The Responsibility to Protect and International Intervention
مسؤولية الحماية والتدخل الدولي

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Abstract: This study examines the evolution of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, tracing its development from its theoretical origins to its first practical implementation in international law. Since the release of the landmark ICISS report in December 2001, the R2P concept has undergone significant conceptual and normative refinement, leading to its formal adoption by the international community on October 24, 2005, during the World Summit marking the UN's 60th anniversary.

The 2011 crisis represented the first concrete application of this principle, following the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1973 on March 17, 2011, which authorized the use of "all necessary measures" to protect civilians under threat. The resolution legitimized international military intervention, enabling states—either individually or through regional organizations—to participate in collective action. As a result, an international coalition led by France and NATO forces intervened, establishing a significant precedent for operationalizing the R2P doctrine in contemporary international law.

Keywords: The principle of responsibility to protect, , international intervention ,reconstruction, the international community.

ملخص:
تستعرض هذه الدراسة تطوّر مبدأ مسؤولية الحماية(R2P) ، متتبّعة مساره منذ جذوره النظرية وصولاً إلى أوّل تطبيق عملي له في القانون الدولي. فمنذ صدور تقرير اللجنة الدولية للتدخل وسيادة الدولة (ICISS) في ديسمبر 2001، شهد المفهوم تطوّرات معيارية وفكرية مهمة أدّت إلى اعتماده رسميًا من قبل المجتمع الدولي في 24أكتوبر 2005 خلال القمة العالمية بمناسبة الذكرى الستين لتأسيس الأمم المتحدة.
وقد مثّلت أزمة عام 2011 أوّل تطبيق ملموس لهذا المبدأ، عقب تبنّي قرار مجلس الأمن رقم 1973 في 17مارس 2011، الذي أجاز استخدام "جميع التدابير اللازمة" لحماية المدنيين المعرّضين للخطر. وقد منح القرار شرعية للتدخل العسكري الدولي، مما أتاح للدول—بشكل فردي أو عبر منظمات إقليمية—المشاركة في عمل جماعي. ونتيجة لذلك، تدخّل تحالف دولي تقوده فرنسا وقوات حلف شمال الأطلسي (الناتو)، مما رسّخ سابقة مهمة في تفعيل مبدأ مسؤولية الحماية في القانون الدولي المعاصر.

كلمات مفتاحية: مبدأ مسؤولية الحماية، التدخل الدولي، إعادة البناء، المجتمع الدولي

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INTRODUCTION :

The development of human rights following the Second World War, along with the adoption of numerous international legal instruments and the recurrence of serious violations, gave rise to the notion of humanitarian intervention. This concept is commonly defined as "the threat or use of force across state borders by one or more states to prevent or end large-scale and serious violations of fundamental human rights of individuals who are not their nationals, without the consent of the territorial state." A decade after the International Commission on Intervention and

State Sovereignty (ICISS) published its seminal report *"The Responsibility to Protect"* (R2P) in December 2001, which outlined three core responsibilities, and six years after its formal integration into international law on October 24, 2005, during the World Summit marking the 60th anniversary of the United Nations, the R2P principle was applied in practice for the first time during humanitarian crises. Through a Security Council resolution adopted on March 17, 2011, the United Nations explicitly authorized states—acting individually or collectively—to take "all necessary measures" under the R2P doctrine to protect civilians in the affected state.

From a humanitarian and normative perspective, the implementation and exercise of the Responsibility to Protect represent a logical and morally compelling concept. However, its application within contemporary international relations remains highly complex and deeply contested. Any form of external military intervention in the territory of a sovereign state—even when motivated by humanitarian purposes—inevitably challenges the principle of state sovereignty, which lies at the core of the international legal order. Sovereignty is not merely a functional concept in international relations; for many states, it symbolizes equality, dignity, and the preservation of national identity and independence.

To safeguard this fundamental right, the United Nations Charter and related international instruments prohibit the threat or use of force, except in cases of self-defense or when authorized by the Security Council. Core principles of international law—such as sovereignty, territorial integrity, non-intervention, and self-

defense—are all grounded in the central and dominant role of the state as the primary subject of international law.

