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Aristotelian Logic in the Islamic World: The Dialectic of Acceptance and Rejection

المنطق الأرسطي في العالم الإسلامي جدلية القبول والرفض

Dr. Kadi Khalf Allah¹, Dr. Baghdad Ben Dida²

¹ Associate Professor A, Nour Bachir University Center – El Bayadh, k.kadi@cu-elbayadh.dz

² Associate Professor A, Nour Bachir University Center – El Bayadh, b.baghdad@cu-elbayadh.dz

Corresponding author: Kadi Khalf Allah,

k.kadi@cu-elbayadh.dz

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Abstract:

The translation movement of Muslim philosophers had a serious impact on Islamic logical thinking. The impact provided an integration of Aristotle's logic with Islamic sciences, and this enabled it to penetrate deeply into theological and legal argument. As a result, the majority of Islamic scholars asserted that it was a religious obligation to study logic. While as much as many of them admired Aristotelian logic and some of the Muslim scholars accepted it, its opinions were still divided. Writers were primarily in two groups: The first group embraced and supported Aristotelian logic. Their numbers included an appreciable number of philosophers that not only accepted this science but also evolved it throughout centuries, spreading it over lands such as Persia, the Levant, and the Islamic Maghreb. The second group rejected it. Some jurists and theologians viewed logic as a danger to religious doctrine. They opposed its use, and in some cases, individuals who engaged with it were stigmatized or punished.

Keywords: Aristotelian logic, philosophy, religion, Greek culture, Islamic culture, acceptance, rejection.

1. INTRODUCTION

The majority of Western and Eastern thinkers have taken it for granted, long enough, that Aristotelian logic was welcomed with open hearts in the Muslim world. Muslim schools of thought—so greatly varied in purpose and directions—treated it as the ultimate criterion of rational law. It was considered a sure method of inference, capable of reaching certainty and sound knowledge. Most scholars took it as a corollary that they declared logic a public obligation for Muslims.

But while there was this general respect for Aristotelian logic, Muslim thinkers themselves did not have a uniform view of it. Some admired and accepted it, while others, certain theologians and jurists, rejected it in its entirety. They did not merely protest against its philosophical basis but equated it with foreign, heterodox trends. So there developed two large intellectual currents:

The first modern defended logic. Numerous philosophers embraced it and adapted it as their own. They wrote differently and covered different areas but all collectively contributed to Islamic thought across broad regions, including Persia, the Orient, and the Maghreb.

The second one in modern times resisted logic. Certain theologians and jurists saw it as an alien science. They labeled its adherents as deviates. Logic was dealt with as a novelty or even as a religious deviation. Its adherents were accused, publicly criticized, and even punished under the law.

In response to this schism, some valid questions are raised: How did Muslims really react to this alien Greek wisdom? Why did some accept it while others rejected it?

1. The Philosophers' Support for Aristotelian Logic

The critics of logic based their criticism on the fact that it went against Islamic dogma. They wished to preserve Arab-Islamic

cultural heritage from outside influences. Ironically, the defenders of logic used the same basis to defend it. They believed that logic complemented religion and never negated it.

Among the earliest and most powerful defenders of Aristotelian logic were translators and philosophers. They introduced the *Organon* of Aristotle into the Islamic world, not as a tool for establishing religious dogmas, but as a means of facilitating debate and intellectual disputes. Logic was in most cases a rhetoric instrument used in royal courts and among elites, far from the everyday affairs of the populace, who were more interested in Sufism and Islamic law.

Yet, under Caliph Al-Ma'mun's leadership, the movement of translation peaked and bred the Baghdad School. It was a school that bred great Islamic philosophers such as Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina. These works treated Arab-Islamic society's intellectual needs and offered a more whole approach—one in which fragmented pieces were harmonized to the overall entity, instead of solely broken forms of study.

Al-Kindi, Al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina all set forth Aristotelian logic in different manners—philosophically, logically, and linguistically. Al-Ghazali would then include logic in his religious and philosophical system, especially that of Islamic jurisprudence (bin Yaish, n.d., p. 14).

