





جامعة تيسمسيلت

المعيار

مجلة نصف سنوية متعددة التخصصات
مصنفة " C "

في الآداب، الحقوق والعلوم السياسية،
العلوم الاقتصادية والعلوم الإنسانية والاجتماعية

المجلد الثاني عشر العدد 02 ديسمبر 2021

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جامعة تيسمسيلت - الجزائر -

شروط النشر وضوابطه

- المعيار مجلة علمية محكمة تنشر البحوث الأكاديمية والدراسات الفكرية والعلمية والأدبية التي لم يسبق نشرها من قبل.
- دورية تصدر مرتين في السنة عن جامعة تيسمسيلت. الجزائر.
- تُقبل البحوث باللغات العربية والفرنسية والانجليزية.
- ضرورة وجود مختصر أو تمهيد للمقال سواء باللغة العربية أو الأجنبية.
- تخضع البحوث والدراسات المقدمة للمجلة للشروط الأكاديمية المتعارف عليها.
- تخضع البحوث للتحكيم من طرف اللجنة العلمية للمجلة.
- تُقدم البحوث والدراسات مكتوبة في ورقة على مقاس (21/29.7) بهامش 1.5 سنتيم عن يمين الصفحة وعن يسارها وهامش 1.5 سنتيم عن أعلى الصفحة وأسفلها.
- تتم الكتابة بخط (Traditional Arabic) حجم (16)، وفي الهامش بالخط نفسه حجم (14).
- تتم كتابة البحوث كاملة أو الفقرات والمصطلحات والكلمات باللغة الأجنبية داخل البحوث المكتوبة باللغة الفرنسية بخط (Times new roman) حجم (12)، وفي الهامش بالخط نفسه حجم (10).
- تكون الهوامش والإحالات في آخر الدراسة ولا يستعمل فيها التهميش الأوتوماتيكي.
- يُقدم البحث في قرص مضغوط ونسخة ورقية مطبوعة.
- لا يقل حجم البحث عن 10 صفحات ولا تتجاوز 15 صفحة.
- الأعمال المقدمة لا تُردّ إلى أصحابها سواء نشرت أم لم تنشر.
- المواد المنشورة تعبر عن آراء أصحابها، والمجلة غير مسئولة عن آراء وأحكام الكتاب. كما أن ترتيب البحوث يخضع لاعتبارات تقنية وفنية.

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أ. د. عيساني امحمد.

المعيار

المجلد الثاني عشر العدد 2 ديسمبر 2021

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كلمة العدد

بعد تصنيفها في صنف "C" تواصل المجلة صدورها لتطل على قراءها الكرام بعدد كبير من المقالات وهذا راجع إلى المشاركات الكثيرة للأساتذة الباحثين دون إقصاء أحدهم وفسح مجال المشاركة والتسهيل للأخوة الأساتذة والباحثين لتسيير مساهمهم العلمي قصد الترقية أو المناقشة في مذكراتهم العلمية.

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The Colonial Ethnic Legacy of French “Divide and Rule” Policy in Post Independent Algeria

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Abstract :

Divide and Rule is one of the policies which were used by the French in Algeria from 1830 to 1962. It was explicitly adopted to embed division and discord in the Algerian social fabrics and primarily between Arabs and Kabyles in matters of identity and ethnicity. The article will discuss the concept and implementations of this policy during the occupation, its aftermath and long term tensions which have lasted and extended to the post-independent and contemporary history of Algeria.

Such tensions have led to serious riots and confrontations in the decades following the independence, and they still fuel social, ethnic and identity disturbances in the country. The article will uncover the continuity of the policy's effect on ethnic divisions in Algeria. It will stress the French intervention, its role and its intentions after 1962 as well.

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1. Introduction

Several strategies and policies have been used on African peoples throughout the colonial periods by imperialist powers. In Algeria, the French have practised all means possible to subject Algerians. They invested in the division of the ethnic composition of the society. After 1962, Algeria witnessed a socio-cultural dissonance instead of a harmonious outline to the revival of the national identity. To this end, the article tends to build a relation between the divisive French policy during the time of occupation and the post independent Algerian disturbances. It deals with Divide and Rule policy, its effectuation and the way it was contextualized with the colonial scholarship. It will illustrate the French use of education in producing local denationalized elite which would be of central effect on future post independent stability in Algeria. It will also reveal how the inherited remnants of the policy were used after independence. To uncover this process, the following questions are stressed: Why and how was the Divide and Rule policy applied? To what extent was it successful? Did its legacy continued to exist after independence? If yes, then why and how was it exploited?

