Examples of Modernists' Suspension of Revelation Texts Under the Pretext of Implementing Maqasid al-Sharia - Presentation and Critique -

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Abstract

This study presents a critical evaluation of the modernist approach to Islamic legal texts and rulings, by analyzing selected cases in which scriptural injunctions are set aside under the pretext of applying the objectives of Sharia (Maqāṣid al-Sharīʿah). It demonstrates that modernist discourse often rests on a selective reading of Islamic sources, influenced by contemporary social, cultural, and ideological shifts. This approach tends to prioritize historical context and overarching objectives at the expense of established jurisprudential rulings. The study concludes that, while the consideration of maqāṣid is integral to Islamic legal reasoning, it must not entail the circumvention of definitive scriptural texts or the invalidation of their rulings—rulings that were revealed precisely to secure human welfare and uphold the public good.

Keywords

Modernity;
Modernists;
Maqasid al-Sharia;
Maqasid;
Interest.

نماذج من تعطيل الحداثيين لنصوص الوحي بدعوى تطبيق مقاصد الشريعة -عرض ونقد -

ملخص

تتناول هذه الدراسة بتقييم نقدي للمنهج الحداثي في التعامل مع النصوص والأحكام الفقهية في الشريعة الإسلامية، من خلال عرض بعض الأمثلة على تعطيلهم لنصوص الوحي بدعوى تطبيق مقاصد الشريعة. وتُظهر الدراسة أن الخطاب الحداثي غالباً ما يستند إلى قراءة انتقائية للمصادر الإسلامية، متأثراً بالتحولات الاجتماعية والثقافية والإيديولوجية المعاصرة، حيث يتم إيلاء الأولوية للسياق التاريخي وأهداف الشريعة (مقاصد الشريعة) على حساب الأحكام الفقهية. وتخلص الدراسة إلى أنه الرغم من أهمية اعتبار المقاصد في بناء الأحكام، إلا أن ذلك لا يعني أبدا تجاوز النصوص القطعية الثابتة وإبطال ما دلت عليه من أحكام، والتي ما شرعت إلا لتحقيق الخير والمصلحة للإنسان.

الكلمات المفتاحية

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Introduction:

Modernists invoke (Islamic) Maqasid to pass their intellectual projects and "enlightenment" propositions. Despite their varied personalities and writings, they agree on suspending religious texts and dropping their decisions under the pretext of considering human interest. They twist the texts to respond to their preconceived ideas and predetermined motives, striving to remove religious texts from being a focal point and source of guidance for Muslims and all people.

They consider that renewal must be centered around activating the essence of Sharia and its supreme objectives, such as justice, equality, freedom, dignity, and tolerance, rather than adhering to the literal religious texts and the verdicts they indicate. This can only be achieved by invoking an evolutionary view of Islamic rules, as they are seen as "deeply rooted psychologies from pre-Islamic times, without being an objective of Islam. The decisions established for them, whether confirming or modifying them, remain as long as these practices remain. If these practices disappear, their verdicts disappear with them, and their complete disappearance does not harm Islam. This includes issues like slavery, polygamy, and similar matters that cannot be considered even as part of Islam".

Accordingly, in their view, these Islamic rules must be abandoned because applying them in today's reality negates the historical circumstances and contexts in which these decisions came, and neglects the legislator's intentions in enacting and enforcing them.

The modernist theorization of Maqasid - as well as its applications, as will be shown through this section - has been flawed with many methodological and epistemological shortcomings. It is far from a disciplined scientific approach, devoid of even the minimum standards of objectivity and balanced reference. It lacks seriousness in presentation and credibility in handling, contradicting natural disposition, transmitted knowledge, reason, and even the reality from which they claim to start and to which they refer.

The examples of modernist discourse slipping into labyrinths of severe distortion and confusion are countless, as they have employed their infatuated thought and decayed approach in various areas of religion, both creed and law, in matters of monotheism and faith, matters of the unseen and its givens, worship and transactions, Islamic politics and international relations, judiciary and Islamic punishments, personal status and women's jurisprudence, etc. Since the purpose of this section is to provide examples rather than an exhaustive account, I will mention some models here, limiting myself to three examples they have frequently discussed: their position on implementing Islamic punishments, women's share in inheritance, and the views on dealing with usury in this era.