This particular case occupies a pivotal place in the practical embodiment of the R2P principle. It represented both a crucial test for the state in fulfilling its responsibilities toward its population and a humanitarian mandate delegated to the international community under Security Council authorization. Theoretically, the successful implementation of R2P in this situation could have marked the emergence of a new customary norm legitimizing humanitarian intervention to protect civilians from mass atrocities. However, the exceeding of the Security Council's mandate during the intervention provoked significant criticism and political backlash from several states, including those that had refrained from opposing the resolution. Moreover, the international community's inaction in the face of mass atrocities in other regions reignited debate over whether R2P has truly crystallized into a principle of binding international law. Many skeptical states have since expressed serious reservations regarding the use of military force for humanitarian purposes, warning that such interventions may serve political objectives under the guise of humanitarianism.

We pose the following question: **To what extent has the application of the R2P principle in humanitarian crises been respected in accordance with its foundational principles?**

To answer this question, we have addressed the following:

Section One: The Meaning of the Responsibility to Protect and its Relationship to the Regime of International Intervention

The principle of "Responsibility to Protect" (R2P) emerged from debates on humanitarian intervention, establishing that a state holds the primary duty to protect its own population. Should it fail to do so, this responsibility shifts to the international community. The R2P framework is a three-tiered hierarchy, prioritizing prevention of conflicts. If prevention fails, military intervention is considered an exceptional last resort, followed by the crucial phase of rebuilding after the conflict.

The 2011 intervention in the humanitarian crisis is a key case study. Authorized by UN Security Council Resolution 1973, it invoked R2P to justify taking "all necessary measures" to protect civilians. However, the NATO-led operation was widely criticized for exceeding its mandate and turning a humanitarian mission into a regime-change operation. This misuse, stemming from the vague wording of the resolution, led many to believe that the principle was being exploited, ultimately damaging its credibility and highlighting the significant challenges in its practical application.

1.1 Chapter one: The Meaning of the Responsibility to Protect

Since the end of the Second World War, the principle of humanitarian intervention has been the subject of constant debate within the United Nations, states, the academic community and civil society, and at the centre of this controversy lies the tension between two fundamental principles of international law: On the one hand, the prohibition of the use of force; on the other, the obligation to respect and protect human rights.

The phrase "responsibility to protect" appears clearly for the first time in the report of the International Commission on Sovereignty in Outer Space, established by the Canadian government in

December 2001, which states that sovereignty not only gives a state the right to control its own affairs, but also the primary responsibility. The crux of the ICISS argument is that a state's sovereignty implies a primary responsibility to protect its people. The idea of the report is that when a state proves unable to do so - whether it is unable or unwilling - the responsibility should shift to the international community.

The responsibility to protect is first and foremost a matter of the state, with prevention starting at the national level, where the protection of the population is one of the hallmarks of state sovereignty in the 21st century. The IFSI emphasises the importance of prevention and, if ineffective, the speed, flexibility, adequacy and proportionality of intervention. Finally, this new term makes it possible, through a consecrated expression, to materialise a new paradigm: The UN chooses to approach the issue of individual security from a new angle, henceforth placing human security above all other principles, sanctifying it in a way, and now focusing on the individual, not the state, as this new paradigm allows, in a way, to resolve the issue of the right to intervene: The state is responsible for protecting its own population, but if it does not do so, this task falls - in the name of the principle of subsidiarity - on the international community. According to the report, the responsibility to protect involves a hierarchy; the first responsibility comes from prevention, i.e. the obligation to address the root causes of internal conflicts and other man-made disasters, which is a necessary step that makes it possible to reduce or even overcome the need for future intervention. For this prevention to be effective, three basic

conditions must be met, including early warning, which refers to analysing the situation and its fragility, preventive tools, which concerns policies that are likely to change the situation, and political will [3]. If these preventive measures fail and the security of the population is seriously threatened, the community then comes military intervention, which is considered an exceptional and extraordinary measure, which is considered only as a last resort, after careful analysis of its consequences, and in fact the use of force always carries the risk of unintended human casualties and instability, and finally comes the responsibility to rebuild, which constitutes a crucial stage in the continuity of the responsibility to protect [4], and accordingly, the responsibility to protect extends to providing the necessary assistance for recovery, reconstruction and reconciliation, especially after military intervention taking into account the causes of the humanitarian crisis that is the subject of intervention, and it does not end when the conflict stops; it is a continuous process that includes.

