The Russo-Ukrainian war and the change in US strategy

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Abstract:

The Russian-Ukrainian war broke out on February 24, 2022, with a massive Russian military buildup in northern and eastern Ukraine. This war is a response to Moscow's strategic objective of taking control of its neighboring country, which in recent years has moved away from the Russian orbit and towards the European Union and NATO. The Atlantic Alliance, through its successive enlargements in Central and Eastern Europe, on Russia's borders, places the current conflict in the context of a confrontation between Russia and NATO, which acts indirectly by sending arms. This study addresses a number of points for reflection in order to understand the conflict, with a general overview of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Finally, it examines Donald Trump's approach and the shift in US strategy towards Ukraine

Key Words: Us Strategy; Russia; War; Ukraine; Nato

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Introduction:

The ongoing war between Russia and Ukraine has escalated tensions between Moscow and NATO, impacting not just the region but also the United States and the wider world. Russia views full control over Ukraine as vital for its stability and strategic goals. NATO's successive expansions toward Russia's borders have intensified this tension, a scenario Russia finds unacceptable given its historical rivalry with the West. The core issue extends beyond the Russia-Ukraine conflict to include broader tensions between Russia, NATO, and the United States.. So the problematic of this study is: how the US can possibly exploit Ukraine as a territory that allows the approach of a threat to Russia's security and changes the geopolitical and strategic situation in the region?

This study explores the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, examining geography, language, Russia's claims to Crimea and the Black Sea, and the geopolitical strategies of Russia and the U.S., while highlighting the role of economic resources like gas, oil, minerals, and grain.

Research methodology

To illuminate this study, the researcher employed a historical approach to reconstruct past events and understand the background of the issue. Additionally, statistical data collection and analysis were used to clarify the facts, alongside Descriptive Content Analysis.

The study plan

Introduction

1. Russian strategy and war dynamics
2. The western countries combined political and military approach
3. Donald Trump Administration plan
4. Conclusion

Russian strategy and war dynamics

The Russian strategy in Ukraine reflects a combination of military, political, and geopolitical objectives aimed at asserting influence over its neighbor and countering Western expansion. Since the 2022 invasion, the conflict has evolved into a complex war characterized by conventional battles, territorial control, and asymmetric tactics. Understanding Russia's approach requires examining its operational goals, the methods employed on the battlefield, and the broader regional and global dynamics shaping the war.

First: The main Elements of the war

Like all wars, the factors and reasons behind the Russian war against Ukraine can be traced back to the following elements:

1. **The Geographical Element:**

Ukraine was formed in its current form in the mid-20th century. The Ukrainian people, divided between Poland and Russia, and then Austria, were not reunited within their national framework until after World War II. A land of borders ('Ukraïna' means land of borders), without natural boundaries, Ukraine was for a long time devoid of a clear perimeter. Two characteristics of its geography influenced its history: its openness to the Central Asian steppes and the presence of two powerful neighbors, Russia and Poland

Historical Ukraine traditionally included the eastern bank of the Dnieper River, under Ukrainian sovereignty until its reunion with Russia in the 18th century, and the western bank, a region with a mixed population, mostly of Ukrainian origin, but also Polish, Austrian, Romanian, and Jewish identity, which was under Polish sovereignty until the end of the 18th century and then Austrian again.

Ukraine was a small part of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), the most European in terms of both its climate and its size and strategic location between Central Europe and Russia. Its size (603,700 km², 900 km from to south and 1,300 km from east to west) makes it a large European country, although relatively small compared to the continental size of Russia as a whole **(Dumont, 2023)**

Ukraine is mostly a vast sedimentary plain, with two mountainous regions: the Carpathians (2,000 m) in the west and the Crimean Mountains (1,545 m) in the south. Steppes cover 40% of the country, nourished by the 2,285 km Dnieper River flowing into the Black Sea. With fertile black soils, this well-irrigated region was Europe’s richest agricultural area, once called the "Russian wheat granary." **(Dumont, 2023)**

Ukraine’s situation shows how geography has shaped its political position. Since gaining independence on August 24, 1991, it has sought closer ties with Western Europe and the U.S., while maintaining important economic and political links with Russia. Its security challenges largely stem from its exposed location between the West and Russia.

