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Shin Beth and The importance of Zionist intelligence in the survival of the Hebrew entity

شين بيت وأهمية الإستخبارات الصهيونية في بقاء الكيان العبري

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Abstract:

Since the establishment of the Zionist entity, it has often given great importance to the intelligence and security apparatuses, the security, civil and military, which are among the best in the world. Israel cannot afford modesty in this regard or error. Hence the high level of demands and professionalism, but also sometimes a tendency to consider that the end justifies all means, and the tendency obviously questionable but which Israel does not have a monopoly on. The secret services have therefore been at the heart of the security strategy of the Hebrew State since its origins and none of the successive governments have called this central place into question.

If in this area, necessity is the law, some peoples, some nations seem more than others to have a "gift" for intelligence: Israel is one of them. It has succeeded in setting up very efficient services in record time and in naturally integrating intelligence into the government decision-making process.

Key words: Israel, Mossad, Intelligence, Hebrew entity, Secret wars.

الملخص:

بعد إنشاء الكيان الصهيوني، أعطيت أهمية كبيرة لأجهزة الإستخبار والأمن المدني والعسكري، والتي تعد واحدة من بين الأفضل في العالم. وفي ذلك، لا يمكن لإسرائيل أن تسمح بارتكاب أي خطأ. نظرًا للمستوى العالي من المتطلبات والإحترافية، هذا بالإضافة إلى ميلهم إلى التفكير في أن الغاية تبرر الوسيلة. هو توجه إسرائيلي قابل للمناقشة لا يمكن أن يكون محصوراً فيها في أي حال من الأحوال. تعتبر المصالح السرية أساس الإستراتيجية الأمنية الإسرائيلية منذ تأسيسها، لم تعارض أية حكومة من الحكومات الإسرائيلية المتعاقبة تلك المكانة المركزية التي تحظى بها. إذا كانت، في مثل هكذا مجال، الحاجة تفرض نفسها، فإن بعض الشعوب والدول لها "موهبة" في الإستخبار، مقارنة مع دول وشعوب أخرى: تعد إسرائيل واحدة من تلك الكيانات. حيث تمكنت وفي وقت قياسي من استحداث مصالح استخباراتية جد فعالة، ودمجها بشكل طبيعي في عملية اتخاذ القرار الحكومي. الكلمات المفتاحية: إسرائيل، الموساد، الإستخبارات، الكيان العبري، الحروب السرية.

1. INTRODUCTION

While the geopolitical context and threats are essential elements, they do not explain everything: not all countries that evolve in a similar configuration (small surface area, hostile environment, diaspora, etc.) have developed this "intelligence culture". It is possible to find traces of it in the Old Testament, and the trading and diasporic tradition of the Jewish people, but also the many persecutions of which it has been the victim throughout its history, have predisposed it to opening up to the world and the creation of "networks". But it was especially from the beginning of the 20th century that the phenomenon took off: as the Hebrews had done before settling in the Promised Land, the first Zionist immigrants set up various structures of intelligence and action, responsible for ensuring the security of the yishuv, the Jewish community of Palestine, and organizing the immigration of Jews from around the world.

Moreover, intelligence services and special units are like football teams: those that are engaged in high-level competition, facing opponents who are constantly improving themselves, are, by necessity, the best, or they disappear. Thus, one of the main reasons for the effectiveness of the Israeli services is the situation of permanent conflict in which their country has been involved since its creation in 1948. As a result, the Israelis have never known a break or a respite, and cannot afford to lower their guard against their opponents, who remain extremely determined and creative.

Certainly, since September 11, 2001, the majority of Western countries have

seen their performances improve, due to the terrorist threat embodied by Bin Laden and his organization. It is therefore difficult to establish a ranking to define who are the best special services in the world, especially since we do not have sufficient information on the level and operations of the Chinese, Indian, Iranian, Turkish services, etc., which have no reason to be ashamed of the comparison with their Western counterparts. But two things are certain: on the one hand, the Israeli services remain, without a doubt, among the very best services in the world; on the other hand, they know how to communicate cleverly in order to convince the entire planet that they are the best and that they never fail, which is objectively exaggerated but is part of an influence approach intended to make their adversaries doubt.

If the Mossad is by far the best-known of the Israeli services, it is because, operating abroad, it has been at the origin of the most spectacular and most publicized operations. But it is not the only one, nor the main Israeli intelligence service. Two other agencies contribute just as much, if not more, to the security of the Hebrew state. The Israeli intelligence community is organized around three main services, with precise and distinct missions:

- Aman, the military intelligence directorate, also responsible for censorship. It reports directly to the chief of the general staff and the minister of defense. Aman is the service with the largest personnel.

- The Shin Bet, which is under the Ministry of Public Security, is entrusted with internal security and counter-

espionage tasks.

– The Mossad, which reports directly to the Prime Minister, constitutes the intelligence and action service abroad.

In order to analyze this research the following problematic is being raised:

“Where does the Israelis' predisposition for intelligence come from? Where does it have its roots ?

To answer this problematic we discuss the following axis:

.1The overwhelming superiority of Israeli security.

.2Palestinian anti-Israeli forces.

.3Hezbollah.. The threat and the mysterious resistance code.

.4Secret defenders of the security of the Hebrew entity.

.5Shin Beth's New Challenges.

.6Other internal security services.

.1The overwhelming superiority of Israeli security:

The various Arab-Israeli wars (1948, 1956, 1967 and 1973) have demonstrated the overwhelming superiority of the Israeli army over those of its neighbors, none of which has pretended, for several years now, to rival it. Similarly, thanks to its air and sea power, Israel is territorial waters of the Middle East in case of need. This conventional “domination” of Tsahal over the other armies in the region limits – without making them completely disappear – the risks of a conventional military confrontation.

Above all, Israel has nuclear weapons – although it has never officially acknowledged this – its arsenal is estimated by specialists at a few hundred warheads. According to the investigation published in the German newspaper Der Spiegel on June 4, 2012, some of the Dolphin attack submarines purchased from Germany have been equipped with nuclear warheads.

But this does not mean that Israel is not

at risk, quite the contrary. While the time when it had to wage major conventional wars against its neighbors seems to be over – but not completely ruled out – the Hebrew state is now facing increased asymmetric threats, both on its own territory, on its borders, and abroad. Israel today faces five types of threats.

