Alnaciriya: Journal of sociological and Historical Studies
Vol: 17. **Issue** : 01. June 15, 2026
EISSN: 2600-6189/ ISSN: 2170-1822

The French Repressive and Coercive Strategy to Isolate the Rif Region of the Historical Fifth Wilaya from the Course of the Algerian Liberation Revolution (1954–1958): A Historical and Analytical Study

Guerraoui Nadia

University of Saida, Dr. Moulay Tahar
nadia.guerraoui@univ-saida.dz

Received: 27/02/2026 Accepted: 02/04/2026 Published:15/06/2026

Abstract: During the early years of the Algerian War of Independence (1954–1958), the French colonial authorities implemented a systematic military and political strategy aimed at isolating the rural areas of the Historical Wilaya V from the revolutionary movement and the National Liberation Front (FLN). This strategy focused on establishing total control over the population and severing their communication with revolutionary strongholds. Key measures included the designation of "forbidden zones" (zones interdites), the restriction of movement between villages, and the forced displacement of civilians into resettlement camps (centres de regroupement) to ensure rigorous surveillance. Furthermore, France employed coercive methods, including torture and intensive interrogation, to dismantle rebel support networks and undermine the rural population's capacity to sustain the revolution. While the official justification for these measures was the restoration of security, the underlying objective was to detach the peasantry from the revolutionary cause and neutralize their commitment to the struggle for independence. Nevertheless, the FLN demonstrated significant resilience and adaptability, organizing sophisticated clandestine networks to maintain the resistance.

Keywords: Forbidden Zones; Algerian Countryside; Wilaya V; Detention; Resettlement Camps.

Introduction:

The Algerian Revolution (1954–1962) constituted a pivotal juncture in the history of national liberation movements in the twentieth century. During this period, the national movement

confronted a deeply entrenched colonial apparatus that relied on a multi-dimensional arsenal: military, security, administrative, and psychological. In this context, the Historical Wilaya V (Western Algeria) emerged as a strategic domain of paramount importance, owing to its geographical location, strategic nature, and social and tribal extensions. These factors rendered it a vital space for the activities of the National Liberation Army (ALN).

In response to the escalation of armed struggle since the revolution's inception, the French colonial administration sought to implement systematic mechanisms to isolate the rural populations from the revolution. This was executed through policies of "Forbidden Zones" (*Zones interdites*), the establishment of internment camps (*Regroupements*), and the intensification of detention and torture, all within a comprehensive framework of counter-revolutionary warfare.

This study is situated within the field of contemporary Algerian history, aiming to analyze the strategic mechanisms employed by the French colonial authorities to isolate the Algerian countryside from the Liberation Revolution within the Fifth Wilaya. It seeks to uncover the military, political, social, and humanitarian dimensions of these strategies, while assessing their short- and medium-term impacts on the region's socio-economic fabric. Furthermore, the research endeavors to deconstruct the colonial discourse that framed these measures as 'security necessities,' re-evaluating them through the conceptual lenses of total war, psychological warfare, and colonial policing policies.

The significance of this subject arises from several considerations. First, it highlights the particularity of the revolutionary struggle in Western Algeria within the broader framework of the War of Independence. Second, it sheds light on the structural colonial policies that targeted the rural society—the primary social base of the Revolution. Third, it contributes to the documentation and scientific analysis of local collective memory.

Accordingly, the central problematic of this study revolves around the following question:

To what extent did the isolation mechanisms implemented by the French colonial authorities in the Fifth Historical Wilaya constitute a comprehensive strategy aimed at

dismantling the nexus between the rural hinterlands and the Liberation Revolution? Furthermore, how effective were these measures in achieving their intended military and political objectives?"

From this central problematic, the following research questions emerge:

1. What was the military and political context that necessitated the implementation of the "Forbidden Zones" policy (*Zones interdites*) in Western Algeria?
2. How were the regroupment camps (*les camps de regroupement*) organized and administered? Furthermore, what were their socio-economic repercussions on the rural population?
3. What role did torture and detention centers play within the framework of counter-insurgency warfare? And how did these mechanisms influence the trajectory of revolutionary activities?
4. Did these colonial apparatuses succeed in attritioning the revolution, or did they inadvertently bolster its cohesion and broaden the scope of popular support for the national cause?

