



The French Secret Army Organization (O.A.S) and its rejection of the Evian negotiations and agreements 1961-1962

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Abstract:

This study aims to attempt to shed light on the position of the Secret Army Organization O.A.S., which rejects negotiations with the National Liberation Front and works to thwart and undermine them, thus obstructing the imminent independence of Algeria. Its terrorism reached its peak when the ceasefire agreement was signed between the two parties and its entry into force on March 19, 1962. .

The Secret Army Organization insisted on clinging to French Algeria by adopting a military strategy that targeted supporters of General de Gaulle and supporters of the idea of Algerian independence. It did not exclude civilians, leaders, and intellectuals. It also destroyed and blew up cultural, social, religious, and economic structures and institutions. In other words, it created an atmosphere of security and stability, all through unrestrained violence. It did not succeed in achieving what it aimed to achieve.

Keywords: Evian negotiations, French Algeria, Scorched earth policy, Secret Army Organization, Self-determination, Transitional phase,

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I. INTRODUCTION

General de Gaulle's recognition of the right of the Algerians to self-determination on September 16, 1959, and then his invitation by the leaders of the Algerian revolution to enter into negotiations to discuss the conditions for stopping the fighting and ending the war in Algeria was a painful blow to his supporters who had called upon him for help on May 13, 1958 in defense of the same idea that they saw as He abandoned the idea of "French Algeria".

This shift in Gaullist policy was seen by the people of Algeria as a dangerous deviation, or even a betrayal and surrender, which made them revolt against him, denouncing his policy and confronting it, and even working to overthrow him and turn against him, being certain that violence alone would prevent him from granting independence to Algeria, and on this basis it was decided to establish a secret organization, military-style organization composed of veteran generals, security commanders, and settlers with the aim of obstructing and stopping the path to a political settlement of the Algerian issue. All the political and terrorist organizations defending the idea of French Algeria were melted into it following the meeting of exiles in Madrid in 1961. This organization was called the Secret Army Organization (O.A.S), and was headed by General "Salan", with the assistance of General "Djouhaud", "Guardey", "Jean Jaques Suisini", Colonel "Gouder"... and other extremists defending... The same idea is "French Algeria." In addition to mobilizing and recruiting French public opinion to confront Gaullist policy, the organization worked hard to undermine the negotiations and blow up the agreements between the Algerian and French parties to obstruct and prevent Algeria's independence.

From here, we can raise the following problem: “ How did the French Secret Army organization bet on the failure of the Algerian-French negotiations project and sabotage the Evian Agreements? And to what extent did it succeed in that ? ”

Based on this problem, we can determine the desired objectives of this study, which can be summarized as follows:

- Knowing the circumstances that characterized Algeria in the late period of the liberal revolution.
- An attempt to highlight the terrorism of the Secret Army Organization and the extent of its influence on the course of the revolution in its final stage.
- Highlighting the efforts of the Secret Army Organization in preserving French Algeria, thwarting the negotiations project and undermining the Evian Agreements.

To answer this question, this study was divided into four axes as follows:

- 1- The circumstances of the organization's emergence and establishment.
- 2- Its objectives and means.
- 3- The Secret Army Organization's rejection of the Evian negotiations.
- 4- A ceasefire does not mean peace for the Secret Army Organization.
- 5- The organization failed to achieve its project.

Conclusion:

1. Circumstances of the organization's emergence and establishment:

With the return of General de Gaulle to power following the events of May 13, 1958, the morale of the settlers and those who believed in the idea of French Algeria rose, and their hope of preserving Algeria within its French framework increased, believing thus that their dream of preserving it would be fulfilled through the return of the general. However, this did not last long in the face of the strength, solidity and successes of the revolution. Political and military, internally and externally, which led to the failure of the plans and projects of the savior general, who was disappointed as he lost his compass in resolving the issue, which made him think about the most successful and easiest ways to end the war. After betting on the choice and military decision to eliminate the Algerian revolution, he finally found himself forced to put forward the idea of self-determination. .

