

The United States of America's doctrine of intervention in international conflicts prior/ post the Gulf War

مبدأ تدخل الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية في النزاعات الدولية قبل وبعد حرب الخليج

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الملخص:

يهدف هذا المقال إلى استكشاف مبدأ التدخل في النزاعات الدولية وفق ما تمارسه الولايات المتحدة الأمريكية، كما تقوم الدراسة بتحليل المبادئ الأساسية والدوافع والمبررات التي توجه تدخلات الولايات المتحدة، مع مراعاة مجموعة من العوامل كمصالح الأمن القومي، تعزيز الديمقراطية وحقوق الإنسان، الحفاظ على الاستقرار العالمي ومدى تعارض ذلك مع قواعد القانون الدولي؛ بالإضافة إلى ذلك، تُقيم الورقة فعالية وآثار التدخلات الأمريكية، بما في ذلك تأثيرها على البلدان المستهدفة والاستقرار الإقليمي، والتصورات العالمية للسياسة الخارجية الأمريكية، من خلال دراسات الحالة قبل وبعد حرب الخليج والتحليلات العلمية.

الكلمات المفتاحية: مبدأ التدخل، الأمن القومي، حقوق الإنسان، الديمقراطية، القانون الدولي.

Abstract:

This analysis investigates the United States' history of intervention in international conflicts, examining the motivations, justifications, and legal implications of these actions. The study explores how U.S. interventionism is shaped by factors like national security interests, the promotion of democracy and human rights, and the maintenance of global stability, considering the potential conflict with international law. The effectiveness of these interventions is assessed, exploring the impact on targeted countries, regional stability, and global perceptions of American foreign policy through a close examination of case studies both before and after the Gulf War, as well as by referencing scholarly analyses.

Key words: The principle of intervention, national security, human rights, democracy, international law.

Introduction:

During the Cold War, the United States used development aid as a tool in its fight against communism, showing little remorse for its political motivations. However, when it came to providing emergency relief, the principle of neutrality was typically upheld. In the 1990s, US foreign policy evolved, leading to the exploration of leveraging humanitarian aid for specific political goals. Examples include directing aid intended for famine relief to North Korea in hopes of influencing its decisions and providing aid selectively in Serbia to support opposition groups in Belgrade¹. The proposed approach sparked resistance from numerous American NGOs and some government-linked humanitarian groups. In the post-Cold War era, governments grappled with balancing humanitarian goals with established security interests, creating a complex situation for international relations scholars. Traditional security analysts often neglect the role of humanitarian motivations in justifying interventions. Instead, they attribute U.S. involvement in conflicts like Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo to a range of other factors, including idealistic aspirations, responses to immediate crises, or efforts to promote stability and bolster NATO's legitimacy².

Constructivists, legal scholars, and policy analysts increasingly uphold humanitarianism as a legitimate rationale for governmental actions. They highlight the expanding framework of humanitarian treaties, standards, and laws, along with global activist networks collaborating to sway decision-makers and public opinion towards endorsing these interventions. For this cohort of scholars, the puzzle lies in understanding why humanitarianism yields varied outcomes. Despite established rules and norms, humanitarian principles are often flouted. The Rwandan tragedy illustrates that humanitarian concerns don't consistently lead to interventions or uniform responses³. With the conclusion of the Cold War, many foreign policy analysts anticipated a return to isolationism for the United States. The argument was that without the need to counter the Soviet Union, Americans would naturally focus inward. However, those predictions have proven incorrect. Throughout the 1990s, the United States continued to assert itself as a key player on the global stage, maintaining military bases worldwide and frequently engaging in military interventions. The 9/11 attacks further solidified this trend. Presently, politicians from both parties view the deployment of military forces as a customary aspect of international relations⁴.

This is what happened in the invasion of Iraq under the pretext that it possessed weapons of mass destruction, which is a weak excuse to eliminate Saddam Hussein's regime, as the US Congress authorized the use of military force against Iraq under Public Law N° 107-243⁵. As Distinguished Democrats urged the United States to employ military intervention to halt the mass atrocities in Darfur, Sudan. In 2007, then-Senator Joe Biden, now serving as President, urged the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, stating, "I would use American force now... I believe it's not only time to refrain from taking force off the table. I think it's time to place force on the table and utilize it"⁶. **If international military intervention becomes acceptable whenever the international community deems a national government ineffective in responding to human disasters? Is intervention in sovereign states justified for humanitarian purposes, and if so, what considerations should balance the principle of humanitarian intervention with pragmatic considerations? Here we can answer to these questions in some points as follow:**

I- Pragmatic principles of Humanitarian intervention in the politics of United States of America amidst non-intervention doctrine in international law.

The current state of humanitarian intervention appears bleak, with major candidate states like the United States, Britain, France, and others unlikely to intervene or only

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intervening in small nations, particularly former colonies or nearby areas. The alternative formula of ad hoc multinational military forces directed by the UN faces significant obstacles, including potential vetoes from permanent Security Council members and opposition from numerous countries in the General Assembly. Even if these hurdles are overcome, assembling such forces often leads to delays and poorly organized efforts, rendering them ineffective⁷.

A potential third approach involves regional organizations directing existing military forces drawn from the area, such as the EU deploying a force from its member states to address ethnic conflicts in regions like the Balkans. However, this approach may face redundancy, particularly with NATO already possessing similar capabilities. As debates around US foreign policy continue, questions arise regarding its direction under President Obama's leadership and the potential articulation of a distinct foreign policy doctrine. Despite various policy actions, a framework of moral pragmatism appears consistent under the Obama administration, evident in approaches such as drone strikes in the Afghan war⁸. So is this consistent with Non-Intervention Doctrine in international law?

