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PIERRE BOURDIEU'S CONCEPTION OF STRUCTURALISM

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ملخص

يتعرض هذا المقال إلى مفهوم بيار بورديو Pierre Bourdieu للمذهب التركيبي في علم الإجتماع. عرف الكاتب في بداية هذا المقال إصطلاح التركيبية حسب وجهة نظر علماء الإجتماع والتربية وعلم النفس والأنتروبولوجيا. وقد حاول شرح هذا المفهوم حسب مجالات المعرفة التي تتعامل مع المذهب التركيبي : اللسانيات، علم النفس، الرياضيات والفلسفة. ويعتبر المذهب التركيبي أسلوب أساسي للتفكير حول الحيات ويهتم بشكل خاص بالرؤية والوصف للتراكيب المختلفة. فهو منهج بحث إنعكست عنه آثار أيديولوجية. ثم ركز الكاتب بعد ذلك على مفهوم بورديو لهذا المذهب. وفي رأي بورديو فإن التركيبية هي تعامل مع الواقع الإجتماعي كنظام يحوي في طياته تلك الضرورة التي تفلت من الوعي العام للفراد. ويقول آخر، يجب التركيز على التراكيب الخفية والعميقة للحقيقة الإجتماعية ولا نأخذ الحوادث الملموسة كإجابات كافية للظواهر الإجتماعية.

INTRODUCTION

One of the major problems in social sciences is the lack of precise definitions of concepts which are commonly used in its literature and which make a kind of misunderstanding and controversy in sociology. Therefore it is necessary to start this work on Bourdieu's structuralism by an attempt to clarify the concept of structuralism itself and its features.

STRUCTURALISM: A DEFINITION

Structuralism is considered as hard to define. It has often taken too many different forms which are deriving essentially from the same basic concept which is:

The structure. Merton (1976) has argued that structuralism has been built on the basic ideas of structure in sociology and it has now been adopted by a variety of discipline such as anthropology, linguistics and biology. (p.32)

The concept of social structure itself has different conceptions and it is actually in a state of controversy in social sciences. Blau (1976) argued that:

> "Structural analysis is both polyphyletic and polymorphous, deriving from different theoretical traditions, the most important of which are rooted in Durkheim's work and Marx's and hence assuming a variety of forms". (p.1).

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Focusing on the comments of Broekman (1974), we find that he has also pointed out the controversial aspect of "structure". He believes that structuralist authors have no agreement about what the structure actually is. He thinks that the motives of this controversy could be that the structures do not exist independently from the immediate context of their definition. Therefore, sociological, linguistic, anthropological or economical definitions of structure cannot lead to a general definition.(p.5)

Despite the difficulty of defining the concept of structure specifically, Broekman (1974) argues that there is some sort of consensus about the nature of structure which is a "combination of relations in which the interdependence of parts (elements) is characterized by their relation to the totality". (p.4). We can bring here as well the definition of Hjelmslev which says that a structure is an "autonomous entity of internal dependencies" (quoted in Barthes, 1974, p 5).

Structuralism as we have emphasised before, has taken different definitions according to the kind of discipline in question. For instance, the mathematicians considered structuralism as "opposed to compartmentalization which it counteracts by recovering unity through isomorphism". (Piaget, 1971, p.11). For several generations of linguists, structuralism is mainly shifting from the study of isolated linguistic phenomena which had dominated in the nineteenth century towards an emphasis on the functioning of unified language systems. In psychology structuralism has rejected the idea of the atomistic tendency which simplify wholes to their basic elements. In current philosophical discussions, it is quite clear that structuralism has triumphed over the explanation given to history and all theories that have recourse to the human subject. (Piaget 1971 p. 4). The different attitudes of structuralists in diverse subjects has been well expressed by Richard de George (1972) when he said that "structuralism is a loose, amorphous, manyfaceted phenomenon which no clear lines of demarcation" (p.11).

