

Terrorism: Exploring Criminology Theories

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ABSTRACT

The study of terrorism is relatively new in Criminology. Terrorism has been extensively researched and discussed in political science, policy studies, international relations and law. The dearth of literature on terrorism in Criminology has prompted Richard Rosenfeld, a renowned professor in Criminology to write "Why Criminologists should study terrorism?" in *The Criminologist*, the official newsletter of the American Society of Criminology at the end of 2002. After September 11, 2001, there is more interest in studying terrorism as a criminal phenomenon. More research and publications in this topic are being carried out in the area of Criminology.

This paper surveys existing literature on terrorism in Criminology as well as Sociology of Deviance. Discussions that have been brought up include studying terrorism as another form of criminal behaviour, defining it as a political and/or violent crime and using structural and rational choice theories to explain the criminogenic behaviour.

This paper will conclude with showing the important relevance of Criminology in studying terrorism and introducing other possible criminology theories that could be used to explain the phenomenon.

Keywords: terrorism, criminology, criminology theories, differential association theory, neutralization theory.

INTRODUCTION

Terrorism has been researched and discussed extensively in political science, policy studies, international relations and law. However, it is a relatively new research area in Criminology although it has traditionally been treated as a crime by the US government (Harvard Law Review, 2002; 1224). Many researchers have also considered terrorism as a type of political crime (Ross, 1993; 318). As such, theories of crime causation are relevant in the study of terrorism. However, there is still a dearth of literature on terrorism in Criminology. This prompted Richard Rosenfeld, a renowned professor in Criminology, to write in 2002 "Why Criminologists should study terrorism?" in *The Criminologist*, the official newsletter of the American Society of Criminology. To Rosenfeld, terrorism is a form of interpersonal violence which criminologists have been studying extensively. Terrorism and interpersonal violence share basic properties and is a subject for Criminology theory and research. Rosenfeld pointed out that terrorism is justice-oriented violence with a decidedly predatory character which could be studied within the theoretical framework criminologists study other forms of violence (p.3). Moreover, Criminology theories will be able to enrich the study of terrorism because they bring an understanding of the purposeful nature of all types of interpersonal violence to the study of political violence.

Rosenfeld explained that perhaps criminologists did not study terrorism because they did not believe terrorism had much in common with street crime, youthful aggression, drug markets, domestic abuse or other subjects they felt comfortable addressing (p.2). Other reasons listed by Rosenfeld include (p.2-3):

1. Terrorism is qualitatively different from the forms of violence that criminologists study;
2. Terrorism does not fit Criminology theories of violence;

3. Terrorism is political violence while Criminology theories are intended to explain non-political violence.

Another reason majority of criminologists are not keen to study terrorism is the difficulty in obtaining primary data as access to terrorists is usually not possible unlike doing research with juvenile delinquents and prisoners. Secondary data will then be used to testing Criminology theories or models. This data has its limitations. However, these limitations should not deter criminologists from studying terrorism. As Guss, Tuason and Teixeira (2007; 439) said, “Although science has its limitations and although methodologies are not always well developed, we think that we have to try to work with the tools we currently have at hand..... but if our work stimulates discussion and further research, it has served its purpose. Even if there are inherent difficulties with the methodologies available to explore this topic, we believe that this should not hinder further research. If we cannot come to understand Islamic martyrdom, how can we work to prevent it?”

Mathieu Deflem, who edited a book on “Terrorism and counter-terrorism: Criminology perspectives” in 2004, concurs with Rosenfeld. He said that until September 11, 2001, terrorism and counter-terrorism were relatively under-explored topics in the Sociology of crime and social control. However, after September 11, 2001, new ground has been made in the study of terrorism and terrorism-related phenomena across the social sciences, including ground-breaking work from the field of Criminological Sociology.

Sheptycki (2007; 396) said that “the argument that Criminology theory counts in world affairs is part of the further evolution of critical views of approaches to security studies, criminologists have to be involved in the study of terrorism”. Sheptycki went on to say that Criminology counts especially because its field of concern is based on justifications about the use of coercive power.

