

Securitization of Irregular Migration in Euro-Maghreb Context: Can the Marginalized be Heard.

أمننة الهجرة غير النظامية في السياق الأوروبي-مغاربي: هل يمكن سماع صوت التهميش.

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Abstract :

This study tries to explain irregular migration from the perspective of immigrants and Ultras, as a group that is more prone to irregular migration ; this study first presents how Europeans deal with irregular migration , which is centred on the securitization of this immigration. The article argues that irregular migration is primarily the result of European colonialism and the continued exploitation of the Maghreb's resources. It concludes that European policies toward irregular migration are still shaped by the same mindset that governed colonialism in the past.

Keywords : : irregular migration; Securitization; Ultras; migrants.

ملخص:

تحاول هذه الدراسة تفسير الهجرة غير النظامية من وجهة نظر المهاجرين والألتراس، كمجموعة أكثر عرضة للهجرة غير الشرعية؛ تعرض هذه الدراسة أولاً لكيفية تعامل الأوروبيين مع الهجرة غير النظامية، والتي تتمحور حول أمننة هذه الهجرة. ويرى المقال أن الهجرة غير النظامية هي في المقام الأول نتيجة للاستعمار الأوروبي والاستغلال المستمر لموارد المغرب العربي. ويخلص إلى أن السياسات الأوروبية تجاه الهجرة غير النظامية لا تزال تتشكل بنفس الذهنية التي حكمت الاستعمار في الماضي.

الكلمات المفتاحية: الهجرة غير النظامية، الأمننة، الألتراس، المهاجرين.

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Introduction:

In the 2023 Bollywood film, *Danky*, a man named Suki commits suicide after failing to obtain a visa to England so he can meet his girlfriend, Jassie. One of his friends, "Hardy," wept at Suki's cremation, remembering the British presence in India for nearly a century. Back then, he said, no one asked them to take a speaking test, or even asked if the British knew any Hindi. Hardy and his friends decided to take the "Danky path," an illegal intercontinental route to Britain.

This scene is very similar to what happened in Algeria. The country was occupied by France for approximately 132 years, during which time Europeans benefited from its wealth of natural resources. Even after the signing of the Association Agreement between the EU and Algeria on April 22, 2002, which entered into force on September 1, 2005, freedom of movement between the two shores of the Mediterranean remains limited, despite efforts to develop multilateral relations. Moreover, hundreds of Algerians have had their applications to enter Europe rejected due to the extreme complexity of visa requirements. In 2021, approximately 40,000 Algerians were refused a Schengen visa. Visa applications are complex, and appointments to obtain them are sometimes exchanged on social media at exorbitant prices.

Since it is impossible to reach Europe legally, many Algerians take boats every day to reach the other side of the Mediterranean. Social media is full of advertisements for irregular migration by motorboats. Even though the journey is dangerous—more than 500 people have lost their lives on the migration route between Algeria and Spain by 2024, according to the Spanish NGO *Caminando Fronteras*—dozens of Algerians use these boats to cross the Mediterranean to the other side, despite the possibility that their journey will end and their aspirations will be drowned by the sea.

While I was researching the problem of irregular migration, or *harga*, as Algerians call it, a young man informed me that, for example, Annaba, a coastal city in eastern Algeria, has two international airports: one is official, and the other is located in the Sidi Salem region, one of the busiest departure points for the *harga*. Despite this sarcastic answer, it shows that there are two ways to get to the other side of the Mediterranean: one for the lucky ones who can meet the rigorous conditions of a visa, and the other for the less fortunate who must take a significant risk to reach Europe.

In this context, the EU has implemented a number of policies aimed at stopping the flow of irregular migration, including the externalisation of European borders, which amounts to extraterritorial control of illegal migrants, and the construction of smart borders with non-Schengen states.

The academia in Algeria has been interested in this phenomenon, but the production of knowledge in this context has always been subject to the European point of view, which securitizes the phenomenon of irregular migration.

