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The Tidjania and the contradictory positions between the alliance of the Hachim tribes in Mascara and the opposition of Emir Abd al-Qadir during the first half of the 19th century

التجانيون وتضارب المواقف بين محالفة قبائل الحشم في معسكر ومعارضة الأمير عبد القادر خلال النصف الأول من القرن 19م

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Abstract:

In 1782 the Tidjaniya order was founded by cheikh Ahmad al-Tijani who chose to avoid confrontation with the Ottomans, in a period of tension with them. The beys resorted to eliminate it and to preserve its existence, the Tidjania allied with the Hachim tribes.

This alliance raises several questions, including: How did contact with Hachim come about despite the distance between them, and how did the hostility between the Hachim and the Ottoman beys develop to the point where they allied themselves with the Tidjania against Ottomans? It is noteworthy that Emir Abdelkader belonged to the same region, so why did they oppose him and even clash with him in 1838?

We will attempt to analyse all these questions, explaining first the Tijani alliance with the Hachim and its circumstances, then the results of Ottoman pressure on the Tidjania, concluding with the results on the Tidjania's positions towards Emir Abdelkader

Keywords: Tidjania; Hachim; Emir; Ottomans; alliance.

الملخص:

في سنة 1782م ولدت الطريقة التجانية بعين ماضي بالأغواط كطريقة صوفية جديدة، وإن أثر شيخها أحمد التجاني منذ تأسيسها الابتعاد عن الصدام مع العثمانيين لتمكينها من العمل في هدوء والانتشار السريع في الجزائر وخارجها، إلا أن ميلادها تزامن مع مرحلة القطيعة بين الحكام العثمانيين في الجزائر والطرق الصوفية. وكان من البديهي أن يلجأ البايات العثمانيون إلى مضايقتها للقضاء عليها وبالمقابل كان على الطريقة المحافظة على وجودها فتحالفت مع عدو الحكم العثماني في الجزائر؛ قبائل الحشم.

هذا التحالف سيثير حتما عدة تساؤلات منها: كيفية حدوث الاتصال مع أهل الحشم، وكيف حدث العداء بين الحشم والبايات حتى حالفوا التجانيين؟ وللإشارة فالأمير عبد القادر ينتهي إلى الحشم فلماذا عارضوه وتصادموا معه سنة 1838م؟ هذه التساؤلات سنجيب عنها مفسرين هذه التناقضات متبعين خطة تبدأ بالتحالف التجاني مع الحشم، ثم نتائج الضغط العثماني على التجانيين وصدامهما عام 1826، لنصل إلى تأثيرات هذا الصدام على المواقف التجانية من الأمير عبد القادر بعد مبايعته لقيادة المقاومة المسلحة.

الكلمات المفتاحية: التجانية؛ هاشم؛ الأمير؛ العثمانيون؛ التحالف.

INTRODUCTION

In 1782, Algeria witnessed the birth of the Tidjania order, which was added to the other Sufi orders that were already present throughout the country. Sixteen orders were counted, thirteen of which were of chadhili origin. Most of these orders supported the Ottomans at the beginning of the Ottoman era, including the Taybiya in western Algeria, the Hansaliya in the suburbs of Constantine, the Qadiriya, whose teachings spread in Algeria even before the arrival of the Ottomans, the Ziyaniya in the south, the Rahmaniya in the Zouaoua region, and the Derkaouia, which arrived from Morocco and spread throughout the regions of Oran and

Constantine at the beginning of the 19th century, rebelling against Ottomans on both fronts.

Returning to the circumstances of the rift between these Sufi orders and Ottomans during the second half of the 18th century and the beginning of the 19th century, we see the difficulty of the period in which the Tidjania order emerged and the position of the beys towards it. Harassment of its cheikhs continued throughout this period, both during the reign of the founder cheikh (Ahmed al-Tijani) and his sons Muhammad al-Kabir and Muhammad al-Saghir. This pressure forced the founder of the order to emigrate to Fez, while his eldest son refused to accept further harassment, which led him to seek allies,

including the Hachim tribes. This alliance raises several questions, especially when we consider the distance between the regions of Mascara and Ain Madhi and the lack of contact between the two sides prior to this alliance. This leads us to ask the following question: if the Tidjania wanted to get rid of this ongoing siege by the Ottoman beys, what did the Al-Hachim have to do with it? How did this rapprochement come about given the distance between them? Did they actually participate in his campaign against Mascara? If this rapprochement with the Hachim, who are from this region, why did the Tidjania oppose Emir Abd al-Qadir?