CRIMINOLOGY AND SOCIOLOGY THEORIES ON TERRORISM

There has never been any agreement on a definite definition of terrorism in political science, international relations, public policy studies, etc.. Likewise, there has also been no consensus of the definition of terrorism in Criminology or Sociology. Gibbs (1989, 339) pointed out that a definition of terrorism must promise empirical applicability and facilitate recognition of logical connections and possible empirical associations. Ross (1993; 318), who considered terrorism as a type of political crime, said that there were no generally accepted causal theories of crime and in particular political crime. However, some of the general structural factors associated with crime causation could be integrated into a model of the structural cause of terrorism. Post (2005; 615) reminded researchers that each terrorism must be understood (and studied) in its unique cultural, historical, and political context.

Tilly (2004, 5) also cautioned that social scientists, who attempted to explain sudden attacks on civilian targets, should doubt the existence of a distinct, coherent class of actors (terrorists) who specialized in a unitary form of political action (terror) and, thus, should establish a separate variety of politics (terrorism). He said that the terms terror, terrorism and terrorists did not identify causally coherent and distinct social phenomena, but strategies that recur across a wide variety of actors, organizations, circumstances, beliefs and political situations. He pointed out that the US State Department’s own reporting on world affairs generally confirmed this argument and tracked the world’s vindictive violence from two distinct perspectives; human rights and global terrorism. The human rights examples include government-backed torture, cruel punishment, irregular detention, drastic civil liberties restrictions, compulsory labour and child labour (p.6). The State Department also sent Congress an annual document called “Patterns of Global Terrorism” (p.7). The annual reports described two different kinds of events: 1) the significant terrorist incidents – the attackers came from outside the country (crossing international lines), received substantial backing from outside or they assaulted foreigners; and 2) other attacks by domestic groups on domestic targets. Tilly found that the overall trend for international terrorist incidents ran downward. Instead, most terror occurred on the perpetrators’ own home territory (p.11).

Lafree (2007; 1) supported Larry Sherman's argument that a new paradigm in Criminology was needed for the study on terrorism, i.e. "emotionally intelligent justice" (p.9-10). This means that governments should try to make its officials control their emotions and adopt a more rational stance while realizing that the actions of offenders and victims will often be highly emotional. Terrorism is specifically designed to evoke strong emotional reactions. Therefore, in combating terrorism, Criminology research evaluations must encourage governments to be rational while assuming that those using terrorism may behave irrationally. This is contrary to the deterrence-based thinking that has dominated counter-terrorist policies in most countries. Deterrence models refers to the belief that credible threats of apprehension and punishment deter violence and that human beings are rational, self-interested actors who seek to minimize personal cost while maximizing personal gain. Research from the social and behavioral sciences, including Criminology, have shown that punishment does not always deter future acts of violence and may, in some cases, increase violence. Sherman has called this alternative approach "defiance."

Comparisons between deterrence and defiance models have been carried out by Lafree, Korte and Dugan in 2006 (p.12-14). Their study was based on data collected after the implementation of five highly visible British counter-terrorist interventions in Northern Ireland in the late 1960s. Of these five interventions, two were primarily criminal justice based and three were primarily military. They found no support for deterrence arguments. They also found statistically significant increases in the risk of terrorist strikes. Lafree, Korte and Dugan cautioned that their results were based on a case study which might not be generalized to other situations. However, their study showed the importance of not simply assuming that all those willing to use criminal violence would be deterred by the threat or use of harsh punishment.

In another study by Dugan, Lafree and Piquero (2005) on airline hijackings, they tested the rational choice model. The rational choice perspective has been applied to a wide variety of criminal behavior, including drunk driving, burglary, robbery, shoplifting, income tax evasion, drug selling, and white-collar crime (p.1032). A rational choice explanation of crime suggests that if the benefit of committing a crime is greater than the costs, then crime is more likely to occur, and conversely, if benefits is less than the costs, then crime is less likely to occur (1033-1034). Benefits can be both internal (for example, monetary gain) and external (for example, achieving political recognition) to offenders. The probability of success is a function of the offender's perception. The rational choice perspective assumes that offenders calculate their probability of success when evaluating criminal opportunities. Therefore, for policy makers who design formal systems of punishment, their goal is to control or alter this calculation through policies aimed at reducing the certainty of success. These policies are known as deterrence-rational choice policies. In the case of policies on aerial hijacking for the past half century, the goal has been pursued primarily through target hardening that include using metal detectors, posting security personnel at airport gates and baggage-screening.