The first is represented by the Palestinians, some of whom still advocate the disappearance of the Jewish state. These groups consider “armed struggle” as their only means and see in every Israeli citizen – even in every Jew, wherever he or she may be – an adversary, and therefore a legitimate target. Thus, the most radical engage in terrorist actions against the Hebrew state to exert pressure in the framework of negotiations for the recognition of a Palestinian state; or as a retaliatory measure for the actions of the Israeli army or secret services (occupation of the West Bank, fight against the blockade of Gaza, targeted assassinations, etc.); or because they are not always able to control their troops.

The second threat comes from Hezbollah, a Lebanese Shiite movement officially listed as a terrorist movement by Washington and supported by Syria and Iran. The 2006 war in Lebanon demonstrates that this movement has a highly disciplined, well-equipped, military-type organization capable of inflicting significant losses on the Israeli army and even striking Israeli territory.

These Palestinian and Lebanese groups are supported by Israel's enemy states, which, unable to engage in military operations against it, finance and support terrorist actions, while waging their own secret war against the Hebrew state.

Third threat, Israel has been the target of Al-Qaeda for a decade. The fight against the Hebrew state holds a

prominent place in the rhetoric and imagination of jihad developed by the organization founded by Bin Laden, which has multiplied attempts to establish itself in Israel's neighboring countries, with varying degrees of success.

The fourth threat, perceived as the most worrying by Tel Aviv, lies in Tehran's probable intention to acquire nuclear weapons. For the Israeli authorities, the Iranian nuclear program represents a formidable danger, even before Hezbollah or Hamas, humiliated or eliminated.

The last threat is of a different nature: as in all democracies, radical groups contest the foundations of the rule of law in Israel, in this case religious extremist movements, often openly racist such as Kach, which consider that the legitimate borders of the State of Israel are those of biblical Israel at the height of its power, that is to say the whole of Mandatory Palestine but also present-day Jordan, as well as territories located today in Lebanon and Syria. These groups therefore consider any idea of returning territories, particularly in the West Bank – which they call Judea and Samaria – to the Palestinians, to be “sacrilegious”. They have also shown in the past that they are capable of carrying out terrorist-type attacks and still regularly commit abuses against Palestinians, as evidenced by the current “Price Tag” campaign. The assassin of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin in 1995 was part of such groups. The number of individuals capable of carrying out violent actions probably numbers in the hundreds rather than the thousands, but this internal threat is nonetheless real and would probably reappear in an increased manner if an agreement were signed as part of the peace process relaunched in September

2013. Israel is therefore also confronted with genuine Jewish terrorism.

.2Palestinian anti-Israeli forces:

The Palestinian groups that continue their violent actions against Israel are seven in number: Fatah, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Allah Brigades¹.

Fatah ("Conquest") was created in 1959 in Kuwait by five young Palestinians in exile, including Yasser Arafat. Originally, this movement advocated armed struggle. In 1967, Fatah became the main component of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), an organization founded in 1964 whose objective was to unite all Palestinian movements, and, from then on, the destinies of the two organizations were intertwined. If, within the framework of the Oslo Accords, the PLO and Israel recognized each other, its armed wing called by Tel Aviv the Tanzim ("Organization") has not abandoned violence. In fact, these are the "Black Panthers" operating in the West Bank and the "Falcons", renamed the Abu Rish Brigades, operating in the Gaza Strip. Today, this military branch continues to play a double game: on the one hand, it participates in the constitution of the security forces of the Palestinian Authority; on the other hand, it sometimes carries out jihadist actions.

The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades (Kataeb Shuhada Al-Aqsa) emerged just after the start of the second Intifada in 2000. It is in fact a secret branch of the Tanzim created by Marwan Ben Hatib Barghouti, secretary general of Fatah in the West Bank and head of the Fatah military apparatus, currently in prison. A large part of the funding of this organization is

now reportedly channeled through Mounir Mouqdah, a Fatah member residing in the Ain al-Hiloué camp in Lebanon. According to some rumors, this man maintains close relations with Syria and Iran. The Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades enjoy a great deal of autonomy within Fatah. For their operations, they now act in close coordination with the armed branches of Hamas and Islamic Jihad. In addition to the classic anti-Israeli attacks, they also engage in the elimination of Palestinian “traitors” or “corrupt” people, such as that of Hisham Miki, the director of Palestinian television, assassinated in January 2001.

The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a Marxist-Leninist movement, was created in 1967 by Georges Habache, a Palestinian Christian. A member of the PLO since 1968, the PFLP became known for its numerous spectacular terrorist actions, including plane hijackings in the 1970s and 1980s. It was this movement in particular, which, in cooperation with the Baader-Meinhof gang, hijacked a plane at Entebbe airport in Uganda in 1976. The hostage-taking had then was settled by a bold Israeli commando operation. The PFLP is opposed to the Oslo Accords. As a result, it is not present in the Palestinian Authority.

The armed wing of the PFLP is composed of the Abu Ali Mustafa Brigades: they carry out numerous suicide attacks against Israeli interests. The Secretary General of the PFLP, Abu Ali Mustafa, was the victim of a targeted Israeli assassination in August 2001. In response, the armed wing of the PFLP assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavan Zeevi. For this, Ahmed Saadat, the new Secretary General, was imprisoned by the Palestinian Authority in early 2002 in Jericho, from where he

continued to lead his movement. However, the PFLP has lost much of its importance to the benefit of Fatah and Palestinian Islamic movements.

The Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (FDLP) is a Marxist-Leninist movement born in 1969 from a split within the PFLP. Its leader was then Nayef Hawatmeh. For a long time, this movement had an ambiguous policy, advocating the destruction of Israel but also agreeing to negotiate with the Hebrew state from 1971. Today, its position is still unclear. It has renewed ties with the Palestinian Authority but continues its anti-Israeli activities in the occupied territories.