The methodology adopted in this study is based on the historical-analytical approach, drawing upon the systematic collection of archival materials—including French administrative and military documents, as well as reports from the National Liberation Army (ALN). These materials are analyzed through a critical-comparative perspective. Furthermore, the study employs a descriptive-analytical method to deconstruct the concepts associated with counter-revolutionary warfare.

In doing so, this research seeks to provide a rigorous scholarly interpretation of colonial isolation policies within Wilaya V. This region serves as a significant case study, reflecting the nature of French strategy in confronting the Liberation Revolution, the dynamic interplay between colonial violence and popular resistance in the Algerian countryside, and the subsequent strategic responses of the National Liberation Front (FLN).

I. The Establishment of Concentration Camps and Prohibited Zones

I.1- Prohibited Zones (Zones Interdites)

The creation of Prohibited Zones (*Zones Interdites*) was one of the repressive and coercive measures central to the French strategy aimed at suppressing the Liberation Revolution. This was achieved by exerting total control over the rural population in western Algeria. These zones were established in strategic locations where the units of the National Liberation Army (ALN) were concentrated. The objective of this French strategy was to monitor and restrict the movements of the ALN units and to sever any potential communication or support channels with the rural populace.

The 'forbidden zones' (*zones interdites*) constituted strategic locations for the deployment of National Liberation Army (ALN) units. Consequently, the French administration sought to depopulate these areas by forcibly displacing the inhabitants to regroupment centers (*centres de regroupement*) (Al-Tahrir, pp. 32-33), these regions were placed under the strict surveillance of the French military forces and remained subject to continuous aerial bombardment, aimed at neutralizing any detected movement within them (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 6).

The colonial administration designated these as 'Security Zones' (*zones de sécurité*), which emerged at the onset of the Liberation Revolution. These zones encompassed various mountainous terrains, forests, and vast open spaces, extending as far as the Moroccan border. The 'Forbidden Zone' (*zone interdite*) stretched approximately 400 km from north to south, with a width ranging between 30 and 50 km (Teguia, p. 362).

Nevertheless, these regions remained strongholds for the *Mujahideen*, providing them with unrestricted mobility. The rural inhabitant, characterized by an inherent resilience and steadfastness, would systematically reconstruct what colonialism had demolished, fashioning shelters from the charred branches of trees and the rugged stone (Teguia, p. 301), he worked on ventilating them to ensure they were suitable for the stationing of National Liberation Army (ALN) units. In his strategic perspective, these were regarded

as liberated zones (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 06), as French forces were unable to penetrate them with their ground troops.

Consequently, the National Liberation Army (ALN) secured new depopulated zones, which afforded it greater operational mobility. This strategic advantage stemmed from two factors: first, the alleviation of concerns regarding civilian safety; and second, the systematic denial of human intelligence to French forces concerning ALN tactical movements (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 07).

The colonial authorities established these zones through two distinct methods:

- The first followed large-scale 'mopping-up' operations (*opérations de ratissage*) conducted by French forces in areas where the National Liberation Army (ALN) was active. In these instances, no prior notice or grace period was granted to the local population to evacuate.
- The second was implemented following a preparatory phase, triggered when French forces suspected that certain hubs were providing support or assembly points for the National Liberation Army. In such cases, the inhabitants were given a formal deadline to depart, after which the territory was officially declared a 'Forbidden Zone' (*Zone Interdite*).

I.2- Regroupment Camps (Les Camps de Regroupement)

The establishment of "forbidden zones" (*zones interdites*) resulted in the forced displacement of the rural population, who were relocated in massive numbers toward three primary destinations:

1- Regroupment Centers: (Specific sites designated for civilian internment and surveillance).
2- Major Urban Centers: Primarily Tlemcen, Oran, and Mostaganem.
3- The Moroccan Border: Where the number of displaced persons reached 100,000. (Teguia, p. 363)

Despite these French repressive measures involving the establishment of 'forbidden zones' (zones interdites) and resettlement centers, many rural inhabitants chose to join the ranks of the National Liberation Army (ALN) in the mountains.

