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The Economic and Social Impact of the Maritime Jihad on Tripoli (Libya) during the 10th-11th Centuries AH / 16th-17th Centuries AD

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Abstract

After its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire in 1551, the Eyalet of Tripoli emerged as a crucial stronghold for maritime jihad, which significantly impacted the ongoing conflict across the Mediterranean. This influence extended beyond direct engagement, shaping the course of the struggle through a series of naval expeditions. These expeditions included rapid raids on Southern European coastlines and organized retaliatory actions against occasional assaults. The consequences of this activity were multifaceted, with a primary focus on the significant economic impacts, such as the profits from the sale or ransom of captives and the spoils of war. Additionally, the social impact was evident in the diverse demographic composition of Tripolitanian society, resulting from its interactions with various ethnic groups.

The objective of this research is to examine and analyze the economic and social ramifications of maritime jihad, as well as the effects of economic revitalization on social dynamics. A statistical approach was employed to document the proportions of spoils and resources, the number and monetary value of captives, and the revenue ratios of the treasury. Given the nature of the topic, it requires a historical and analytical review of the economic and social conditions of the Eyalet of Tripoli following its adoption of maritime jihad.

The study concludes that the economic expansion and qualitative transformation experienced by Tripoli as a result of maritime jihad also precipitated a profound shift in its social dynamics.

Keyword: Naval jihad; Tripolitanian fleet; prisoners; ransoms; spoils.

Introduction

The naval jihad movement had significant economic and social impacts along the Tripolitanian coast. It served as a form of self-defense and a firm rejection of the European Christian dominance that European states sought to impose on the military and economic ports of the region. Additionally, it directly influenced the social structure of the Eyalet of Tripoli during the 16th and 17th centuries (10th-11th AH). To understand the extent of the economic and social impact of the naval jihad in the Tripolitanian context, it is essential to examine the scale of spoils and maritime revenues that were utilized to improve and stimulate the internal economic situation. It is also important to assess the effect of this jihadist movement and the economic situation of the eyalet on various social groups, which will be implicitly discussed in this research paper.

1. Economic Impacts of Naval Jihad on Tripoli

The Ottoman authorities supported naval jihad to provide revenue for the state treasury. The naval jihad movement played a significant role in Tripoli's economy because it was linked to the spoils of war, which were marketed after acquisition, as well as the financial revenues from the sale or ransom of prisoners. This will be addressed through the following two points.

1.1 Financial Revenues from the Sale and Ransom of Prisoners:

The Barbarossa brothers (Khair al-Din and Dragut) were not the first to encourage and practice naval jihad in the Maghreb during the 16th century (10 AH). The Maghrebis had been engaging in this activity since the Islamic conquests of the Maghreb. Consequently, Tripolitanian sailors practiced it just like their counterparts in Algeria and Tunisia due to the income from spoils, which brought significant benefits to the country's economy.¹ This pattern was established during Dragut Pasha's era, where the country's economy heavily relied on spoils. As a result of the Tripolitanian fleet's activities and its substantial revenues, naval jihad became a major field of investment, attracting capital from both the ruling authorities and individuals.² The process of capturing and enslaving prisoners led to an international trade movement in various directions.³

Murad Agha, during his campaign on Zuwara, managed to amass a considerable fortune, having three hundred Christian slaves in that town. His successor, Dragut Pasha, gathered significant spoils and a large number of prisoners through his naval raids in the year 959 AH (1552 CE) on the coasts of Calabria. In the same year, he also captured seven ships belonging to Andrea Doria and subsequently transported the war spoils to Tripoli in Sha'ban 959 AH (August 1552 CE).⁴ The success of the naval activities and the increased number of European prisoners led to the Tripolitanian prisons becoming overcrowded with prisoners of various nationalities.⁵

In the last two years of the rule of Safar Dey, he managed to capture around 150 individuals.⁶ Due to their increasing numbers, a refuge was constructed in the year 1022 AH (1613 CE) near Dragut's palace, accommodating about 600 people, known as the Old Bathhouse. Christian captives referred to it as "*Medenalro Rosario*".⁷

