The Role of Chinese Energy Resource Diplomacy Towards Africa

دور دبلوماسية موارد الطاقة الصينية تجاه أفريقيا.

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الملخص:

تسعى هذه الدراسة الى ابراز دور دبلوماسية موارد الطاقة لدى الصين تجاه افريقيا، حيث تعتزم الصين الاستفادة من معاناة إفريقيا من الاستعمار الغربي من خلال توجيه سياستها الخارجية نحو القارة وتعزيز العلاقات مع حكوماتها. كما تسعى إلى ترسيخ نفسها كقوة اقتصادية رئيسية على الساحة العالمية. ونتيجة لذلك، وجه الحزب الشيوعي الصيني في عام 2001 الشركات الوطنية الصينية لاستكشاف الخارج للحصول على إمدادات طويلة الأجل وموثوقة من الموارد الطبيعية مثل الحديد والصلب والنحاس والنفط، كأولوية استراتيجية للحكومة الصينية. ووفقًا لهذه الأوامر، وسعت الشركات الوطنية الصينية عملياتها في جميع أنحاء العالم، من أوروبا إلى أمريكا اللاتينية وأفريقيا. ومع ذلك، أدرك الصينيون بوضوح أن إفريقيا هي القارة الرئيسية الوحيدة التي تحتوي على حقول نفطية لا تديرها بالفعل شركات الطاقة الغربية وبالتالي فهي متاحة للشركات الصينية. وللحصول على هذه الموارد، منحت الصين إفريقيا صفقات مربحة وحاولت معالجة قضاياها الاجتماعية والاقتصادية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: دبلوماسية ؛الصين ؛موارد الطاقة ؛أفريقيا ؛ الاعتماد المتبادل.

Abstract:

China intends to capitalise on Africa's suffering from Western colonialism by directing its foreign policy towards the continent and strengthening ties with its governments. It is also seeking to establish itself as a major economic power on the global scene. As a result, the Chinese Communist Party directed Chinese national businesses to explore abroad for long-term, dependable supply of natural resources such as iron, steel, copper, and oil, as the Chinese government's strategic priority. According to these orders, Chinese national businesses have expanded their operations all over the world, from Europe to Latin America and Africa. However, the Chinese have clearly realised that Africa is the only major continent with oil fields that are not already managed by Western energy companies and hence available to Chinese companies. To gain these resources, China has given Africa lucrative deals and attempted to address its socioeconomic issues.

Keywords: Diplomacy; China; Africa; Energy Resources; Interdependence.

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Introduction:

In recent years, both industrialised and developing countries have made energy security as a policy objective. This is not just because energy resources play such an important part in modern state governance, but also because, with the advent of global trade and globalisation, the global economy has grown increasingly reliant on the availability of energy resources such as crude oil and uranium. Energy security is critical to the global economy as it constitutesa vital input for all economicactivities. Although oil is the world's primary energy source, alternative energy sources such as iron, cobalt, uranium, hydropower, and biofuels are becoming increasingly important for countries looking to diversify their energy supply. Given Africa's vast oil reserves, including Libya, Nigeria, Egypt, Angola, Algeria, and Sudan, as well as additional deposits of natural energy resources such as iron, cobalt, and uranium across the continent, a better understanding of China's growing interest in Africa is required to determine the nature of China's roles on the continent.

China's rise has coincided with its large and growing interest in its economic partners. In this setting, China has attempted to broaden its international investment and trade base. It has also emerged as a key actor in global policy as an international duty, thanks to its dedication to fostering global prosperity through development investments in Africa and other areas.

Despite the significant debate surrounding China's foreign policy and energy diplomacy towards Africa, these problems continue to pique the interest of many study and policy circles throughout the world, as well as the media. As a result, most of the literature on Sino-African relations has centred on determining the nature of this exceptional connection and explaining China's role on the continent. Especially since China's economic rise in the early 1970s has posed a challenge to the United States and other Western nations in Africa. The situation became morecomplex and significant in2010, when China surpassed the United States as Africa's largest commercial partner. This significant achievementdemonstrates China's expanding influence on the African continent.