Hamas (Harakat Al Moukawama Al Islamiya – “Islamic Resistance Movement”) emerged from the Sunni movement Al-Moujamma al-Islami, created in 1967 by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, which served as a cover for the activities Muslim Brotherhood in the occupied territories. Hamas was officially founded on December 14, 1987, during the first Intifada, and has since positioned itself as the PLO’s main rival. It calls for the creation of an Islamic Palestinian state covering Israel and the Palestinian territories and also defines itself as anti-Western. It advocates armed struggle, including suicide attacks. It strives to build a powerful and effective socio-political structure in the occupied territories and the Gaza Strip, which has earned it significant popular support. After the first Gulf War (1991), Hamas having publicly declared itself against the regime of Saddam Hussein – unlike Yasser Arafat –, a large part of the Saudi funding that had previously gone to the PLO was attributed to it. After the Oslo Accords of 1993 – which it rejected –, particularly bloody clashes took place

with the PLO. After the attack carried out by an Israeli, Baruch Goldstein, who murdered twenty-nine worshippers praying in the Ibrahim Mosque in the Cave of the Patriarchs (Hebron), Hamas launched numerous terrorist operations in Israel, including the suicide attack on a bus in Haifa (sixteen killed), claimed by the Jenin Martyrs Brigade, which in reality was just another name intended to confuse the issue. The historic leader of Hamas, Sheikh Yassin, released by Israel following the failed assassination of Khaled Meshaal in 1997 in Jordan, was the victim of a “targeted elimination” in 2004. His successor, Abdel Aziz Al-Rantissi, suffered the same fate some time later. For this reason, the movement no longer discloses the identity of its leaders.

Hamas’s military wing is composed of independent cells that number a thousand seasoned fighters, including fighters from the Ezzedine al-Qassam Brigades and Jihad Aman, the movement’s security service, which is responsible for eliminating “traitors.” Two political branches share propaganda, recruitment, training, finances and cooperation: A’Alam and Dawa. Very active in the occupied areas – particularly in the city of Hebron – and in the Gaza Strip, they tend to supplant the representatives of the PLO, many of whose leaders are perceived by the population as totally corrupt. Although it is considered an unsavoury movement by Washington and the European Union has placed it on its “black list” of terrorism, Hamas has participated in certain Palestinian electoral processes. On 26 January 2006, it won the majority of seats in the Palestinian Assembly and seized power. Since then, it has considered itself, not without a legal basis, as the legitimate government of the Palestinian Authority,

the mandate of President Abu Mazen having expired in 2009. Since June 2007, Hamas has alone controlled the entire Gaza Strip and enjoyed de facto independence from the Palestinian Authority. The disorder reigning locally has favored the establishment of jihadist terrorists linked to Al-Qaeda. They infiltrate from neighbouring Egypt, where they have already committed several bloody attacks in the seaside resorts of Sinai.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Harakat al-Jihad al-Islami al-Filastini) is, like Hamas, the descendant of the Muslim Brotherhood. It is a Sunni movement created in 1981 by students from the Islamic University of Gaza, led by Sheikh Assad Bayoub al-Tamini, now imprisoned in Israel. The latter remains, despite his imprisonment, the spiritual leader of Islamic Jihad. Under international pressure, its Secretary General, Dr. Ramadan Abdallah Shallah, had to leave Damascus for Qatar in 2004. The goal of this very violent movement is the destruction of Israel and the creation of an Islamic Palestine. Its few hundred activists have been joined by dozens of Shiites.

Very active in the Gaza Strip and in the most radical cities of the West Bank (Nablus and Jenin), the Islamic Jihad was the first movement to carry out suicide attacks after the start of the second Intifada through its armed wing: the Jerusalem Brigades. With offices in Amman (Jordan), this movement maintains close operational relations on the ground with Hamas. It is directly supported by the Lebanese Hezbollah and by Tehran, which provides it with logistical resources and facilities in Iran itself. Unlike other Palestinian movements, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad does not engage in political and social

actions aimed at gaining popular support. Moreover, it does not participate in the legislative elections.

In May 2005, the Israelis reported the emergence of a new group affiliated with Al-Qaeda and operating in the southern Gaza Strip. The Brigades of Allah (Jund Allah) are said to be a group of radical activists who have left Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad because they reject any idea of a ceasefire. They allegedly carried out their first attack in Rafah in mid-May 2005. Al-Qaeda is said to have provided financial assistance to this new movement.

.3Hezbollah.. The threat and the mysterious resistance code:

Hezbollah ("Party of God") is a Shiite Islamic movement created in 1982 by Sheikh Fadlallah, a Lebanese Shiite born in Iraq. With financial and especially logistical help from Iran, where Ayatollah Khomeini took power after the overthrow of the pro-Western Shah's regime in 1979, Hezbollah gradually supplanted the Amal militia, until then the main Lebanese Shiite organization, which, while maintaining Shiite solidarity, had managed to retain a fairly large degree of autonomy from Tehran. Iran's support for Hezbollah can be explained by the desire, in the midst of the war with Iraq (1980-1988), to ignite a "second front" capable of diverting Westerners from their support for Saddam Hussein's regime. It also allows Tehran to benefit from the prestige of the fight against Israel, which occupied southern Lebanon from 1982 to 2000, and to set itself up as a champion of the Palestinian cause, significant assets for gaining the sympathy of the "Arab street" and making people forget its Shiite specificity in a predominantly Sunni Muslim world.

Since its inception, Hezbollah has

undertaken violent actions in Lebanon. On November 11, 1982, it claimed its first suicide attack against the headquarters of the Israeli forces in Tyre (141 dead). Then, on April 18, 1983, a car bomb killed 64 people at the United States embassy in Beirut. On October 23, 1983, two similar attacks targeted the French and Americans of the Multinational Force in the Lebanese capital: 58 French paratroopers and 241 Marines were killed. These terrorist operations were then claimed by an Islamic Jihad (not to be confused with the Palestinian movement of the same name) which was only a cover for Hezbollah.

After the Taef Accords, which ended the Lebanese conflict and endorsed Syrian guardianship over the Land of the Cedars, signed on October 22, 1989, Hezbollah asserted itself as a major socio-political player on the Lebanese scene while retaining its weapons. Indeed, these accords did not end the Israeli occupation, which would last until 2000, and Hezbollah proclaimed itself the spearhead of the "resistance". In parallel with the war that this organization waged against Israel, it engaged in numerous social actions, compensating for the shortcomings of the Lebanese state in this area. This way of operating is fundamental for all Islamic movements because it generally allows them to obtain a broad popular support among the most disadvantaged classes. Since the 1992 elections, Hezbollah's influence has continued to grow in the Lebanese Parliament, and the most recent elections (2009) gave it a central role in Lebanese political life. However, since April 2001, the movement has been listed as a terrorist organization by Washington.