1.1. Problem statement:

Most research on this topic is subject to cognitive biases. It therefore defends European policies and attempts to maintain the status quo and (re)create a reality that favors center-periphery relations between Algeria and the EU. White supremacy, ethnocentrism, and the white man's burden are the main concepts reflected in European management of irregular migration, as Europeans, at least in their imagination, view illegal migrants as other and uncivilized beings. The colonization of Algeria, once perceived as a civilizing mission, was justified by this logic and continues to impact European relations with Algeria.

1.2. Problematic:

This study attempts to answer the following question, which is based on Robert Cox's thesis that problem-solving theories take the world as it is and use dominant power, social relations and their organizing institutions as a framework (Cox 1981, 128): to what extent has the coloniality of knowledge contributed to the legitimacy of European management of the phenomenon of irregular migration?

This question includes the following sub-questions:

What are the causes of irregular migration in Algeria from the subaltern point of view?

How could decolonizing knowledge production contribute to the development of migration theories that are not influenced by the Western perspective on migration?

1.3. Hypotheses:

01 / The core periphery relationship between Algeria and the EU is the cause of irregular migration.

02 / Since ideas and discourses contribute to the creation of reality, it is essential to develop Algerian analytical tools that help to end European epistemic hegemony.

03/ Adopting a counter-narrative can change how reality is seen. One could consider this migration to be human mobility and emancipation.

1.4. The aim of the study:

This paper aims to critically examine the issue of irregular migration and shows that the many hypotheses advanced by Western academia is an effort to defend EU migration policies. This study attempts to construct a theory based on the Algerian cultural dimension and critiques existing theoretical frameworks.

1.5. Study Methods:

This study seeks to search for the reasons that push Algerian youth to irregular migration, and it takes the Ultras, a group that is more prone to irregular migration, as a model for study. It attempts at analysing the narratives that they produce, whether through the songs they sing in stadiums, chants, or graffiti, with the aim of constructing a theory of immigration from the illegal immigrant's point of view, away from theories devoted to state procedures. This study aims to identify the factors that motivate Ultras to emigrate by using the songs they yell in the stadiums at every game, which frequently convey their desire to leave the country.

Ultras in Algeria express a wide range of political and social issues through their visual (tifo, graffiti) and verbal (songs) discourses

.1-COLONIALISM/NEO-COLONIALISM AND THE CREATION OF MARGINALIZED SOCIETIES IN THE MAGHREB.

Emmanuel Macron, President of the French Republic, enquired about the age and nationality of a group of Marseille researchers who advocated the use of chloroquine as a treatment against Covid-19. He was surprised to learn that most of them were from former French colonies. This image recalls France's historic triumph at the 1998 World Cup, won by a team made up of players of African origins. However, the team's achievements have been presented as shining examples of multiculturalism in France and across Europe, the history of Europe and Africa seems to paint a different picture; Africans were perceived by Europeans as inferior and physically different from Europeans. Accordingly, they owed it to the apparently primitive peoples of Africa to advance civilization¹.

In North Africa, Algeria was the first country to be colonized in 1830. Following this year, the countries in the region suffered from constant European meddling in their internal affairs. While each power had a distinct goal, the main trend was to protect their economic interests.

The pre-colonial economy, which was centered on agriculture and traditional industry, was decimated when France, Spain, and Italy conquered the entire region at the start of the 20th century. The colonizers also greatly influenced the economies of the region. The European settlers established rules pertaining to land concession in the most fertile regions of North Africa.

The settlers imposed a new economic model and every able-bodied person was required to do forced labour.

Spacious squares and boulevards built in the area in the European nineteenth-century architectural style². The physical evolution of the city reshaped the urban fabric of the Maghreb countries. In the sense that a sizable portion of European settlers resided in big towns while the indigenous people lived in slums on the outskirts of large cities (a spatial exclusion), it symbolized marginalization and core/periphery differences. Natives were thus the victims of colonial mindsets that viewed them as inferior and mirrored the notion of white supremacy.