One of the most fruitful attempts at a definition of structuralism has been pointed out by Jean Piaget (1971). He said that the idea of structuralism is built on the following fundamental points:

a) The idea of wholeness: The structures are characterised by a certain wholeness which is consensual amongst all structuralists, since all of them

recognize that there is a fundamental contrast between "structures" and "aggregates". The former are taken as wholes, the latter are considered as composites formed of elements which are independent of each other. The elements of the structure are governed by laws and it is in terms of these laws that the structure is defined as a whole or a system (Piaget, 1971 p.6 and 7).

b) The idea of transformation. The structure is not a static phenomenon. It has constant movement. Piaget (1971) points out that: "If character of structured wholes depend on their laws of compositions, these laws must of their very nature be structuring". (p.10).
Therefore, the structure has to be in permanent transformation so as avoid a reduction to the level of passive forms. For instance, language which is a basic human structure has the capacity to transform various fundamental sentences into the widest variety of new utterances at the same time keeping them within its particular structure. (Hawkes, 1977 p.16).

c) The idea of self-regulation. According to Piaget (1971), the third basic property of structures is as he said: "They are self-regulating; self-relation, entailing self-maintenance and closure". (p.13 and 14). He points out also that the structure conserves its properties and has a stability of boundaries despite the construction of indefinitely many new elements. This fact presupposes that structures are self-regulating in the sense that it makes no appeals beyond itself in order to manipulate its transformational procedures. If we refer to example of language given by Hawkes (1977), we find that the language does not construct its formation of words by reference to the patterns of "reality" but it is constructed on the basic of its own internal laws (p.16). Piaget (1971) argues that it is the self-regulating system which makes the idea of structure so important and accounts for the high hopes it raises in all domains of inquiry. When an area of knowledge could be reduced to a self-regulating system or "structure", this means that it has gained a kind of self-generating source of movement. (p.14).

In addition to piaget's definition of structuralism, we feel that it is useful to expose other definitions. For instance, Hawkes (1977) defines structuralism as a "Fundamental way of thinking about the world which is predominantly concerned with the perception and description of structures". (p.17). Scholes (1974) said that:

> "Structuralism is at present only a methodology with ideological implications. But it is a methodology which is seeking nothing less than the unification of all the sciences into a new system of belief". (p.2).

This standpoint of scholes about structuralism, is shared also with Bovon (1974) when he argues that structuralism has become a fad and ideology which necessitate a confrontation from the Christian theologian. He argues on the other hand that structuralism is a method also which could serve a lot the theologians for better understanding the Biblical texts.(p.6 and 7).

Coming again to the views of Scholes (1974), we find that he believes in the existence of a certain opposition between Marxism and structuralism in many ways but:

> "They share a "scientific" view of the world as both real in itself and intelligible to man. Both Marxism and structuralism are integrative, holistic ways of looking at the world including man". (p.3).

He believes as well that structuralism is a "way of looking for reality not in individual things but in the relation-ship among them". (p.11). He quoted Wittgenstein as insisting that "the world is the totality of facts not of things".(p.4).

Referring to the point of view of Broekman (1974), we observe that it is quite similar to that Scholes (1974).Broekman (1974) thinks that structuralism is a kind of holistic approach which has many philosophical implications that are quite different from those contained in existential philosophies. The first difference that could be regarded is that every existentialist thinker assumed that the thoughts developed are genuine philosophical thoughts. On the other hand, structuralists, avoiding taking decisions beforehand are no longer restricted to the traditional laws and habits of philosophical reasoning. Broekman (1974) points out also that structuralism is presented as a holistic interpretation of reality using philosophical argumentations, but at the same time structuralist method tries to avoid the leading of their argument to philosophy. Structuralism, therefore "presents itself as a specific activity, a modus operandi in reality itself". (p.7). As a structuralist, Barthes (1974) explains that:

"The goal of every structuralist activity, whether reflective or creative, consists of reconstructing an "object" in such a way that this reconstruction reveals the rules according to which the object functions". (Quoted in Broekman, 1974 p.3).

Another explanation of structuralism could be drawn from the definition of Robey (1973). He said that the formal beginnings of structuralism has been in the theses presented collectively by the members of the Prague Linguistic Circle to the first International Congress of Slavic philologists held in Prague in 1929. The theses introduced the notion of structures as a function system to be understood with regards to its aim (that of communication. The theses proposed the structure as a system, that is the manner in which the individual elements of a particular language are arranged and functioning relation of mutual dependence. Since the languages are different from each other, this means that the isolated elements of a system can only be understood in the light of the system as a whole. Therefore the primary object of the linguistic discipline must be the structure of the system itself rather than the individual linguistic fact. (p.1).