Pasha Muhammad al-Saqzli also worked to improve the economic situation of the country based on the revenues from naval jihad.⁸ During his tenure, the province was so filled with

Christian captives that there was no space left to house them. Therefore, in the year 1050-1051 AH (1640-1641 CE), he established a new shelter or bathhouse near Bab al-Manshiyya, known as the New Bathhouse, compared to the Old Bathhouse built by Safar Dey. This bathhouse consisted of 76 rooms, each accommodating six people, totaling approximately 450 captives.⁹ The value of captives of various nationalities during his time was as follows: a French captive was valued at about 300 qirsh, which increased to 150 scudi during the campaign of "Knight Paul" on Tripoli. The average price of an English captive reached 400 riyals, while a Dutch captive was valued at 220 riyals for a common sailor and 350 riyals for a captain, in the year 1072 AH (1662 CE).¹⁰

In the year 1082 AH (1671 CE), Osman Dey conducted a census of European captives in the province of Tripoli, finding their number to be 1,560, and proceeded to offer them for sale. Historian Ali Masoud Al-Bloushi estimated their number at six thousand captives. As previously mentioned, various shelters or "bathhouses" were constructed to accommodate these Christian captives, who were held in captivity awaiting ransom by European governments or sale in the markets.¹¹ Due to the large number of captives in the province during his tenure, Osman Dey established a new bathhouse in the year 1075 AH (1664 CE) over the ruins of Dragut's palace, known among the captives as the "San Michele Bathhouse." It covered an area of forty-four steps in length and five steps in width, containing eighty-six medium-sized rooms arranged in four rows, accommodating 672 captives. The number of captives resulting from Tripolitanian raids during his twenty-three-year rule was estimated to average between 1,500 and 2,000 annually, a figure confirmed by an anonymous author and the necessity for the new bathhouse. Furthermore, Muhammad and Osman Pasha captured 2,450 Christian captives during the period between 1079-1089 AH (1668-1678 CE).¹²

In the first half of the 11th century AH (17th century CE), European states began to establish consulates along the Maghreb coasts. They sought, through treaties, to secure the release of their captives and to put an end to what they referred to as acts of piracy,¹³ (The primary duty of European consuls was to directly redeem captives. Additionally, members of religious orders such as the Trinitarians and Jesuits, as well as various Protestant organizations, were involved in sending missions,¹⁴ The primary role of these religious missions in Tripoli was to redeem or free captives and assist them in dealing with the circumstances surrounding their conversion to Islam.¹⁵

These religious institutions, which developed over three centuries in Europe with an evangelical spirit and encouragement from the popes, sent groups of envoys to the Maghreb to assist and redeem captives. In 1039 AH (1630 CE), the religious mission appointed Spanish priest Beato Giovanni D'Abrado as the head of the mission to Tripoli. He was accompanied by friar Marco de Scagli and friar Edward Dabur Jammu. However, they were unable to meet the needs of the Christians, whether slaves or free persons. In 1051 AH (1641 CE), the Christian mission sent friar Pasqualecumith and his companion, friar Pacifico, both French, to Tripoli with a dual mission of redeeming captives and establishing a mission center. Pasquale managed to redeem 130 French captives at half the usual amount, while the envoy requested 400 para for their redemption. However, the French cardinal deemed the requested amount too high, and the envoy only succeeded in freeing 50 captives.¹⁶

Osman Pasha demonstrated a strong desire to advance both private and official ransom efforts due to the large number of prisoners. In Tripoli in 1080 AH (1669 CE), there were over 1,500

prisoners distributed across three public prisons, in addition to those held privately. Consequently, the city's houses, shops, and gardens were filled with prisoners throughout his tenure.¹⁷

In 1068 AH (1658 CE), England sent Admiral Stokes, who compelled Osman Pasha to accept a peace treaty. On July 15 of the same year, the Frenchman Cavalier Ball appeared with his fleet off the coast of Tripoli and managed to obtain a list of four hundred French prisoners, securing their release at a rate of one hundred and fifty scudi per person.¹⁸

