

Post-Islamists: A Critical Analysis in a Contextual Perspective of Islamist Parties in North Africa



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Abstract:

The Arab Spring presented Islamist movements with significant challenges, including state crackdowns, internal conflicts, and declining public support. The Muslim Brotherhood experienced a brief period in power, but poor leadership resulted in a return to authoritarian rule. Efforts to establish ideal Islamic states through essentialist approaches failed because they did not address practical governance needs. Some reformists within these movements now advocate democratic principles, pluralism, and pragmatic political engagement tailored to specific contexts. Tunisia's Ennahda party transformed into Muslim democrats, while Algerian Islamists lost influence due to both internal divisions. In Morocco, the Islamist movement adopted two distinct strategies: cooperating with the government or using religious principles to challenge state authority. The research calls for a performance-based approach that emphasises institutional participation, governance, and practical policy agendas. Islamist movements can regain public trust by shifting from theoretical ideology to strategic realism and competence, enabling them to contribute constructively to modern political systems.

Keywords: Post-islamism; Contextual Political Participation; Islamic Movement; North Africa.

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Introduction:

More than ten years after the start of the so-called "Arab Spring," moderate Islamist movements or those seeking to engage in institutional politics have faced various challenges. These challenges range from the risk of complete elimination in certain cases (such as Egypt), experiencing significant tensions (like in Tunisia), internal disintegration (as observed in Jordan), being overshadowed by armed groups (as seen in Syria and Libya), or losing legitimacy (as witnessed in Algeria). Consequently, there is an urgent need to discuss the phase of "post-Islamism," suggesting that Islamist movements have reached a point where their survival is at stake. The brief period when they attained power in Egypt, followed by their subsequent overthrow, is seen as a defining moment for these movements. It is important to note that the challenges faced by these movements are not solely attributable to the current stage (i.e., the Arab Spring and its aftermath). Rather, they can be traced back to earlier disputes that existed from the very inception of these movements. While these disputes have provided these groups with historical depth and moral grounding, their natural domain has always been within the opposition sphere rather than within the realm of political power, whether in its entirety or partially.

Within the context of self-criticism and the recognition of the need for political engagement, several intellectual revisions have emerged, focusing on the promotion of democracy and political pluralism while stepping away from the concept of an Islamic state. These revisions have been put forth by what is known as the "new reformers." Notable works include Rashid Ghannouchi's book "Public Freedoms in the Islamic State," Hassan Al-Turabi's "The Islamic Movement in Sudan: Method, Profit, and Development," Tariq Ramadan's "Radical Reform: Islamic Ethics and Liberation," Muhammad Emara's "The Islamic State between Secularism and Religious Authority," Youssef Al-Qaradawi's "Of the Jurisprudence of the State in Islam," and Fahmi Howaidi's "Islam and Democracy," among others. These revisions emphasize the importance of adopting a realistic perspective when examining reality, its problems, and the various crises it faces, in contrast to the idealistic views of traditional leaders of the movement.

Despite these revisions and the course of events during the Arab Spring, it appears that Islamists have not fully learned from their past mistakes. Their handling of the wave of revolution revealed a lack of strategic thinking when facing critical moments. Consequently, it is essential for them to continually reassess their historical and theoretical perspectives, as well as their practical stances, in light of the latest developments.

By striving to operate within the realm of what is feasible rather than what is ideal, Islamic movements need to reconsider their survival strategy. This strategy should not only encompass materialistic aspects but also emphasize the

importance of gaining legitimacy through acceptance and engaging in competitive governance. In this regard, valuable lessons can be drawn from the experiences of North African countries, specifically Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, which have made significant progress in adapting to these principles. Through studying their achievements, one can glean numerous insights in navigating this path.

1. Expanding the Theory: Additional Insights into the Context

Efforts to incorporate Islamists into the political landscape during the Arab Spring uprisings yielded an ambiguous outcome. The Islamists proved unable to establish themselves as a sustainable alternative to the existing regimes, which, in turn, resulted in the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. This outcome prompted a reevaluation of some fundamental assumptions that underpinned Islamist movements. This reassessment focused not only on conceptual, issue-based, and survival-related considerations but also on the structural and behavioral aspects of the movement. It sparked a renewed debate on the positions of Islamists, encompassing topics such as democracy, political pluralism, individual and public freedoms, and the distinction between political engagement and proselytizing (Williamson et al., 2003). However, the unfolding events necessitated a more precise and profound methodological adjustment to these revisions due to the setbacks encountered by Islamists in various domains.