1.2 Chapter Two: The Relationship of the Responsibility to Protect Principle to the Regime of International Intervention

Intervention in state affairs is strictly regulated legally and in order to maintain peaceful international relations, it is impossible in principle to grant oneself the right to intervene militarily to protect a population that is subjected to gross human rights violations in a third state, unless authorised by the United Nations Security Council.

In the case of the humanitarian crisis, a few days after the start of the demonstrations against the regime, an international mobilisation became evident. On 26 February 2011, the Security

Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1970, recalling that the responsibility to protect the population rests with the national authorities, and considering that systematic and widespread attacks against the civilian population constitute crimes against humanity. The Security Council then calls on the government to act in accordance with human rights and international law.
After a week of back and forth in the UNSC, the deliberations resulted in Resolution 1973. The text regrets the failure of the authorities to respect Resolution 1970, expresses the Security Council's deep concern at the deterioration of human rights and the escalation of violence in the country, recalls the government's responsibility to protect its population (paragraphs 4 and 5), provides for the establishment of a no-fly zone (paragraphs 6-12), and authorises Member States to "take all necessary measures [...] to protect the civilian population and areas under threat of attack in the affected state [...] excluding the deployment of a foreign occupying force".
The draft resolution, submitted by the UK, France and Lebanon, was adopted by 10 of the 15 members of the Security Council. Germany, Russia, India, Brazil and China abstained, arguing that military intervention, even if organised, is not the right solution at this time, that diplomacy can still work, and that the military strategy is not clear, especially with regard to its implementation. Accordingly, the international intervention operation launched by NATO was based on Security Council Resolution 1973.
The intervention campaign was carried out by a coalition of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and "partner" countries (Sweden, Morocco, Jordan, Qatar and the United Arab

Emirates), as if it were an international organisation and states fighting against another state in the humanitarian crisis [5]. From the first days of the operation, under first French and then NATO leadership, the air campaign focused on disrupting the affected state's air defences and destroying the heavy weapons of its army in the vicinity of the besieged cities. The use of armed force found all its legitimacy and legality in the text of Resolution 1973, and the first incarnation of the Responsibility to Protect principle appeared to many to be successful [6].

The text of Resolution 1973 states that the solution to the crisis must meet the legitimate demands of the population (paragraph 2) for the establishment of a democratic constitutional order. Therefore, the sanctions imposed on the regime stipulated in Resolution 1973, although they aim to force it to change its position, they also serve to strengthen the opposition, and thus regime change would be a legitimate means of achieving the goal of the Security Council's mandate [7].

In any case, this is what some Western countries tried to emphasise, pushing the R2P doctrine to its logical conclusion. Just one month after the adoption of Resolution 1973, the architects of the text and the NATO-led campaign, Barack Obama, Nicolas Sarkozy and David Cameron, in an op-ed published in The Times, Le Figaro, the International Herald Tribune and Al-Hayat, rejected the Security Council's mandate: "There is a path to peace that brings new hope for the population." The article went on to outline a political idea of a future without the regime in power. This clear violation of the Security Council's mandate did not fail to provoke reactions within the international community, because

instead of protecting the civilian population, it led to a real war that resulted in several thousand casualties and displaced persons [8]. Some states saw this as a glaring example of the excesses and political interference that the R2P doctrine can lead to. The implementation of Resolution 1973 was heavily criticised by the BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China), who accused NATO of exceeding its mandate and turning a population protection operation into a regime change operation. In fact, from the moment the resolution authorised preventive intervention on the entire territory of the affected state, where the "aggressor" was the head of state himself, the boundaries between the two types of operations became easily blurred. From the beginning of the operations, tensions arose over the interpretation of "protection of civilians." In an official reaction the day after the first Western strikes, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa declared: "What happened in the humanitarian crisis is different from the objective of imposing a no-fly zone." "We want to protect civilians, not bomb other civilians."