In 967 AH (1560 CE), when the monks learned that Osman Dey was offering prisoners for sale, they issued a call to all Christian countries urging them to redeem the prisoners regardless of the cost per individual. Consequently, the Marquis traveled to the Tripoli region and redeemed the prisoners there. After a year, in 1071 AH (1660 CE), a French admiral and subsequently the Dutch admiral Roeberts arrived, focusing solely on redeeming prisoners of their own nationalities. Notably, France took a keen interest in Christian prisoners, even those who were not French, freeing over 1,200 people, most of whom were Italians.¹⁹ On 22 Ramadan 1104 AH (27 May 1693 CE), an agreement regarding prisoners was reached, stipulating that one Muslim prisoner would be released for every French prisoner. The ransom required for each freed slave was between 200 and 300 dollars at the beginning of 1086 AH (1675 CE), a figure that was raised to 500 dollars by Misser Agha upon taking power in May of the same year.²⁰ It is worth noting that this agreement generally favored Tripoli, as the head-for-head redemption arrangement, one French prisoner for one Turkish prisoner, was advantageous for them due to their fewer number of captives compared to the French.

It should be noted that prominent prisoners were treated specially. For example, Durgut Pasha gave special treatment to Alfarudi Sandu and the Bishop of Catania Neukolomaria Krachiulo, among others. Bishop Chevalu, who was released by Durgut Pasha after a long period of captivity, was redeemed for a significant ransom of 3,000 scudi, with a promise of additional payments should he ever ascend to the papal throne. Lesser-ranked prisoners were sold in the slave markets of Tripoli.²¹

From this, we can conclude that the Tripolitanian corsairs were meticulous in gathering accurate information about each prisoner, including their rank, social status, and professional experience. Based on this information, the price of each prisoner as a commodity was determined according to supply and demand. It should also be noted that the revenue from the sale or ransom of prisoners was not a fixed income, as it depended on the fortune of the corsairs in their raids. Similarly, the income from spoils could only be assessed based on the number, size, load, and types of the spoils captured, making it difficult for the corsairs to provide accurate estimates due to the variability in the number of jihad operations during each.²²

1.2 Financial Revenues from Goods and Military and Commercial Ships:

The maritime spoils resulting from jihad operations, along with consular fees, commissions from foreign agents and merchants, and gifts from European representatives and envoys, constituted an important source of revenue. This revenue functioned as an indirect tax covering the administrative and military expenses of the Maghreb countries during the 16th and 17th centuries (10th-11th Hijri).²³

Thus, the maritime jihad movement was a significant part of the revenue for Tripoli in the West, as the state shared the income from these operations with the corsairs. The Tripolitan sailors engaged in raids due to the substantial revenue from the spoils, which brought significant benefits to the country's government and economy. Maritime jihad operations were not solely focused on capturing spoils but also on their value and profitability for the ruling authorities and their staff.²⁴

The Tripolitan fleet also conducted raids along the eastern coast of Spain and the coastal areas of Italian states to obtain valuable spoils and captives. This capture of ships and goods enriched the corsairs and their close associates. The revenue from participating in naval wars brought significant spoils to Tripoli in the West, which somewhat contributed to the development of trade and craftsmanship. The distribution of the spoils involved the Janissaries and merchants who financed the galleys and supplied the crews with provisions.²⁵

In 1082 AH / 1671 CE, Osman Pasha conducted a naval raid and seized four ships laden with valuable goods. The following year, in 1083 AH / 1672 CE, the Tripolitan corsairs returned to Tripoli's port in September and October with substantial spoils, including two Venetian ships and a French vessel. The estimated value of the ships and their cargo was approximately £150,000. Customarily, half of the spoils were allocated to the men; however, the Pasha retained only £20,000 for them,²⁶ Osman Pasha was responsible for setting the price of the goods obtained during the raids and would compel merchants to purchase these goods at inflated prices compared to similar goods available in the market. Furthermore, Ibrahim Merselli, between 1086-1087 AH / 1675-1676 CE, captured three English ships, and their cargo was sold at a substantial profit. In August of 1085 AH / 1674 CE, six Tripolitan ships seized two English merchant vessels.²⁷

