

to be an essential Mediterranean virtue, *joie de vivre*, with the modernist basic of efficiency.

Braudel (1996: 45) complains that "psychology has rarely dared to seek adventure on the path of history". Yet, if history lives, it lives more in the structures charting the commonplace practices of individuals, than in textbooks or chronicles. The lives of ordinary people offer the mortar that binds the blocks of history. It is how history is incorporated in their *Eigenwelt* which links the present with the unchanging constancies of time. However we reify history for our objective political and ideological purposes; we can only validly reconstruct the past in ways that serve the exigencies of today's existence with the adaptive values we draw from yesterdays. Any perception of the Mediterranean, which is, at its roots, a historical construct, will be shaped according to any adaptive value it may have in the history Mediterranean people are in the process of shaping today.

(cuore?) of the world. Identity, elevated to ideological status, presupposes an "otherism": Because it is a hollow construct; a shell of exogeneously ascribed traits and roles, which in order to stand up, must describe itself in contrast with others.

An "identity" can only survive by rendering its components identical, devoiding any individual difference of import and meaning which threaten the homogeneity of the unit. Identitism is parental to stereotypical thinking, both because it defines the individual self or collective selves as reified, unproblematic monoliths, and has to see other identities in the same light. In its existential insecurity, identitism relates badly to the pronoun "we", and its focus of attention is on elements of variation that may change the emphasis of perception from "we" to "I and you". It is interesting how in Greece and Turkey perceptions of each other are centrally influenced by the political society and the media which in this issue, prefer to side up with the political center (Millas, 1995: 32-48, 60-65, 168-179).

This is not a picture that inspires optimism as to a "soul unity" in the Mediterranean. The Padania affair and the Spanish Basque problem, viewed from a psychological as well as physical distance, give rise to the impression that an identification with modernity and its ultimate fruit, globalism, is more determining than politico-historical experience and/or loyalties. Maybe, the Mediterranean's historical failure is less in its loss of trade routes and world leadership in squabbles over differences than its inefficacy to create a Mediterranean ideology amalgamating the factors which today make it a focus of interest for anthropologists as well as tourists. Paradoxically, the sole probability for an ideological unification of the Mare Internum basin rests with the elements more ordained for the globalism of the future than the glorious historicism of the Inner Sea. Perhaps, just as Dante Alighieri of Niccolò Macchiavelli laid the intellectual foundations of modernity and its historical successor, globalism; Northern Italy may come up with an intellectual construct which can combine what seems

make it viable, new roads are opened. The subjective label "better" hardly has to be universally true; if it is functionally adaptive to survival, it is accepted though with reluctance on some parts and pockets of resistance in others. This brings the topic back to Braudels (1994: 133) concept of rejections: Civilizations (including the Mediterranean) survive on their capacity of borrowing cultural goods; but their ability to last also depends on what they can reject. Rejection is derivative of a culture's inherent power of sufficiency. If the Mediterranean resistance to modernity is merely due to a peasantly ignorance of the modern way of life it can be expected to give way to relative standardization as modern modes set in. Yet, if the adaptive value of its cognitive structures are vital to its survival systems, the Mediterranean will evolve into a culturally luxurious polis beside and in intense relationship with the global village. Which cultures will be swallowed into the ghetto is probably a function of an ability to maintain an adaptive structural balance of borrowing and lending cultural-cognitive goods. Those who are severed from their roots are the easiest to be swallowed and those who make a *raison d'être* of resistance are bound to be sieged and absorbed.

In the politics of this perspective, the Mediterraneans' perception of other Mediterraneans will probably play an important role. In the past, the division between the cross and the crescent cost the Mediterranean its global primacy. Today as well, the *Mare Internum* is fractured along times of myriad identities, dubious boundaries created by underlined differences: Little love is lost among Arab states on the Southern and Eastern shores. Turkey has problems with nearly all its previous imperial terrains and especially with Greece although the two are actually the closest in affect and culture. Italy is pondering Padania secessionism; Spain is trying to keep the Basques and Catalans in fold, who according to Aymard, "may be Spanish, but Castillian, never".

From a historio-psychological viewpoint, the epidemic of "identitism" was the cause of the Mediterranean's demise as the core

also establishes symbolically an intimacy among men which can be interpreted as homosexual" (Gilmore, 1987: 10). Gilmore thus implies explicitly that the cultural unity of the Mediterranean is based on latent homosexuality; though he admits later (Gilmore, 1987: 12) that "there is no (further) evidence that Mediterranean men are any more latent homosexuals than others". The author's attempts at Freudian interpretation of data are linked with compulsions traceable to "the period of the primacy of the genital's in the latency period of the psychoanalytical stages of personality development, the theory has proposed as a universal fact (Tolan, Isen, Batmaz, 1986: 131-132). Apparently, the androcentric trend is equally visible in feudal Europe (Duby, 1991: 110-112). Modern non Mediterranean parallels also exist in British male clubs, American university fraternities, ect. "Tea and Sympathy" is not a Cinecitta production either.

Modern anthropology's props for the thesis of Mediterranean cultural unity are shown here to be based on the perception of the *Mare Internum* as living in a premodern era. Epistemologically, it is suggested that if the thesis is founded on the terra firma of psychological structures of cognition and praxes, premises to diagnose a radically similar style among the cognitions and cultures of the Inner Sea can be established. Structures promise to be more stable over time, or rather, time unfolding into epochs; however, it must not be forgotten that they are for continuity rather than continuous. It is still probable that the global world system, in the process of peripheralizing a large portion of the earth, perhaps even including Northern Europe, can stamp the Mediterranean so hard, these structures will have to give way to more adaptive ones. In the "global village" to come, the *Mare Internum*, the center of the world until only three centuries ago, will turn into the ghetto of global proletariat.

Cultural structures are comparable to roads: One follows a given path, whether it is the best possible way or not; even when other options are present. Only when a novel or alternative route is introduced as "better" with sufficient following and material means to

aesthetics in space perception and definition; again largely overlooked by the academe. Yet, beauty is one of the first elements in the description of social spaces, be it cities, landscapes, buildings or furnishings as a junction where geography and biography meet. People define themselves in relation to the places they live, on both macro and micro levels.

CONCLUSION: HOMOEROSIS, "IDENTITISM" AND PROSPECTS

OF GLOBALISM:

Understanding of cultures is incomplete without understanding the structural mechanisms guiding people who make and nature a particular culture. Manolis Andronicus, the archaeologist who discovered the tomb of Alexander's father, Philip of Macedonia, is reported as saying he still finds the Mediterranean "elusive" after spending a lifetime on studying its Eastern shores (Fox, 1991: 5). Therefore, reductionist approaches to the question of Mediterranean unity are likely to miss the core, simply because there is always more than meets the eye. Observation of behaviors or attitudes may leave the observer baffled (as in the cases of women's daily lives or "equality" of individuals reported here) and mar the scientific propositions they weave from empirical data. In the Mediterranean even the most public acts are cloaked in an aura of secret private enterprise (Fox, 1991: 12); a disposition certainly not conducive for penetrating minds the motivations they engender.

A dire example of scientific bafflement is Gilmore's (1987: 9-16) case where, faced with the looming universality of such constructs as androcentricism and the honor-shame complex, he extracts a "homoerotic" component of the Mediterranean males' physically proximal socialization; which he carries to the claim that "sexuality, ...

sublimation of instincts (Freud, 1979: 69). Beauty is a stimulant of sensual and sensory excitation and the pleasure it embodies (Freud, 1979: 130). Aesthetic enjoyment, i.e., beauty diffuses the pleasure of pain and the pain of pleasure; it can be put to no use except as stimulant (D. Scheinder, 1962: 18). Sexual excitation deflected from its original aim or object of gratification is sublimated and art is the ultimate sublimation.

Not everyone is endowed to produce universally reclaimed works of art, but even for the less talented, aesthetic gratification comes through the small items and practices which add gusto to ordinary life. Beauty in the milieu of everyday experience enriches the worth of life. Aymard (1995: 89) warns that hordes of invading tourists fail to comprehend this aspect of life around the Inner Sea as the reality of the Mediterranean, but rather as a game they are participating in. The Mediterranean, where life is often difficult and savage, is nevertheless a land of easy hedonism and sensual gratification with its capturing beauty. The Mediterranean which offers nature's own ready answer for sensual gratification, escaped Europe's rationalist segmentation of aesthetics as art in a compartment alienated from daily life (May, 1958: 20-21) because it is a sublimation in itself.

In phenomenological jargon, beauty belongs to the realms of *Mitwelt* and *Eigenwelt*. In other words, a person experiences and enjoys beauty in his/her own and social time, not the quotient determined in the social order. One obvious consequence of this is related to the value of time as the only element that renders a praxis of aesthetics possible. If there is no time, there is no time to appreciate beauty. Thus, a conscious or unconscious drive to appropriate more time from the *Umwelt* for instinctual gratification in the *Eigenwelt* or *Mitwelt*, is a psychological factor which weighs considerably in the structuration of cognition. Thus, beauty as an infrastructural project of life plays a role in individuation (Jung, 1980: 122-123) and hence, in the conceptualization of time. This runs corollary to the role of

form and a desire to idealize the sensible through art (Read, 1966: 18-21). The static, infrastructural aspect of beauty is in this universal drive rather than what humanity in any era has created to satisfy it. If this search for hedonistic aesthetics in ordinary experience can be discerned as etched in the cognitive style of Mediterranean peoples, another basis for cultural unity can be established. For, the beauty of nature of the Mediterranean, which otherwise is hardly generous and often savage has to be pondered as at least an "aside" that has attracted and nourished life in its "creative void, which is a masterpiece continuously reshaped by humans according to a compelling plan" (Braudel, 1994: 670). If the beauty of the Inner Sea is a primary target for millions of tourists, the relationship between its aesthetics and inhabitants should have a testimony on the way people feel about the venue of their lives.

There is enough historical ground to claim that a basic Mediterranean civilisation exists; a specific form of life, thinking and feeling, albeit subject to different emic interpretations in line with the idiosyncratic characteristics of cultures and individuals: As Braudel (1994: 201-209) comments, the Mediterranean, both the Christian and Islamic sectors, still continued to educate the world in the art of living until a century after Vasco de Gama and Colombus completed their discoveries. He shows Baroque as an example of the *Mare Internum* light shining on the whole globe. With Mediterranean art, mundane joys and the beauty of the naked was made known to the world. "The lessons, the art of living, the *gusto*" of the Mediterranean became the law, even far away from its shores through the message of art (Braudel, 1994: 202-203-205).