2. French Colonialism and the Algerian Context

The French have used every possible way to serve and realize their colonial project in Algeria. The military force and harshness marked the first years of the process. Along with those subjugative practices, French colonialism has implemented division among natives in order to facilitate the colonial tasks and take control over the region. The division which was sought by France was very effective to the point where it created long-lasting cultural and identity conflicts between several Algerian regions, ethnic and even sectarian groups in the independent Algerian state. In the years between independence and the present time, numerous articles and researches have been done around the disturbances regarding the ethnic and cultural situation in the country. Marnia Lazreg lists Wilbert's, Feldman and Moore's, Kerretal's, Inkeles and Smith's agreement upon the impact of modernization in giving rise to certain global values at the expense of individualistic attitudes. To give more details, Huntington argues that the revival and assertion of old traditions by certain communities, Berbers and their Berberist claims in this case, during the establishment of the nation is a reaction which is stimulated unintentionally by the modernization and its globally predominating consequences (Lazreg, M., 1983, 381). This may be true for other cases, but for Algeria, it was the opposite. Nationalists were reviving their almost eroded values while Berberist claims, which were designed by the French, were calling for universalistic principles such as secularism.

Divide and Rule was not a very explicit policy in Algeria as it was elsewhere like Nigeria or what the other imperial powers had exercised in several of their colonies in different parts of the world. However, based on the definition provided by Richard Morrock, the strategy seems to be very compatible with what the French had done with the Algerian people. Morrock (1973, 129) defines it as *"the conscious effort of an imperialist power to create and /or turn to its advantage the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, tribal and religious differences within the population of a subjugated colony"*.

Throughout history, Algeria was a scene for numerous invasions and wars, a site for consecutive kingdoms, tribes and entities, and a refuge for diverse communities and ethnic groups. The Mediterranean was also a hot spot for foreign trade which Algeria was an active part of. That made it natural to find varied backgrounds in the Algerian society in the 1800s. In discussing the diversity of 19th-century Algeria, the Berbers were considered to be the native inhabitants of North Africa (Pfostl, 2012, 24). The region was invaded by various conquerors such as Phoenicians (Gherabi, 2019, 05), Vandals then Romans, but all that is left from their civilizations is some "rocks" here and there that testifies to their existence (Maouel, S., 2020). By the 8th century, the Arabs arrived with the divine mission to spread Islam. Their civilization and culture were warmly accepted. Their coexistence led to quick integration and settlement. After the fall of the Islamic rule in Spain, the Christian persecutions obliged the Muslims (Moors) to shelter in the opposite south bank to Europe. Algeria welcomed them with open arms; even the Jews with the same fate were accepted and integrated with the locals. They, later on, had their social and economic status in the Algerian society (Saadallah, A., 1998, 302). By the first quarter of the 16th century, the spread and control of the Ottoman Empire had reached Algiers. Though their presence lasted more than 300 years, yet their influence was more political. It also added the Turkish element to the local society. The marital alliances between the latter and locals gave birth to the Kouloughlis who were the mixed offspring of Turkish men and North African women (and rarely vice versa). Social and cultural diversity made the possibility of being distorted inevitable.

In the light of this record, the social and ethnic compositions of the Algerian populace were distinctly various and varied. Therefore, the existence of conflicts, confrontations and competition over power was highly expected and recurrent. Richard

Morrock mentions “ethnic, linguistic, cultural, tribal and religious” differences as the several aspects which could be used to create discord among a single nation or people. In the case of Algeria and according to Khalfallah (2017), all these elements already existed within the local community. Though religious variations were not very profound regarding Islam itself, an account Saadallah (1998, 323) approved and strengthened when he mentioned T. Victor’s statement about the fact that all the French agreed upon the religious unity among the population, but the leaders of sectarian orders were in constant misunderstandings about who should be “*the rightful leader of Muslims*” (Khalfallah, 2017). The French found a ready “*breeding ground*” (Khalfallah, 2017), they just needed to fuel the tensions between the existing sides and exploit the contentions to their benefits. They “*wielded ethnic and cultural diversity as a weapon and engineered sectarian discord to achieve its colonial goals*”, adds Adam Bensaid (2020) in his opinion about ethnic rivalry engineering. Using an analogy, the practical aspect of the strategy can be demonstrated in the colonial actions which will be displayed in the subsequent accounts.

3. Divide and Rule: The Gradual Implementation

The Sufi orders had a remarkable influence on Algerians’ religious and daily life. They were the only standing system after the fall of the administrative and military ones (Saadallah, A., 1992, 383). Their influence was seen in recruiting followers and volunteers for Jihad against France, raising funds for such mission and carrying guns to defend their land. Almost all insurrections were backed up with the support of an order, a marabout or a well known Sufi figure to stimulate people’s feelings of duty towards their country (Saadallah, A., 1992, 382). For these reasons and others, Sufi orders around Algeria were faced with the strategy of inciting internal as well as inter-orders conflicts and discords over matters related to position, domination or decision making. Saadallah thinks that France had come to realize that orders weakened when their temporal power increased and it was the other way around where they would be strengthened when such power was rejected, their roles thereof were limited to teaching and practicing religious matters. Therefore, some sectarian leaders were appointed and given certain positions by the French administration so they would act in the favor of their personal aims instead of the public good or religion. Several examples included the sons of Oulad Sid Elshiekh in El Bayadh, Ibn Ali Elsherif in Akbou, and Elsahraouis in Tiaret (Saadallah, A., 1992, 303). When El Amir Abd Elkader, who was a follower of Elkaderia but who prioritized national sovereignty above all, called for uniting efforts to fight back colonialism, El Tijania refused national unity due to its submissive position to the French. This was unexpected and unaccepted for El Amir, consequently, he fought the Tijania leaders along with his insurrections against the French army (Slamani, A., 2019, 38). This conflict continued and was kept alive for generations to come between the two orders (Saadallah, A., 1998, 302). Other divisions based on religious pluralism considered granting Algerian Jews French citizenship and full rights under the famous Crémieux decree in 1870 (TRTArabi, 2020).