The Tripolitan corsairs also succeeded in capturing five ships, including three French vessels. The first ship was laden with 600 sacks of wool from Alicante, Spain, and goods for the crew from Venice. The second ship was coming from Marseille, while the third had departed from Venice with a cargo of rice and other valuable items. On 9 Dhu al-Hijjah 1093 AH / 9 December 1682 CE, Tripolitan sailors captured a French ship with a 200-ton cargo, which was en route from Sidon to Marseille. This ship was a significant prize, containing 500 sacks of potash, 300 bales of cotton, and five bundles of silk, with a total value of thirty thousand dollars. In the same month, they also seized four French ships: a small vessel loaded with grain, a ship called "Golden Sun" from Marseille with a valuable cargo from Alexandria, and a vessel departing from Sidon with goods and eighteen thousand dollars for Spain, which was captured along with its seventeen crew members. The fourth was a two-masted ship with twenty-two crew members.²⁸

During the era of Muhammad and Osman Pasha, half of the goods or their equivalent value, as assessed by experts and agents, was allocated to the Janissaries, after deducting an 11% share for the Pasha as his due. During the governorships of Muhammad and Osman, the corsairs managed to sink four large warships belonging to Malta, six ships belonging to Tuscany, as well as several vessels from Spain, the House of Savoy, and four from Venice. It was customary for victorious sailors to sing victory chants as they returned laden with plunder and spoils. After unloading their cargo on the shore and flooding the markets with captives and goods, they would return to sea to bring back more spoils. Thus, victory followed victory until the Tripolitan ships instilled fear in the hearts of Europeans.²⁹

According to their customs, upon the arrival of the ship, a thorough inventory of the spoils was conducted by the ship's clerk, who examined the contents of the vessel. A detailed report was then provided listing the goods, materials, and tools on board, along with data on the number of captives and estimated ransom values. This inventory was completed before the spoils were disposed of through a public auction, where traders competed to purchase them. Merchants from England, Holland, France, Spain, and Italy also benefited from acquiring the wealth and substantial profits, to the extent that some historians considered them worse than the corsairs themselves. This was due to their exploitation of the misfortunes of their counterparts and their involvement in speculative trading in Europe with the plundered goods, particularly in the markets of Livorno, Pisa, Corsica, and Venice.³⁰

The anonymous author in his book describes as disgraceful and unworthy the trade practiced by Christians along the coasts, driven by greed, as they purchased spoils taken from their co-religionists. They exchanged these spoils for military and naval supplies, which aided the Tripolitan sailors in their maritime raids. The types of goods acquired by the corsairs were varied and included velvet, cannons, clear crystal, Venetian glass, fine fabrics from France, Spain, and Italy, gold and silver bullion, as well as medicinal herbs and spices imported from India. Consequently, Tripoli and other coastal bases became hubs for a diverse range of Asian and European products,³¹

These goods were typically unloaded and stored in port warehouses, after being inventoried in a detailed list in preparation for distribution. The distribution of spoils followed a specific system, largely derived from Islamic principles. The ruling authority's share of the spoils was one-fifth, which was taken first before distributing the remaining shares. Furthermore, upon returning to port after a successful voyage, each ship was required to unload its cargo in the presence of an official representative. This was to conduct a general inventory of the spoils and to account for all captured munitions and weapons, retaining only what was necessary for the crew's defense in future expeditions. The more active these ships were, the greater the overall income for the authorities and individuals who relied on the sea for their livelihood.³²

Regarding the goods located in the hold or on the deck of the ship, they belong to ordinary pirates. However, what is found in the captain's cabin is assigned to the captain, as he is the one who seized the vessel. As for money and valuable items, they are entrusted to the leader. If the ship is stripped of its contents and the sailors receive their designated shares, the remainder is entrusted to one of the deputies and sent to Tripoli with an inventory of the seized goods.³³