1.1. Abu Nasr Al-Farabi (c. 874–950 CE)

Al-Farabi is regarded as one of the founding figures of Islamic philosophy and a central figure in the logical tradition. Known as the “Second Teacher” after Aristotle, he strongly supported Aristotelian logic. He was the first prominent philosopher of the Islamic tradition to present Greek logic in a fully organized form to the Arab world. He studied

Aristotle closely, wrote commentaries on his works, and clarified their symbolic and conceptual ambiguities (Ghalib, 1983, pp. 16–17).

Al-Farabi's most significant contribution to Arab logic was his effort to reconcile logic with religion. He emphasized that logic did not contradict faith but served it. Responding to grammarians who challenged logic, he insisted that logic and grammar are distinct and complementary. Grammar, he argued, applies to the specific language of one people, while logic provides universal laws of thought applicable to all languages and cultures. He explained, “grammar is concerned with the language of one people, while logic is a law of expression in the language of the human mind for all nations” (Bakhit, 2000, p. 81).

He also compared the functions of the two disciplines: just as grammar governs the rules of spoken language, logic governs the reasoning of the mind. “The ratio of logic to reason and plausibilities is like the ratio of grammar to tongue and words. All that grammar gives us of the laws in words, the science of logic gives us its analogues in plausibilities” (Al-Farabi, 1949, p. 16).

Al-Farabi believed that ignorance of logic leads to errors in judgment and flawed arguments. Without logic, people cannot distinguish between valid and invalid opinions or resolve intellectual disputes. Logic is the standard by which the truth of arguments is measured (Bakhit, 2000, p. 78).

His approach to logic was methodical and deeply analytical. He clarified the five types of logical materials, explained how to use them, and described how analogical reasoning works within each type. He critiqued and expanded upon the work of earlier thinkers like Al-Kindi, and he

emphasized the need for clarity in the structure of logical proofs.

Al-Farabi's genius lay in his ability to connect logic not only with reasoning but also with language and epistemology. He wrote that while syntax governs the Arabic tongue, logic governs all languages and protects them from misinterpretation (Jumaa, 2011, p. 44).

For Al-Farabi, logic was a mental discipline that offered precise rules to help the intellect identify certainty. He examined plausibilities in terms of their semantic significance and organized them into categories that assist in constructing accurate knowledge. This structuring helped enhance the clarity and rigor of logical definitions.

Al-Farabi is widely regarded by Muslim scholars as a towering figure in Islamic logic. He refined the field and surpassed many of his contemporaries in explaining its principles. His works on logic were so influential that later thinkers, especially Ibn Sina (Avicenna), built upon them. Al-Farabi followed Aristotle's methods closely but added original insights, clarified ambiguities, and developed practical applications. His writings became popular for their clarity and intellectual depth.

1.2. Ibn Sina (c. 980–1037 CE)

Ibn Sina (Avicenna) viewed logic as a necessary foundation for philosophy—especially for those lacking intuitive reasoning or a natural inclination toward philosophical thinking. He noted, however, that those with innate intellectual precision, like Bedouins who master grammar instinctively, could manage without formal logic. In his view, logic was an abstract discipline that protected the mind from error and guided it toward truth by revealing proper reasoning and valid paths of argument (Ghalib, 1983, p. 35).

Ibn Sina compared the role of logic to a tool used for checking and refining thought. He argued that a logician must work rigorously, testing their reasoning as carefully as one memorizes and verifies a narrative. Mastery of logic ensures confidence in thought and accuracy in judgment. He likened the relationship between logic and internal speech to that between grammar and spoken language—essential but invisible—and between prosody and poetry, where rules help shape taste though not necessarily produce it. While Bedouins might dispense with grammar due to linguistic instinct, scholars could not disregard logic unless they possessed exceptional divine insight (Ibn Sina, n.d., p. 7).

For Ibn Sina, the true value of logic lay in its ability to uncover truth. The active force behind the discovery of truth was not logic itself, but the mind that applies it. Logic, like a saddle for a horse, facilitates the journey but does not move on its own. It aids the intellect in reaching clear and accurate understanding.