The famous French declaration, which was supervised by De Bourmont and directed to the Algerian population in May 1830, bore deceptive intentions. France was aware of the fragile relationship between the rulers and their subjects. For such purpose, it claimed specific intentions using specific language and tone to gain support from certain local categories such as the urban high class, but after the invasion, France respected neither the deal which was signed with the Dey of Algiers nor the given promises to the population. Instead, it chose to dispossess their properties. It engaged with the Jews who did not hesitate to offer their loyalty and services (Saadallah, A., 1998, 301). Ethnic and social divisions started appearing afterwards between the different groups. The French began using them against each other, “*the urban vs. Turks, urban Arabs vs. urban Kouloughlis, Jews against all the urban*” (Saadallah, A., 1998, 302). Often it even took a side to destroy another. In Tlemcen, it supported the Turkish party to control the city in opposition to the party of the Arabs who advocated for El Amir Abd Elkader (Saadallah, A., 1992, 108).

Struggle for power was a major concern for most tribes and wealthy families. It has been so even before 1830. But after this date, the rate of conflicts increased, since France had made it an inevitable responsibility for its officers of the Bureaux Arabes to note, create, use and take advantage of every possible dispute or disagreement between individuals, families, tribes or regions to incite divisions and tensions among them. The French were unable to deal with the local resistance in the west, east and the centre, so they adopted the Ottoman system of fight, they provided arms for some vulnerable weak leaders or tribes over others who were against the colonial presence (Slamani, A., 2019, 35). In their war against El Amir, the French relied even on leaders of Turkish origins, namely: Ibrahim Bouchnak and Mustapha Elmkalach in Mostaganem and Tlemcen respectively. They were also responsible for the separation between El Amir and Mustapha Ibn Ismail, Mohamed Elmazari and Sidi Elaribi. Numerous tribes in Oran were convinced to cooperate and engage in battles with French authorities against national resistance led by Prince Abd Elkader. In the east, Elhadj Ahmed, who was the Bey of Constantine, found himself opposing Ibrahim Elkritli in Annaba and

Bouakaze family against his son-in-law Ibn Kana in the Zibane region (Saadallah, A., 1998, 302). The Bey was isolated from his external allies in Tunisia, Libya and Istanbul, and internally through negotiations and promises with his opponents in an attempt to create rivalrous parties, some of them were also brought to the French side (Saadallah, A., 1992, 155). The rule in the east fell as a consequence of treasons and oppositions more than of military intervention. To this end, there were no serious unified insurrections against "Christian invaders" (Ageron, C., 1991, 09).

The strategy was used as an effective "*weapon of division*" against Algerians, declares (Saadallah, A., 1998, 299). Before the invasion took place, the French made it certain to indoctrinate their army and troops with misleading, evocative and prejudiced conceptions about the people of Algeria. These conceptions, which originated from and were rooted outcomes since the times of the Crusades, were consolidated through several European biased writings and literature. They, in their turn, depicted North Africans as savage, primitive, fanatic and eternally Muslim enemies. In dealing with and according to the French indoctrination, France's duty was to liberate the population, since the urban bourgeoisie of the same enemies mentioned previously were ready to side and cooperate with them to substitute and shed the subjugative Ottoman rulers who were also envisaged being an *oligarchic minority* looking to rule and impose its power over the territory through piracy and illegal activities, stresses Saadallah. These points were clearly stated in the French declaration to Algerians a short period before the attack on Algiers. It addressed them in the name of religion and freedom to ensure unaggressive reactions, stressing the need to eradicate the oligarchic control over the helpless population (Saadallah, A., 2007, 277-280).

Each of these previously mentioned differences, which form a diverse combination of integrated backgrounds living interrelatedly, has a history of itself in the Algerian society and social composition. But with the intensive French field trips that resulted in massive colonial ethnographic studies and writings and their reinforcements in the French literature, the ethnic, linguistic, cultural, tribal and religious variations were all redeployed together to introduce a new dichotomous opposition which was set between Arabs and Berbers in what was coined by Charles Robert Ageron as "*The Kabyle Myth*".