General de Gaulle's speech on self-determination on September 16, 1959 was enough for some army leaders to move away from the policy he followed, trying to repeat the events of May 13, 1958 to overthrow the legitimate authority and replace it with a government supportive of French Algeria, despite the failure of the week of barricades in Algiers (January). 1960), as well as the generals' coup attempt (April 1961), but those opposed to General de Gaulle were structured into a new organization, which is the "Secret Army Organization," which was created on January 20, 1961 in Madrid, Spain, by Jean Jacques Suisini. "Pierre Lagailleard", "Jean Claude Pérez", General "Salan" (Benjamin Stora, 2012, p. 331)

Thus, the head of state - General de Gaulle - caused the crisis with his speech on self-determination, in which he spoke and hinted at the possible independence of overseas territories, including Algeria. Thus, this position and decision marked the beginning of the break with his civilian and military opponents who protested the change in his policy, which it was not acceptable to them, especially since they truly considered themselves the reason for his coming and return to power, which they considered an abandonment of the promises of May 13, 1958, so they began their rebellion against him, just as it was the beginning of the fermentation of the idea of the birth of the Secret Army Organization.

As for the date of the organization's founding, there is a clear conflict between historians, as we find that some set its date as: January 20, 1961, which is what Benjamin Stora and Charles Robert Ageron said, who attributed the origin of its name to Pierre Lagailleard and Joseph Ortiz "Joseph Ortiz"...and other exiles in Spain (Ageron, 2005, p. 526) While some other historians do not agree on this date, including historian Georges Fleury, who sets the date of its founding on February 11, 1961, with the meeting of exiles in Spain as well, and adds that after many consultations and discussions between "Pierre Lagailleard" and "Jean Jean Jaques Suisini It was decided to create a new armed organization, which was given the abbreviation O.A.S. (Fleury, 2002, p. 275)

Between the two opinions comes the middle opinion of the historian "Muhammad Al-Arabi Al-Zubairi," who believes that it was founded in January 1961 and actually began its work at the end of February 1961. (Al-Zubairi, N Y, p. 107)

The exact date of the emergence of the Secret Army Organization remains subject to debate, which is normal for an organization of this type. Despite this difference, it remains a secondary matter that does not change anything in light of the heinous terrorist acts carried out by this terrorist organization. What all historians agree on is that The organization was first established in Spain, then it was re-established again in Algeria following the attempted military coup in April 1961 after the exiles moved from Madrid to Algeria.

The establishment of the Secret Army Organization was a necessity dictated by circumstances stemming from the settlers' natural fear of losing their project and their dream of preserving Algeria in the embrace of France, the features of which began with General de Gaulle's declaration of the right to self-determination on September 16, 1959, and was reinforced by the referendum on it on January 8, 1961, and confirmed by his call. For the leaders of the National Liberation Front to negotiate with it which disappointed the settlers who considered General de Gaulle to have abandoned them, betrayed them, and betrayed their cause.

Jean-Jacques Suisini believes that the Secret Army Organization is not a regular army, but rather a “melting pot in which very different sensitivities gathered together former fighters in the resistance and veterans in France, as well as veterans in Indochina, in addition to the Suez Canal mission.” In 1956, alongside the officers who fought in Vietnam and Christians who are convinced that Algeria must not remain in Muslim hands, otherwise it will be another defeat for the West.” (Gendre, 2012, p. 85)

Thus, the organization started from the conviction and principle that “France’s last hour in Algeria is France’s last hour in the world and the West’s last hour.” Thus, it realized that everything is now on the verge of loss and salvation, certain that the battle for victory requires complete unity, so it decided to join and unite. The rest of the underground movements and their organization to unify their forces and efforts into one combat movement (Ramon, 2008, p. 46), Thus, it brought together the extremists of French Algeria, including civilians and deserters from the army, and many Europeans who shared the ideas and ideologues of the extreme right, and simply included everyone who believed in the idea of preserving French Algeria (Stora, *The Algerian War Explained to All*, 2012, p. 42), It also included the Black Feet that waged attacks against the Algerians through individual attacks, kidnappings, and the use of plastic bombs, all in order to pressure the French government to review its calculations in its negotiations with the interim government of the Republic of Algeria. (Aboura, 2013, p. 07)

Thus, the Secret Army Organization included in its human composition all social groups, which made it form a heterogeneous social base whose common denominator was the belief in the idea of a French Algeria and the defense of France’s interests. Thus, it brought together civilians from the settlers and the Black Pieds, whether employed or unemployed, in addition to merchants, craftsmen, students, and soldiers from the army. And the policemen, thus bringing together the extreme right-wing elements known for their racism. It also attracted the movement and the Jews, ultimately becoming a melting pot in which all these factions melted, thus forming a real problem that both the Algerian and French parties suffered from.