From this perspective, questions arise about the potential impact of China's increasing reliance on Africa's energy resources on its role on the continent. China's interest in investing in Africa's energy sector could lead to a genuine partnership between the two countries, generating real development opportunities for African economies and improving the living conditions of the continent's people, based on a win-win relationship. On the other hand, Chinese energy influence may deepen dependency and consolidate Chinese hegemony due to the weak economic structures of most African countries. Consequently, the benefits would be unilateral, resulting in a win-lose relationship.

The scientific significance of this topic stems from the critical importance of the debate surrounding China's rise and position in the new international order as a power with significant and growing economic weight in general, as well as China's role in the African continent in particular, and its desire to establish an energy-based partnership. The topic's significance stems also from its novelty as one of the most important current topics of discussion in academic circles within the field of international relations and strategic studies, which is concerned with studying the importance of natural resources and their role in explaining major countries' political behaviour, including China.

The practical importance comes in understanding the nature of the influence of Chinese energy initiatives, which are aimed at ensuring energy security on the African continent. This is to better comprehend the nature of China's participation in Africa at all levels (political, security, economic, social, and environmental), particularly in light of the divisive debate between optimists and pessimists. This is to clarify the vision with the goal of improving African behaviours and policies in order to develop a true relationship with China, which is regulated by it. Win-win relationships and minimising the possibility of loss.

The problematic question; Securing energy resources is a key focus and goal of Chinese foreign policy in Africa. As a result, China's presence and behaviour in the region are driven by its rising energy interests. From this vantage point, questions arise concerning the impact China's growing reliance on Africa's energy resources may have on its involvement in the continent. **To what extent does China's diplomatic pursuit of African energy resources affect its role on the continent?**

-The role analysis approach has been used to investigate China's foreign policy and interactions with African nations. It has also been used to better comprehend the nature of China's global roles, notably in Africa, where Chinese energy activities are on the rise and Chinese influence is expanding.

Section I: Fundamentals of Chinese Energy Diplomacy in Africa:

China seeks to capitalise onAfrica's post-colonialvulnerabilities.by directing its foreign policy towards the continent and strengthening ties with its governments. It is also seeking to establish itself as a major economic power on the global scene. As a result, in 2001, the Chinese Communist Party directed Chinese national businesses to explore abroad for long-term, dependable supply of natural resources such as iron, steel, copper, and oil, as the Chinese government's strategic priority. In compliance with these directions, Chinese national firms have expanded their activities globally, from Europe to Latin America and Africa. However, China has clearly recognisedthat Africa remains the onlymajor continentwith oil fields that are not already managed by Western energy companies and hence available to Chinese companies.[1]

To secure these resources, China has offeredbot Africa lucrative deals and attempted to address its socioeconomic issues. Although African-Chinese relations include political, social, and cultural exchanges, economics and energy have always been and will be the primary focus of these interactions, owing to Africa's massive energy resources, which China requires to finance its industrial programs and build its economy.[2] Furthermore, China seeks access to a market of over 1.5 billion clients for its expanding manufacturing sector. China benefits from Africa's abundant energy resources and large consumer market. This explains China's pattern of embracing resource diplomacy towards Africa, with energy economic diplomacy serving as the primary emphasis of African-Chinese ties.

The conference will discuss the most essential pillars and components of Chinese energy diplomacy towards Africa, focussing on the most critical measures China uses to assure its penetration of the African resource sector. [3]

A) A Brief history:

The current economic slump in China has encouraged Chinese enterprises to look for new markets abroad. With growing production capacity in numerous areas, Chinese

enterprises must seek new markets to maintain growth. The economic recession has also caused a shift in China's international economic policies, since the demand for new markets adds new dimensions to energy security concerns. In 2007, energy diplomacy became an important part of China's diplomatic rhetoric. Chinese diplomatic penetration into Africa dates back to the late 1950s and early 1960s, and it was renewed following the events surrounding the Tiananmen Square incident in June 1989, when African leaders rushed to support Beijing in the face of harsh criticism from the West. Sino-African relations were revitalised after a decade of neglect, when Beijing launched its "socialist modernisation" effort.[4] In response to the perilous international isolation and Western sanctions imposed on China, six southern African nations—Botswana, Lesotho, Zimbabwe, Angola, Zambia, and Mozambique—significantly intensified their efforts to assist China. They invited Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen for a visit on August 1, 1989, to remind China, following the Tiananmen Square events, that Africa served as a valuable ally, particularly amid its conflicts with other global entities and Beijing's ongoing marginalisation of Taiwan.[5]

B) China's Challenge to Liberal Democratic Principles in Africa:

China's increasing interest in Africa coincided with the Western push to propagate the values of liberal democracy and human rights. Indeed, with the conclusion of the Cold War, Africa was swept up in the so-called "third wave of democracy," which was backed by the developed world (although disproportionately). This tendency represents a considerable threat. Current African politicians' unwillingness to compromise. As Philip Snow has pointed out, both Chinese and African elites want to maintain a stance based on shared experience while confronting the common foes of imperialism and neo-imperialism. This self-image of African leaders reveals a significant scepticism about criticising their ruling regimes based on human rights and democratic ideals.[6] The "Western-centric" liberalism that appears when local government records are questioned. In this regard, it is vital to underline China's emphasis on respecting African governments' sovereignty and non-interference in their internal affairs, which stems from its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which have served as the foundation for its foreign policy since the 1950s. [7] Energy diplomacy was not previously prioritised in Chinese public diplomacy, but with China's burgeoning economy and fast increasing demand for imported energy, expanding energy supply routes has become a vital component of China's energy policy.

According to the most recent international energy organisation statistics, China's oil consumption in 2003 topped Japan's for the first time, placing second only to the United States. Despite slowing economic development, China recently accounted for around 43% of the rise in global oil demand from 2009 to 2015, and over half of the increase in demand between 2005 and 2015. These increases compensate for diminishing demand/consumption elsewhere during the same period, as the United States decreased its oil consumption by 1.3 million barrels per day, while advanced economies reduced Others consume 2.9 million barrels of oil every day. According to forecasts, Chinese demand for oil may accelerate, potentially resulting in a major increase in oil prices.[8] This is because Americans' purchases and sales of oil and petroleum products on the worldwide market, as well as global demand expectations, all have an impact on the profitability of American oil producers and the expenses borne by American consumers.

The research, which is based on the global link between Economic Development and Oil Demand, depicts the potential for increased Chinese oil demand, as well as the opportunities and problems that this presents for producers and consumers in the US. 2 Given the strategic importance of oil, global oil production hubs have become the target of competition from a variety of multinational players. Competition for oil will be strong, driven by each country's need to survive and grow. As a result, China will suffer enormous pressure. With competition for oil resources intensifying, ensuring oil security will grow more challenging in the future. [9]In an effort to meet the rapidly expanding Chinese economy's demand for energy resources, the Chinese government has begun to encourage the development of a national oil security supply system based on indigenous oil reserves and diverse sources of imported oil. This entails minimising China's reliance on a single oil-producing region and transit route.

All of these elements. Energy resources have become a crucial problem in China's expansion into Africa, accounting for the majority of China's investment and diplomatic efforts. As a result, energy diplomacy has emerged as a critical component of the country's broader diplomatic strategy. Indeed, in recent years, technology has played a significant role in summit diplomacy. At the same time, the diplomatic aspects of China's key energy institutions' foreign actions have become more apparent. In March 2006, the People's Republic of China's Eleventh Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development clearly stated the following: expanding the scope of international oil and gas development cooperation on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, actively participating in the international energy system, fully utilising the international market, and ensuring China's energy supply security .[10]