Relying on the efforts of the Prague circle authors, Robey (1973) draws attention to the definition of structuralism which is:

"That approach- to any subject - which has a its object, in the words of the theses, the "laws of solidarity", then "reciprocal relations" of the different facts under observation, rather than considering these facts in isolation". (p.1 and 2).

PIERRE BOURDIEUS'S CONCEPTION OF STRUCTURALISM

Pierre Bourdieu has been known among sociologists and educationists as a structuralist. For instance, Brian Davies (1976) calls him a structuralists influenced by the anthropological tradition of Durkheim kennett (1973) and Musgrove (1979) argue that Bourdieu is a structuralist and mainly inclined towards the doctrine of Marxism because of his criticisms and rejection of French capitalist society. Bourdieu's structuralism is based essentially on the contradiction with the substantialist way of thinking which conceives relations among elements in their factual existence instead of considering them in their reciprocal relations. Bourdieu argues that:

> The philosophical glosses which have dominated, one time, structuralism, forget what is new and essential in this tendency: to introduce in the social sciences the structural method.
>
> Or more simply, the relational way of thinking, is against the substantialist may of thinking, which conduct to characterize every element by the relations that unite it with others in the system." (1980 p. II).

There are at least important differences between "global" structuralism and deliberate "analytic" structuralism. Durkheim, for instance, is merely global because he seeks the explanation of phenomena from the totality of components. For example, the social whole arises for itself from the union of components. Global structuralism holds to systems of observable relations and interactions, which are regarded as sufficient unto themselves. On the other hand, analytic structuralism which is represented by Levi-Strauss, who speaks of "laws of compositions" and also Mauss who is regarded by Levi-Strauss as an analytic structutalist especially for his studies of the gift, where he sought and found the details of transformational interactions. Analytic structuralism seeks to explain empirical systems by postulating "deep" structures from which the former are in some manner derivable. The structures in this sense are logico-mathematical models of the observed social relations, they do not themselves belong to the realm of "fact". (Piaget 1971 pp. 97-98).

If we try to classify Bourdieu's structuralism, according to these two previously stated tendencies, we can say that he is an analytical structuralist, because, though he has been influenced by Durkheim's anthropology, he believes like Levi-Strauss and Mauss, in the existence of "deep" structures from which he starts the sociological interpretations. Kennett (1973 p.239) argues that Bourdieu believes in a hidden structure structuring the unseen "reality" of the social system.

According to Pouillon (1960) the structuralists claim that historical realities should be analysed structurally, and this is what they have been trying to prove so far. But the question is that we can accept that the relations should be analysed structurally, but who made them like that in the first place? This is a fundamental objection to structuralism. Structuralism permits the analysis of the "constitute" and not the "constituent".

The answer of Sartre to this question in that we have to bear in mind that the structure could be understood by the "praxis". In Sartre's and Levi-Strauss's point of view, the notions of structure and praxis are complementary to each other; they are the face of the same reality. Sartre considers the relation between the structure and "praxis" not as cause and effect between action and product but it is a dialectic exchange which we cannot privilege one of them. He said that man is always conditioned and always surpasses his conditions. (Pouillon 1960 p.788). Pouillon (1960) argues that the articles of Pierre Bourdieu could be read in this perspective. He said Bourdieu developed an idea which we could find in M. Godelier, which is non-linear determination, non-limited relation to the two elements which unite, but always mediated by the structural ensemble of relations where they are inserted, and it is done by the crucial example of the individual creator action, this shows that dialectic of praxis and structural causality are not-in contradiction, and suggesting that they are complementary to each other and inextricably related (Pouillon 1960 p. 789).

Bourdieu (1968) believes that the structuralist approach in anthropology has played a role in vanquishing the fictitious originality given to anthropological knowledge through its spontaneous theories. The originality of structuralism in anthropology has developed principles that are diametrically opposed to the spontaneous theory of knowledge of man and society. Therefore, when anthropology undertakes the task to found itself upon principles that are similar to any theory of scientific knowledge, it has to overcome epistemological obstacles that are different from those faced by the natural sciences (p.681).