I. Their position on Implementing Islamic Punishments (Hudud and Qisas)

Modernists argue that Islamic punishments cannot be applied in our present era, claiming that reality has changed and interests have shifted. They contend that these punishments no longer achieve the objectives of Sharia, so they must be abandoned and replaced with contemporary penalties that fulfill the spirit of Sharia and suit the system of modern, civilized states, not the cultures and customs of primitive, backward societies.

They view these punishments as inconsistent with the spirit of Islam and its higher objectives, such as tolerance, gentleness, mercy, and ease. Instead, they believe these punishments associate Islam with violence, cruelty, extremism, and barbarity in the eyes of global public opinion, as they are based on "retaliation and corporal punishment, which are punishments aimed at inflicting pain, such as stoning". [1]They argue it would be more appropriate to focus on "rehabilitating the deviant, or at least isolating and removing them from harming others".[2]

By employing the Maqasid dimension of Sharia, modernists make the prevention and reduction of crime the general objective of punishments that must be considered and achieved. They argue that the means to achieve this objective are not specified, and thus each society can legislate punishments that suit its circumstances in time and place, as long as the means achieve that general objective.

Abdul Majid Al-Sharfi, for instance, sees that Qisas (retaliation) is not intended for itself, but rather the intention is to punish the killer, which can be achieved through imprisonment, for example. He says: "Qisas is not intended for itself, but for what life requires in its simplest meanings. Therefore, the death penalty can be replaced by imprisonment or other means, and this does not contradict the general Quranic principle".[3]

Similarly, Abdullah Al-Alayli believes that implementing Qisas "does not align with the spirit of the Quran, which made Qisas a preservation of life and a spread of security, not to make society a group of disfigured individuals - one with a severed hand, another with a severed leg, another with a gouged eye, or a clipped ear, or a cut nose".[4]

Regarding the punishment for theft, Abdul Majid Al-Sharfi states: "There is no doubt that cutting off the hand of the thief was a practice known before Islam. It is natural for the punishment for theft to be severe in the context of a Bedouin

society and generally in a subsistence economy, as theft could lead to the demise of the victim. Perhaps this severe punishment was the only means to maintain a minimum level of order in the absence of a political authority extending its influence to all members of society. Corporal punishments in general, from beating and flogging to amputation and even execution, were considered normal, with people seeing no alternative for establishing and stabilizing any society. The Quranic text was thus fully consistent with the circumstances of the time. However, this does not mean closing the door to other forms of punishment as societies evolve and values more in harmony with this development emerge, considering corporal punishments and all forms of torture as contrary to human dignity. In other words, cutting off the hand of the thief, like any other punishment, is not an end in itself. There is no harm in abandoning it and replacing it with other punishments that align with the conditions of modern Islamic societies, as long as 'the purpose' can be achieved by other means. Undoubtedly, the abolition of this punishment in most Islamic countries has not distanced Muslims from the spirit of the Mohammadan message".[5]

Similar to Abdul Majid Al-Sharfi's view is Mohammed Abed Al-Jabri's statement: "Cutting off the hand of the thief is a completely reasonable measure in a nomadic desert society where people live in constant movement". [6]He criticized Islamic jurists for making the punishment for theft "a legal ruling rather than just a custom".[7]

In the view of modernists, adultery is "limited to the sexual relationship between a man and a woman, one of whom is married; because only this relationship can be considered a crime, as it simultaneously violates virtue and infringes upon and betrays the rights of others" . [8] They argue that its punishment need not be as specified in the Quran - as they deny stoning, claiming it is only mentioned in isolated Hadith. They contend that "this punishment was intended to prevent the spread of immorality and the mixing of lineages in a society that, like Bedouin societies, placed great importance on purity of lineage, and where men had no need for illicit sexual relations. The matter should not be limited to a specific punishment, as this is among the changeable and unstable matters".[9]

Thus, we find that modernist thought has used Maqasid-based interpretations as a pretext to abolish Sharia punishments, including Hudud and Qisas, replacing them with other punishments like imprisonment. Upon reflection, this modernist Maqasid discourse appears to prioritize the interest of the individual (the criminal) at the expense of society's interest. This approach, aside from explicitly contradicting Sharia, also contradicts wisdom and reason. A diseased limb whose retention causes the spread of disease to the entire body, potentially leading to death, must wisely be amputated. Although amputation involves harshness, it is, in reality, a mercy and cure for the rest of the body. Similarly, a thief - for example - who has not benefited from encouragement or discouragement, and for whom promises and threats have been ineffective, choosing the path of aggression and injustice over guidance and goodness, leaves no solution to curb his evil and corruption except punishing him with that prescribed punishment. While it may involve harshness and harm to him - due to his own actions - it undoubtedly brings mercy and benefit to society at large.