The idea of this myth was formed and developed gradually in the minds of the French officers, scholars and polytechnicians. By the early years of occupation, France had already dispersed its young military and scientific staff in the different occupied and unoccupied regions in the form of explorations and data collection operations. Such missions were undertaken specifically via the *Bureaux Arabes*, governmental Scientific Commissions, officers of the *Ecole Polytechnique*, and specialized civilian graduates (Lorcin, P., 1995, 35). The accumulated information and findings were registered, analyzed and shared with the aim of "*coordination of administrative, developmental and defensive activities*", of "*exploitation*" and of "*reconstruction*" (Lorcin, P., 1995, 36) of scientific spaces in the colony. This "*colonial knowledge*", as Hannoum (2001, 343) puts it and unlike its original intentions, was employed in expatiating on the categorization of Algerians on racial, linguistic and cultural bases. For examples, Arab Bureau officers Colonel Daumas and Captain Fabar published a book entitled "*Grande Kabylie*" in 1847. From a historical and to some extent a geographical standpoint, they conjured up the Vandal and Roman presence in the area, the existence of related ruins which, to Fabar and Dumas, was an admixture of European and indigenous North African touches and their confrontations with Kabyles who fought them back in the name of Christianity then Donatism, Concluding that the Kabyle was Christian and nationalist opposed to the destructive Arab invader (Hannoum, 2001, 348).

In the same narrative, the officers continued categorization ethnographically with regard to origins, culture, social organization and skin color. A series of dichotomies were elaborated and stereotyped to the alleged oppositions. The Kabyle was a studious hardworking monogamous white, a liberal and a detached superficial Muslim democrat whose life was regulated by conventions and Romanized local laws. Contrariwise, the Arab was a lazy polygamous dark-skinned committed Muslim. Islam was his cornerstone in his social and political life (Hannoum, 2001, 350). The Roman ruins were once again brought to the fore for archaeological aims. By means of genealogical studies, the standing constructions were believed to be creations of the Berber ancestry which was under the domination of a northern blond race, therefore the Kabyle, more than the Arab, inherited adaptability to French control (Effros, B., 2017, 61). From a French anthropological perspective, all means were allowed to reinforce the claims, ethnology, morphology and even craniology. The examination and measurement of skulls of the dead as well as of living people of both Kabyle and Arab were considered another determinant of French scholarly arguments, though it was not very solid for the officials, yet it contributed to the transmission, imposition of the alleged differences and submission of the colony (Effros, 2017, 75).

Basically, the Kabyle Myth was a scholarly French-made embodiment of a racial opposition between Berbers and Arabs in matters of race, ethnicity, language, belief and religion, social and political organization, civilizability and above all, their degree

of assimilability into French values. They did not only create the dichotomy, but they also apposed Kabyle's side. The latter was labeled good qualities which he acquired due to his European (Nordic, German, Celtic, Gallic...) origins and kinship ties while the Arab was designated with negative connotations. Unlike the rest of the Algerian society, the Kabyles had undergone extensive sociological studies which intended to understand their customs and define their standpoints regarding religion and customary social conventions.

Conclusions upon such studies argued that Kabyles were superficially Muslims who could still be converted to Christianity. The religious campaign of *Lavigerie* with the White Fathers in the region failed (Lazreg, M., 1983, 386) and proved useless against Islam. Hanoteau and Letourneux were two major officers who, in their book, dealt closely with the Kabyles and their customs. They made sure to produce a reference which would be of considerable value for the stereotypes of their contemporaries and colonial use. While they declared that they focused on valuing and restoring the ancient Kabyle customs and laws. In reality, the existing laws were being substituted with the French while the religiously-based ones were being denied and disregarded (Lazreg, 1983, 387). As it has been illustrated previously, an indirect inter-disciplinary approach was used and encouraged. Eventually, it resulted in a scientific framework for racial scholarship (Lorcin, P., 1995, 119). The reinforcement of the Arab/Berber dichotomy through French literature was "*too entrenched to be ignored*" (MacDougall, J., 2003, 71). It was strengthened to the point of conceptualizing misleading facts in Algeria. As a "*counter-myth*" (MacDougall, 2003, 66), the national reformists tried to create a historical account where Berber existence was not denied and Arab density and concentration were not disregarded as well. A national history had to be established in Arabic and in contradiction to the French propaganda and distortion historiography which claimed ethnic and linguistic oppositions among Algerian local communities with the help of biased scholars who exploited knowledge to their favor. This reaction tended to educate Algerians themselves and foreign observers about the unity, diversity and common history before and after the coming of Islam which in its turn secured a peaceful ground for Arab and Berber coexistence (MacDougall, 2003, 71). Despite national attempts to cast doubt and eradicate colonial allegations and racial stereotypes about Algeria's social tissue, divisive French scholarship was not shaken, it continued to exist. It was reinforced through the economy and education. The economic situation in Kabylia was hard because of the mountainous geography of the area in comparison to the plains areas elsewhere. Its dwellers exercised laws based on honor which was taken from Islamic teachings. Christian missionaries with the lead of the White Fathers tried to take advantage of the social and economic situations of the Kabyles through religious schools and the provision of food and shelter for orphans and needy people to break their bonds with their principles (Eljazairi, 2010). Religious penetration of Kabyles was propagated and believed to be of considerable ease due to the averred image of their disloyalty to Islam and thereof their assimilability to European standards. Yet, the reality was very opposite to the French claims for the Kabyles were very strict and conservative when it came to religion. Mohamed Haj Aissa said that the French cultural efforts in the Igawawen region were intense because they were faced with a harsh resistance in the name of religion, land and freedom until 1857.