1- Non-Intervention Doctrine in International Law

The Peace Treaty of Westphalia (1648) stands as a pivotal moment in European history. It ushered in a new era where independent states, with solidified sovereignty, became the dominant power structure. This shift away from the centralized model of the middle Ages emphasized non-interference between these states. Initially, the use of force was guided by the concept of "Just War." However, this concept gradually transformed into a state's inherent right to wage war for any reason, essentially eliminating the need for justification. The League of Nations, established in 1919, introduced the first significant restrictions on this right. It recognized self-defense as a legitimate exception to the use of force, even in the absence of an explicit prohibition. However, attempts to completely outlaw war in 1928 proved unsuccessful due to a lack of clear guidelines regarding lesser acts of violence. Finally, the United Nations, founded in 1945, brought much-needed clarity to the norms of state sovereignty. The UN Charter explicitly forbids attacks on a state's political independence and territorial integrity, and strictly limits interventions in internal affairs⁹.

Where the principle of non-intervention occupies a central role in international law, yet its precise contours remain a subject of debate. Questions linger regarding its reach, particularly whether it applies to all forms of external influence or solely to more substantial interventions like military action. Additionally, its interaction with other core principles like self-determination, domestic non-interference, and the prohibition of force requires further clarification. Notably, the interconnectedness of non-intervention and the ban on using force is particularly pronounced in both international and non-international armed conflicts. This connection was underscored by the United Nations General Assembly in resolutions 2625 (1970) and 3314 (1974), and also through the rulings of the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua and Armed Activities situations¹⁰.

The UN Charter enshrines non-intervention as a cornerstone principle, reflecting the sovereign equality of all member states. Articles 2(1), 2(4), and 2(7) explicitly prohibit threats or use of force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence. Exceptions to this rule are limited to collective security actions authorized by the Security Council (Article 42) and the inherent right of self-defense (Article 51). Although the Charter recognizes the importance of human rights, it doesn't authorize individual states to use force for humanitarian intervention. This view aligns with rulings from the International Court of Justice, which have

consistently rejected the notion of a unilateral right to intervene militarily for humanitarian reasons. The Court emphasizes that force is not a legitimate tool for enforcing human rights. Consequently, the Charter creates an inherent tension between state sovereignty and the need for humanitarian action. Currently, there's no universally accepted legal framework for the international community to undertake humanitarian intervention¹¹.

The Charter, while appearing self-contradictory, acknowledges the crucial concept of state sovereignty. Article 2(7) of the Charter states that nothing within it authorizes the United Nations to intervene in matters essentially within a state's domestic jurisdiction, nor requires members to submit such matters for settlement under the Charter; however, this principle does not affect the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII. This creates an evident conflict: the Charter advocates for human rights protections and grants the Security Council the authority to use force when international peace and security are threatened, yet states are protective of their autonomy. Consequently, the UN's role remains ambiguous, leading to significant legal debate¹².

Enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the principle of non-intervention stands as a cornerstone of state sovereignty. It affirms the fundamental right of states to govern their internal affairs without undue external influence. This principle serves as bedrock of international relations, fostering stability and mutual respect among nations¹³.

However, Military intervention, according to the United States Department of Defense (2005), refers to deliberate actions by one or more nations involving the deployment of military forces in response to ongoing disputes or political conflicts. Since the Cold War, there has been a significant increase in military interventions aimed at humanitarian aid, conflict resolution, and peacekeeping efforts. These interventions may involve traditional troop deployments or unconventional actions such as disaster relief missions, like the U.S. assistance in Honduras after a devastating hurricane in the 1990s. However, military interventions can also be controversial, especially when used to intervene in unresolved conflicts or when neighboring countries conduct military training near borders, potentially threatening sovereignty. In the context of Ukraine, Russia's military intervention in eastern Ukraine, where separatist groups operate, is legally permitted if requested by Ukraine's government under international law. The legitimacy of military intervention often hinges on whether a government facing internal conflict is recognized internationally and is seen as having a legitimate authority¹⁴.

Whereas, unilateral intervention involves a state coercing another state to act against its free will, threatening the autonomy of its people. The legal nature of such intervention is debated among scholars, who variously describe it as prohibited, a negative principle, a right, a positive duty, or a negative duty. The 2019 Draft Conclusions on jus cogens norms emphasize that these norms reflect fundamental values of the international community, are hierarchically superior to other international laws, and must be widely accepted by states. While the UN Charter is not the "Constitution of the international community," it embodies principles vital for international peace and security, particularly sovereign equality (Article 2(1)) and peaceful settlement of disputes (Article 2(3)). These principles bind states to refrain from intervention and the use of force, except in self-defense (Article 51). The prohibition of force (Article 2(4)) and the binding nature of "shall" reinforce non-intervention as a general rule in international law, though Article 2(7) as a customary principle remains contentious¹⁵.

2- Exploring the Complexity of US Foreign Policy Doctrine towards international conflicts.

