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Outside 'The soldier and The state': The Reconsideration of Civil military
relations analysis

خارج 'الجندي والدولة': إعادة النظر في تحليل العلاقات المدنية-العسكرية

Hors du "soldat et de l'Etat" le réexamen des relations civilo-militaire

Nihed Guendouzi1

Member in The Laboratory of Comparative Politics

Department of Political Science and International Relations, Alger3

Corresponding author: Nihed Guendouzi, guendouzinihed@gmail.com

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Abstract

This study aims to review the theoretical background of civil-military relations analysis and the empirical structure of each one. Further, it will aim to figure out the logical construction analysis of these theories. Besides, it will look for other theories like the concordance and the agency theory to see the other views of different researchers in the sphere of CMR analysis and explore the different area.

Key words: civil- military relations (CMR), traditional theories, neo theory concordance theory, agency theory.

ملخص

هذه الدراسة تهدف الى مراجعة الخلفية النظرية لتحليل للعلاقات المدنية العسكرية، وكذا البنية الامبريقية لكل نظرية، الى جانب ذلك ستقوم الدراسة بالبحث في نظريات أخرى منها النظرية التوافقية ونظرية الوكالة لنظر في أسس مختلفة لتحليل العلاقات المدنية العسكرية واختبار مجمل الأفكار التي تحملها هاته النظريات لابد من وضع اسقاط تاريخي لبعض تجارب العلاقات المدنية العسكرية واختبار مدى نجاعتها على أرض الواقع.

كلمات مفتاحية: العلاقات المدنية العسكرية، النظريات التقليدية، النظرية التوافقية، نظرية الوكالة، النظرية الجديدة.

Résumé

Cet article vise à passer en revue le contexte théorique de l'analyse des relations civilo-militaires et la structure empirique de chacune. En outre, il visera à comprendre l'analyse de construction logique de ces théories. En outre, cette étude cherchera d'autres théories comme la concordance et la théorie de l'agence pour voir les autres points de vue de différents chercheurs dans le domaine de l'analyse CMR et explorer les différents domaines.

Mots-clés: relations civilo-militaires (CMR), théories traditionnelles, théorie de la concordance néo-théorie, théorie de l'agence.

2. INTRODUCTION

Civil-military relation is one of the vexing domains to conduct. A multidisciplinary field of study Social Science; Political scientists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists, and decision-makers have impact studies in the field which produced plenty of literature that enrich the theoretical construction but each one has a different corner, even though; they benefit from each other to build their Own basic analysis. The key point in civil-military relations is that we build institutions to protect us, but we fear the wrong use of its power that might spawn negative results on the state's existence, development, and survival to some extent. The military, the state, and the society are the three pillars of the study in any research of civil- military relations. Some contributions consider them as subordination relation set, while others take them as a relation of interchangeable effect, so; the field tends to reveal as '*ceteris* . In this study, we attend to look *parabus* into these convoluted ideas by asking this question: **to what extent the theories of civil- military relations reflect the needs of the field?**

We divide this dilemma into subfield questions:

- What are the clue ideas of traditional theories in civil- military relations?
- Why the area of civil-military relations demand new theories to explain it?
- Is the same principle of civil-military relations work for all the case studies?

This essay proceeds in four parts. I begin with a scope of civil- military relations as a sphere. I then present anatomy for a

landmark work of both Samuel Huntington and Janowitz's supposition. The antepenultimate section; introduces the new theories that tried to explain civil- military relations from a different perspective, while the last section discusses the Importance of the good theory in practice for both theoretical and empirical dimensions.

2.The conceptual evolution of CMR as a sphere

Despite the historical background of civil- military relation discussion which goes back to philosophical contributions since Plato, scholarly interest has somewhat brightened since world war two through the work of historians such as Alfred Vagts 1937 and Harold Dwight Lasswell 1941. The concern of these studies in this period was the rise of militarism in the pre-world war II.¹

The second period emerged duringThe cold war, the donation of this period to harmonize the demand for "*permanent and large standing army with America's traditional suspicions of the threat to liberty posed by standing armies*"². The mostbrighten scholar writers here were Jermo G. Kerwin 1948, David O. Smith 1951, Harlod Dwight Lasswell 1950, Ekrich 1956, Wright Mills 1956, Walter Millis et al 1958.