In 1898, the institutionalization of the differences between the Arabs and Kabyles was officially decided by the *Délégations Financières* headed by Camille Sabatier, whose project was to isolate the Kabyles from the rest of the population in a matter of treatment (Saadallah, A., 1998, 322), and therefore, they were represented in the taxation system by two different groups based on race. Six delegates were allocated for the 700,000 Kabyles and 15 delegates for the 3,300,000 Arabs. In an implicit way to stimulate the Kabyles' feeling of their difference and superiority, they were set to pay one-third of the taxes paid by the Arabs (Lazreg, M., 1983, 388). In accordance with fiscal favoritism, Kabyle women were induced to intermarriage with Frenchmen and to Gallicize their names as a step towards "*ethnic fusion*" (Lazreg, 1983) or in another term, assimilation.

Migration to France was very popular among the Kabyles of Igawawen by the beginning of the 20th century. Outwardly, it was a consequence of demographic and economic hardships as the French put it (Saadallah, A., 1998, 367). Still, it was also an outcome of the French attempts to isolate and alienate the locals from their communities. Several French figures such as André Servier showed interest in this phenomenon, he even encouraged it and saw it as a way to "*break the Algerian Muslim unity*" and to create ties between the Kabyle emigrants and the host society in France (Saadallah, A., 1998, 322). It was made easy by the French government.

4. The Outcomes of French Interests in Kabylia

The Kabyle Myth drew a "*positive image*" of the Berbers, who held positive traits. For Weitzman (2011, 37-38), their ideologues and policy-makers were considered "*potential partners*" and such people were of primary importance in the French minds. This

image had encouraged the spread of French education in the area (MacMaster, N., 1997, 44). Kabyles were encountered to a considerable amount of French culture through the establishment of numerous French schools in their region. Thereof, French education was another major element in the partial alienation of the Kabyle population. It was associated with direct decisions to suppress Arabic. Quranic schools, being the responsible institutions for teaching language and religion, were banned and forced to close in the area by 1881 (Lazreg, M., 1983, 388). Instead, the French built their schools all around the occupied Algerian territory since they strongly believed in the power of education, and teachers were seen as the conquerors of the Kabylie (Lazreg, 1983). Ageron (1972, 141) refers to Algeria's supervisor of education at the time addressing French teachers, he clarified that they would teach the Berbers everything except for Arabic and Islam. Though the schooling system was nationalized, the focus of the process was based on Kabylia. In 1892, a census revealed that French schools allocated for Algerians in Kabylia were as high as 34% of the total number of schools in Algeria (Saadi, 2017). By the end of the century, 50% of the existing regular schools and more than 75% of vocational ones, which were of secular, religious and anti-Muslim curricula and instructions, were based in the region (Lazreg, M., 1983, 388). From a wider visionary perspective, the French established the National School for Literatures in Algiers at the beginning of the 1880s; it was an oriental-based establishment (Eljazairi, 2010). The school included a branch that dealt with Kabyle language to promote the prevailing cultural objectives, simultaneously; a chair for the Berber language was created in the department of Oriental Languages in Paris (Saadallah, A., 1998, 321). All these efforts were purposeful and of future visions.

Despite the various strategies and "*body of opinion*" to demonstrate the Kabyle favoritism and superiority in comparison to the other local communities, the French had never made any legislation for the Kabyles as distinct from others, but the opinions had left a considerable impact portrayed in the colonial ethno-racial attitudes and practices (Barrows, L., 1999, 02). The long extensive exposure of Kabyles to the French educational process succeeded in its quest of creating an elite which was raised believing in a different falsified past, holding oriental ideas, and calling for secular and anti-Muslim values. Kabyle children were forced to join French schools where they would be taught about European ancestries and religious ties to Christianity. Such claims reinforced the dichotomous rivalries between them and the Arabs. They made the myth even more believable. The belief of a certain contemporary Kabyle minority in the unquestionability of the indoctrinated truths proved the power of education and the efforts undertaken by the French school during the long years (Lazreg, M., 1983, 389). The racial educational policy had also embedded identity issues among the Frenchified Kabyle elite. They have developed the concept of a "*modern Kabyle identity*" (Weitzman, B., 2011, 39) in an ideological context of "*Berber consciousness*" (Ben Noueman, A., 1990, 70) or "*Berberism*" (Ben Khada, Y., 2012, 240) as it was coined. This context was framed on the basis of the Kabyle Myth (Lazreg, M., 1983, 395).

5. The Development of Berberism

The outcomes of French education and indoctrination in Kabylia were countless and immeasurable. The oriental-based schools and higher education institutions had a remarkable influence in the production of local divisive figures. Said Boulifa and Mohamed Maamri were among the pioneers to express their Berberist views (Eljazairi, 2010) which would later be another weapon in the hands of the French against the political activities of Algerian parties. To this point, there is a need to highlight the difference between Berberism and Berberity, the former is a French-made ideology which was created to destabilize the national unity among Algerian social composition, while the latter is a fundamental historical characteristic of North African peoples (Saadi, 2017). The ideology was implanted among Kabyles over time; it was an alternative plan and a preparation for the future as General P.J. Andre stated in 1956 (Saadi, 2017).