Discussions surrounding presidential doctrines in foreign policy may seem somewhat

outdated given the rapidly evolving global landscape and the diverse array of threats and opportunities facing US interests in the 21st century. With the demise of the Cold War and the disappearance of the singular threat of global communism, the past decade has witnessed a proliferation of disparate and complex challenges, rendering US foreign policy both less secure and increasingly precarious. In such a dynamic environment, the notion of a single foreign policy doctrine, even within specific policy realms like the use of force, appears challenging to conceptualize. Moreover, attributing the formulation of a doctrine solely to a single political actor risks oversimplifying the complex and multifaceted nature of foreign policy decision-making within a competitive and intricate apparatus¹⁶.

During the first two decades of the Cold War, the United States maintained a largely coherent and unified foreign policy aimed at establishing a U.S.-dominated "international liberal order." Despite occasional defeats, such as the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war in October 1949, the fundamental goals of limiting Soviet influence and preventing the spread of Communism were consistently pursued. Most studies of Henry Kissinger depict him as a key advocate of continental European realism, which gained popularity in Cold War America. This view suggests that Kissinger aimed to remove the extreme moral and ideological aspects that characterized the Cold War. Historian Walter Russell Mead noted that Kissinger saw the United States and the Soviet Union as merely "two great powers like Prussia and Austria"¹⁷.

As for the Gulf War¹⁸, The United States' decision to engage in war with Iraq has been criticized as driven by interests in "oil and jobs," raising questions about the value placed on human lives. Despite advocating against using war to resolve conflicts in regions like Central America, the Bush administration pursued military action against Iraq. The war's devastating impact on human lives, politics, economy, culture, and the environment remains to be fully assessed. Critics argue that the U.S. did not exhaust all diplomatic and peaceful options before resorting to military force and accuse the administration of using intimidation and stereotypical rhetoric. Furthermore, the U.S. is seen as hypocritical for demanding Iraq's unconditional withdrawal while ignoring similar aggression by other countries. The war was perceived as defending regimes contrary to American principles of democracy and justice, leading to accusations of duplicity and selective application of these values. David Hackworth, a decorated Army colonel, highlighted this inconsistency by noting the absence of influential figures' relatives in the conflict. History is expected to judge the U.S. harshly for its actions¹⁹.

Nevertheless, As far as the post gulf war situation is concerned, despite the complexities and uncertainties, there remains a desire for clarity and decisiveness in US foreign policy, often symbolized by a president Obama articulating a distinct foreign policy doctrine. President Obama, like his predecessors, seeks to leave a lasting imprint on US foreign affairs. Despite criticism regarding the coherence of the Obama administration's foreign policy approach, a discernible doctrine has indeed emerged one characterized by moral pragmatism. This doctrine, while perhaps lacking a catchy slogan, provides a systematic framework that aligns with Obama's political style and aims to advance US moral interests and values through practical and technocratic solutions to international challenges²⁰. However the national interest is the first concern even for Trump and Biden.

3- Pragmatic technique of US Doctrine towards international conflicts.

According to the American trend, there is a necessity for a new pragmatic standard for interventions, based on three key "pillars." Firstly, the presence of mass murder; secondly, the

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assessment of intervention's cost in terms of lives lost; and thirdly, the potential for intervention to lead to lasting peace. In the case of Syria, US proclaimed that the mass murder has been ongoing for years under the Assad regime, leading to the Syrian civil war. However, the immense challenge of intervening without significant loss of life, especially considering the complex dynamics of the ongoing civil conflict and the risk of appearing biased towards one side. Furthermore, US argues that Syria's vast size and diverse demography make achieving lasting peace through intervention highly improbable²¹.

Despite the practical hurdles, including legal, diplomatic, and logistical obstacles, some regional experts stress a moral obligation to intervene as hundreds of Syrians face daily violence and displacement. This approach is not only pragmatic but also ethical, asserting that aiding strangers is a moral imperative as long as it aligns with other moral commitments²². There are two ethical considerations for the US president when contemplating intervention in Syria: the protection of US armed forces and the potential for exacerbating the situation for Syrians. Significant US troop casualties would weaken the military's ability to fulfill its own responsibilities and that intervention could lead to Syria becoming ungovernable chaos²³.

Various factors influence the decision to intervene in humanitarian crises, including the media, since the media in general should have a strong influence on States' decision to intervene for humanitarian purposes. It disseminates information on the humanitarian situation in a State as a result of armed conflicts and disseminate information on universally accepted humanitarian goals and principles, which form in whole the basis of the resolutions adopted by various United Nations agencies within the overall humanitarian framework. The Western media, however, is selective, may promote lies or practise intimidation to serve political agendas, including some private corporate channels including CNN.

The "CNN effect," domestic politics, national self-interest, and the nature of the crisis itself. The CNN effect, driven by repetitive television coverage, can shape public perception and support for intervention. For example, the lack of media coverage of the genocide in Rwanda contributed to the international community's failure to intervene. Conversely, coverage of crises in Somalia, Kosovo, and East Timor spurred intervention efforts. In some cases, such as East Timor and Bosnia, public support influenced government decisions to intervene²⁴.

Public support for intervention often hinges on perceptions of atrocities, such as reports of rape during the Bosnian conflict, which can mobilize public sentiment in favor of intervention. Domestic politics and public opinion also exert significant influence on leaders' decisions to engage in humanitarian intervention. For instance, President Clinton's decision to intervene in Haiti and Bosnia was influenced by public opinion and election cycles, with interventions timed strategically to boost his approval ratings before elections. Conversely, the lack of public support and the political risks associated with intervention, as seen in the case of Rwanda, can deter leaders from taking action, especially when elections loom²⁵.