The originality of anthropological structuralism is based essentially on the fact that it attacks from the beginning the substantialist way of thinking which modern mathematics and physics have constantly refused. It is only in recent times that it has been possible to break with the substantialist way of thinking which conceives geometrical figures in their factual existence instead of considering them in their reciprocal, and it has finally become possible to perceive that single elements only help their properties by virtue of the relations linking one with another within a system, in other words, considering the function they fulfil within the system of relations. It has been possible to discover also that any geometry is nothing but a pure system of relations determined by the principles governing them and not by the intrinsic

nature of the figures entering those relations. As an example, Bourdieu (1968) draws attention to Euclidean geometry. He said that points, lines and planes in that theory could be replaced by an infinite different signs without affecting the validity of the corresponding theorems (p.682).

I understand from Bourdieu's arguments that the principles of anthropology, in structural terms, should reach the point of physics and mathematics in its abstractions and validity concerning various social phenomena. But recognizing the degree of difficulty of this fact, he said:

> One can immediately see all the epistemological obstacles, anthropology must overcome in order to deal with its subject cultural systems and systems of social relations as modern geometry deals with its subject, that is, systems defined not by some substantial "content" but only by the laws of combination of their constitutive elements," (Bourdieu 1968 p.683).

Bourdieu (1968) argues that in order to deal with things such as language, culture or a complex of social relations as systems having internal coherence and necessity, we are bound to overrule the opposition between formal eternal truths of logic and mathematics and contingent empirical of history. He conceives the method of structuralism as founded on the postulate that experience is a system by dropping the fact of opposition between what is formal and what is real, reason and experience. However, the postulate of the systematic character of empirical facts requires the overcoming of another epistemological obstacle which is proper to the sciences of man. In fact, it consists in the artificialism inherent in the spontaneous philosophy of the social world, where the social subjects are inclined to deny the social world the immanent necessity they recognize in the natural one. Avoiding such artificialism, Bourdieu is in favour of dealing with social reality as a system that:

> "... has immanent necessity, independent of individual's consciousness and will, and that, therefore, must be explored in the same way as the relationships among facts of the physical world." (Bourdieu 1968 p.84).

Giving more support to his arguments, Bourdieu (1968) stated the views of the founders of social sciences, Marx and Durkheim, as explicitly saying in their theoretical writings and scientific practice that:

> "Structuralism simply reaffirms the postulate of the systematic character, social world, thus, divesting individual consciousness of the gnoseological privilege granted to it by the spontaneous theory of the social." (p.684).

Bourdieu (1968) recognizes that there are considerable difficulties which hinder the methodological decision to consider a cultural formation such as language, myth or ritual as a system having the key to its own interpretation and to draw from the facts themselves the code for unravelling their meaning. The problem posed is that the symbols of cultural formations, such as myths or rituals- even more than language -do not have the clarity of the symbols of formal logic and therefore, they are arbitrary and perceived in an arbitrary sense. They appear as concrete individualities that must be dealt with in themselves and for themselves, rather than in their relations with all phenomena in the same class. Bourdieu (1968) draws attention to the myths, rituals or oven literature or philosophical work, belonging to different traditions, which have been shielded against interpretation

> "...because they give an appearance of sense to partial and selective readings, where the meanings of each symbolic element is expected to derive from a special revelation rather than from its methodically established relation with all the other elements of the same class." (Bourdieu 1968 p.685).

The interpretation, of myths and rituals on the basis of substantial elements rather than on the relation of these elements to others is due to the fact of allowing to assign one meaning to each symbol separately taken. Bourdieu (1968) gives the example of books on dreams (specifically known in France) which have even discouraged the intention of referring each symbolic element to the total system of manifestation from which it derives its trues sense. (Bourdieu 1968 p.685).

The partial and atomic interpretation is found without difficulty among sociologists. A lot of them, yielding to an easy task, take the statistical table as the unit of interpretation and expose an entire coherent body of prepositions that might be derived from every table. This is against a system of hypotheses which owes its epistemological value to coherence. The system of hypotheses, as Bourdieu believes,

" Cannot receive the immediate and easy corroboration that facts at their face value or documents literally taken would provide:
its verification is only made possible by the whole coherence of the total system of facts created by -and not for- the theoretical hypotheses." (Bourdieu 1968).