French colonization in Algeria led to the destruction of rural socioeconomic systems through the seizure of agricultural land, the eradication of traditional local cultures and the entrance of contemporary cultures and mechanization³. These activities encouraged the tribes, whose ties to the land were sacred, to show resistance against the occupation, since the tribe was the first group to rebel against colonialism in its early years. This explains why, in 1863, the colonial authorities established a new urban area known as "the Douar," which served to fragment the Algerian tribal fabric⁴. Algerians were forced to flee to rural and mountainous areas, particularly in places where agricultural land is unproductive. However, some people chose to create slums surrounding cities in order to relocate closer to employment; as a result, "slums" first appeared between 1926 and 1930. There were eighteen of them, primarily centered around the capital Algiers, and more than 5,000 Algerians called them home⁵.

By the early 1960s, all Maghreb countries had gained their independence, these countries adopted different pathways to achieve development (socialism, capitalism), but they all ended up (re)integrating into a new Western labour division. Income disparity and poverty escalated as a result of the development initiatives' inability to promote and implement inclusive growth. Today's most vulnerable groups face even greater challenges as a result of the growing economic and social divide between the richest and poorest people as well as between rural and urban areas⁶. In order to address issues of social injustice and regional disparity, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund introduced plans of austerity and economic policy reforms to the region. These measures increased class inequality and relative social deprivation, which in turn fueled the "bread riots" and other social unrest in the area. Demands for political reforms have grown increasingly linked to austerity protests; in Tunisia (after 1984) and Algeria (after 1988), major political reforms have been implemented, in part as a result of these demands⁷, these reforms were abandoned and had no impact on reducing social and regional disparities.

Furthermore, as free trade agreements between the Maghreb nations and the European Union (EU) are always in the Union's best interests, it is crucial to note that trade links between the EU and the Maghreb countries exacerbate this reality. While most imports from EU are immediate, mixed, and equipment goods with a high proportion of added value⁸, the majority of Maghreb countries' exports to the EU are primary products like gasoline and gas (Algeria, Libya), phosphate (Morocco), water-intensive food, and export-oriented monoculture agribusiness paired with tourism in Morocco and Tunisia⁹.

2/ EUROPEAN NARRATIVE: SECURITIZATION OF IRREGULAR MIGRATION.

Before delving into the European narrative, it is useful to briefly touch on the history of migration between the Maghreb countries and Europe. The movement from the Maghreb to Europe began at the turn of the 20th century. Due to the Maghreb's growing population and the colonists' constant pressure on its resources, the dispossessed and displaced native population was forced to go across the Mediterranean to Europe in search of work. While immigration first increased slowly, the French government, particularly the Ministry of War, directly hired Maghreb labourers to work in armaments factories, army services workshops, transportation, and mines during World War I¹⁰. In France, the number of migrants increased from 5,000 Maghrebs in 1912 to 150,000 Algerians and 40,000 Moroccans, in addition to 175,000 soldiers, most of whom were repatriated after the end of the war¹¹. The number of migrants had actually declined rather than grown as a result of the 1929 Great Recession, immigration restrictions, and anti-immigrant sentiment stemming from settlers opposed to the departure of their cheap labour.

However, there was also a second wave that occurred during World War II, when Maghreb nationals fought alongside France and other Allies in addition to working in France. By 1945¹², there were about 350,000 Algerians, 20,000 Moroccans, and 5,000 Tunisian working in France¹³, Algerians were granted precedence over Moroccan and Tunisian citizens due to their legal status as a colony and a part of France. However, during the Algerian Revolution (1954–1962), this

permission was revoked. To meet the demands of the labour market, the French government so promoted migration from Tunisia and Morocco.