The Shiite party is led by Sheikh

Hassan Nasrallah, its secretary general. The man is surrounded by great prestige – even Lebanese and Syrian Christians recognize his personal charisma – because he is considered to be the one who “defeated Israel” by forcing its forces to evacuate southern Lebanon in 2000, and who succeeded in freeing four hundred and thirty-six prisoners in exchange for an Israeli civilian and the remains of three soldiers on January 29, 2004 .

Hezbollah’s prestige was greatly enhanced by the confrontation with Israel during the war in the summer of 2006. This result was achieved thanks to the movement’s new tactics. On the operational level, the Shiite fighters were divided into small units, from ten to thirty men. They received intensive training in urban combat and the use of anti-tank weapons, with the help of Iranian and North Korean advisers. Their night combat capability was enhanced by the acquisition of night vision devices. They operated from bunkers, weapons caches, underground communications and sophisticated transmission networks that had been set up very discreetly in southern Lebanon. Above all, the command Hezbollah’s military establishment granted a great deal of autonomy to the combat units, dividing southern Lebanon into several military zones and delegating authority to the lowest levels. This decentralization allowed for great flexibility and extremely rapid responsiveness during clashes .

In other words, the state had become not only the sole legitimate manifestation of national liberation or “freedom” but also the irreplaceable instrument of humanity’s aspirations, for the wretched of the earth at least.

On this occasion, in terms of

intelligence, Israel was held in check. Its services do not seem to have succeeded in penetrating Hezbollah’s operational cells due to the security measures imposed by the movement’s leader, Nasrallah. In addition, this movement benefited from excellent intelligence provided by the Shiite population of southern Lebanon who were totally favorable to it. However, Iran, Hezbollah’s main supporter, criticized the Lebanese movement, considering that this confrontation was a mistake. Indeed, faced with the failure experienced by Tsahal, the Israelis have completely questioned themselves and reviewed their tactics. This conflict finally “woke them up,” allowing them to build a military apparatus better adapted to the new conditions of engagement and thus neutralizing, in part, the Iranian strategy².

Hezbollah today presents two major risks for Israel. First, a military threat since it threatens the north of the Hebrew state with its impressive arsenal of rockets, missiles and mortars. Second, a classic terrorist risk with intensive use of suicide bombers from the "Islamic Resistance", the armed wing of the movement. These militants are well-versed in all methods of irregular combat through many years of experience.

Since 2006, the Lebanese Shiite movement has been constantly strengthening its arsenal and infrastructure along Israel’s northern border, in anticipation of a new confrontation with the IDF. Hezbollah’s forces, mainly concentrated in southern Lebanon, are today estimated at around 30,000 militants – compared to just under 15,000 in 2006 – assisted and trained by the Iranian Pasdaran (Revolutionary Guard Corps), which has its HQ in the Baalbek region. The

primary objective of these fighters is to prevent an Israeli land invasion, but they are also responsible for deploying their arsenal of rockets and missiles to strike Israel³.

Hezbollah has significantly increased its stock of rocket launchers⁴. These are all of Iranian origin and can carry several thousand kilos of explosives. Israel estimates that Hezbollah now has nearly sixty thousand rockets and missiles of different types that can reach almost any point in the Hebrew state, including the Dimona nuclear power plant, located in the south of the country⁵. That is to say, it has quadrupled its capabilities in seven years. According to experts, these weapons are currently equipped only with conventional warheads, but could be equipped with chemical weapons.

If a new war were to break out against Hezbollah, Israeli intelligence services estimate that the IDF would face even greater challenges than in 2006. During that conflict, Hezbollah fired an average of one hundred fifty rockets per day. In a future conflict, the number of shots would probably be three times higher and the Shiite fighters would be likely to use the latest generation of anti-tank missiles as well as anti-aircraft weapons capable of seriously compromising the flights of the Israeli Air Force over Lebanon⁶.

Finally, Hezbollah is currently working to improve the capabilities of its drone unit. According to Israeli military officials, the Shiite organization has had Iranian-made Ababil drones since 2002, as well as other types of devices, some of which can be equipped with explosive charges weighing several dozen kilos.⁷ These drones do not require extensive training for their users, and it is difficult to spot them in order to destroy them in flight due to their small size. For the

moment, they have only been used for “psychological warfare” – several have flown over Israeli territory.⁸

Alongside the strengthening of its paramilitary arsenal, Hezbollah continued its terrorist actions against the Israelis. The movement’s intelligence and special actions branch is called the “Special Security Apparatus.” It was led by Imad Fayez Mughniyeh, until he was eliminated by Israel in 2008. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the movement organized kidnappings, hijackings, and attacks – in Buenos Aires, Paris, etc. In 1996, it participated in the attack on the Al-Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, killing nineteen Americans. With Iranian support, Hezbollah is increasing its attempts to kidnap Israelis abroad. The organization is seeking to avenge the “liquidation” of Mughniyeh, and it is for this purpose that its members travel the world in search of Israeli prey. Since 2011, the group has launched various operations against Israeli interests in Cyprus, Thailand and Kenya, but almost all of them have failed. Finally, according to the Bulgarian Interior Ministry, the movement is responsible for the attack on a bus carrying Israeli tourists (seven dead) on July 18, 2012, at Burgas airport.

.4Secret defenders of the security of the Hebrew entity:

Faced with a permanent threat on its territory, the State of Israel has built a very effective security system that aims to protect its population and its interests, both at home and abroad, against attacks and hostage-taking. This system is based essentially on the Shin Beth (Sherout Ha-Bitachon Klali, Shabak – although other agencies (police, border guards, army) also contribute to this task.

The Shin Bet’s missions cover a wide spectrum: internal and external

counterterrorism, counterespionage and military security, close protection of senior national authorities, protection of Israeli diplomatic representations, security in airports and on aircraft of the national airline El Al, etc. Since the Six-Day War (1967), this service has also been in charge of security in the occupied territories: in the West Bank and, until the departure of the Israeli army in September 2005, in Gaza. It became a prominent exponent of Islamic critiques of the predominantly nationalist and socialist rationales for the postcolonial state.