The search for answers to these questions leads us to a number of hypotheses, including: The Tidjania may have sought leadership by eliminating the Turkish garrison in a camp that was highly regarded for being the former headquarters of the Bey before the conquest of Oran in 1792. The choice of the Hachim tribes may have been based on their strength and ability to support them in achieving their objectives. The two sides may have had common objectives in confronting the Ottoman beys, especially during the reign of Bey Hassan bin Moussa in the Western Beylik, who was known for his tyranny and oppression of the population and religious leaders. This is what we will seek to investigate, relying on the historical method and employing analysis, comparison and conclusion, through various elements that address all the stages that this alliance went through until it reached a breaking point with Emir Abdelkader.

1- The emergence of the Tidjania order and the Ottoman attitude towards it:

1-1 The birth of the Tidjania order:

cheikh Ahmad al-Tidjani's travels had a significant impact on the path of Sufism, and he had great ambitions to establish a Sufi order that would be stronger and more widespread than its predecessors. This ambition was confirmed in his visions, through which he wanted to prove to people that he was promised the status of kotb (spiritual leader). These visions were mentioned by Ali Hrazim Brada, one of his

companions, in Diawahir al-Ma'ani (Ali Harazim Barrada, 1997: 42).

The Tidjania mention that cheikh Ahmad al-Tidjani sensed the signs of victory during his stay in Tlemcen and after his departure from there to the village of Abi Samghoun on the outskirts of El-Bayadh in 1782, the greatest victory befell him – according to what was reported about him – by seeing the Prophet, peace be upon him, awake and not in a dream, who, according to him, determined for him the Tidjani method (unknown, manuscript no. 2093: page 11, front). The cheikh thus announced the birth of his new order and returned to Ain Madhi to establish it as the headquarters of this nascent order. It seems that this vision brought him trouble even from scholars and religious, regardless of the Ottomans.

1-2 The Ottomans' stance on the emergence of the Tidjania order:

The Tidjania order emerged during the reign of Bey Muhammad al-Kabir, who was known for his fond of religious men and scholars but feared a rebellion by the inhabitants of the desert regions such as Laghouat, Chelala and Ain Madhi after the emergence of the Tidjania order, especially when he heard that people were gathering around it, adopting its practices and its followers were beginning to multiply. He conquered these regions and forced their inhabitants to pledge allegiance and obedience to him in 1784. His scribe, Ahmed bin Hatal al-Tilimçani, recorded these conquests in detail. (Ibn Hatal al-Tilimçani, 1785: from pages 1- 9), and the invasion of Ain Mahdi had a great impact on the founder of the order, Ahmad al-Tidjani, and the inhabitants of his town, especially when he forced them to submit and imposed a tax on them in the form of a herd of horses, a number of servants, a share of money, and an annual tax of 188 riyals. (Louis Rinn, 1884: 84)

After the death of Bey Muhammad al-Kabir in 1798, his son Othman succeeded him and once again conquered Ain Mahdi, subjugating its inhabitants and forcing them to pay taxes. cheikh Ahmad al-Tijani was forced to flee to Fez in Morocco, where he

established a greet zawiya. Despite his flight, the harassment continued even after Bey Othman was deposed in 1800. The beys who succeeded him also took a hostile stance towards the Tidjania order, starting with Mustafa al-Adjami (1800-1805), then Muhammad al-Mqalish (1805-1808), followed by Bey Boukabous (1808-1813) Then Qara Baghli (1813-1817) and finally Bey Hassan ben Moussa (1817-1830), who was known for harassing religious men and Olema, especially the Tidjania, with whom he reached the point of armed conflict, which had a serious impact on the Tidjania, resulting in the killing of their cheikh, Muhammad al-Kabir, and the annihilation of his army (Belhamissi, 1978: 37). This also had an impact on their future relationship with the people of Mascara, led by Emir Abdelkader, which we will discuss in the following paragraphs.

2- The desire of the Tidjania for revenge and their alliance with Hachim Tribes:

2-1 The emergence of a desire for revenge among the Tidjania after harassment by the Ottoman beys:

Bey Hassan's attack on Ain Madhi cost its inhabitants another 100,000 riyals in fines, and their city was'nt spared his brutality, as he bombarded it with cannons for 36 hours (Skiredj, 1907: 404). The pressure on the Tidjania continued, which was a strong motive for revenge against the Ottomans. They even saw that the only way to escape their oppression and harassment was to revolt against them, and thus began preparations for this revenge and to escape the pressure of these beys.

2-2 Mohammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani's alliance with the Hachim tribes:

It may seem strange when we consider the distance between the regions of Mascara and Ain Mahdi, which exceeds 300 kilometres, and how the meeting between the Hachim and the Tidjania came about and what caused this alliance. These are questions that may occupy the reader's mind and must be explained.