Although Ibn Sina moved toward a formal and systematic approach to logic, he did not reduce it to empty formulas or abstract formalism as some medieval European logicians later did. He believed logic remained grounded in reality. If it helped people understand how mental processes correspond to external truths, it remained a valuable discipline. Logic, he argued, is a method for distinguishing between correct and false knowledge (Avicenna, 1960, p. 167).

Ibn Sina was a major proponent of logic, though he did not frame it in explicitly religious terms. Still, he recognized logic's indirect and direct service to religion. His work pushed back against those who equated logic with atheism or saw it as a threat to

Islamic doctrine. He and others argued that logic was a rational tool used to construct knowledge across all fields. It remained essential for intellectual integrity, allowing scholars to discern truth from falsehood. Logic, in this view, ensured clarity, precision, and valid reasoning, protecting the mind from error (Yassin, 1979, p. 7).

1.3. Abu Hamed Muhammad al-Ghazali (1058–1111 CE)

Imam al-Ghazali addressed the topic of logic in his book *The Purposes of the Philosophers* in a brief and clear manner, closely following the approach of Ibn Sina without changing or altering the logical terms. His earlier work, *The Criterion of Science*, demonstrates his alignment with Aristotelian logic as interpreted by Avicenna. In this book, al-Ghazali aimed to simplify logical thinking for Muslim readers by separating logic from other branches of philosophy. He treated logic as a foundational discipline, a standard tool for generating knowledge. He emphasized this by stating, “Every science that does not weigh this balance and is not calibrated by this standard is corrupt, the caliber is unsafe and the depths” (Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali, *The Criterion of Science in the Art of Logic*, Dar Al-Andalus for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Beirut, 1981, p. 27).

In *Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim (The Just Balance)*, al-Ghazali linked logical structures to Qur’anic verses. He renamed traditional logical forms using Qur’anic terminology such as “equivalence,” “correlation,” and “stubbornness.” He writes, “Do not change this system and take these meanings from this cladding. I have taught you how to weigh the reasonable based on the movable so that hearts are faster to accept” (Abu Hamid Muhammad bin Muhammad al-Ghazali,

Straight Qistas, Presented by Victor Shalhat, Catholic Press, 1959, Beirut, p. 101). This integrative method also appears in his other works like *The Criterion of Science*, *The Test of Consideration*, *The Purposes of the Philosophers*, and the introduction to *Al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul*.

Following *The Criterion*, al-Ghazali wrote *The Criterion of Consideration*, where he applied religious terminology and examples drawn from Islamic teachings. In *Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim*, he developed a logic derived from the Qur’anic method of reasoning, attempting to extract analogical principles from its verses. He replaced many conventional logical terms with Islamic ones that were more familiar to Muslim students.

Finally, in *Al-Mustasfa fi ‘Ilm al-Usul*, al-Ghazali introduced a concise chapter on logic. He regarded logic as an essential preface to all sciences, including *usul al-fiqh* (principles of jurisprudence). According to him, those who lack knowledge of logic cannot firmly establish any form of knowledge. This reflects al-Ghazali’s strong belief in the foundational role of logic (M. Hamad ibn Ya’ish, *Islamic Logic: The Presence of Aristotelian Logic among the Thinkers of the Islamic Mashreq*, op. cit., pp. 73–74).

In his critique, al-Ghazali warns that logic may appear persuasive to some, which may lead them to believe that accusations of disbelief against certain philosophers are backed by logical proofs. This could, in turn, drive them toward disbelief before they truly understand divine knowledge. He states, “Logic may also be considered by those who like it and see it as clear, so they think that what is quoted about them of disbelief is supported by such proofs, so hurry to disbelief before completing the divine sciences” (Abu Hamid al-Ghazali,

Deliverance from Error, edited by Muhammad Muhammad Jabir, Publishing House, Cultural Library, Beirut, Lebanon, p. 26).