While cutting off some transgressing hands may cause partial disability for their owners in their work and production, the imprisonment of thousands of thieves for months and years results in an even greater disruption to them. Additionally, prison often serves - in many cases - as an excellent school for teaching crime and establishing connections between criminals. These are two corrupting factors that must be weighed in the balance.

On the other hand, merely announcing the implementation of the punishment of cutting off the thief's hand leads to the deterrence of a large number of thieves, relieving society from their thefts, trials, guarding, and feeding them in prisons. How much more effective would it be if this punishment were actually implemented? It could potentially reduce the crime of theft to a tenth or less. This means we would be faced with great benefits reaped by individuals, society, the state, its institutions, and its budget, in exchange for a few individuals who would be partially harmed by what they have unjustly and aggressively earned.

If we look at the issue from its various beneficial aspects, does there remain any room to assume that the prescribed punishment for theft is no longer suitable for the objectives of Sharia, the interests of individuals and society, and our current circumstances? [10]

2. Women's Share of Inheritance

Modernist voices have risen demanding equality between males and females in inheritance, citing the change in women's social status in the present era. They argue that women have moved from the confines of the home to the breadth of life, competing with men and often excelling in various fields of life including education, work, politics, and culture. Women have proven their competence and ability to achieve successes and victories in many areas. All this, they argue, necessitates a review of women's share of inheritance, equalizing it with men's.

They contend that today's woman is not the same as the woman of pre-Islamic times who was secluded in her home and financially dependent on others. Today's woman works as a man does, earns as he does, and spends as he does. Therefore,

they argue, she should have an equal share of inheritance. They claim this does not contradict the intent, essence, and spirit of Islam, which came with justice, fairness, and equality, not injustice, oppression, and favoritism.

They also claim that when Islam came, it found women deprived of rights, if not entirely devoid of them. Women were bought and sold, had no inheritance or property, and were themselves inherited like possessions. Islam, they say, elevated women's status, bringing them out of a state akin to slavery and giving them, like men, a prescribed share of inheritance. However, as bequeathing to women was heavily opposed by pre-Islamic customs, Islam wisely adjusted it by making her share half that of a man. They argue that Islam was wise in gradually improving women's rights to avoid dangerous rapid change.

According to this analysis, Islam aspired to achieve the objective of justice and fairness for women by giving them their full right to inheritance. Therefore, they argue, Islam did not establish the lower inheritance of women as a fundamental principle, but rather as a necessary phase towards achieving equality between men and women in inheritance when circumstances changed and minds became ready to accept it. They claim that time has now come, and this equality should be established .[11]

Al-Jabri says: Let's take the example of a daughter's share of inheritance in Islam, which is one-third, as evident from the Quranic verse: "For the male, what is equal to the share of two females" .[12] How do we read this view in a way that makes it contemporary to itself and to us at the same time? The Quran does not explain the considerations that justify this distinction, so we must use reason by referring to the objectives (Maqasid), reasons for revelation, and Arab customs.

In reality, Arab society during pre-Islamic times and the time of the Prophet was a tribal, pastoral society. The relationship between pastoral tribes was one of conflict over pastures. Marriage in such a society, if it involved marrying a daughter to someone outside her tribe, raised problems related to inheritance in case of her father's death. If she were to take a share of what was left, whether livestock or just the right to common pasture, this share would go to her husband's tribe at the expense of her father's tribe, which could cause disputes and wars. To avoid such conflicts, some pre-Islamic tribes resorted to not giving daughters any inheritance at all, while others gave them a third or less.

If we add to this the limited circulation of wealth in tribal society, it becomes easy to understand how inheriting daughters could lead to an economic imbalance between tribes, especially with the prevalence of polygamy. Undoubtedly, Islam took this situation into account and considered the aspect of benefit, which is avoiding conflict and strife. It decided on a kind of middle solution suitable for the new phase initiated by the establishment of the Mohammadan state in Medina, making the daughter's share half that of the son, and making the woman's financial support the responsibility of the man - whether as a wife or mother.

