammatical interpretation and estimation to support and defend their theological principles. Some of them also saw that the reasons for grammar were closer to the reasons of theologians than to the reasons of jurists (Ahmad Sulayman Yaqut, 2000, p. 118). Ibn Jinni (d. 392) says: "Know that the reasons of grammarians, and by that I mean their skilled and proficient ones, not their

weak and weak ones, are closer to the reasons of theologians than to the reasons of jurists. This is because they only refer to the senses and argue in it by the heaviness or lightness of the situation for the soul. This is not the case with the reason for jurisprudence, as they are only signs and indications of the occurrence of rulings, and the aspects of wisdom in them are hidden from us and not apparent to us." (Ibn Jinni, 2008, p. 49)

As for the manifestations of the connection between grammarians and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence, it is evident in the shared evidence of the two disciplines: the principles of grammar and the principles of jurisprudence. Some grammarians took chapters from the principles of jurisprudence and engaged in them. (Ibn Jinni, 2008, p. 94) Perhaps there were grammarians who wrote in the style of the principles of jurisprudence, such as Ibn al-Anbari, who says in the introduction to "Al-Insaf": "...and then: a group of well-mannered jurists and learned men of letters who studied with me at the Nizamiyya School... asked me to summarize for them a nice book that includes the famous controversial issues between the grammarians of Basra and Kufa, in order of the controversial issues between al-Shafi'i and Abu Hanifa..." (Ibn al-Anbari, 1997, p. 5)

However, The grammarians' conception of cause differed from that of theologians and scholars of the principles of jurisprudence, as the theological cause is final, revealing a rational connection between it and the effect, and the relationship between them is a companion relationship in existence - that is, they exist together - just as the jurisprudential cause reveals the general good and precedes the effect in existence, as the cause calling for the ruling arises first, then the ruling arises after it. As for the grammatical cause, it is sensory, revealing the result of induction, and it may be necessary in some cases, and it accompanies its effect in existence, and thus it belongs to natural material logic, and has nothing to do with formal - Aristotelian - logic. (Tamam Hassan, 2004, p. 164) This is supported by what Ibn Jinni stated in several places in the book "Al-Khasais"; He says: "I have only made this statement in this place so that you may strengthen in your mind the power of the senses of these people, and that they may notice, through grace and nature, what we do not notice through long discussion and listening. So consider it, for the need for something similar is clear." (Ibn Jinni, p. 276). He also says: "You will not find anything with which the people explained the aspects of grammar except that the soul accepts it and the senses are fully aware of it. Do you not see that the accidents of what exists in this language are something that preceded the time of the law and forced the judgment of the natural intuition in it? All the reasons for grammar, then, are in accordance with nature." (Ibn Jinni, 2008, p. 163). Therefore, it is not appropriate to search for the concept of reason among grammarians in Aristotle's reasons, because this inductive approach in the grammarians' approach is the result of a revolt against logic and a rejection of its demonstrative analogy. (Hussam Ahmed Qasim, p. 45)

The inductive approach of grammarians has enabled us to discover that the path of grammatical causation is the same as that of the Mu'tazilites, who hold that "causation is an intrinsic description that does not depend on the presence of a causator." However, grammatical causation is necessitated by the presence of a

causator—the Arabs—and is not intrinsically necessary, as is the case with the theological causation of the Mu'tazilites. Thus, a distinction is made between rational and linguistic causation. (Ibn Jinni, 2008, p. 46)

What can be concluded is that logical causation is also rejected in the principles of grammar, as is the case in theology and the principles of jurisprudence, due to metaphysical problems and the perception of speech occurring in a manner that contradicts reality. Thus, the grammarian's acquisition of the image, with its parts and the relationships between them, for the purpose of generalizing the rule, becomes a matter far removed from causation. (Jalal Shams al-Din, 1994, p. 61)

In any case, Proving this ruling requires examining the method of reasoning itself and tracing its stages and characteristics at each stage. Grammatical reasoning has gone through three basic stages, each characterized by overlap, based on the fact that there is a transitional period between each two stages. Therefore, examining these stages—that is, the stages—is a general matter. (Hassan Khamis Saeed Al-Malakh, 2000, p. 53)

2. The emergence of the inductive-causal method:: The beginnings of grammatical causation were linked to the narratives of the founder of Arabic grammar, despite their differences in attributing it to a specific founder. Perhaps this connection was due to the fear of deviating from the traditions of the Arabs in their speech, as Ibn Khaldun (d. 808 AH) asserts. This connection also stemmed from the necessity of "deriving consistent laws, quasi-universals, and rules by which people, especially non-Arabs, could measure all types of speech, and compare similarities with similarities." (Ibn Khaldun, 2001, p. 625). On the other hand, this was due to the connection between the Arabic language and the Islamic religion, which was revealed to all people. (Hassan Khamis Saeed Al-Malakh, 2000, p. 36)

Abdullah ibn Abi Ishaq Al-Hadrami (d. 118 AH) can be considered the pinnacle of grammatical reasoning, as Ibn Salam Al-Jumahi (d. 231 AH) stated, "He was the first to expand grammar and extend analogy and reasoning." This is evident in his dialogues with Al-Farazdaq (d. 110 AH), in which he challenged him by directing some of his statements to conform to Arabic usage.