Al-Ghazali strongly rejected the idea that logic is part of Greek philosophy or merely a tool of it. He even questioned the term "logic" itself, avoiding its use out of deliberate caution (pp. 19–20). Instead, he proposed alternative terms such as “the caliber of science” or “the touchstone.” His approach aimed to broaden the use of logic in theology and jurisprudence. In his later book, *Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim*, he avoided common logical terminology almost entirely, replacing it with new, more contextually appropriate expressions (Muhammad Mahran, *Logic and Qur’anic Balances: A Reading of the Book Al-Qistas al-Mustaqim by al-Ghazali*, International Institute of Islamic Thought, Cairo, 1st ed., 1996, p. 16).

2. The Position of Philosophers Opposed to Aristotelian Logic

The strongest opposition to logic came from jurists and religious scholars. Many researchers have noted that these figures showed deep aversion and hostility toward philosophy and logic (Suleiman, Abbas Muhammad Hassan, *The Link Between Theology and Philosophy in Islamic Thought: An Attempt to Evaluate and Renew Theology*, Dar al-Maarifa al-Jamiya, Egypt, 1998, p. 51). They believed that “the recognition of Aristotelian methods of proof is a danger to the validity of faith doctrines because logic threatens them greatly” (Al-Ghamri, Afq, *Ibn Taymiyyah and Logic*, Dar Quba for Printing, Publishing and Distribution, Cairo, 2001, p. 51). From their perspective, Muslims had no need for logic, since religion alone was sufficient, and logic’s association with Greek philosophy—often linked to disbelief—made it suspect.

Rejection of Aristotelian logic began as soon as it was translated and introduced to the Islamic world. Scholars, theologians, and linguists alike contributed to discrediting it and pointing out its weaknesses (see: Mahmoud Yacoubi, *Ibn Taymiyyah and Aristotelian Logic*, Diwan of University Publications, Algeria, 1992, Part One, Chapter Two). They believed logic originated in a non-Islamic philosophical context, shaped by polytheistic and atheistic thinkers. Many Muslim scholars rejected Aristotelian logic not just for its origins, but also because of the risk it posed: its convincing style could mislead some into believing that all its propositions were true, including those related to theological doctrines.

This current was represented by a group of jurists and religious scholars, including:

2. 1. Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328 CE)

Ibn Taymiyyah’s position on Aristotelian logic was deeply rooted in his jurisprudential and theological approach. He followed a practical methodology grounded in Islamic belief, aiming to defend the core principles of the faith from heretical influences. His perspective combined rational inquiry with a strong commitment to safeguarding doctrine. As a jurist, Ibn Taymiyyah focused on concrete legal issues and real-life applications. For him, Islam offered a comprehensive framework suitable for all times and places. Therefore, his critique of Aristotelian logic was intended to expose its flaws and demonstrate its connection to Greek metaphysics, which he believed made it incompatible with the Islamic worldview.

Motivated by practical reasoning and empirical observation, Ibn Taymiyyah challenged the logical theory of inference,

especially its reliance on abstract forms. He proposed alternative methods rooted in observable reality. In his early writings, he reflects on his changing view of logic: “I used to think that his issues – that is, logic – were true to what I saw from the sincerity of many of them, and then it became clear to me later that the error of a group of his issues ... It became clear to me that much of what they mentioned in their origins in theology and in logic is from the origins of the corruption of their saying in theology, but much of what they mentioned in logic requires sophistry in mindsets, and karma in audiology” (Ibn Taymiyyah, *Warding Off the Opposition of Reason and Revelation*, ed. Dr. Muhammad Rashad Salem, Vol. 1, p. 218).

Ibn Taymiyyah harshly criticized Aristotelian logic and those who promoted it. He was influenced by earlier fatwas, especially those of Ibn Salah and other Islamic scholars who condemned the logic and its proponents. He observed that many prominent jurists from both the Shafi‘i and Hanafi schools had also spoken strongly against the teaching and use of logic.