The post-independence era was characterized by increased migration and a wider range of destination nations¹⁴. The demand for inexpensive labour and Europe's ongoing growth¹⁵ were its main drivers. The Maghreb countries, on the opposite side of the Mediterranean, need to lower unemployment, therefore they reached a bilateral agreement with the main destination nations outlining the rights and obligations of labourers as well as the annual maximum quota¹⁶.

The Algerian government and France struck an agreement on December 27, 1968, arranging for Algerians to work in France. However, the Algerian government chose to halt emigration to France following the nationalization of Algerian oil. It also negotiated recruitment agreements with Belgium and the German Democratic Republic (DDR) in 1974¹⁷. Agreements were signed by Tunisia in 1963, 1965, 1969, and 1971 with France, Germany, Belgium, and the Netherlands, respectively. Morocco signed recruitment contracts with Belgium in 1964, France and Germany in 1963, Belgium in 1964 and the Netherlands in 1969.¹⁸

The number of migrants from Maghreb approached 1.5 million in 1974¹⁹. However, following the 1973–1975 recession, Europe has reduced immigration after years of open-door policies welcoming immigrants from the Maghreb for economic reasons. The European decision was a watershed in the history of migration from the Maghreb countries to Europe; it brought an end to a protracted period of migration, which in turn gave rise to new patterns of migration, including family reunions, seasonal migration, and irregular migration. Irregular migration from the Maghreb countries and other parts of the world has increased since the end of the Cold War. In 2017, there were about 5 million undocumented residents in Europe. As such, the increase in undocumented immigration has elevated immigration to the top of the EU security agenda.

Securitisation of irregular migration is one of the strategies used by the European Union to address the issue. Barry Buzan and Oliver Weaver developed securitization, a central concept of the Copenhagen School (CS), drawing on John Austin's "speech act" theory, which he first presented in his seminal book "How to Do Things with Words" (1962). The CS claims that the term "security" indicates that a problem must be addressed in addition to being recognized as security-related²⁰. Consequently, rather than being a "pre-exist" reality or the result of interactions between components of the international system, security is a socially constructed and intersubjective concept that acknowledges an existential threat to a particular referent object and justifies the use of extraordinary measurement to counter that threat and safeguard the referent object²¹.

The process of securitization begins when there is an existential threat (terrorists, immigrants, Islamic extremism) through the implementation of extraordinary measures such as mass surveillance, anti-terrorism policies and anti-illegal migration laws. Since this measure would affect the lives of the ordinary people, the speech act seeks to convince them of the need for the extraordinary measurement. A securitization needs the audience's consent in order to succeed. Only after assessing the audience's reaction can a securitization step be discussed²². However, if this assessment goes against the fundamental beliefs of the target group, it will be considered incorrect. Securitization of irregular migration involves the following security steps:

The first step; anti-immigrant rhetoric:

The securitization of irregular migration has led to a negative framing of migrants as an impediment to host countries. Without an "othering" process through speech that tends to differentiate between Self and Other, the securitization would not be successful. This starts the process of "Othering," which includes labelling immigrants as a "burden on the economy," "Islamic," or preventing immigrants from assimilating into the majority population. The conservative mayor of Paris, Jacques Chirac, who became the president of France, made a startling statement in Orleans on June 20, 1991, about a French worker who lives next door to an immigrant family "with a father, three or four women, perhaps 20 children, earns 50,000 francs each month in social welfare, without working. If you add to that noise and the smell (le bruit et l'odeur), and the French worker goes crazy". Similarly, Jean-Marie Le Pen declared that "The French want to be at

home in France," when he expressed his strong opposition to immigration to France from the developing countries²³.