This stage ends with Al-Khalil ibn Ahmad Al-Farahidi (d. 175 AH), who can be called both the pinnacle and finale of grammatical reasoning in this stage (Shadha Jarrar, 2006, p. 126). He achieved the ultimate in correcting analogy and extracting grammatical issues and reasoning. The reasoning at this stage was characterized by simplicity and was directly connected to its linguistic meaning (Ali Abu Al-Makarem, 2006, p. 152), as it searched for the reasons that lie behind the linguistic phenomena and grammatical rules - first - and it is a search on the margins of those phenomena and rules - second - and this means that it is not a basic aspect of grammar as much as it is psychological and mental curiosities that grammarians enjoy. (Ali Abu al-Makarem, 2006, p. 154) Dr. Ali Abu al-Makarem states that reasoning at this stage was characterized by three features (Ali Abu al-Makarem, 2006, p. 154):

The first: the partiality of the subject and perspective, meaning that reasoning addresses partial issues and subsidiary matters, and is only connected to the issues

being reasoned. This indicates the absence of reasoning that seeks to expand reasoning to encompass multiple phenomena.

The second: consistency with the original rules, meaning consistency between reasoning and the grammatical rules arrived at by grammarians, as there is no apparent contradiction between them.

The third: consideration of linguistic texts, whether they are narrated or based on narrated texts, as they do not reason in ways that contradict the linguistic texts, regardless of their source. Rather, they make reasoning a servant to them, a justification for them, and a justification for their phenomena. The reasoning in it was derived from the spirit of the language, relying on sound evidence, and on instinct and intuition by their very nature, and it was far removed from philosophical thought. (Mazen Al-Mubarak, 1965, p. 69)

3. The development and advancement of the inductive reasoning method:

This stage begins with Al-Khalil's students, led by Sibawayh (d. 180 AH) and ends with Al-Zajjaj (d. 311 AH). It thus encompasses approximately one and a half centuries, extending to the early fourth century AH. This is undoubtedly a very long period, and it is worthy of leaving clear traces on the reasoning method and its characteristics, as some of its features changed from what they were in the previous stage as a result of the circumstances experienced by society during this period. (Ali Abu al-Makarem, 2006, p. 156)

Sibawayh represents the pinnacle of rationalization, as he compiled grammar in his book and listed its rulings supported by rationalizations. His rationalizations were "similar to those of al-Khalil and those from whom Sibawayh narrated, in terms of their attention to meaning, their reliance on the Arabs' taste for lightness, their interest in comparing similar things with similar things, basing analogies on analogies, and their avoidance of ugliness and heaviness. This is no surprise, as Sibawayh was a student of al-Khalil, and if he had merit in rationalization, it was merit in expansion... For Sibawayh, rationalization is nothing more than attaching a grammatical ruling to a rationalization presented by its author in the style of a qualified professor or a confident scholar, so that no one can imagine a response to it or assume a refutation of it." (Mazen Al-Mubarak, 1965, p. 64). Thus, Sibawayh takes the form of field research that relies on incomplete induction, as it is based on describing the subject and establishing a codification for it, and explaining both the description and the codification. (Hassan Khamis Saeed Al-Malakh, 2000, p. 41)

It is worth noting in this context that explaining linguistic phenomena and grammatical rules was one of the important areas in which grammarians revealed what had settled in their minds and conscience regarding the wisdom of language. Therefore, explaining attracted significant efforts from scholars during this period, given that the codification of grammatical phenomena had been completed or nearly completed in the previous period and at the beginning of this period. Therefore, the desire to establish a codification was no longer what grammarians aspired to, allowing them to focus on explaining both what is present in the language and what is codified in the rules. Therefore, the prominent feature of this period was the prevalence of explaining itself. (Ali Abu al-Makarem, 2006, p. 158)

The characteristics of reasoning at this stage can be summarized as follows (Mustafa Jatal, 1981, p. 463):

First: Reasoning began to address the details of grammatical research, and we hardly find a detail without a reason.