At the end of October 2011, Marcel Boisard, former UN Under-Secretary-General, stated: "nothing was respected," no ceasefire was actually negotiated, exclusive control of the sky was exploited to support the opposition, the protection of civilians was a pretext to justify any operation and it was no longer about protection, but about regime change, "the principle of "responsibility to protect" is dead in the humanitarian crisis, just as the principle of "humanitarian intervention" died in Somalia in 1992" [10]. Without fully opening the regime's box, the intervention in the humanitarian crisis was legally authorised by normal procedures,

because the responsibility to protect civilians was the responsibility of the international community, and the ground has been prepared to put the responsibility to protect into practice, but the ambiguity of Resolution 1973 would expose the application of the principle of the responsibility to protect to great difficulties, as the vagueness of the "all necessary measures" formula prevents from the outset the confirmation that the measures taken are compatible with the objectives stipulated in the resolution.

2. section Two : The international community's violation of the principles of R2P

The humanitarian crisis raises questions about the justification, scope and ultimate consequences of military intervention. In this regard, it is important to remember that, according to the International Centre for Strategic Studies, six right to war criteria must be observed for military intervention to acquire the character of a legitimate action:

Appropriate authority, just cause, good faith, last resort, proportionality of means, and reasonable prospects. These are largely inspired by the traditional "just war" criteria, but the broader interpretation advocated by the Coalition does not fully respect these criteria.

2.1 Chapter One: Proper Authority and Just Cause

The principles of proper authority and just cause form the legal and moral foundation for any legitimate intervention under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These criteria are essential to ensuring that the decision to intervene is taken by a legitimate international body and justified by compelling humanitarian

reasons. Together, they define the boundaries within which the international community can lawfully act to prevent or halt mass atrocities, ensuring that intervention remains consistent with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

2.1.1 Branch One: Appropriate Authority

The question of appropriate authority remains a key element - to which the Society for Independent International Studies has devoted an entire chapter - among the precautions taken to mitigate the adverse effects of military intervention. Expressing its deep conviction in multilateralism, the Commission expresses its belief that it is primarily up to the United Nations, and subsequently the Security Council, to play the leading role in determining the forms surrounding intervention; With its representative nature of the international community, its efficiency and its room for manoeuvre in legal terms, the Commission aims to be the most legitimate authority [11].

2.1.2 Branch Two: Just cause

For a military intervention to be deemed legitimate under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, there must exist a situation involving serious and irreparable harm inflicted upon human beings, or at least an imminent and credible threat of such harm. However, the situation in the humanitarian crisis in March 2011 did not, by objective legal standards, reach the threshold of genocide or crimes against humanity as defined in Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC).

In this regard, Donatella Rovera, Senior Crisis Response Adviser at Amnesty International, reported a markedly different assessment following her three-month field mission in the

humanitarian crisis in 2011. She noted that the death toll figures circulated in the "official" narrative used to justify the intervention were greatly exaggerated. This overestimation of civilian casualties is not particularly surprising and aligns with the skepticism expressed by Indian representatives during Security Council debates, who lamented that "there was almost no reliable information on the situation on the ground."

While there can be no justification for the repressive practices of the regime, the distortion of factual realities by the intervening states—often amplified through their national media outlets—raises significant concerns regarding the authenticity of the humanitarian justifications advanced for the intervention. This, in turn, prompts the critical question of whether the invocation of the Responsibility to Protect in this instance represented a genuine humanitarian necessity, or merely a political pretext employed to legitimize external interference and regime change [13].

2.2 Chapter Two: Goodwill and Last Resort

Framework of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) ensures that international intervention is conducted with genuine humanitarian intent and employed only when all non-coercive measures have failed. Together, these principles help maintain the moral and legal integrity of R2P by preventing its manipulation for political or strategic ends and by upholding the doctrine's foundational purpose—protecting populations from mass atrocities in a legitimate and restrained manner.

2.2.1 Branch One: Goodwill

The principle of goodwill represents a fundamental condition for the legitimacy of intervention under the Responsibility to Protect

(R2P) framework. Any military action undertaken pursuant to this doctrine must have as its sole and primary objective the prevention or cessation of large-scale human suffering, devoid of political manipulation or pursuit of strategic interests. The moral and legal validity of such intervention is thus contingent upon the purity of intent and the genuine commitment to humanitarian objectives.