The sociologist sets in motion a circular process in his analysis of the facts drawn by an investigation. Starting to investigate the complex of responses by a questionnaire, and interpreting the meaning of each question by the way he has elicited and built the responses and in the end reformulating the meaning of the whole in the light of what he learns from each of the responses. In Bourdieu's view, the structuralist approach can be established in research provided that all automatic routines in scientific practice are ignored. (Bourdieu 1968 p.886).

Bourdieu (1968) quoted Duhem description the progress of physics which can be applied to the progress of any structural research. He said:

" A symbolic painting to which incessant retouching gives greater extent and unity..., while each detail, cut off from the whole, loses any meaning and no longer represents anything." (p.688).

Bourdieu (1968) made a comparison between the theoretical construction in physics and in cultural and social formations. He points out the example of Hertz who differentiates himself from positivism when he stresses that in order to verify a theory it is not necessary to verify each single proposition but only the complete system of propositions. That is to mean that no element in a theory of nature, such as the notion of force or mass, can be isolated in order to be verified by an objective correlate. The concepts are conceived in their totality, or more exactly, in their mutual relations. The theory in natural and physical sciences is not a literal translation based upon an exact correspondence with the real such as the fashion of the mechanical model of ancient physics. It is now, as Bourdieu sees it,

" The structure of symbols symbolizes the structure of relations established by experience in such a way that the relation between reason and experience, is still a structural homology." (Bourdieu 1968 pp. 688-689).

For better understanding of the theoretical construction in physics, Bourdieu (1968) quoted Juvet as saying:

> " In the rushing flux of phenomena, in ever changeable reality, the physicist observes something permanent, in order to describe it his mind builds geometry, kinematics, mechanical models whose axioms fulfil the purpose of specifying that which, for what of a better term, we shall call useful understanding of the different concepts formed after experience and observation. If the axioms thus built are representations of a group whose invariants allow for the translation into reality of all permanent elements discovered empirically, physical theory is free from contradictions and is a reflection of reality." (Juvet 1933 quoted in Bourdieu 1968 p. 689).

The theoretical construction of social formation resist more than cultural formations the application of such a meta-theory. In the first place, social relations and institutions, like cultural facts, are endowed a necessary character which makes them appear to individuals as natural and partaking a human nature because of their belonging to a system of relations among relations. Social relations or institutions, in Bourdieu's view, should be conceived as - arbitrary constructs- they stand unquestioned concerning their belonging to the system and are rather apprehended in themselves, in absolute terms and in their apparent necessity. Secondly, the logical constitutions of facts as elements of a system of relations find here some particular difficulties. The elements in mutual relationship are individual agents which are directly perceptible and immediately located in here and now, and therefore, they insistently demand to be conceived of in their separate existence, as if they had a real autonomy as against the system of relation of which they are part and by which they are produced. The deduction of Bourdieu here is that in order to focus the methodological decision upon the relationships rather than on the elements composing them you must reckon with this ensrealissimum of the spontaneous theory of the social. He said that the subject is more resistant than geometrical figures to the effect of grasping the system of relations from which it derives its reason d'etre and even the appearance of an autonomous existence. For example, the objective relations among the subject's social positions are usually reduced in the substantialist theory, to the "inter-subjective relations" which actually involve the individuals occupying those positions. Such a procedure, however, ignores the fact that the

characteristic of social relations is precisely that of existing even if the subjects they involve(employers and workers, educated and uneducated people, etc.) do not have any direct relationship, even if they have never met and will never meet within the same here and now. It also ignores the fact that the actual relations among subjects (and a number of kinds of conducts as well cultural practices) always imply an objective reference to the objective relations of positions which define their form and content. (Bourdieu 1968 p.690).

Bourdieu (1968) stresses that

> "Only a radical break with the spontaneous way of thought and perception which allows us to perceive that, for instance, the actual relations among agents constituting the intellectual field owe their specific form to the position each agent occupies within such a field, to the extent that each of these relations is dominated and defined by the objective relations between the positions of the agents that enter it- such an objective relation being itself defined by its belonging to the intellectual field conceived as a system of relations." (p.691).