The myth, which was created during the early years of the 1840s, had intrigued numerous "*divisive ethnic subnationalism*" (MacDougall, J., 2003, 67) issues inside Algerian cultural and political compositions. Politically, Berberists, most of whom came from naturalized families and thereof governed by French law (Eljazairi, M., 2010), were already communist-oriented with their loyalty to the French Communist Party, then to its offspring, the Algerian Communist Party which was founded in 1936 (Ben Khada, Y., 2012, 80). With their principles of communism, the idea of Berber identity took a bigger shape at the expense of Arabo-Muslim one in the, according to them, ongoing formation of the Algerian nation (Ben Khada, 2012, 237). Since this ideology had already gained support among the French-educated oriental Kabyle elite, its elements, who were members of the Algerian People's Party (APP) as well, established the first Berberist nucleus group in 1946. Its first major divisive French use was in the late 1940s by intruders with the supervision of governor Chatenion (Saadi, O., 2008). It had penetrated Algeria's main nationalist party and started diffusing their Berberist intentions and questioning the national political path which was set by the party based on Arabic and Islam. In

1949, the APP discovered the real plans of these elements. In France, Berberism had already spread its roots with 80% active units (Ben Noueman, 1990, p. 72). This was a major event in the history of the party, it was an internal conspiracy led by intruders and supervised by the French administration. The conflict was called *The Berberist Crisis*.

Besides their Marxist and Communist conventions, the advocates of Berberism at the time rejected Arabness and Islam as the sole defining notions of Algeria (Saadi, O., 2018, 35). Instead, they called for an *Algerian Algeria*, through which they could not be openly depicted as deniers of the national orthodoxy but as claimants of their identity's acknowledgement (Roberts, H., 2001, 08). They ended up being eradicated from the party's membership or being murdered such as those who were proved to have dealt with the French governor to stimulate internal conflicts (Eljazairi, M., 2010).

The new state established its national identity on the basis of being Arab and Muslim because these two constituents were the only standing shields against the opposed Catholic Latinized France. In fact, Arabic was spoken by the majority and Islam was the only identity and nationality Algerians could refer themselves to during the French occupation (Lorcin, P., 2006, 191). It was a war against Islam and thereof against Arabic, as the latter is the vehicle of the former. France had planned and put into practice several cultural, social, economic and political projects to eradicate the local history, language and religious practices "*forcing the new colony to shed its own cultural and historical narrative*" (Brown, H., 2018, 11). As a reaction, the Algerian national identity was officially and basically built on these two fundamental elements without taking into account other sub-national and ethnic components which were not of less importance locally, but was evocative and of "*insensitive intrusion*" to most Berbers as well as all the other Algerians (Lorcin, P., 1995, V). A more clear-cut account was explained in the words of Eva Pfostl when she said that the new Algerian state "*never excluded Imazighen as Imazighen from power. However, it has historically excluded Imazighen with an Imazighen agenda*" (2012, 217).

The Berber was and still is an inseparable component of the Algerian identity, but the French planted the seeds of superiority over Arabs in his belief. As a reaction to the foreseeable effect of these filthy seeds, the state was built on the only solid grounds known to most Algerians, who the Berbers are a very integral part of. Another major reason for the inconsideration of the Berber identity in the national culture is its "*reification*" by the French as superior at the expense of the Arabic/Muslim identities which were fighting, resisting eradication and calling for unity. Berber specificity has always existed in the Algerian identity, before French existence in the area, without being contested by its holders or Arabs alike. But during colonialism, this issue was ignited and fueled. In this account, Weitzman (2011, 05) considers this decision a consequence of the French ethnographic production. He goes further to specify that it "*delegitimized any Berber specificity within the budding nationalist discourse and praxis*", (Weitzman, 2011). The Berber crisis was a fundamental cause in the subordination of the Berber entity for it marked a threatening instrument for ethnic rivalries in politics. It was also the desirable outcome of the long French indoctrinating pains.

The Berberists tried to resurge and impose their cultural characteristics after independence as a reaction to civic and political developments of the new Algerian state which neglected the existence of Berber identity. This is very similar to Geertz' (1963, 109) description of the revival of ethnicity in the formation of new states. He refers to "*primordial attachments*" as an expression which intrigues certain groups to call for a nation that is based on linguistic, racial and cultural bonds related to their own identity. However, the new state was aware of the real intentions of these dissidents who were still calling for the same subversive ideas.

The problem is not in whether Kabyles, and Berberists to a greater extent, should have or should not have claimed or revived their traditions in the time of the new state establishment. Rather, the problem lies in the rootage of the Kabyle elites' "*racial consciousness*", as Lazreg (1983, 390) stresses, or "*Berber consciousness*" (Ben Noueman, A., 1990, 70) to be more accurate. On the basis of the first idea, the issue of ethnicity has never been contested among Algerians before the coming of the French occupation. Marnia Lazreg (1983, 384) mentions that "*trends toward a symbiotic relationship between Arabs and Berbers started to emerge at the end of the eighth century*" with the coming of Islam which had them unified and coexisted in a single society that had never witnessed racial, linguistic or ethnic issues between them, states Saadallah (1998, 305). In a televised show about Algeria's Contemporary and Ancient History, Dr Said Maouel (2020), who is a Central Director in the Ministry of Religious Affairs and is a Kabyle scholar in Quranic Studies and History, stated that Berbers were "*the fastest peoples to embrace Islam*" though there were some confrontations in the beginning. They had rejected all that had been brought by outsiders except for "*There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his messenger*" i.e., Islam, as their sole religion.