National self-interest also shapes decisions regarding intervention. While humanitarian concerns may factor into foreign policy, they are often subordinate to broader national interests. Presidential Decision Directive 25 underscores that while humanitarian intervention can serve US interests, it should not overshadow other strategic priorities. This pragmatic approach reflects the understanding that interventions must align with broader national objectives, balancing humanitarian concerns with strategic imperatives²⁶. "Given Rwanda's absence of significant natural resources and geopolitical strategic importance, alongside

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considerations such as PDD 25 and other factors previously mentioned, it became challenging to justify any form of intervention solely on humanitarian grounds." ²⁷ .

The intervention decisions of the USA in Bosnia, Haiti, and East Timor were influenced by various factors beyond purely humanitarian concerns. In Bosnia, the aim was to redefine NATO's role post-Warsaw Pact dissolution, while in Haiti, it was driven by the need to stem refugee flows and maintain regional stability, particularly concerning US interests under the pretext of intervening for democracy. Similarly, Australia's intervention in East Timor was motivated by considerations of natural resources, regional stability, and economic interests with Western states. The severity and scale of the humanitarian crisis also play a significant role in determining intervention likelihood, with larger and more egregious human rights violations often prompting action²⁸. While international law acknowledges the responsibility to intervene when a state fails to protect its citizens, practical considerations frequently override purely moral arguments for intervention. Despite widespread endorsement of UN human rights declarations, states often prioritize pragmatic concerns, such as regional stability and national interests, over strict adherence to humanitarian principles. This underscores the complex interplay between moral imperatives and realpolitik in the decision-making process regarding humanitarian interventions²⁹ .

II- Moral Pragmatism as a foreign policy Doctrine towards International Conflicts.

Nations frequently justify interventions in conflicts by citing humanitarian concerns and a global responsibility to protect human rights. All U.S. administrations have taken the same direction, even if the methods differ, especially in the era of George H.W. Bush to Clinton system, who have often framed interventions as responses to large-scale humanitarian crises and the prevention of genocide. However, scholars like Mason and Wheeler point out the potential for complex motives behind such actions. They argue that humanitarian goals can become intertwined with strategic interests, such as promoting regime change or bolstering democratic processes³⁰. This multifaceted nature of intervention challenges traditional theoretical frameworks like realism, liberalism, and idealism. These approaches often fall short in explaining inconsistencies in US actions, such as interventions in Somalia and Kosovo compared to the lack of intervention in Rwanda. To understand the drivers of humanitarian intervention, we must move beyond simplistic notions of intent and acknowledge the intricate interplay of various factors in foreign policy decision-making. Given this complexity, how can the United States achieve a balance between ethical imperatives and pragmatic considerations when contemplating humanitarian interventions?³¹ .

1- Realism, liberalism, and idealism theories for the nature & the legality of humanitarian interventions in the U S Doctrine.

While realism, liberalism, and idealism offer insights into state motivations, they fail to fully elucidate the multifaceted nature of humanitarian interventions. For instance, realism cannot explain interventions lacking strategic interests, like Somalia, while liberalism struggles to account for interventions not aligned with liberal agendas, such as those in Iraq and Kosovo. Similarly, idealism falls short in explaining instances of nonintervention, such as Rwanda. The reasons behind interventions do not always align with the motives speculated by these theoretical frameworks, indicating a need to examine additional factors beyond stated intentions. Identifying causal mechanisms and understanding the paradoxes of American humanitarian interventions requires a nuanced analysis that considers a range of intervening factors beyond simple theoretical paradigms³² .

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The coevolution model, when applied to U.S. led humanitarian interventions, underscores the significance of evolving global legal and normative frameworks. While the United States strategically engages in such actions, its endeavors have contributed to shaping an operational landscape more conducive to humanitarian endeavors, whether undertaken collectively or unilaterally. However, this does not guarantee immunity from potential repercussions; failures in Afghanistan or Darfur could fuel public resistance to future involvements. Additionally, the absence of a defined American doctrine of humanitarian intervention leaves decisions regarding such operations susceptible to the influence of national interests and political dynamics³³.

The global community recognizes the fundamental human right of ethnic, linguistic, and indigenous minorities to provide culturally nurturing education for their children. Despite the United States signing key international agreements supporting this right, it has yet to fully articulate and implement its interpretation. Educators and policymakers at all levels have a moral obligation and an opportunity to integrate cultural rights into educational planning and development. However, the US's interventionist foreign policies, often inconsistent, raise questions about its motives. Similar concerns arise globally, as interventions in sovereign states' affairs frequently face public dissent and criticism, complicating efforts to gain necessary support and consensus for future interventions³⁴. Over time, many have come to perceive the U.N. Charter as overly restrictive, leading to the establishment of new norms. In 1948, following the Holocaust in Europe, the U.N. adopted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, defining genocide as any act of violence aimed at destroying all or part of a specific national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. This obligated the international community to take necessary measures to prevent such killings and punish the perpetrators. However, a challenge with the convention arises from its vague language³⁵.

In the wake of the Rwandan genocide, the UN General Assembly adopted the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) in 2005. This landmark set of principles emphasizes the primary responsibility of states to protect their own populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. The international community is obligated to offer assistance and support in this endeavor. However, if a state manifestly fails to fulfill this protection duty, the R2P framework allows the international community to take stronger measures, including sanctions, diplomacy, and as a last resort, even military intervention. This creates a potential "humanitarian exception" to the traditional principle of non-intervention, potentially permitting intervention without a UN Security Council mandate. However, the legitimacy and applicability of this exception remain a subject of debate among experts³⁶.