At the turn of 1957, Samuel Huntington wrote his book the soldier and the state which remarkably become the capstone for the field of civil military-relations. At the same period, precisely in the 1960's, Janowitz chalked his work the *professional soldier*. Posterior; the domain of CMR cleft into two discrete trails: the

sociological and political science scholars with more specified themes tackling, one the hand; the relation between society and the armed forces with the writing of many figures in the filed namely: D. Larson 1974, David Segal 1986, Sam. C. Sarkesian 1975, Charles C. Moskos 1970, and in the other hand; the post-colonial countries in which they studied the phenomena of coups in these areas. The most notable scholars were Samuel Finer 1962, Claude E. Welch 1976; others focused on the study of civil-military relations in communist regimes as such Campbell, C. Colton, and Timothy J., Gustafson 1990, Dale, R. Herspring 1996, Kimberly Zisk Martin 1993. In the field of ethnicity and its effect on civil-military relation plus to the subject of authoritarian and post- authoritarian regimes; Horowitz, Dan 1982, 1985, Filipe Aguero 1995, Alain Rouquié 1982 had a noteworthy exertion.³ The literature of the field continues to bring different works of either theoretical debate or empirical analysis; the most avowed ones are peter's feaver agent theory 1999, and Rebecca's Schiff concordance theory 1995.

Broadly speaking, the scope of the civil-military relations according to the above flashpoints have been centralized in three main elements: military institution, state, and society that can be exemplified in the following figure:




Figure 1

With relation to the above figure, we can detail the patterns of civil- military relations into the following motifs:

- The relation between the state, society, and military achievements to protect the country.
- The relation between military and civil corps;
- The relation of the military institution with the executive, legislative, communications institution, and society as a whole.

Beyond these broad descriptions of civil-military relations' basis; we figure out the civil military relation nexus as presented in the following cycles:




Figure2 Figure3




Figure 4

Through the same logic of the drawn cycles, we can say that the civil- military relations flow inter alias three forms. Firstly, the strong relations between state and Military while the society is detached in which the people do not trust the state as an institution and the military as Egypt; secondly, a thick relation between society

and the state when the military has not a clear role inside the society like South Africa; lastly, a firm relation between society and military whilst the state as an institution is considered sourcing of threat and corruption inside the state like Algeria.

3. Methodological Analysis of civil-military relations

Peter feaver delineates the analysis of civil-military relations upon the tools' analysis of political science. As he stated three patterns. Firstly; the normative approach in which the researcher focuses on the cultural background of the case study and measure its impact on the relations between the state, society, and the military. Secondly; the empirical Method concentrates on the different case studies; it can be part of the normative research. Thirdly, the descriptive method stresses the general features of civil-military relations in a specific area. Lastly, the theoretical method in which it relates the theoretical background of civil-military relations to the empirical studies to figure out the different reasons for a certain type of relation.⁴ Each pattern as mentioned above has a specific goal to achieve and different roles to be used for that can be summarized in the following table⁵:

Normative	al/Descript	Theoretical
• what ought to be done? • how can we improve civil military relations ? • the extent of civilian control	• details about Normative method through empirical studies.	• it focuses on cause and effect relationship.

Table 1

Salvador Sanchez Tapia tried to create a model that can be useful as the method for civil-military analysis; he considers it a very handy tool to research civil-military relations with any case study, as he applied it to the United Kingdom of Britain and Greece. The model was categorized in four areas as the following:⁶

3.1. The first area: military Autonomy

The idea behind military autonomy according to *Salvador Tapia* is the freedom of military institutions to take actions toward their 'professional affairs' without outside institutional encumbrance. To intensively the fathom of military autonomy within this model, he stated four components:

- Record of direct military participation in politics.
- Promotions to generalship and appointments to key positions.
- Promotions to generalship and appointments to key positions.
- Professional Military education.
- Military Justice.
- Procurement and acquisitions.