In this context, let us take as an example the method of distributing spoils during the time of "Mohammed Pasha al-Saqizli" in the year 1046 AH (1636 AD). The pasha received an 11% share of the total goods and slaves. Additionally, 1% was deducted for the maintenance of the quay and port, and another 1% was allocated for the sustenance of the scholars and religious figures serving the mosques. As for the share of the professionals, the ship's captain and his financiers received half of the spoils as compensation for the costs of outfitting the ship. The other half was distributed among the crew, from the captain down to the last sailor. Specifically, the division included 10 to 15 shares for the captain, depending on the value of the spoils, three shares for the Agha of the Janissaries, his deputy, and the artillery officer, the master and the pilot, the pasha's sailmaker, the surgeon, and the scribe. Two shares were given to the Janissaries and regular soldiers, the artillery soldiers, the carpenter, and the

painter or calafat. The remaining sailors and one share were allocated to the participants from the local crew, if any.³⁴

2. Social Impact of Naval Jihad on the Eyalet of Tripoli:

The impact of naval jihad extended beyond the economic sphere to significantly influence the social fabric of Tripoli. Here's how the naval jihad contributed to altering the social structure of Tripoli and how these new social groups affected the political, social, and economic aspects:

2.1. The Andalusians:

With the dawn of the 11th century AH (17th century AD), the number of Andalusian expatriates increased due to forced deportations between 1018-1023 AH (1609-1614 AD). They sought refuge from the oppression of Spanish Christians and the Inquisition, finding sanctuary aboard ships led by sea captains engaged in raids on Spanish shores. Their primary mission was to rescue Muslims from Andalusia. When the Moriscos settled in the Maghreb, they excelled in maritime affairs due to their concentration along the Tripolitanian coast. They played a significant role in the resurgence and intensification of seasonal raids against Christians after gaining the necessary experience in ship preparation and navigation.³⁵ The Andalusians were distinguished by their cultural level and professional skills, which helped many of them acquire wealth and secure high-income jobs and professions. Prominent families, such as the Ibn Galboun, Al-Wurshfani, and others, emerged during this period,³⁶ Their scientific and architectural expertise left a lasting imprint on the region during this time,³⁷ This group played a crucial role in drawing the attention of the European Christian world to the Maghreb countries. Mediterranean European pirates, particularly the Spanish, sought to pursue Andalusians fleeing from the Inquisition and Christian oppression to prevent their return to Europe.³⁸

2.2. The Ottoman Turks:

Among the groups that settled in Tripoli were the Ottoman Turks, who arrived with the intention of jihad, including the rescue of Andalusian Muslims and the liberation of the Maghreb coasts. The initial presence of the Ottomans in Tripoli was a response to the repeated appeals for help from Tripoli's inhabitants to the Sublime Porte (Ottoman government) seeking assistance against Spanish occupation. Having observed the successes achieved in Algeria due to their struggle against the Spanish, which led to the stabilization and security of the region, the Ottomans decided to extend their influence to Tripoli.

Khayr al-Din Barbarossa (Khayr al-Din Pasha), recognizing the strategic importance of Tripoli, stationed a garrison in the city of Tajura and appointed Commander Khayr al-Din Kerman in 921 AH (1515 AD) to create unrest for the Spanish and their allies in Tripoli. Meanwhile, the Ottoman Empire prepared its naval fleet to liberate Tripoli. In 945 AH (1539 AD), Khayr al-Din appointed "Murad Agha" as his deputy in Tajura, succeeding Khayr al-Din.

By 958 AH (1551 AD), the Ottoman Empire successfully liberated Tripoli, making it the second eyalet (province) in the Maghreb. The Ottomans, including the re'is (sea captains), Janissaries, and other officials, settled in Tripoli, establishing themselves at the top of the social hierarchy due to their influential positions and administrative roles within the city.