The legal landscape surrounding humanitarian intervention remains murky. International law offers conflicting interpretations, allowing arguments for intervention (like in Libya) based on protecting civilians, while also upholding state sovereignty principles that can be used to oppose it. In the case of Syria, the US should prioritize an evidence-based approach over seeking strict legal justifications for intervention. Unlike Libya, where a clear case could be made for NATO intervention to safeguard civilians from the Gaddafi regime, the Syrian situation presents a more complex picture. The Syrian government's superior weaponry, organization, and air defenses raise serious questions about the efficacy and potential unintended consequences of US or foreign military intervention³⁷.

It was relatively easy for NATO to dismantle the Libyan government's air defenses and provide air support to the rebels. "That might not be feasible in Syria without causing significant damage," "There's a risk of inadvertently causing more harm than good. However,

humanitarian intervention doesn't have to be military," the U.S. is already intervening in at least two or three significant ways: pressuring the Russian government to reduce support for Assad and providing humanitarian aid to the people of Syria³⁸.

Supporters of humanitarian intervention may argue that the assessment presented here overlooks its effectiveness by disregarding the additional U.S. interests served by these military missions. However, even fervent proponents of intervention in places like Kosovo, Sudan, or Libya generally admit that these crises didn't directly threaten U.S. security. Nevertheless, assisting refugees, providing aid through public health initiatives and disaster relief, also advances various secondary U.S. interests such as fostering international relations, promoting economic development, and enhancing regional stability. Thus, a comprehensive evaluation must consider these benefits. Washington should reconsider its focus on military intervention and adopt a humanitarian foreign policy centered on saving lives. This could involve investing in public health programs in developing countries, aiding victims of natural disasters, and supporting refugees fleeing violent conflicts³⁹. But the matter may differ between the viewpoints of Obama, Trump, and Biden.

2- Barack Obama and Donald trump doctrine towards International Conflicts.

The Obama doctrine towards International Conflicts is characterized by moral pragmatism, which entails serving U.S. interests through practical solutions grounded in American values. This approach recognizes the intersection of morality and self-interest in foreign affairs, emphasizing the need to identify and address barriers to achieving national goals. Rooted in the progressive and entrepreneurial spirit of American political culture, moral pragmatism encourages dynamic problem-solving and innovation in response to evolving challenges. It reflects a mindset of problem-solving akin to engineers, where obstacles are identified, solutions proposed, and adjustments made based on real-world outcomes⁴⁰.

However, the Obama doctrine goes beyond mere engineering blueprints in foreign policy; it strikes a careful balance between pragmatic interest-driven policies and cultural values accessible to the public. Unlike rational actor theories that prioritize self-interest, this doctrine situates foreign policy objectives within a broader cultural context that resonates with the American populace. By aligning policy goals with cultural values and public accessibility, the Obama doctrine seeks to bridge the gap between pragmatic necessity and broader societal understanding, fostering a nuanced approach to foreign affairs that acknowledges both practical imperatives and cultural identity⁴¹.

The United States, as a global military and economic power, plays a critical role in shaping international policies to address emerging humanitarian crises. Effective policies must prioritize transparency, consistent implementation, and broad international support through multilateral cooperation grounded in legal and moral frameworks. Comprehensive and sustained interventions are necessary to address the root causes of humanitarian disasters. However, there has been a lack of significant leadership, with some countries disengaging from multilateral institutions, leading to recurring crises like those in Sudan. Meanwhile, President Barack Obama faces pressure to intervene in Syria's civil war, with calls for actions ranging from airstrikes to establishing no-fly zones. These demands come from various sources, including domestic political opponents, Syrian rebels, and key allies, citing Syria's crossing of Obama's "red line" regarding chemical weapons use against civilians⁴².

Some question why President Obama appears hesitant to intervene in Syria, especially considering the U.S.'s involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Is it because the

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American public no longer favors military interventions abroad following experiences in those countries? Could it be due to Syria's lack of significant petroleum reserves? Or is it because the U.S. government is wary of entangling itself in the internal conflicts of another Muslim nation? Another possibility is that without a clear mandate from the United Nations Security Council, Washington sees no diplomatic or legal justification for intervening in Syria⁴³. In March 2011, President Obama defended the intervention in Libya, stating, "There will be times when our security is not directly threatened, but our interests and values are. In such cases, we should not be afraid to act"⁴⁴.

The United States played a key role in rallying international support for intervention in Libya in 2011. It pressured NATO member countries to participate, as America did not want to intervene directly on the ground. Instead, it pushed other countries like France and Britain to intervene, serving American interests in accessing oil reserves and eliminating the Gaddafi regime that opposed it. Whereas, Two weeks before the start of Operation Odyssey Dawn to impose a no-fly zone over Libya later, US President Barack Obama stood up to clearly announce his goal: "Colonel Gaddafi must go"⁴⁵.

President Obama has been described as both progressive and pragmatic, willing to compromise when necessary while striving to maintain consistency in his foreign policy approach. The American approach to foreign policy is deeply intertwined with both moral conviction and pragmatic necessity, reflecting a historical sentiment rooted in the nation's identity and aspirations. From Thomas Paine's vision of a nation empowered to reshape the world to Ronald Reagan's invocation of a divine plan guiding America's role, moral rhetoric has long shaped discussions about the nation's global position. For the Obama doctrine, morality intersects with pragmatism, providing a framework for navigating the complexities of international affairs. This blend is evident in Obama's adherence to global standards, such as the just war doctrine, as articulated in his Nobel Prize address, where he emphasized the ethical imperative guiding America's use of force in pursuit of policy objectives⁴⁶.