3.2. The second area: Military participation in policy-making

The hearty relationship in civil-military relations is the subordination of military institution from policy decision-making only for what concern the security issues. To analyze this area, we have to look for the following points:

- Institutionalize security and defense policy and strategy making.
- Is the military input appropriately considered?
- Education of political elites on security and defense matters.
- Handling of military dissent.

3.3. The third area: Military interaction with civil society

A Day to day interaction between military and civil society has a crucial role in maintaining the norms of CMR in any given society; Especially, in democratic countries where the public opinion has a central voice in the policymaking process and direction. This dot has been analyzed trough:

- Recruitment and retention issues
- Existence of values gap between society and the military
- Presence of security issues in the armed forces in the public debate
- Social composition of the armed forces

3.4. The fourth area: the politicization of the military

the extent of military friction with policy depends on,

- Political activity of the military

- Politicization of the military by civilians
- Rules for public manifestation, or political commitment of retired personnel.
- Unionization of the military.

4. Anatomy of traditional theories about civil-military relations

The theory is a rational composition of ideas and principles used by the researcher in his analysis and explanation of any phenomenon, its purpose is to break down the complex structure of the levy phenomenon and rebuild it again to extract a general conclusion about it that has to be generalized for the same type, through the following lines, we are going to conduct a set of important theories in civil-military relations and assess the main ideas have been flowing to the field.

4.1. Huntington and Janowitz's theory

Samuel Huntington is considered to be the pioneer in the civil-military relations analysis area, even though; many scholars conducted the field before him. Through his book the soldier and the state; he tried to represent the analysis' basis of civil-military relations. The military institution according to Samuel is formed by two imperatives⁷:

- Functional imperative: driven from the societal threat.
- Societal imperative: comes from social power, ideology, the dominant institutions in society

He argues that The most important area in civil-military relations analysis is the relationships between the military command and the state in which the conflict between the above imperatives arise; the role of the

military command is to protect the societal security while the state has to value the degree of risk or threat.⁸ So, a military institution is a tool for the state which must be under its control. about what it is mentioned above; the analysis of civil-military relations embedded within two important questions:

- what is the nature of the military institution?
- what is the character of the military officer?

From this statement, Samuel Huntington proposes the concept 'professionalism' which contain three important elements: expertise, responsibility, corporateness; each of those elements has a certain feature⁹:

4.1.1. The expertise

- It includes all the issues related to the academic side like education and training, Moltk stated that *'the best period to teach war is during peace'*¹⁰
- The ability to apply what they have learned
- Establish an especial institution that has to be different from civil institutional construction.

4.1.2. The responsibility

- the work within groups
- to provide social services.
- Transfer the academic ideas into daily life.

4.1.3. Corporateness

- Organic unity inside the military institution.
- The differentiation from the rest of society and especially layman.

Accordingly, the job of the professional military command lies in a set of missions that include as follows: organize, equipment, training the military forces, planning military forces activities, direct the especial military forces mission inside and outside the battle. But, how could any state ensure the control of military institutions?

4.2. Mechanisms of civilian control

4.2.1. Subjective control

The state might achieve civilian control through subjective control with three main approaches. Firstly, the civilian control by governmental institutions like what happened in the USA in 17th and 19th century. Secondly, the civilian control by the social class. Finally, the civilian control through the constitution balances the relationship between the military and the civilian matters in which the democratic system of the state will guarantee the process.¹¹

4.2.2. objective control

Objective control has to do with the elevation of military professionalism through the division of power between what is civilian and military. The concentration of professionalizing the military step up the ability of this institution in both behavior and reaction toward their environment which creates a technical mind that is mature and neutral; the tools used to reach out mechanisms is the educational system and the nature of formation inside the military; what spawn it to be effective, sufficient so that the military become a device for the state.¹²