In their test on the rational choice model, Dugan, Lafree and Piquero found that, firstly, new hijacking attempts were less likely to be undertaken when the certainty of apprehension or severity of punishment increased. However, in this regard, one of the certainty measures they examined (metal detectors and increased enforcement) had significant effects whereas another (tighter baggage and customer screening) did not. This could be due to the metal detectors and increased law enforcement at passenger check points were more tangible, public and identifiable intervention than the tighter screening policies. The drop in the hazard of hijacking attempts after the Cuban crime policy was implemented also strongly suggested that the threat of sanctions was useful here.

Secondly, they found partial support for a contagion view of hijacking. The rate of hijackings significantly increased following a series of successful hijackings, but actually declined following a series of hijacking attempts that did not take success into account.

Finally, they found that the counter-hijacking policies examined had no impact on the hazard of terrorism-related hijacking attempts. By contrast, metal detectors and increased police surveillance significantly reduced the hazard of non terrorist-related hijackings. They concluded that their study showed mixed evidence regarding the effectiveness of deterrence-rational choice policies.

In Tosini's (2007) study, the focus was on specific social, cultural and religious factors as the root causes of terrorism. He used suicide terrorism as a case study. He warned that terrorism should not be confused with „normal' criminal activity– “Unlike drugs, or car crime, or the Mafia, for example – where the nature of the crimes involved implies that an individual is acting in his or her own egoistical, material or other kinds of personal interest – all actions defined as „terrorist' are based on motivations that are mainly political” (p.666). He defined terrorism as the use (or the threat) of violence against civilians (and personnel not engaged in combat operations) by non-state entities for specific political purposes (p.667). These political objectives consist of 5 types; 1) nationalism, 2) revolution, 3) vigilantism, 4) symbolic and 5) and single-issue terrorism (p.668-669). He said that to investigate the social mechanisms underlying (suicide) terrorism, due attention should be given to the reasons and actors' rationality associated with specific political, economic, cultural and religious conditions (p.672-675). This required a multilevel analysis which had at least three fundamental levels. The first concerned *terrorist organisations*, which should be treated as rational decision-makers. This implied a methodological approach that consisted of analysing terrorism as a strategic choice. In social science, this is called instrumental rationality.

The second level of analysis should focus on the *community* whose interest a terrorist organisation wanted to represent and defend. The community's role was crucial, in that it provided, or helped to find important resources for armed groups, such as money, weapons, hiding places and militants (including those taking part in suicide missions). The different motivations to support terrorism included the previous success of the terrorist organisation, specific material rewards in the form of economic aid, symbolic rewards such as elevation of status not only on the individual militants who gave their life, but also on all their family members, and an unconditional assumption of certain principles or values such as a set of shared beliefs. These shared beliefs were able to inspire a culture of martyrdom.

The focus for the third and final level of analysis concerned the suicide attackers themselves. They revealed a complex constellation of possible motivations for joining suicide missions. The first was revenge. A second factor was status crisis, which meant that potential attackers considered dying in a suicide mission as a better option than suffering a loss of reputation due to questionable behaviour, such as either adopting a wrong lifestyle (according to their religious beliefs) or committing actions that were condemned by their community. The prestige associated with being martyred (at the service of the political or religious cause of the attackers' community) purified the attacker from all past wrongdoings. A third factor was *altruistic* interest. For example, attackers considered their mission as the best means to liberate or defend their community. A final motivation was that militants had deeply interiorised the values and principles of the culture of martyrdom and were driven by the duty to die, as commended by their beliefs, independently of the consequences to which this behaviour could lead.