The regroupement centers (*centres de regroupement*) constituted a specific category of settlements, characterized

primarily by the density of their inhabitants and the coercive nature of their displacement. The process of regrouping was initiated through forced 'deportations' (*trahi*), which were notably implemented in the Batna region as early as November 1954 (Teguia, p. 363), it was signed by General Gilles, who employed both physical force and coercive rhetoric to effect the deportation of the population (Boumali, 2003, p. 41), this was followed by a subsequent stage in which political decision-making played a pivotal role in endorsing the regroupement policy. This was institutionalized through the State of Emergency Law, specifically Article 7, which granted the Minister of the Interior and the Governor-General the authority to deport any individual whose activities were deemed a threat to public security and order to any designated location (Belgith, 1422/2001, p. 187), this mass deportation was accompanied by violence deployed as a regulatory mechanism to suppress the popular effervescence unleashed since November 1, 1954.

France introduced the system of regroupment (*système de regroupement*) under ostensibly proclaimed objectives: namely, for 'humanitarian reasons to liberate the population from the terrorism of the insurgents and to improve their social conditions (Boumali, 2003, p. 40),' as well as to 'separate the corrupted seeds from the healthy ones (Algerian Resistance, p. 18, July 1956, p. 12).' From a surface-level observation, one might infer that France’s intentions were noble, particularly as it presented the project under the nomenclature of 'regroupment centers' or 'new villages.'

Algerian civilians since the first day of the revolution (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 08): "What the French authorities have said is reasonable for the general or French public opinion, but what about the name given by the Algerian media affiliated with the JT, which called the gathering centers "camps and slow death centers" (Boumali, 2003, p. 35), these centers are mostly located on the outskirts of the cities next to the French military centers to facilitate their monitoring by the French forces, enclosed by electrified barbed wire, while others were established haphazardly without prior planning. In the latter case, rural inhabitants were restricted to a designated perimeter in close proximity to a military outpost, where they were forced to construct their own shelters—huts made

of mud or corrugated iron—to shield themselves from the summer heat and the winter cold (Yahyaoui, 2005/2006, p. 220).

The regroupment process was accompanied by a series of military measures strictly enforced by French officers. Their implementation reflected the varying temperaments of these officers—ranging from composed to volatile—which, in turn, dictated the nature of the population transfers. These transfers were categorized into two types: voluntary and forced, both of which were ostensibly justified, as previously noted, by security and humanitarian reasons.

The optional limit is set by an estimated period of time: 24 hours in which the residents are allowed to move to the new center built around the military centers and pre-determined" (Boumali, 2003, pp. 42-43), but after the expiration of the specified time, "the military apparatus of tanks, cannons and planes that strike the siege work to bombard the place that has been evacuated from the residents" (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 08), so that these deportees "surround these deportees with barbed wire that extends to a height of 10 meters" (Boumali, 2003, p. 42), and the residents threaten to demolish the village after the end of the specified time (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 08), what we observe about the scenario of the mobilization The optional is that it is a combination of fear and humiliation and a title for the rule of the strong over the weak, but it is less psychological and physically burdensome than the forced mobilization entitled "force, violence and the forced loading of civilians in trucks, which is accompanied by the demolition of villages" (Al-Mujahid, April 18, 1958, p. 08) with the aim of "cutting off villages and their lands from the civilian population" (Raphaëlle, 2001, p. 282).

Regarding the conduct of French conscripts, Jauffret Jean-Charles, in his work, cites an instance involving the burning and subsequent demolition of a village. He describes how the fragments of roof tiles from the dwellings were blasted into the air, and how the tears of women and children bore witness to a chilling scene. Furthermore, the conscripts persisted in the destruction of farms and the pillaging of resources (Autrement, 2000, p. 265). The aforementioned displacement of the population, and its subsequent consequences, led to their relocation into 'regroupment centers'

(*centres de regroupement*), which were categorized into two types: temporary centers and permanent ones.

Pierre Bourdieu goes as far as to assert: "This policy of resettlement is the most repressive policy in the history of population displacement" (Bourdieu & A., p. 363). In Tlemcen alone, a quarter of the population was forcibly relocated to regroupment camps (*centres de regroupement*). Furthermore, 100,000 rural inhabitants sought refuge across the Moroccan border, fleeing the colonial authorities' brutality and the dire living conditions within the camps. Mortality rates surged significantly, with deaths being recorded on a daily basis. (Teguia, p. 367)

Despite their French origin, these reports provide a profound insight into the deplorable conditions within the regroupment camps. These sites functioned more as detention centers where French forces exerted various forms of psychological, repressive, and punitive pressure against the Algerian rural population. These measures were designed to achieve the following strategic objectives:

- Isolating rural and village populations, placing them under stringent surveillance in close proximity to military outposts.
- Intimidating the rural populace by instilling fear and panic to ensure their total subordination to the colonial administration.
- Dismantling social cohesion through the systematic fragmentation of tribal and ancestral structures (Tribes and 'Arshs).