In the same way, Bourdieu (1968) conceives the relations between individuals from different social classes as determined by the objective relations (p.691). He goes far more to say that:

> "Being established among social conditions and positions (e.g. those defining a class situation), objective relations have more reality than the subjects involved, than the direct or mediated relations actually taking place among the agents, than the representations the agents form of these relations." (p.691).

If one ignores the objective relations this leads to treating all the characteristics observable or even disclosed by experimentation as if they were substantial properties, attached by nature to individuals or classes of individuals. Most usages of concepts, at the same time, descriptive and explanatory such as "motivations", "tendencies", "needs", "inclinations", or "aspirations", rest upon a bracketing of the system of objective relations. Social science has to act like physics where they have removed any sign of substantialism by replacing the notion of force with that of form. In the same way, social science

could do away with the idea of human nature only by substituting for it the structure it conceals. That is, by considering as product of a system of relations the properties that the spontaneous theory of the social ascribes to a substance. (Bourdieu 1968 p.692).

Bourdieu (1968) argues that:

> "The system of objective relations in which the individuals find themselves and which are more adequately expressed in the economy and morphology of groups rather than in the individual's declared opinions, contains the principle of the "satisfaction" or "dissatisfaction" they feel of the conflicts they experience or of the expectations and ambitions they express. It constitutes, therefore, the condition for a complete understanding of the lived-through relationship individuals hold with their objectivated truth within a system of objective relations." (p.693).

We have exposed the point of view of Bourdieu which stresses the fact the social sciences and anthropology should focus principally on the objective relations rather than on the subjects and objects or reduce social relations to relations among "subjects". In his opinion, there are reasons that prevent scientists from using this methodology of objective relations. He said that science conceals the objective relations and in order to make them explicit it is necessary to shatter the apparent relations that are already existing. One of the obstacles to objective relations are the ideological representations which the science of objective relations reveals at once theoretical fallacy and social function". (Bourdieu 1968 p.693).

Bourdieu (1968) believes that it is useless to hope that the revelation of the objective truth of social relations, by force of its own evidence and truth alone, can break down the ideologies contained in the methodology of "participation" and "communication" which is conveyed and guaranteed by certain kinds of social psychology and predisposed to become the justification of the enterprises or institutions. This is the error of those who believe in the virtues of the dialogue and of the face to face situation and socio-drama or non-directed interviews. These well-founded errors in the form of ideological representations, offer to science an organized and systematic resistance because they are supported by the whole social order they in turn help to support. The social system tends to conceal its truth by

using all the "techniques" and the logic of camouflage. The relations and their real configurations are in some way lost, confused, blurred and disfigured in the intertwining of their appearances. Anyone who has done research work in social sciences realizes the degree of precaution one has to take in order to avoid the false trails contained in the object itself and to resist the numerous difficult epistemological obstacles that could face him. The researcher is always found in the situation where he has to take ready-made interpretations that reality insistently proposes to him often in a deceiving way, even without any intention of doing so. (Bourdieu 1968 p.694).

Bourdieu (1968) points out that

" The adequate theory of the object implies the theory of the social conditions in which are produced the pre-constructed objects that are proposed by ideology and that constitute the major obstacle to the formulation of an adequate theory of the object." (p.695);

This highly abstract quotation from Bourdieu could be made clear by the following example. A sociologist may study juvenile delinquency, as a social problem by means of statistical techniques where he could establish relations between types of delinquency and the different characteristics of delinquents such as sex, social origin, level of education, employment or unemployment, membership in a more or less integrated family milieu, etc. In so doing he is bound to an explanatory system- as his own production and interpretation- which, in fact, has been objectively imposed on him by the pre-constructed object which he has allowed to be imposed upon himself, if he fails to investigate the institutional conditions that produce delinquents. Such conditions, in Bourdieu's view, include institutions and agents that are responsible for curbing delinquency and identifying delinquents; from the people in the neighbourhood where the first complaints are made, up to the judges in the children's courts, passing through police officers and social workers; it includes also the values and the conscious or unconscious representations of the "social order". (Bourdieu 1968 p.696).