Moreover, one of the securitizing strategies used to turn the migrant flow from a non-security concern to a security issue was the discursive association between irregular migration and crime, danger, national security, and national interest. "It will become a destabilizing factor for our security...Uncontrolled migratory movement would be a great threat against our fundamental national interests," stated French Socialist Interior Minister Philippe Marchand in 1991²⁴. In a press conference, Jean-Claude Chirac reaffirmed his firm position on immigration, saying that Europe's goal is to eliminate threats like instability, migration, and war. He restated his stance once more in 2005, saying, "Europe needs to give member states the chance to work together in some areas...Among these include organized crime, international terrorism, security, and the battle against networks of illegal immigrants²⁵.

The audience will thus be persuaded that there are several security risks associated with irregular migration, including those posed by criminals, terrorists, and extremists. The Spanish Prime Minister, José María Aznar, cited the similar connection between crime and irregular migration, in his 2001 Address to the Nation, he emphasized that any illegal resident who commits a crime will "reasonably be deported" as part of his focus on immigration and crime²⁶.


The media was crucial to the securitization process in two ways: first, by normalizing boat tragedies involving refugees from the Mediterranean and reproducing the mainstream rhetoric regarding immigrants. In fact, by frequently depicting the victims of irregular migration as statistics and figures with no history, present, or future, the media has contributed to the dehumanization of immigrants²⁷. Fears of immigrants are often aroused by media hyperbole over immigration. The Spanish media regularly uses terms like "boat people"²⁸, "irregular migrant," "undocumented," and "clandestino" (clandestine) to describe the legal status of migrants. Similarly, anti-immigrant discourses that more or less justify the EU's anti-immigration stance have been used to portray immigrants adversely in the Italian press²⁹. Additionally, immigrants' dread of a second Moorish invasion of Spain is conveyed by Spanish characters in *Partir*, who denigrate the Moros (Moors) as Muslim invaders capable of a second Reconquista³⁰.

The second step: audience acceptance of anti-immigration rhetoric

since securitization is an intersubjective process, the audience must be highly accepting of it. A majority of respondents (about 52% of those surveyed in the EU) to the 1993 Eurobarometer study on immigration opinions believe that there are too many non-Union immigrants³¹. As of 2016, 45% of Europeans believe that immigration is still the EU's top concern³². Approximately 40% of Europeans believe that immigration from outside the EU is a problem rather than an opportunity in 2017, while 31% see it as both. Only 20% of Europeans believe that immigration is an opportunity. Less than one in ten respondents (8%) believe that immigration is neither a challenge nor an opportunity³³.

The 'othering' process was evident in Figures 1 and 2, as evidenced by the Századvég Foundation survey, in which over half of the participants believed that the flood of immigrants could have an impact on their culture. In a similar vein, over two thirds of the respondents see a threat from the Muslims' explosive demographic rise.


Figure 1. Public Attitudes in the European Union Regarding Immigration



Source : <https://project28.eu/migration-terrorism-2018/>

In 2018, nearly three out of four respondents (73%) believed that managing immigration poses a significant financial burden for receiving countries. This belief was strengthened by concerns about the economic slowdown and the bad perception of immigrants as an economic burden.

Figure 2. public opinion on Europe's growing Muslim population:



Source : <https://project28.eu/migration-terrorism-2018/>

The third step; exceptional measurement

It was not possible to limit the securitization of migration to merely rhetorical processes. Even while it's a crucial stage in the societal building of a new danger (irregular migration), taking extraordinary measures inevitably reinforces them. Despite the European countries' attempts to address this issue through unilateral action centered on economic considerations, immigration policy became more European as European integration grew. According to Article 7 of the Schengen Agreement of 1985, "the free movement of people throughout the European countries required a harmonization of the external border control."

The parties shall endeavour to approximate as soon as possible their visa policies in order to avoid any adverse consequences that may result from the easing of

controls at the common frontiers in the field of immigration and security³⁴.