By the same logic as Samuel Huntington, Janowitz believes in professionalism as a device that

balances civil-military relations, but he tried to explain the day-to-day relations between them, so that; it raises the understanding of the complex relations. Also, he tried to explain Huntington's functional imperative with the new threat delivered by nuclear weapons which changed the military role and nature.¹³ The essential contribution of Janowitz's analysis is his ability to analyze 'how the politicized Cold War American military seeks to influence civilians and resist unwelcome policy direction' he concludes that the military at that time has combined the assembly of national security which is 'the department of defense and national security council' in the civilian executive branch to interfere in the political affairs.¹⁴ In addition to that, Janowitz criticized the ideal definition of professionalism as it was stated by Samuel Huntington; rather, he introduced the 'pragmatic professionalism' and he claims that the politicization of the officer in post-world war two enable them to face the soviet menace to prove the fact that the officers are part of the 'nation's political system'.¹⁵ To clarify more this idea; he pointed out five drifts¹⁶:

- The transformation in the premise of command and attitude "organizational revolution"
- Unlikeness knowledge between the military and civilian elite
- The change of American social structure that affected the recruitment method in the military.
- The change of officers' career line.
- Including professionalism within the political doctrine.

5.RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

5.1. Is control sufficient?

Even both frameworks are considered to be vital theories in the field of civil- military relations, many researchers fortify critics toward the general edifice. Peter feaver summarized Samuel's Huntington ideas into four hypotheses namely¹⁷:

- 1) Elements of civilian control are affected by the changes of internal and external variables.
- 2) A liberal ideology will influence the military institution.
- 3) Autonomy of the military is key to professionalism.
- 4) Objective control keeps the military institution away from civilian authority

He tried to discuss the good and worse of his ideas upon them, asserting that Huntington's work does not reflect reality history rather than presenting the ideal model of how civil-military relations have to be and this is the same critics have been developed by Rebecca Schiff for the sake of representing a new theory of analysis.


Eliot Cohen claims that Samuel's Huntington theory is deliberated to be normative theory in which the military does only what the civilians ask them to do; this is a fallacy or ideal division of what is military and civilian. He adds; the idea of total subordinations was denied through both Vietnam War and Golf war; the first failed because of the 'presidential micromanagement', while the latter successes due to the presidential bridle. The same critics were given to Janowitz' theory; although it proved its efficiency in describing day to day relations of the military with society; it fell in the same problem of total division like Huntington, furthermore; Cohen ponders both internal and external factors as crucial elements in

drawing the civil-military relations unlike, both classical works which stressed only the internal ones.¹⁸

Moreover, indeed, Deans theorists of civil-military relations were extremist in their basis analysis of division that cannot be generalized for several reasons. First, the vital criteria of both analyses were the stable democratic states in which the civilian institutions are strong enough to stand on their own, unlike the fragile or developing states which still struggle to build even the infrastructure, these normative theories failed in explaining the process of establishing strong civil institutions. Second, globalization excreted many issues that affect the relationship and make it complex and interfere such as technology and

military relations in the world but only the USA can be the case. Accordingly, the needs of states are different from one state to another, the rooted and stable democratic states not like the developing states and pre colonized ones in which the institutions are fragile so that the protection of these states from coups and the falling of institutions is the prior step in the building process as Douglas Bland 2001 stated as well.¹⁹ The concordance theory, sheds light on 'dialogues, adaptation, values, and shared goals' between the components mentioned above or as she labeled them 'partners'.

Partners as the concordance theory maintain; are divided into three structures. Firstly, the military institution as a partner, this latter includes the armies, the



revolutionary outcome at both levels civilian or military.