One of his main arguments against Aristotelian logic was its excessive abstraction. According to Ibn Taymiyyah, this form of logic was detached from reality, as it operated within a realm of intellectual faculties rather than concrete existence. He noted that such abstract logic had no external reality—it existed only in the mind. He observed that both Muslim and European scholars had taken this abstraction too far, separating logic from the broader context of scientific inquiry. Instead of contributing to empirical sciences, they spent their efforts analyzing mental processes, disconnected from the real world (Mahmoud Qassem, *Modern Logic and Research Methods*, Lisan Al-Arab Anglo-Egyptian Library, 2nd ed.,

1953, Ch. 1: Ancient Logic and Modern Logic, p. 2).

Ibn Taymiyyah emphasized that many fields—such as engineering, medicine, and astronomy—had made remarkable advances without relying on Aristotelian logic. He wrote: “We do not find anyone from the people of the earth who has achieved a science of science and has become an imam in it thanks to logic, neither from religious sciences nor others. Doctors, engineers and others achieve what they achieve from their sciences without making logic. In Islam, the sciences of grammar, presentations, jurisprudence, its origins, etc., have been classified. Imams of these arts do not pay attention to logic, but rather their generality was before Greek logic was known” (Ibn Taymiyyah, *The Rejection of Logic*, ed. Muhammad Hamid Al-Faqi, Library of the Mohammedan Sunnah, Cairo, 1951, p. 168).

He further argued that Aristotelian logic is not only unhelpful, but also harmful. He described it as overly complicated and obscure, stating: “The region expresses what is clear in the most costly and strange way, and this has no benefit except wasting time, mind fatigue, and the abundance of delirium, and the claim of investigation by lying and fading” (Ibn Taymiyyah, *Responding to Logicians*, Dar Turjuman Al-Sunnah – Pakistan, p. 31). He challenged its effectiveness by pointing out that if Aristotelian logic truly led to certainty and resolved disputes, then disagreements in philosophy and theology would have ceased to exist. He wrote that logical analysis often made simple matters unnecessarily complex, distancing learners from the essence of the sciences.

In support of this, he said: “If it were true, it would lead to a certain truth or resolve a dispute, there would be no remaining in

people a case for which they disagree, and there is no secret except that they discovered and understood it, and the conflicting philosophical teams and doctrines that destroy each other would not have been common. The introduction of the logic industry in the correct sciences prolongs the phrase and distances the signal, and makes the close to science distant, and the easy from it difficult. This is why you find those who brought him into the dispute and talk and the principles of jurisprudence and so on, only the abundance of talk and schism, with the lack of knowledge and investigation” (Ibn Taymiyyah, *The Rejection of Logic*, ibid., p. 169).

Ibn Taymiyyah concluded that everything that can be learned through their logical methods can also be learned without them. Conversely, what cannot be known without those methods, will not become known through them either. Hence, logic has no real effect. He explained: “It became unaffected by the existence and nothingness when he collected that it does not benefit in the world the fees of psychosis, and the abundance of delirium, and what is required of evidence and proofs is a statement of knowledge, and a statement of the ways leading to it, and this does not benefit the required” (Ibn Taymiyyah, Ahmad ibn Abdul Halim, *Responding to the Logicians*, ed. Rafiq Al-Ajmi, n.d., Dar Al-Fikr, Beirut, Vol. 2, 1993, p. 99). He even described logic as “A knowledge that the intelligent does not need and that does not benefit the dull” (*Response to Logic Qayin*, p. 45).

2. Ibn al-Salah (1181–1245 CE)

Ibn al-Salah initiated his opposition to logic with firm reasoning. He argued that Muslim exposure to diverse cultures, especially during periods of expansion and prosperity, created an intellectual

environment in which Greek philosophy found its way into Islamic discourse. This exposure coincided with a decline in *jihad* and a turn toward contemplation, opinions, and sectarianism. As Greek philosophy was translated into Arabic, Muslim thinkers began adopting its structures to express Islamic ideas. Ibn al-Salah viewed these borrowed philosophical frameworks as disconnected from revelation, focused solely on the intellect, and operating within a dry, abstract logical form—“neither the beginning nor the end of human thought” (Ibn al-Salah, 1986, p. 70).