Bourdieu (1968) points out also the attitude of Erving Goffman defending himself in his study of what he calls total institutions against the substitution of the object. Goffman refuses to accept the social definition of insanity according to which the "given" is constructed and described instead the logic of the process of "alienation" by which a society chooses and

produces its "insane" population. In short, each institution (or class of institutions constitutes a system which plays a role in shaping the kinds of logic accepted socially and used by researchers as unquestioned reality. The solution envisaged by Bourdieu to escape the ideological considerations of those cases that have been able to resist any interpretation for so long and they are perceived as they "demand" to be, that is in their specificity, is that

> "Science must construct a system which alone can reveal the hidden truth of the case considered because it contains the principle of its own interpretation. For this purpose it must use the hypothesis of analogies among facts claiming to be considered in themselves and for themselves, or between the fact directly studied and the complex of logically possible facts constituting the class of which the particular fact is a part from a sociological viewpoint." (p.697).

In Bourdieu's view, the systematic application of the structural approach brings new scientific attitudes in research. Firstly, there is a break which is made with the verbiage about totality inherited from the philosophical tradition of the "objective spirit", and with the holistic or "configurationistic" intuitionism which consists in the belief that a social system expresses in each of its parts the action of one and the same principle, and found it possible to recapture in a sort of central intuition" the unitary and unique logic of a culture. This implies disregarding the methodical study of the different sub-systems and the investigation of their real interrelations. Secondly, there is a break with the hair splitting hyper-empiricism which is unable to conceive of the synthesis of the "givens" accumulated other than as of a convenient compilation of small facts and of relations detached from their context. Finally, the structural approach made a break with the spontaneous philosophy of knowledge of the social world when taking the decision to give methodological primacy to objective relations as against the agents entering them and the representations they may form of them. This constitutes an inevitable moment in the progress of any science of man (Bourdieu 1968 p. 702).

Spelling out the principles upon which the structural approach is founded, Bourdieu argues that :

" Anthropological science cannot constitute itself except by constructing its object as a system of objective relations, at the price of bracketing the native experience of apparent relations, that it still has to build the system able to encompass both the objective sense of conducts organized according to observable and measurable regularities, and the particular relations that individual agents hold with the regularities objectively defining their condition of existence and the objectiveness of their conduct- a sense which possesses them because they are dispossessed of it." (Bourdieu 1968 p.704).

Having emphasised the necessity of studying the objective relations in anthropology rather than relations between the agents, Bourdieu points out also the role of the habitus as a mediator between the system of objective regularities and the system of directly observable conducts. He said:

"Without falling back into a naive subjectivism, or "personalism" one must remember that, ultimately, objective relations do not exist and to not really realize themselves except in and through the system of dispositions of the agents produced by the internalization of objective conditions." (Bourdieu 1968 p.705).

CONCLUSION

The structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu is essentially based on the fact that it attacks from the beginning the substantialist way of thinking which conceives relations among elements in their factual existence instead of considering them in their reciprocal relations. In Bourdieu's view, the single elements only held their properties by virtue of the relations that link one with another within a system and the function they fulfil within the system of relations. Bourdieu's conception implies that the principles of anthropology should become like the laws of physical sciences and mathematics, but he recognizes the difficulties involved in such perspective. The structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu emphasises the fact that we should deal with social reality as a system that has immanent necessity and which is independent of individual's consciousness. In other words, we should focus on the hidden and deep structure of social reality and we should not take the concrete facts as sufficient explanation of the society.

Bourdieu points out that it is quite difficult to conceive the cultural formations such as myths, or rituals even more than language as phenomena that have a relational aspect because they do not have the clarity of the symbols of formal logic and therefore they are arbitrary and perceived an arbitrary sense. They, in fact, appear as concrete individualities that must be dealt with in themselves and for themselves rather than in their relations with all phenomena in the same class.

What Bourdieu is asking for is to conceive the

> "...actual relations among agents constituting the intellectual field...to the extent that each of these relations is dominant and defined by the objective relations between the positions of the agents." (Bourdieu 1968 p.691).

He conceives the relations between individuals from different social class as determined by the objective relations. He goes far to say that objective relations have more reality than the subject involved.

From the comparison of the structuralism of Pierre Bourdieu with that of Levi-Strauss and other structuralists, I think that he shares a lot of ideas and concepts with other structuralists, but he still has some conceptions which are idiosyncratic such as objective relations.

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