The Obama foreign policy doctrine represents a deliberate departure from the perception of America as the world's sole military superpower towards a more nuanced approach grounded in ethical principles and pragmatic considerations. Obama's emphasis on the importance of adhering to global standards reflects a commitment to legitimacy and moral integrity in foreign interventions, as highlighted in his address where he asserted that adherence to rules of conduct is essential for the credibility of future interventions. While morality remains central, it is tempered by pragmatism, as exemplified by Obama's acknowledgment of the limitations of violence and the imperative of seeking peaceful solutions to social problems. This fusion of morality and pragmatism defines the core of the Obama doctrine, shaping the use of force as a means to uphold ethical principles while recognizing the complexities of international relations⁴⁷.

On the other side, in his 2000 book, Donald Trump expressed skepticism about American intervention in regional conflicts, particularly citing the Balkan war, suggesting that such interventions often only temporarily shift the balance of power without addressing underlying issues. He outlined a clear set of rules for engagement, emphasizing that interventions should only occur when there is a direct threat to national interests, defined as a threat so apparent that it is widely recognized and clearly articulated by national leaders. Trump advocated for humanitarian assistance but cautioned against prolonged involvement in conflicts for humanitarian reasons alone, stating that military engagement should be reserved

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for cases where national survival is directly at stake. While Trump's writings and statements provide insight into his approach to national defense and foreign policy, they raise questions about the coherence and consistency of his doctrine, leaving observers to ponder the underlying principles guiding his decision-making:⁴⁸

- 1- The United States must maintain a robust defense system that remains adaptable to the changing nature of threats in the world.
- 2- It is imperative for the United States to be prepared to prevent and, if necessary, preempt threats posed by foreign adversaries, their proxies, and terrorist organizations.
- 3- American military involvement in distant regional conflicts, unless directly threatening domestic security, is counterproductive to national interests and diverts resources from domestic priorities. Engagement in conflicts like Iraq-Syria and Libya, short of direct warfare, undermines national interests and risks entanglement in foreign wars.
- 4- The financial responsibilities associated with longstanding commitments such as NATO and similar regional defense agreements, excluding Zionist entity's defense, are unsustainable for the United States and should be shared more equitably among allied nations⁴⁹.

The Trump administration, foreign policy priorities were evident, but the extent of engagement with the UN remained uncertain. Some critics predicted the downfall of multilateralism under Trump's presidency⁵⁰. It appears evident that Trump lacks a fundamental understanding of humanitarian values. His approach to governance seems solely driven by personal gain and profit. Unlike his predecessors, Trump's decisions lack consistency and appear to be driven by short-term gains rather than long-term strategic objectives. His "America First" stance seems devoid of moral considerations, as evidenced by his prioritization of financial interests over humanitarian concerns. Recent events in the Gulf nations following his visit suggest a disregard for international relations and human welfare, emphasizing his focus on financial gains even if it involves controversial actions or alliances.

3- Joe Biden doctrine towards International Conflicts.

President Joe Biden, inaugurated in January 2021 after serving as Vice President under President Barack Obama from 2009 to 2017, represents a significant shift from the policies of his predecessor, Donald Trump. Trump's tenure strained transatlantic relations to their lowest point since the 1940s, characterized by a para-isolationist approach and selective engagement with global powers. Biden's presidency marks a return to strengthening the transatlantic alliance, viewed as foundational despite Trump's divergence. The early 1990s optimism about a unipolar world dominated by the West following the Cold War gave way to a complex, multipolar reality in the 21st century. Factors such as terrorism, military interventions, the rise of BRICS countries like China and Russia, energy dynamics, and geopolitical shifts in Eastern Europe reshaped global dynamics, highlighting a new era of asymmetric multipolarity with potential for renewed bipolar tensions⁵¹.

Where President Joe Biden assumed office with a goal of restoring America's global standing, which he felt had been damaged under former President Donald Trump. Biden aimed to reverse Trump's "America First" policies by rejoining international agreements like the Paris Climate Accord and the World Health Organization, and by reasserting U.S. leadership globally, particularly in climate diplomacy. However, some aspects of Biden's foreign policy closely resemble Trump's. His "foreign policy for the middle class" aligns with prioritizing U.S. interests, similar to Trump's stance. Biden also continued Trump's planned

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withdrawal from Afghanistan, leading to significant political fallout after the Afghan government's collapse and a chaotic evacuation. Additionally, Biden was slow to change Trump-era immigration policies and only later lifted tariffs on European metals and sanctions on Cuba⁵².

The chaotic U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 shocked many in Europe and the U.S., threatening the transatlantic partnership. However, Russia's war in Ukraine soon restored unity. The withdrawal, part of a long-standing shift towards the Indo-Pacific and reassessment of military roles in the Middle East, conflicted with Biden's pledges to renew American leadership and promote democracy and human rights. Biden emphasized military restraint, preferring diplomacy and sanctions. The U.S.'s global standing, weakened during Trump's presidency, was further strained by the pandemic and domestic unrest, particularly the January 6 Capitol attack. This attack unsettled both Americans and international partners, prompting debates on European strategic autonomy. Biden's withdrawal underscored his foreign policy priorities: limiting military interventions to vital interests and focusing on the Indo-Pacific, though achieving this remains challenging amid global uncertainties⁵³.