The Hachim tribes, for their part, wanted to take revenge on Bey Hassan and get rid of

him, and here cheikh Mouhammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani found in them a reliable ally. Mouslim ben Abdel Qadir al-Wahrani reported that there were twelve (12) Hachim notables, and Bey Hassan had been informed by his spies that they were preparing to rebel against him. He went to their tribe and pretended to organise a feast for them. By chance, one of them was absent from the feast because he was on a hunting trip, and the Bey was forced not to wait for him and killed the eleven notables, which gave rise to intense hostility towards the Bey among the people of Al-Hachim, who were determined to take revenge on him. (Mouslim ben Abdel Qadir al-Wahrani, 1974: 31)

Faced with this situation, the people of Al-Hachim went to cheikh Mohammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani in Ain Madhi and offered him their allegiance and assistance in defeating the Turks. He agreed to attack Mascara, which, according to most researchers, was the most dangerous

He took due to the difficulty of the task, given the weakness of his forces, the exhausting distance the army had to travel, and the difficulty of trusting his allies. Even Agha ben Ouda al-Mazari doubted the loyalty of the the desert tribes, describing them as tribes that did not comply with what was expected of them, and saying that they had pressured him to attack the camp before he was properly prepared to face Bey Hassan. (Agha al-Mazari, 1990: 352)

3-The attack on Mascara and the annihilation of Mohammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani's army

3-1 Mohammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani's attack on the city of Mascara and the Battle of Awaja

Following the agreement between the Hachim tribes and cheikh al-Tidjani, his army moved from Ain Madhi in 1826 towards the city of Mascara with about six hundred (600) men. Whenever he passed by the Saharan tribes, a number of their members joined him until he reached the south of the city of Mascara (Muslim ben Abdel Qadir, 1974: 31).

He began his attack from Al-Argoub, and Mascara was divided into seven (07)

neighborhoods: Houmat Al-Argoub, Houmat Sidi Ali m'hamed, Houmat Ain Al-Bayda, Houmat Al-Bab Al-charqi, Houmat Baba Ali, Houmat Sidi m'hamed Boujellal, and Houmat Al-Madina Al-Dakhiliya, which is the central one with its wall (Al-Agha Al-Mazari, 1990, p. 356). The fighting intensified in Houmat al-Argoub, and after two days, al-Tidjani managed to subdue it, as well as several other neighbourhoods such as Houma al-charqiya and Houmat Sidi M'hammed Boujellal, and besieged the rest of the neighbourhoods.

When news of Al-Tidjani's attack on the city of Mascara reached Bey Hassan, he moved his army to the city. When he reached Al-Kert, ten kilometres west of the city, he heard of Al-Tidjani's arrival and was forced to lift the siege of Mascara and descend south to the outskirts of Froha, where the two sides met in the Awaja area. There, the fighting intensified, and within hours, the Hachim withdrew from Al-Tidjani, and the rest of the Bedouins withdrew with them. Tidjani's forces remained fighting alone, given the imbalance between the two armies, as the tide turned in favour of Al-Bey Hassan, who besieged Tidjani's army from all sides and attacked them until they were completely wiped out. He then returned to Oran victorious. (Mohammed ben Abdel Qadir, 1903: 81)

Opinions differed about the withdrawal of the Hachim tribes from the battle despite their alliance with the Tidjani, with Mohammed ben Abdel Qadir attributing this to their pullback in the fighting and their inability to continue.

(Mohammed ben Abdel Qadir, 1903: 81), while researcher Hassan Remaoun attributes this to the fragility of the alliance between them and the Tidjania (Remaoun, 2000: p. 30).

4- Emir Abdelkader's pledge of allegiance to the resistance and the position of the Tidjania towards it:

With the fall of Algeria under French occupation in 1830, the Ottoman administration collapsed, chaos reigned, and French colonial ambitions increased in the

rest of the national territory. After Bey Hassan surrendered the city of Oran to the French, the need arose for a national leader to lead the resistance against the occupiers. Attention turned to Mahieddine, the father of Abd al-Qadir, but due to his advanced age, he presented his son Abd al-Qadir to the delegations as he possessed all the qualities of a leader. The Emir had to unite all the tribes without causing any sensitivities, especially since the Sufi orders were competing for leadership and followers.

4-1 Cheikh Mohammed al-Saghir al-Tidjani's position on Emir Abd al-Qadir's allegiance:

Cheikh Mohammed al-Saghir al-Tidjani categorically refused to join hands with Emir Abd al-Qadir, even though his allegiance was legitimate. The LAghouat tribes, who were loyal to cheikh al-Tidjani, who had been running the Ain Madhi zawiya since 1827, rallied around him.