He posed critical questions: Did the Prophet’s Companions, the Followers, the leading *mujtahids*, and the righteous predecessors approve of logic? Is it legitimate to use logical terminology in deriving *Sharia* rulings? Do such rulings even require logic for their validation? And what responsibility falls upon those who teach or learn logic? Should philosophers in Muslim societies be removed from influence for the sake of communal protection?

Ibn al-Salah’s reply was unequivocal: “Logic is the entrance to philosophy, and the entrance to evil is evil.” He declared that studying or teaching logic is not sanctioned by the *Sharia* nor by the early generations of scholars. “None of the diligent Companions, the Followers, the Imams, the righteous predecessors, or the leaders of the nation permitted such study. God absolved them from such ostentation, purified them of its harms, and protected them from its impurities” (Ibn al-Salah, 1986, p. 211).

He also responded to the question of using logical terminology in jurisprudence. In his view, this practice was “one of the repugnant evils and innovations,” irrelevant to the actual derivation of legal rulings. He contended that the sciences of Islam reached

full maturity without the aid of logic or philosophy. He asserted: “The *Sharia* and its sciences have been completed and delved into the depths of facts and intricacies by its scholars—without logic, philosophy, or philosophers. Those who claim to engage in logic and philosophy for benefit are deceived by the devil and misled by illusion” (Ibn al-Salah, 1986, p. 211).

This *fatwa* led to a prohibition on studying fundamental jurisprudential texts that integrated Aristotelian logic with *usul al-fiqh*. Books such as *Al-Burhan* by Al-Juwayni and *Al-Mustasfa* by Al-Ghazali, despite their significance, were considered impermissible under Ibn al-Salah’s stance.

He was once asked about a book on legal principles that contained no theological or logical content—just pure *usul*. The intent behind the question was clear: to determine if the absence of logic rendered the book permissible. Ibn al-Salah confirmed that such texts were indeed acceptable for study, provided they were free from philosophical influence.

In one of his most severe recommendations, Ibn al-Salah urged the state to take action against teachers of Aristotelian logic. He proposed that such individuals be expelled from educational institutions and even punished physically: “exposed to the sword until they are settled” (Ibn al-Salah, 1986, p. 211).

2. 3. Muhammad ibn Idrīs al-Shāfi‘ī (767–820 CE)

Imām al-Shāfi‘ī strongly rejected Aristotelian logic. In his view, this form of reasoning could not be applied to the principles of the Arabic language, as the foundations of Greek logic stood in contradiction to the linguistic structures of Arabic. He is recognized as one of the prominent figures in Islamic intellectual

history who opposed Aristotelian logic. Al-Hāfiẓ ‘Izz al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd Allāh narrated a statement attributed to al-Shāfi‘ī: “What people did not know and did not disagree about except because they abandoned the language of the Arabs and inclined toward the language of Aristotle Thales” (al-Suyūṭī, n.d., p. 15).

According to Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī, this quote illustrates that anyone who attempts to interpret the Qur’an, Sunnah, and Islamic law through the principles of logic deviates from the true objectives of *Sharia*. When applied to secondary issues, logic may lead to error, and when used in foundational matters, it may result in heresy. Al-Suyūṭī argued that logic is an innovation that leads to deviation, opposes the Sunnah, and contradicts the purpose of Islamic law—sufficient reasons to reject it altogether (al-Suyūṭī, n.d., p. 15).

This interpretation by al-Suyūṭī demonstrates the first and primary reason for the prohibition of logic in Islamic sciences: logic introduces innovations into religion at both the foundational and practical levels. Since Greek logic and the Arabic language are incompatible, adopting logic becomes a misguided approach. In Islamic jurisprudence, the means take on the same ruling as the ends, and thus any means that lead to error are themselves forbidden.

This position reflects that al-Shāfi‘ī’s approach to legal methodology remained firmly grounded in Islamic sources. Muhammad ‘Ābid al-Jābirī supports this view, stating that al-Shāfi‘ī was the first to develop a purely Arab-Islamic epistemological method, uninfluenced by Greek philosophy (al-Jābirī, 1991, p. 100).