Today, however, polygamy has decreased, marriage relationships are increasingly moving away from tribal considerations, especially in cities, and more importantly, women are working, earning money, and contributing to household and children's expenses... etc. Consequently, the impediment that justified not implementing the general rule of equality between women and men has lessened. In this case, I do not say the specific decision should be suspended, but rather it should be viewed as an exception to be applied in some cases and suspended in others, because our societies are currently going through a transition phase where the new coexists with the old, the urban situation with that of the countryside and rural areas .[13]

Shahrour reached the same conclusion when he said: "God gave the female half the male's share as a minimum limit. This minimum is in case the woman does not participate in the family's financial responsibility. In case of participation, the gap between male and female decreases according to the rate of participation and what historical circumstances impose".[14] As for Al-Sharfi, he says: "The disparity between sons and daughters in inheritance is one of the manifestations of inequality in civil rights" .[15]

The objections raised by modernists regarding inheritance laws in Islam can be addressed by affirming that these laws are the legislation of Allah, the Lord of the Worlds. Allah, the Almighty, is the Creator of humankind, and He alone knows what is best for His creation. As stated in the Quran, "Should He not know what He created? And He is the Subtle, the Aware".[16] Allah has legislated what is beneficial for humans, both outwardly and inwardly. Consequently, Islamic law comprehensively covers all aspects of life, including the system of inheritance. In this system, Allah has specified the heirs and the share of each inheritor, granting women their full rights according to their relationship with the deceased, whether as a mother, daughter, wife, or sister.

Islamic jurists have thoroughly examined the various scenarios of women's inheritance.[17] They found numerous instances where women receive equal shares to men, especially when the degree of relation to the deceased is the same. There are also cases where women and men receive equal shares despite differences in their degree of kinship. In some situations, the female's portion exceeds that of the male, and there are even cases where women inherit while men do not. Despite this, Islam is still criticized for supposedly depriving women of their rightful inheritance.

As for the other cases where women inherit less than men, wisdom and benefit necessitate this arrangement. The rationale behind favoring males over females in these instances is due to the financial burden that Islam places on men in contrast to women. Women share in the inheritance without bearing any responsibilities; they receive without giving, gain without losing, and save money without contributing to expenses or sharing in the costs of living and life's requirements. The man is legally obligated to financially support his wife - even if she is wealthy and he is poor - as well as his mother, daughter, or sister (until they marry). Some argue that this preference was justified in the past, but now that women have entered all fields of work, the financial burdens placed on them are equal to those placed on men, necessitating equality in inheritance.

This argument can be countered by stating that the fundamental role of women in Islamic society is to remain in their homes, even if they are educated and have university degrees. While women's work is permissible in certain exceptional cases, such as in professions required by society like teaching girls or women's medicine, or when there is a specific need for the woman herself, such as the absence of a provider to meet her financial needs, this remains an exception. Verdicts are based on what is common and prevalent, not on rare cases.

The wisdom behind favoring males over females in inheritance is to balance the reciprocal rights and obligations between heirs and the deceased. For instance, a son is obligated to support his parents if they are poor, unlike a daughter who is not burdened with this obligation. Thus, it is just for him to inherit more from the parents than she does. The same view applies to full or paternal brothers, as they are obligated to support their sister or brother if they are in financial need, unlike sisters who are not bound by this duty. Therefore, it is just for them to inherit more from the deceased than sisters do.

This principle also applies to the inheritance of husbands and wives. A husband's share from his wife's estate is twice that of a wife's share from her husband's estate. The reason is linked to the obligations placed on the husband towards his wife: he pays her a dowry and is obligated to support her throughout her life. He may also have contributed to the formation of her wealth, unlike the wife who is not bound by any of these obligations.

Where, then, is the injustice claimed by advocates of absolute equality? The issue is one of balancing the interests considered in inheritance, not false emotions or inventions contrary to reality.[18]

3. Dealing with Usury in the Present Era

Through their analysis based on Maqasid Al-Sharia (objectives of Islamic law), modernists have concluded that the usury practiced by banks and financial institutions in this era is permissible. They argue that Islam only prohibited usury to achieve the objective of justice and prevent the exploitation of the weak by the strong. "In the modern era, however, circumstances have changed, and the situation has transformed. Society has become a state society, not a city or village society".[19]

They contend that the matter is no longer as it was - "an exploitation of the debtor's need, which could lead to insolvency and bankruptcy" . [20]Therefore, they argue that we cannot rule on the prohibition of usury because there is no longer a system of usury as such. Instead, "it is a system for calculating interest on debts in a society where the legislator plays a supervisory role in transactions and determines the amount of interest, so that it neither enriches the creditor nor exploits the debtor" .[21]