The Biden administration has yet to reconcile the tension between U.S. national interest and its global commitments. President Joe Biden's address to the 76th Session of the UN General Assembly provided a moment to reflect on recent pivotal events in U.S. foreign policy. Biden aimed to present a cooperative vision of U.S. engagement on global challenges such as the pandemic and climate change. However, this vision is difficult to align with his remarks on the Afghanistan withdrawal, where he emphasized national interest and ending the era of major military operations to remake other countries. At the UN, Biden emphasized a shift from "relentless war" to "relentless diplomacy," reiterating that U.S. military power should be a last resort. The AUKUS defense partnership with Australia and the UK, announced in September, highlighted national interest by prioritizing security in the Indo-Pacific and strengthening defense capabilities. While AUKUS aligns with U.S. strategic priorities, the Afghanistan withdrawal remains contentious. Biden's justification focused on preventing terrorist attacks, but critics argue that the U.S. has a broader interest in Afghanistan's future. Despite advocating for democracy and human rights at the UN, Biden's actions suggest a challenging balance between national interests and global commitments⁵⁴.

When Joe Biden campaigned for the presidency, he championed military restraint and ending the "forever wars" that followed the September 11 attacks, envisioning a foreign policy where military force was a last resort. However, the Biden administration's actions in Yemen contradict these principles, with the Pentagon preparing for a "sustained military campaign" in response to the Houthis' maritime assaults in the Red Sea, raising questions about policy consistency. Efforts to prevent Zionist entity's invasion of Gaza from escalating have been evident, yet regional volatility persists across Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and the Red Sea. The administration's reluctance to press Zionist entity for a ceasefire contrasts with its stated priority of regional stability, despite having significant leverage. The Houthis' alignment with the "axis of resistance" adds complexity, highlighting the challenges of U.S. engagements with insurgencies. Crafting a nuanced foreign policy that addresses humanitarian issues and avoids further conflict is crucial for safeguarding U.S. interests while promoting global stability and peace. Engaging in conflict with the Houthis is unlikely to achieve these objectives⁵⁵.

The United States' strong support for the Zionist entity has raised concerns about its stance on alleged human rights violations. Critics argue that US backing implies tacit approval of such actions. They point to the recent incident where twelve US Senators threatened International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor Karim Khan with sanctions if he

pursued an arrest warrant against Zionist entity Prime Minister Netanyahu. A statement signed on April 24, 2024, declared: "If you attack Zionist entity, we will attack you." This episode highlights a perception of continuity in US foreign policy, prioritizing strategic interests and maintaining support for the Zionist entity, whatever the cost even when such actions face international scrutiny⁵⁶.

However, the International Criminal Court's Prosecutor promptly submitted requests for the arrest of Zionist entity Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his Defense Minister Yoav Gallant, along with Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza, Mohammed Deif, the General Commander of the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, and Ismail Haniyeh, the head of Hamas' political bureau. These requests were based on allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity committed by both Zionist entity and Palestinian sides⁵⁷. Therefore, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated that he plans to collaborate with U.S. legislators to consider potential sanctions against the International Criminal Court. This announcement followed the Court's Prosecutor, Karim Khan, disclosing his intent to pursue arrest warrants for high-ranking Zionist entity officials. During a congressional hearing, Blinken expressed his determination to oppose what he described as an "extremely misguided decision"⁵⁸.

As for international cooperation concerning international conflicts, Minilateralism as a form of international cooperation that involves a small number of countries coming together to address specific global issues or challenges. is a concept emphasizing smaller, targeted international collaborations over larger, slower multilateral institutions like the UN and WTO, characterizes the Biden administration's approach to global governance. This shift marks a departure from traditional Democratic Party foreign policy strategies seen under Obama, which favored major initiatives through UN or NATO channels. Instead, Biden's team relies on "coalitions of the willing," such as the G-7 for sanctions against Russia and ad hoc groups like the Ramstein group for military aid to Ukraine. In Asia, initiatives like the Quad and AUKUS demonstrate efforts to counterbalance China's influence through regional partnerships with Japan and the Philippines, reflecting a fracturing of the post-Cold War global order⁵⁹.

On the other hand, in assessing whether the United States currently possesses a grand strategy, it's evident that the Biden administration has articulated a broad set of objectives and policy tools, but lacks the tightly coordinated and effective approach necessary for a traditional grand strategy. The administration's approach, coined as "progressive transformation at home and abroad," blends elements of restoring Obama-era foreign policy priorities with adjustments to accommodate Trump-era realities. This includes a focus on domestic socioeconomic issues intertwined with international priorities, recognition of China as a major strategic rival, and a cautious stance on military interventions abroad. However, the strategy faces criticism for its inconsistency and disconnect between declared priorities and effective implementation. Despite efforts to adapt to unforeseen challenges like the Afghanistan withdrawal and Russia's invasion of Ukraine, there remains a fundamental lack of clarity in prioritizing threats and aligning capabilities with commitments, which undermines its overall effectiveness and strategic coherence⁶⁰.

Despite U.S. assistance to Ukraine amidst Russia's aggression, focusing on political cooperation paradigms, acknowledges constraints such as the timeframe ending in March 2023, which limits consideration of subsequent events. The study, conducted by Ukrainian authors using primarily English-language American sources, analyzes the Biden administration's foreign policy towards Ukraine, highlighting bipartisan arguments for substantial American aid to Ukraine. It hypothesizes that U.S. support intensified following Ukraine's effective defense against Russian aggression, positioning Ukraine's victory as a

crucial aspect of Biden's foreign policy doctrine. The research aims to test this hypothesis across governmental, congressional, and NATO dimensions, emphasizing military and financial aid's role in U.S.-Ukraine relations since 2014⁶¹.

