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**Political Disputes in the National Liberation Front during the Activity of the
Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic 1958-1962**

الخلافات السياسية في جبهة التحرير الوطني خلال نشاط الحكومة المؤقتة
للجمهورية الجزائرية 1958-1962

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Abstract:

This research paper dealt with the subject of political differences between the leaders of the revolution during the activity of the provisional government between 1958 and 1962, this topic is considered very important in the study of the history of Algeria in general and the history of the liberation revolution in particular, and we may find very few studies and researches in this field, due to the lack of archival and oral material and the sensitivity of the subject, but we as researchers in the history of the revolution try as much as possible to be objective and analyze the facts from historical sources from archival documents, memoirs of the most important actors in this, including the leaders of the Politicians and military. This paper presents the most important political differences between the leaders of the National Liberation Front during the course of the Provisional Government, because these differences did not appear explicitly until after the Soummam Conference of August 20, 1956. On this basis, we pose the following problem: What are the most important differences that the interim government has faced during its political career? What are its effects on the course of the liberation revolution and how the National Liberation Front has dealt with this situation?

Keywords: The Algerian Revolution, National Liberation Front, National Council of the Algerian Revolution, Committee of Coordination and Execution, Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic.

المخلص:

تناول هذه الورقة البحثية موضوع الخلافات السياسية بين قادة الثورة خلال نشاط الحكومة المؤقتة ما بين 1958-1962، يعتبر هذا الموضوع جد مهم في دراسة تاريخ الجزائر بصفة عامة وتاريخ الثورة التحريرية بصفة خاصة، وقد نجد الدراسات والابحاث في هذا المجال جد قليلة، لنقص المادة الارشيفية والشفوية ولحساسية الموضوع، ولكن نحن كباحثين في تاريخ الثورة نحاول قدر المستطاع أن نكون موضوعيين نحلل الوقائع من المصادر التاريخية من الوثائق الأرشيفية، مذكرات لأهم الفاعلين في ذلك، من قادة سياسيين وعسكريين.

تقدم هذه الورقة أهم الخلافات السياسية بين قادة جبهة التحرير الوطني خلال مسار الحكومة المؤقتة لأن هذه الخلافات لم تظهر بصريح إلا بعد انعقاد مؤتمر الصومام 20 اوت 1956.

على هذا الأساس نطرح الإشكالية التالية: ماهي أهم الخلافات التي واجهتها الحكومة المؤقتة خلال مسارها السياسي؟ وماهي تأثيراتها على مسار الثورة التحريرية وكيف تعاملت جبهة التحرير الوطني مع هذا الوضع. الكلمات المفتاحية: الثورة الجزائرية، جبهة التحرير الوطني، المجلس الوطني لثورة، لجنة التنسيق والتنفيذ، الحكومة المؤقتة للجمهورية الجزائرية.

1. INTRODUCTION

After the assassination of Aban Ramadan in December 1957, the Coordination and Implementation Committee did not resume its activities until April 1958, and the intensity of caution among its members increased.

The distribution of tasks within the Coordination and Implementation Committee was as follows: Karim was in charge of the War Directorate or Omran of Armament and Supply, Boussouf was in charge of Public Communications, Amin Dabbaghin in External Relations, Mahmoud Sharif Mali, Ben Toubal in Interior and Administrative Organization, Mahri of Social Affairs, and Farhat Abbas of Press and Media (Lounisi, p. 24).

The following three names: Karim, Boussouf, and Ben Toubal, are considered the most influential nucleus in decision-making, if not the decision that goes back to them before Boumediene emerged as the head of the General Staff in 1960, but the problem that comes to mind is: why did they remain only ministers in the Algerian interim government, and none of them took over the presidency of this government and preferred to hand it over to Farhat Abbas and then Ben Khudda, despite the fact that all three of them have historical legitimacy, they are veterans of the private organization and were In the Group of 22, Karim is the only remaining of the historic nine.