Emir Abdelkader wrote to cheikh al-Tidjani several times to unite their efforts against colonialism, but he did not receive his support (Ismail al-Arabi, 1982: 171). French sources indicated that al-Tidjani had been a closest ally of the French since their arrival in Algeria and that the Emir tried to persuade him to stay away from them (General P.J. Andre, 1956: 292). Opinions differed on the reasons for al-Tidjani's refusal to pledge allegiance to Emir. Officer Rinn believes that Tidjani was certain of the Emir's defeat and that he had nothing to gain from the Emir's victory because the north was under the control of other Sufi orders (Rinn, 1884: 84), while Ismail al-Arabi attributes the refusal to the political ambitions of cheikh al-Tidjani, who wanted to regain the influence that the order had lost by allying with the French (Ismail al-Arabi, 1982: 171). In our view, the real reason may be The sensitivity that exists between the Tidjania and Qadiriya orders stems from the fact that the Tidjania did not view Emir as a national leader leading the struggle, but rather as a Qadiri. in addition to the historical factor we mentioned earlier, namely that the Hachimites betrayed the Tidjania in the Battle of Awaja in 1826, including Emir Abd al-Qadir, which is the

same opinion held by Kaddour ben Rwila, author of *Wachaih al-Kitab* (Kaddour ben Rwila, 1980: 96).

4-2 The armed confrontation between Emir Abdelkader and Cheikh Mohammed al-Saghir al-Tidjani:

cheikh Mohammed al-Saghir al-Tidjani's continued refusal to cooperate with the Emir led to an armed clash in 1838, forcing the Emir to besiege Ain Madhi. The spy Léon Roche played a key role in increasing the hostility between the two sides. The siege began on June 5th 1838, and Faucon believes that the Emir had reached the point of no return in his determination to destroy the Tidjania order, given its continued hostility towards him at a time when colonialism was growing in strength and expansion (Narcisse Faucon, 1889: 23). In our view, these accusations are far from historical truth, as the Emir did not view him as a tidjani, but rather as a dissident, which affected the unity of the struggle against the occupier.

Léon Roche, a spy infiltrating the Emir's army, played an important role in increasing the rift between the two men, and Emir did not discover his true identity until mid-November 1839, after he fled to Oran (Youssef Menassria, 1900: 33).

The siege of Ain Madhi lasted for nearly six months, despite the Emir's repeated attacks on the fortress of Tidjani and the use of artillery. Hunger, fatigue and fear exhausted al-Tidjani's followers, and he was eventually forced to agree to surrender the fortress on the Emir's terms, which included:

- Paying compensation to the prince
- Leaving the city within 40 days
- Allowing him to transfer his transportable funds
- Allowing his supporters to accompany him
- Lifting the siege on the city and withdrawing Emir and his army so that Tidjani could leave
- Tidjani place his son as a hostage with Emir.

When these conditions were fulfilled and Emir entered the fortress, he demolished it (Adib Harb, 2005: 29-30). Tidjani retreated to Tajmout near Ain Madhi, and Emir returned to Mascara after lifting the siege

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The conflict between the Hachimites and their Tidjani allies against Bey Hassan, followed by the conflict between Emir Abdelkader and the Tidjani, led to a number of consequences, the most important of which were:

- The final period of Ottomans in Algeria was very turbulent, leading to armed clashes, including the Tidjani-Ottoman clash.
- Bey Hassan caused a lot of trouble for the Sufi orders, which turned from supporting the Ottomans to breaking with them.
- The extermination of the Tidjani army by Bey Hassan and the withdrawal of the Hachimites were interpreted as deception and betrayal and contributed to the conflict between the Emir and the Tidjania.
- Espionage was behind the rift between Emir Abdelkader and the Tidjania, which was fuelled by the spy Léon Roche.
- The conflict that marked the end of the Ottoman era in Algeria hastened the country's fall under French colonialism and was later exploited by France to fragment national unity.

3. CONCLUSION

Looking back at the events that unfolded for both the Hachim tribes and the Tidjania in their joint struggle against Ottomans in Algeria, it becomes clear that the circumstances of this conflict were behind the Tidjania's changing positions towards the Mascara tribes. The battle of Awaja in 1826 left a deep wound among the Tidjania with the complete annihilation of their army and the beheading of their cheikh, Mohammed al-Kabir al-Tidjani, whose head was taken to Algiers as a sign of victory by Bey Hassan over the Tidjania.

The Tidjania could not forget this tragic incident due to its severity, but the majority of those who wrote about it exonerated the Hashim tribes from deliberately withdrawing and leaving the Tidjania to face their fate. Perhaps due to the imbalance between the two armies and their inability to continue the confrontation, they expected him to flee with his forces to save them from extermination.

In addition to this historical factor, Emir Abdelkader was a Qadiri, and it is well known that there was a fierce conflict between the Qadiri and Tidjani orders over leadership, especially in Africa, which made the Tidjani view the Emir – in addition to being one of his followers – as a Qadiri rather than a national leader. This had a negative impact on our national struggle, which, had all its factions been united, would have been able to expel colonialism and rid Algeria of a dark colonial era that had lasted for more than a century.

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