Despite the nation-state's inability to establish inclusive systems of governance based on the concept of "participatory citizenship" as an alternative to pre-state practices, Islamic movements have pursued a similar path with a slight variation. Rather than attempting to work within the existing national framework, despite its shortcomings, there has been an endeavor to construct an alternative model for the postcolonial state. This has created a challenge of reconciling rational compatibility with the realist notion of the state and the idealized model of the state envisioned by these movements. Abdullah Al-Aroui referred to this as "Islamic utopias" (2014, p. 121), reflecting the Islamists' aspiration to envision a governance system beyond the existing state. Consequently, this aspiration not only subordinates the past to the present but also allows the present to dictate the future by imposing super-constitutional and unalterable principles on future constitutions (Hallaq, 2014, p. 11). Such developments have caused a shock among Islamic movements, ultimately leading to the triumph of counterrevolution and the reproduction of authoritarian regimes.

Based on the trilogy proposed by Gabriel A. Almond and S. Verba on the patterns of political culture, which include the culture of narrowness, the culture of submission, and the culture of partnership (Iovan, 2015), we can establish a standard model that serves as a reference for Islamic movements aiming to engage in institutional politics and discern what is feasible and what is not. Within this framework, radical movements emerge, representing the culture of isolation and rejecting any notion of reconciliation with the political system unless it involves

radical change. They often overlook the significance of national issues and the functioning of the political system. On the other hand, the culture of submission justifies the complacency of movements that acknowledge the influence of the state on them but also recognize its inability to effect change. It views the idea of change as a deviation from the prevailing value system and draws on justificatory jurisprudence to support the notion of submission to the ruling authority. Finally, the center-right/center-left position acknowledges the mutual influence between Islamic movements and the state. Drawing on Weber's concept of sovereignty, which centers around the legitimate power of the state to govern, these three divisions have subjected to the logic of "securitization," where all discourses of Islamic movements, regardless of claims of moderation and inclusivity (Hamid & McCants, 2017), are interpreted within a context of insecurity.

According to Max Weber's concept of the "ethics of conviction" versus the "ethics of responsibility" (Enderle, 2017, p. 83-94), the aftermath of the Arab Spring will gradually push Islamic movements towards a new and pragmatic approach, emphasizing the ethics of responsibility that prioritizes the consequences of actions, even if they contradict their beliefs. This shift aligns with the perspective highlighted by Muhammad al-Mukhtar al-Shanqiti, which emphasizes the value of political performance over political construction (Al-Shinqiti, 2018). It also resonates with the "contextual view" proposed by Olivier Roy, suggesting that the behavior of Islamic movements is influenced not solely by ideology but by the dynamics of events, making them interactive and adaptable. Making concessions to the constraints of reality is seen as tactical rather than ideological compromises (Roy, 2017).

Indeed, the ascent of Islamists to power can be viewed from a "foundational perspective." However, the failure of Islamist parties to address the underlying causes of the revolution against authoritarian regimes and its subsequent repercussions leads us to favor the "contextual perspective," which places emphasis on the political practices of Islamists rather than solely focusing on the position of Islam on politics. The Tunisian Ennahda party exemplifies this viewpoint, highlighting the importance of examining the actual political actions and practices of Islamist movements (Roy, 2017).

In this regard, Assef Bayat's analytical model suggests that the transformations of Islamic movements towards a "post-Islamist" direction do not necessarily imply a complete transition to "post-Islamism" or a shift towards secularization. Rather, the focus is on emphasizing rights over duties and promoting pluralism instead of a singular voice (Bayat, 2013, p. 8). Thus, the idealistic aspirations of certain Islamic movements shift from demanding strict Sharia implementation to emphasizing the purposes and objectives of Sharia (maqāṣid al-sharīa).


It is important to recognize that these viewpoints highlight the complexities and nuances within the Islamic movements and their adaptation to the changing political landscape, but the underlying motivations and true intentions behind these transformations remain subject to interpretation and debate.