Al-Jabri asserted the permissibility of interest resulting from certain financial transactions such as investment certificates and bank bonds. He based this on the absence of exploitation in these types of transactions, justifying his view from a Maqasid perspective: "It is known that preventing exploitation is the wisdom behind prohibiting usury".[22] We find the same reasoning in Al-Sharafi's argument that prohibited usury is "that which occurs between two individuals, leading to the enrichment of one without any effort, at the expense of impoverishing the other merely due to their need for money in certain circumstances. It may even result in the enslavement of the debtor due to inability to repay the debt with such exorbitant interest. Therefore, the Quranic prohibition of usury is very natural and consistently valid in all cases where such excess and illegitimate exploitation exist" .[23]

This delusion and its inherent falsehood can be refuted from several aspects:

1. The Islamic legal texts that go with the prohibition of usury came in general terms and did not differentiate between transactions where the creditor exploits the debtor or not.

2. This argument is based on justifying their objectives, while it is established in Islamic legal theory that the decision revolve around their effective cause ('illah), not their wisdom (hikmah). Wisdom is neither apparent nor precise; rather, it is what the Sharia intends by establishing the decision. We have previously explained the invalidity of the modernists' approach in justifying Islamic view based on perceived benefit to suit their desires.

3. Justifying the prohibition of usury by the objective of preventing exploitation was not proposed by any of the early jurists. It did not appear in their explanations for the opinion on usury across their different schools of thought. This claim only emerged in this era from those who claim liberation, but their approach, in reality, achieves a form of liberation - and what an evil liberation it is - as it is liberation from the wisdom of Sharia to the foolishness of desire and misguidance.

4. Even if we hypothetically accept the legitimacy of justification based on wisdom and benefit, this does not help us in using the wisdom of preventing exploitation to permit usury. The wisdom in prohibiting usury is not limited to exploitation. Scholars have mentioned numerous other wisdoms for prohibiting usury. For example, Al-Razi states in his exegesis: "Usury was prohibited because it prevents people from engaging in earning, as the owner of money, when able to obtain additional money through usury contracts, whether immediate or deferred, finds it easier to earn a living. He hardly bears the difficulty of earning, trade, and demanding industries. This leads to the cessation of benefits for people, and it is known that the world's interests are only organized through trade, crafts, industries, and development" .[24] If we consider this wisdom influential in judging usury - on their approach to reasoning with wisdom - we would say that usury is prohibited, because if we allow Muslims (interest) usury, many of them would not tend to put their money in usurious banks, because it is the easiest way to obtain profit if then, and investment projects would have decreased and many aspects of gains would have been disrupted, and that is from the obvious corruption that teaches the slightest But, as the saying goes, "Passion blinds and deaf" and has even wandered from the route of direction and guidance, despite the fact that it is as clear as the sun at noon.

5. What invalidates limiting prohibited usury to cases involving exploitation is that some Arabs engaged in usury for commercial purposes. Hence, Allah said: "Allah has permitted trade and has forbidden usury" [25], in a subtle reference to the fact that the Quran was revealed prohibiting usury in a society where a group of merchants dealt with usury. Trade is generally based on the principle of profit and mutual consent, not exploitation, yet Islam prohibited it.

6. As for Al-Ashmawi's statement - which we quoted earlier: "In the modern era, circumstances have changed, and the situation has transformed..."[26], and Al-Sharafi's statement: "Banking institutions did not exist in the time of the Prophet (peace be upon him) [27], so it is inconceivable to prohibit something that did not exist in reality" [28], we respond: What has changed? Are we considering realities and meanings, or words and structures? The reality of modern banking transactions is that they involve a debt to a term with an increase, and this transaction existed at the time of the Quran's revelation and was prohibited. The form, image, and procedures of the transaction may be different, but this does not mean we should make the prohibited permissible despite the existence of the same reality and meaning with only a difference in form and appearance. However, if the modernist believes that usury is prohibited only in the community of a village or a small city[29], but what is done in high-rise buildings and luxurious offices is neither usury nor forbidden, how can those who advocate for "renewal and modernity" [30]and oppose anyone whose proposal for change is "a cure for symptom and not the eradication of disease"[31], contend that his thinking is superficial, his comprehension of world naïve, while similtaneously claiming to be rational and enlightening?