2.3. The Karaglā:

The Karaglā emerged from the presence of Ottoman Turks whose primary goal was maritime jihad, as previously mentioned. The Karaglā are individuals born from Turkish fathers and Tripolitan mothers. Although a relatively recent group, they were among the closest to the local population. Among the prominent Karaglā families in Libyan politics was the "Daghis" family, which traces its roots to the early Karaglā who settled in Tripoli in the 17th century,³⁹ This group is also referred to as (Qulughiyya or Karaghli). They played a significant role in the political and economic life of the region, evidenced by the services they provided to the rulers of the eyalet in exchange for certain privileges.⁴⁰ Thus, a real integration occurred between the Karaglā and the Tripolitan society, where their language, manners, and customs became indistinguishable from those of the locals. Despite this integration, the Karaglā continued to show a preference for the Turkish ruling element in Tripolitania, often disregarding the subsequent local families.⁴¹

These elements had clear social impacts on the demographic composition, particularly evident in the Karaglā phenomenon. The term "Karaglā" is derived from the Turkish word "Quluğ," meaning "son of the servant," as their fathers were Janissaries, or "servants" of the Sultan, and their mothers were either local Arab or Berber women or Christian concubines captured by the Tripolitan corsairs. The Karaglā formed a significant proportion of the population in some regions such as Misrata, Zliten, and Tripoli. They were assigned various government roles, including defense, security, and tax collection, in return for certain privileges and special rights,⁴² It should be noted that Tripolitan fathers rarely allowed their daughters to accompany their husbands to their homeland if their service in the army ended or if they were transferred from Tripoli. Consequently, the Karaglā families remained within Tripolitan territory and became integrated into the local society,⁴³ However, this raises the question of why Tripolitan fathers permitted their daughters to marry Ottoman soldiers despite knowing they were foreigners with no permanent settlement in the region.

The Ottoman Empire utilized the Karaglā to stabilize the system and ensure security. They were led by a figure known as the **Pasha Aga**,⁴⁴ Despite their prominent social position, the Karaglā remained excluded from higher administrative posts during the early period of Ottoman rule. Initially, they were unable to exert significant influence due to their limited numbers and lack of control over the military. However, as the Karaglā population grew, the Turkish element diminished, and the influence of the Janissaries waned, the administration's need for personnel allowed some Karaglā groups to join the military and assume important roles, with some even attaining the position of provincial governor, as seen with Ahmed Karamanli and his family.⁴⁵

Large groups of Karaglā were concentrated in Zawia, Tripoli, along the coast of the Five, Zliten, and Misrata, with smaller groups in Janzour, the Kasbah, and Gharian, as well as branches in other areas like Zuwara. Their total number was approximately 45,000, accounting for over 9% of the population of Tripoli,⁴⁶ However, DE AGOSTINI estimated their number to be around 36,000, with the largest and most influential groups located in Misrata, numbering around 17,000, followed by the Karaglā in Tripoli, Zawia, Zliten, and the surrounding areas.⁴⁷

2.4. The Jews:

Most historians agree that Jews have been present in Tripoli since the Phoenician and Roman periods. Their numbers dwindled in North Africa during the 12th century (6th AH). However, large numbers of Spanish Jews arrived with the Muslims of Andalusia following the maritime campaigns led by the corsairs to rescue persecuted Muslims and Jews from Spanish coasts. These Jewish communities became significant in major cities such as Tripoli, where their number approached approximately 2,000,⁴⁸ They were divided into "**Semitic Jews**," who had settled in the region due to the general expulsion of Jews, and "Berber Jews," who had settled in Nacousa and its surrounding areas, The Jews' knowledge of other languages enabled them to hold important positions within the state. During the early Ottoman period, Jews were notably active in trade, dominating the salt and slave trades as well as maritime piracy. Jewish organizations were formed for the purpose of ransoming captives, with funds provided by the captives' families to these organizations,⁴⁹ This role in ransom mediation helped make this group one of the wealthiest in the eyalet of Tripoli.⁵⁰