However, the 2011 military intervention in the humanitarian crisis, conducted under Operation Unified Protector, demonstrated a notable departure from this principle. The intervention was not entirely guided by humanitarian imperatives, but was instead significantly influenced by political motivations, particularly those aimed at regime change. This was evident when, on 4 March 2011, U.S. President Barack Obama publicly declared that the head of state had lost legitimacy, a statement that reflected a preconceived political objective rather than a neutral humanitarian stance.

Moreover, the continued NATO bombardment of cities in the affected state, even after the fall of the capital, resulted in substantial civilian casualties. Such actions illustrate how the legitimate humanitarian objective of protecting civilians was overshadowed and ultimately replaced by an illegitimate political aim—the overthrow of the regime under the pretext of humanitarian protection [14].

2.2.2 Branch Two: Last resort

The principle of Last Resort under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) framework emphasizes that the protection of civilians must be pursued primarily through preventive and peaceful means, with

military intervention remaining an exceptional and final option. The use of force can only be justified once all non-military avenues—including mediation, diplomacy, and other peaceful mechanisms—have been genuinely attempted and have demonstrably failed, and when there is substantial evidence that less coercive measures would be ineffective in halting or preventing mass atrocities.

In this regard, non-coercive and reactive measures play a vital role before resorting to armed intervention. Such measures may include the initiation of investigations by the UN Security Council, or the establishment of fact-finding missions by bodies such as the Human Rights Council, which may appoint special rapporteurs to gather and provide accurate information on the situation.

These mechanisms illustrate that a prompt and coordinated international response can itself constitute a preventive effort, capable of deterring a state from descending into widespread or systematic crimes. Hence, the principle of last resort serves as a moral and legal safeguard, ensuring that the use of military force remains a final measure, justified only when all other peaceful means have been fully exhausted. On the contrary, NATO worked to undermine the peaceful solution presented by the African Union, which called for an immediate ceasefire. On 25 March 2011, the African Union actually adopted a road map for peace, providing for the implementation of political reforms and the deployment of a monitoring mechanism, which was quickly rejected by the opposition [15].

2.3 Chapter three: Proportionality of Means and Reasonable

Horizons

The principle of proportionality of means and the notion of reasonable prospects constitute essential criteria in assessing the legality and legitimacy of international interventions under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P). These principles ensure that the measures adopted by the international community are both appropriate to the scale of the threat and capable of achieving their intended humanitarian objectives without exceeding necessity or causing disproportionate harm. Thus, proportionality serves as a safeguard against excessive or politically motivated use of force, while reasonable prospects evaluate the likelihood that intervention will effectively protect populations and restore peace.

2.3.1 Branch One: Proportionality of means

The principle of proportionality of means requires that both the duration and intensity of any military intervention undertaken under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) must remain strictly limited to what is necessary and sufficient to achieve the intended humanitarian objective. The justification for the use of force arises only when there exists an imminent or ongoing threat of genocide or other mass atrocities, and when peaceful measures have clearly proven ineffective or inadequate in preventing or halting such crimes. Accordingly, the scale of military action must be proportionate to its purpose, ensuring that the intervention neither exceeds what is required nor causes harm disproportionate to the humanitarian benefits it seeks to secure.

In assessing proportionality, it is essential to balance the consequences of intervention against its intended outcomes. For instance, on 2 November 2011, ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-

Ocampo reported to the UN Security Council that there were allegations of crimes committed by NATO forces and by groups associated with the opposition, including the arbitrary detention of civilians accused of being mercenaries and the killing of captured combatants. In contrast, NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen declared that the operation in the humanitarian crisis represented the most successful mission ever undertaken by NATO.

Such contrasting assessments highlight the complexity of evaluating proportionality, revealing that even interventions justified on humanitarian grounds may, in practice, exceed their lawful limits or result in unintended violations of international humanitarian law.

Although the organisation justified its mission in the humanitarian crisis on humanitarian grounds, NATO operations reflect a growing involvement in an internal conflict, and these operations increasingly look like operations to provide military assistance to one party, rather than operations to protect the population without political motives. In parallel with the military pressure that was gradually neutralising the capabilities of the regime's forces, the contact group, which included the countries participating in the NATO campaign, demanded on each occasion that the regime end, starting with meetings in Rome on 5 May, Abu Dhabi on 9 June, and Istanbul on 15 July [17].