Immigration became illegal with the implementation of the EU visa regime. Nevertheless, the imposition of this system coincided with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the unrest in Eastern Europe which exacerbated the irregular migration. The Maastricht Convention was the only source of the migration-crime fusion. The process of "othering" accelerated as the EU began to speak to itself as an "area of freedom, security, and justice" rather than a "free economy zone," endangering the emerging European identity. Better control of immigration flows and expulsion (of Other) action based on illegal status are two aspects of creating freedom, security, and justice that are affirmed by the Tampere European Council (1999)³⁵. The EU's migration strategy evolved in tandem with a sense of unease, especially following the 9/11 and Madrid bombings in 2004. At that time, irregular migration was seen as an existential threat to the EU. As a result, member states of the EU reinforce their "identity borders" by implementing new migration policies that show how the threat of "terrorism" is used to impose stricter controls and criminalise irregular migration³⁶. Established in 2004 with the goal of promoting collaboration among EU member states and collaborating with national immigration agencies, Frontex has coordinated the security-focused strategy along the Mediterranean Sea border. Additionally, Frontex can interact with border authorities from other states³⁷.

The EU nations want to prevent drawn-out return procedures that offer undocumented immigrants the authority to file a lengthy asylum application by working with Maghreb nations: If the applicant has been living for periods of time of at least five months in several Member States, the Member State where this has been most recently the case shall be responsible for examining the application.

Therefore, by subsidizing migrant control in Maghreb countries—often framed as a prelude to the transfer of norms in "immigration policy" to the Northern African countries—the EU's externalization of borders was a useful method to sustain the image of the EU as a normative power. These nations thus became involved in the militarization of border control; consequently, the EU committed €232 million (\$264 million) through various subsidies to promote migration-related initiatives in the Maghreb nation since 2014³⁸.

In fact, the EU's ability to create a distinctive identity through the production of "strange"—illegal immigrants being a major component of this strange—required the securitization of irregular migration in order to successfully abolish border controls between European nations and establish free human mobility³⁹.

03/ CAN THE (IL)LEGAL MIGRANT BE HEARD:

We are now attempting to present marginalized voices, whether from immigrants who currently reside in Europe or those who want immigration, in order to diverge from the dominant narratives that the European Union promotes through media, politicians, and, frequently, academia.

Migrants rhetoric: counter narrative:

The first counter narrative originated in France and featured a song by the Toulouse music group "Zebda", which was composed by locals with various ethnic backgrounds. Their song "le bruit et l'odeur," from the album of the same name, is the most well-known example of this. This song was written in response to Chirac's previously mentioned speech⁴⁰. Zebda's song made it abundantly evident that the immigrants fought alongside France and were a valuable labor force that helped Europe recover. Ironically, while having contributed to the building of these cities, the immigrants did not reside there.

We can die on the frontline.

And make all the wars.

The sound of the jackhammer.
Who built this road?
Who built this city?
And who doesn't live there?

The singers contended in "le bruit et l'odeur" that racial exclusion barriers prevent equality, which is one of France's national mottos, from existing. "My brothers, equality exists only in dreams."

Manu Chao released his song "clandestino" in 1998. The song tells a story in Spanish and uses passive structures to make the clandestine protagonist appear like an object of desire to Western authorities⁴¹. "They say I am a clandestine, for not having papers". The song's lyrics depict an unauthorized immigrant's potentially fatal trek from Morocco to Spain. "I departed from my life between Gibraltar and Ceuta." Chao affirmed that even individuals who make it to the other side of the Mediterranean Sea and manage to get out of the detention facility would still be subject to stigma and discrimination due to their designation as "clandestine." "The authorities say it is forbidden for me to live."

The song title on both albums is a derogatory depiction of migrants (noise, smell, and clandestine), which is utilized by the government to define exclusion and belonging. The vocalists urge Europeans to overcome the divide between Self and Other by showcasing the richness of immigrant cultures and the fact that migration is driven by a lack of job opportunities at home.

Ultars Songs: the voice of marginalized community.