7. I ask the modernists, seeking an honest and direct answer: Is what you have used to argue for the permissibility of usurious transactions - which you call profit interest - truly a Maqasid-based reason? Or is it Western evasion? Or a practical error? I am certain that if they were honest, they would say: We want to give legitimacy to Western reality, philosophy, and thought. Even if they pretend to analyze and justify, their pens expose them, revealing their malicious intent and deceptive cunning in the tone of their words and even in their explicit statements. Take an example of where we are now, the words of Al-Ashmawi when he wanted to justify the usurious system, based on the perverted reality, he described dealing with usury as having become an indispensable international system for humanity, he said: "It is in fact an international system, which is the fabric of the global economy, and the backbone of trade everywhere",[32] and Al-Sharfi says: "The prohibition of usury exists in Judaism and Christianity, and today no longer followers of the two religions who see it applicable to the loan with interest",[33] see how they claim - in a batant cunning and deceit- to imitate the infidel West, and to rely on its usurious system, which confirms what I previously said, that the people are epileptic as for Western thought and reality, and they want to justify it in any way, even at the expense of Sharia and its purposes.

Conclusion:

This study has sought to critically evaluate the foundations and methodologies of the modernist discourse in its engagement with Islamic legal texts and principles. It has become evident that the modernist approach often relies on a selective reading of Islamic sources, driven by contemporary socio-cultural and ideological imperatives. By prioritizing changing historical circumstances and invoking the objectives of Sharia (Maqāṣid al-Sharī'ah) as autonomous sources of legislation, modernist thinkers tend to detach legal rulings from their textual and jurisprudential foundations, thereby undermining the integrity of the Islamic legal tradition.

The analysis demonstrates that, while the consideration of context and public interest (maṣlaḥa) holds a recognized place within Islamic legal theory, its proper application is bound by clear epistemological parameters and governed by authoritative sources. Attempts to override definitive texts or foundational principles under the pretext of renewal or reform reflect a methodological rupture rather than a legitimate exercise of ijtihād. Such approaches risk transforming Sharia from a divinely revealed, coherent system into a humanly reconstructed, relativistic framework shaped by external values and pressures.

In conclusion, authentic intellectual renewal in Islam must proceed within the framework of its epistemological sources, maintaining fidelity to the Qur'an and Sunnah while employing sound legal reasoning rooted in tradition. Any reform that neglects these foundations ultimately leads to conceptual fragmentation and a loss of normative authority.

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[16] Surah Al-Mulk: 14.

[17] For more details, refer to the book: Shawqi, Ali Mohammed. *"Presenting to the Noble One Hundred and Forty Cases Where Women Inherit Multiple Times More Than Men in Islam"*, Dar Al-Hikma, Cairo, Egypt, 1st Edition, 1437 AH - 2016 AD.

[18] Al-Hayali, Qais Abdul Wahab. *"Women's Inheritance in Islamic Sharia and Comparative Laws"*, Dar Al-Hamed, Amman, 1st Edition, 2008 AD. (p. 280 and beyond).

[19] Al-Ashmawi, Mohammed Said. *"The Principles of Sharia"*, Madbouly Library - Cairo, Iqraa House - Beirut, 2nd Edition, 1403 AH - 1983 AD. (p. 113).

[20] ibidem.

[21] Ibid, (p. 115)

[22] Al-Sharfi, Abdul Majid. *"Islam Between the Message and History"*, Dar Al-Tali'a, Beirut-Lebanon, 2nd Edition, 2008 AD. (p. 71).

[23] Al-Ashmawi, Mohammed Said. *"The Principles of Sharia"*. (p. 113).

[24] Ibid, (p.112)

[25] Surah, Al- Bakara: 275.

[26] Al-Ashmawi, Mohammed Said. *"The Principles of Sharia"*. (p. 113).

[27] It is noticeable that the owners of modernity and enlightenment rarely pray on Al-Bashir Al-Nazir - may Allah bless him and his family and grant him peace -, and no wonder I saw a video of one of them - who is: Ahmed Abdo Maher - denying the leitimacy of prayers and peace be upon the Prophet (peace and blessings of Allah be upon him) whenever his name is mentioned (and came with words that indicate blatant ignorance, but rather compound ignorance, he is ignorant and does not know that he is ignorant, and it is not surprising that we are in the time of Worthless.

[28] Al-Sharfi, Abdul Majid. *"Islam Between the Message and History"*. (p. 71).

[29] Al-Ashmawi, Mohammed Said. *"The Principles of Sharia"*. (p. 113).

[30] Ibid, (p.112)

[31] Ibid, (p.116)

[32] Ibidem.

[33] Al-Sharfi, Abdul Majid. *"Islam Between the Message and History"*. (p. 71).