2. **The cultural element:**

Based on statistics for 2022, 14 million Ukrainian citizens speak Russian as their mother tongue, representing 22% of the country's population. A total of 44 million people speak Ukrainian, with two-thirds of the population speaking it, while 22% consider Russian their mother tongue **(Pawłuszko, 2023)**

Ukraine has always been a mixed country, with a heterogeneous population, but very close to Russia. This diversity has traditionally been a source of intense tension in society; the forced population displacements that followed World War

II considerably simplified the country's ethnic makeup, but also impoverished its culture**.**

The Russian language has posed a major challenge to the development of Ukrainian national sentiment and has been subject to repression. Ukrainian, which belongs to the group of East Slavic languages, is the official language, but not spoken by everyone. Mixing and prolonged Russification have led to its coexistence with Russian. This is the language of more than a third of the population with a bilingualism rate exceeding 60%. **(Bernatchez, 2022)**

Before 1991, the Ukrainian language was suffering from erosion due to Russian's status as a language of instruction and social advancement in the USSR, within a framework of implicit Russification. With independence in 1991, the Ukrainian language regained strength, while Russian remained a minority language, excluded from compulsory education. In the new era, public authorities favored the Ukrainian language and generally refrained from speaking Russian.

The Russians community represented 22% of the country's total population. This situation presented a dissociation between a majority group and a minority group that did not accurately reflect the interaction and symbiosis between the two ethnic and linguistic groups that made up the Ukrainian people. Most (ethnic) Ukrainians speak Russian more than any other language, so we can define three large groups: Russian-speaking Russians (around 22%), Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians (around 43%), and Russian-speaking Ukrainians (around 35%) **(Bernatchez, 2022)**. This asymmetry between language and nationality explains the lack of national sentiment among Russian-speaking Ukrainians, who feel more Ukrainian politically, but more Russian culturally.

Western Ukraine comprises a small Russian minority with a strong preponderance of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians; the center (including Kyiv) has a large majority of Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians, but also a mixed population that speaks both Russian and Ukrainian; in the south, there has been a strong Russian majority (over 68% in Crimea) (Bernatchez, 2022) although a mix of languages is also observed; finally, in the east, there is a greater preponderance of the Russian language, resulting in the situation that, although many Russians claim to speak Ukrainian regularly, in practice, all choose Russian as their home language **(Bernatchez, 2022).**

3. The political and security element

The collapse of the Soviet Union was a difficult and complicated process, which many Russians struggled to accept, and the same was true for Ukraine. Economically, Ukraine’s independence significantly affected trade between Russia and Central and Western Europe. As the second-largest Soviet republic after Russia in population, territory, and economic significance, Ukraine

contributed roughly 25% of the USSR's gross national product and 31% of its agricultural output. **(Dumont, 2023)**

On the strategic level, Ukraine's withdrawal meant the loss of an army of hundreds of thousands of men, as well as the best tanks and other military equipment, deployed primarily, for obvious reasons, in the western regions of the Soviet Union. Aside from these economic and strategic factors, Russia and Ukraine were closely linked culturally and ethnically.

Russia's historical roots can be traced back to Russian Land (Rous), the Kievan state that dominated Eastern Europe from the 10th to the 13th century. Generally speaking, Russians, whether in Moscow or St Petersburg, feel much closer to Ukrainians than to their own compatriots in Yakutsk or Vladivostok; the fact that 22% of the Ukrainian population is of Russian origin reinforces this sense of belonging **(Dumont, 2023).**

The legacy of the empire has weighed heavily on Russian-Ukrainian relations. Misunderstandings and conflicts have marked an interaction that has reached a point of communication breakdown. Ukraine signed several far-reaching treaties of friendship and cooperation with its neighbors, formally renouncing all territorial claims, recognizing the inviolability of their common borders, and promising to respect minority rights (the June 1992 treaty with Poland, for example). But Moscow, despite kyiv's insistence, consistently refused to commit itself to these terms. This refusal was all the more worrying given that radical Russian nationalist leaders viewed Ukraine as a region that, in the foreseeable future, would be reintegrated into "Great Russia." **(Dumont, 2023)**