Shin Beth: A Pillar of Security:

The Shin Beth was created on June 30, 1948, from the security services of the Haganah (which became the IDF). It was initially called Unit 184 of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), but was directly attached to the Minister of Defense and not to the General Staff of the Armed Forces. While the war with its Arab neighbors was raging, it was first to prevent the risk of civil war between the left wing and the religious right wing – known as “revisionist” – of the Zionist movement. Indeed, within Israel itself, power struggles were significant and the consolidation of state institutions appeared to be one of the priorities. But the Shin Beth was quickly instrumentalized by the Labor leaders in power to monitor rival parties: first, the cadres of the right-wing Herut party, who, like their leader Menahem Begin, came from the Irgun; then, with the same methods (stalking, telephone tapping, infiltration, manipulation), the far-left activists of the Mapam party and the Communist party; and finally, the Israeli Arab activists. Similarly, at the request of Prime Minister Ben Gurion, the Shin Beth and the Mossad conducted Operation Tiger (1962) against the ultra-

Orthodox Jewish religious of the Neture Karta, who still contest, today, the legitimacy of the Hebrew state. Not to mention various operations against the press which would give Harel – the first director of the Shin Beth (1949-1952) – and his people the reputation of having built a politicized service acting exclusively on behalf of Mapai, Ben Gurion’s labor party⁹.

When it was created, the Shin Bet consisted of 8 sections:

- Section 1 was in charge of preventing internal subversion, mainly from the far right, but also from the far left. It was a form of political espionage because its mission was to collect information on the opponents of the party then in power, Mapai. A major controversy arose when two agents of the service were caught, in January 1953, installing a listening device in the office of Meir Yaari, the leader of the United Workers Party (Mapam), a left-wing party close to the Soviet Union and Stalin. The importance of the first section will decline with the development of democracy in Israel .

- Section 2 was created in 1950, after the Foreign Ministry’s Political Affairs Department was disbanded and its functions transferred to other intelligence agencies. This section was in charge of counterintelligence, mainly oriented against the USSR, but also monitored Western intelligence agents and carried out security investigations for sensitive government and defense positions. In the late 1960s, Sections 1 and 2 would merge to form the Directorate for the Prevention of Subversion and Counterintelligence, better known as the “Non-Arab Branch”.

- Section 3 was tasked with monitoring “Arab affairs,” that is, monitoring the Arabs of Israel, who at that time were under military rule. It was also

responsible for neutralizing espionage and sabotage operations by the Arab states, which constituted the bulk of its activity until the Six-Day War in 1967. From the early 1970s onward, it devoted itself primarily to combating Palestinian terrorist organizations.

– Section 4, also known as “AL,” was a unit responsible for monitoring new immigrants, first from Yemen and Eastern Europe, then from Morocco and Iraq. Its function was twofold: on the one hand, to detect potential foreign agents among the candidates for the installation in Israel; on the other hand, to conduct interviews in order to gather information on their country of origin useful for the defense of Israel, but also to identify among them future agents of the services who could return to operate abroad. The unit only operated for a few years and was dissolved upon the arrival of Amos Manor (director from 1953 to 1963) at the head of the service.

– Section 5 was responsible for the security of defense installations and that of the Scientific Liaison Office, responsible for the development of the national defense industry. It was from this section that Malmab, the defense security service, was born .

– The department also had the Operations Unit, which was its operational branch, directly attached to the Director General and protected by the strictest secrecy. The Technical Services Unit, which provided it with special surveillance and listening equipment (cameras, microphones, recording devices, invisible ink, etc.), depended on this section. In the 1970s, this unit experienced significant growth and became the Technology Directorate.

– The Interrogation Unit was, as its name suggests, responsible for the interrogation of arrested spies and

terrorists.

– Section 8 was responsible for securing official infrastructure and buildings in Israel, embassies, and the airlines El Al, Arkia and Israir. It provided security officers to all ministries and ensured the protection of secrets. It was responsible for investigations concerning public figures and the close protection of high-ranking state authorities .

The Shin Bet was also heavily involved in intelligence operations abroad: until the creation of the Mossad (April 1951), it was in charge of part of external espionage, which it gradually abandoned. One of its greatest successes in this area was obtaining in 1956 a copy of Nikita Khrushchev’s speech, secret at the time, denouncing Stalinist terror. A Polish Jewish journalist, Victor Grayevsky, close to the secretary of a Polish official, sent the document to the Israeli embassy in Warsaw. The Shin Bet liaison officer in Poland immediately sent it to Israel, which decided to share it with the United States, where it was made public .

From the end of the 1950s, the service returned to its core activities: internal security and counterintelligence, while continuing the fight against clandestine extremist groups. In 1961, the Shin Beth distinguished itself by arresting Israel Beer. This reserve colonel, close to Ben Gurion and very well-connected in Israeli security circles, was in fact a Soviet agent. Sentenced to fifteen years in prison, he died in detention. The same year, Kurt Sita, a German from the Sudetenland – a professor at the Technion, a renowned Israeli technological institute – was unmasked by the Shin Beth: he was spying for the Czechoslovaks.

Another major success of the Shin Bet

was Operation Yated, about which new elements were revealed in 2011.¹⁰ In the early 1950s, Egypt had planted a spy, Rif'at al-Gamal, in charge of gathering intelligence on Israeli military assets. Under the name of Jacques Bitton, he had set up a travel agency that served as a cover to justify his frequent trips to Europe where he would actually meet his handler. His associate, a former member of the security service, whose attention had been drawn to his lifestyle, had contacted the Shin Bet, which had recruited "Bitton" and convinced him to become a double agent. Thanks to the intelligence provided deliberately by the Israeli services, Rif'at al-Gamal/Jacques Bitton had acquired a certain credibility with the Egyptians, who ended up considering him as one of their best agents. In fact, the information transmitted was intended to poison the Cairo services: on the eve of the 1967 war, al-Gamal/Bitton had managed to convince them that the Israeli offensive would first be a land attack. As a result, the Egyptians did not protect their air bases and the Israeli air force had no trouble destroying on the ground, in less than three hours, at the start of the Six-Day War, all of the Egyptian combat aircraft, thus ensuring total control of the air and therefore victory. This operation is considered one of the greatest successes in terms of poisoning in the history of intelligence, comparable to Operation Fortitude carried out by the British and Americans during World War II.