The organization began its activity by distributing its first leaflets on April 7, 1961, but the preparations for the military coup between April 22 and 25, 1961, which ended with the surrender of General Shall to the Gaullist authorities, had the effect of suspending the launch of the new organization, and thus we can determine the real starting point of its activity on the following day. For: April 25, 1961 (Descaves, 2007, p. 50), Which we can consider as the date of its actual founding, and thus we can say that the Secret Army Organization was actually born on the ruins of the failed military rebellion in April 1961 after it had begun its formation in Madrid, Spain, in January of the same year, as it brought together all groups and sects who rejected the idea of self-determination by General de Gaulle and those who pledged to By preserving Algeria, but within its French framework in every way, it was led by military extremists and supported by extremist settlers and supporters of French Algeria.

2. Its objectives and means :

The Secret Army Organization aimed to oppose the policy of General de Gaulle, which had become inconsistent with the principles of May 13, 1958, and therefore it worked by all means to thwart the negotiations and prevent the signing of their agreements in order to prevent Algerian independence based on violence and reignite the fire of war to keep Algeria under French sovereignty, in order to during :

- Preventing the establishment of an independent national Algerian state.
- Destroying the mechanism of negotiations existing between the French government and the interim government of the Algerian Republic.
- Standing against the “Gaullist policy” and continuing the resistance against the National Liberation Front.
- Maintaining French Algeria, meaning Algeria is an integral part of France (Hammamid, 2013, p. 156)

In order to achieve this, the organization launched its activities relying on various means, including:

- Sabotage
- Individual and mass murder.
- Liquidation of Algerian tires.
- Assassinating French people with free ideas who were not loyal to the organization.
- Looting and stealing banks, post offices, and shops.
- Destruction of economic, cultural and administrative institutions.
- Inciting European leaders and Jews to leave Algeria
- Forming a structure for the organization in the home country.
- Recruiting volunteers from officers, the army, movement, and civilians to form armed units.

- Carrying out a coup against the general state and seizing it under the leadership of General Salan (Al-Wa'i, 1995, p. 303)

Exactly, it did everything in its power to cling to French Algeria and close all roads leading to Algerian independence by putting pressure on General de Gaulle by trying to destroy and undermine the negotiations, especially since the two parties to the negotiations had become its enemies: the French government on the one hand and the National Liberation Front on the other hand, and therefore it worked to conduct The negotiations take place in a hectic atmosphere of chaos and terrorism, relying on violence to achieve their goals through killing, assault, bombing, and blowing up anyone who stands in their way.

In return, this organization found support from French capitalist elements and the Jewish movement in France and Algeria. It also had supporters from the financial and industrial circles and senior administrative positions in the French government, as well as some clergy, French army leaders, and some Spanish settlers. It also relied on the support of many companies. Its principles were explicitly adopted by more than 80 French representatives, and French newspapers such as Carrefour, Le Role, and Le Parisien supported it. (Al-Deeb, 1990, p. 526)

Here it is worth noting the organization's focus on the media field, as it issued many propaganda publications calling for people to join and recruit in it, of which the newspaper "Appel De La France" is considered the most important because it is considered its official newspaper and its mouthpiece, which was under the management of "Jean Jacques Soisigny, in addition to the newspaper "Les Centurions", which was directed at calling on the army to mutiny and disobedience, and it was under the management of Colonel "Broissat", in addition to the "bulletin" "Problème Algérien", as well as "Solution Française", which was aimed at introducing The organization's approach and ideology (Al-Zubairi, N Y, pp. 112-113)

In addition, the organization relied heavily on "pirated radio programs," which were most often carried out with complicity in the heart of radio and television. It is worth noting that this complicity extended to various state agencies. In addition to pirated programs, the organization also relied on demonstrations, strikes, publications and graffiti.