As it has been previously mentioned that the Berber consciousness was a progressive outcome framed out of the Kabyle myth, it was also strengthened through the government's inability to handle issues related to culture and cultural dependency (Lazreg, M.,

1983, 395). It started to grow and gain wider attention and acceptance among Kabyles in general as a collective reaction to the state's Socialism and Arabisation policies (Weitzman, B., 2011, 71). For these reasons, this consciousness became the cornerstone of the Kabyles' "quest for power" (Lazreg, M., 1983, 395). Berber militants kept claiming the same racial pronouncements which had been claimed by colonists, they were reflected in the contemporary Kabyle intellectual's writings in the same way the French scholars had done when it came to deal with the myth of dichotomous differences between Arabs and Berbers. The myth continued to exist even after 1962 (Lazreg, 1983, 383).

The notion of Berberism held subversive and divisive intentions from the start, and that is the 48/49 crisis. It did not call for the recognition and integration of the Berber culture in the Arabo-Muslim Algerian identity, but it advocated a "distinctive identity" opposing the national one and "the material interest" i.e., the official recognition as well. This movement was denied and rejected through the consecutive governments up until the late 70s. Afterwards, Berberist claims succeeded to permeate the national unity, first through the development of the social and economic well-being of the Kabyle region where the middle class made sure to evoke cultural agitations to exercise their influence and fulfill their interests. Secondly, the political impact of the movement gained support sporadically. The third reason laid down in another politically-based decision in which official recognition was granted in an attempt to refrain social unrest, subversion and enmity to the Algerian identity (Roberts, H., 2001, 10).

6. The French Intervention after 1962

"The ideological tools used by minority groups in their search for status or nationhood were more often than not supplied, and continue to be reinforced, by their former colonizers" (Lazreg, M., 1983, 383), in reference to this passage, all the political, social and cultural progresses after independence were successfully made effective due to the endless support and supervision of the French. Their media debates played a role in promoting what they called "Algeria's painful crisis of identity" to insist on identity issues for the whole Algerians, not only Berbers or Kabyles specifically. The amount of intention given to Berberism's preoccupation with the Kabyles and their personality indirectly transmitted signs of their discontent and contestation about the Algerian national identity (Roberts, H., 2001, 10). In his book, General P.J. Andre referred to the formulation of a future plan by which they would use Berberism to keep control of Algeria if it was to be independent (Saadi, O., 2018, 38). Two years after this declaration, de Gaulle's administration started preparing and integrating hundreds of young Algerian administrators to replace the French administrative positions which would be left in the coming years; this was included as a part of the large operation "Promotion Lacoste" whose primary objective was to keep French on top, if not the only, of the used languages in the Algerian society (Saadi, 2018, 39-40).

In France, the reinforcement of the Berberist movement was shaped by the establishment of the *Berber Academy* in the University of Paris 08 in 1967 to keep Algeria under French influence. It was founded by Berberists who held French nationality. They were generously financed while working side by side with the French Secret Services. They were well-trained intellectuals with high degrees, in Berber studies, serving the new French colonialism which aimed at the continuity of the linguistic division between Arabs and Berbers (Saadi, 2018). In the following years, several institutions holding the same objectives sprung within the academy such as the *Group of Berber Studies* in 1973, and outside the academy, namely: *Union of the Amazigh People* in 1978. Then in 1982, Moloud Maamri founded the *Center of Amazigh Studies and Researches* and created *Awal* magazine for such studies and articles (Eljazairi, M., 2010).

Despite the numerous channels created for the sake of promoting the Berber language and identity as their names indicated, their true purpose was far from being promoters of their own culture. Hugh Roberts (2001, 11) revealed that in the first movement in 1949, the status of Berber language was not the Berberists' real priority for the following arguments; first, they did not provide a concrete proposal such as the inclusion of the Berber element in the composition of the nationalist entity, and which could be taken seriously by the nationalist party. On the contrary, they suggested a vague conception of *Algerian Algeria* as it has previously mentioned. This was unacceptable because it neglected the cultural aspects of the Algerian nation. The second argument uncovered a real attempt by a group of Kabyles to prompt the Berberists of abandoning their agitational quests, and that proved the hidden jeopardizing intentions of the movement.

In the second movement in 1980, which is one of the direct outcomes of the powerful substructure of the Berber Academy (Aïtel, F., 2013, 68), the language seemed to be the only cause of Berber demonstrations, and it became very intense and hostile due to the fact that the Arabisation policy was put into practice in several sectors. However, with the introduction of the pluralist constitution, the Berberist particularism took a new and legal form in the shape of the Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD)

party. Its central intention was concentrated on the separation of religion from politics, and that is secularism. It did not provide Kabyles with a tolerant approach to join their compatriots in the new democratic operation, its attitude based on Kabyle particularism reignited the old dichotomy (Roberts, H., 2001, 14).