2.5. The Converted Christians (Al-'Alaj):

Among the new groups formed by the maritime jihad in Tripoli were the Al-'Alaj, who were European Christian elements. Most of them were men, though some were women, brought in through captivity before converting to Islam. They preferred to integrate with the Ottoman Turks, which is why they became an extraneous element closely associated with naval activities, especially in the 16th and 17th centuries (10th-11th AH). Their numbers dwindled in the 18th century (12th AH) and early 19th century (13th AH), as the navy weakened and the number of captives decreased,⁵¹ Most of the corsairs and captains of the jihadist ships were Al-'Alaj, who were also known as "new Muslims," while the Ottoman Turks and locals constituted a smaller proportion of the corsair crew. The Al-'Alaj came from various ethnic backgrounds, including Italians, Spaniards, Maltese, and Greeks, who converted to Islam and joined the Ottoman army,⁵² Some even reached high positions in the province due to their skills, with some attaining the rank of bey, such as "**Mohamed al-Saqzli**" and his successor "Othman".⁵³

2.6. Prisoners:

The impact of maritime jihad and its revenues led to the emergence of new social groups, including the prisoners. During his campaigns and naval expeditions, Dargouth Pasha captured a number of Christians, whom he employed in beautifying and developing the city. During his time, prisoners were placed in pits known as "matarim," which resembled trenches. In later periods, they were held in places known as "hammams," which were specialized detention facilities for prisoners. The first hammam established in Tripoli was known as the "Old Hammam," created during the reign of Safar Pasha in 1023 AH (1615 AD). It was followed by the "New Hammam" built by Mohamed Pasha al-Saqzli, and the "Modern Hammam" constructed during the reign of Othman Pasha. Additionally, there was the "Castle Hammam," which housed prisoners working for the pasha and officers. The "Fakh Hammam," established during the time of Mohamed Pasha, was named so because its prisoners were involved in making ropes for ships, agricultural work, and cutting rocks, and were considered in worse conditions than those in the city hammams.⁵⁴

Some prisoners remained in chains for periods ranging from thirty to forty years due to the lack of redeemable individuals. The Pasha would auction the prisoners in slave markets, where they were purchased by Ottoman Turks, Jews, and ,⁵⁵ The price of a prisoner was not fixed in the market; rather, it was determined by factors such as age, attractiveness, gender, and the skills they possessed. Among the most sought-after were young women, who were used as domestic servants in markets such as Merzouga, Tripoli, and Benghazi,⁵⁶ Prisoners were assigned various civilian tasks, such as working in lime kilns, farming, and water extraction. Those who belonged to the Pasha were generally in better conditions, performing less strenuous tasks like being doctors, scribes, or translators. In contrast, prisoners without useful skills were sent to work in quarries and mines, shackled by their legs, and required to cut at least ten stones each day,⁵⁷ Some prisoners managed to attain high positions within the eyalet, such as the head of the eyalet, by demonstrating their competence in their work, which led to promotions to higher ranks, including the position of Pasha. For instance, Murad Agha was the first Ottoman governor, while Qilij Ali and Hussein Captain held the title of Admiral of the eyalet. Many also achieved leadership roles in the military, such as Murad the Maltese. Additionally, governors often employed European scribes due to their language skills; for example, in 1083 AH (1673 AD), Piali Pasha hired a scribe from Venice named Mohamed. One reason for the Ottomans' preference for employing or interacting with foreign prisoners was their desire to work with foreign elements and keep local individuals away from important positions in the eyalet.⁵⁸

Table No. 1: Spoils of the Naval Jihad in Tripoli⁵⁹.

Governors of Tripoli	Number of Christian Captives	Ships and Equipment
Murad Agha	300 prisoners	
Durgut	150 prisoners	
Mohammed and Osman Pasha	2450 prisoners	4 ships with goods, 2 Venetian ships, 1 French ship
Ibrahim Mursalli	/	3 English ships, 5 spoils, 4 French ships

Table No. 2: European Liberation of Captive Europeans⁶⁰.