In psychoanalysis, beauty is directly linked to sensual gratification. Freud (1979: 69n) openly states in *Three Essays on Sexuality* (1905) that the concept of beautiful has its roots in sexual excitation. Beauty has a double evolutionary function: Supporting natural selection by exciting sexuality and leading to the development of arts through the

THE BEAUTY OF BEHOLDING:

In addition to the phenomena of underlining differences, individuation of normative structures and a typical praxis of temporality; another psycho-cognitive factor can be discerned which is a gift of the Mediterranean to its people: Anywhere around the Inner Sea, human settlements are not far from, if not in or on natural beauty. Beholding the beauty of the landscape, one easily forgets the treachery and cruelty of the Mediterranean 's geology and climate (Braudel, 1990: 19). This constitutes an interesting intersection of geography, humanity, history and aesthetics with deep lying cognitive effects.

Beauty was tantamount to moral goodness in Greece where ugliness was almost a sin. Albert Camus claimed that the Greeks would not hesitate to acquit a beautiful murderess. However, the philosophy of hedonism which found a large following in the ancient Mediterranean has not been able to penetrate the domain of positivist social science in modernity (Read, 1966: 196). Beauty is traditionally studied in the realm of art and aesthetics as only a fragment of social activity, rarely made a subject of social scientific inquiry as a basic element of individual, therefore collective experience.. The enormous presence and influence of beauty in person's lives somehow goes unnoticed except in statistics relating to fashion or cosmetic sales and media accounts of "beautiful people". Yet, considering that the final objective of every human effort is to render ordinary experience better, more beautiful and more enjoyable, aesthetics should be deliberated as infrastructural to existence.

Beauty can be described as the sense of pleasurable relations with forms or objects of sensory perception in the environment; simply, that which gives pleasure. By nature, this definition is subjective, relative and fluctuating in time and culture. The concept of beauty is theoretical and has but limited historical significance (Read, 1966: 16-17-18). However, man has always had an aesthetic sensibility, an instinct for

of self" oneness of the phenomena of future, past and present (Binswanger, 1958: 301-302). Personality is a trajectory of the past to the future via the present; however, here "future" means a mien into which present moment self awareness and realization is to be carried in a continuum, rather than a discreet planned but unrealized distant time to come. The essence of self awareness is immediate and instanteneous, yet carries its impetus for all time. In this vein, the past is the domain of contingency in which we accept events and from which we select the events to fulfill our potential toward an immediate future (May, 1958: 67-69). In other words, past and present as Binswanger (1958b: 194) emphasizes, are "unfolding into future" immediately; that is why "no clock strikes for the happy one" (May, 1958: 67).

The Mediterranean idea of time puts a bigger accent on experiencing it than counting it. Even in more urbane settings, such mundane phenomena as prolonged luncheons, the ubiquitous "siesta" and the tendency to enjoy work while profiting from it are ethnomethodologically observable. It is not too difficult to concur with Aymard (1990: 142) that idleness has secretly been coveted as a virtue since the times of Pericles. And quite different from the honor-shame complex, which is already reported as diminishing with the spread of modernity; this existential praxis of temporality seems to show lasting traits. The Mediterranean experiences time in relation to the exigencies of its geography and climate; quotidien cycles of life adapt to the psychology born of physical conditions. The simple example of siesta, almost universal in the Mare Internum basin is but one aspect of this adaptation. A telling example is that, in Turkey, where modernism is the official ideology of the state, European "modern-objective" time schedules are adhered to, rather than publicly adopting the naturally dictated hours as in the rest of the region.

love life for instance, physical time has no significance. His *Eigenwelt*, the world of his relations with himself or his self awareness is a world of spontaneity (May, 1958: 65-68). It can be said that the modernist collective project has expanded the *Umwelt* to the detriment of the other *Welten*. Mass communication or mass society has curried the *Umwelt* into man's leisure, his personal time or *Mitwelt* and the universalization of homo faber values has conquered the criteria of the individual's self awareness, the *Eigenwelt*.

As an element of consistency, a certainty that life is going on, man's natural time is an extended present.. "Now" is an assertion of existence and for the living being, all time is a constant "now" of ascertained existence. It is not the movement of the arms of the clock, or the rolling feuilles of the calendar that tell us when now is; it is the sheer fact that we exist. As a social and symbolical being, man is aware that the "now" of this moment is experientially different from the nows of other times; but all time still is a reference to the present as the quotient of existence. That time is tripartitely divided on a continuum of past, present and future is a device to take it under control in the name of social order. It is an objectification of time, which with modernity achieved the status of a dominant force that can extract the individual from his natural quotient of now, into the realm of "then" but especially, of "after".

Although time was first captured in an equal and standard measure in Pisa, its deterministic consequences did not affect the Mediterranean in the same degree. Even in urban centers which had developed their notions of subjective time long before modernity, the modernist, objectified time implying a collective project in the clearcut, irreversible (Ellenberger, 1958: 102) sequence of past, present and future, did not quite catch. Instead, in a Binswangerian sense, Mediterranean temporality displays an ecstatic (ex-static), that is, "out

center of time machines. So was England (Boorstin, 1994: 70-71). This alone goes to show the relation between the standardization of time and the rise of modern capitalistic mentality. In the end, though most of humanity today measures time by the equal standard units devised in the modern epoch, the subjective meaning of an hour, a minute, a season, a rendez vous can still display sometimes amusing differences between cultures, cultural geographies and individuals. Henri Bergson said "Perception is master of space in the exact measure in which action is master of time" (Jung, Jung, 1976: 1). In this sense, individual time is determined by action; and only when action is standardized by a particular social organization, time as measured becomes a standard experience and a standard of experience. As Hwa Yol Jung and Pette Jung (1976: 12) succinctly stated, temporality is lived time rather than objective, standard, quantitative time. When action is programmed according to social standards, so in some extent, is thought that guides it. Standardization in this sense does not necessarily mean uniformity but a rationing of thinking and action along probably diverse but nevertheless perceptibly predictable courses.

Yet a psychological, subjective meaning of time may deviate significantly from the physicist's homogeneous concept: An activist fills his never sufficient time with things to do, whereas a mystic by comparison "wastes" it. Drugs later the feeling of passage of time. But in every case, meaning of life is only understood dependently on the subjective feeling of experienced time (Ellenberger, 1958: 101-106). What three centuries of modernity has accomplished is to render this experience as humanly objective as possible, standardizing the experiencing of time by turning it into a collective project (see Jung, Jung 1976) with a force that can penetrate the public and even the most private realms of life, work, leisure, learning, love etc.

In phenomenological psychology, quantitative time relates to man's Umwelt or "world around"; where he is among the conditioning and deterministic forces of the social world. In his Mitwelt, personal world;

work-labor hours, man's productive time; what it finally achieved is a standardization of his private time, his leisure, his time for himself on the linchpin of his productivity. By defining the concept of time, limiting the priorities of how it must be spent, controlling the time at the individual's own disposal by allotting sanctioned --i.e., "productive" --ways and means of evaluating it, time was reconstructed as the social honeycomb that lives as standard as worker bees strive to fill in a predictable, if not always approved, fashion.

Dantel Boorstin (1994: 12) rightly identifies the calendar as one of humanity's most rigid institutions. That is because controlling time is tantamount to controlling lives and the social order shaped by their interaction. Revolutionary governments in France, Russia and China attacked calendars in their attempts to renovation. The clock as an instrument of measuring the passage of the day in equal intervals is Galileo Galilei's invention, perfected in Northwestern Europe in answer to the pressures of incipient open sea navigation (Boorstin, 1994: 48-55). Thus, one great accomplishment of modernity was the standardization of time, albeit in answer to technical and productive requisites but with inevitable consequences in psycho-social organization. Ellenberger's (1958: 101) observation that "orientation is time" is a sign of mental health in common psychiatric practice, is a dramatic example of such consequences.

Glimpses from the history of time show its capricious character: In China, calendars used to change with dynasties. The first clock made by Su Sung in the 11th century could last the reign of one emperor only (Boorstin, 1994: 61-63). Clocks brought as presents from Europe by missionaries were little but toys for the ruling classes of Medieval China and after the invasion of the market by Western products, a popular status symbol. The oriental concept of time was still uncaptured by the clock (Boorstin, 1994: 64-66). In Europe, watch and clockmakers were mostly Protestants and when they took refuge in Geneva from Catholic persecution, Switzerland emerged as the world's

capitalist productive and social organization. As Pina-Cabral paraphrases Aron Gurvitch, the standardization of time's rhythms is a source of predictability and control, Modern (bourgeois, urban, industrial) worldview rejects a time concept of reversible rhythms and institutes the dogma of irreversible, equalized time. This perception is a break from that of the prior mode of social organization, the community (*gemeinschaft*), where past and present constantly renew each other; time is repetitive, circular ever beginning again toward sameness and stasis, without end, without collision (Pina-Cabral 728-729, cf. Zonavcnd). Gurvitch (1958) proposes that social life takes place within multiple, always divergent, frequently contradictory individual times and that society faces the problem of unifying this plurality (Pina-Cabral: 716). Repetitive, circular life praxes in relatively very constant spatial milieux secured the premodern communities with a sense of consistency which was also supplemented with a similarly consistent reversible, cyclical concept of time. This "alternational" time is a time of the present constantly revisited by a "mute" past of seasons, variant rhythms of production, rituals etc. and anticipating an irrelevant future (Pina-Cabral: 726- 731).