The establishment of these internment camps (regroupement centers) exerted a profound impact on the socio-economic status of the rural population, precipitating widespread poverty, famine, and the outbreak of lethal epidemics. In response, the National Liberation Front (FLN) and its military wing, the National Liberation Army (ALN), countered this repressive and coercive strategy through sophisticated tactical maneuvers, successfully instituting clandestine cells within the camps. Consequently, it is evident that the proliferation of these camps intensified the prevailing security crisis following the outbreak of the Revolution in November 1954, which systematically targeted sensitive French military installations.

The popular base played a pivotal role in the success of the initial operations conducted by the National Liberation Front (FLN). This grassroots support facilitated the mobility of recruited personnel across the national territory during the coordinated attacks. Consequently, the French authorities were compelled to establish military outposts to monitor and regulate the movements of Algerian civilians through systematic search patrols. However, such measures proved insufficient against a population in open rebellion against the French administration. In response, the colonial authorities resorted to the forced displacement of inhabitants from insurgent regions in an attempt to apprehend national activists who were mobilizing the masses against French rule. This strategy can be defined as a 'policy of encirclement' aimed at the Algerian society, designed to isolate the rural hinterland from the FLN leadership and its operational units.

The regroupment camps (*centres de regroupement*) were the areas seized by the FLN. However, the Revolution's relative success in instilling turmoil and panic among French political and military circles was primarily attributed to the nature of the leadership and the prerogatives it enjoyed within the region. This was particularly evident in the tribal solidarity (*Asabiyyah*) inherent to the revolutionary leaders, coupled with the unique geomorphological characteristics of the Western Region.

The scope of the regrouping policy (*le regroupement*) was extended to the southern regions of the western sector. In 1957, General Salan stated that the objective of organizing this strategy was to isolate the National Liberation Army (ALN) and to monitor the peasantry, who served as a support base and a source of 'disorder'—as characterized by the French media (Ageron Cherles, 1993 , p. 158).

To achieve this, the French administration worked to provide the control castles in the camps, which equipped them with floodlights and loudspeakers that pour a barrage of threats and propaganda to brainwash them, as well as the nationalist teams that ensure the comfort of the French soldiers in exchange for tightening the noose on the camps, especially in the psychological warfare that violates morals and human values.

I.3- The Policy of Torture and Detention

The practice of torture by French colonialism was not a byproduct of the Liberation Revolution; rather, it was a long-standing practice and a quasi-automatic behavior in Algeria since the inception of the occupation. This was manifested through French policy in Algeria, characterized by various methods of oppression, violence, genocide, and the "scorched earth" policy perpetrated by French colonialism against the Algerian people—particularly those in rural areas, who constituted the majority of the Algerian population (The National Liberation Front, the National Organization of the Mujahideen, Jihad al-Tahrir: Facts that Defy Forgetting, The Third National Forum for Writing History, November 1985, p. 06).

The rural population in Western Algeria—historically designated as Wilaya V—endured the brunt of these policies aimed at stifling any national endeavor to dismantle colonial injustice (Gharbi, 2005, p. 222). Such practices became an indispensable necessity and a core strategy for the French administration to maintain its grip on Algeria. This occurred amidst a burgeoning national consciousness fueled by the rise of decolonization movements across the Third World, and in the wake of the heinous massacres perpetrated by French colonialism against the Algerian people following the Uprising of May 8, 1945 (Gharbi, 2005, p. 222).

French colonialism established torture centers where diverse forms of physical and psychological abuse were systematically practiced. The French administration sought to empower these institutions by providing a legal framework designed to grant them immunity from judicial oversight, thereby ensuring their operations remained unhindered. The direct complicity of the French government is evidenced by Document No. 11, issued on July 1, 1955. Signed by the Minister of the Interior, Bourges-Maunoury, and the Minister of Defense, General Koenig, and addressed to all French military units stationed in Algeria, the document explicitly asserted that the conflict with the National Liberation Front (FLN) was primarily a security-driven war rather than a conventional military one (Gharbi, 2005, p. 223).