Though social inequality and regional disparities (between European and non-European space) which were expected to decrease with the end of French colonialism in Algeria, new forms of social exclusion emerged as a result of development plans failing after independence. Cultural, economic, and political differences, according to Nacer Djabi and Ali el Kanz⁴², created a clear distinction between two classes: the marginalized community and the modern community. The latter is well-versed in French and supports secularism, democracy, and gender equality. Therefore, this elite openly backed the army's coup d'état to stop the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) from seizing power. However, while the majority of the modern society lives in affluent neighbourhoods, a sizable portion of the marginalized society lives in popular neighbourhoods with high unemployment rates and congested housing. Increasingly, youth of popular neighbourhood began to forge their sense of identity and loyalties in relation to the neighbourhood, and the football club⁴³.

Every football team has a composer and musical instrument, and every football game is a joyous event where the Ultras yell songs that convey their hopes, disappointments, and desire to cross the Mediterranean. In Babur Ellouh (Wooden Boat), proponents of the USMA (capital club) assert that immigration is their only means of escape since they have run out of other options and are stuck in a situation where their suffering has become unbearable.

Please let me go; my heart hurts.

Permit me to board a wood boat.

El Harrach Club (an Algiers-based club) supporters explain why they have reached this point of despair. They contend that the primary cause of their suffering, which began at an early age, is the political system:

Who's to blame for our misfortune?

The regime is the cause of our suffering.

You have sold and divided the country.

You bought villas in Paris

The solution is in « harga »

Oh, mother, tell me why you are crying.

Oh, my dear (his mother), forgive me, destiny has taken me away from you.

While I was working in Annaba, a seaside city in eastern Algeria that has become, in a short span of time, one of departure points of the "harga" in both Algeria and North Africa, I met a number of

people who wanted to migrate illegally to Europe. Even though they were completely aware of the high risks involved in their boat trip, their responses reflect a part of their suffering, they simply reply "I prefer to be eaten by a whale rather than by a worm" (yakolni lhout wa mayakolnach doud) or "Rome rather than you" (Roma wa lan'touma). In this instance, haraga were anticipated to free them from deprivation and isolation. Both sayings refer to the social, economic, and political marginalization that has reached a point where people feel like they are already dead in their own country, regardless of the past or present. Algerian "Raï" singer "Reda Taliani" captured this concept to perfection on his album "partir loin" (moving far away):

Oh boat, my love!

Get me out of this suffering.

I suffer from injustice in my country.

I am fed up; I am fed up.

I will not miss the opportunity.

In my country I tried and tried for a long time until I have forgotten who I am.

It's a good country, mine.

However, it is saved for the most fortunate.

I'll make sacrifices and construct my home.

And I, too, will become wealthy.

Conclusion:

irregular migration has demonstrated that the relationship between the Maghreb and the EU is deeper and more complex than the reductive and security-oriented policy that adopted by the EU and executed by the North Africa countries. The cause of the irregular migration, which is mostly the direct outcome of the ideational and material factors that govern this interaction, is the long history of immigration. The foundation of the European imagination is the classification of the Other as inferior, with a variety of labels that are more or less emotive according to the historical context (uncivilized/Berber/illegal/undocumented/ irregular).

The negative label provides justification for both colonialism and neo-colonialism, as demonstrated by unfair trade agreements and the support of the political and business elite that impedes the shift to democracy. Moreover, these representations justify the European exceptional measurements.

The only narratives that challenge the European hegemonic discourse are those of immigrants and oppressed communities. While it is a critique of European assertions of cultural superiority (equality doesn't exist: Zabda's song), it also exposes the deep-rooted partnership between the political and economic elites of the Maghreb and the West. The West guarantees its dominance over the local economy in exchange for the latter giving legitimacy to the ruling regime (You have sold and split the country). You purchased Parisian villas. As a result, "harga" is a form of social protest, and the route across the Mediterranean represents the liberation of a marginalized and impoverished population.

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