It also received support from members of the National Assembly, as Georges Bedault, as well as Jean Marie Lepen, supported it openly, similar to the representatives of the extreme right, as previously mentioned. (Yousfi, N Y, p. 75)

It should be noted here that the organization even received the support of a group of Algerians, by which we mean Colonel Si Sharif's group of 850 men, which was stationed in the "Ain Boussif" region, as well as the group of "Abdullah Al-Selmi", who had about 800 men with him in the "Bou Saada" region (Fares, 2007, p. 149), The Jews were also among its staunchest supporters to the extent that a Jewish branch was established for it in Algeria, which is the Jewish Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.J.), of which "Marcel Abelli" was its most prominent member. (Harrison, 2007, p. 154)

Therefore, the organization's main goal was to defend French Algeria by pressuring General de Gaulle to retract his policy, and to clarify its policy and recruit its members, it relied on the media aspect by adopting several of its own newspapers, which were thus its speaking tongue and tool for mass mobilization and the definition of its ideology. And its programme.

3. The Secret Army Organization's rejection of the Evian negotiations:

The emergence of the Secret Army Organization coincided with the beginning of the official negotiations, and because it posed a threat to the general situation, it was one of the factors that prompted General de Gaulle to strengthen his political positions and move forward towards resuming the latter.

After organizing the self-determination referendum in January 1961 and announcing the results that were in favor of "Yes" (75.25% of the votes in France and 69.09% in Algeria), the features of an official move towards negotiations began, and during the next few months, exactly at the beginning of April, General de Gaulle held a press conference in which he confirmed He said: "France has no interest in keeping Algeria in its law and subservience that chooses another fate." Therefore, there was no possible doubt. As for de Gaulle himself, Algeria would soon be independent. Then the senior commanders in the army decided to turn against him in the same month (Stora, *The Algerian War Explained to All*, 2012, p. 47)

Thus, the positive results of this referendum were a sign for General de Gaulle to continue his policy, which increased the resolve of his opponents who decided to turn against him. Despite the failure of the latter, it is considered a new beginning, and is even considered the first action undertaken by the secret army organization, which took it from its secrecy to publicity within the framework of Systematic criminal sabotage operations.

In this regard, one of its members, "Michèle Barbier", believes that the organization gave them hope after the despair that overwhelmed them following the failure of the coup. He describes it as a huge popular movement that everyone should join, as it is the only one that still adheres to French Algeria and that expressed this through violence (Benjamin Stora, 2012, p. 334), Which it considered the only way to prevent the negotiations from reaching an end to the fighting, by adopting it against the French authorities and against all officials who implement its instructions calling for the attack on the militants and supporters of "French Algeria." Thus, it began its terrorism and crimes from Oran, promoting the slogan "hunting for the Arab." (Hammamid, 2013, p. 180), This slogan took us back to the beginnings of the French occupation of Algeria, to the era of General Peugeot, Saint-Arnaud, Bellissi and others...

Thus, the organization began its terror and killing of large numbers of Algerians, and it did not hesitate to kill intellectuals, policemen, the army, and anyone who stood in the way of implementing its plan, and not even foreign journalists who opposed it were spared, thus adopting a terrorist method based on creating an atmosphere of organized terrorism and carrying out acts of sabotage. And practicing guerrilla warfare. Thus, it targeted everyone. It targeted everyone who opposed its policy, everyone who supported General de Gaulle, and everyone who supported the idea of independence. It did not exclude civilians, military personnel, leaders, or intellectuals.

Since the announcement of the resumption of the Evian negotiations, the organization has intensified its terrorist acts to prevent the implementation of the ceasefire, and since February 24, it has begun expelling Muslims from the European neighborhoods of the city of Algiers through systematic raids. (pervillé, 2012, p. 120)

At the time when the negotiations were taking place, the destruction and killing operations took an escalating pace, as the organization issued many leaflets, posters and graffiti urging the French to stand against the Evian negotiations. This anger and indignation was translated into the assassination of its sponsor who allowed the negotiations to take place on his land, Mr. Camille. Camille Blanc, mayor of Evian, on April 1, 1961.