4. The International Element

Moscow, which has always lamented the loss of its empire, has pursued a distinct and consistent policy towards the 'near abroad', the Russian expression generally used to refer to the countries of the former Soviet Union. Russian nationalists and former communists constantly accused Boris Yeltsin (the first president of the Russian Federation) of making the country overly dependent on the West (particularly the United States) and of poorly protecting national interests in the "near abroad." They demanded more authoritarian and more direct intervention from Moscow in the former Soviet republics, based on three strategic arguments.

First, Russia's vital economic interests in the former Soviet Union: these included, in particular, the ports on the Baltic and Black Seas (where the waters do not freeze), access to raw materials and energy resources, and transportation and communication routes. Second, Russia had major political interests in the former Soviet Union; the diaspora of 25 million Russian-speaking citizens of Russian origin was the main reason why Moscow did not withdraw its intervention in the political game of its neighbors, protecting "exiled" Russians

from any discrimination, especially in Ukraine. Third, Moscow had every security interest in preventing Ukraine from allying itself with other major powers or security forces that were potentially hostile to it (NATO) **(Pawłuszko, 2023)**

5. The Ethnic Element

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, approximately 25 million Russians (or Russian-speakers) found themselves in the "near abroad." The way in which Russia then responded to human rights violations against this Russian population abroad was one of the main signals of its policy toward its neighbors. The 12 million Russians living in Ukraine, who represent approximately 22% of the total population, became potential political allies for Moscow, ensuring that Russia would remain closely involved in Ukraine's internal affairs.

In many cases, the minority issue has been just one of the many bones of contention that have poisoned relations between Russia and its neighbors. In the case of Ukraine, the crisis remained contained, despite sporadic unrest in Crimea, where Russians made up 68% of the population.

6. The scale of the Black Sea fleet

An isolated sea linked to the Mediterranean by a series of straits, the Black Sea is relatively little known. Long divided, it has lost one of the essential functions of any sea: promoting trade. What's more, the heterogeneity of the peoples surrounding it makes it difficult to study: languages, religions, resources, geography.

The Black Sea region is one of the most explosive places on the planet, with crucial geopolitical and strategic value. It occupies a key position at the crossroads of three ancient worlds: to the North, the Slavic countries, with Russia's dominant role; to the West, Central and Eastern Europe, a bridge to the European Union; to the South, Turkey, the gateway to the Middle East and the Turkic-speaking states. **(Rebière, Avril 2024)**

The conflict over control of Crimea has deep historical roots. The Tsars seized Crimea from the Ottoman Empire in 1783, an episode of which Russians are especially proud. Russia considers Crimea to be its right, although Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev declared Crimea to be Ukrainian territory in 1954, to mark the friendship between the two countries and commemorate the tercentenary of the Pereyaslavl Treaty. This region lies at the crossroads of Europe and Asia, constituting a space of struggle for control of access and communication routes between these continents. The separation of this territory corresponds to two main religions: Christianity and Islam. In the Middle Ages, this circumstance was the cause of several wars; today, obviously, the international community has reached a level of development and integration that makes it easier for religious differences to not play a determining role in regional contradictions. The end of the Cold War led to the opening of the Black Sea, which not only provided

opportunities for economic development for the region but also weakened regional security **(Rebière, Avril 2024)**.