Psychologically, life is best explicable as a certain duration of time spent on this world; as Simone de Beavoir said, "existing means existing in time". The natural tendency of the mind should be to consider time as a consistency which signifies a continuation of life for the individual. Community time may be imprecise but it is in accord with existential and practical temporality (Pina-Cabral: 723). As Gurvitch put it, societies inherently tend to control time, rendering it continuous in order to extract unpredictabilities (Pina-Cabral: 729). With modernity, society acquired the technical means and the productive dynamics to standardize and equalize time as was never before possible. Time was externalized. Consistency was replaced with continuity, which implies the capacity to last above its constituent elements, i.e., individuals; which again implies the dispensable and interchangeable function of the standardized, equalized individual, hypostatized to social order. Modernity started with determining

intellectual enlightenment of the Renaissance, the freeing of the individual's soul and conscience from Simon Peter's vicars, the concept of homo universalis and the Cartesian revolution in the 17th century grounding thought on mathematics, humanity's sole near universal covenant, the most standard of all constructs; emancipated man from dogma, theology and the tyranny of nature, or the natural order. Politically however, Descartes himself explained to Princess Elizabeth that individual liberty does not mean that the interests of the individual are above those of "everyone", the society (Braudel, 1996: 340-341). On the economic front, individual liberty translated to the marketability of manpower as labor; on the psychocultural front, "free and equal man" began to read as a replaceable, interchangeable, standard element of capitalist society; what Marx termed "alienated". To paraphrase Hannah Arendt, the utilitarianism of the homo faber, the weltanschauung of the modern man, reduced intrinsic values of time as well as self, others and objects to extrinsic or instrumental ones (Jung, Jung, 1976: 8).

TIME IS OF ESSENCE:

The standardisation of man manifests itself in the popularization of culture, faith and politics (Burke, 1996: 235-320) but the factor underlying the process is temporal: The zero point of modernity can be traced back to when time was reconstructed as a universal, equal and therefore measurable object with the advent of the standard clock and the calendar. With this, the initiative of using his own time has shifted from the individual to the (modernist-capitalist) social organisation. The most spectacular achievement of modernism as a blanket name summing up liberation, Cartesianism and positivism, is the standardization of time and its use as described by Henry F. Ellenberger (1958: 101) as "an abstract continuum that is homogeneous, continuous and infinitely divisible into identical and mutually exclusive units".

This physicist's definition of time contains the accordant ability of formatting individual lives conforming to the requirements of modern

differences. So, laws governing social interaction may always be subjected to reinterpretation, unless they are acquiesced by covenant. Charles Stewart (1992: 211-214) recites how in Naxos, Greece, rules can be bent to suit self and shortcuts leading to successful ends are condoned by the community, as long as others are not directly harmed. Descriptions of machismo expose an empirical vista of this attitude, namely the challenge to authority and its symbols in the everlasting gamble with fate: Committing a sin successfully is a point stolen from God (Anderson, 1978: 155-156). In Greece, a fellow Christian is another imperfect fellow rogue; rather than a good person who is responsible for his spiritual salvation as the Protestant sense of the term would imply (Stewart, 1992: 214). Thus, what can be dubbed a mild perpetual anomy pervades every day lives in both rural and urban Mediterranean, from traffic to business and interpersonal relations. The probably unconscious cognitive attitude of exalting the individual also leads to the resolution of conflicts through personal means, with little recourse to institutional, legislative institutions. The individual's self perceived moral worth hypostatizes the universality of norms; they become like social shoals one must navigate through rather than paragons that regulate life's transactions.

One outcome of the spread of capitalist - modern metamorphosis in Europe was standardization, a necessity of the new mode and organization of production and distribution, employment, organization, generalized transportation and communications etc. (Burke, 1996: 275-280). Standardization, which probably began with roof tiles (Burke, 1996: 278) gradually seeped into every aspect of social and private life, eventually rendering the individual a standard item as well. Ironically, the philosophico-cultural ground breaking of this process corresponds exactly to the history of human liberation. Cogito set off from the thinking individual, delivering him from scholastic darkness but to the modernist impersonality of individualism. Modern thought followed Descartes to positivism, severing the individual's existential link with *res extensa* (May, 1958: 58-59, 59n). The

uniqueness. Carl G. Jung (1980: 121-123) clearly sets apart individualism from being/becoming an individual, i.e., individuation: Whereas the former deliberately stresses "supposed peculiarities"; individuation is a process of psychological development by which a man becomes the definite, unique being he in fact is (Jung, 1980: 122).

The Mediterranean was not caught totally in the Cartesian battle to save the human soul from God and nature, by severing consciousness from an experience of the world from which individualism emerged as a teleological abstraction of man. Jung (1928, 1935) points out to an inherent contradiction of individualism which cuts off the individual from the universal with the emphasis placed on his singular peculiarities (Jung, 1980: 123). Mediterranean thinking maintained its ties between nature, man and his collective being. The Cartesian inspired mode of modernist thinking, which can be summed with the proposition "something happens in the outside world, according to laws of nature" did not overwhelm the perceptive-cognitive unity of the experience and the experient in Mediterranean thought praxes: "Something is happening to me in the world" (Straus, 1958: 140-143). Individuality was not replaced by individualism, hence, the individual gained (or held to) his worth as a part of the experienced world, not as part and component of the *res extensa* where he is just another object. Psychological investigation of traits visible in the Mediterranean such as strong urban orientation, a disdain for the peasant way of life and manual and menial labor, ego centered coalitions and inevitably, approach to honor (Gilmore, 1982: 178-179) can, plausibly, reveal this perceived innate worth of the individual, both of self and others.

The lack of effective central bureaucratic apparatus in the Mediterranean (even after the introduction of nation states) and the traditional tendency to let sometimes conflicting religious and pagan standards of action coexist (Stewart, 1992: 211-213) have had a cumulative effect with this psycho-social exaltation of the individual in bringing about an ambivalent normative structure: Individuality is not compatible with the universality of regulations designed to iron out

underlying the "we" syndrome, signal an incompatibility or a wish to be different rooted in the collective unconscious of culture groups. In this aspect, even if the underlining of differences per se cannot be considered a proof of similarity, it can be seen as an indicator that deeper structural likenesses may exist.

This similarity offers such potential depth that Braudel (1996: 321) refers to the Manche, the North Sea and the Baltic as "the cold Mediterranean of the North": The warm, southern Mediterranean has given cultural birth to these seas as its opposite; in peoples, foods, tastes and ages of settled civilizations. The North has learned from the Mare Internum, but maybe, to penetrate the soul of the difference, it might be more productive to pay attention to what the pupil has had to teach the teacher:

"Mediterraneanist" anthropologists report a difficulty in analysing the subjective reflections of objective social stratification, in other words, visible class distinctions are annulled to the observer with and in the statement "we are all equal here". Indeed, class is almost pushed aside (Gilmore, 1982: 186). Yet, in the Mediterranean, economic class distinction can be said to be almost "calcified" historically, as witnessed in the annexation of arable lands newly gained from wilderness to the properties of big landowners (Braudel, 1993: 91). However, classlessness can be read in another sense which lies in the structure of interpersonal relations: A person is attributed an intrinsic value for what he/she is; not only for what he/she has or does. Individual value or worth is person specific rather than role specific. Rich or poor, weak or strong, every individual is entitled to pride and dignity: which may be linked to the non sexual aspect of the honor syndrome.

THE MAKING OF AN INDIVIDUAL:

This nuance between individuality and European modernist ideology of individualism may easily elude empirical grasp: Whereas individualism renders persons interchangeable, individuality conveys

Throughout this paper, underlining differences was outlined as one factor broadly characteristic to cognitive structures in the history of the Mediterranean. This basic attitude is limited neither to higher politics, nor to the past tense. Anthropological findings refer to an atomistic community life, intense parochialism, rivalry among villages, intrafamilial hostilities, sibling rivalries among brothers, and a general antagonism in interpersonal relations concealed by a superficial cordiality (Gilmore, 1982: 178-180, 189); which constitute empirical examples that underlining as a cognitive style has penetrated the smallest units of social interaction.

By an apposition of opposites, it is tempting to claim that this factor alone implies the existence of unifying similarities: By simple logic, an emphasis of differences delineating self from the other should be necessary only if the differences are not so obvious to be easily perceived. Also, it can be speculated that this kind of forced cultural individuation, here used broadly to mean "incorporation with personality" only as part of the Jungian (1980: 122) process of "coming to selfhood" or self realization lends to affected modes and patterns of differentiation at attitudinal and behavioral levels which reveal themselves to empirical observation as idiosyncratic: although at a more basic level, they derive from similar structural motivators. The ripeness of the underlining syndrome justifies the question whether it constitutes a cognitive style typical to one culture area. Of course, as much documented in social psychology, there is a universal tendency to discriminate ingroups and outgroups, so the investigation of a Mediterraneanogenetic version of this phenomenon can expose a trait more by empirical extent: What is the similarity, the basis of probable unity that Mediterranean people reject to identify with? For, as Braudel (1994: 132-133) says, rejection of cultural goods is an affirmation of the cohesive strength of a group's own culture. The structural question that may need empirical validation is whether the nature and extent of these justifications of the rejection, i.e., the socio-psychological forces

sense that it evolves into epochs; eras distinguishable by typical modes of life and thought. Certainly these constructs are bound to travel across boundaries and geographies but in modes traceable back to their origins. The integral image of the Mediterranean, which almost automatically forms in the human imagination is, as Braudel (1990: 9) accentuates, is the consequence of a systemic whole. This multi hued mosaic owns itself to a plethora of what may be called Braudelian constants; geography, topography, climate, land, constraints on transportation, the Inner Sea, economies and their interactions, the juxtaposition of civilizations; all of which intimate that these special parameters impose typical praxes of psycho-cultural adaptation that foster the structuration of similar ways of life, cognition and affect. The Inner Sea was the center of the world; about until mid 17th century from time immemorial and it seems impossible to assume that 90 percent of recorded human history has not left some imprint on the lives of its peoples.

BEING, THINKING, SEEING AND DOING MEDITERRANEAN:

Thus, any thesis of Mediterranean cultural unity needs to establish a cognitive style or a mentality typical to the peoples of the area. Through its geography and civilization, i.e., a space enclosure with discreet boundaries embroidered and organised by humans (Braudel, 1994: 140) the Mediterranean has enough historical background to be expected to engender similar cognitive styles basic to its peoples, a monotony in the ways minds work. As Braudel (1993: 336) underlines, the historical Mediterranean achieved physical unity through the movements of its people, the connections of their movements and the conduits that made them possible. Just as concrete signs of European holisticity can be detected in the modernist way of mind, a unity of the Mediterranean can only be established or ruled out by the common denominators of its people's modes of being, thinking, seeing and doing.

It has to be clarified here that modernity is not an inevitable teleological objective all societies must attain. Rather, it is a temporal denominator that has psychologically and socio culturally separated Northern Europe (and later, most of the world) in a historical and historic process of differentiation. Modernity and its ideology in general have come to constitute the universal paragon for the psycho-subjective definition of good, hence, better. Even the more rustic contemporary cultures adapt themselves to the materialistic/instrumental aspects of modernism, while striving to retain their premodern, androcentric and patrimonial social values.