At the same time, the Shin Bet managed to poison the Soviet services, a feat that few Western countries would achieve. Once again, the operation took place thanks to Victor Grayevsky, the journalist who had obtained the Khrushchev report (1956). Back in

Israel, he was approached by representatives of the KGB under diplomatic cover, who knew nothing of the role he had played in this affair. Relations were quickly established, but Grayevsky had informed the Shin Bet from the outset.

For years, this agent, whom the KGB believed it had recruited, gave his handlers information prepared by Hebrew counterintelligence. Representatives of the Soviet service met him in the woods around Jerusalem and Ramla, in Russian churches and monasteries in Jaffa, Jerusalem and Tiberias, and "by chance" in crowded restaurants and at diplomatic receptions. Not once during the fourteen years he operated as a double agent did the Soviets suspect that Victor was using them. They constantly complimented him on the quality of the information he gave them and never questioned his credibility. At KGB headquarters in Moscow, rumor had it that the Soviet Union had an agent very high up in Israeli ruling circles. The only time the Russian central's handlers had any doubts was in 1967. Ironically, it was the only time Grayevski provided them with information accurate. This was in the "waiting period," before the Six-Day War. Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser wrongly believed that Israel would attack Syria in May. So he massed his troops in the Sinai, expelled the United Nations peacekeeping forces, closed the Red Sea straits to Israeli ships, and threatened the Jewish state with annihilation. Prime Minister Eshkol then asked the Mossad to inform the Soviets that if Egypt continued to adopt this aggressive stance, Israel would have no choice but to go to war. He hoped that Moscow, which wielded enormous influence over Cairo, would arrest

Nasser. Victor Grayevski passed a document to the KGB detailing Israel's true intentions. But the USSR did not take the measure of the situation, ignored his report and encouraged Nasser in his desire for war.¹¹ Ironically, Grayevsky was doubly decorated during his lifetime: by Israeli counter-espionage, of course, but also by the KGB "for services rendered to the Motherland."

Thus, the Shin Beth asserts itself as an elite service, with a small staff (600 employees), but very professional. All its executives come from the army and are most often former members of the Hagannah or the British army, mostly Ashkenazi.

However, a change of direction was made in 1967. At the end of the Six-Day War, the Shin Bet extended its activities to the West Bank, the Golan and the Gaza Strip: it took charge of the repression of terrorist activities in the territories occupied territories, a mission for which it was not prepared. In order to cope with it, it had to rapidly increase its staff and recruited mostly Arabic-speaking Sephardim. In the early years of this new mission, the Shin Beth had practically no informants in the villages of the occupied territories. But under the leadership of Avraham Ahituv (1974-1981), it quickly adapted to this new role and became a highly effective organization. However, its status had changed profoundly: from a counterintelligence service defending the interests of the nation, the Shin Beth had become the security service of an occupied territory and began to show a great deal of arrogance, while being less professional in its practices¹².

A new development occurred following the hijacking of an El Al plane to Algiers in 1968 and the murders of Israeli athletes at the Munich Olympics

(1972). The Shin Beth then developed its security activities in aircraft and multiplied its branches abroad to ensure the protection of Israeli embassies around the world, which became potential targets for terrorists, just like the planes of the national airline.

The 1980s were marked by the continuation of the fight against terrorist movements, support for the army in Lebanon – which Israel entered in 1982 – in order to dismantle the Palestinian and Syrian networks and the infiltration of clandestine extremist Jewish circles. In May 1984, the Shin Beth discovered, in East Jerusalem, twelve bombs attached to several Arab buses carrying civilians, including children. A bloodbath was avoided in extremis. The type of explosives used – from Israeli military stocks – and the detonation devices left no doubt about the origin of the terrorists: they came from radical far-right Jewish circles. Quickly arrested, they were tried and imprisoned, in conditions that were, however, less severe than if they had been Palestinians¹³.

After the Oslo Accords of 1993, the Shin Bet underwent a new complete change in its working methods and a small technical revolution. It took charge of intelligence gathering in the areas from which the Israeli army was withdrawing, developing, among other things, its technological means of surveillance and information gathering. Above all, under these agreements, it had to begin to dialogue and cooperate with the security services of the Palestinian Authority.

During the second Intifada, which broke out in the fall of 2000 following the failure of the Camp David summit, the Shin Beth reacted quickly to stem the tide of violence. In a few decades, this

service had become a major player in Israel's war against Palestinian terrorism. It provided intelligence that enabled the Israeli army to arrest some of the suicide bombers before they could carry out their attacks. These preventive arrests were usually carried out at roadblocks. The Shin Beth also worked closely with the air force to guide its strikes, identifying the locations where the leaders of Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades and Fatah. These operations, described as "targeted killings," are generally carried out by combat helicopters.

The Shin Bet has managed to identify and neutralize dozens of terrorist groups. It has had remarkable successes thanks to its informants who infiltrated terrorist organizations to prepare "targeted assassinations." The assassinations of Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, on March 22, 2004, and of Abd al-Aziz Rantissi, the founder of its military wing, on April 17, 2004, demonstrate the extent to which this service has penetrated Palestinian circles. As a result, Palestinian groups, mainly the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, have begun to lynch suspected Israeli collaborators or execute them without trial.

While many of its successes have remained secret, the Shin Beth has been put in difficulty in several cases, notably that of "Bus 300" in 1984, following which Avraham Shalom, its director since 1981, had to resign: two hostage-takers, members of the PFLP, were executed by men of the service after having been disarmed. The event led to the creation of the Zorea (1984) and Landau (1987) commissions chaired by judges of the Supreme Court of Israel, which regulated the Shin Beth's interrogation methods. Above all, the

service was criticized for its inability to prevent waves of Palestinian attacks, on the one hand, and the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by a Jewish extremist Yigal Amir (1995), on the other hand. Indeed, the Shin Beth apparently had information on the intentions of this individual and one of the service's agents had even been given the mission of monitoring him. However, he had concluded that Amir did not constitute a serious threat. Faced with this fiasco, the director of the Shin Beth, Carmi Gillon, resigned. Later, the Shamgar Commission highlighted the many flaws within the service.