With the outbreak of the War of Liberation, the recourse to torture escalated as a systematic means to humiliate the rural populations who had embraced the revolution from its inception, sacrificing their lives and most precious possessions for the cause of victory. The French colonial administration proliferated these detention centers in direct proportion to the revolution's intensifying momentum. Following any successful offensive by the National Liberation Front (FLN), the French army would summarily arrest the local inhabitants of the affected area without exception, subjecting them to an exhaustive array of torturous methods and instruments (Testimony of the late Mujahid Karoui Abdelkader, personal interview, July 10, 2010).

Torture centers and mass graves were established within natural grottos and caves—such as the Békancane grotto in the Fourth Region and the grotto at the Beni Bahdel dam in the Tlemcen region (Kantari, 2007, p. 344). Resistance fighters (*Mujahideen*), both men and women, were transferred to these sites to be subjected to various experimental methods of torture. The objective of these practices was twofold: to extract intelligence that would enable the dismantlement of the National Liberation Front's (FLN) infrastructure and to strategically isolate the rural areas of the Western Region from the Revolution.

These facilities, encompassing both detention centers and prisons, were strategically positioned adjacent to the regroupment camps (*centres de regroupement*) and were systematically utilized for various methods of interrogation. These centers bore witness to the most heinous atrocities committed against the Algerian people, and specifically against those in the rural hinterlands.

The administration of Governor-General Jacques Soustelle ordered the accelerated establishment of internment camps following the outbreak of the Liberation Revolution, aiming to contain the insurgency and isolate the populace from the revolutionary movement. Initially, these measures resembled house arrest; however, the situation rapidly shifted as the French administration realized the true magnitude of the events—a full-scale revolution—particularly in the aftermath of the North Constantine Offensive on August 20, 1955. As the revolution intensified and secured strategic victories, the French authorities tightened their grip on the detention centers, employing the most

heinous methods of torture within screening and transit centers (*centres de tri et de transit*). Furthermore, the prison administration devised increasingly brutal and oppressive means of repression (Guerraoui, 2010, pp. 131-132).

Following the completion of interrogations via various methods within the screening centers (centres de tri), detainees were seldom released, regardless of the intelligence gathered. Instead, they were transferred to internment camps to undergo further cycles of torture. This systematic violence aimed at the forced 'pacification' and co-option of the rural population, seeking to instrumentalize them as a counter-revolutionary force to dismantle the National Liberation Revolution.

Prior to their arrival at the internment camps, detainees were funneled through transit centers, which were tasked with distributing them across various detention facilities throughout the national territory.

Within these centers, detainees were subjected to various forms of torture and extrajudicial practices. Torture served as a primary instrument of warfare, aimed at extracting intelligence and suppressing the revolution at large. Furthermore, those categorized as 'missing' or 'disappeared' within these facilities were, in reality, victims who had succumbed to torture or were extrajudicially liquidated. From these transit centers, detainees were subsequently transferred to internment camps—the final destination of their ordeal (El Moudjahid, 25 Avril 1960, p. 57).

Interment camps were established for several objectives, most notably to sustain repressive measures aimed at extracting intelligence regarding the *Moudjahidine* in the western region. Furthermore, they served as psychological battlegrounds where authorities attempted to co-opt detainees to abort the Revolution and dismantle the organizational networks established by the National Liberation Front (FLN) within the camps. The detainees played a pivotal role in organizing the liberation movement and raising political consciousness among their peers, particularly those possessing a clear strategic vision of the Revolution. This was crucial given that French military forces frequently raided rural areas following engagements, conducting arbitrary and mass arrests whenever suspicions arose regarding a *Douar's* support for the

liberation struggle. While these detention centers shared a unified functional purpose, they varied in terms of both form and legal status. Regarding their form (Guerraoui, 2010, pp. 131-132):

Certain detention centers were meticulously constructed to serve as 'model camps,' designed to represent the broader penal system during inspections conducted by international anti-repression associations and human rights organizations. Conversely, other detention facilities were established as ad hoc sites by military commanders, functioning entirely outside of any official administrative documentation.

Among these internment centers was the Stleu camp in Oran, considered a 'model' detention facility. The site was enclosed by four perimeter walls, each standing six and a half meters high, with ten-meter observation towers positioned at every corner, equipped with powerful searchlights. Internally, the compound was secured by electrified barbed-wire fencing, followed by a 'white line'—a lethal boundary marking the limit beyond which guards were authorized to open fire without prior warning. At night, trained attack dogs were deployed to patrol the camp's courtyard.