In this perspective, anthropological theses of Mediterranean cultural unity or disunity are based on prevalent values of rural, preindustrial communities, with dubious application to urban modernistic life. (Schneider: 3-17; Braudes, 1987: 125). Hence, the point in question is less whether the honor-shame complex constitutes a viable corroboration of Mediterranean cultural unity than whether, it merely goes to show that Mediterranean (especially rural) communities still occupy proximate places along the continuum of social evolution of premodern societies. Brandes (1987: 126) points out to the possibility that as anthropology is striving to constitute its own object by creating "other"s (cf. Fabian, 1983), the other in the honor-shame case may well be Mediterranean peasantry and rural workers. Gilmore (1982: 197) implicitly admits the time warp between Europe and the Mediterranean suggesting that Spain and Italy, which have "many social institutions comparable to... 19th century Northern Europe" as research grounds for psychoanalytical constructs.

Thus, the honor and shame syndrome emerges as a temporal relic, the local version of an ethic historical phenomenon capable neither to prove or deny a unity of the Mediterranean. Then, the search for the intellectual constructs of the *Mare Internum* as a culture area must focus on aspects relatively emic to the region that withstand the passage of time, not as measured by the clock and the calendar, but more in the

even families, honor and shame play a central role in generating a solidarity and social order related to patrimonial power schemata which link the smaller units of society with external politico-economic centers. Men's control of prenuptial virginity and post marital chastity function politically in rallying solidarity groups around the ideology of the honor-shame complex. By compelling woman to act true to her role, the idea of shame serves to defend and enhance patrimonial political orders (Schneider: 12-22).

Although anthropological evidence on the honor-shame complex points to similar social practices in the Mare Internum basin, the shared praxes look far from emic; the Mediterranean simply has not extricated itself from the premodern, rural value systems that also affected Northern Europe and to a lesser degree, still do. George Duby (1991: 31-32) reports that 12th century feudal Medieval Europe was no less androcentric: Man, though expected, was never assumed to be monogynic, public value systems exalted his sexual conquests and feats, whereas, woman, deemed a congenital sinner, was encased in a web of restrictions aiming to keep her virgin and chaste. This obviously differs little from the latter day vision of the Mediterranean woman as "devil's net" or "satan's cow" etc. (J. Schneider: 20) J. Schneider (2) aptly puts that as all ideologies, the honor and shame syndrome serves to complement institutional arrangements for the distribution of power and the creation of social order (see also Giovannini, 1986: 66); yet, not only in the Mediterranean. At a certain point of cultural evolution, the institutionalized distribution of power more or less universally favored an androcentric, patrimonial value system to which a sexually determined complex of honor and shame was axial. This socio political power structure appears as ethic to premodern; mostly rural, agrarian and pastoral societies. Certainly, socio-psychological values are not limited exclusively to urban or rural settings (Brandes, 1987: 126) therefore I prefer the dichotomy "modern/premodern" since it refers more to states of mind than sheer locality.

of these codes have not been systematically explored and the tendency has been to take them for granted.

This complex occupies anthropologists in a bifaceted perspective: Honor either as a social reflection manifest in codes centered on the control of female sexuality, or (cf. Davis) as a not necessarily sexual idiom symbolizing acquired social differences (Fiume, 1996: 118). Of course, honor is deeply entwined with concepts of masculinity, or more accurately, gender roles and identification. Most cultures define a desirable format of masculinity and for that matter, femininity (see: Gilmore, 1987: 9-10). Honor functions to evaluate a man's social worth and also to lend order to social relations. Consistent with this pattern, it involves the male control of female sexuality, the virginity and chastity of women (Giovannini, 1987: 61), Gilmore (1987a: 90) emphasizes that honor as disgrace befalls a man via women's sexual misconduct, in other words, woman's sexual conduct can make or break man's honor. Shame, on the other hand is the property of women; an innate virtue of passive sexual chastity and modesty, which cannot be gained but only lost (Gilmore, 1987a: 90-91). A woman, as a victim of her sexuality is distrusted to handle herself in a sexually appropriate manner (J. Schneider: 20).

According to various writers (Hart 1976, Davis 1977, Pitt-Rivers 1977, Blok 1981), male honor has an aggressive or competitive component, also encapsulating less dominative characteristics as economic success, physical prowess, autonomy, hospitality, integrity and generosity (Gilmore, 1987a: 90-91). Regardless of their probably universal prevalence especially in premodern rural societies, these values are observed all around the Mediterranean (J. Schneider: 1).

Jane Schneider (2-3, 7) places the topic in the more structural frame of power relations generated by a particular set of ecological forces in Mediterranean agricultural and pastoral (i.e., rural) economies. In the absence of effective bureaucracies, in spite of centrifugal forces working against unity and underlining differences within lineages and

harvesting, manual work ect. (Gilmore, 1982: 196-197). Secondly, Herzfeld's findings show that observations relevant to social interactive positions of sexes are determined or at least formed according to roles which do play a binding part in relations in premodern societies. This fact legitimizes any doubts as to whether both the proponents and opponents of the Mediterranean unity thesis are delving in the wrong treasure trove.

ON THE PLACE OF HONOR AND SHAME:

If anything, anthropological data only show that the present day Mediterranean is different from present day Northern Europe and most probably, similar to what it used to be before modernity. On the strength of the findings, it can be claimed that the Mediterranean today is relatively tardy on the supposedly "universal" track of modernism, but to either prove or disprove its distinction, other evidence is necessary. The same seems to hold true of the honor and shame syndrome, anthropology's great debate over the Mediterranean. The thesis maintains that the complementary values of honor and shame constitute a pervasive and more or less uniform system around the Mediterranean. According to this code, a man's honor is sacred, even more precious than his life; and honor is associated with female sexual purity, virginity, chastity, seclusion from other males etc. (Herman, 1996: 5-6). This association is supposed to be weak however, since areas and eras exist where exceptions abound. Also, the same values may carry an equal force outside the Mare Internum basin. Lack of a homogeneous concept of honor which captures local subtleties and complexities is another weakness of the syndrome's corroborative powers (Herman, 1996: 6-7). For example, honor can be divided into two components in Turkish; "namus", related to sexuality and "seref" a more general category of behavioral decorum (see: Delaney, 1987: 36). Jane Schneider (1), a pioneer Mediterranean, complains that the origins

Greece (Herzfeld). However, the shadow of a buffoon nevertheless keeps lurking behind every honorably masculine hero (Gilsenan, 195).

Reciprocally, that in the Mediterranean is restricted to the private sphere seems to be a deduction predominantly male anthropologists from the North have reached through the observation of men, which can lead to naive misreadings of women's social activities. Gilmore (1982: 195) quotes Douglas and Whitaker as concluding that women do not have friends and himself admits a failure to document feminine camaraderie. Yet, he points out to studies showing "how drastically women's networks have been underplayed". Women are reported as family spokespersons, as economically productive individuals, even to virtually run the daily life of villages by maintaining social control through gossip (Gilmore, 1982: 195). At a deeper level of intersexual relationships, Herzfeld (90-98) recounts cases from Crete where outward female submissivity and conformity conceal an internal resistance. The outward affirmation of male domination as social ideology may not always mean what it appears to: Couples enjoy friendly relations; women can assert some rights they have or acquired, even go as far as slapping their husbands. Herzfeld refers to the situation as a "true hegemony" where women ostensibly endorse the social ideology of male dominance but also subvert it through their express resentment of male control and pretensions. According to Aymard (1990: 133), intersexual norms and behavior patterns conceal a particular logic that cannot be discerned or penetrated by putting externally observed (empirical) facts side by side; the student of the Mediterranean must guard against the pressure toward uniformity and uniformisation in contemporary perceptions. Much of the anthropological data pertaining to male domination, machismo or intersexual interaction is based on stranger's observations in foreign premodern settings or rural, non urban communities as attested to by the list of economic activities women participate in: Caring for animals, domestic manufactures, making bricks, putting long hours in the fields,

WHAT MAKES A MEDITERRANEAN MAN?

One example of value systems imported to the studies of the Mediterranean is concerned with intersexual relations. Anthropologists have reached an almost unanimous consensus that throughout the *Mare Internum*, the public domain belongs to man and women are segregated, sequestered to the sphere of the private (see Gilmore, 1982: 194). This, in fact, is nothing new. The status of woman in ancient Athens of Sparta was reducible to "a machine that gave birth to citizens"; particularly in Athens, the situation was even worse: The female of the species, a property that had to be dispensed with at the first chance was worth male respect only if she were an accomplished courtesan (La Gorce, 1870: 64, 65). Ancient Greek law seriously discriminated against women (Senel, 1968: 126). The attitude of the Mediterranean male of antiquity apparently lasts: According to contemporary anthropologic data, a woman is still seen as a "threat, a symbol of disorder and chaos", a volatile uncertainty, devil, temptress, sorceress, etc. (Gilmore, 1982: 195). A man, on the other hand, is something a male becomes; a sex related social role won through internal and external struggle and continued affirmation of manliness by competition in every field, from love to economic enterprise (Gilmore, 1987: 9); a process that componentially entails having enough courage to be ready and willing to retaliate to violence with violence when necessary (Herzfeld, 1984: 446); keeping his work (Gilsenan: 196-197), displaying a sexual assertiveness whose ultimate evidence is procreativity and providing the means to sustain a family (Delaney, 1987: 40). Writers emphasize one important factor about machismo: Whether a man possesses these qualities or not is only as important as making sure that his andric message is understood by the community. More than or equal to its self knowledge thereof, being a man and possessing the subsequent honorrequire being recognised as one, which underlines the social aspect of machismo. The tough guy is thus incorporated in the cultural image of man; macho in Spain, *delikanlt* in Turkey, *marajul* in Lebanon (Gilsenan: 197) or a *palikari* in

is now observable in the Mediterranean is emic to it and was not or will not be experienced elsewhere at other times. Yet, supposedly emic traits of the Mediterranean are revealed as ethic under close scrutiny. For example, according to Gilmore, 1982: 197), Mediterranean people place a strong emphasis on the visual propensities of things, on seeing and the eye as an instrument of "power, predation, dominance and sexuality" (Gilmore, 1982: 198). The pagan artefactual legacy, the blue "eye bead", against evil truly seems to be a Meditarrenan univrsal, but warding evil via symbols is visible in as diverse cultures an in Somalia and England (Herzfeld, 1984: 447; Burke, 1996: 200) Ocularism and vision as a confirmation of reality or means of power as Gilmore centends is certainly not limited to any geography. In English, definitely not a Mediterranean tongue, "to see" is synonymous with "to understand"; seeing is believing, i.e., knowing for sure. David Hume (1992: xiv-xvii), in *Treatise of Human Nature*, establishes the relation between "scientific" empirical knowledge and the senses, particularly, vision. As to the eye having erogenous properties (Gilmore, 1982: 198), poetry is witness to the fact that this is as universal a perceptual phenomenon as possible. Under critical scrutiny, further supposedly emic traits of the Mediterranean like machismo of androcentricism, the segregation of women, hospitality, respect, honesty, female chastity and above all, honor and shame are equally revealed as ethic, albeit with premodern overtones.