This has not, however, affected its effectiveness. According to the information it provides on its website¹⁴, in 2012, the Shin Bet arrested 2,300 people suspected of terrorism. Following the interrogations, 2,170 were prosecuted and imprisoned. Thanks to the service's effective action, around one hundred major terrorist attacks were prevented. Half of these were bombings or attacks with firearms, and a third were attempted kidnappings.

The number of victims of jihadist attacks in Israel decreased in 2012 by approximately 55% compared to the previous year: 10 deaths (six civilians and four soldiers) compared to 22 in 2011. On the other hand, the number of injured increased significantly: 309 in 2012 compared to 159 victims in 2011. Most of the victims (243) were injured following rocket fire on Israel, particularly in response to Operation Pillar of Defense, launched in Gaza in November 2012. During the year, the West Bank and Jerusalem experienced an increase in terrorist acts: +80% in the West Bank (578 compared to 320 in 2011) and +44% in Jerusalem (282 attacks compared to 191 in 2011). The

deadliest terrorist attack occurred on a Tel Aviv bus on November 21, 2012, killing 29 people. It was the work of a local cell of Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad¹⁵.

In terms of counter-espionage, a rather secondary activity, the Shin Beth's action is mainly focused on neutralizing the actions of the Iranian services with which the secret war is raging. Any individual of foreign nationality is potentially subject to surveillance by the Shin Beth, which has a large network of agents and informants.

In order to accomplish its missions, the service would today bring together 2,000 to 3,000 employees and is structured into three major operational divisions:

- The “Arab Affairs” division is responsible for the fight against terrorism and monitoring Palestinian movements. It is particularly active in the fight against the armed wing of Hamas.

- The “Non-Arab Affairs” division deals primarily with counterintelligence and seeks to infiltrate foreign intelligence services and diplomatic missions in Israel. Before the fall of the Soviet bloc, this division was subdivided into two sections: the Communist Section and the Non-Communist Section. It studied the files of certain immigrants from Eastern Europe or the countries of the Soviet Union.

- The “Security” division ensures the protection of members of the government, official buildings, embassies and consulates, military industries, as well as airports and aircraft of the national company El Al.

The Shin Bet (Henza) military detachment works in cooperation with Aman to combat riots and is also active in the fight against Hamas' armed wing.

Finally, two special units responsible for clandestine operations were created

at the time of the first Intifada in 1988: Duvdevan for the Gaza Strip and Shimson for the West Bank. Composed of a few dozen men who speak perfect Arabic, these structures have the mission of identifying the leaders of terrorist movements and arresting them or, sometimes, eliminating them outright. Duvdevan was dissolved in 2005, when the Gaza Strip was withdrawn.

The Shin Beth also has five reserve sections.

In 2013, the service formed a new section to cover the Sinai region. According to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz, which cites sources close to the Shin Bet, its goal is to collect intelligence on jihadists concentration sites. This new mission therefore extends the area of responsibility of the internal security service beyond the borders of Israel.

.5 hin Beth's New Challenges:

Constantly evolving since its creation, the Shin Beth is today faced with four new challenges that it will have to take up in the coming decade: increasing cooperation with the Palestinian Authority, relaunching surveillance of fundamentalist circles, strengthening the protection of sensitive infrastructures and placing renewed emphasis on counterespionage.

Since 2005, the Shin Beth has been tasked by the government with assessing the possibilities of dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, with a view to possible negotiations, and no longer just to suppress terrorism. It is a Copernican revolution that this service has decided to take on without qualms, because many of its successive directors have complained about the lack of a serious government policy with regard to the Palestinian question. This new mission leads the Shin Beth to call on academics to benefit from their expertise and provide

appropriate responses .

Another mission has been relaunched in recent years: monitoring various forms of domestic extremism, including preventing “Jewish terrorism,” but also monitoring the Arab community in Israel. Israeli far-right activists regularly carry out attacks on Palestinians, even though these have been decreasing for some time (18 in 2012, compared to 30 in 2011). For example, in 2012, minors affiliated with this radical movement threw a firebomb at a Palestinian taxi near the settlement of Bat Ayin (West Bank), killing six Palestinians. As for the far left, part of its activities consists of demonstrations to express solidarity with the Palestinian population and to conduct various protest actions in conjunction with foreign Jewish and non-Jewish movements, as in the case of the Estelle ship, intercepted off the coast of Gaza by the Israeli fleet in April 2012.¹⁶ Finally, Israeli Arabs are the target of subversion by terrorist organizations and foreign states. However, their participation in terrorist attacks remains fairly low. However, terrorist groups, particularly Hezbollah, continue their efforts to recruit volunteers for information gathering, suicide attacks or logistical support from this population. Thus, in 2012, the arrest of Milad Mohammad Mahmoud Khatib took place, an Israeli Arab recruited by a Hezbollah official based in Denmark, who had tasked him with collecting intelligence on sensitive installations in Israel, on Israeli personalities (politicians and public figures) and on the security forces' devices.

This surveillance mission became all the more necessary after the assassination of Prime Minister Rabin by the Jewish extremist Yigal Amir in 1995. Of course, there has been no longer a

“political police” in Israel since 1963, a consequence of the discovery of the wiretapping requested by Ben Gurion in leftist and right-wing revisionist circles. Only surveillance of the Communist Party, composed of mainly Israeli Arabs. No legal Jewish organization, even extremist, can theoretically be subject to permanent surveillance by the Shin Beth. The establishment of a surveillance system requires written authorization from the Minister of the Interior. However, since the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, the prerogatives of the Shin Beth in this area have been strengthened.

Another major concern of the service is the strengthening of the protection of sensitive infrastructures. For several decades, the Hebrew State has been confronted with a multitude of attacks on its soil, against its citizens and its installations, causing victims and damage. In fact, Israel has become the world leader in securing public buildings, and embassies, airport installations and aircraft. After the elimination of Imad Mughniyeh, the head of the military wing of Hamas (2008), Israel has significantly increased the level of security of its infrastructures abroad .