Oberschall (2004) used the theory of collective action to explain the dynamic of violence escalation and persistence of terrorism. He believed that terrorism should be explained in the same way as other forms of collective action, for example insurgencies, social movements and dissidents. As such, each of the four dimensions of collective action had to be considered and analysed: 1) discontent; 2) ideology-feeding grievances; 3) capacity to organize; and 4) political opportunity. A positive value on each dimension was necessary for collective action (p.27-28).

Where discontent, the first dimension, was concerned, it had to be widespread for which the usual means of relief were thought to be lacking. The second dimension of ideology or belief system had to be spread widely in a population which framed discontent into legitimate grievances. These legitimate grievances justified violent means to remedy problems. The third dimension, the capacity to organize, referred to recruitment, fundraising, leadership, internal communication and decision-making. The members recruited had unusually high levels of trust in one another and dedication to the shared cause. Terrorists often had known each other for years, for example, at the university where they shared in a dissident political subculture or in the case for Islamist terrorism, the recruitment and socialization was through the religious infrastructure of fundamentalist religious teachers, schools, mosques and foundations in which many young men became encapsulated. Oberschall pointed out that terrorists were bred through and in preexisting groups and sub-cultures that were viewed as legitimate and not deviant.

The fourth dimension of political opportunity referred to public opinion support, political allies, a favourable international climate and in the case of terrorism, state support and sponsorship were analysed and factored in with the other three dimensions.

Besides the four dimensions of collective action, Oberschall pointed out that the acts of violence had to be given some justification by the perpetrators as they needed public opinion support in some segment of the population. The most common justification was that one's enemies had done the same and deserved retaliation in kind or to blame one's enemies for such actions. For example, after 9/11, rumour was spread that it was the Israelis who destroyed the World Trade Centre. Osama bin Laden had claimed that the US had killed one million children in Iraq and, therefore, the US was getting back what it was responsible for.

Oberschall concluded that although the conditions conducive to the rise of terrorist collective action were present to a high degree, for example there was no shortage of religious and ideological radicalism, he believed that the trend towards moderation was inevitable despite being a slow process (p.36-37). For example, religious virtuosos would yield to temptation and sin, and would reveal themselves as cynical and corrupt, just as religious institutions and reforms they introduced and enforced fall short of solving sinfulness, poverty, social inequities and other ills they promised to alleviate. Moreover, a new generation would grow up knowing nothing of the revolution. The institutions that were enthusiastically adopted by their parents were experienced as a stifling burden and the theocracy as oppressive. To illustrate his point, Oberschall cited the example of Iran 30 years after the Ayatollah Khomeini and the Islamic revolution as the most appropriate example of the "routinization of charisma". In the last several elections, the Islamic religious movement got about 30 percent of the vote whereas the reformists who wanted a more secular state and better relations with the US got 70 percent. Oberschall concluded that "On top of the social control from without by denying terrorism political opportunity, there is an inhibitor from within as well, albeit a slow one" (p.37).

From the literature review on terrorism by criminologists and sociologists, it could be concluded that much work is still needed in this area. Current discussion is still largely on the definition of terrorism, whether it should be considered a crime or a political issue, and a general model that could be used for research. There is still a dearth of research testing Criminology and Sociology theories on terrorism. The prominent theories that have been tested are rational choice theory, deterrence theory, defiance theory (criminology theories) and collective action theory (sociology theory). However, it has been noted that these theories have not been retested and are still being at the preliminary stage.

OTHER UNEXPLORED CRIMINOLOGY THEORIES

From the literature review carried out, it can be concluded that the study of terrorism in Criminology is still at an infant stage. As pointed out earlier, one of the main reasons could be the difficulties in getting primary data. As such, major Criminology theories have not been fully explored. However, using secondary data and studies done by other researchers as case studies, Criminology theories could be identified for further studies in terrorism.