At the G8 summit in St. Petersburg in July 2006, Chinese President Hu Jintao stated that "the core content of China's energy strategy is to maintain the highest priority for energy utilisation, focus on domestic conditions, engage in diversified development, protect the environment, strengthen mutually beneficial international cooperation, and undertake efforts to build a stable, economical, and clean energy supply system." We will strengthen our collaboration with all energy producing and consuming countries on the basis of equality and mutual benefit." and the shared advantage of ensuring global energy security. "[11]

Section II: The Oil as a crucial aspect in Chinese diplomacy towards Africa:

The aforementioned documents and speeches all represent the necessary conditions for strategic energy diplomacy in relation to China's national energy strategy. Although China's diplomatic efforts are primarily focused on enhancing the country's energy and resource security, several fundamental ideas guide its approach to international relations. These ideas are critical to understanding China's recent diplomatic successes in oil-rich developing countries, particularly in Africa. China's involvement policy on the continent is still founded on the premise of "not being subject to political considerations," as well as the incentives it offers. China's financial cooperation is consistent with the country's longstanding foreign policy tradition of not interfering in sovereign governments' domestic affairs.[12] As a result, China has emphasised a rhetorical tone that includes respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, which has resonated with many Africans, because its policy of non-interference has been accepted by many African leaders for obvious reasons, and has been welcomed by many

Africans who consider the principles of Western attitudes towards human rights, economic liberalisation, and democracy to be lofty and dualistic. In contrast, the lack of conditionality or extensive consultation associated with Chinese aid and financing enables projects to be done fast, with clear and often immediate effects. Most crucially, while Sino-African ties have a strong historical foundation and reach, founded on the principle of "non-interference," it may be argued that the economic motivation has now taken precedence.[13]

Beijing's employment of ideological cover is crucial to its oil diplomacy and diplomatic ties, thus there is no contradiction in their behaviour. Ultimately, it is an appealing concept for many African leaders.

However, China's specific interest in and focus on African oil, along with its stated lack of involvement in African countries' internal affairs, raises significant concerns. Perhaps the most striking paradox is that China's desire of greater integration into the global economy, as well as its dedication to the rules of the game, are mostly governed by Western rules (as seen by its participation in the World Trade Organisation). Global), as well as its efforts to strengthen relations with African countries, including the establishment of the China-Africa Cooperation Forum in 2000, in order to confront new challenges and protect legitimate interests, as these are the most prominent common issues that both China and African countries are considering at the start of the twenty-first century.

Indeed, several African countries say that Sino-African ties should be adapted to the new scenario by building high-level communication structures.[14] On a broader scale, such as the US-Africa Business Forum, the Commonwealth Conference, the Franco-African Summit, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development, and the Europe-Africa Summit, as well as strengthening bilateral contacts on issues of common interest like peace and development.2 These links are being constructed in part to promote standards that Beijing considers repugnant to Chinese sensitivities, even as China's economic and political influence in the world grows dramatically.[15]

This paradox underlines the general contradiction in Chinese foreign policy between its desire of involvement in the global economy on the one hand and its firm stance on certain of the principles that underpin the existing global order on the other. This has produced challenges for Beijing because it has been increasingly accused of turning a blind eye to authoritarianism and corruption (an accusation that appears to be given China's rising energy interests in Africa, there are growing concerns regarding the nature of its participation there and elsewhere.[16] Aware of the potential negative consequences of its rising economic participation in developing countries (especially where access to resources plays a big role), China has It has spared no diplomatic effort to highlight the goodwill and mutual benefits of increased economic ties. As a result, Beijing's rhetoric about its rising engagement in these regions focusses on fostering world peace and creating and establishing a new, just, and equitable political and economic order by strengthening cooperation among developing countries.

This viewpoint definitely connects China's interactions with the Third World to the larger Chinese discourse on peaceful development and a harmonious world, as well as Hu Jintao's legacy of party theory, which today characterises China's foreign policy as that of a rising power. This would emphasise China's position as a Third Way, in contrast to the United

States' limited engagement in Africa (the narrow pursuit of resource diplomacy) and the European Union's multifaceted engagement. The European Union and the United States of America have economic, political, and military relations.) China's intervention is aimed to alleviate any concerns raised by unbalanced power relations.