At the end of August 1956, six hundred Algerians were rounded up. This detention center was subsequently uncovered following the exposure of acts of torture perpetrated by the police (Guerraoui, 2010, pp. 131-132).

Many detention centers were not officially sanctioned at their inception; rather, they were established through the unilateral initiatives of military commanders in response to the escalation of the Liberation Revolution. The detainees in these centers included individuals already sentenced to prison terms, those who had served their sentences, and those apprehended during mass raids on entire villages. Furthermore, there were 'preventive arrests'—particularly during the early stages of the Revolution—targeting veteran activists from national political parties and patriotic trade unionists. Detainees were not subjected to uniform treatment regarding torture, forced labor, or living conditions. Instead, they were categorized into three distinct groups based on their perceived willingness to collaborate with the French administration.

- **Category I:** The hesitant (or *undecided*), referring to those who did not participate in any revolutionary activity.

- **Category II:** The hardliners (or *stalwarts*), who openly declare their allegiance to the National Liberation Front (FLN).
- **Category III:** Political detainees whom the police attempt to induce into collaborating with France, in exchange for expunging their revolutionary records and attempting to integrate them into French military units composed of Harkis (pro-French Algerian auxiliaries).

The prisoners, in their various capacities, played a proactive role in serving the Liberation Revolution from within confinement, enduring all forms of oppression and torture. This steadfastness stemmed from their resilience and unwavering belief in the right to liberty and the reclamation of usurped land. Consequently, the prisoners sustained their revolutionary struggle; driven by their commitment to the national cause, they extended revolutionary structures into the prisons. The organizational hierarchy was meticulously structured: each cell (khaliyya) comprised ten militants and a leader; each branch (far') consisted of three cells; each squad (firqa) included several platoons; and each section (qism) encompassed one hundred *mujahideen*. These figures varied according to circumstances, locations, and the profile of the detainees—whether civilian or military. Furthermore, revolutionary committees were established to oversee prisoner affairs, including:

1-**The Organizing Committee (La Commission d'Organisation):** Responsible for the reception of detainees and their systematic integration into secret cells, squads, and sections.

2-**The Social Committee:** Charged with the distribution of food and clothing rations; it was funded and sustained by the Revolution's administrative organs.

3-**The Political Committee:** Tasked with the political indoctrination and consciousness-raising of prisoners, keeping them informed of the Revolution's political and military developments—both domestically and internationally. Furthermore, it aimed to counter the psychological warfare and propaganda disseminated by the SAS (Sections Administratives Spécialisées), which sought to erode the morale and psychological resilience of the detainees.

4-**The Disciplinary Committee (Commission de Discipline):** Tasked with adjudicating personal disputes among prisoners and handling cases involving collaboration with the French adversary.

5-**The Medical Committee:** Responsible for maintaining sanitary conditions within the prison, ensuring general hygiene, and facilitating the procurement and provision of essential medicines.

6-**The Coordination Committee:** Functioned as the primary liaison, managing interactions and coordination between the prisoner body and the prison administration. (The National Liberation Front, the National Organization of the Mujahideen, Jihad al-Tahrir: Facts that Defy Forgetting, The Third National Forum for Writing History, November 1985)

These committees and cells played a pivotal role in raising the consciousness of the prisoners and providing them with welfare. Furthermore, they facilitated the resolution of their social, administrative, and political grievances, while consistently emphasizing continuous mobilization and awareness-raising to bolster morale. These organizational structures enabled the orchestration of hunger strikes within the prisons in solidarity with the Revolution and in demand of freedom; they also facilitated prisoner escapes and spearheaded educational and cultural programs for the detainees (The National Liberation Front Party, January 15, 1985, p. 25).

Hence, it becomes evident that despite the measures implemented by the French administration within the detention camps—which had morphed into 'schools of torture'—the resolve of the rural prisoner was only further solidified. His strength and conviction in the revolutionary struggle to reclaim the usurped land remained unshaken. This steadfastness was bolstered by his inherent revolutionary nature, the influence of the harsh environment on his endurance of suffering, and the strategic role of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in raising political consciousness and mobilizing the rural population to the side of the Revolution.