Mr. "Olivier Long" also mentions that the organization's supporters expressed their objection to the Algerian-French discussions with actions that ranged between propaganda and attacks when announcing the holding of the first Evian meeting, on March 30, 1961. Threats were directed at figures in Geneva and in other regions of Switzerland, despite this. He acknowledges that Switzerland has not known any attacks, unlike the municipality of Evian, whose president paid with his life for this (Long, 2012, p. 213)

, However, in the same context, he does not deny receiving threats from the organization against his person from time to time - according to his statement - which he explains as an attempt to discourage the Swiss authorities and force them to abandon the case (Long, 2012, pp. 104-105)

The Algerian-French negotiations were a nightmare for the Secret Army Organization, as their success meant the independence of Algeria and thus the loss of their dream in Algeria. Therefore, they worked hard to obstruct and prevent them by all means, to the point that the French police arrested one of its members on May 16, 1961, called "Michelle Stop." "Who admitted that he was assigned to sabotage the helicopters placed at the disposal of the negotiating delegations in Geneva and Evian as well." (Malek, 2003, p. 157)

The organization embodied its position of rejecting negotiations with its terrorist acts, as "El Moudjahid" newspaper counted more than 1,420 bombs between April 23 and August 15, all of them made of plastic, most of which exploded in the capital, Oran, Sidi Bel Abbes and Annaba. (Plastic gang activity, 1961), The "Commando Delta" groups affiliated with the organization also continued their assassinations, murders, and assaults on Algerians in the streets. They killed in the heart of the "Royal Palace Center" six social center employees, including the writer "Mouloud Pharaoh." They also destroyed the "Boufrizi" clinic and killed the patients in their beds. They kill postmen, fruit and vegetable merchants, pharmacists, and bakers. They also destroy and burn public buildings, hospitals, schools, and high schools. (Ezzedine, 2011, p. 353)

Thus, the organization carried out selective mass and individual assassination operations according to social groups: merchants, pharmacists, teachers, social officials, and domestic workers. Gendarmes and police were also targeted and considered "servants of traitors."

Historian Muhammad Al-Arabi Al-Zubairi believes that the organization celebrated "the failure of the first Evian negotiations" on June 13, 1961, by detonating a powerful bomb in the center of Algiers, which was intended to prevent the resumption of dialogue again. (Al-Zubairi, N Y, p. 109), Assassination operations also intensified in Algeria in the summer of 1961 against military and civilian figures, whether loyal to General de Gaulle and his regime or to the army and the National Liberation Front. These assassinations even extended to General de Gaulle himself, as on September 8, 1961, the organization made an attempt to assassinate him. (Aguila, 2013, p. 459), Farhat Abbas attributes this to his abandonment of the most important French demand in Evian, which is the demand to divide Algeria into north and south, as he declared that "the Sahara is an integral part of Algeria." (Abbas, 2010, p. 425)

In the face of this situation, Salan called for rebellion through Order No. 29 issued on February 23, 1962 (Order No. 29/O.A.S), which aimed to show the organization its latest papers to create a state of rebellion and disorder that would prevent the success of the current negotiations, through systematic shooting at the gendarmes. Gendarmerie and pushing crowds into the street at the right time (Gendre, 2012, p. 157).

Thus, through this strategy, he aimed to prevent the success of the negotiations, reach a ceasefire, and put pressure on General de Gaulle to force him to retreat and abandon his project that aims for self-determination, which explains the doubling of its crime, which took an upward trend after every step the general took in his project, ignoring it.

4. A ceasefire does not mean peace for the Secret Army Organization:

March 19, 1962, at 12:00, witnessed the entry into force of the ceasefire decision between the Algerian and French parties, but a civil war was quickly ignited by supporters of French Algeria in order to prevent the implementation of the Evian Agreements. Which, for them, is the end of their dreams and hopes in Algeria, which is announced explicitly immediately after signing it, as it distributed a leaflet that said: "The ceasefire only requires de Gaulle." As for us, it is the beginning of the battle (Al-Zubairi, N Y, p. 109) and it was aimed by This publication to make the Evian Agreements inapplicable, which would force the Interim Government of the Republic of Algeria to abandon them..

For this reason, on the same day, the organization announced a general strike that paralyzed most of the European neighborhoods in the capital, Oran, where General Salan issued calls to all Europeans to protest against "de Gaulle's shameful betrayal." Indeed, the Europeans responded strongly to this call, closing cafes and shops and emptying the streets. To express that "the cessation of fighting does not prevent the development of events, and that the organization will undertake to thwart the implementation of the agreement, and that the real struggle is still at its beginning." (Hammamid, 2013, pp. 291-292).

Thus, the organization demonstrated its control over its supporters, who were following its orders, whether to strike, demonstrate, kill, or sabotage.