In reviewing the literature on terrorism, two interesting themes that are being repeated and noted in these studies are how the terrorists have a strong and trustworthy network of colleagues, and how they need to continuously justify their actions. An example is the study done by Guss, Tuason and Teixeira (2007), which investigated the cultural-psychological contributions to a person's decision to become an Islamic martyr. A cultural-psychological theory explains phenomena at the micro level, i.e., the individual level, yet also considers the macro level, i.e., society, culture, and history. In the study by Gus et al., culture referred to the "human made part of the environment" and to internalized knowledge, norms, values, beliefs, and problem-solving strategies shared by a specific group that were transmitted from generation to generation. Guss et al. used the term Islamic martyrdom instead of suicide terrorism as it was an acceptable and revered way of death in certain cultures. This acceptance of martyrdom in certain culture is also reported by Allen (2002; 34) who said that "Regardless of its form, resistance to occupation and sacrificing for that struggle are highly praised and everywhere commemorated in Palestine. Everything from streets

and hospitals to new babies and children's events are named after martyrs". Allen also observed that the children in this culture grew up in unnatural circumstances and accepted martyrdom events as "normal". Andoni (1997; 42) reported that defiant and traumatized children who came of age during the *intifada* developed suicidal tendencies as a result of constant fear and humiliation. He quoted Sarraj, a psychologist treating dozens of cases of suicidal Palestinian children that, "The words angry and defiant accurately describe the Palestinian children of the *intifada* generation....These children have learned the language and the meaning of occupation. Even if every child has not been humiliated by the Israeli soldiers or told that his or her life is worthless, the environment sends this message loud and clear" (p.42).

Guss et al. (2007) found that most Islamic martyrs were males, quite well educated, from middle-class families and did not suffer serious psychological disorders (p.417). They were aware of what they were doing (Allen, 2002; 37). They were fearless people with strong convictions. This was contrary to the western stereotype often portrayed in media that an Islamic suicide bomber was a male religious fanatic or a psychopath, who did not appreciate life, had no education, was living in poverty, and was irrational.

The model developed by Guss et al. on the causes of Islamic martyrdom, where the central variable was the individual's decision to become an Islamic martyr, was influenced by four sets of causes: 1) macro-socio-historical-political context, 2) group processes, 3) immediate and anticipated rewards for the individual, and 4) mechanisms to eradicate possible guilt or doubts (p.435). The decision to become a martyr was a process that might take several years. The decision might start from a strong dissatisfaction about the current political situation and strengthened through the support of meeting people who had similar thoughts, having experienced death or cruelties against loved ones, joining a cell, and intensive training. The process led to a growing commitment to a martyrdom mission as the individual led a normal life until the time came to join a cell and conducted the mission.

Gus et al. found that Islamic martyrs were individuals who perceived the socio-political situation as unjust, and that they were unable to correct things through the legal channel. When they started to witness the killing of loved ones by foreign troops, the resulting feelings of outrage and helplessness might push the individual to do something as extreme as joining an Islamic martyrdom cell. The motivation behind "wanting to do something" was the basic need for self-determination and the ability to make decisions about one's own life. This finding was supported by Allen (2002; 37) that martyrdom operations were one means of taking back control. Islamic martyrdom volunteers satisfied this need of "wanting to do something" by joining a group or cell and preparing for their missions. In such a cell, they were among others who had the same thoughts and pursued the same goals. The group reinforced not the motivation per se, but the commitment to act. To dismiss further doubts and possible confrontation with contradicting views, the volunteers were often isolated from their families and friends who might not agree with their decisions. The volunteer's need for affiliation was met by belonging to a group of people who had similar thoughts and who were most likely to have had experienced the same oppression, outrage and helplessness. These convictions and beliefs that were shared became the core aspects of the volunteer's identity (Gus et al., 2007; 427).