The explanation lies in the fact that these three people, despite their struggle, were distinguished by not crossing the red line, and not endangering the unity of the revolution, no matter how intense the conflict between them, and they also tacitly agreed to keep the influence in their hands,

so they were united against anyone who threatened this influence, and it can be said that the relationship between them is a relationship of balance within the system of the revolution, and any breach of this balance can endanger the revolution in depth, and that is why none of them allowed the other to assume the presidency of the interim government, so they resorted They always choose the head of government, not one of them, but he is weak so that their influence remains (Lounisi, p. 24).

2. Meeting of the Interior Colonels

This meeting was held between 6 and 12 December 1958, and included the leaders of the following states: Amirouche, who was the one who invited the meeting, represented the third term, El Hadj Lakhdar from the state of Auras, Si Mohamed from the province of Algiers, and Si El Hawass from the sixth term.

As for the background and reasons for this meeting, historical testimonies as well as historians differ.

According to Suleiman Al-Sheikh (Lounisi, p. 44), the commanders of the provinces of the interior are forced to confront the repressive military apparatus of the French power, and as a result they are particularly vulnerable. The leadership that is stable in Hana abroad has handed them over to themselves and neglected them, and from this observation, they have reached the point of accusation, especially since the conditions of the struggle in the resistance are difficult, especially since the force of the enemy's repression is exhausting.

At this meeting, inaccuracies were raised about the inadequacy of the assistance provided by the Provisional Government

with weapons, ammunition and medicines, as it neglected the armed struggle taking place at home, intensified the effort around diplomatic work, and condemned the inadequacy and inadequacy of attempts to overrun the electrified dams, and the inadequacy of the distractions carried out in the Liberation Army along the border in order to freeze the enemy's force and reduce the pressure on the resistance elements at home.

Mohamed Harbi (Harbi, 1993, p. 196) has a different opinion, saying that the meeting was held after the "La Bleuet" operation launched by Amirouche, which resulted in 2000 deaths (there is no consensus on the number of victims of La Bleuet), for which Karim Belkacem congratulated him for foiling the enemy's conspiracy, but neither Colonel Kafi nor Colonel Lotfi accepted to join Amirouche, as Kafi was linked to Ben Toubal and Lotfi was linked to Boussouf, as they feared that the goal of Amiroush's initiative would be to make Karim the leader of the revolution. The state meeting was a maneuver carried out by Karim by Amirouche, who confirmed that he had resolved the codes of the messages exchanged between the two men in this regard, and in fact the signals of the third state were no longer working, and their messages were passing through the second term.

In this regard, Kafi said (Memoirs of President Ali Kafi., p. 142): "Thus, Amirouche, seeing himself in a position of power crowned by the 'Akfado' incident, behaves as if he is the 'savior' of the revolution, and by suggesting these decisions, he wants to control and govern the whole of the interior, he is not desperate to extend his influence to the second and

fifth terms, and in addition to making room for him, the rising officials abroad congratulate him, especially Karim, who sees him as the most reliable ally in his attempt to seize power."

Lakhdar Bourgaa (Memoirs of Major C. Lakhdar Bourgaa, Algiers, 2000, p. 21) disagrees with Kafi and said that the call for the conference was collective and with the agreement of all the participating leaders and was not inspired or briefly by one of them, and they were in complete agreement on the necessity of holding the meeting. Void.

Perhaps what refutes the argument that by inviting him to the meeting, Amiroush wanted to provide support to Karim Belkacem in the context of the conflict between the three Ba'as, is that one of the demands of the meeting of the colonels is the entry of the interim government into Algeria, especially the Minister of the Armed Forces, Karim Belkacem, whose place should be inside the country and not outside it.

The four leaders sent Omar or Siddiq to the Interim Government in Tunisia to inform it of the decisions taken at the meeting, and the meeting assigned Colonel Amirouche and Si Hawass to go to Tunis accompanied by special forces to put pressure on the Interim Government and force it to implement the decisions emanating from their meeting.