Where The United States and Ukraine have had significant and evolving relations since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Initially, U.S. national security figures like Zbigniew Brzezinski emphasized Ukraine's role as a counterweight to Russia for regional and global Security. Following Ukraine's decision to become a non-nuclear state in exchange for political guarantees from the U.S., Britain, and Russia in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, the U.S. has increased its support for Ukraine, providing substantial financial aid and military assistance. This includes training, equipment such as anti-tank missiles and patrol boats, and joint military exercises with NATO allies. Under President Joe Biden, who took office in 2021, the U.S. has intensified efforts to strengthen ties with Ukraine, culminating in high-level visits and pledges of military support amidst ongoing tensions with Russia. The Biden administration has reiterated its commitment to supporting Ukraine's sovereignty and reforms while condemning Russia's aggression and military build-up near Ukraine's borders, threatening further sanctions if Russia crosses into Ukrainian territory⁶².

However the evolving relationship between the United States and Ukraine within the context of modern international relations. draws on historiography and contemporary sources to analyze American assistance to Ukraine, particularly in response to Russia's aggression. Whereas, The Security Council voted on a draft resolution at the behest of the United States of America, which would have condemned in the strongest terms the Russian aggression, against Ukraine, but Russia used its veto while China, India, and the United Arab Emirates abstained from voting, and thus the draft resolution was not adopted⁶³. Focusing on the Biden administration's foreign policy doctrine, the supporting Ukraine aligns with U.S. interests in Europe and beyond, by using historical institutionalism and rational choice institutionalism to examine how and why the Biden administration chose extensive support for Ukraine amidst geopolitical tensions. It must be also provided a comprehensive understanding of U.S. policy decisions and their implications for the ongoing crisis in Ukraine⁶⁴.

Conclusion:

The core principles of U.S. foreign policy towards international conflicts have remained consistent from the era of George Washington to the current president, with some differences in handling specific conflicts during interventions. This continuity spans from George Washington, through James Monroe and Roosevelt, to George Bush and up to Biden. While Obama Doctrine, characterized by moral pragmatism that has shaped US foreign policy in recent years, even amidst debates on counterinsurgency tactics, in understanding the factors influencing American humanitarian interventions. While strategic goals and self-interest are the primary drivers of intervention, numerous other factors, including domestic pressures, global influences, humanitarian concerns, play significant roles. Despite the complexity of these decisions, US foreign policy has continuously evolved to address the varied needs of humanitarian crises in Obama Doctrine towards international conflicts.

However in trump doctrine, the outcomes of American foreign policy were tied to the financial gains that could be achieved from investing in international conflicts. In contrast to Biden's doctrine, which remains unclear regarding international conflicts, except for the Middle East, Biden has taken a strong and firm stance towards Iran, including significant military retaliation against Iran's proxies and agents in the region. The second track includes a diplomatic initiative by the United States to establish a Palestinian state "as soon as possible"

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in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, which would be "demilitarized" and recognized by Washington. However, this cannot happen as long as Palestinians retain their right to self-determination. The third track involves a broad security alliance between the Palestinians, Zionist entity, the United States, and regional countries to ensure the continuity and success of the plan, which is impossible to implement in reality. Because the Zionist entity is occupied and usurped. US also is her godmother.

From this standpoint we can conclude some results:

- The intersectionality of global relations, domestic context, law, policy, ethics, human rights, and human security is a main factor in understanding humanitarian interventions.
- Humanitarian intervention in foreign states may lead to state fragmentation, akin to neocolonialism, by dividing them into spheres of influence.
- Involvement by countries like the USA, UK, France, and Zionist entity often appears more politically motivated than humanitarian, aiming to advance agendas like the American-Zionist entity influence in the Middle East and Africa, and promoting regime change under the guise of democracy.
- Involvement of the Security Council reveals decisions that are often politicized and subject to geopolitical interests.
- The principle of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has been utilized as a diplomatic tool to divide Sudan and undermine Egypt's strategic security for the benefit of Zionist entity's Nile resource interests.
- The foreign policy of the United States remains largely unchanged during the Trump administration, with potential interventions viewed as lucrative deals publicly.
- The policies of successive American presidents may differ slightly, but they share the common trait that humanity is the last consideration compared to serving American and Zionist entity's interests. This leads us to conclude that there is no room to talk about ethics according to these policies.

Based on the results of this research, some proposals have been suggested.

- be ensured that any intervention is made in accordance with international law and United Nations resolutions.
- States' sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs must be respected only to the extent permitted by international law.
- be ensured that the intervention is aimed at protecting civilians and preventing the occurrence of international crimes.
- Humanitarian assistance must be provided in cooperation with international and local organizations.
- Diplomacy and mediation must be strengthened to resolve disputes before resorting to force.
- A comprehensive assessment of the possible effects of military intervention, including

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human, economic and political losses, as well as plans for post-conflict reconstruction and development, must be undertaken to ensure long-term stability.

- The role of private companies in conflicts must be monitored and their involvement in fuelling conflicts prevented for financial gain.
- Accountability mechanisms must be put in place to ensure that human rights violations are not committed during intervention.

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