2. Exploring Diverse Contexts: Unifying Outcomes and Patterns

Despite the significant attention given to the rise of Islamic movements in the Middle East and North Africa following the Arab Spring, the case of Algeria's Islamic movement has often been overlooked. It seemed that the Islamic movements in Algeria did not view the wave of change as an opportunity for them, as they had already made important decisions in the 1990s that became influential among Islamic movements during the Arab Spring, particularly in Tunisia and Morocco. As a result, the Islamic movement in Algeria has, in a way, prioritized contextual engagement, determining its political approach as parties with Islamic references, considering what is required and what is not within the political system. Simultaneously, the impact of their experience has had regional implications, serving as a case study for Islamists in both governing and being overthrown.

From this perspective, it is not our intention to present the rule of Islamists in Algeria as either a model for success in accessing power (in the early 1990s) or as a model to be avoided by resorting to revolutionary proposals against the political system. Instead, we present the Islamists in Algeria as part of a complete contextual cycle, encompassing their experiences of working within the opposition as well as within the political system, as illustrated in the figure below:

Fig 1: The Holistic Journey: Unveiling the Complete Contextual Cycle of Islamic Parties



From this analysis, we can identify three tendencies that characterize the work of Islamic parties in Algeria. First, we have the strategy of action that Islamic

movements can pursue when they attain governmental power (the method). Second, we have the potential outcomes they may experience when adopting revolutionary agendas (the results). And third, we have the expected consequences when adopting the contextual model (the outcomes).

The first tendency often refers to the initial foundation of the Islamic movement, whether before or after independence, where the religious motive (jihad) served as the primary reason for confronting French colonialism. However, at that time, religious tendencies and organized movements were not prevalent. Instead, rural Islam or Islam Populism emerged as a behavioral pattern among the people, acting as a significant motivating factor. During the long period of French colonialism, Islam and Islamic identity became crucial elements in the process of state-building. This was achieved by bringing together various currents within the framework of the National Liberation Front Party and the National Liberation Army.

Until 1989, the Islamist movement in Algeria consisted of three main parties: the Society for Peace Movement (Hamas) led by Mahfouz Nahnah, the Ennahda Movement led by Abdullah Jaballah, and the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) led by Ali Belhaj and Abbas al-Madani. However, the decision of the Islamist parties to pursue government participation led to a gradual division within the Islamist movement into three directions (Al-Ayeb, 2020).

Firstly, there emerged political parties that rejected government participation, such as the Justice and Development Front led by Abdullah Jaballah. Secondly, the Society for Peace Movement became selective in its approach to engaging with political power. And thirdly, there were Islamic parties that lacked a clear strategy for political practice from an Islamic perspective, such as the Renaissance and Reform Party. This division raised the question of how these parties should approach their participation in power and define its conditions and limitations.

As for the third tendency, the regime implemented a policy of securitization, leading to the dissolution of the Islamic Salvation Front and the prohibition of political activities. However, the Islamic parties that adopted a contextual perspective since the early 1990s faced a significantly different environment. The experience of conflict caused many people to distance themselves from the Islamists, while simultaneously gravitating towards "state Islam." The regime favored non-politicized religious currents such as Salafism and Sufism over revivalist currents. Moreover, the regime explicitly embraced Islamic Sharia provisions concerning family and personal status, effectively depriving the permitted Islamic movements of any means to challenge authority on these issues. Consequently, the pragmatic political participation of the Islamic parties appears to have significantly weakened them.

Accordingly, the adoption of the contextual perspective by Islamist movements associated with the Brotherhood has internally eroded the movement and damaged its voter base, undermining its credibility in society. The Islamic Salvation Front gained, first and foremost, popularity and obtained a majority by addressing economic and social issues, but it ended up disregarding all popular support it had gained.

Therefore, the Arab Spring, which witnessed the rise of Islamists in many Arab countries, had a debilitating effect on Islamic movements in Algeria. These movements were aware of the consequences of adopting an essentialist perspective. The rejection of the Islamic movements was reiterated in the recent Algerian movement in 2019 with the expression "They All Should Go -Yetnahaw Gaa", which refers to the non-acceptance of any political movement that had previously participated in the regime. The current challenges faced by Islamic movements in Algeria can be seen as a consequence of adopting the contextual perspective without sufficiently establishing and theorizing it.

The Islamic parties in Algeria failed to establish their distinctiveness and lacked an understanding of the neutrality of the state, the nature of power within the state, and the characteristics of Algerian society at that time.