2.3.2 Branch Two: Reasonable Prospects

The criterion of reasonable prospects stipulates that any military intervention carried out under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) must present a realistic and credible likelihood of halting or

preventing the suffering that originally justified the intervention. Even in circumstances involving mass atrocities, and despite the failure of all other peaceful measures, the use of armed force cannot be deemed legitimate if it is expected to aggravate the situation or cause greater instability.

In the humanitarian crisis, the 2011 intervention appeared, at least initially, to hold a reasonable chance of suppressing the imminent threat to civilian populations, and in certain respects, it achieved this objective. This outcome suggests that the sub-criterion of balancing consequences was partially satisfied. Nevertheless, this balance proved to be highly fragile. While it may be difficult to fully evaluate the potential outcomes—positive or negative—of inaction, the implementation of Security Council Resolution 1973 arguably contradicted the intended purpose of Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Rather than diminishing the threat to international peace and security, the intervention amplified it, transforming what began as a domestic armed uprising into a broader international conflict.

By choosing to intervene in favor of only one party, the states that undertook the implementation of Resolution 1973—individually and collectively through NATO—effectively intensified the conflict, thereby exacerbating divisions and precipitating conditions that risked the fragmentation of the affected state [18].

Conclusion:

Finally, despite the previous failures, the case of the humanitarian crisis revealed that the international community is capable of

taking timely action to stop mass atrocities when there is political will and sufficient operational capacity. However, the military intervention itself was not carried out in accordance with the principle and spirit of the Responsibility to Protect, but rather its goal went beyond protecting civilians to seeking regime change. This has led to a backlash by states against R2P, based on the legitimate concern that the concept is being misused for undeclared purposes. The case of the humanitarian crisis was a step forward in that it prompted the Security Council to act decisively, with remarkable speed and in full compliance with R2P. Moreover, the Council has repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to authorise the use of military force to protect individuals under the guise of humanitarian intervention through the adoption of Resolution 1973, even against the will of an existing state.

Hence, the difficulty that members of the United Nations Security Council currently face in voting on a resolution on the Syrian situation and the inconsistency in the number of vetoes. In this regard, France has launched an idea that the permanent members of the Security Council should voluntarily and collectively commit not to veto a draft resolution aimed at protecting populations in the event of mass atrocities.

It should be noted that this initiative will not be able to put a quick end to what is considered a disruptive and abusive use of the veto, as is the case with Russia and China. However, limiting this abusive use for such crimes seems to be an important medium-term goal. Finally, the experience of the humanitarian crisis has raised and revived yesterday's rivalries and debates about the idea

of the right of international intervention for humanitarian purposes.

Thus, instead of R2P being a decisive step, it becomes, due to the broad interpretation of "all necessary measures," a return to ground zero—a concept that countries such as Algeria, South Africa and Brazil have championed in many international fora. Moreover, the attempt to implement R2P clearly showed that insufficient attention was paid to strengthening post-conflict institutions. The intervention in the humanitarian crisis has failed to achieve lasting peace or to prevent renewed violence, which has so far caused the affected state to lose its international standing through its presence in global affairs, reflected in the absence of an effective authority that unifies the territory and is responsible for what happens within its borders. To this day, the territory affected by the humanitarian crisis remains a hotbed of conflict, a headquarters for terrorist groups, a safe route for smuggling, and a constant threat to neighbouring countries that make weak efforts to protect their borders, for example, the Algerian state.

On this basis, we make the following suggestions:

- The need to develop a clear and binding international legal framework to apply the principle of the Responsibility to Protect, ensuring a balance between protecting civilians and respecting the sovereignty of states.
- Strengthen early warning mechanisms, mediation and preventive diplomacy before reaching the stage of military intervention.
- Establish an international monitoring mechanism to assess the effects of applying the Responsibility to Protect to

ensure respect for international humanitarian law and human rights during intervention.

- Work to build the capacities of states to protect civilians internally to minimise the need for external intervention.
- Encourage regional cooperation in the protection of civilians in coordination with the UN, especially in internal conflicts within the Arab region.
- Conduct a comprehensive review of the experience of the humanitarian crisis within the UN and concerned countries to draw lessons and develop the application of the principle in the future, to achieve effective protection of civilians without creating security or political vacuums.

Footnotes

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[13] Sandra Zurek, op. cit. Ibid, pp. 91-92.

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