The first service concerned with the prevention of terrorist attacks, the Shin Bet has set up a special base entirely devoted to training personnel responsible for ensuring the security of El Al planes and premises, as well as Israeli diplomatic and consular representations. This base includes a replica of an aircraft in which simulations of hijackings and training with live ammunition take place. The same complex includes a replica of an embassy in which recruits are trained to respond to different attack scenarios, including the infiltration of commandos

inside the premises. In addition, concrete measures have been taken to reduce the risks. For example, in India, El Al planes have no longer been allowed to take off during the day, because it is easier to shoot down a plane in broad daylight with a portable anti-aircraft missile launcher. Combat helicopters have escorted civilian flights in Europe and Southeast Asia during takeoff and landing, when they are most vulnerable. Members of the security services also travel undercover on commercial flights .

Finally, the Shin Bet wants to put the emphasis back on counterespionage, somewhat neglected for three decades. Indeed, the secret war between Israel and Iran is growing year by year, with Tel Aviv seeking by all means to slow down the development of its adversary's nuclear program, and Tehran responding to these attacks by supporting all armed movements fighting against the Hebrew state .

The year 2012 was marked by a significant increase in terrorist attacks against Israeli and Jewish targets around the world (employees of Israeli diplomatic missions, members of Jewish communities, Israeli tourists), organized mainly by Hezbollah and Iran. In order to carry out their operations – which are not always successful (see Bangkok in January, New Delhi and Tbilisi in February, Cyprus in June, Nairobi in July 2012, etc.) – the Iranian services supported by Hezbollah launch numerous intelligence operations on their potential targets, seeking information on means of transport and tourist sites frequented by Israelis, as well as on the security of embassies, etc.

The Iranian services, with the help of their Hezbollah allies, are increasingly aggressive and professional, not hesitating to increase attempts to recruit

Israeli agents in Israel itself. On July 8, 2006, the Shin Bet arrested Ghazi Falah, a Canadian citizen who also had Israeli nationality. He was accused of spying for Hezbollah. The Israeli authorities accused him in particular of having taken photographs on the Israeli-Lebanese border. In August of the same year, Riyad Mzarib, a resident of the Bedouin village of Beit Zarzir, was arrested for spying for Hezbollah. He provided the Lebanese movement with information on the movements of Israeli troops and the locations where rockets were falling.¹⁷ Faced with this growing threat, the Shin Bet has begun to redevelop its counterintelligence department, which had long been secondary to antiterrorism.

.6Other internal security services:

While most domestic security intelligence is the responsibility of the Shin Bet, several other organizations also participate directly in this mission. Less involved in intelligence, they are much more active in the actions of protecting secrets, controlling territory and monitoring borders .

A structure on which little information is available, the Malmab (Memuneh Al Ha'Bitahon Be'Ma'arekhet Ha'Bitahon) is a service created within the Ministry of Defense at the end of the 1960s. It has more than a thousand soldiers, present in all defense installations and industries throughout the country. Its missions are comparable to those entrusted, in France, to the Directorate of Protection and Defense Security (DPDS)

Malmab is responsible for the physical security of the ministry and sensitive facilities working for its benefit, in particular the Dimona nuclear reactor. It conducts security audits of sensitive government, military and industrial facilities and monitors all international cooperation projects in Israel and abroad.

It manages personnel clearances and conducts various internal security investigations. For several years, it has specialized in computer security and network protection. In partnership with another small organization also dependent on the Ministry of Defense, Sibat (Siyua Bithoni), Malmab closely supervises Israeli arms manufacturers, who are constantly looking for new export markets. This monitoring aims to reduce any potential damage caused by the spread of Israeli technologies or weapons into hostile hands .

Malmab is also the Israeli military counterintelligence service, tasked with ensuring the security of IDF troops and preventing enemy infiltration. It is also responsible for protecting secrets and preventing leaks within Israeli security institutions, including the Mossad and Shin Bet .

Although it contributes to the security of the Defense, Malmab is not an intelligence service in the true sense, because it does not engage in information gathering. Israeli law even denies it the right to conduct interrogations, a domain reserved by the Shin Beth and the police. Also, in order to carry out its qualification investigations, it must be content to conduct various security interviews .

In the mid-1980s, Malmab was unable to prevent a Dimona nuclear site employee, Mordechai Vanunu, from revealing critical information about Israel's most secret facility. However, the investigation conducted after the leak by Shin Bet and Malmab concluded that the latter agency was not directly responsible for the affair.

The Ministry of Public Security is naturally involved in internal security and the fight against terrorism, through various police services. The Border

Police, created in 1953, is the armed wing of the Israeli police in matters of internal security, the fight against terrorism and organized crime. It is a paramilitary force comparable to the French Gendarmerie. Since 1990, it has had a unit clandestine operation called Yamam (Yehidat Mishtara Meyuhedet), which aims to infiltrate terrorist movements for intelligence purposes and to make preventive arrests. The police also has an Intelligence Department, created in 1997, which collects, evaluates and disseminates intelligence relating to public order, the fight against crime and internal security.¹⁸

Finally, the Ministry of Justice has also had, since 2002, a department specializing in the fight against illegal money laundering and the financing of terrorism, following new international legislation following the attacks of September 11, 2001 .

.7Conclusion:

Finally, Faced with the uncertainties of the future, at the heart of the most unstable region of the world since the middle of the 20th century, Israel has no choice but to continue its efforts in terms of defense and, above all, to maintain the high level of excellence of its intelligence and security services. Indeed, their role will be even more decisive in the years to come than in the past. Because to effectively deal with threats, "intelligence work must continue 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year," as General Amir Eshel, commander of the Israeli Air Force, explains.

Israeli intelligence will have to be even more attentive to the situation in neighboring countries, the moods of their leaders, their intentions and plans, especially with regard to Iran and its nuclear program. It will have to continue

its efforts to detect as early as possible the preparation of terrorist attacks and the infiltration of enemy fighters into its territory. It will also have to vigilantly monitor subversive tendencies within Israeli society, among Israeli Arabs and among ultra-Orthodox Jews, who should never be forgotten as being behind the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin. But all these missions will have to be carried out with respect for human rights, if Israel wants to continue to claim its status as the only "true" democracy in the Middle East. At the same time, the intelligence community will have to be able to detect and assess opportunities for peace, and to reestablish dialogue with the Palestinian Authority. The Shin Bet, Aman and the Mossad therefore have many good years ahead of them .

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