Thus, seminal events such as the 1988 uprising, the black decade and its aftermath, the 2011 Arab Spring, and the 2019 popular protests have all contributed to weakening the appeal of the remaining Islamic parties. These events have challenged Islamists to navigate a new path within a political environment that imposes constraints on their activities. Moreover, both political Islam and the party-political arena have become increasingly mistrusted by a significant portion of the population.

The Moroccan context provides further evidence of the integration of Islamic parties into the official framework and their ability to operate within the boundaries of the state. However, there are contrasting considerations regarding political participation by two of the largest Islamist groups in Morocco: the "Justice and Spirituality Movement" (Al Adl Wa Al Ihssane) and the "Justice and Development Party" (PJD).

The two groups start from opposing premises, at least from a political perspective. The Justice and Spirituality Movement is a political movement that only exercises its political position in the absence of the monarchy, considering the monarchy as illegitimate. On the other hand, the legitimacy of the Justice and Development Party as a political party with a religious reference is based on its cooperation with existing state structures and its recognition of the religious foundations of the state, as well as the role of the king as the "commander of the faithful."

In many respects, the Islamists in Morocco present an exceptional model compared to Islamists in other Arab countries. King Mohammed VI has not faced existential challenges like those confronted by authoritarian rulers in the region. Despite the dominance of Islamists in parliamentary elections in 2011 and 2016, Morocco's case stands out as unique in the Middle East and North Africa region

In the Moroccan context, the Justice and Spirituality Movement has provided a model for revolutionary movements through nonviolent activism, as demonstrated by its involvement in the February 20 movement. Furthermore, the Islamic case in Morocco offers a model for distinguishing between political work and advocacy. However, it is important to note that this distinction has sparked significant debates that have not been fully resolved by either the regime or the Islamic parties, whether revolutionary or moderate.

In the Tunisian case, specifically with regard to the Ennahda party, a clear distinction between the political and religious spheres has emerged, taking various forms in terms of functions, symbols, and discourse. Ennahda serves as a model for the civil nature of Islamic parties that prioritize pragmatism over ideology, being more responsive to events and adaptable in their approach. This new orientation of the Ennahda party draws inspiration from the experiences of the Justice and Development Party in Turkey and, to a lesser extent, Christian Democracy in Germany, as models to emulate. It is worth noting that the Ennahda party's approach differs from that of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which is often seen as a failed model for Islamists in Egypt.

Table 01: The different patterns adopted by Islamic parties

	Proactive style	Adaptation style	Reaction pattern	The pattern of change imposed by the environment
Survey the surroundings all the time; Anticipate changes in the environment	Tunisia			
Recognizing environmental changes, making gradual changes to adapt		Morocco		
Face the effects of unexpected change; get into a crisis; change reaction			Egypt	
Automatic change as a result of environmental change without the ability to influence the results				Algeria

Source: Kassiar, F. Van den Berg, "Strategic Planning for Political Parties: A Practical Tool," International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Netherlands Institute for Multiparty Democracy, March 17, 2017, p. 17.

The completed contextual cycle presents a challenge for Islamic parties that have adopted this perspective, as it can have consequences that are not necessarily advantageous for them. By embracing the contextual trend, Islamic parties risk serving the logic of governance, which aims to consolidate power and prevent a genuine alternative from emerging. Consequently, their participation in government may lend legitimacy to the political system, but it can also weaken their position as authentic opposition parties.

Islamic parties find themselves in a dilemma: either they adhere to the essentialist perspective and remain on the margins of the system, potentially facing eradication, or they adopt the contextual perspective, which aligns them with the system. The crucial question then becomes how Islamic parties can strengthen their presence as a distinctive alternative within the contextual framework.

3. The legitimacy of accomplishments rather than the legitimacy of survival.

Understanding politics and governance from the perspective of the opposition differs from the view within the authority, where the logic of interests and influence prevails. Accordingly, the political logic of the work of Moroccan Islamists formed a somewhat different model of political participation, taking into account the nature of the political system and its institutions, and the degree of its openness or closedness. One of the outcomes was the consideration of the state as a given, acknowledging its fixed (de facto or status quo) nature rather than what it should be. Therefore, instead of attributing the decline of Islamists in Egypt to a "postmodern" phenomenon that characterizes Islamists as a whole, it is necessary to view this decline as an evolutionary phenomenon in an objective context, where political parties rise and others experience setbacks. Hence, in defining political practice from an Islamic perspective, it is crucial to consider the dynamics of rise and decline, rather than adopting a unilateral logic that aims to establish an alternative theory of the state and governance, or attempting to monopolize power once domination is achieved.