As Stanley Brandes (1987: 124-125) notes, anthropologists' search for differences of cultures moves from data provided by paragons of ethnocentric Anglo Saxon models and perspectives, rather than comparisons across space and time. Consequently, instead of collating date in the perspective of human experience as a whole, the results record features which vary most perceptibly from the social structures and value systems of researches. This, in itself is alien to the polyglot, multicultural make up of the Mediterranean, where cultural chauvinism did not exist until nationalism was imported along with modernism (Braudel, 1990: 111; Ortayli, 1982: 11).

Culture is another basis of presumed Mediterranean unity: An atomistic community life, sexual segregation, religiosity, a widespread practice of dowry (Gilmore, 1982: 179), a strong urban orientation coupled with a disdain for peasantry, weak bureaucracies and central government rule, patron-client relationships, sexual stereotypes etc., are viewed as culturally uniting factors throughout the *Mare Internum* basin and adjoining cultures (Gilmore, 1982: 178-181). For others, the Mediterranean shares a similar fate having taken its place in the periphery or the semi periphery of the global world capitalist system (Gilmore, 1982: 182, Goody (1983) for instance, maintains that an originally homogeneous society has gone through a historical conditioning along a "pastoral agrarian continuum" has caused them to resemble each other, resulting in a "progressive peripheralization" in the world system (Davis, 1987: 22).

Most of the argument centers around the visibly observable aspects of social relationships in the Mediterranean countries; segregation of women, "machismo", i.e., androcentricism or the inevitable honor and shame syndrome; to which other details are somehow related. In practice, the empirical axes of unity theses pivot mainly on the key values of honor and shame. For instance, Gilmore (1982: 197-198) who claims that "the most dramatic affinities within the Pan Mediterranean region are not structural but psychocultural and pschosexual", lists related sexual norms, female seclusion, psychological defense mechanisms which he sees as contributing to a prevalent type of "personality structure or psychic constellation". It is difficult to understand how personality structures can be abstracted from the structures of human interaction, considering that personality is a system of articulating ontogenetic and phylogenetic acquisitions of individuals to enable an optimum adaptation in the evolutionary sense; and placing social milieux as the environment to which the organism must adapt to.

In fact, most of the "psychic constellations" which are deemed typically Mediterranean boil down to empirical assumptions that what

is not difficult to accept that such an academic construct reflects differences Europe as the agent of the modern(ist) world still perceives between itself and the Mediterranean (Bostanoglu, 1996: 6-14).

The challenge to the Mediterraneanists is by no means limited to that: Llobera (1986: 33) and James W. Fernandez (1986: 83) accentuate the Mediterranean is a "constructed" object of Anglo Saxon and North European anthropology. For Herzfeld, (1984: 439, 451) Mediterranean refers to little more than a geographical region; Llobera (1986: 33) concludes that it is premature to talk about the Mediterranean as a "cultural area" and proposes Southwestern Europe as a safer candidate and historical origins rather than a set of objectified Mediterranean countries". He then turns the other side of the coin and reads aloud the mercenary print: Those who sell images of "quintessence" to West European and North American tourists, have not hesitated to exploit the stereotype of a Mediterranean culture.

In a comprehensive overview of literature on the anthropology of the Mediterranean, Gilmore (1982) sums the bases on which the theory of a distinct culture area is proposed. Geography is a key concept, since "historically, the Mediterranean has acted more as a bridge than a barrier (Gilmore, 1982: 177). Actually, the bridge was never free of barriers but still it served as a conduit of maritime and mercantile human interaction (see: Braudel, 1993; 1994). Writers as Davis hold that the intensity of historical contact among Mediterranean peoples has created a perpetual and inescapable unity (Gilmore, 1982: 181). An ecological-topographical approach enlarges the scope of the Mediterranean to include countries like Portugal that mere geographical definitions leave out (Gilmore, 1982: 177). Braudel (1993: 37-330) elaborates in depth how climate, mountainous terrains, arable plains, irrigation problems together with the property relations bred by these factors, a dependence on sea routes, transhumance of migrations, have created comparable life styles and forced relationships through which cultural goods have travelled.

European author expected to see in the hotter climes. But then, as Fox (1991: 7) says, the Mediterranean has always been underestimated by Northern Europe and North America. Aymard (1995: 88, 91-92) notes that the Mediterranean is viewed by Northerners and Americans as a sun drenched land of the lazy. He reminds us of the book by L. Bertrand (1907) which warned the modern(ist) world against the Italian threat to the North because of late 19th century migrations from the South and the shaping of what may be summarized as the wop image of Italians. Cole still argues that the European shore of the Mediterranean has more in common with the Southern shore than with the industrialized states across the Alps (Gilmore, 1982: 182).

The idea of a discreet Mediterranean anthropology originated with George Peristiany and Julian Pitt-Rivers, who assumed a cultural unity in the Mediterranean on the basis of a moral - cognitive internal cohesion and a clear "trait enclosure in space" (Gilmore, 1987: 2-3). After the Second World War, anthropologists from the United Kingdom and the United States stressed a similarity and continuity they observed between the Southern and Northern shores of the Inner Sea. In the postwar era, it would not be too surprising to encounter widespread common premodern traits on either coast. However, as the conditions of anthropological fieldwork were considerably modified since, the younger generation of fieldworkers found it problematic to categorize the European, Asian and African parts of the Mediterranean under the same heading (Pina-Cabral, Campbell, 1992: xi, Pina-Cabral, 1992: 2, 5). Doubts were raised of the *Mare Internum* as an integral construct. For instance, Herzfeld (1984: 451), comments that before its ethnography, the Mediterranean itself has to be analysed as a category; this way, contemporary anthropology's concept of a discreet Mediterranean culture area can be seen for what it is. Patently, Herzfeld's position is reminiscent of the type of perception that reflects the veiled ideology it contains. Considering the nature of the relationship between scientific endeavor and socio-political interests, it

was "forgotten" but the feat of Cristobal Colombus was an epoch maker? Because, at the end of the 15th century, Europe "needed" America (see: Braudel, 1994; Zinn, 1990: 1-5, 18).

MODERNISM AND LOOKING FOR THE MEDITERRANEAN:

In Northern Europe, the history of ordinary life took a turn with the humanist intellectualism of the Renaissance, the individualization of faith and conscience with the Reformation, the philosophical assertion of man as a universal being, the Cartesian introduction of mathematics into structures of life as a new deity, the rise of individualism (see Braudel, 1996: 340-341; Strayer, Gatske; Harbison, 1974: 219-225, 475-476). The cornerstones of European modernity were in place and when August Comte declared "positivist" society as the ultimate stage of human development, he was also stating the claims of modernism to universality. Europe, as the emergent center of a new capitalist world relegated the Mediterranean, the stem from which it sprouted, to a global varoche connecting the "periphery", i.e., the geography South of it with the center. It became just an "other" world that perpetuated the modernistic myth of European superiority (see: Amin, 1995: 40-41; Gilmore, 1982: 182).

The modernist intellectual construct of the Mediterranean as a distinct cultural and socio-political geography manifestly served Europe to separate itself from what was "lesser". Just as Islam had helped bolster the cultural self image of Europe, like a mirror that showed what it was not (Neumann, Welsh, 1991: 327-339); after the 17th century, the Mediterranean became another mirror to let Europe boast about the superiority of its dominant modernist values of rationalism, civics and technical progress. In Jensen's novel "Gradiva" (which was a source of inspiration for Freud); 19th century Italy, the indisputable jewel of the Mediterranean is depicted as a dirty, fly ridden backwater, which, in secret writing, is what the modernist North

History in general, is not a consumer good. But apart from the accomplishments or vanquishments of kings and emperors, great commanders and admirals, or epic heroes, it is a process in which the structures guiding and forming the ordinary man's ordinary affairs take shape and are modified. Chronicled history, or the chronology of triumphs and defeats merely consists of the visible and exciting, as opposed to drab cross-sections of the continuum of human interaction (see: Braudel, 1993: 18-23).

Structures, more than being continuous, are for continuity - of systems, of behavior patterns ect.; hermeneutically devised, time proven and time proof modes and methods of balancing interactions created by social beings for their survival and the milieu which enables them to survive. The function of structures is adaptation and the structures which guided the lives of the ordinary people of the Mediterranean ensured that the vicissitudes of higher politics did not destroy the quotidien modes of existence of the multitudes, however devoid of effulgence.

Looking upward from the bottom, the structures provide the multitudes with the parameters for their definition of "life". The Mediterranean soldier or sailor came home with spoils, but it was the Andalusian peasant tilling the earth, the Samiote fisherman cleaning his nets, the Venetian merchant bargaining a sale who guaranteed the continuity of life, the ordinary cognitions and praxes for survival, from generation to generation. Yet, the structure of the history of the ordinary also tells us which events are worth chronicling: "Turning points" in history are often moments in time when the existing structures are hardpressed to sustain the continuum of the platitudes of the multitude. Was it possible that without the Crusades, earlier peasant revolts in Europe could reach a threatening extent for the feudal consensus on the definitions of "normal" and ordinary? A perfect example of the "extraordinary" sprouting from the continuum of the ordinary: How come the discovery of the new world by the Vikings

populations were ousted - often, not even then. Spanish rule was an anathema for manufacturers and merchants who were powerful enough to influence policy making in Italian cities (Cameron, 1973: 250; Braudel, 1994: 36). The Low Countries were lost to Spain because their protestant identity and urbanized value systems as well as economic growth could not be controlled. In the Turkish Empire, ethnic and religious minorities survived with minimum intervention until differences threatened the center with loss of territories. For instance, the Ottomans did little, even politically, to upset the Mamlouki power structure in Egypt; the former rulers, vast landowners, got back in the saddle soon after the conquest (Braudel, 1994: 25; Strayer, Gatzke, Harbison, 1974: 316-317). Although the ebb and flow of political tides, the structures of interaction that shaped life for those at the bottom changed little. Throughout wars, as Cameron (1973: 254) writes of Italy and India, estates only changed boundaries and owners, but the peasants continued to work while wars raged around them. Consequently, loyalty to the closest possible minimal identification group; family, relatives, community etc., over or alongside more encompassing social allegiances such as state or emperor appears as a cognitive legacy of imperial history (see Davis: 104-105).