One of these skeptics is Captain Mokhd Aarab Besaud, who was an officer in the third and then fourth mandates, and says that he investigated the case of the martyrdom of Amirouche and Si Hawass when he was assigned a mission in Oujda, and discovered that Nassef Ammar and Ben

Aarab Rashid, who were in charge of using communication devices, had used a coda in their communication with Amirouche and Si Hawass. The French army was aware of this, and this allowed the French army to discover the locations of Amirouche and Si al-Hawass (Lounisi, p. 27).

Prior to the formation of the interim government at the beginning of September 1958, the Coordination and Implementation Committee put an end to the experience of the Eastern Military Organizing Committee, and punished its members on charges of incompetence, so Bouklaz was suspended from all activity, his rank was dropped and he was sent to Sudan, and the rank of Colonel Al-Amouri was demoted to the rank of major, and all his activities were suspended and sent to Lebanon, and Mohammadi Al-Said was sent to Cairo, that the cadres of the Eastern Base and the Awras were the ones who were sentenced to the harshest punishments, and they tried to take revenge two months later through the so-called Colonel Al-Amouri conspiracy. In the West, on the contrary, the Fifth Mandate tried to organize itself into an orderly, organized and centralized apparatus whose forces were firmly and bureaucratically military and police, thus being the most "modern", more rational and less tribal organization than the other organizations (Harbi, 1993, p. 181).

Colonel Mohamed al-Amouri is considered a veteran of the People's Party, and he resented the appointment of Mahmoud al-Sharif as the commander of the first term, the latter, who was an officer in the French army and fought against the National Liberation Army, was taken prisoner and chose to join the revolution, and al-Amouri did not hide his criticism of

Karim Belkacem because he allowed the infiltration of the officers fleeing from the French army into the high command of the National Liberation Army, headed by Commander Edir Mouloud, the latter participated in several combating operations against the mujahideen and suffered from al-Amouri. When Commander Eder was appointed Commander of the Armed Forces.

Karim Belkacem became given his orders to Colonel Mohammadi al-Said, the chief of staff of the National Liberation Army in the east, and in the face of al-Amouri's criticism of Karim and then his expulsion and his successor at the head of the province was Colonel Nawara, who is a friend of Amouri.

Colonel Amouri began to plan a military coup against the interim government of the Algerian Republic, which deviated from the principles of the revolution in his eyes, and Al-Amouri based his plan on the military forces under the command of his friend Nawara in the first term, and Awashriya in the eastern commanders, and they were joined by the commander Jamaï Saadi, nicknamed Mustafa Lakhal, who was a student in Cairo and had intimate relations with the regime of Abdel Nasser, so he was able to gain Egyptian support for the coup plotters because Abdel Nasser was very resentful of the leaders of the interim government and considered it far from His proposals for Islamic Arabism also won the support of the Tunisian Arab-Islamic militant Saleh Ben Youssef, who opposed Bourguiba and wanted to overthrow him, allowing Tunisia to be involved in the struggle against French colonialism within the framework of the idea of the Arab Maghreb Liberation Army.

About 50 ELN officers were meeting

in Tunisia's Kef region to draw up a plan to overthrow the interim government headed by Farhat Abbas.

It seems that Ben Toubal and Boussouf were aware of the movements of Al-Amouri by virtue of their positions, as the former was the Minister of the Interior and the second was in charge of intelligence, which is not hidden from him, no matter how big or small, he left, but they let things go as they intended because the operation allows them to get rid of their rival Karim, who hid everything from him, while Ben Toubal and Boussouf can take their precautions on the day of the operation, and intervene after the assassination of Karim.