If political practice is to be based on the Islamic reference, then the field in which politicians operate remains determined by the dynamics of the field itself, characterized by power struggles, conflicting interests, and competition of programs (the legitimacy of performance). The basis for competition lies within the neutral context of the state, as well as the balance of power. However, the legitimacy of performance, as a fundamental determinant, should be the primary focus. To exist as an attractive model, Islamic parties need to develop specialized agendas that can effectively compete within the existing political landscape while maintaining their distinct Islamic identity. These agendas should be closely intertwined with the challenges of the social context they operate in.

In this regard, the strength of the ideology of Islamic parties lies not only in its depth and intellectual structure but also in its ability to present ready-made models and win the support of voters by offering feasible solutions and alternatives to the existing crisis. The strength of Islamic parties in establishing effective policies is determined by their daily practice and their ability to address immediate challenges.

Most political parties, including Islamic parties, aim to attract voters by offering competitive agendas and seeking to gain political power. Islamic parties have a distinct feature in terms of the ideology they uphold. In order for Islamic parties to make a meaningful contribution to the competitive political process, they need to focus on finding solutions to the challenges faced by the state, the political system, and the governance structure. This requires building their capacities in various aspects such as extraction, organization, distribution, symbolism, and responsiveness. Instead of solely developing an alternative vision for the state and the political system, Islamic parties should concentrate on addressing the practical issues at hand and improving their ability to govern effectively.

The state, as a sovereign entity, refers to a group of institutions that possess the authority to exercise legitimate force within a defined geographic area. The political system, on the other hand, encompasses the various interconnected components that functionally interact within both the state and society. Changes within a specific system can have implications for the other components of the broader system. Just as the state has distinct functions (as outlined in the table), the political system is characterized by a set of functions identified by Gabriel Almond, which include political socialization and recruitment, political communication, interest articulation, interest aggregation, and the development, implementation, and adjudication of policies (Castles, 1973, pp. 26–34).

Table 02: Functions of the state

	Addressing market failure			Improving equity
Minimal functions	Providing pure goods: defense, Law and order, property rights, Macroeconomic management, public health			Protecting the poor: Antipoverty programs Disaster relief
Intermediate functions	Addressing externalities: Basic education Environment protection	Regulating monopoly: Utility regulation Antitrust policy	Overcoming imperfect information. Insurance (health, life, pensions) Financial regulation	Providing social insurance: Redistributive pensions, family allowances, unemployment, insurance

			Consumer protection	
Activist functions	Coordinate private activity: Fostering markets Cluster initiatives			Redistribution: asset redistribution

Source: The world Bank (1997), The State in Changing World, World Development Report, P 27.

The fundamental distinction lies in recognizing that the state is not synonymous with the political system, and similarly, the political system is distinct from the system of government. While there may be overlapping functions, there are clear boundaries that differentiate these entities. The state is characterized by stability and survival, whereas the political system is a behavioral system that both influences and is influenced by its environment, adapting to survive in a dynamic and open setting. The system of government, on the other hand, undergoes continuous change (whether through peaceful or violent means) due to various demands such as elections, reforms, coups, revolutions, or war.

The contextual perspective emphasizes that the realm of deliberation for political parties lies at the level of the system of government rather than the state or political system. When a party wins an election, it is expected to enact changes within the system of government. However, when a party in power implements changes at the level of the political system or the state, it implies ideological and radical transformations. Essentialist views often disregard the context of the modern state, failing to distinguish it from the political system and the system of government. Calls for an Islamic state based on prophetic methods or a caliphate based on the behavior of the companions exemplify an essentialist approach, as they advocate for a fundamentally different model of the state. Calls for the application of Islamic economics, on the other hand, pertain to changes within the economic system, which is part of the political system and can be subject to adjustment. Calls for change at the level of government provide an open field for political competition among different parties.

On the other hand, in their pursuit of establishing a new governance model in which authority is grounded in the principles of the modern state and the people are a genuine source of authority, Islamic parties must rationalize governance by incorporating its constituent dimensions: government, civil society, and the private sector (as depicted in the figure). Therefore, effective policies and governance systems necessitate active participation from these three stakeholder groups. This can be achieved by promoting participatory democracy as an alternative to representative democracy, which has proven insufficient in addressing the crises of power and participation.