In truth, the ideal foundations of Beijing's policy towards Africa are largely owing to what may be described as "China's exceptionalism" in relation to conventional donors. Despite China's overall economic presence on the continent Although Africa continues to trail behind traditional powers, the gap has been steadily closing over the last decade, with China becoming a key commercial partner for Africa in 2009. Furthermore, Beijing has gained significant influence in this region through all of its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic initiatives, including the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 and China's Africa Policy Paper (2006), which supported... China has significantly increased its soft power on the continent.

In addition to establishing a multilateral cooperation forum, Beijing has sought to strengthen ties with Africa by reinvigorating its participation in both the African Development Bank (of which China has been a member since 1985) and the African Union, as well as establishing the China-Africa Development Fund to finance the Chinese continent in 2007. This new reality has sparked worry in both the United States and the EU. This is especially true given how long this continent has been under its influence. This is attributable not only to economic competitiveness, but also to China's unique strategy of "zero conditionality and no strings attached," which differs from previous donors' conditional cooperation methods. As a result, China's promotion of the aforementioned programs can be regarded as an attempt by Beijing to assuage growing concern among developed countries about China's involvement in these regions. In this context, it was clear that the main concerns were the increasing volume of resource exports from these regions to China, as well as the growing and rapidly expanding interests of Chinese national companies in resource sectors that were previously exclusive to Western companies. In this backdrop, China has made soft power a significant component of its strategy with developing countries, particularly in Africa. The employment of soft power in Africa is primarily motivated by economic and diplomatic interests.[17]

The primary economic motivations behind China's interest in Africa are the preparation for membership into the World Trade Organisation, the need for natural resources, and the desire to develop a diverse trade system. [18]

At the same time, Beijing seeks to position itself as a "politically attractive" partner for African countries, as opposed to imperialist powers. China intends to promote and justify the creation of a positive and peaceful international environment, particularly in light of its emergence as a military and economic power, by demonstrating its ability to actively contribute to the continent's pacification process and its willingness to work with other powers on conflict resolution.

Beijing aspires to improve its image as a responsible power committed to supporting peace on the African continent. In this new, enlarged era of Chinese engagement in Africa, China has prioritised soft power. [19]As its involvement in the continent grows, it may be forced to reconsider some of its approaches to both hard and soft (soft) power.[20] This will provide substantial issues for underdeveloped countries. African countries have fragile and

less legitimate administrations, especially given the growing importance of parallel non-state actors.

Section III : Chinese loans and assistance to Africa.

The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and China have distinct perspectives on help. Official development aid (ODA) was defined by the OECD in 1960 as resource transfers from one government to another or from a government to an international organisation like the United Nations that are carried out with the intention of advancing the welfare and economic development of developing nations. China, a non-OECD member, uses the "Eight Principles" to characterise its help. These eight guiding principles for Chinese international aid were put forth by State Council Premier Zhou Enlai following a number of trips to Latin American, Asian, and African nations in the early 1960s.[21]

Through the use of low-interest or interest-free loans and a commitment to upholding their sovereignty and independence, these ideas describe China's pursuit of foreign aid as a way to build mutually beneficial relationships with other "poor" nations. Although the Eight Principles-based concept is quite similar to the OECD's definition of aiding in the "economic development and welfare of developing countries," China also distributes aid for political or other objectives. Additionally, it does not always offer grants equal to at least 25% of official development assistance, as required by the OECD criteria.

The Ministry of Finance and the Chinese Information Office proposed the following assistance classification thresholds in their 2011 "White Paper" on Foreign assistance Policy, which was released by the Chinese government: Grants: This covers funding for the construction of schools, hospitals, and homes. Low-cost projects, water supply projects, and other small and medium-sized social welfare initiatives, together with technical cooperation, emergency help, in-kind assistance, and collaboration in the area of human resources development.