Second: Attempts arose to combine details within a comprehensive framework that encompasses them, which contributed to the emergence of the factor theory.

Third: Reasoning remained limited to grammatical rules and linguistic phenomena, respecting them and limiting its relationship to them to justification.

Fourth: Grammarians presented various models of reasoning in their reasoning, whether partial or general, but they mostly reveal two main lines: reasoning by alleviation and reasoning by difference.

4. The maturity and flourishing of the inductive-causal method:

This phase began after al-Zajjaj with Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn al-Sirri, known as Abu Bakr ibn al-Sarraj (d. 316 AH). This phase marked a major change in the grammatical causal method and its relationship to grammatical rules (Ali Abu al-Makarim, 2006, p. 164). It is sufficient for us that causal reasoning was no longer intended to justify existing phenomena, but rather extended to finding what is consistent with causal explanations, proceeding from the confines of linguistic phenomena and grammatical rules to conceptualize the phenomena upon which the desired rules are based. This means that the nature of the relationship between causal reasoning and codification has been reversed, as codification was the goal and causation merely a justification for its rulings. Thus, seeking out and investigating causal explanations became the goal of grammatical research, on the basis of which rules can be modified to align with causal explanations and their conceptualizations. (Ali Abu al-Makarem, 2006, p. 169) The grammatical cause has received such attention among Arabic scholars that some of them devoted special works to it. Qatib Muhammad ibn al-Mustanir (d. 206 AH) wrote "Al-'Ilal fi al-Nahw," while al-Mazini Bakr ibn Muhammad (d. 230 AH / 248 AH, according to the dispute) wrote "Ilal al-Nahw." Harun al-Darir also wrote a book called "Ilal fi al-Nahw." Ibn Kaysan (d. 320 AH) wrote "Ilal al-Nahw," and Ibn al-Warraq Muhammad ibn Abdullah (d. 381 AH) wrote "Ilal al-Nahw." (Mazen Al-Mubarak, 1965, p. 95)

The grammatical deductive approach at this stage sought to achieve two objectives:

First: To link rulings and causes, to base rulings on causes, and to make causes a reason for the consistency of rulings and the consistency of phenomena. Thus, the search for causes became essential for the grammatical researcher, prior to the study of rules and phenomena, based on the fact that causes are the core of both rules and phenomena.

Second: To coordinate grammatical causes and clothe them in a cloak of consistency between their components, such that they possess the quality of convergence and complementarity, not of conflict and contradiction. By the fourth century AH, grammatical reasoning received more attention and greater effort. As we mentioned, many books were written on it, and it underwent a great deal of development. Abstract theoretical discussion addressed it, and those who divided the reasons and

noted their goals appeared. Grammarians' trends began to be determined according to the divisions of reasons. (Mazen Al-Mubarak, 1965, p. 69)

Conclusion :

we have observed that the approach of Muslim scholars—whether theologians, jurists, or grammarians—in their method of reasoning differs significantly from what is commonly found in Aristotelian logic and Greek philosophy, particularly with regard to demonstrative induction, which for Aristotle and the Greeks was bound by strict rules and specific procedures. In Islamic thought, however, a different methodology emerged, one grounded in close observation of phenomena, careful consideration of particulars, and the linking of these particulars to general principles, without resorting to mere imitation or blind repetition of foreign systems. This highlights the originality of a mode of thought that developed within the broader Islamic intellectual environment, an environment that gave rise to *kalām* as a defense of doctrine, *uṣūl al-fiqh* as a methodology for deriving legal rulings, and Arabic grammar as a discipline that safeguarded the language of the Qur'an and Arabic expression.

Moreover, although these sciences shared the same cultural and intellectual milieu, each acquired its own distinct identity, methods, and scope that differentiated it from the others. *Kalām* was characterized by rational disputation, *uṣūl al-fiqh* by precision in formulating principles for deriving rulings, and Arabic grammar by its reliance on tracing linguistic usage and establishing rules that explain its phenomena while regulating both its regular and exceptional forms.

Accordingly, we may assert that the inductive method in Arabic grammar is an original one, rooted in sound intuition, refined linguistic sensibility, and the innate Arab disposition that enabled the derivation of grammatical rules directly from the reality of the language itself, without recourse to foreign philosophical constructs. This perspective calls for a reconsideration of the accusations leveled against the grammarians, namely, that they borrowed their method of reasoning from Aristotle and his logic. Such a claim amounts to no more than a hasty judgment, based on superficial resemblance rather than genuine methodological equivalence. At its core, it is a reactionary stance that misses the mark and fails to grasp the true nature of grammatical inquiry, which preserved its authenticity and retained its distinctiveness derived from the Arab-Islamic intellectual context.

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