In Crenshaw's (1981; 396) study, she believed that terrorism per se was not usually a reflection of mass discontent or deep cleavages in society. More often it represented the disaffection of a fragment of the elite, who might take it upon themselves to act on the behalf of a majority unaware of its plight, unwilling to take action to remedy grievances, or unable to express dissent. She said that terrorism was a deliberate choice of a basically rational actor (p. 380). Like Gus et al. (2007), she found that there was a strong bond among the terrorists (p.393). She found that terrorists could confide in and trust each other. This was due to the nature of their commitment that cut them off from society. As they inhabited in a closed community, isolation and the perception of a hostile environment intensified their shared belief and commitment. A pattern of mutual reassurance, solidarity and comradeship developed, in which the members of the group reinforced each other's self-righteousness, image of a hostile world and sense of mission. Due to the real danger they confronted, the strain they lived under and the moral conflicts they underwent, they valued solidarity highly.

As for the issue that terrorists continuously need to justify their activities, Gus et al. (2007; 427) found that the justification of the use of violence was part of the training for Islamic martyrdom, i.e. by

describing the mission as an act of service to Allah (*istishhad*) (p.427). The rewards of such service were said to include the beginning of an eternal life in heaven, that they would be united in heaven with loved ones who were killed by foreign troops, the saving of their loved ones, and monetary and social support for their families. What appealed to volunteers was that their action would be the most valuable act someone could ever do, i.e. to die for the Islamic faith and for one's country (p.431). Martyrdom was the most valued technique of jihad. Volunteering, then, was related to a feeling of moral superiority as they were "doing the right thing" and had the courage and faith to do what many could not.

The indoctrination of such justifications were relatively easy when strong radical religious or ideological beliefs were paired with the death of a loved one, with experienced injustice, with resulting emotions of rage, frustration, sadness, and helplessness, and with the belief that the enemy occupation was responsible for the suffering of the country. However, Gus et al. cautioned that cementing of the decision to be a martyr might not yet be accomplished even with such strong motivation. There were still doubts about leaving the family behind, fear of dying, and whether this was indeed the right thing to do. To strengthen the volunteers in their decisions, rigorous training was provided through these cells. In this training, volunteers have spiritual mentors who taught them and interpreted the Koran. Training also included the teachings of bin Laden, al-Zarqawi and radical Islamic scholars. One example quoted by Gus et al. that could offer insight into the teachings of such training was a manual found in the home of an alleged al-Qaeda member in England on "Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants" (2000). Beginning with "In the name of Allah, the merciful and compassionate," the manual identified volunteers' main mission as "the overthrow of the godless regimes and their replacement with an Islamic regime." Contents of the manual showed that key criteria for al-Qaeda membership were strong faith in Allah, obedience to Allah, absolute commitment to al-Qaeda and its leaders, and health and intelligence. The suicide act was described as martyrdom and dying in the name of Allah. Intense training, particularly ideological training, was a key factor in the formation of a martyr. Three main mechanisms were utilized to alleviate feelings of guilt. Firstly, the enemy was dehumanized (for example, describing the other as an animal or as "evil" rather than as a human being); secondly, an individual's responsibility for the act is minimized (for example, the act is desired by God); and thirdly, thinking about consequences of the act to possible victims was forbidden. The training and indoctrination was extremely intense that it enabled a volunteer to be able to go about his normal life, even for a few years, before he was called to carry out the mission. His mind and goals had never changed.

In Crenshaw's (1981; 394-395) study, she also mentioned that almost all terrorists seemed compelled to justify their behaviour (p.394-395). Justifications usually focus on past suffering, on the glorious future to be created, and on the regime's illegitimacy and violence to which terrorism is the only available response. Shared guilt and anxiety increased the group's interdependence and mutual commitment. This might also make followers more dependent on leaders and on the common ideology as sources of moral authority. They also reinforced each other's justification for martyrdom. Moreover, guilt might also lead terrorists to seek punishment and danger rather than avoid it.

As illustrated by the studies of Guss et al. and Crenshaw, two themes that could be investigated using criminology theories to understand the behaviour of terrorists are the "group processes" and "the mechanisms to eradicate possible guilt or doubts". In many criminal acts, such as white collar crimes, organized crimes and juvenile delinquency, the dynamics is similar to terrorism. Instead of using the terms "group processes" and "the mechanisms to eradicate possible guilt or doubts", criminologists use the terms "differential association" and "neutralization". Potential criminals usually associate themselves with individuals or groups that could teach them about the deviant or criminal act and they need to neutralize or justify their acts before they commit the crime. These are also identified in the study of terrorists.