Since the beginning of 1992, issues relating to territorial control of the Crimean Peninsula and the Black Sea Fleet occupied a prominent place between Ukraine and Russia. Like the nuclear issue, they were of particular importance, as they were perceived by the Ukrainian leadership as tests of national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The armed forces of both countries were directly involved in the dispute over control of Crimea; for this reason, numerous Ukrainian units were deployed in the region, while the Russian Navy and Army strengthened their interests in Sevastopol, the main naval base for their fleet. For Russian nationalists, Crimea and the fleet should remain Russian. In the opinion of Russian military officials, a divided fleet would be unfit to fulfill its mission, which was to defend Russia's (and Ukraine's) southern flank from a potential threat from Türkiye and NATO

7. The battle for the control of Crimea, a global strategic axis

The Crimean Peninsula is central to Russia’s strategic interests, securing influence over the Caucasus and Eastern Europe via the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol. Crimea’s annexation gives Russia a key geopolitical advantage, supported by ethnic and linguistic ties. In 2008, 10,000 Russian troops in Sevastopol allowed control over Ukraine, the Caucasus, and access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean, including Syria and Israel. The base also enables rapid deployment to Iran, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. If Ukraine and Crimea fell under NATO influence, Russia would lose its security dominance, leaving the Black Sea largely controlled by the West. **(Kastouéva-Jean, 2022)**.

Tensions in Crimea and the invasion of Ukraine are not the region’s only recent crises. In 2013, presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych promised to sign an EU Association Agreement, highly desired by Ukrainians. After winning, he reversed course, rejecting the treaty and strengthening ties with Russia instead. This sparked massive protests, known as the "Euromaidan," where thousands gathered in Kyiv to demand support for closer ties with the EU. **(Kastouéva-Jean, 2022).**

The protests intensified in successive days, and President Yanukovych implemented anti-protest measures. The demonstrations became radical and anti-government, spreading to other regions of the country. In response to these events, on February 22, 2014, the Ukrainian Parliament decreed that the president of the republic could not fulfill his duties, given his lack of control over the situation and the country, and called extraordinary elections for May 25, 2014. Petro Poroshenko won the second round of these elections, running a fully pro-European campaign and prioritizing quelling the unrest in eastern Ukraine. The new government's position was to remove Ukraine from Russia's sphere of influence and turn its attention to Europe and NATO.

Dissatisfaction broke out in pro-Russian areas of some Ukrainian regions, especially in the Crimean peninsula (which is ethnically Russian-speaking). The fall of President Yanukovych sparked a secessionist crisis, and on February 28, 2014, Russian soldiers began maneuvers in Crimea. Three days later, former President Yanukovych, who came from the eastern region of the country (Donetsk), an area culturally and politically close to Russia, where the majority of the population speaks Russian (68%) (Kastouéva-Jean, 2022), called on Russia to use military force to restore legitimacy, peace, law and order, and to guarantee stability and the defense of the citizens of Ukraine. That same day, Russian President Vladimir Putin received authorization from the Federation Council to deploy troops and take control of Crimea. On March 6, 2014, the Crimean Parliament approved its accession to the Russian Federation, launching a referendum for the Crimean population to decide whether to join Russia or return to its previous status as part of Ukraine. Having decided on the path to joining Russia,

On March 18, 2014, Russia and Crimea signed their annexation treaty, which was rejected on March 27, 2014, by the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution voted by 100 countries, expressing a commitment to return Ukraine's territorial integrity. Starting in 2014, there was a very clear breakdown in relations between Russia and Ukraine. Not a formal diplomatic rupture, but the end of an important commercial, political, and cultural closeness. Ukraine distanced itself from Russia and attempted to leave its sphere of influence and move closer to NATO **(Oludele Akinloye Akinboade, Yunus Heske & Victor Sannyboy Molobi, 2023).**

Second :Russia-Ukraine War of 2022 : The Russian approach

Before the invasion, Russia sent more than 100,000 troops to the borders with Ukraine, from the East, North, and South, initially arguing that these were merely military exercises. In late 2021 and early 2022, tensions grew as the threat of Russian invasion increased. International organizations, governments, and the international media interpreted this as merely a deterrent effect at the borders, but unfortunately, a swift attack and invasion materialized. Currently, the conflict is at a crossroads, with a solution seemingly distant, even though several countries and international organizations are interested in seeking mediation and a solution.