5.2. The need for new theories in civil-military relation analysis

5.2.1. Concordance theory

Rebecca Schiff reasoned the concordance theory upon her critics for Samuel Huntington and all the theories of total subordination betwixt the military, society, and state. She argues that these frameworks do not provide a general explanation for all the case studies of civil-

military command which is the production of society and political institution, their goal is the protection of the state as it differs from state to another. Secondly, the political elite component that contains the president, parliament, the parties' commands, or the monarchy. Thirdly, the citizenry; embody not only the citizens' votes but also the entrepreneur, civil society organizations, agriculturists.²⁰

Figure 5

The three partners interact with each other within three levels which are determined in four essential indicators including the social formation of the military command, the process of decision-making, the method of recruitment, and the military-style. The first indicator differs from one state to another; every state has an especial social, cultural, historical structure. The second indicator involves the societal institution which decides about the budget of the military institution it might be an official one like the government as it can be non-official like the complex military industry in the USA. The third indicator includes both *coercive* and *persuasive* recruitment. The fourth indicator builds upon the military-style, ethics, and the people's thoughts about their military.²¹


5.2.2. Agency theory

This theory was driven from the economic perspective, upon the critics of civil-military relation theories; *peter feaver* build up his theory on two factors values-based factors and rational interest factors using the tools of economic analysis. In *Armed servants: Agency, Oversight, and civil-military relations*, he argues that the relationship between the civilian and military base on principle Agent theory,²² so, what does it mean principle agent theory, and how does it work?

The principle agent theory approaches the relation of two parties, one of them works to another in which he has to be the expert in the specific domain and work for it while the other provides payment. This type of relation is divided into two preferences, 'functional and relational goals'. The first, protect the civilian from external threat, while the second, reflects the view of civilian toward

the military; they want them to keep their line and not interfere the civilian supremacy, the degree of this relation depends on what extent the military is "working" or "shrinking".²³ Accordingly, the military preferences focus on three elements: national policy, the military behavior, the way civilians monitor the institution.

CMR relations preferences



Protecting civilian from external threat
view of the military toward civilian

Figure 6

Speaking of the top, *peter feaver* suggested mechanisms for the civilians to monitor and control the military, namely; rules of engagement, standing orders, mission orders, and contingency plans. Plus, to what is mentioned, he added several ways to build healthy CMR relations that include, screening and selection of personnel and advisors, fire alarms and institutional checks, police patrols. The first includes the qualified advisors from the military spectrum but still in harmony with his Own policies. The second refers to the media, think tanks, and independent institution which can check and alarm when the military misbehave. The third is similar to the second but its concern is to report about

the activities of the military such as the budget.

Slightly more, Peter's theory offers a wide range of variety to punish the military side for misbehavior if it occurs, he divided them into different categories includes, 'unwelcome Monitoring arrangements, budget cuts, discharge or retirement, military justice, and extralegal civilian action to include verbal rebukes.'²⁴ In each category, there are different tools of punishment depends on the monitoring and shrinking principle applied on daily basis.

Both preeminent theorist Rebecca Schiff and Peter Feaver's works have been based on critics toward the classical theories of civil-military relation; more specifically on the idea of the total subordination between the military and civilian sphere but still, both theories use the same logic when it comes to the analysis of the field. Rebecca's framework was about documenting the details of civil-military relations relying on a certain aspect to explain the cause and effect relationships or tries to justify the logic of this relation. Protect the state from coups is enough for some states as she claims, yet her mechanisms for this process cannot be applicable in reality. On the other side, Peter Feaver tried to look at the issue from different stand pointing as mentioned above; his concern was the national security vision of both civilian and military in which he tried to represent many details on both sides preferences which are embedded within three sections 'the content of the policy, the interpretation of its behavior, general preference.'²⁵ When it comes to national security; trying to figure out the friction interest of the two that lead the military

either shrink or work. Conversely, it did not provide a clear outline of those preferences.

6. Conclusion

To be sure, civil-military relations is a complex domain to deal with, especially in the world of continuous changes. At its heart, the theories should stress the importance of building a strong process of relation between the civilian as a sphere, society, and the military as an institution. Many researchers have been tried to discuss this phenomenon namely Samuel's Huntington normative theory which focuses on subordination relation and deliver professionalism as an approach to facilitate this idea to Janowitz' theory that tried to build its mastery upon Samuel's weakness thought but both fell in the same problem of division. Others tried to cover this corner and find different approaches to deal with CMR like Rebecca Schiff and Peter Feaver; in short, many researchers dealt with this issue trying to explain this dilemma and find a healthy path toward the three pillars of CMR but none of them hit the point within the real world.

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