- Interest-free loans have been given to developing nations with strong economies, and they cover things like public utilities and projects aimed at improving people's quality of life. Large and medium-sized infrastructure projects that have positive social and economic effects are included in preferred or concessional financing. The desire for more specific information from the international community is growing as a result of the restricted availability of actual data on China's foreign aid program. Observing the outcomes of Beijing-initiated projects in areas like Africa and Asia, which now receive the great majority of China's humanitarian aid, has provided the most trustworthy information to date.[22]
- The second white paper on Chinese international aid, issued in 2014 by the Chinese State Council, outlined measures to improve Chinese foreign aid by focussing on the most critical areas connected to:
- Assistance in raising people's living standards through agricultural development, education, medical and health services, public health infrastructure, and humanitarian relief.
- Promoting economic and social development by developing infrastructure, increasing capacity, facilitating trade expansion, and strengthening environmental protection.

Oil is an important part of China's rising influence in Africa. As a result, China has adopted a policy of "aid to serve its oil strategy," with the biggest beneficiaries being oil-rich African countries like Angola and Sudan. As a result, China has made significant investments in each

of them to develop their infrastructure. It is worth mentioning that the strategy of gaining access to essential goods (resources) in exchange for guaranteed financing, which has been used in Africa, is not solely Chinese in origin. This mechanism has existed since the early to mid-1990s.[23]

This is related to the African setting, which is marked by a shortage of capital and low creditworthiness in most African countries. Nonetheless, it provides a solid foundation as a supply of basic commodities and primary resources. The formula was developed. For the first time in London, a large number of Western private banking institutions (British, French, Dutch, and later South African) came together to mitigate the risks of lending to African governments rich in energy resources (such as Angola and Nigeria) or to finance specific mining projects on the continent (such as the Lumwana Copper Mine in Zambia and the gold mine in Tanzania).

The primary difference in the Chinese model is that the permitted financing mechanism is totally government-originated, linking the Beijing government, its bank regulations, and the resources of its state-owned enterprises.[24]

Furthermore, while regular commodity-backed financial loans are secured against mining or oil exports regardless of the off-taker or final destination, in the Chinese model they are either secured by the export of oil to China or, in the case of a mining deal, the company China is usually the off-taker. Furthermore, the entry of Chinese resource corporations into Africa appears to be closely related to the rise of this sort of loan in a number of nations. Examining the changing patterns of Chinese infrastructure-for-resource funding in Africa over the last decade, two different periods of this method emerge, separated by the global economic crisis of late 2008. The initial recipients of Chinese economic cooperation on the continent were oil-rich African countries such as Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria. Only later did China begin to engage with mineral resource producers such as Gabon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Zambia, following the same strategy of subsidising infrastructure in exchange for mining supplies and equity shares. African nations see China as an attractive partner because it will undertake large-scale infrastructure projects without the Paris Club and Bretton Woods institutions' criteria for transparency and enhanced governance.

China has aggressively strengthened its collaboration with African countries through the Forum on China-Africa collaboration (FOCAC), gradually increasing its aid to the continent and actively supporting the overall development of its relations with the region. China has prioritised agricultural growth and paid close attention to its agricultural cooperation with Africa. Between 2010 and 2012, China created 14 agricultural technology demonstration centres and is planning or constructing eight more. China has also dispatched a big number of agricultural professionals to Africa to promote technical cooperation, training over 5,000 agricultural technicians in various African countries. During the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in July 2012, the Chinese government pledged to help Africa build more agricultural technology demonstration centres, improve technical training and promotion, and assist African countries in improving their food production, processing, storage, and marketing capacities. As previously stated, the framework of these cooperation agreements (which provide infrastructure in exchange for resources) has It started with Angola, which was the first to accept a big loan from China to help rebuild the country

after nearly three decades of ethnic and racial conflict.[25]

In early 2004, the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM Bank China) inked an initial $2 billion infrastructure contract. The concessional loans were secured by oil sales (equal to 10,000 barrels of oil per day) from Sonagol (ANPA) to a SINOPEC subsidiary, as well as sources of up to 70% of Chinese firms, equipment, and labour.