Russia invaded neighbouring Ukraine on 24 February 2022, triggering a conflict that shook the whole of Europe and had serious consequences, including the exodus of over 7 million people from Ukraine, who sought refuge in various European countries. The effects of this conflict are also affecting areas such as energy, food and the global economy, which is experiencing increasing inflation as a result of the war.

Russian President Putin justified the invasion of Ukraine as protection for Russian-speaking separatist regions, warning of severe consequences. Ukrainian President Zelensky condemned the attack and cut ties with Russia. The EU called it one of Europe's gravest crises since World War II and pledged massive sanctions. Russia has seized parts of Ukraine, especially in Donbass, while the conflict's outcome remains uncertain. The international community watches closely as Ukraine resists, amid limited and often biased media coverage. **(Oludele Akinloye Akinboade, Yunus Heske & Victor Sannyboy Molobi, 2023).**

The stakes of this conflict have kept the international community in suspense. This situation is bound to change the geopolitical landscape and give rise to a new world order. For reasons of natural security, the United States and Europe have allied themselves against Russia in an attempt to find a peaceful solution in the short term.

Russia is calling for effective guarantees that NATO will not include Ukraine or countries with which it has strategic interests in its security arrangements, and that it will withdraw its weapons from Eastern European NATO members, including Romania and Bulgaria. Russia is trying to demonstrate that it is a strong international player, a power with interests, concerned about its security and its influence, particularly in the countries that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. From this point of view, Eastern Europe is a kind of zone separating Russian territory from NATO, and this is where Ukraine's geographical importance as a so-called buffer country lies. Although Ukraine submitted its application to become a candidate country for European Union membership on April 18, 2022, it seems unlikely that Ukraine will become a member of the European Union and NATO in the short term: it is one of the poorest countries in Eastern Europe and depends on contributions from various Western countries in economic, security, and defense matters, and is currently a territory at war **(Cotte, 2023).**

For Ukraine, Russia is an aggressor that annexed Crimea in 2014 and supports separatists. NATO membership could trigger a direct conflict with Russia, which holds the world's largest nuclear arsenal. Since 2019, Ukraine has aimed to join NATO and the EU, though Russia's opposition leaves its future uncertain. Moscow seeks to assert regional dominance, guided by General Valery Gerasimov's "hybrid warfare" strategy, emphasizing a pragmatic, self-reliant, and militarily strong Russia. **(Cotte, 2023),"** which combines military actions with other actions of a different nature. Thus, non-military activities are reinforced by the covert use of force and by overt military interference against an opposing state, initiated after finding a pretext.

In the 21st century, war has evolved, with conflicts often undeclared and the line between war and peace blurred. Modern strategies involve both military and non-military actors to shape social, economic, and political conditions. Russian

doctrine highlights tools like diplomacy, sanctions, cyber operations, and unconventional tactics—such as paramilitaries, terrorism, and subversion—to destabilize target areas. **(Cotte, 2023).**

It is worth noting that the application of the Gerasimov Doctrine was evident in 2014 in Russia's actions in Ukraine, combining a series of non-military and information actions, as well as movements of regular forces as a whole, allowing the Russians to occupy and annex their most strategic target, the Crimean peninsula, in the face of a passive NATO and the West, focused on their interests in the Middle East.

The western approach of the Russian ukranian war

The Western approach to the Russia-Ukraine war combines political, economic, and military support for Ukraine while avoiding direct conflict with Russia. It includes sanctions on Russia, diplomatic isolation, and the supply of weapons, intelligence, and aid to Ukraine, aiming to strengthen its defense, deter further aggression, and uphold international law

First :The US combined political and military approach

The United States position on the conflict in Ukraine has a marked geopolitical and geostrategic character. On the one hand, the United States views Ukraine as a factor diminishing Russia's influence in Central Europe and the Balkans, areas whose security is of great importance to Washington; for this reason, it supported Ukraine's policy of independence. On the other hand, the United States believes that by maintaining its status as a great power, Russia will harm Western security. The 2014-2015 Ukrainian conflict has its origins in the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, in November 2013. As a result of the rejection of the Association Agreement, the Euromaidan (demonstrations of discontent by Ukrainian citizens) brought to power a new government, a new parliament, and a new president of the republic: Petro Poroshenko. The United States has supported Ukraine militarily and financially since the beginning of the war. If Russia supports the insurgency in the country's east, the United States is supporting a Ukrainian state that is increasingly moving closer to the West. All of this would serve to demonstrate that any former Soviet republic can ignore Moscow.