Fortunately for Karim, the Kabylie "Salem Shalbek" discovered the conspiracy when he heard Al-Amouri talking to his comrades in Chaouia, so he told Mahmoud Cherif, who in turn told Karim, so he asked Bourguiba to help arrest the conspirators, and Bourguiba rushed to help because his fate was linked to the failure of the coup attempt supported by his opponent Saleh Ben Youssef, so he arrested the Amouri group and some of them escaped in November 1958. (Lounisi, p. 27)

3. The third meeting of the National Revolutionary Council

By the end of 1958, the situation of the revolution began to deteriorate for many reasons, including the fact that the French authorities had pushed all their forces into the battle and the pressure on the people had been concentrated, as well as the effect of the two electrifying lines on the internal situation of the revolution.

In addition, the attempted coup d'état of Amouri had negative effects on the

combatants, as well as another small incident that almost blew up the leadership at the summit, namely the assassination of Amira Mufayeh, who was an employee of the Front's representative in Lebanon and a friend of Lamine Dabbaghin, and who was one of those who did not accept the assignment of the presidency of the interim Government to Farhat Abbas (Hishamaoui, p. 173).

These disagreements paralyzed the work of the interim government and imposed this crisis situation at the meeting of the National Revolutionary Council, which was preceded by preparatory work carried out by a committee of seven people (proposed by Boussouf): Mohamed Said, Houari Boumediene, Ali Kafi, Obeid Hajj Lakhdar, Boudegan Lotfi, Said Yazouran and Dahiles Slimane.

The committee ended its work after meetings that lasted from October to December 1959, and it was decided to form the National Revolutionary Council in Tripoli, which was held on 16/12/1959 to 18/01/1960, and one of its decisions was to reorganize the government, and then renew the confidence of Farhat Abbas, as well as reconstituting the military leadership, so they abolished a ministry.

The defense is accused of negligence, and a new formula has been formed, namely the formation of the "Ministerial Committee for War", which includes Karim, Ben Toubal, and Boussouf, but this committee will only exercise indirect control over the army.

One of the most important decisions of the Council was the formation of the General Staff Command, which was taken over by Houari Boumediene (its Chairman)

and Ali Mengli, Gaid Ahmed and Rabah Zarrari Ezzedine as members.

At the end of the meeting on 18 January 1960 (33 days later, the longest meeting of the National Revolutionary Council), Farhat Abbas and Houari Boumediene assumed their responsibilities on 23 January 1960, and the provincial leaders began to prepare themselves to enter their provinces, including Lotfi, who was martyred on his way to the fifth term on 27 March 1960 south of the city of Bechar (Hishamaoui, pp. 180, 185).

The incident of Lotfi's martyrdom calls for several possibilities, whether it is an ordinary incident of martyrdom, or is it one of the liquidations that the revolution has witnessed, this issue requires a great deal of research in order to reveal its truth.

4. The Fourth Meeting of the National Revolutionary Council (August 9, 1961)

What characterized this period of liberation was the sharp disagreement between the General Staff and the Provisional Government.

The Frontier Liberation Army was a military and political force at the same time, as it did not devote its efforts to mastering military art alone, but also allocated an important field for political upbringing, and while in the areas of operations they were actively carrying out the duties of armed struggle, they in the rear bases were more preoccupied with preparing the future and forming the frameworks, and the army began to openly demand its political role in the face of the interim government, as it considers itself with the people as the main driving force of the revolution, and here the army clashed with the interim government,

the latter which was known for its support. Although the interim government represents to the French authorities and the international community the image of a unified and homogeneous entity, if viewed from the inside, it will reveal a heterogeneity, especially since it is the fruit of multiple balances.

The Provisional Government was too busy with its diplomatic activity and seemed to neglect the military aspects of the revolution, while the military, on the other hand, gave greater importance to the armed conflict, demanded more and more arms and money (Cheikh, 2002, p. 109).

The dispute was fueled by the resignation of the General Staff on 15 July 1961 following a dispute over the detention of a French pilot who raided Algerian refugees (Hishamaoui, pp. 180, 185).