In the context of this, it issued other leaflets that it distributed in Algiers, in which it assured “the supporters of French Algeria” that “they cannot consider the ‘ceasefire’ as a guarantee of a return to peace, as much as they must consider it a new signal for fighting. The same thing happened in the city of Oran, and it announced that the ‘real resistance’ will begin.” At the end of the strike, residents are asked to prepare to follow the instructions of General Djouhaud to the letter (Fleury, 2002, p. 723)

In the same context, these calls emphasized that “announcing a ceasefire will be the signal to begin the attack phase on the army and gendarmerie units.” They also ordered maritime and air companies not to sell travel tickets to Europeans who might be tempted to seek to leave Algeria without official permission from Her interests (Al-Zubairi, N Y, p. 122). Here, the Secret Army Organization became a real problem for the French government, whether in Algeria or even in France itself.

The organization escalated its terrorist activity by detonating a car bomb near the port of Algiers at six-thirty in the morning on the seafront street. The car bomb was packed with explosives, pieces of tin, and nails. It exploded in the middle of 600 port workers (porters), during which 63 people were killed and 150 wounded (Ezzedine, 2011, p. 353).

Two pilots also bombed a camp belonging to the National Liberation Army “Oujda” on the orders of “Joho” on board two “T6” aircraft at the military air base in “Sennia” in Oran, followed by many other raids that left a heavy toll of victims. The organization also launched an operation “Blue Night” on May 5, 1962, with a series of bombings that lasted 24 hours and a total of 125 bombings, which left heavy material and human losses among the ranks of defenseless Algerian civilians (Yousfi, N Y, pp. 93-94)

In a state of desperation, the Secret Army Organization adopted a scorched earth policy to thwart the Evian Agreements that were signed without their knowledge and without their representation, seeking thus to obstruct the path towards Algerian independence, motivated by nothing but hatred. (Yousfi, Algeria in March, 2012, p. 194)

In his description of the scorched earth policy, Jean-Jacques Suny says: “We were determined to return Algeria to the Muslims as it was in 1830 when the French settled there.” (Gendre, 2012, p. 175). This statement and this policy in itself express the extent of the state of despair to which the organization reached when it became certain of the loss of its dream of preserving Algeria, where it decided to hand it over to a completely collapsed and destroyed situation in retaliation.

To clarify this policy, the organization published a leaflet in April 1962 in which it expressed, “Some are wondering about the feasibility of the destruction now being practiced in major cities in Algeria by the special “commando” of the Secret Army Organization, and they are wondering about the goal of this seemingly negative work,” “Why do we destroy then?” We wanted to stay? The author of the post responds by saying: “His work is normal because the withdrawing army is always forced to destroy everything in order to prevent it from falling into the hands of the enemy.” (Dahmane, 2009, p. 321)

June 7, 1962 was one of the peak points in the scorched earth policy and the most horrific of all, as the Algiers library was set on fire, destroying more than 60,000 volumes. The same thing happened in Oran, where the municipal building and its library were destroyed, in addition to four schools, using explosives. (Stora, The Transfer of a Memory, From “French Algeria” to Anti-Arab Racism, 2000, p. 55)

As for the number of volumes that were burned and destroyed, it was mentioned in many writings that dealt with the subject at about 600,000 volumes, not 60,000, including Major Ezz El-Din, in addition to the destruction of chemistry, science and medicine laboratories, pathology laboratories, the Institute of Political Studies, and the School of Fine Arts. (Azzedine, 1997, p. 288)

It should be noted that the leaders of the organization were unanimous in supporting the strategy of “deliberately targeting” the Muslim population in order to provoke a response from the National Liberation Front, and thus force the security forces to violate the ceasefire. Thus, it sought to provoke the National Liberation Army to involve it and force it to respond to its operations and thus violate it. With the ceasefire decision which results in a reversal of the agreements between the French government and the National Liberation Front.

The organization's work was not limited to terrorizing the population only, but also went beyond inciting the Europeans and trade unions to frequent strikes in Oran, Algiers and Annaba in order to strike the national economy, which would inevitably lead to the destruction of the administrative organization and infrastructure of Algeria. Thus, it targeted all economic, administrative and health facilities so that Algeria would inherit, on the eve of its independence, a devastating situation that would be difficult to adapt to, especially since it was certain of its near end and thus its failure to preserve French Algeria.