Conclusion:

This study concluded that the French strategy in the fifth historical term (western Algeria) was based on a comprehensive conception of the counter-revolutionary war, which aimed to dismantle the interdependent relationship between the Rif and the liberation revolution, as the basic popular base for the continuation of the revolutionary action. This strategy was embodied in a number of repressive mechanisms and organizational measures, most

notably the "no-go zones" policy, the establishment of camps, and the expansion of the scope of detention and torture of various kinds, as part of the colonial administration's efforts to dry up the sources of human and logistical support for the National Liberation Front and the Liberation Revolution.

However, their findings show that these policies, despite their intensity and breadth, have not succeeded in achieving their strategic objective of isolating the countryside from the revolution. Historical data have revealed that the logic of comprehensive repression has deepened the gap between rural society and the colonial administration, and has strengthened rather than weakened the level of sympathy and engagement in revolutionary action. The experience of camps and no-go zones has also led to a reshaping of the collective consciousness of the population, as daily suffering has become an element of popular mobilization in favor of the revolution.

On the other hand, the study highlighted the effectiveness of the counter-strategies adopted by the FLN in the fifth term, whether through the reorganization of communication and supply networks, the adoption of flexible mobility tactics adapted to field transformations, or the intensification of political and awareness work within rural areas through its political and military organization in the countryside. This dynamic interaction between colonial repression and revolutionary initiative has made it possible to maintain the cohesion of the home front, and to thwart the isolation and dismantling schemes that the colonial authorities had bet on.

The French strategies implemented against the rural population in the western region—the Historic Wilaya V—which aimed to contain and isolate them from their front and revolution, only served to bolster their resilience and commitment to their cause. By 1958, following the establishment of the Provisional Government of the Algerian Republic (GPRA), the Revolution garnered significant international support.

Bibliography

- Ageron Cherles, R. (1993). *L'Algérie des français.* (Seuil, Ed.) Paris .
- *Algerian Resistance, p. 18.* (July 1956).
- Al-Mujahid. (April 18, 1958). (42).

- Al-Tahrir, J. (n.d.). *The State Report for Writing the History of the Fifth Mandate: Facts that Defy Forgetting.*
- Autrement (Ed.). (2000). *Soldiers in Algeria (1954-1962).* Paris.
- Belgith, M.-A. (1422/2001). *The Attitude of French Intellectuals on Torture, Prisons and Camps during the Algerian Revolution, Sources, ,* (Vol. 05). Algiers: National Center for Studies and Research in the National Movement and the Revolution of November 1954.
- Boumali, A. (2003). *Centers of Slow Death: A Stain on the Forehead of Colonial France, Sources, p. 08, Rabi' al-Awwal 1424/May 2003, National Center for Studies and Research in the National Movement and the Revolution of November 1954.* Algiers.
- Bourdieu, P., & A., S. (n.d.). *Uprooting. The crisis of traditional agriculture in Algeria.*
- El Moudjahid. (25 Avril 1960). (63, Ed.)
- Gharbi, G. (2005). *French Strategies in the Face of the Liberation Revolution 1954/1958, Ph.D. Thesis.* Oran: Department of History, University of Oran.
- Guerraoui, N. (2010). *The Role of the Countryside in the Algerian West in the Course of the Liberation Revolution, 1954/1958, Master's Thesis.* Oran: University of Oran, 1 Ahmed Ben Bella.
- Kantari, M. (2007). *Algerian Women's Features in the Liberation Revolution and the Crimes of French Colonialism.* Oran: Dar Al-Gharb for Publishing and Distribution.
- Raphaëlle, B. (2001). *Torture and the Army during the Algerian War.* (Gallimard, Ed.) Paris.
- Teguia, M. (n.d.). *Algeria at War.* Office of University Publications-Algiers.
- *Testimony of the late Mujahid Karoui Abdelkader, personal interview.* (July 10, 2010).
- The National Liberation Front Party. (January 15, 1985). *The National Organization of the Mujahideen, Report of the Third Regional Forum for the Writing of History for the Western States (Fifth Term) Phase 56-58, held in the Wilayat of Saida, Tlemcen Govern.* Tlemcen.
- *The National Liberation Front, the National Organization of the Mujahideen, Jihad al-Tahrir: Facts that Defy Forgetting, The Third National Forum for Writing History.* (November 1985). Sidi Bel Abbes.
- Yahyaoui, D. (2005/2006). *The Development of the National Liberation Army, Ph.D. Thesis, University of Oran, Department of History, .* Oran.