The possibility of Ukraine joining the European Union would mean gaining an important market. Russia, by natural means, was Ukraine's main trading partner, but starting in 2014, with the annexation of Crimea, it forced kyiv to turn toward the European Union. In March 2018, then-President Poroshenko stated that the Russian occupation of the Donbass region had meant the loss of 15% of GDP and 25% of Ukraine's national industry. In this sense **(Kolodko, 2023, p. 96),** the United States and the European Union should take advantage of this situation

to add an important customer and also a supplier of raw materials, particularly wheat. Regarding the tensions that had arisen, NATO had conducted military exercises near Russian territory (in the Black Sea, near Crimea and the important Russian naval base of Sevastopol). President Putin described these actions as a "challenge" to Russia. This is the same way the United States describes the Russian invasion today **(Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe, 2024)**.

Amid rising tensions, Russia fears NATO bases in Ukraine, while the US worries Russia might establish a presence in Venezuela, Nicaragua, or Cuba, countries with which it has close ties and where Venezuela is a major buyer of Russian weapons. Russia also supplies much of Europe's gas, traditionally via pipelines through Ukraine and Belarus, paying them transit fees. Just before the war, it completed Nord Stream 2, a pipeline to Germany bypassing those countries, which the US opposed, citing increased European dependence on Russia. Both Nord Stream pipelines are now inactive. **(Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe, 2024).**

To reduce dependence on Russian gas, the US plans to export liquefied gas by sea, despite higher costs. The West has also imposed sanctions on Russia since 2014, affecting its economy, currency, and markets, but Moscow's demands have remained unchanged. Even after stronger sanctions following the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the ruble stabilized, forcing the Russian Central Bank to try to weaken it to keep exports competitive.

Russia is the world's largest gas exporter and the second largest oil exporter, primarily to the European Union, which has been paying millions of dollars for Russian energy, while, paradoxically, applying economic sanctions against what was once its main supplier of gas, oil, and coal. The new sanctions could lead Russia to redouble its interests in Eastern Europe, hoping to maintain its influence and authority, both internationally and regionally. But they could also push it further into the Chinese market, strengthening its political alliance with Beijing and further directing its trade toward the BRICS countries, which, in addition to Russia and China, also include Brazil, India, and South Africa and that doesn't seem like a good option for either the United States or the European Union. There is also the possibility that, even without an open war between NATO and Russia, the Russia-Ukraine conflict could be maintained through the shipment of weapons to both sides of the line of contact. This would stimulate an indirect confrontation between the two powers, a proxy war similar to the conflicts of the Cold War era **(Samuel Charap, Miranda Priebe, 2024)**

Second :The European countries combined political and military approach

The Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 has turned international relations upside down. The war that is now raging on the European continent is at the centre of the Union's concerns. Between sanctions against Russia, aid to the Ukrainian state, economic repercussions and a European response, this dossier looks at the major issues raised by the conflict. The Relations between the EU and Russia have been tense and complicated for several years, and with the military invasion launched by Moscow, the EU-27 have hardened their tone **(Fontelles, 2024).**

On February 27, the European Commission announced historical measurements:

1. The release of 450 million euros for the purchase and delivery of arms to the Ukrainian army (plus protective equipment and fuel worth 50 million euros) - a first in European history.
2. The closure of European airspace to Russian aircraft, which will no longer be able to land in, take off from or fly over EU territory - including private jets belonging to Russian oligarchs.
3. A ban on Russian state-owned media and their subsidiaries from broadcasting in the EU.

Measures with economic consequences have also been put in place:

a. Reducing Russia's access to European capital markets
b. Ban on the sale of aircraft and equipment to Russian airlines
c. Freezing the assets of the Russian Central Bank outside Russia.