5. The organization failed to achieve its project

Anyone who follows the activity of the Secret Army Organization will realize that its chance of changing the situation from what it was was very low, as the overthrow of the Gaullist regime and authority required widespread support in all aspects of the state and its agencies, especially France, the center of actual power. On the other hand, we find that this support was subject to the control of Supporters of General de Gaulle, and this became apparent through the referendum of January 8, 1961, which gave General de Gaulle the green light to implement his policy.

In his evaluation of the organization, Claude Perez, one of its leaders and founding members, says: “The Secret Army Organization was nothing at all, as it was completely isolated from the world. It was almost the only organization in the history of the secret war that did not receive any external support. No one helped the Secret Army Organization at all.” Neither before nor during nor after. There was only a small minority of people fighting for something that was ultimately very fragile. We were a minority. Even within our ranks, there was no collective consciousness. After that, France was not far away. The borders were not closed”. (Harrison, 2007, pp. 35-36) ...He meant then the option of returning to the motherland.

As for its leader, Jean-Jacques Suisini, he attributed the reason for the failure of his organization to the fact that they were fighting on two fronts: against the French security forces and against the Algerian National Liberation Front, on the one hand, and on the other hand, he attributed it to weak armament, as he admitted that, with the exception of a small number of bazooka pieces, the organization had only pistols and rifles. A machine gun at a time when the gendarmes had all the necessary means of logistical support, helicopters, weapons and equipment, etc. This disparity cost them dearly, leading to their failure (Ramon, 2008, p. 153)

Hence, it becomes clear to us that the Secret Army Organization has failed to achieve its project for several factors, including:

- Disagreement and differences between the organization's leaders and the diversity of its intellectual and ideological views, which deepened the gap between its members and sharpened its division.
- Deprived of support due to the mass migration of the Pied Noirs who were its artery and raison.
- Its leaders were arrested one after another.
- Noticeable superiority in equipment and numbers between them and the French authorities.
- The opposition of the majority of the French people to the organization's program and activities and their aspiration to end the war that depleted the economy.
- Lack of coordination and connection between the Secret Army Organization and various international terrorist organizations

II. Results and discussion :

The crimes of the Secret Army Organization (O.A.S.) in Algeria exceeded in their ugliness the crimes of Nazism and fascism, and they exceeded all description.

- Neither the Algerians nor even the French themselves were spared the crimes of this organization.

The organization insisted on undermining the draft Evian Agreements and keeping Algeria French, but it failed to do so.

III. Conclusion:

Through this brief study entitled: “The French Secret Army Organization (O.A.S) and its rejection of the Evian negotiations and agreements 1961-1962,” we concluded the answer to the problem that we had raised at the beginning of the study, which we can summarize as follows:

General De Gaulle's speech and his recognition of the right of the Algerian people to self-determination on September 16, 1959 created a crisis between him and the leaders of the French army in Algeria, as they considered the change in his political positions a threat to the survival of French Algeria. In response to this policy, he began the formation of the organization that officially appeared. In February 1961 in the Spanish capital, Madrid, the attempted military coup on April 21, 1961 to remove General de Gaulle was considered the first serious attempt by the organization.

The Secret Army Organization insisted on thwarting the negotiations and ceasefire project, and to implement this, it planned and used all possible capabilities and means to achieve its goal by adopting an infernal military and political strategy to prevent this and blow up everyone who stood in its way, but in the end it failed in that.

The organization pursued a series of criminal acts, including assassinations of prominent figures, in addition to sabotage operations, as an expression of its rejection of Algeria's independence, in an attempt to pressure the French side to keep Algeria French.

The Secret Army Organization was creative in its methods, which varied between bombings, bombings, and assassinations... It simply created an atmosphere of security and stability through systematic violence, through which it aimed to stand as an obstacle in the path of settling the Algerian issue, but it failed in doing so.

IV. Recommendations:

The subject of the Secret Army Organization and its terrorist activity in Algeria still needs research and scrutiny because it has not received the necessary academic study. This is because the discussion about it is always within the general context of the last stage of the life of the liberal revolution and the obstruction of the progress of the Algerian-French negotiations. Therefore, specialists, professors, researchers and students, must do more research. Research and exploration on this fertile topic.

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