Although the infrastructure to be created with the Ex-Im Bank of China credit line is not directly related to oil exploration operations situated primarily outside, the agreement prepared the ground for China to enter the Angolan oil industry.

This arrangement was also accompanied by the rapid entry of Chinese construction companies into Angola, constructing their first assets in the Angolan oil industry while the financing was secured. However, a disagreement between Beijing and Luanda over the construction of a refinery weakened their relationship in 2007. Despite signing billions of dollars in additional loans with the Export-Import Bank of China and the Caribbean Development Bank (CDB) for infrastructure and agricultural development in 2010, the Chinese petrochemical company SINOPEC was only able to acquire more assets in the Angolan oil industry after extending Chinese commercial loans from Sonagol from 2013 to 2015. Nigeria, under the leadership of Obasanjo Olegun, likewise implemented the infrastructure-for-oil scheme. SINOPEC signed annual contracts with the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation to deliver 100,000 barrels per day, while China Petrochemical Corporation (CPC) received annual contracts for 30,000 barrels per day. [26] In fact, Chinese oil corporations Sinopec and CNOOC (CNPC) obtained their first holdings in Nigeria's oil sector during President Obasanjo's final years in office (2005-2007), in exchange for participation in large infrastructure projects. China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) invested $2 billion to rehabilitate the Kaduna oil refinery, established the Lagos-Kano railway (1350 km), and funded the construction of Mambilla station. The Mambilla hydroelectric station was funded by the Export-Import Bank of China ($2.5 billion) and partially supported by Nigerian oil firms. After the 2007 elections, Yar'Adua Musa Umaru halted the majority of Chinese oil exploration contracts agreed under Obasanjo's presidency. Similarly, Chinese interests in Sudan faced significant challenges following South Sudan's split and independence in 2011. Later, Chinese interactions with African mineral producers began, based on similar agreements aiming at financing mining projects and accompanying infrastructure in exchange for mining concessions and mineral supplies, which were inked with Gabon and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

In 2006, the Gabonese government granted a Chinese consortium led by a construction business (China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation (CMEC)) the license to develop the Belinga mine, which it claims holds one of the world's largest undeveloped iron ore resources. 1 The Export-Import Bank of China financed the agreement, which was worth $3 billion. The project will be funded by Belinga mine exploration revenues and will include the construction of a new 560-kilometer railway line connecting Belinga to the Transgabonais railway, the establishment of a deepwater mining port in Santa Clara, a hydroelectric dam, and a steel mill in exchange for exploration rights through the establishment of a joint electric power company, 75% of which will be owned by the Chinese, as well as Purchase pledge rights. China inked a similar agreement with the Democratic Republic of the Congo in

September 2007, providing an initial loan of $5 billion, which was later extended to $9 billion in January 2008. According to the deal, $6 billion would be committed in the first phase to repair and expand infrastructure, with $3 billion going towards mineral exploration. The projects comprise a 3,400-kilometer roadway, a railway line, and another railway line. Katanga's mining province is connected to the port of Matadi at the mouth of the Congo River by a 3,200-kilometer railway; 31 hospitals, 145 health centres, two universities, and 5,000 housing units are under development.[27]