HELENE'S APPLE AND WORKERS OF THE ORCHARD: A BUG'S EYE VIEW OF MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY:

The entire political history of the *Mare Internum* is about control of East - West trade routes (Murphey, 1993: 187). Probably, Paris's apple Helene found by her feet had grown in the orchards of Asia Minor, for Troy is only an epic version of this struggle for commercial-military supremacy. For millennia warriors gained glory, honor and wealth; lost fame or were ridiculed. The victorious and the vanquished alike went back among the multitudes, the platitudes of their lives. The heroes' military - political history of the Mediterranean took place in the backdrop of the drab daily lives of its peoples.

cosmopolitan Mediterranean Empires which commanded enormous geographies, could exercise less than full control on local ethnic, religious, cultural, even political minorities. Maurice Aymard (1995: 97) stresses that from the Roman to the Ottoman, not even the strongest empire oppressed its people the way the weakest modern state did. The "not so heavy" obligations of imperial subjects were limited to a quasi religious respect for the emperor, paying taxes, military duty when summoned in return for consideration toward their customs and creed. Priorities of administrative bureaucracies served the emperors' interests and charisma, which in final analysis, was the way to serve their own. The degeneration of the administrative systems resulted in corruption, a general lack of security and resistance to central authority; all factors that enhanced an underlining of individual differences (Braudel, 1994: 39-54). It is not too surprising that in the absence of effective state institutions, all over the Mediterranean a basic distrust of government, a general hostility toward administrative control can still be widely encountered. The ostensible respect shown for bureaucrats is probably due rather to the fear they used to instill as local wielders of imperial power. Popular emphasis is on informal in loco personal power, rather than formal institutions, which modern anthropology studies as patron-client relationships (Gilmore, 1982: 179, D. Schneider, 1962: 3, J. Schneider, 3).

Looking upward from the bottom, the significance of imperial forms of life lies in the fact that often, including brute force, little could prevent the subdued populations from retaining their cultures and identities. The sundry ethnic, religious, economic, cultural minorities of empires could easily maintain, develop or awaken discreet characteristics which later translated into political and nationalist claims of identity (J. Schneider: 3), Kenneth Neil Cameron (1973: 264-264) writes about the case of Palestine versus the Roman Empire that simple changes of masters by imperial invasions in a country of small farmers and traders did not work unless large indogeneous

used as a harbor, the "skala"; and one in the easier to defend hillsides, the "chora", home town. It is impossible to assume that this positioning does not reflect a cognitive psychological effect: Self sufficiency within, especially as a requisite of security, inevitably breeds a closure against the outsider, the "other" and the foreign; and from this closure breeds the tendency to underline differences. Accentuating the discriminating characteristics of "self" to the point of obscuring all but inescapable similarities become the norm. Also, women, as precious a booty as could be obtained, are traditionally perceived as entities or commodities best kept as far from strangers' eyes as possible.

Mediterranean political history is decidedly imperial, from the Hellenistic Empire of Alexander the Great to Rome, Byzantium, the Arabs, Mongols, Seldjouki Turks, Ottomans, Spain as the heir of Carolingus etc. The history of the Inner Sea also pitted empire against empire: From the Persian invasion, to Rome and Carthage, to the Ottomans and Spain, empires warred for supremacy over trade routes, until power over the Mediterranean was grasped by the North. In between empires, Mediterranean territories were ruled by regimes loosely comparable to feudality, which did not last long until they either swelled into or were swallowed by empires. This did not contribute much to social, political or administrative stability in Mediterranean life either; another factor leading to introversion and underlining differences.

DECIDIOUS TRIUMPHS AND LASTING STRUCTURES:

Domestic social values play an important part in the generation of an order among nations or communities. These values shape the logic of human interaction via collective identification, group consciousness and cohesion; and also the identification, delineation and definition of the "other" (Neumann, Welsh, 1991: 328). As opposed to nation states with more homogeneous relations between the rulers and the ruled, the

included mercenaries and adventurers from any nation or creed, who enlisted with the strong for spoils (Braudel, 1994: 252, 304; Murphey, 1993: 187-188). The Mediterranean was always short of hands for ships and at the end of the 17th century, frequently employed seamen from Northern Europe (Braudel, 1993: 170-171). Actually, one sign of Mediterranean cultural resemblances that shines through all differences is maritime life; not only as reflected in the nautical lingua franca, but also in the lives of the mariners. As the convergence of Mediterranean praxes were displayed in ports, life at sea knew neither religion nor patriotism. Christian sailors used to read the opening prayer of the Koran, "Al Fatiha", to bless the soul of Ibn Majid, whose prowess as a sailor elevated him to the status of a saint for all faiths (Boorstin, 1994: 179-180). In this aura of nautical cosmopolitanism, piracy, more than central states, can probably be listed among the chief historical determinants of Mediterranean cultural constructs, of the peoples' history. Piracy was private enterprise par excellence, which thrived with the retreat of official navies and privateers from the scene. It was so commonplace, the identities of raiders to the Balinears could only be surmised as French, rather than Turkish because pillagers also stole pork fat - yet, still not even that was conclusive evidence.

Pirates kept their distance from navy fleets, fortified towns and cities but hit unguarded shores (Braudel, 1994: 305-306). This naturally decided the details of lifestyles, from settlement patterns to the protection of the females from slave hunting raids. On the other hand, state sponsored privateers also ransacked the shores under the auspices of their governments. Following the naval peace between Spain and Turkey in the 16th century, which lasted well into the 17th, the war was continued in small scale by "anarchic and individualistic" pirates (Braudel, 1994: 258-276, 652).

One effect of piracy on Mediterranean life was ingrown, introverted small settlements, as easily evident in the architecture of the Aegean Greek Islands: The sea dependent islanders maintained a village they

Byzantine bureaucratic rule. The Orthodox Church almost openly sided with Turks who were more tolerant toward other creeds rather than be swallowed by the occupants of San Pietro (Braudel, 1994: 138-139). Yet, came the time this dubious affinity collapsed when, in Greek independence, the Orthodox found an ethnic self definition. Nikos Kazantzakis's somewhat exaggerated narrative of the Turkish oppressed Anatolian Greek Orthodox peasant in *Jesus Recrucified* can be cited as an example where not only inter group but also intragroup differences are underlined.

In and among each Mediterranean society, it seems every group, community, city, nation or faith possessed a historical collection of "others" it could use for self emphasis in time of need. Better chronicled than social history, the flow of political events reveal this tendency to underline differences: Venice had a near endemic apprehension of its natural ally against the Turk, Spain, whose presence in Toscana and Milano was a constant source of irritation. Venice also suspected that the Spanish instigated crusades provided an excuse cooked in order to weaken and cause attrition to the Signorie (Braudel, 1994: 544). Instead of allying with Spain to finish off the Turk in the aftermath of Lepanto, Venice bought an expensive, precarious but nevertheless profitable peace with the enemy and "betrayed" the crusaders (Braudel, 1994: 545). According to Braudel (1994: 175), the division, skimishes, betrayals among their rivals enabled the Turks to continue their hold in the Mediterranean much longer than their technical decline in the late 16th century warranted; in fact, to the detriment of Venice who lost Crete to Istanbul in mid 17th century (Murphey, 1993: 187-200). This was not all, the sectarian wars within both Christianity and Islam were also effective in the depreciation of the Turkish and Spanish Empires, and the Italians in between (Braudel, 1994: 220, 303).

As just an example of how these skirmishes reflected on peoples' ordinary lives, piracy deserves mentioning: First of all, piracy was only a profession. Pirates were guided solely by avarice, no other faith or loyalty (Braudel, 1994: 251-254).. Mediterranean corsairs and pirates

by geography, both the Christian Catholic and Moslem worlds lost their primacy along with the primacy of the Inner Sea, because they failed to perceive the rewards of relating to and with each other. History is not a science of what might have been, but such questions always lurk in the air: If, instead of trying to strangle each other in the Western Mediterranean, Felipe II and Suleyman the Magnificent could have reached an accord over sea trade routes, history might be written in a different language and narration. They made their peace too late, or when too little was left to fight about. Ironically, what the two powers on the extremities of the *Mare Internum* failed to see was obvious on the other side of the Atlantic: Little after his inauguration at the turn of the century; President Theodore Roosevelt said Turkey and Spain were holding the two keys to world domination and it was these two he had to overcome as head of the United States (Okan, 1994: 155).

From its fauna and flora to its cultures, the Mediterranean has always seen a fast current of influxes and outfluxes (Fox, 1991: 8-9). Elements thought to be discreet to one region or culture prove to be borrowed from another one in the *Mare Internum*: Sarabande has only become Spanish in Cervantes's time. Tuna fishing, a Christian practice according to historians, was learned from the Arabs. The ports of the Inner Sea in late Medieval times, were the converging points of all Mediterraneanisms, from all races or religions to cuisines, from customs to hairstyles (Braudel, 1994: 131-132).

History as comprehensive background of a psychology of cognitions, paints a backcloth of intra-Mediterranean relations based on ample distrust; an underlining of differences. Even on the religious-political front, Islam, the collective other, was only superfluously influential among Catholics as the unifying counterpoint, seldom resulting in more than deciduous Crusade coalitions from which the Orthodox would exclude themselves. Moslem forces were largely aided by at least passive support from the Orthodox population during their conquest of Asia Minor; they were simply referred and preferred as "just and fair" against the corrupt

"civilization of the chivalry" (Braudel, 1996: 330-331). By the time fiefs were united under nation states, the North was long ready to identify with a holistic "European culture". In the genesis of this collective identification "areas and values beyond the pale of European society", namely, the Turk as the "other" played an undeniable role (Neumann and Welsh, 1991: 329). It should be remembered how Erasmus (1995: 13-20), in the 16th century preached a unity of European Christianity meanwhile extolling the virtues of war against the Moslem infidels.