Critics of formal logic argue that it offers no new knowledge. The classical logical structure—consisting of two premises

leading to a necessary conclusion—merely restates what is already contained in the premises. It circulates previously known facts rather than producing fresh insight. As Muḥammad Naṣṣār explains, "The conclusion is already folded within the premises," meaning that the outcome is predetermined by the initial statements (Naṣṣār, 2004, p. 241).

Moreover, formal logic analyzes the structure of reasoning without regard to its content. This allows logically valid arguments to yield faulty conclusions. For instance, the following syllogism is formally valid: "Freedom is a right of every human being. A criminal is a human being. Therefore, freedom is a right of the criminal." Despite its correct form, the conclusion is problematic, illustrating how valid premises can lead to ethically or legally unsound results (Naṣṣār, 2004, p. 241).

Al-Shāfiʿī's opposition to Aristotelian logic was not merely critical; it was categorical. He not only rejected it but also considered it prohibited. His reasoning stemmed largely from the linguistic incompatibility between Greek and Arabic. Applying Greek logic to Arabic thought, in his view, created contradictions and misunderstandings (al-Nashar, 1984, p. 86).

This perspective was echoed centuries later by Ibn Taymiyyah, who also rejected Aristotelian logic. He famously argued that "everything that can be learned by their logical measurement can be learned without it; and what cannot be learned without their measurement cannot be learned with it either." Therefore, logic becomes irrelevant in both cases, as it neither adds nor subtracts from what is already accessible through direct knowledge and sound reasoning (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1993, p. 99).

Ibn Taymiyyah also remarked that logic is a discipline that "the intelligent do not need, and the dull do not benefit from" (Ibn Taymiyyah, 1993, p. 45). This criticism highlights the inefficacy of logic in both advancing knowledge and aiding those without intellectual acuity.

3. CONCLUSION

Aristotelian logic sparked intense debate and controversy within the Islamic epistemological tradition, dividing scholars and thinkers into two camps: enthusiastic proponents and critical opponents. These differing positions can be attributed, first, to the varying degrees of awareness among scholars regarding the extent to which Aristotelian logic was saturated with Greek theological concepts, and second, to differences in their intellectual training and areas of specialization. Among them were thinkers engaged in speculative reasoning and contemplation—such as most philosophers and many theologians—as well as those rooted in practice, rulings, and ethical conduct, like the majority of jurists.

Muslim scholars came to the conclusion that Greek philosophy and logic were intrinsically linked to Aristotle's metaphysics, which conflicted with the metaphysical worldview of the Qur'an. They recognized that Greek methods of inquiry and rules of reasoning were infused with Aristotelian metaphysical assumptions and their attendant certainties. They also rejected Aristotle's physics, which contradicted the physical understandings held by Muslim scholars.

Most significantly, they saw that Greek logic was a precise formulation of the Greek soul, reflecting its worldview and attempts to establish a doctrine of existence. The Islamic soul, however—founded on another milieu, identity, and civilizational worldview—

denied this intellectual legacy and constructed its own research methodologies according to the particular characteristics of its worldview and culture.

But Aristotelian logic left its influence in other branches of knowledge too, particularly regarding argumentation techniques, dialectics, and fallacies of logic. Its influence—positive or negative—extended even to the inner Islamic sciences, like jurisprudence and legal theory, despite expectations that these sciences would be immune from outside influences.

Followers of Aristotelian logic accepted it as a well-ordered intellectual system and used it as the firm law of reason and offered multiple justifications in their writings. They sought to reconcile Aristotelian logic with non-Aristotelian elements, integrating it into the framework of the Arabic language through linguistic adaptations and additions necessitated by the nature of that language. Thus, logic was not treated merely as a discipline parallel to others; rather, it was viewed as foundational—perhaps even preceding all other sciences—since it functioned as the "instrument" and "tool" of thought, concerned not with content but with form. Accordingly, in the view of many Muslim thinkers, logic evolved into a flexible intellectual apparatus capable of adapting to diverse domains of knowledge and to the theoretical structures of each individual science.

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