Country	Year	Number of Captives Freed	Equipment
France	1658	400 captives	
	1672	300 captives	
	1677	Failed to free 800 captives	
Malta	1640	14 captives	Frigate
	1678		Sank two ships
	1703		Tripolitan boat (70 men)
	1700		Ship
	1709	50 captives	400 sailors

2.7 Consuls:

As previously mentioned, after Tripoli became under Ottoman rule, it became a vassal state bound by submission and loyalty to the Ottoman Empire. Consequently, it was obligated to implement the treaties that the Ottoman Empire concluded with European countries. It was natural that this situation would result in the presence of European ambassadors at the Ottoman court and consuls from these countries in Tripoli working to protect their commercial and political interests in the region. During the first half of the 17th century (11th century AH), European countries began efforts to establish consulates and appoint consuls and representatives in Tripoli. European nations saw the establishment of consulates in Tripoli as a way to facilitate treaty agreements, secure the release of prisoners, and avoid the maritime raids conducted by Tripolitan sailors against their ships, who demanded tribute or fees to refrain from attacking their vessels.

It is also worth noting that the emergence of European consulates was due to the increase in commercial interests in Tripoli, in addition to the protection of European nationals there. Conversely, similar circumstances led the Ottoman provinces to appoint commercial agents in their capitals and cities,⁶¹ The early beginnings of English consular activity in the province date back to 1658 following the agreement concluded on July 25, 1658 (25 Shawwal 1068 AH) between "Osman Pasha al-Saqizli" and the English fleet commander "Robert Blake" (Robert Blake). Consequently, "Samuel Tucker" was appointed as the first consul of his country in Tripoli,⁶² Tucker worked to protect his country's interests, especially when Tripolitan ships attacked English vessels, by promptly meeting with the Pasha and urging adherence to the agreement made with him. Consulates were also tasked with protecting the interests of English nationals, securing the release of prisoners, and supervising the implementation of the agreements.⁶³

Despite this, the desire to establish consular relations between European nations and the Eyalet of Tripoli remained weak during the studied period. This was attributed to the challenges and obstacles resulting from the shifting political landscape of the Eyalet and the decline in its commercial importance. In an effort to navigate these difficulties, Muhammad Pasha sought to rekindle relations with France, which had recalled its envoy in 1634. However, a few French merchants, such as Baldassare Bayon, who acted as consul, had settled in the Eyalet since 1640 for commercial purposes. Additionally, the representative of the Marseilles consulate, Étienne, had established himself there since 1650. Meanwhile, the English government showed little interest in establishing consular relations with the Eyalet until the latter half of the 17th century. This interest arose following the defeat of the Spanish at Santa Cruz and the Dutch fleet by Admiral Robert Blacke. Consequently, Blacke received instructions from Oliver Cromwell regarding his mission to the Eyalet of Tunisia to conduct bombardments, which was successfully carried out in 1653.⁶⁴

3. Conclusions:

Based on the above, it can be stated:

- The maritime jihad movement had notable economic impacts, as it generated revenues through the capture of prisoners, spoils, and various maritime assets for the Eyalet of Tripoli. This influx of resources revitalized the state's treasury and significantly increased its income.

- The process of selling and redeeming prisoners was conducted based on their origins, numbers, and market value. Additionally, revenues from the spoils of warships and commercial vessels contributed to this process. This underscores that the maritime jihad was a significant component of the Eyalet of Tripoli's revenue.
- The maritime jihad movement also had substantial effects on different social groups. It contributed to the development and improvement of certain groups' conditions while also integrating and creating new groups, such as prisoners, 'Aylaj, and Andalusians. Furthermore, the period saw the arrival of Jewish traders, driven by the diversity and abundance of income during the studied period.
- The maritime jihad movement had a dual nature. Economically, it was a positive force that improved the province's status and contributed to its financial enhancement. Conversely, it also had negative aspects, as some newly formed social groups remained loyal to their places of origin and occasionally seized opportunities to gather intelligence and spy.
- The economic and social impacts of the maritime jihad were interrelated. The economic benefits played a significant role in shaping the dynamic structure of Tripolitanian society, particularly by exacerbating class distinctions.

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