Differential association theory was first put forth by Edwin H. Sutherland in 1939 (Siegel, 2006; 226- 228). This is one of the most enduring explanations of criminal behaviour. To Sutherland, criminality stemmed neither from individual traits nor from socioeconomic position. Instead, he believed it to be a function of a learning process that could affect any individual in any culture. Acquiring a behaviour is a social learning process. Criminal skills or techniques, motives and rationalization are learned as a result of contacts with individuals or group with pro-crime values, attitudes and definitions and other patterns of criminal behaviour. Thus, criminality cannot occur without the aid of others as it is a function of

socialization. Learning occurs within intimate groups. Whether a person obeys or disregards the law is influenced by the quality of social interactions. Frequent contacts have greater effect than rare and haphazard contacts, and those of lasting duration have greater influence than those that are brief. The importance and prestige attributed to the individual or groups from whom the definitions are learned is also crucial. Those who are considered more important will have greater influence. In summary, Sutherland's theory suggests that individuals become law violators when they are in contact with people, groups or events that produce an excess of definitions favourable toward criminality and are isolated from counteracting forces that could have influenced the individuals not to violate the law.

Neutralisation theory was introduced by Gresham Sykes and David Matza in 1957 (p.230-231). They viewed the process of becoming a criminal as a learning experience in which potential delinquents and criminals mastered techniques that enabled them to counterbalance or neutralize conventional values and to drift back and forth between illegitimate and conventional behaviour. Matza argued that even the most committed criminals and delinquents were not involved in criminality all the time. They also attended schools, family functions and religious services. Their behaviour could be conceived as falling along a continuum between total freedom and total restraint. This process, which Matza called "drift", referred to the movement from one extreme behaviour to another, resulting in behaviour that was sometimes unconventional, free or deviant and at other times constrained and sober. Learning techniques of neutralization enabled a person to temporarily "drift away" from conventional behaviour and get involved in more subterranean values and behaviour, including crime. Sykes and Matza suggested that people developed a distinct set of justifications for their law-violating behaviour. These neutralization techniques enabled them to temporarily drift away from the rules of the normative society and participate in subterranean behaviour. These techniques of neutralization include the following patterns:

- Deny responsibility – Criminal acts resulted from forces beyond their control or were accidents;
- Deny injury – By denying the wrongfulness of an act, for example, stealing is viewed as borrowing;
- Deny victim – Maintains that the victim of crime "had it coming";
- Condemn condemners – An offender views the world as a corrupt place with a dog-eat-dog code. For example, police are on the take and, therefore, unfair for them to condemn the offender;
- Appeal to higher authority – They are caught in a dilemma of being loyal to their own peer group while at the same time attempting to abide by the rules of larger society.

In summary, the theory of neutralization presupposes a condition that allows people to neutralize unconventional norms and values by using such slogans as "I didn't mean to do it", "I didn't really hurt anybody", "They had it coming to them", "Everybody's picking on me" and "I didn't do it for myself". These excuses allow people to drift into criminal modes of behaviour.

In conclusion to this paper, differential association theory and neutralization theory have been identified as very relevant to the study of terrorism, particularly on the issue of group process and mechanisms to eradicate possible guilt or doubts, besides those already listed in the earlier section of this paper. The two criminology theories could throw some light on the process that could lead a person to becoming a terrorist. Moreover, many significant studies have been done to test both theories and these studies could be used to guide studies on terrorism. From findings of these criminology studies, possible social means of preventing terrorism could be identified instead of relying mainly on physical prevention that has dominated counter-terrorist policies in most countries. Moreover, there are doubts shown in some of these studies on the success of physical prevention or "deterrence". Finally, there could also be other criminology theories that are important that have not been identified by this paper. Criminology certainly has an important role in the study and prevention of terrorism.

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