PERCEPTION AND HISTORY:

In *Totem and Taboo* (1913), Sigmund Freud (1971: 139) stresses that the human mental apparatus exerts a pressure to classify perceptions in a coherent, meaningful whole with our thoughts and ideas. Perceptions are thus organized according to a system by which they acquire their meanings. In a continuum of conscious and unconscious workings of the mind, perception occurs simultaneously with mnemonic (memory) processes (Freud, 1971: 137). In other words, man has to conceive in order to perceive. Jean Piaget (1976: 97-98) has explained how conceptual representations, i.e., thoughts can modify perceptive processes in a preinferential sense. Although the Mediterranean, the historical background, or the well of concepts upon which the Gestaltic figures of perceptions took coherent form, favored an underlining of differences by individual elements, be it states or persons. Historical references in this paper were made to point out to this general theme of schisms and therefore may be lacking in detailed narrative of events. However, the drift of historical instances have to be mentioned, for, the praxis scheme (Piaget, 1976: 70-72) of the Mediterranean, including the failure to conceive of themselves as a unity, must have had historical consequences:

If the Mediterranean cognitive style of underlining differences betrayed its cultures in conceptually relating themselves to the global

others tended to underline differences. Cognitive style signifies the molar structure of specific approaches, perception and interpretation of the world and events, problem solving and defense mechanisms organised in a consistent and congruent whole which is expressed in persons' actions? a distinguishing trade mark of individuals; and by extension, cultures (Tolan, Isen, Batmaz, 1986: 126-127). In the timeless backdrop of Mediterranean history, differences in any walk of human life and interaction, rather than similarities were emphasized in cultural self description. Every minimal group could somehow extricate cognitions relating to how and from what it differed; identifying itself with some discreet definition. The differences, though, could well have their roots in the soil of similarities: Suffice it to remember that Christianity was perceived as a "Jewish heresy" (Cameron, 1973: 271). The unfolding of Mediterranean civilizations and cultures for millennia could never erase all traces of the former ones and a cross section of the layers of history reveal the differentiating elements within the general continuity of the Mediterranean (Aymard, 1995: 101).

The Mediterraneans' "failure" to seek a regional identification resulted in a false polarization of *Mare Internum* psychologies (as well as social and political forces) along the fault line of humanity's greatest and most general rift, religions. Ostensibly the cross and the crescent pitted each against the other in ostentatious jihads or crusades. However, under the wide blankets of Christianity and Islam, too many potentially restive bodies were covered to make the long sleep restful.

By contrast, despite differences of probably no less radical nature, in lands foreign to the olive tree, history witnessed the emergence of a common platform of values and praxes: ascribed a universal status with modernism. Furthermore, structures arose in European history about which the common platforms of values and praxes could continue. Following the *regni Caroli*, in the age of feudal kings and lords, a notably identical pattern of civilization and culture prevailed and permeated Europe. Everywhere, moral, religious, cultural values; rules pertaining to war, fighting, conflicts and revolts, love, life and death; constituted a single "Christianity" (cf. Marc Bloch) or a single

Levante, Henri Kahane, Renée Kahane and Andreas Tietze (1988: viii, 15-16, 20) show that maritime terms in Turkish borrowed from the Greek. Arabic and Latin languages point to a Mediterranean distribution. The linguistic-cultural unity of the Mare Internum finds a solid basis here.

CHILD CHRISTENS MOTHER:

"MEDITERRANEAN" AS A EUROPEAN ANNEX

Having thus expanded its frontiers beyond the visibly observable, it is time to look into the genesis of Mediterranean as a linguo-cultural concept that supercedes the geographical. How, as the sun garden by the sea lost its global primacy, the Mediterranean came to be perceived in Northern eyes as "Europe's inconvenient annexe, part of the precarious passage to India or the sun patio for occasional and casual use by the Northern hedonist and tourist" (Fox, 1991: 525).

By coinage and function, Mediterranean is a modern European concept. The peoples of the Mare Internum never perceived themselves as a whole, because the rest of the world hardly provided a Gestaltic background upon which such a comprehensive figure could appear. It is not an exaggeration to claim that from the Minoan era, until well into the 16th century, the Mediterranean was the center of the world. The cognitive emphasis is marine charts and maps up to the Medieval times show clearly how the Inner Sea, drawn in detail, constituted the mainstay of the idea of the world; its immediate shores tapering rapidly off toward its rather indifferent hinterland (Özdmir, 1992; see Boorstin, 1994: 150-156).

On the other hand, the Mediterranean in its heyday contained an abundance of geographic, ethnic, territorial, political, religious, racial, cultural, characterological, linguistic and social subcenters, each of them an "other" the rest could psychologically describe themselves in regard to. The cognitive syle of the Mediterranean peoples pertaining to

the olive tree. Otherwise, I have no intention of debating the geographico-cultural boundaries of the Mediterranean. As Braudel (1993: 18) says in the 1946 foreword to *La Méditerranée et le Monde Méditerranéen*, The Mediterranean is a historical personality awaiting to be determined and for this purpose, her frontiers are immaterial. This, I believe, is the task of linguistic philosophy, psychology and sociology.

Ludwig Wittgenstein holds that language, a well of social reality and praxes, is the infrastructure of social reality which it determines independently of the external world. It has the power to shape the world or the way it is contrued. Peter Winch extrapolates that social reality is a reflection of meanings through language (see: Sunar, 1986: 96-97, 119-120, 127-128). Another nonpositivist theory of language sees it as a superstructure that indirectly reflects human social existence through symbols. Experience, or *dasein* in existential terminology is symbolized by language (Bostanoglu, 1995: 115-116). Either way, non-positivist paradigms of language unbreakably link human thought and practice to words uttered or written.

In this perspective, languages should be the right lieu to track down the historio-cultural extent and influence of the Mediterranean, a path trailing from lexicons and symbol systems into "ways of mind" as a shorthand for culture: Customs, beliefs, praxes and processes of thought, tools and modes of adapting to nature. I do not use symbol systems loosely instead of languages. Kabaagaçlı (1991: 43-46) draws extensive parallels between ancient Anatolian symbols and customs that Mediterranean cultures eventually inherited and passed on. Even vine and wine can be considered practical symbols of a Mediterranean cultural legacy, both in Northern Europe and the new world (Aymard, 1995: 112). Thus, any language penetrated by Latin or Levantine Arabic reformed from traditional poetry and the Koran (Braudel, 1996: 95-95) will most probably relate to a praxis that is rooted in the Mediterranean. In a glossary of the nautical lingua franca of the

international relations, the state is a reified, unproblematic entity which possesses the faculties of reason, perception and action attributed to homo sapiens.

I consider this anthropomorphised perception of states or countries particularly dangerous in a study of the Mediterranean; not only because of the ethnological, religious, social, cultural, psychological, political or economic diversity of the region but also because of its politico-historical inaccuracy: Imagine that what was known as Turkey in the 16th century today comprises over a dozen states, including Libya and Israel. Where is the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies? So, if we are looking at how any Mediterranean group is/was perceived by others, we must carefully determine who really is the perceiving actor and what really is the subject of perception. As mentioned above, the apperceptive masses which particular cultures accumulate function as sources of information in the formation of perceptions. As collective cognitive structures, cultures and/or subcultures within political frontiers harbor ready made perceptions of self and others often in the form of stereotypes. Yet, it would be egregiously farfetched to assume that countries represent homogeneous cultures anywhere, but especially in the Mediterranean where the nation state, hence, nation feeling identifiable in geographies recognised as countries is a relatively new phenomenon (see: Aymard, 1995: 96).

(I envy my lawyer and to some extent, economist and political scientist colleagues, they have a much more tangible, homogenous material to work with, whereas, we students of psychology, sociology, anthropology etc. have first of put a name to what we are dealing with).

THE HISTORIO CULTURAL LANGUAGE OF THE OLIVE TREE:

Only for the sake of practicality, I shall mean by Mediterranean here, the socio-political geography around the Inner Sea, the reach of

syndrome in the Mediterranean not just because it was there (as in so many other societies), but mainly because they were looking for it; and they were looking for it because they apperceived it as an academic criterion for proving or disproving their position. This point is raised more in the nature of a methodological reminder than a critique of the author or a defense of the model.

PERCEIVING THE MEDITERRANEAN: WHO, WHAT, HOW?

Considerations of methodology, inevitably, also dictate a scrutiny of the title of this very meeting: *La perception de la Méditerranée par les pays méditerranéens*.

Simply put, "les pays", do not percieve. Only persons perceive. Certain groups of persons in or close to the governing apparati, who perceive certain events and procedures in a perspective commensurate with the possibilities of the practice of government, convert their perceptions to policies or policy referrals and we regard these formulations or summations as the perception or opinions of, say all Italy, the Carolingian Empire, France or Indonesia (Bostanoglu, 1996: 59-84, 150-161). Burcu Bostanoglu (1996: 46-50, 75-77, 379-381) has culled and succinctly summarized post modern criticism of the realist theory, the positivist-empirical approach in international political science that views the state as an anthropomorphic actor. She concludes, along with writers as Robert Cox or Stephen Gill that this outlook reduces social (and for the purposes of this work, cultural) procedures to governmental, producing an illusion of homogeneity where the vicissitudes of civil society and the plethora of values in a "country" are squeezed into the perceptions and practices of the political society (Bostanoglu, 1996: 46-53). States, or "pays Méditerranéens" in this case are almost assumed to be "utilitarian, reasoning actors", who act to shape "the momentum of events according to their interests and plans just as a (conscious) rational individual" (Bostanoglu, 1996: 76). Bostanoglu (1996: 75-77) shows that according to the positivist philosophy of government and

the polis, or using a modern term, on their "rule of law". Furthermore, Athens was a cosmopolis with a diversity of moral codes (Finley, 1963: 145-148) just as the contemporary urban centers of the Mediterranean (Brandes, 1987: 124-245). Is it inconceivable that the cuckolded, bullied, slighted or insulted citizens of Athens followed an urbanised, civilized code of ethics to defend their honor rather than jump to the sword-which, incidentally, they did not carry in the polis (Herman, 1996: 28; Ortayli, 1982: 106-107)? Did their peers really consider them less honorable for not acting like barbarians? Herman's (1996: 14-15, 19, 21, 22, 25-26) own empirical evidence suggests otherwise: Citizens of Athens apparently placed a higher value on the supremacy of public law than personal vengeance. The plaintiffs were favored by the courts in most cases, one of which involves two men's squabble over the love of a slave boy. Again, Herman's refutation of "a" Mediterranean honor code on the evidence of Prussian duels must first divorce the Prussian concept of honor from its possible Mediterranean, say, Imperial Roman roots in order to claim validity. After all, German territories were long a hinterland of the Mediterranean and cultural goods as well as material, frequently travelled in all directions (Braudel, 1994: 129-132). Since Carolus Magnus and the attempts to establish a "Holy" Roman state, the Teutonic peoples have historio-psychologically tended to consider themselves as heirs of Roman traditions as well as the empire (see: Ortayli, 1982: 113; Toynbee, 1972: 70, 190).