China has historically prioritised infrastructure development and construction in Africa. The Tanzania-Zambia Railway is a watershed moment in China's early efforts to strengthen cross-border infrastructure in Africa. Following its completion, China has constantly supplied technical assistance for railway operation and management. From 2010 to 2012, China completed 86 economic infrastructure projects on the African continent.[28] China announced in 2012 that it would form a transnational and transregional infrastructure cooperation partnership with African countries, providing assistance with project planning and feasibility studies while also encouraging capable Chinese companies and financial institutions to participate in project construction. However, despite China's eagerness to provide cheaper, unconditional loans and its willingness to embrace large infrastructure projects neglected by Western donors, which represents a valuable competitive advantage for Chinese companies in Africa (to help them compensate for their continent's backward position in comparison to Western countries), it has not always produced the desired results. This is the case in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, where project construction has been stalled due to pressure from conventional funders to renegotiate the contract and modify and lower the loan to US$6 billion in 2009, at Kinshasa's request. Furthermore, the new contract signed in 2009 has only partially taken effect, as the majority of the loan has not been issued pending clearance by the appropriate authorities on both sides.[29] In Gabon, the Belinga project has been frequently postponed owing to ongoing problems (labour and environmental difficulties), and efforts have been made to renegotiate the contract, which civil society believes is favourable to China. [30]

Global commodity price swings, as well as changes in the domestic political climate (with Omar Bongo's death), have added new risks and expenses for the Chinese . China's aggressive pursuit of this sort of diplomacy (oil diplomacy) without regard for the worries and preoccupations of the international community may benefit China in the near term, but it may cost it in the long run, diminishing its future advantages to the continent.[31] This condition may assist the African continent as well, but it may also have unintended consequences and effects, as detailed in the last chapter.

As a result, China must exercise extreme caution in continuing and advancing this type of oil diplomacy on the African continent. Beijing must consider numerous things, including Washington's concerns, especially considering what they reflect. A major part of the worldwide community shares the same worries as the United States.

Conclusion:

China has used a peaceful ascent and soft power perspective to strengthen its relations with Africa, transitioning from a logic of ideological commitment during the Cold War to a logic of economic interests, especially after the Cold War's end.

-China suffered a substantial imbalance in energy demand and production, becoming the world's largest oil importer, particularly after 1993. As a result, it incorporated energy security into its grand strategy, which focused on reducing foreign energy dependence and diversifying energy providers in order to minimise energy insecurity. As a result of its vast energy assets, Africa has emerged as a priority in Chinese foreign policy.

-China has used "resource diplomacy" to increase its penetration of African energy resources by extending trade ties on the continent, particularly with resource-rich nations. Furthermore, it has attempted to increase its investments in Africa, particularly in infrastructure, public works, and agriculture, in order to secure additional concessions in the African energy industry. China has been and continues to dramatically increase its energy investments in Africa, as well as generously providing loans, grants, and other trade benefits to the continent to support its seamless access to resources.

As a result, China's discourse on "non-interference" with other countries is likely to shift.

-Furthermore, particularly in the search for energy resources, which are increasingly required to build their economies, as well as their residents seeking shelter abroad, they must modify their strategy for dealing with the outside world.

The international struggle over African energy resources by international actors such as the United States, Western European countries, and emerging nations poses a serious threat to energy security on the African continent, which has become a preferred arena for international competition, due to the various strategies these actors use to dominate the energy sector.

-Chinese energy security in Africa faces security problems, which may have an influence on Chinese energy activity in energy-rich countries.

This is due to the continent's ongoing military conflicts, which have resulted in attacks against Chinese oil sites.

- China continues to extract raw materials and energy resources from Africa while flooding the African market with low-cost manufactured goods, hindering African countries' industrialisation.

It is important to note that the only option to address Africa's social and economic issues is to prioritise intra-African commerce. However, it may appear difficult for Africa to do so at this time because, on the one hand, it will continue to be strongly dependent on China and will be unable to function without it.

-China, on the other hand, will continue to be obsessed with energy security challenges, such as meeting its energy demands and guaranteeing steady clients for its manufacturing industries, as African countries are.

The chapters of this paper show that China's foreign policy towards Africa is shifting in response to its economy's urgent need for energy resources. Given the ongoing internal disputes in several African countries, this shift in China's foreign policy may pose a danger to Africans in the future.

As a result, China risks supporting authoritarian regimes that prioritise national elitesinterests overcitizens' rights and socioeconomic progress.

China can also achieve this through military intervention, such as giving or selling weapons to African regimes who use them against their own people or to various opposing factions, as demonstrated in the previous chapter.

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