Not forgetting, of course, the EU's role in receiving Ukrainian refugees. Since 24 February 2022, more than a million Ukrainians have fled the bombardments and fighting to neighbouring EU countries such as Poland, Romania and Slovenia. Faced with this situation, the EU has activated the temporary reception mechanism **(Fontelles, 2024).**

Donald Trump Administration plan

While campaigning for his re-election in May 2023, the President of the United States had vowed to end this war in one day, This desire to stop war has its roots in the collosal spending by the United States to help Ukraine face up to Russia. In fact The United States has helped the Ukrainians with weapons and dollars more than 100 billion since February 2022, but also with valuable intelligence based in particular on spy satellite images, innovative war strategies and new technologies. For the American army, it was also an opportunity to gain valuable field experience in a very real war context (Grieger, February 2023)

In detail, according to the Kiel Institute, Washington has provided Kyiv with €64.1 billion in military aid, €46.6 billion in financial aid, and €3.4 billion in humanitarian aid. These amounts place the United States at the top of the list of countries providing aid to Ukraine.

Total cumulative aid granted to Ukraine



Graphique: Le Grand Continent • Source: Kiel Institute for the World Economy

To get his money back, Donald Trump has made a proposal to stop the war between russia and ukraine while suspending american aid to ucraine and reclaiming the amounts owed by the ukranian government.

US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent was in Kyiv on Wednesday, February 12, to meet with Volodymyr Zelensky. According to the Telegraph, Zelensky presented Zelensky with a draft pre-decision contract marked "Privileged & Confidential" and dated February 7, 2025 (Mitchell, 2025).

1. The United States is demanding repayment from Ukraine of $500 billion, a sum that exceeds the reparations imposed on Germany after World War I—and is 4.5 times greater than the aid granted to date by Washington (€114 billion, or around $119 billion).
2. The contract proposed by the United States provides for an economic takeover of Ukraine, covering its mineral resources, oil, gas, ports, and infrastructure. It would be governed by New York law.
3. The United States would take 50% of Ukraine's recurring revenues from resource extraction and would have a right of first refusal on exportable minerals. It would also take 50% of the financial value of "all new licenses issued to third parties" for future resource monetization.

After lengthy negotiations with the russians and ukranians, the united states of america has succeeded in setting up a meeting between the countries involved in the conflict, without the europeans being involved

Several hours of conventional negotiations on neutral ground. Then a joint statement, demonstrating real progress: Kyiv's acceptance of the principle of a temporary ceasefire in the war that has been ongoing since 2022 (Mitchell, 2025)

Conclusion

The US administration's plan was not to engage in direct military confrontation with Russia and not to deploy US military forces on the ground. The US administration worked to propose other solutions to support Kiev, in particular the political mobilisation of European allies and the ongoing coordination of European countries and other key countries such as Canada and Japan, and have sent an immediate shipment of modern weapons to Kiev to support the Ukrainian army, as well as anti-tank missiles and other American weapons to Ukraine.

On the basis of what we have discussed about the Russian-Ukranian War and the US position, we can draw some key findings:

1. Trump's new policy on the Russia-Ukraine conflict has profoundly altered the balance of power between the US, the EU and Russia. While the EU is trying to strengthen its role as an independent player, the United States has cut its support and is negotiating with Ukraine over compensation for all its subsidies, a situation that presents Europe with security challenges.
2. With potential US support diminishing, the European Union may become the primary player in the Ukraine issue. This shift requires additional European investments, whether in the form of economic aid or strengthening the defense capabilities of countries in the region. However, the EU's ability to shoulder these responsibilities depends on several factors, including the willingness of EU countries to unite their efforts and bear the costs.
3. A US retreat from support for Ukraine could give Russia an opportunity to expand its political and military influence in the region. This could translate into increased Russian pressure on Eastern European countries and increased security challenges facing the European Union. Consequently, Europe may need to increase its defense spending and intensify its investment in collective security initiatives.

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