Under these circumstances, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution met in Tripoli from 9 to 27 August 1961, with the aim of renewing future projects for the War of Liberation, as well as approving the texts that would set the direction and objectives of the Algerian Revolution (Statement of the National Council of the Algerian Revolution, Al-Memory, 1996,, p. 296).

The National Council of the Revolution (NCR) had two parallel discussions, one on negotiations and the other on leadership, with the first of which the General Staff stood up to the overwhelming majority of the Council, and since it was the leader of the Authority.

What characterized this period of liberation was the sharp disagreement between the General Staff and the

Provisional Government. The Frontier Liberation Army (PLA) was both a military and a political force. The army began to openly demand its political role in the face of the interim government, as it considers itself with the people as the main driving force of the revolution, and here the army clashed with the interim government. The Provisional Government was very busy with its diplomatic activities, and seemed to neglect the military aspects of the revolution, while the military, on the other hand, gave more importance to the armed conflict, demanding more and more weapons and money, and this is the point of difference between the General Staff and the Provisional Government.

The dispute was fueled by the resignation of the General Staff on July 15, 1961, following a dispute over the detention of a French pilot who raided Algerian refugees. Under these circumstances, the National Council of the Algerian Revolution met in Tripoli from 9 to 27 August 1961.

The CNR engaged in two parallel discussions, one on negotiations and the other on leadership, the first of which stood up to the overwhelming majority of the Council, and since the Chief of Staff, Houari Boumediene, was unenthusiastic about expressing his views, he left a leader and Mingeles to present their assessment of the negotiations, the latter of which considered that the Provisional Government was moving towards a solution of the neo-colonial model that sacrificed the revolution in favor of cooperation with France (Harbi, 1993, p. 236).

The meeting ended on August 27, 1961, with Ben Youssef Ben Khedda appointed as head of the Provisional

Government.

Ben Yusuf bin Khudda tried to appease the General Staff in his appeal to the people on 15/9/1961, stressing that the interim government attaches the greatest importance to increasing the equipment of the Liberation Army. (Cheikh, 2002, p. 109)

The General Staff retracted its resignation in early November 1961, but the dispute did not end with this solution because the Provisional Government was certain that the solution was political and non-military.

In any case, this dispute, despite its seriousness, remained at the level of the leadership, and did not have a significant impact on either the fighters or those working in the political field, and the operations were ongoing and negotiations with France were continuing, and perhaps France at that time was not in a better position than the Algerians, as the disobedience movement in the army and the deteriorating social situation threatened the French government, and perhaps this was what left each side to find a solution to end its problems. (Hishamaoui, p. 194)

5. CONCLUSION

The manifesto of November 1, 1954 is considered the first document for the formation of the National Liberation Front and is the most important ideological document in terms of the future construction of the State of independence.

Hence, under the roof of the Front, social forces that ranged from the far right to the far left, but united around the line of revolutionary struggle.

After the Sawmam Conference, the door was wide opened to individuals from different political currents, and this difference in the ideological composition of the National Liberation Front was perhaps one of the most important reasons that helped create the crisis within the Front, and this type of disagreement emerged clearly after the formation of interim governments that consisted of different ideological structures, and the best evidence of this proposition is the conflict between Farhat Abbas from the UDMA and Amin Dabbaghin from the MTLN after the killing of Amira Alawa, and many others like them.

In the period from 1958 to 1962, a conflict between the military and the politicians was clearly prominent, which in fact represented a conflict between the city and the countryside, as the various military leaders of the revolution hail from the countryside, while the civilian population was born and grew in which various political currents and parties, especially moderate ones, such as the group of Farhat Abbas, the scholars and the Algerian Communist Party, were born and grew.

The coup attempt by Colonel Amouri and the meeting of the colonels of the interior against the policy of the interim government, and the conflict between the General Staff and the interim government are only an embodiment of this kind of dispute, i.e., the dispute between the city and the countryside.

In addition, there are personal disputes, such as those between Ben Toubal, Boussouf and Karim.

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