To this end, both movements were not basically contributing to the progress of what they had called for in the first place. Dr Mohamed Hadj Aissa (2010) states that despite these movements and organizations which claimed to defend Berberity as an identity, culture and ethnicity, they had not made any efforts to collect their heritage or record their history because they were not loyal or really interested in this matter. Their total focus was on fighting Islam and Arabic. They were a tool in the hands of the French, and then the Berber Academy, to be used in the implementation of the internal political and social unrest. Weitzman (2011, 80) summarizes the idea when he says that “*the movement was more united in what it opposed, state repression, than in what it demanded (cultural pluralism? Amazigh revivalism? Laissez-faire economics?)*”.

The previous developments lead to conclusions about the French involvement in Algerian political life. Ahmed Ben Noueman (1990, 139) lists the numerous objectives France had concerning its involvement:

First was the destruction of the superiority of the Arabic language which represented the base for the Arabo-Muslim national identity. It has been the defining criterion between Arabo-Muslim Algeria and Franco-Muslim and Algerian Algeria, and between Muslim Arabs and Christian French individuals. It secured unity among the Algerian people.

Second was erasing the language as being the most essential element in realizing cultural harmony which forms any nation's national personality. It reflects its relation to intellect, sentiment and culture with all its tangible, intellectual, spiritual, behavioral and scientific aspects against other languages.

The third objective was to disturb the national unity of the Algerian Arabo-Muslim community through creating a second language or co-wife languages which could defy the sovereignty of Arabic as the only and officially recognized language. The French believed that linguistic unity was a key to the national one. So it had to be manipulated.

The fourth was to force Algeria to abandon its plans for Arabisation through which it could regain its constitutional linguistic sovereignty. Obstacles were made and created in its way, while the French language was pictured as a useful tool which should continue to serve as a medium of communication and administrative transactions in all the different sectors.

The fifth one combined a bit of the previous objectives which were all interrelated. It tackled the pressure, of certain post-independence lobbies, put on Algeria for the sake of pushing it to admit the existence of an ethnolinguistic variety in order to maintain a total or partial dominance of the French language.

The sixth called for the promotion of one of the Berber dialects into an official language to guarantee loyalty dispersion and national insubordination. This act would defuse hatred and linguistic stratification between other local dialects. In addition, each region would call for the promotion of its own dialect and it would therefore lead to unwanted geographic divisions.

Concerning the former objective which highlights the official recognition of one or several dialects, the seventh objective represents the outcomes of such recognition. It aimed at creating an interdialectal psychological barrier which would put communicators of a single dialect in a position where they would use theirs only; the sole exception to communicate with others would be a *lingua franca* which is in this case the French language.

Eighth, as a reaction to the recognition of Berber dialects, the vernacular ones descending from Arabic would also claim their recognition with the right of being written in Latin alphabets. This objective would deny Muslims from the use of Arabic and thereof Quran and religion.

Ninth, they intended to destruct the nation's cultural personality, political unity and spiritual essence in a revengeful operation against the efforts of the martyrs to unify their state.

The last objective set its intentions towards avenging the devastating failure in the Evian Accords in 1962 concerning Algeria's commitment towards the unity of the Arabo-Muslim Algerian people, and towards refusing the colons' right to stay in the country.

To demonstrate the gradual realization of these objectives, a couple of significant events should be mentioned along. In 1995, the Haut Commissariat à l'Amazighité (HCA) was established and was headed by Mohand Ait idir u Amrane. It marked the official recognition of Tamazight language and culture and was soon to be a part of the educational and communicative systems. In 1996, Amazighity was constitutionally adopted as the third component constituting the Algerian national identity in addition to Arabic and Islam (Weitzman, B., 2011, 114).

7. CONCLUSION

The ethnic situation in post independent Algeria was unstable in matters of identity, nationalism, and concordance about their guiding principles. Despite the introduction of the Arabisation policy, the instability continued to exist and delay Algerian cultural development. The legacy and cultural remnants of Divide and Rule policy were one of the direct reasons for such problems. Analyzing the strategy reveals that there were intentional short-term goals and effects, and diachronic, progressive long-term ones. The former aimed for divisions among the one-side parties and ignited their self-elimination to secure less resistance, to minimize French efforts and to clear the way of the existing sides through the already mentioned tribal, sectarian and ethnic local and regional disputes. While long term goals developed gradually with the biased colonial scholarship. The concentration and spread of education in Kabylia revealed the intentions to plant the seeds of ethnic rivalries on the basis of the Kabyle Myth, which in its turn, paved the way for “the anti-Arab Berber policy” (Hamel, A., 2017, 13) and to a more extent, it gave birth to Berberism. This movement continued to exist and to be supported by France after 1962 in order to protect its interests and keep control over valuable resources in the former colony. More importantly, the ethnic rivalries that were created over the colonial period still impose divisions and identity conflicts within the Algerian society. More studies are needed to deal with divisional colonial legacies to eradicate cultural incompatibility.

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