Participatory governance should not be seen as a replacement for representative democracy, nor should its objective be limited to ensuring the

integrity of the political process. Rather, its aim is to advance the principles of good governance through a dual emphasis on competence and merit, as well as the dualism of responsibility and accountability. This approach gives rise to a new form of legitimacy that is not solely based on individual will and claims to representation, but is rooted in functional effectiveness. Legitimacy, in this context, becomes the mechanism through which rulers present the outcomes of their work to the governed, thereby encouraging potential actors to present alternative positions and visions.

In summary, the implementation of participatory governance allows for the establishment of a governance model that prioritizes good governance principles, emphasizes competence and accountability, and creates a new basis for legitimacy that is tied to tangible results. This fosters an environment where different actors can offer alternative perspectives and visions for the betterment of society.

Fig 2: Governance of Islamic parties' work




Participatory democracy enables Islamic parties to integrate into the political scene as it has the potential to create common spaces for collaboration. This includes engaging with the political system to enhance their capabilities and building cross-ideological alliances to rationalize political practices. In this context, Islamic parties can present themselves as an alternative that offers high-quality

political goods reflecting the goals of Sharia law. They can also propose the institutionalization of these goals within a clear constitutional framework, ensuring that they are protected and not subject to the arbitrary whims and fluctuations of authority

In any political system, political parties often operate in a complex and unstable environment. Change is a constant and inevitable aspect, stemming from evolving constitutional rules, laws associated with the political game, and shifting views of the electorate. Political upheavals or security disruptions at domestic or regional levels may also challenge parties to address emerging issues, leading to the rise of some parties while others decline. This dynamic landscape can impact the working strategy of Islamic parties, whether operating as part of the opposition (formal or radical) or aligning with the ruling regime. However, adopting a particular direction will have consequences that may not necessarily be in the best interest of Islamic parties.

Therefore, by utilizing the SWOT analysis as an assessment model, it becomes possible to identify the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats that can impact the strategies of Islamic movements operating within the political system. To comprehend the internal and external environment in which these movements function, it is necessary for them to consider the SWOT analysis, allowing for the improvement of their performance and prompt response to evolving circumstances. This enables them to effectively address past and potential future events with the aim of achieving medium and long-term continuity.



The call made by Asef Bayat in his thesis "Post-Islamism" to prioritize internal political engagement rather than adopting an essentialist perspective is a call to transition towards a contextual field that Islamic movements have not traditionally been involved in. This necessitates a prior reassessment of the performance of Islamic parties in terms of their strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats, which are their own responsibilities. This assessment

helps in understanding their structure and guiding their behavior within an environment characterized by significant and unexpected changes. It involves strategic planning based on effective action and a conscious standpoint, considering the broad range of internal and external variables.

Conclusion

It is important to discuss the effectiveness of Islamic parties in shaping public policy. However, the literature on Islamic movements generally lacks a comprehensive philosophy for managing state affairs and the political system. There are several possible explanations for this inadequacy, with one of the most significant being the attempt to apply an essentialist perspective to the modern state rather than adopting a contextual approach. The latter perspective considers the state and the political system as coherent cognitive models responsible for organizing the deliberative field, providing equal qualifications to all societal currents and constituent groups, regardless of their affiliations. This is achieved through electoral mechanisms or appointments based on competence and merit.

Nonetheless, Islamic parties have often attempted to invoke an idealized model of governance lacking specific characteristics and preconditions (such as the state and the political system) to apply it to the modern state. This has resulted in a synthesis of contradictory political practices among Islamists, thereby raising questions about the identity of Islamic practices. Despite the rich intellectual and theoretical heritage of Islamic discourse, it struggles to translate its profound mission values (the identity of the word) into tangible projects of societal rejuvenation (the identity of the deed). Consequently, Islamic movements are left with no choice but to focus on renewing their internal identity rather than attempting to solely transform society.

In summary, reconciling the ideological perspective of Islamic parties within the context of the modern state is not possible without adopting a contextual standpoint. Recent years have revealed the political limitations of the essentialist perspective, as evidenced by the experiences of Islamists in Egypt and Tunisia. It became clear that their constituents were primarily concerned with economic and social needs, such as job creation, income improvement, and housing, rather than the role of Islam in the constitution. This led to challenges for President Morsi in terms of economic growth, a decline in popular support for his government, and ultimately, the return of military rule.

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