Any single deductive model moving on the strength of observations of isolated phenomena, no matter how widespread, would fail in articulating "local subtleties and complexities" (Herman, 1996: 7) with the history-deep structures of human interaction. Therefore, it is not difficult to agree with Herman (1996: 6-7) or Brandes that the honor and shame syndrome is not capable of testifying to a Mediterranean unity; but for that matter, neither is it capable of refuting it. In fact, anthropologists diagnosed an "all embracing" honor and shame

reality in a way that.... no formulation of paradigms can accomplish" (Pi sunyer, 1986: 97). But, even for deciding what constitutes social reality, the point of reference is theoretical.. Mere observations of phenomena, distended from their historiogenesis may lead (or mislead) researchers into incomplete representations of the social reality under scrutiny.

In anthropology, discussions of the Mediterranean as constituting a "distinctive cultural entity" (Herzfeld, 1984: 439) or a "culture area" (cf. Braudel) have boiled down to debates of whether the "honor and shame syndrome" is a Mediterranean-specific or universal phenomenon. Peristiany, Pitt-Rivers, Jane and Peier Schneider, John Davis and David D.. Gilmore are among anthropologists who believe that these complementary omnipresent values indicate a cultural unity around the Mediterranean (Gilmore, 1987: 2-3), as the "reflection of social personality in the mirror of social ideas" (Herman, 1996: 14; Cf. Peristiany). Others like Herzfeld (1984, 1986) or Llobera (1986), believe that anthropologic evidence is at least premature to justify a conclusion of unity. I shall dwell on this controversy further on. Here I shall use it as an example of how ignoring the structural in favor of the empirical may lead to short jumps to conclusions.

Gabriel Herman (1996) challenges the quintessence of a universal Mediterranean honor and shame code citing a number of cases from law courts of ancient Athens, where the "wronged" actors, instead of resolving their problem personally as the honor code supposedly dictates, preferred to sue (Herman, 1996: 7-15; 19-26). He then refers to lethal duels of Prussian knights over "honor". By his logic, if Athenians very unmediterraneanly refuse to kill their persecutors and Teutons duel to death for honor, the "honor and shame" complex can hardly provide decisive basis for a quintessentially Mediterranean culture (Herman, 1996: 34-35, 36).

How complete is this picture? Which honor code is referred to? We read that (see Finley, 1963, Senel, 168) the Athenians fairly prided themselves on being democratic and civilised, on their institutions of

JUDGING OR MISJUDGING LIKENESSES

Comparisons of human activity and the constructs of their mental praxes easily defy exact correspondence. So, why should it be expected that peoples who live by one sea should be exactly alike? If a "unity" of the Mediterranean is to be established or denied, it seems that, rather than empirically observable molecular resemblances, the focus of research should be on seeking molar discriminants, the existence or absence of structures which determine similarities in the modes of being, seeing, thinking and doing common to the *Mare Internum* humanity. To use a simile, the method of judging similarities of diverse cultures can be misleading if the researcher is looking for a sameness in appearance and behavior as only found among identical twins. A more productive approach would be to discover the genetic and generic likenesses in looks and actions that "unite" brothers and sisters, or even, cousins.

Fernand Braudel, whose insightful historical syntheses have apparently inspired the Mediterraneanists (Gilmore, 1987: 2) uses the term "culture area". Whether the Inner Sea basin constitutes a culture area or not, is basically an epistemological question as Josep. R. Llobera (1986: 32) pinpoints: Mediterranean anthropology accords a privileged status to empirical fieldwork as "constitutive of the object of study" and the "main repository of information" (Llobera, 1986: 33). Pointing out to the "mystique" of fieldwork, Joao de Pina-Cabral (1992: 10-12) warns that ethnographic reporting is of a perspectival nature. Loizos (1992: 169) says accumulation of fieldwork data eventually enlightens theory according to (certain) anthropologists. Yet, description uninformed by theory, independent of a research design has little to do with science and for any progress, the role of empirical fieldwork must be reversed to servant, instead of master of theory (Llobera, 1986: 33). Other anthropologists Paul Herzfeld (1986: 86-87), Antony Leeds (1986: 90), Oriol Pi-sunyer (1986: 97) to name a few, have responded in defense of fieldwork as "the contact of anthropology with social

small anthropological units or isolated observations of behavior patterns may certainly reveal insights (see Fernandez, 1986: 84-85) into common practices or idiosyncracies. However, to separate the quintessentially Mediterranean from the universal, further query might be in place. A molar approach linking molecular-empirical common denominators to the body of social theory, the psychology, history and geography of the Mediterranean as a "discreet" area; where emphasis is placed on the similarities or differences of structures that make individuals and societies move, their cultures (here used in short definition to mean "a way of mind", describing the social parameters according to which cognition-praxis procedures of individuals are structured) and shared or typical characteristics, promises to be more revealing. Also, while determining the parallels among structures, sometimes it is essential to look for probable common roots of phenomena empirically unrelated or even mutually exclusive. A molar, structural research may uncover hidden similarities of apparent opposites, which are often forms that take shape in reaction to the same initiating force. Hence, any discerning reading must also look into when and where to "opposite the opposites". For instance, while comparing the Mediterranean with Northern Europe - a popular polarity - overlooking the social, cultural and economic nourishment the North has received from the South may easily lead to misconceptions of the Mediterranean roots of phenomena assumed to be universal because they were observed in the North.

Any study of the Mediterranean is duty bound to keep in mind that the cultures and values which emanated on the shores of the *Mare Internum* effervesced into worlds far beyond the reach of its temperate climate, as Fernand Braudel (1993, 1994) has exhaustively laid out in his (1500 odd pages) treaty on the Inner Sea.

emerge where, to enlarge C.W. Mills' famous phrase, "history and biography" encounter geography. History tells us how biographies in this geography intersected to underline differences, rather than enhance similarities, and how biographies in other geographies evolved to construe it as a discreet entity which did not reflect in the cognitions of its indogeneous populations as such.

Psychology is more involved with the mechanisms of how individuals perceive; however, the mechanisms of perception occur within a framework of cognitions of self and others structured in time and space to be called cultures, through which individual minds cruise. In other words, particular cultures are particular collective cognitive structures which, drawing from the crop of collective apperceptions, impose methods and criteria on adherent individuals as to how they are expected to know and recognise the world. It is against this triune background of history, geography and biography that perceptions of the Mediterranean in an (at least loose) association of similarity make sense, ethnomethodologically or academically.

I am of course aware that this association is not universal. In anthropology, objections to the theory of a Mediterranean "unity" carry an equal weight to the propagation of the idea. This controversy leaves me wondering whether either side does not place an exaggerated importance on the empirical validation of correspondences over a guiding search for the structures of intercultural similarities or differences. At best, the proponents of unity come up with observations of certain supposedly Mediterranean-specific values, among which honor and shame occupy the foreground. The opponents are unsatisfied with the flimsy evidence provided by field studies pivoting on these values.

For readers of the Mediterranean, it seems necessary to be wary of taking both similarities and differences at empirical face value; independent of their historio-cultural structures. Molecular studies of

COLLECTIVE EYES, INDIVIDUAL VISIONS

Somehow, large sections of humanity have ethnomethodologically come to know and perceive the Mediterranean as an entity unto itself. How we perceive is often a key to how we think; corollarily, what we perceive is in tandem with what we think. If an ethnomethodological tendency to perceive the Mediterranean as a whole exists, it may as well be attributed to certain patterns of thinking that mentally prepare us to see the subject of perception in a holistic frame, as any properties it may possess to classify it as a totality. Krech and Crutchfield (1948) have laid out half a century ago that perception is not only a registration of sensory stimuli from external objects but a co-product of memory, imagination, fantasies and prior perceptions that organize sensory data into cognitive structures (Krech, Crutchfield, 1967: 87-88). From a psychologist's perspective, perceptions about the Mediterranean are only meaningful in relation to the cognitive, social, cultural and historical contexts of both the perceiver and the perceived and their time-space related milieu. Hence, if the Mediterranean is wrought into a concept, i.e., an abstraction that elicits a concrete picture of the subject in the mind, as a whole, it is either:

- a) because it displays sufficient characteristics to be categorised as a totality; or;
- b) because, for whatever reason, the perceiver(s) display an apperceptive readiness to see it holistically.

Since the Mediterranean as a much a historical concept as geographical, the social roots of cognitions necessarily reach deep in time. Thus, to use Gestalt terminology (see Perls, Hefferline, Goodman. 1976), history becomes the "background" against which figures assume their perceptible contours. Human life, as reflected in the human mind is conjoined with the time extensive frame of social interaction, from which structures of meaning are extracted. Perceptions of the Mediterranean, whether one is of it, or looking at it,

UNDERLINING THE DIFFERENCE OF SIMILARITIES: BEING, DOINT, THINKING AND SEEING MEDITERRANEAN

Galip B. Isen (Ph.D) *

The Sumerians called the shores of the Mediterranean "the sun garden by the sea" (Kabaagaçlı, 1991: 29). In various languages of the ancient Near East, the sea was called "white" or "translucent", probably inspired by its brightness. With a deference hardly concealed in his texts, Fernand Braudel's (1949) preferred term is "Mare Internum", the "Inner Sea", a reference dating back to early Arab and Jewish cartographers(Fox, 1991: 5).

Are these merely terms that describe or identify an expanse of briny water on which the sun shines generously? If we are only discussing geographical nominations, how can we explain the curious phenomenon that the sheer utterance of the word Mediterranean, as if magic, evokes a holistic concept which encompasses millions of people sharing a temperate climate, diverse cultures, languages, three monotheistic faiths, and sundry ways of life?

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